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Laurel J. Brinton

The Comment Clause in English

Syntactic Origins and Pragmatic Development

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The Comment Clause in English

Although English comment clauses such as *I think* and *you know* have been widely studied, this book constitutes the first full-length diachronic treatment, focusing on comment clauses formed with common verbs of perception and cognition in a variety of syntactic forms. It understands comment clauses as causal pragmatic markers that undergo grammaticalization, and acquire pragmatic and politeness functions and subjective and intersubjective meanings. To date, the prevailing view of their syntactic development, which is extrapolated from synchronic studies, is that they originate in matrix clauses which become syntactically indeterminate and are reanalyzed as parenthetical. In this corpus-based study, Laurel J. Brinton shows that the historical data do not bear out this view, and proposes a more varied and complex conception of the development of comment clauses. Researchers and students of English language and historical linguistics will certainly consider Brinton's findings to be of great interest.

LAUREL J. BRINTON is Professor of English Language at the University of British Columbia. She is also the co-author of *Lexicalization and Language Change* (2005).

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Abbreviations

ACE	The Australian Corpus of English
A	adjective
AP	adjective phrase
Adv	adverb
AdvP	adverb phrase
ASPR	Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records (see Krapp and Dobbie 1931–1952)
Benson	*The Riverside Chaucer* (see Benson [3]1987)
BNC	British National Corpus
CNS	Canadian Newsstand
DARE	*Dictionary of American Regional English*
DOEC	Dictionary of Old English Corpus in Electronic Form
ED	English Drama (Chadwyck-Healey)
EEBO	Early English Books Online (Chadwyck-Healey)
EEPF	Early English Prose Fiction (Chadwyck-Healey)
EModE	Early Modern English (c1500–1700)
Evans	*The Riverside Shakespeare* (see Evans [2]1997)
FLOB	The Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English
Fr.	French
FROWN	The Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English
HC	The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, Diachronic Part
Lat.	Latin
LC	The Lampeter Corpus of Early Modern English Tracts
LModE	Late Modern English (c1700–1900)
ME	Middle English (c1150–1500)
MED	*Middle English Dictionary*
ModFr.	Modern French
N	noun
NP	noun phrase
OE	Old English (c650–1150)
OFr.	Old French
OED	*Oxford English dictionary* (3rd edn online)

P	preposition
PDE	Present-day English
PP	prepositional phrase
Strathy	Strathy Corpus of Canadian English
UofV	University of Virginia Electronic Text Center – Modern English Collection
UTEL	University of Toronto English Collection
V	verb
VP	verb phrase
WC	The Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English
Webster's	*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage*
18cF	Eighteenth-Century Fiction (Chadwyck-Healey)

1 Introduction: comment clause, parentheticals, and pragmatic markers

1.1 Introduction

The reader of an Early or Late Modern English text, upon encountering the expressions highlighted in (1), might well be reminded of the discourse markers – *pragmatic markers*[1] – of Present-day English:

(1) a. A practise which **I trust** shal shortely come to light (1539 Cromwell in Merriman, *Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell* (1902) II. 199 [*OED*]).
b. A cat maie looke on a king,[2] **ye know** (a1562 Heywood, *Woorkes. A Dialogue Conteynyng Prouerbes and Epigrammes* (1867) 57 [*OED*]).
c. They follow the dead corpse to the graue with howling and barbarous outcries, pitifull in apparance: whereof grew, **as I suppose**, the prouerbe: To weepe Irish [orig. Hibernice lacrimari] (1586 Stanyhurst, *A Treatise Contayning a Playne and Perfect Description of Irelande* viii. 44/2 in Holinshed [*OED*]).
d. But some then will demaund, where had Pope Alexander . . . that map or net at Rome wherin (**it is said**) the napkin of our Sauiour Christ is preserued (1608 Topsell, *The Historie of Serpents* 220 [*OED*]).

A pragmatic marker is defined as a phonologically short item that is not syntactically connected to the rest of the clause (i.e., is parenthetical), and has little or no referential meaning but serves pragmatic or procedural purposes. Prototypical pragmatic markers in Present-day English include one-word inserts such as *right, well*, *okay*, or *now* as well as phrases such as *and things like that* or *sort of*. Such pragmatic markers have been extensively studied in contemporary English (see the pioneering work of Schiffrin 1987), and increasingly in the history of English. Other parenthetical items of a clausal nature, such as *I mean*, *I see*, or *you*

[1] For reasons set out in Brinton (1996:40), I prefer the designation "pragmatic marker." On the various names that have been proposed, see Brinton (1996:29) and Schourup (1999:228–230).

[2] "A cat may look on a king" is a figure of speech that may be glossed 'there are certain things which an inferior may do in the presence of a superior.'

know, are also typically identified as pragmatic markers, but the history of these forms has received considerably less attention. Following Quirk *et al.* (1972:778) in *A Grammar of Contemporary English*, I will refer to these clausal pragmatic markers as "comment clauses." Unlike non-clausal pragmatic markers, comment clauses – as will be shown in the following study – arise primarily in the EModE and LModE periods.

Clausal pragmatic markers include a wide variety of formal structures. A preliminary classification is the following:

(a) first-person pronoun + present-tense verb/adjective: *I think, I suppose, I guess, I reckon, I fear, I hope, I hear, I feel, I understand, I admit, I see, I'm sure, I'm convinced, I'm afraid*;
(b) second-person pronoun + present-tense verb/adjective: *you know, you see*;
(c) third-person pronoun + present-tense verb/adjective: *it seems, they say, they allege, one hears*;
(d) conjunction + first-/second-/third-person pronoun + present-tense verb/adjective: *as I'm told*, *as I understand (it), as you know, so it seems, as everybody knows*;
(e) imperative verb: *look, say*, *listen, say, mind you, mark you*; and
(f) nominal relative clause: *what's more, what's more* {*surprising, annoying, strange,* etc.}, *what annoys me*.

Modalized forms (*I dare say, I must say, I can see, you must admit, you may know*), passive forms (*it is said, it is claimed, it is rumored, as was pointed out*), perfect forms (*I have read, I have heard*), and negative forms (*I don't know, I don't doubt*) also exist, as do some interrogative tag forms (*wouldn't you say?, don't you think?*). The majority of comment clauses attested in contemporary English belong to category (a), namely, first-person forms. Note that in most cases the clause to which the parenthetical attaches could serve as the missing complement to the verb or adjective (that is, *John has been promoted, I'm told* ~ *I'm told that John has been promoted*).

This chapter will begin by situating comment clauses (§1.4) among the larger categories of sentence adverbial (§1.2) and disjunct (§1.3). It will then seek to elucidate the nature of a "parenthetical" (§1.5). Section (§1.6) argues that the parenthetical comment clauses are best understood as pragmatic markers. The chapter ends with details concerning the structure of the study that follows and a description of its methodology (§1.7).

1.2 Sentence adverbial

The broadest category to which comment clauses could be said to belong is that of "sentence adverbial." These are forms which function either as sentence modifiers, or "disjuncts" (e.g., *frankly*), or as connectors, or "conjuncts"

(e.g., *moreover*).[3] Sentential adverbials have three distinctive characteristics (see Swan 1988:29; Bussmann 1996:s.v. *sentential adverb*). They are speaker-oriented, expressing, as Bussmann notes, "the subjective attitude of the speaker towards some state of affairs." They have sentential scope, and they have clausal properties or can be understood as reduced sentences; that is, *frankly* can be understood as expressing the clause 'I am being frank when I say . . . .' In the category of sentence adverbial, Bussmann includes modal adverbs such as *maybe* and prepositional phrases such as *without a doubt*. Jackendoff (1972:95–100) argues for classifying comment clauses such as *I think, I assume, I don't think*, or *I doubt* as "speaker-oriented" sentence adverbials.

Swan's semantic typology of sentence adverbials distinguishes evaluative adverbs (*predictably, remarkably*), modal adverbs (*certainly, actually, supposedly*), subject disjuncts (*cleverly, stupidly, wisely*), and speech act adverbs (*precisely, bluntly, frankly*) (1988:30–77). González-Álvarez (1996:219–220) provides a similar typology, which combines Swan's first and third categories:

(a) evaluative adverbs, which indicate the speaker's attitude towards the statement, both agent-oriented (*wisely, cruelly*) and content-oriented (*happily, regrettably*);[4]
(b) epistemic adverbs, which indicate the speaker's attitude towards the statement, including logical (*certainly*), evidential (*clearly*), distancing (*allegedly*), and performative (*admittedly*) adverbs; and
(c) illocutionary adverbs, which modify an implicit illocutionary verb, including attitude (*frankly, simply*), presentation (*briefly, simply*), and participant (*privately, confidentially*) adverbs.

Ifantidou (2001:97–99) divides the epistemic category into evidential adverbs, which denote the source or strength of the speaker's evidence (e.g., *clearly, obviously*), and hearsay adverbs, which claim that the source of knowledge is not the speaker's (e.g., *allegedly, reportedly*).

Hansen (1998:57–62) shows that sentence adverbials bear many similarities to pragmatic markers. They do not have referential or propositional function, they typically occupy sentence-initial position, they mainly serve to comment on the clause to which they are attached, they are not integrated fully into the syntactic structure of the clause, and they often carry an independent tone. Moreover, these qualities account for the non-focalizability of sentence adverbials (in clefts,

[3] On the distinction between conjunct and disjunct, see Quirk *et al.* (1985:501ff.). Hansen (1998:57–62) suggests that although the tests to distinguish these two categories are not foolproof, disjuncts but not conjuncts may generally serve as answers to *yes/no* questions: *Will John be attending the lecture? Yes, unfortunately/*besides.*

[4] The difference between these two is that in the case of content-oriented adverbs the speaker's evaluation does not apply to the subject.

interrogatives, negatives); for example, {*Predictably, certainly, wisely, bluntly*} *he left early* > ∗*It was* {*predictably, certainly, wisely, bluntly*} *that he left early*.[5]

1.3 Disjunct adverbial

Of the two types of sentence adverbials, Quirk *et al.* (1985:612ff.) classify disjuncts as adverbial elements that convey either the speaker's comment on the style or form of what is being said ("style" disjuncts) or the speaker's observations on the content of the utterance ("content" disjuncts). Each class has two subclasses. Style disjuncts may express either modality/manner (e.g., *truthfully*) or respect (e.g., *generally*), while content disjuncts may express the degree of or conditions for truth, such as conviction, doubt, truth, or falseness (e.g., *really, certainly*), or a value judgment on the content, that is, a judgment applied to the subject (e.g., *wisely, to my regret, what is even more important*).

Quirk *et al.* note that disjuncts have a "superior role in respect to other sentence elements"; they are syntactically more detached, they have scope over entire sentences, and they are "in some respects superordinate" (1985:613). While the position of disjuncts is flexible, initial position is most common; in this position, disjuncts are typically set off by comma punctuation (González-Álvarez 1996:233). In contrast with prototypical adverbial elements – i.e., adjuncts – disjuncts cannot be in focus position in a cleft, they cannot be in contrast in interrogation, they cannot be within the scope of predication of pro-forms, and they cannot be focused by a focusing subjunct (Quirk *et al.* 1985:613). Style and content disjuncts display somewhat different syntactic behavior as the former can generally modify questions and imperatives whereas the latter cannot (627–628). Finally, Quirk *et al.* (1985:618–620) observe that style disjuncts may be put to metalinguistic use as comments on the form of the linguistic utterance itself (e.g., *strictly speaking, if I may say so, so to say*).

According to Quirk *et al.* (1985:617), disjuncts may also be realized as PPs (e.g., *in all seriousness*), infinitives (e.g., *to everyone's surprise*), *-ing* participles (e.g., *putting it bluntly*), *-en* participles (e.g., *crudely put*), and finite clauses (e.g., *if I may say so*). They note that these more expanded expressions are often formed with the same lexical base as the simple adverb.

1.4 Comment clause

Quirk *et al.* (1972:778; 1985:1114ff.) use the term "comment clause"[6] to describe parenthetical disjuncts that have a clausal structure and comment on the clause

[5] By Hansen's (1998) definition of pragmatic markers ("non-propositional linguistic items whose primary function is connective, and whose scope is variable" [73]), conjuncts are pragmatic markers, but disjuncts are not (59). Cf. §1.6.

[6] For a brief history of the term see Peltola (1982/1983:103). Quirk *et al.* (1972:778) describe comment clauses as disjuncts or conjuncts, while Quirk *et al.* (1985:1112) describe them as disjuncts.

to which they are attached. These include forms such as *I suppose, you know, as you say,* and *what is more surprising*.

The notion of COMMENT is understood in a variety of ways. For Quirk *et al.* (1985:1114–1115) comment clauses are both style and content disjuncts; they function as hedges expressing tentativeness over truth value, as expressions of the speaker's certainty, as expressions of the speaker's emotional attitude towards content of the matrix, and as claims to the hearer's attention. According to Peltola (1982/1983:103) comment clauses are "metacommunicative": they "comment on the truth value of a sentence or a group of sentences, on the organization of the text or on the attitude of the speaker." Biber *et al.* (1999:197, 864–865, 972) see comment clauses as markers of "stance," or the expression of personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments, or assessments (966), denoting epistemic stance (*I think, I guess*), attitude (*as you might guess*), or style (*if I may say so*) (853ff.).[7] Palacas (1989) likewise sees parentheticals as primarily subjective; they express "a self, a first person, expressing reflections for the benefit of the implied second-person listener/reader, thus drawing the latter into the communicative event" (516). Urmson (1952:484), in a discussion of what he calls "parenthetical verbs" (i.e., comment clauses), observes that they "prime the hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of our statements." Bolinger (1989:190–191) sees comment parentheticals as qualifying "in some way the intent or import of the frame sentence or some part of it" by referring to truth value, pointing out incidentalness, making comparisons, expressing degree, or describing a protagonist. Finally, Espinal (1991) sees parenthetical disjuncts as serving as a "sort of metalinguistic COMMENT" (760) in that they can connect to the speaker or addressee, provide information about the attitude of the communicator, introduce assumptions, or provide information about the context of interpretation.

In medial and final position comment clauses are parenthetical, or loosely connected syntactically with the anchor clause (see Peltola 1982/1983:102). In initial position, especially in conversation where *that* deletion is frequent, the syntactic status of expressions such as *I think* may be indeterminate between main clause and parenthetical (Biber *et al.* 1999:197, cf. 1076–1077; Kaltenböck 2005:43–45). As parentheticals, comment clauses generally form a separate tone unit and are marked by increased speed and lowered pitch and volume (Peltola 1982/1983:102; Quirk *et al.* 1985:1112, 1113).

Some comment clauses are quite "stereotyped" or "formulaic" (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1114; Biber *et al.* 1999:197), while others are much freer. They are characteristic of oral discourse. Biber *et al.* note that while certain comment clauses

[7] Biber *et al.* (1999:981, 1086, 1136n) argue that *I mean, you know, you see, mind you,* and *now then*, because they are primarily interactive rather than markers of stance, are discourse markers ("finite verb formulae" [1086] or "unanalysable wholes" [1078]) but not comment clauses. However, they inconsistently cite these same forms as examples of comment clauses (197), and they observe that in final position, they are more like comment clauses (1136n).

are very common, overall their rate is low (1999:983). *I think* is common in conversation on both sides of the Atlantic, but British English favors *I suppose* and *you see* while American English prefers *I guess*, *I mean*, and *you know* (982, 1096–1097). Second-person forms are typical of conversation and fiction (862).

Biber *et al*. distinguish between non-adverbial and adverbial comment clauses (*I think*, *I suppose, I guess* vs. *as you say, as I've said, as you might expect, to be honest, to tell the truth*). The former typically consist of first- or second-person pronouns, not third-person pronouns, with simple present-tense verbs (*I think, I guess, I bet, I suppose, I believe*, but also *I would say, who knows, it seems, it appears*) (865, 983). Quirk *et al*. (1985:1112–1120) identify three types of comment clauses formed with finite verbs:

(a) those such as *I believe* which resemble matrix clauses with a transitive verb or adjective otherwise requiring a *that*-clause complement;
(b) those such as *as you know* which resemble finite adverbial or relative clauses; and
(c) those such as *what is more important* which resemble nominal relative clauses.

Type (a) comment clauses are syntactically defective since the verb or adjective lacks its normal complementation. Type (b) clauses are often intermediate between a relative and an adverbial construction, with *as* meaning either 'which' or 'in so far as' (1116). *It* may or may not be present (e.g., *as (it) seems likely*). Less often, comment clauses may be formed with *to*-infinitives, *-ing* participles, and *-ed* participles.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1350ff.) identify a class of "supplements" which bears similarity to Quirk *et al*.'s comment clauses. These are expressions which occur in linear sequence but are not integrated into syntactic structure. They are either interpolated or appended, they are intonationally separate or set off by punctuation, they are semantically related to the clause with which they occur (they must be compatible), and they are semantically non-restrictive. Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1356) recognize a wide variety of supplements, including among others, relative clauses, verbless clauses, non-finite clauses, and interjections. The main clause type of supplement departs from the canonical structure of main clauses because it is structurally incomplete (1356).

Peltola (1982/1983:103ff.) provides an extensive typology of comment clauses:[8]

(a) inserted main clause, e.g. – *there's no harm in naming him* –
(b) sentence apposition, e.g., – *worse luck!*
(c) non-additive *and* clauses, e.g., *and I know that they are great*
(d) non-alternative *or* clauses, e.g., *or so it seems*

[8] One should note that a number of these categories (e.g., i–k) are not clausal at all. Peltola seems to be giving a list of parentheticals rather than comment clauses, strictly speaking.

(e) non-conditional *if* clause, e.g., *if I refrain from discussing these questions, if you'll forgive the expression*
(f) parenthetic *as* clause, e.g., *as I had thought, as far as I can tell*
(g) parenthetic relative clause, e.g., *what is more, which sometimes happens*
(h) elliptical predicative in front position, e.g., *no wonder, more important*
(i) interjection, e.g., *thank God*, 'fortunately'
(j) adverb, either opinionative, e.g., *understandably* (< *it is understandable*), signaling, e.g., *honestly*, or modal, e.g., *possibly* (cf. *I think/suppose/imagine*)
(k) prepositional phrase, e.g., *in summary* (cf. *to sum up*)
(l) parenthetic epistemic main clause, e.g., *I guess, one wonders, it is asserted, he argues*
(m) absolute use of the infinitive, either modal, e.g., *truth to tell*, opinionative, e.g., *to give him his due*, or signaling, e.g., *to begin with*
(n) absolute use of the present participle, e.g., *judging by the headlines*.

1.5 Parenthetical

Before proceeding it is important to examine in more detail what is meant by the concept of parenthetical and how the form and syntactic status of parentheticals can best be understood. Parentheticals are frequently attributed to disfluency or performance difficulties, but many are deliberately selected for stylistic reasons or as a communicative or pragmatic strategy (Wichmann 2001:191; Blakemore 2005:1167).

1.5.1 Definition of a parenthetical

Parentheticals may be succinctly defined as "syntactically unintegrated elements which are separated from the host clause by comma intonation and function as comments" (Rouchota 1998:105, also 97).[9] Huddleston and Pullum (2002:895) point out another general quality of parentheticals, namely that they have non-parenthetical uses in which the anchor serves as complement rather than main clause.

Parentheticals are defined by their **lack of syntactic connection** with the clause to which there are attached (their "anchor"; see Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1351n). Syntactically, parentheticals are described as "peripheral" to, "unintegrated" with, "independent" of, or "loosely linked" to their anchor. Their relation is one of linear adjacency, but the parenthetical and anchor do not form a single grammatical construction, nor is the parenthetical an immediate constituent of the anchor (Peterson 1998; Schelfhout *et al.* 2004:331). As a result, a parenthetical cannot be the focus of a cleft, cannot be questioned, does not follow sequence of tense, and so on (Espinal 1991:730–733). It does not participate

[9] A volume on parentheticals appeared too late to be included in the following discussion (Dehé and Kavalova 2007).

in any syntactic processes in the anchor domain (Dehé and Kavalova 2006:293); for example, it is passed over by VP deletion (McCawley 1982:96), it is not subcategorized by verbs in the anchor (Espinal 1991:735), and initial position of a parenthetical does not cause inversion in the anchor in a verb-second language (Schelfhout 2000; Schelfhout *et al.* 2004).[10] Nonetheless, Blakemore (2005:1166) observes that parentheticals must be "licensed by grammar even though they have no syntactically specified function in the structure that contains them."

A consequence of the syntactic independence of parentheticals is their **positional mobility**. They may be either "juxtaposed" (sequentially ordered before or after the main clause) or "interpolated" (Peterson 1998), what Schelfhout *et al.* (2004:331) call "intercalations." Although the position of the parenthetical is assumed to be free, there are some syntactic constraints on its position; it cannot occur between a verb and its complement (Jackendoff 1972:98) nor within the premodifier of an NP or between a P and its complement (Schelfhout 2000; Potts 2002:645–646). Kaltenböck (2005:42) suggests that there are certain "weak spots" which more readily admit the insertion of parentheticals than others. There are discourse constraints as well: a parenthetical cannot occur before non-focused constituents (Peterson 1998:24) and it rarely interrupts new information or a major constituent (Schelfhout *et al.* 2004).

The parenthetical's independence from the anchor is also reflected prosodically. A parenthetical is marked by "comma intonation" (pauses in speech, or actual commas in writing) that separates it from its anchor. Bolinger (1989:186) identifies three prosodic characteristics of parentheticals, relating these to their syntactic and semantic qualities: lower pitch (denoting their "incidentalness"), set off by pauses (denoting their "separation"), and rising terminal (denoting their "link up" with the anchor). However, he notes that all three of these features may be missing or reduced in any given case. Wichmann (2001) raises further doubts concerning the prosodic features of parentheticals. She observes that while some parentheticals show the canonical features of lowering pitch along with lack of accent (what she calls "compression"), others show "expansion," or the raising of pitch, while still others show "integration," or continuation of the pitch direction of the previous tone (thus not representing a prosodically separate entity) (see also Kaltenböck 2005:28).

Semantically, parentheticals exhibit independence from their anchor as well. The parenthetical is a separately planned utterance (Palacas 1989:514; Wichmann 2001:181), giving information that is "related to but not part of the main message" (Biber *et al.* 1999:137–138). The parenthetical provides second-order reflection, commentary, or evaluation upon the anchor (Palacas 1989:514) and is backgrounded semantically in respect to the anchor, which communicates

[10] Even those aspects of parentheticals that might point to some degree of syntactic incorporation, such as (occasional instances of) sequence of tense, backwards pronominalization, and constraints on negative and interrogative parentheticals, are likely independently motivated by pragmatic principles (Kaltenböck 2005:31–34).

the important information (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:896). Focusing on the semantic function of parentheticals, Bolinger (1989:190) identifies three types: comment, revision (e.g., *I mean, rather*), and decision (*well, let's say*) parentheticals. Comment parentheticals are the largest class, often providing additional information or afterthought. Revision parentheticals provide self-corrections or metalinguistic repairs in which "the speaker makes a ceremony of correcting himself" (190–191). Decision parentheticals are concerned with word-finding.

According to Biber *et al.* (1999:1067), a parenthetical's being independent entails that it "could be omitted without affecting the rest of that structure or its meaning." Wichmann (2001:181) likewise suggests that were parentheticals edited out, the utterance would remain well-formed (see also Hübler 1983:114). In respect to semantics, both statements would point to the **non-truth-conditionality** of parentheticals; that is, they are not relevant to the conditions that must hold in any possible world for the anchor sentence to be true.[11] A test for non-truth-conditionality that has been proposed (see Asher 2000:32) is the impossibility of embedding the parenthetical in the protasis of a conditional clause. We see that this test is valid for comment clauses:

If he's not working, he's not happy, {frankly, as far as I can tell}.
?If {frankly, as far as I can tell} he is not working, he's not happy.

The non-truth-conditionality of parentheticals is a position maintained in speech act theory (see Rouchota 1998:109), but it has come into question more recently (see §2.2).

1.5.2 Types of parentheticals

Kaltenböck (2005) notes a lack of consensus about what is delimited by the term *parenthetical*, listing seventeen different categories ranging from main clauses to discourse markers that have been included among the category of parentheticals. In an early study, Corum (1975) includes sentential adverbs, adverbial phrases, parentheticals (e.g., *I believe, Harvey says*, etc.), some non-restrictive relative clauses, and rhetorical tag questions (e.g., *isn't it?, doesn't he?*) in a category called "parenthetic adjuncts."[12] The members of this category share functional as well as syntactic properties in that they may all be used for speaker evaluation, softening, and what she terms a "sneaky" or deceptive use "to seduce the addressee into believing the content of the proposition" (135). Espinal (1991:726–727) provides an extensive list of structures that may function as grammatical parentheticals: these include sentences (e.g., *I guess, that is*), appositive relatives (sentential, non-restrictive), adjectival phrases (e.g., *difficult to quantify*), adverbial clauses (e.g., *if that makes you feel any better*), adverbial phrases (e.g., *frankly*), noun phrases

[11] Another way to understand the non-truth-conditionality of parentheticals is to understand them as having no propositional status (Hübler 1983:115).

[12] By the criteria given above, these would be disjuncts, not adjuncts.

(e.g., *ladies and gentlemen*), propositional phrases (e.g., *on the contrary*), and combined structures. Asher's (2000:31) list of non-truth-conditional items includes many of the same items, such as mood indicators, interjections (e.g., *gee, too bad*), discourse adverbials (e.g., *allegedly*) and adverbial clauses (e.g., *as Mary assures us*), pragmatic conditionals (e.g., *If you know what I mean*), discourse particles and discourse connectors (e.g., *but, therefore*),[13] and parentheticals missing a verbal complement (e.g., *I hear*).

Espinal sees parentheticals as falling into three types on the basis of form: those containing a pronominal expression linking the parenthetical to the main clause (e.g., *which was a good thing*), those with a syntactic gap filled conceptually by the main clause (e.g., *I think*), and those which are self-contained (e.g., *frankly*) (729). Focusing on clausal parentheticals, Kaltenböck (2005) determines that that are two main types: asyndetic and syndetic. Asyndetic clausal parentheticals include coordinated main clauses (introduced by *and* or *or*), non-restrictive relative clauses (adnominal, nominal, and sentential), appositive or content clauses, adverbial clauses, and right-node raising. Syndetic clausal parentheticals include three types: (a) self-contained parentheticals (independent main clauses, semantic gap-filling clauses); (b) reduced or gap-containing parentheticals (main clause-like comment clauses, reporting clauses); and (c) amalgamated clauses. He divides category (b) of reduced parentheticals into two types: commenting and reporting. After some deliberation, he limits the latter to third-person forms such as *he says, she reported*.[14] The former includes all first- and second-person forms as well as evidentials such as *it is said* and *I was told*.

1.5.3 Syntactic derivation of parentheticals

According to Kaltenböck (2005:22) there are three ways in which the syntactic "dilemma" of parentheticals – the fact that they do not enter into any syntactic hierarchical relation with their host clause but intervene in its linear order[15] – can be accommodated: by adding an extra level of syntactic structure, by elaborating transformations, or by excluding parentheticals from the

[13] Rouchota (1998) provides a detailed argument for considering adverbial discourse connectives (*however, nevertheless*) as parenthetical: they are relatively free in position, they are separated from their host by a pause, they have low tone (are backgrounded), they function as a comment or gloss on the clause, they take the whole clause within their scope, and their position affects their scope and interpretation (see also Potts 2002). She argues further that they are procedural in meaning and function as parenthetical discourse markers. According to the perspective of Relevance Theory, discourse connectives "fulfil the commenting function by encoding procedural meaning and by constraining the implicatures of an utterance" (1998:113).

[14] Inquits or reporting clauses, such as *she said*, are not included in this study as they appear to function rather differently (see, e.g., Banfield 1982).

[15] On the conflict between linearity and hierarchy in parentheticals, see also Burton-Roberts (2006:181).

grammar altogether. The elaboration of transformations may involve two distinct approaches (Schelfhout *et al.* 2004; Dehé and Kavalova 2006:292ff.).

In the first approach, which Schelfhout *et al.* (2004) call the "extraction" analysis, the parenthetical begins as syntactically integrated with the anchor, the syntactic bond is broken, and it is then moved into position in the anchor clause. This approach is typically used to account for comment clauses such as *I think* or *you know*. The parenthetical originates as a main clause with the anchor as its complement, as in *I think that the world is flat*. Deletion of the complementizer *that* allows for movement of one of the constituents. Either *I think* is "lowered" into disjunct position (see, for example, Thompson and Mulac 1991b) or *the world is flat* is "lifted" to a higher position and adjoined to *I think* in a process that Ross (1973) calls "slifting," or 'sentence lifting.' Arguments have been made against these transformational approaches, in large part based on the lack of synonymity between *I think that the world is flat* and *The world is flat, I think* (as will be discussed in more detail in §2.3.3).

A variant of this approach – widely assumed in the linguistic and grammatical as well as philosophical literature – views the parenthetical and anchor as independent clauses but interprets the complementizer *that* as originally an anaphoric demonstrative (i.e., *I think that. The world is flat*.).[16] Hand (1993) refers to this as the "paratactic" analysis. While he points out that this analysis fails syntactically, he believes that it has pragmatic significance. Moreover, the omission of *that* may explain the development of parentheticals (see below).

In the second approach, the "parenthetical" (see Schelfhout *et al.* 2004) or "double speech act" (see Ifantidou 2001:132–138) analysis, the parenthetical begins as a syntactically independent utterance and is then inserted into the anchor clause with which it bears no syntactic relationship. The primary difficulty with generating the parenthetical independently is that it is often structurally incomplete; it contains a transitive verb but lacks the obligatory direct object. A number of different solutions, primarily semantic, have been proposed for this problem. Jackendoff (1972:99–100) interprets the parenthetical as a speaker-oriented adverb. Generated on its own, it would be syntactically and semantically defective, but generated as an adverb it is subject to the projection $P_{speaker}$ which embeds the rest of the sentence as a single argument to the adverb: "$P_{speaker}$ will therefore fill the missing argument of the parentheticals with the reading of the main clause, exactly the structure needed to provide semantic similarity to the complement constructions" (99). Espinal (1991) argues that the syntactic gap will be filled conceptually by a process of hearer inference making use of the most readily available contextual information (1991:746, 756): "The linguistic meaning of the host . . . is projected into the empty argument position of the verb of the parenthetical – following lexical specifications – in the final

[16] Banfield (1982:42ff.) presents a similar argument for reporting clauses such as *she said*. The clause with the verb of communication has an anaphoric NP (*thus, so, this*) that is co-referential with preceding clause. The anaphoric NP is subsequently deleted.

process of utterance interpretation" (748). Schelfhout *et al.* (2004) argue that clauses are parenthetically attached by use of an operator, which optionally surfaces as *so* or may be phonologically empty: "this operator . . . somehow absorbs or takes on the direct object role" (345). Dehé and Kavalova (2006:294) believe that the parenthetical is generated separately and related to the anchor by a "discourse-governed process of linearization only" (294) but that there may be a unidirectional syntactic relationship: the parenthetical "can introduce a property or syntactic feature which remains unsatisfied within its internal syntactic structure, but can be satisfied by elements in the host clause" (295).

Potts (2002), focusing specifically on *as* parentheticals, argues that the parenthetical adjoins like a regular non-parenthetical adverbial (an adjunct) directly to the linguistic material from which it obtains its meaning; the gap in the parenthetical is interpreted by the most local phrase of the appropriate type (the sister of the parenthetical) (640–641).[17] He believes that there is nothing remarkable about the syntax of *as*-parentheticals; rather, their "otherness" is a semantic effect (649–650). Writing against Potts, Blakemore (2006) argues that because the interpretation of the gaps in parentheticals often requires pragmatic enrichment, parentheticals cannot be inserted into the syntax at the level of grammatical representation but must be inserted at the level of pragmatic interpretation. Potts's locality condition must be regarded as a constraint on conceptual representation.

1.5.4 Distinguishing a parenthetical from a main clause

In non-initial position, forms such as *I think* or *you know* are unambiguously parenthetical, i.e., not syntactically integrated with the anchor clause. In initial position, the status of such forms is syntactically indeterminate between matrix clauses (with *that* deleted) and true parentheticals.

When a sentence-initial subject + verb sequence is followed by a non-declarative complement (which it normally does not govern), we can interpret the sequence as a parenthetical rather than as a matrix clause (see Thompson 2002:147–150). In (2) *I mean*, which typically takes a phrasal complement, and *you know*, which typically takes a *that*-clause complement, are followed by interrogative complements, and are hence unambiguous cases of parentheticals:

(2) a. **I mean**, can you think of any other situation, Pop, when a man gets so close to a woman except when he's actually making love to her? (1981 Rendell, *The Best Man to Die* [BNC]).
b. No, but I suppose I'm a bit worried. **You know**, why don't I miss it? We don't even have sex on holiday (1989 *She* [BNC]).

However, such constructions are infrequent in Present-day English.

[17] Evidence for this locality condition is the fact that the position of the *as*-clause affects interpretation. If the *as*-clause is attached after *that* in a complex sentence, it refers only to the embedded clause; if it is initial or is attached before *that*, it refers only to the main clause. If it is attached to the end of a complex sentence, it can refer to either clause (Potts 2002:640ff.).

Some scholars point to the deletion of *that* alone as evidence of the parenthetical nature of the initial clause. This point was first made by Benveniste (1971 [1958]), who noted that when verbs such as *I presume* or *I suppose* are followed by *that* they denote a real thought operation, but without *that* they function as a marker of subjectivity (228–229). Most recently, Wierzbicka (2006) has argued, for example, that *I believe* differs in meaning from *I believe that*, *I find* from *I find that*. The former are quasi-performatives or "epistemic parenthetical verbs" (in her terminology), whereas the latter express evaluative personal judgments. She observes that the two forms differ in behavior; for example, *I believe that* does not occur with factual statements, whereas *I believe* is completely natural; *I believe that* can cooccur with *strongly* whereas *I believe* cannot. *I believe that* belongs to a full paradigm consisting of *we believe that, he believes that,* and so on; in persons other than the first person *that* can be omitted without semantic consequence, but these forms cannot function parenthetically (213–218). *I find* is compatible with *personally,* while *I find that* is not (222). Thompson and Mulac treat lack of *that* as a sign of grammaticalization of the matrix into a unified particle[18] and see its absence as blurring the distinction between main clause and complement; they correlate *that* with the degree of "embeddedness" (1991a; 1991b). Thompson (2002) takes the argument further, suggesting that certain initial clauses, which she calls "Complement-Taking-Predicates" (see further below), are parenthetical, whether or not *that* is present.[19]

Hand (1993) argues in speech-act terms for a difference between *that*-full and *that*-less forms. In the case of what he calls "propositional attitude verbs" (such as *believe*, *think, suppose*), *that*-deletion allows the illocutionary force of the utterance to attach to the complement; the speaker can then "use the complement itself for an illocutionary act" (499). The original matrix clause merely "fine-tunes" or adjusts this illocutionary act and does not contribute to locutionary force (495, 503). Ifantidou (2001:127) notes further that following *that*-deletion, the original matrix clause, in addition to carrying illocutionary force, also comes to be truth-conditional.

However, omission of *that* may be an unreliable sign of parentheticalness of initial structures, in large part because *that* is typically deleted in colloquial speech. Factors other than register have also been found to favor the omission of *that*. These include pronominal subjects (hence topics) in the *that*-clause, especially first-person subjects, frequent verbs (*think, guess*) in the matrix, structural simplicity in the matrix (no additional elements in the clause), and co-referential

[18] Discussing the development of French *toujours est-il que* 'still, in any case,' Hansen (2006:31–32, 41n) observes that the original complement clause comes to express the truth-conditional core of the utterance and the original matrix is grammaticalized as a pragmatic marker. However, unlike similar constructions in English, *que* 'that' is not omitted but becomes a frozen element of the pragmatic marker.

[19] Huddleston and Pullum (2002:896) admit that even when an initial clause is followed by *that* (i.e., not parenthetical and not syntactically reduced), it may be backgrounded and reduced to a "modal qualifier."

subjects in both clauses. Factors favoring the retention of *that* are structural complexity in the matrix (other clausal elements such as auxiliaries, adverbs, negatives, non-finite verbs, passives, or indirect objects) or anything intervening between the matrix verb and the complement clause, low-frequency verbs, full NP subjects in the complement, and coordinated *that*-clauses (Rissanen 1991; Thompson and Mulac 1991a; Finegan and Biber 1995; Biber *et al*. 1999:680–683; Tagliamonte and Smith 2005).

Traditionally it has been assumed that *that*-deletion has increased over time. However, the history of *that*-deletion is complex; there appears to be no simple path from *that* to the zero form. Rissanen (1991) concludes that "omission" is perhaps not an optimal term because "[a]t the level of spoken expression zero may well have been the unmarked object link throughout the history of English" (287). He finds zero to be scantily attested in OE and early ME, but to have gained ground in late ME and to have reached its height in the seventeenth century. Following this large rise of zero forms in the late sixteenth/early seventeenth centuries, the tide of zero forms is reversed in the "norm-loving eighteenth century" (288). In confirmation, Finegan and Biber (1995) see a consistent rise in the use of *that* from 1650 to 1990. Historically, individual verbs behave differently with respect to *that*-deletion. They find that *think* is the only verb that occurs consistently with a majority of zero forms in their data. In PDE, written and oral registers can vary as well, with *think* and *say* favoring zero more in the oral than in the written register (Rissanen 1991). The one constancy Rissanen notes over time is the preference for zero in oral registers. In a study of *I think*, Aijmer (1997:8–10) believes that zero may have been the unmarked link in speech throughout OE and ME; it is most common in Rissanen's EModE data for *think* as well. In modern British dialect data, Tagliamonte and Smith (2005) find that over 90% of the instances of *I think/guess/mean* and *you know* have zero complementizers, with *think* most frequently lacking the complementizer.

1.6 Pragmatic marker

Stenström (1995:299) concludes her discussion of comment clauses by observing that they differ from normal disjuncts in a number of ways: they are frequent and "highly neutralised" in meaning, they serve different functions depending on clausal position and situational context, they are "person-to-person-oriented and socially required," and they are syntactically deletable but pragmatically required. All of these characteristics point to comment clauses functioning as pragmatic markers.

There are widely divergent views about the forms that belong to the category of pragmatic marker, with the number of members ranging from a dozen to five hundred (see Brinton 1996:31–32). Definitions of pragmatic marker have been equally diverse. An early definition, that of Schiffrin (1987), focuses on the relational and connective function of pragmatic markers, seeing them as

"**sequentially dependent** elements which bracket units of talk" (31). In Relevance Theoretic terms (e.g., Blakemore 1987), pragmatic markers are similarly understood as expressions "used to indicate how the relevance of one discourse segment is dependent on another" (125); specifically, they "constrain the interpretation of the utterances that contain them by virtue of the inferential connections they express" (105). In a tutorial article on pragmatic markers, Schourup (1999:234) likewise suggests that "the typical [pragmatic marker] referred to in the literature is a syntactically optional expression that does not affect the truth-conditions associated with an utterance it introduces and is used to relate this utterance to the immediately preceding utterance." A more recent definition expands the notion of relation from text to context, claiming that pragmatic markers "situate their host unit with respect to the surrounding discourse and with respect to the speaker–hearer relationship" (Waltereit 2006:64).

Some definitions focus on the subjective functions of pragmatic markers as "linguistically encoded clues which signal the speaker's potential communicative intentions" (Fraser 1996:169). Others focus on their intersubjective as well as subjective functions as signals of "an aspect of the speaker's rhetorical stance toward what he or she is saying, or toward the addressee's role in the discourse situation" (Traugott and Dasher 2002:152). Another recent definition attempts to capture all of the functions of pragmatic markers as items "which are useful in locating the utterance in an interpersonal and interactive dimension, in connecting and structuring phrasal, inter-phrasal, and extra-phrasal elements in discourse, and in marking some on-going cognitive processes and attitudes" (Bazzanella 2006:456). Schourup concludes, however, that no definition of pragmatic marker is universally accepted (1999:241).

There seems to be general agreement that pragmatic markers, although they may be homophonous with adverbial, prepositional, or conjunctive forms, do not share morphosyntactic features and thus do not constitute a formal grammatical class (Schourup 1999:236; Hansen 1998:65; 2006:27).[20] According to Hansen (1998:357–358), pragmatic markers constitute "a function class which does not form a category . . . , but which . . . cuts across the classes of conjunctions and sentence adverbials, and which furthermore shows certain affinities with both interjections and modal particles." Pragmatic markers are often relegated to the marginal class of "interjection."

A prototype approach to the category of pragmatic marker is perhaps most fruitful (see, e.g., Jucker 2002:211–213; Bazzanella 2006:450). Despite differences in definition, there are numerous points of agreement among scholars concerning the semantic, formal, and functional characteristics of pragmatic markers. In respect to their semantics, pragmatic markers express little or no semantic content (but see, e.g., Bazzanella 2006:454; Lewis 2006:44). They are

[20] Lewis (2006:44, 58) refutes the non-categoricalness of pragmatic markers by suggesting that the diverse forms have functional and structural similarities; they are perhaps best described as "functional adverbial adjuncts."

non-referential and do not contribute to the propositional meaning of an utterance. Pragmatic markers have been analyzed as expressing "procedural" rather than conceptual meaning. That is, they act as types of instructions or "linguistic 'road signs'" (Hansen 1998:199) to guide the hearer towards the intended interpretation. They encode constraints on pragmatic inferences (Blake 2002:4) and "provide instructions to the hearer on how to integrate their host utterance into a developing mental model of the discourse in such a way as to make that utterance appear optimally coherent" (Hansen 2006:25). However, not all pragmatic markers can be understood as procedural in meaning. Of the four types of "pragmatic markers" that Fraser (1996; 1999) identifies – basic, commentary, parallel, and discourse – the first three express conceptual meaning, while only the fourth expresses procedural meaning.[21]

The presence of pragmatic markers in a discourse is optional: "the absence of the discourse marker does not render a sentence ungrammatical and/or unintelligible. It does, however, remove a powerful clue about what commitment the speaker makes regarding the relationship between the current utterance and the prior discourse" (Fraser 1988:22). If pragmatic markers are removed, the discourse may become "not easily comprehensible" (Hansen 1998:199). Because of their lack of referential meaning, pragmatic markers are not easily glossed and may pose a difficulty for translation (as cross-linguistic studies have shown, see Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2006). In the context of the following diachronic study, it should be remembered that pragmatic markers are understood as deriving from full lexemes with semantic content (Hansen 1998:89, also 69; Traugott and Dasher 2002:153), and may retain traces of their original propositional meaning.

A number of formal features of pragmatic markers have been identified (see Brinton 1996:32–35). Phonetically, they are often "short" or reduced items, and prosodically, they typically occur in a separate tone group. Syntactically, pragmatic markers occur outside the bounds of the clause or loosely attached to the clause; they are not syntactically integrated with their clause (but cf. Lewis

[21] Fraser's four major types of "pragmatic markers" include the following:

(a) primary or basic markers (structures such as imperative or interrogative, lexical forms such as performative verbs and pragmatic idioms [*how about, please, perhaps, to think, where does he get off*], and hybrids such as tag questions);
(b) commentary markers (signaling assessment, manner-of-speaking, evidentiality, consequence-effect, hearsay, mitigation, and emphasis), primarily sentence adverbials;
(c) parallel markers (vocatives, markers of impatience, displeasure, and solidarity); and
(d) discourse markers (topic changers, contrastive, elaborative, and inferential markers) which signal the "relationship between the basic message of the current sentence and the preceding discourse" (1996:188).

Fraser's category of "discourse markers" is thus more limited than that of other scholars. For example, Fraser (1988:26) categorizes *y'know* and *I mean* as parallel pragmatic markers, not discourse markers, as they are primarily interactive; *y'know* "signals a message requesting that the hearer appreciate and/or be in sympathy with the speaker's point of view" (1988:26).

2006:44). They often occur in sentence-initial position but are not restricted to this position, occurring medially and finally as well.

Pragmatic markers are characteristic of the oral medium, particularly of unplanned speech. Watts, in fact, considers pragmatic markers "one of the most perceptually salient features of oral style" (1989:208). However, pragmatic markers may occur in written discourse, and certain pragmatic markers (e.g., *notwithstanding*) may even be restricted to the written medium. Pragmatic markers occur with relatively high frequency in conversation, though there are marked differences in the forms used and frequencies occurring in different dialects (see Biber *et al.* 1999:1096–1097). Because of their frequency and colloquial nature, pragmatic markers tend to be stylistically stigmatized and are often seen as signs of lack of attention or fluency.

1.6.1 Functional characteristics of pragmatic markers

Membership in the category of pragmatic marker is determined by functional criteria (Bazzanella 2006:451; Diewald 2006:406; Waltereit 2006). Bazzanella (2003; 2006) identifies three main functions (2006:456–457): cognitive, interactional, and metatextual. Included among the cognitive function are procedural/inferential, epistemic (subjectivity, commitment), and modulation (illocutionary force) meanings. The interactional function is both speaker and hearer focused and includes attention-getting, hedging, turn-taking, expressing agreement/disagreement, and so on. The metatextual function refers to text marking, focusing, and reformulation devices. Erman (2001:1341) likewise identifies three functional domains in which pragmatic markers operate: as "text-monitors" (discourse markers, editing markers, including repair and hesitation markers), as "social monitors" (interactive markers, comprehension-securing markers), and as "metalinguistic monitors" (approximators, hedges, emphasizers).[22] In Brinton (1996:35–40), I argue that it is possible to understand the function of pragmatic markers in respect to the functional–semantic components of language identified by Halliday (1979). In function, pragmatic markers serve a "textual function" of language, which relates to the structuring of discourse as text, and/or an "interpersonal function" (or what Traugott 1982 calls "expressive"), which relates to the expression of speaker attitude and to the organization of the social exchange. Among the textual functions are those of claiming

[22] Erman (2001:1339) defines metalinguistic markers as speaker-oriented and "basically modal"; they "function as comments, not on the propositional content of the message, but on the implications of it and on the speaker's intended effect with it . . . ; that is, the speaker by using them informs the addressee about her/his commitment to the truth of the proposition or judgement of the importance or value of what is being communicated." Because of the speaker-orientation of Erman's "metalinguistic markers," I would include them among the "interpersonal" component. I reserve the term *metalinguistic* for 'any function of language in which the language itself is discussed' (*OED*: s.v. *metalinguistic*), as in the basic meaning of *I mean* (see Chapter 5) or of *if you will/as it were* (see Chapter 7).

the attention of the hearer, initiating and ending discourse, sustaining discourse, marking boundaries, including topic shifts and episode boundaries, constraining the relevance of adjoining clauses, and repairing discourse. Among the interpersonal functions are subjective functions such as expressing responses, reactions, attitudes, understanding, tentativeness, or continued attention, as well as interactive functions such as expressing intimacy, cooperation, shared knowledge, deference, or face-saving (politeness). Together, the textual and interpersonal functions constitute "pragmatic" meaning. Finally, a well-recognized quality of pragmatic markers is their multifunctionality (Jucker 2002; Bazzanella 2006; Lewis 2006:48–52).

1.6.2 Comment clauses as parentheticals/pragmatic markers

According to the criteria given in §1.5, comment clauses such as *I know*, *I suppose, you know,* or *(as) you see* can be understood – at least in some of their uses – as prototypical parentheticals, constituting the subclass of epistemic/evidential parentheticals (see Chapter 10). They occur in linear order but do not form a hierarchical syntactic relationship with their anchor clause. They are positionally mobile. Their non-truth-conditional meaning makes them semantically independent. Functionally, they serve a "comment" function in expressing speaker attitude. However, prosodically, they are somewhat less clearly parenthetical. Forms such as *I think* or *I suppose* often follow the intonation pattern of the previous discourse, or show "compression" in Wichmann's schema (2001:186; cf. Blakemore 2005:1167). Wichmann (2001:179) suggests that they are syntactically and semantically more integrated than the typical aside and might better be termed "anchored" parentheticals (borrowing a term from Bas Aarts). The historical development of parentheticals such as *I say* and *you see*, which will be studied in the following chapters, will shed light on the "extraction" and "parenthetical" approaches to the derivation of parentheticals and determine the importance of *that*-omission to their status as parentheticals.

According to the criteria given in §1.6.1, comment clauses may also be understood as pragmatic markers.[23] Although they differ from prototypical pragmatic markers such as *well* or *right* in not being phonologically "short," they exhibit the lack of propositional or referential content, the syntactic moveability, and the optionality typical of pragmatic markers. Most importantly, they belong to the class of pragmatic markers by virtue of their textual and interpersonal (subjective and intersubjective) functions in discourse.

[23] Kaltenböck (2005:47–48) distinguishes clausal parentheticals from pragmatic markers such as *actually, like, really*, which he sees as more formulaic (fixed) than parentheticals and entirely grammaticalized. Nonetheless, he is forced to exclude the widely accepted pragmatic marker *I think* from his category of pragmatic marker because it shows a fair degree of flexibility, and despite claiming only minimal overlap between the two categories, he cites *I mean, I see, I think, you know, (you) see, mind you, look,* and *listen* as belonging to both.

1.7 Overview of the book

1.7.1 Approach

A challenge for the study of the development of comment clauses is the recovery of pragmatic meanings for comment clauses (and their source structures) from texts from an earlier period, where many aspects of context are missing, and the relation of these meanings to one another by pragmatic principles. The approach adopted here has had two parts. First, I have identified a number of semantic–pragmatic functions for each comment clause using PDE corpora as a starting point (where the pragmatic context is more readily available to me as a native speaker). Second, I have gone back in time to try to determine when and in what syntactic contexts these functions first arose and how they were related to one another. The underlying assumption has been that pragmatic meaning works uniformly over periods and societies. In the cases in which the comment clause had a metalinguistic function and focused on the linguistic code, features of the immediate context could be identified. In cases in which the comment clause had an interpersonal or hearer-directed function, second-person pronouns, vocatives, or imperatives in the context were significant. But often the semantic–pragmatic interpretation of the comment clause in any given context rests on translation equivalents. This offered the most reliable and transparent method for teasing out pragmatic meaning in these contexts and provided the greatest possibility for replicability.

My approach has been primarily qualitative, not quantitative. Nevertheless, I have assumed that the frequency and distribution of comment clauses across corpora provide evidence for their semantic and syntactic development. A rigorous quantitative study of pragmatic markers is often not feasible or fruitful because one is dealing with extremely high-frequency verbs (e.g., the verbs *say, mean, see, look*), only a very small proportion of which are functioning as pragmatic markers. (As we will see, this provides an interesting reversal of the "expected" situation in cases of grammaticalization in which the newly grammaticalized form comes to be most frequent.) Furthermore, the interpretation of forms as pragmatic rather than purely propositional in meaning often depends on a larger context than is readily available in simple corpus searches. Rather than distorting my data, I have chosen in many cases to make more impressionistic judgments. Nonetheless, where possible, I have included quantitative data.[24]

1.7.2 Sources of data

This following study is corpus-based, with data selected from a variety of online and electronic corpora.

[24] The quantitative data do not lend themselves to strict statistical analysis.

The quotation bank of the *Oxford English Dictionary* was used for all periods of English. Scholars have noted a number of problems in the use of the *OED* quotations for corpus linguistics (see, e.g., Hoffmann 2004), such as the over-representation of certain authors (e.g., Shakespeare),[25] differing lengths of quotations, or inconsistencies in the marking of deletions. The *OED* quotations were collected not for the purpose of creating a representative sample of language for the different periods but rather for the purpose of illustrating the senses of headwords (often obscure senses); however, Hoffmann (2004) concludes that one may safely assume that the words surrounding the headword constitute a fair reflection of the contemporary language (20) and that the *OED* database of 2.4 million quotations covering a timespan "unmatched by any other source of computerized data" (26) can – with caution – be fruitfully used by historical linguists.

Other sources of data for specific periods of English were the following:

(a) **Old English**: the Dictionary of Old English Corpus, the Helsinki Corpus (<850–1150 [413,200 words]);
(b) **Middle English**: the quotation bank of the *Middle English Dictionary*,[26] the Helsinki Corpus (1150–1500 [608,570 words]), the Chaucer corpus;
(c) **Early Modern English**: the Helsinki Corpus (1500–1710 [551,000 words]), Early English Prose Fiction (1500–1700 [c. 200 works]), the University of Virginia Electronic Text Center, Modern English Collection (1500–present), the Lampeter Corpus of Early Modern English Tracts (1640–1740 [1,172,102 words]), the Shakespeare corpus, English Drama (late thirteenth century to early twentieth century);
(d) **Late Modern English**: the University of Virginia Electronic Text Center, Modern English Collection (1500–present), Eighteenth-Century Fiction (1700–1780), English Drama (late thirteenth century to early twentieth century), the University of Toronto English Library;
(e) **Present-day English**: the Australian Corpus of English (c. 1,000,000 words), the British National Corpus (c. 100,000,000 words), the Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English (c. 1,000,000 words), the Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English (c. 1,000,000 words), the Strathy Corpus of Canadian English (54,645,302 words), the Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English (c. 1,000,000 words).

[25] By Willinsky's (1994:211) count, there are over twice as many quotations from Shakespeare as his nearest competitor (Walter Scott) in the first edition of the *OED*. He also points to some obvious omissions from the *OED*, including the Romantic poets, Chancery English, working-class presses of the nineteenth century, and "the entire body of women writers" (177).

[26] To a lesser extent, perhaps, Hoffmann's (2004) cautions concerning the *OED* database would apply to that of the *MED*. Impressionistically I have observed numerous inconsistencies in the marking of deletions in the *MED*.

I have chosen to use corpora of written rather than spoken corpora of Present-day English in order to provide a better comparison with the (necessarily) written corpora of the earlier periods.[27]

1.7.3 Outline of the book

The work begins with three chapters which establish the theoretical context for the ensuing study and review work to date. Chapters 4–10 are case studies of particular comment clauses in the history of English.

Chapter 1 conceptualizes forms such as *I know* and *you see* in relation to a number of different recognized categories, including sentence adverbial, disjunct, comment clause, parenthetical, and pragmatic marker. It concludes that these forms, while they belong to the larger class of disjuncts, are best understood as parenthetical pragmatic markers which are clausal in origin. I adopt the term "comment clause" to refer to these forms.

Chapter 2 reviews the semantic and syntactic development of pragmatic markers. The semantic development of clausal pragmatic markers is generally understood as following the trajectories identified by Traugott and Dasher (2002:40, 281): from truth-conditional > non-truth-conditional, from content > content/procedural > procedural meaning, from non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective meaning, and from scope within the proposition > scope over the proposition > scope over discourse.

However, the syntactic development of comment clauses has been less fully (and conclusively) investigated. Thompson and Mulac (1991b) have argued that comment clauses begin as main clauses with a *that*-complement; the rise of the parenthetical involves reversal of the syntactic status of the matrix and the complement clause following loss of *that*. Thompson and Mulac focus on *I think* and *I guess* in contemporary English. Although theirs is a synchronic study, this has become the dominant theory concerning the syntactic development of comment clauses in a diachronic perspective. Thompson and Mulac's (1991b) proposal – which I will call the "matrix clause hypothesis" – is intuitively appealing and can be extended to cases of second- and third-person parentheticals (such as *you know* or *God forbid*) and parentheticals formed from imperatives (such as *mind you*), but cannot account for the origin of the relative/adverbial type of comment clause (such as *as you say*) nor the nominal relative type of comment clause (such as *what is more interesting*). Moreover, the complement structures predominating in earlier stages of the language and the chronology of changes in the recorded texts often make it difficult to find support for Thompson and Mulac's proposed development, even in the case of first-person parentheticals. The case studies in Chapter 4–10 address questions of syntactic derivation.

[27] For complete details concerning these sources, see the list of corpora in the References.

Chapter 3 discusses the processes of change – grammaticalization, pragmaticalization, lexicalization, idiomatization, and subjectification/ intersubjectification – that have been variously seen as accounting for the development of pragmatic markers. After defining these processes, the chapter explores how they operate in respect to pragmatic markers and summarizes studies of pragmatic markers, and of clausal pragmatic markers in particular, which have evoked these processes as a means of explaining their development. In most diachronic studies, pragmatic markers are conceptualized as undergoing either grammaticalization or lexicalization or both. For Traugott (1995a) and Brinton (1996), pragmatic markers, although they do not typically undergo fusion and coalescence with a host, are otherwise the product of changes characteristic of grammaticalization, including decategorialization (or change from more major to more minor word-class membership), freezing of form, and desemanticization (or generalization of meaning). They also undergo the semantic changes noted above, especially referential to pragmatic and non-subjective to subjective and intersubjective meaning. These changes in meaning occur in specialized contexts via the coding or conventionalization of invited inferences. Pragmatic markers frequently follow Hopper's (1991) principles of divergence, layering, and persistence. In contrast, others (e.g., Erman and Kotsinas 1993; Frank-Job 2006) argue that pragmatic markers, although they derive from lexical structures, undergo a process of pragmaticalization, developing directly into pragmatic markers with no intermediate grammatical stage. Lexicalization is likewise evoked as an explanation for the development of clausal pragmatic markers (see, e.g., Wischer 2000), as clausal forms undergo the fossilization and fusion characteristic of lexical items. Subjectification, or the encoding of speaker attitudes and perspectives, and intersubjectification, or the encoding of meanings focused on the addressee (see Traugott 1995b; 2003b) are often used as an explanation for the development of pragmatic markers, separate from grammaticalization (see Fitzmaurice 2004, Hansen 1998). Again, the case studies in Chapters 4–10 investigate which of these processes best explains the development of the particular comment clause.

The choice of comment clauses for study was in part motivated by the classification of finite comment clauses given by Quirk *et al*. (1985). They recognize three types: (a) those such as *I believe* which resemble matrix clauses with a transitive verb or adjective otherwise requiring a *that*-clause complement; (b) those such as *as you know* which resemble finite adverbial or relative clauses; and (c) those such as *what is more important* which resemble nominal relative clauses. Type (a) is the most frequent type of comment clause, with first-person pronoun subjects predominating. As exemplars of this type, I discuss *I say/I daresay*, *I gather, I find,* and *I mean* as well as the second-person forms, *you see* and *you say*, and the third-person form, *that is (to say)*. As exemplars of type (b), I discuss *as you see, as you say, as it were*, and *if you will,* and as exemplars of type (c), I discuss *what's more* and *what else*. An important type omitted from Quirk *et al*.'s classification, however, is the second-person imperative form; here

I focus on *say, see,* and *look*. In some cases I have chosen the less common variant (*you see* rather that *you know*, *I find/gather* rather than *I think* or *I guess*) as I have discussed the more common forms elsewhere (Brinton 1996).

Chapter 11 presents concluding remarks and reconciles the results of the case studies with the theoretical contexts presented in the first three chapters.

2 Semantic and syntactic development of pragmatic markers

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the semantic development of pragmatic markers (about which there seems to be considerable agreement) and their syntactic development (which has not been fully explored). While it is recognized that pragmatic markers come from a wide variety of sources, ranging from individual lexemes to phrasal collocations and clauses, little attention has been given to the syntactic paths of development. The question explored in this chapter is whether we find syntactic clines in the development of pragmatic makers comparable to the semantic–pragmatic clines that have been postulated. A working hypothesis is that semantic–pragmatic change and syntactic change go hand-in-hand: that is, the shift from content meaning based in the argument structure at the clausal level to pragmatic–procedural meaning at the discourse level will be accompanied by a syntactic shift from an item having scope over phrasal and then clausal elements and, ultimately, to its having scope over more global elements of the discourse.

2.2 Semantic development

As pragmatic markers are typically seen as "empty" markers devoid of lexical content, "bleaching" was the traditional way to account for their development. However, in a groundbreaking study, Traugott (1982) argued that a variety of different forms in language, including pragmatic markers, follow a semantic–pragmatic path in their evolution from propositional meaning to textual meaning to expressive or interpersonal meaning. Traugott adapted these three levels of meaning from Halliday's functional components: the ideational ("language as representation"), the textual ("language as relevance"), and the interpersonal ("language as interaction") (1979). The ideational component is the speaker's representation of happenings, participants, and circumstances through constituent structure. The textual component involves the speaker's structuring of meaning as text by means of theme and focus and units of textual

organization. The interpersonal – the speaker's evaluations, judgments, expectations, and demands – is expressed diffusely rather than discretely, through mood, modality, tone, and intensity (Halliday 1979).

This evolution was then formalized in a set of three "tendencies" (see Traugott and König 1991:208–209):

(a) the shift from meanings based in the external situation to those based in the internal situation;
(b) the change from meanings based in the external or internal situation to meanings based in the textual situation; and
(c) the progression towards meanings increasingly situated in the speaker's subjective belief-state or attitude.

The development of *while* from propositional meaning ('at the time that') to textual meaning ('during') to expressive meaning ('although') is seen as a clear example of these tendencies (Traugott and König 1991:200–201; Traugott 1995b: 39–42).

More recently, the simple unidimensional development (propositional > textual > interpersonal) has been replaced by a more complex conception of unidirectional change, involving multiple semantic–pragmatic tendencies (see Traugott and Dasher 2002:40, 281) from:

truth-conditional > non-truth-conditional
content > content/procedural > procedural
non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective
scope within the proposition > scope over the proposition > scope over discourse

Pragmatic markers are generally seen as following the tendencies outlined by Traugott and Dasher.[1] For example, the test of embedding in a protasis of a conditional (see see §1.5.1) clearly shows the non-truth-conditionality of pragmatic markers:

If he's not working, he's not happy, {you see, I know}.
?If {you see, I know} that he is not working, he's not happy.

Furthermore, it is widely accepted that pragmatic markers lack semantic "content," that is, representational, propositional, or conceptual meaning. Rather, they express procedural meaning (see see §1.6). Procedural meaning has been defined as "information about how conceptual representations are to be made use of in the inferential phase of comprehension" (Schourup 1999:244) or information "which acts as instruction to the hearer about how to 'take' such mental

[1] On the subjectification and intersubjectification of pragmatic markers, see §3.6, and on scope changes in pragmatic markers, see below.

representations, what context to process them in, what conclusions to draw from them" (Rouchota 1998:98).[2]

However, the procedural meaning of pragmatic markers and the relation of procedural meaning and non-truth-conditionality have proved somewhat problematic. Ifantidou (2001) argues that only illocutionary (*honestly*) and attitudinal (*happily*) adverbials and parentheticals are non-truth-conditional; they indicate the manner in which a speech act is being performed or express an attitude towards the speech act; they contribute to higher-level explicatures, not to the propositional content. In contrast, evidential (*evidently, clearly*) and hearsay (*allegedly, reportedly*) adverbials contribute to the propositional content (encode conceptual meaning) and are hence truth-conditional (120, 146). Either they alter the speaker's degree of commitment to a proposition/the range of evidence that falls within the scope of the proposition, or they function "interpretively" rather than descriptively; that is, they indicate that the thought is attributed to someone other than the speaker. Thus, parentheticals such as *you say, Bill says, we all agree* are interpretive and hence truth-conditional, while *I think* and *I fear*[3] are descriptive (express the speaker's own views) and hence inessential to truth-conditions (149–150, 155–159). According to Blakemore 2002:4),[4] the terms "content" and "procedural" cut across truth-conditional meaning. She argues that sentence adverbials such as *seriously* or *in confidence* (illocutionary parentheticals in Ifantidou's schema), while non-truth-conditional, actually encode conceptual meaning. In contrast, Rouchota (1998:113) points to pronouns, which he argues encode procedural meaning but are truth-conditional. Furthermore, he suggests that while some pragmatic markers, such as the discourse connectives *now* or *so*, express procedural meaning, others express different types of pragmatic meaning.

Given difficulties with the concept of procedural meaning, therefore, it might be better to revise Traugott and Dasher's formulation as follows, where procedural meaning is one of several types of non-referential meaning expressed by pragmatic markers (see, e.g., Traugott 1995a:14; 1995b:47):

> referential (propositional) > non-referential (pragmatic, metalinguistic, procedural).

Traugott and Dasher conclude that the history of pragmatic markers provides evidence of the regularity of semantic change:

[2] Rouchota (1998:114–119) observes that content and procedural may be difficult to distinguish. The former refers to representation, is conscious and truth-evaluable, and may be compositional. The latter refers to computation, is not conscious, does not involve the question of truth, and may point in different directions without contradiction.

[3] Ifantidou (2001:155) terms *I think, I know* as "evidential" parentheticals, and hence by her arguments they should be truth-conditional. However, she argues for their non-truth-conditionality on the basis of their "descriptive" use (154). *I hope, I fear* are classified as "attitudinal" parentheticals (155) and hence understood as non-truth-conditional.

[4] But see Rouchota (1998:114).

> [Pragmatic markers] are highly language-specific in their distribution and function. But nevertheless there seem to be quite similar paths of development at the macro-level. When their histories are accessible to us, they typically arise out of conceptual meanings and uses constrained to the argument structure of the clause. Over time, they not only acquire pragmatic meanings (which typically coexist for some time with earlier, less pragmatic meanings) but also come to have scope over propositions. (2002:156)

2.3 Syntactic development

Numerous syntactic sources for pragmatic markers have been recognized. As Fraser points out (1988:24), pragmatic markers are drawn from many categories – verbs, adverbs, interjections, coordinate and subordinate conjunctions – as well as literal phrases and idioms. Not only words and phrases but also clauses can be the source of pragmatic markers. Diachronic studies of English pragmatic markers have typically focused on forms such as *then*, which have adverbial sources.[5] These have been shown to follow one of two paths of development: from adverb > conjunction > pragmatic marker (§2.3.1) or from clause-internal adverb > sentential adverb > pragmatic marker (§2.3.2). After reviewing this work, I will then focus on pragmatic markers with clausal origins (§2.3.3) and set out possible paths of development.

2.3.1 Adverb/preposition > conjunction > pragmatic marker

The first cline is implicit in Traugott's early work (1982), where she mentions the evolution of *why* from an interrogative to a complementizer to a pragmatic marker functioning as a "hearer-engaging" form[6] (following the semantic–pragmatic development from propositional > textual > expressive) (255), as in:

(1) a. *adverb*: **Why** would he choose Finland? (1991 Forbes, *Whirlpool* [BNC]).
b. *conjunction*: He wondered how she was and **why** she wasn't writing (1990 McGrath, *The Charnel House* [BNC]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: They must all think she was out of her mind. As if a mother didn't know where her own daughter was! **Why**, she even remembered Nora's address (1981 Rendell, *The Best Man to Die* [BNC]).

The pragmatic function of *why* {*so*, *then*} is already pervasive in Early Modern English, where *why* may express perplexity or incredulity on the part of the speaker (see Blake 1992; Culpeper and Kytö 1999; Jucker 2002:219–221). A similar course of development is suggested by Romaine and Lange (1991) for the synchronic grammaticalization of *like*: from a preposition (in the propositional

[5] See, e.g., Enkvist and Wårvik (1987) on *þa*; Wårvik (1995) on *þa* and *þonne*.

[6] Jucker (2002:221) observes that the pragmatic use of *why* is rare in British English but still common in Present-day American English.

component) to a conjunction (in the textual component) to a pragmatic marker (in the interpersonal component), as in:

(2) a. *preposition*: From afar it looks **like** the classical volcanic cone (1991 Sale and Oliver, *Arctic Odyssey* [BNC]).
b. *conjunction*: It was **like** the whole audience was eating celery (1990 Breakwell and Hammond, *Seeing in the Dark* [BNC]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: There were **like** three hanging about (1992 Audrey, Conversations [BNC]).

While the preposition is subcategorized to take a nominal or pronominal complement, in its shift to a conjunction, it is recategorized to take a sentential complement, and in its reanalysis as a pragmatic marker, it "shows syntactic detachability and positional mobility" (Romaine and Lange 1991:261). Note that an offshoot of the conjunctive function within the textual component is the "quasi-complementizer," or "quotative," use of *be like*, as in: *And she's like, "Um . . . Well, that's cool"* (Romaine and Lange 1991:239).[7]

The synchronic paths of *so* and *now* are suggestively parallel. Rather than expressing manner as does the adverb in (3a) or cause or result as does the conjunction (*so* or *so that*) in (3b), *so* in (3c) functions as a pragmatic marker denoting an inferential relation.

(3) a. *manner adverb*: Would a trader have dared to raise prices **so**? (1987 Davis, *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution* [BNC]).
intensifier: You looked **so** happy, sweet and gentle (1990 Strong, *Sons of Heaven* [BNC]).
b. *conjunction*: Endill fitted special wheels **so** the catapult base could be pushed through the door on its side (1990 McDonald, *The Adventures of Endill Swift* [BNC]).
but it was Doyle who answered, dropping every word slowly **so that** it rippled like a stone in a pond (1989 Cross, *On the Edge* [BNC]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: John's lights are burning, **so** he is home (cited in Schiffrin 1987:211).
There's $5 in my wallet. **So** I didn't spend all the money then (cited in Blakemore 1988:188).

According to Blakemore (1988), pragmatic *so* assists the hearer to process new information in the context of old information and to understand the way in which two propositions are connected, namely, that the proposition introduced by *so* is a contextual implication of the preceding proposition.[8]

The temporal meaning of adverbial *now* yields a causal inference, which is conventionalized in the meaning of the conjunction (Traugott and König 1991:197–198). The pragmatic function of *now*, in referring forward to something

[7] For further discussion of *like*, see §3.2.3.1 and §4.3.
[8] See Brinton (1996:197–199, 280) for a comparison between pragmatic *so* and OE *hwæt þa*.

in the discourse context, can also be viewed as an extension of the temporal meaning.

(4) a. *adverb*: Old copies are **now** collectors' items (1991 Darracott, *Art Criticism: A User's Guide* [BNC]).
b. *conjunction*: **Now** all those eyes have looked at it, I feel different about it (1991 Josipovici, *The Big Glass* [BNC]).
Now that you are here, he will hand and deliver (1990 Heald, *A Classic English Crime* [BNC]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: **Now** Italian people are very outgoing (cited in Schiffrin 1987:233).

Schiffrin (1987:230) argues that the pragmatic function of *now* in (4c) is to mark "a speaker's progression through discourse time [i.e., the temporal relation of utterances in a discourse] by displaying attention to an upcoming idea unit, orientation, and/or participation framework." Aijmer (1988:16) considers *now* in this case to be a kind of "misplacement marker" intended as a signal for the hearer to reconstruct a coherent discourse; it is used to express evaluation, as a textual organizer guiding the hearer in the interpretation process, to shift topic, or to change footing.[9]

In all of these studies, however, determination of whether the pragmatic markers, *why, like, so,* and *now*, develop from the conjunctive use or directly from the adverbial use (or in some other way) will await fuller diachronic exploration.

A number of historical studies have underscored the general validity of the proposed cline, while at the same time pointing out potential complications. Brinton (1996:Ch. 7) traces the evolution of OE *hwæt* 'what' (but often translated 'lo, alas, thus') as a pragmatic marker. It would appear to evolve from an interrogative pronoun/adverb/adjective that introduces direct questions, to a complementizer that introduces indirect questions, to a pragmatic marker that questions/assumes common knowledge (cf. modern *y'know*), expresses speaker surprise, or focuses attention (cf. modern *y'know what?*):[10]

(5) a. *adverb:* **Hwæt** murcnast þu þonn[e] æfter þam þe þu forlure? (c888 Ælfred, *Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy* 14.31.2 [DOEC]).
'why do you grieve then after that which you lost?'
b. *conjunction*: Wel wiste crist **hwæt** he don wolde (990–92 Ælfric, *Catholic Homilies: The First Series* 276.45 [DOEC]).
'Christ well knew what he would do'
c. *pragmatic marker*: "**Hwæt**, þu worn fela, wine min Unferð, / beore druncen ymb Brecan spræce" (c800 *Beowulf* 530–531 [ASPR]).

[9] See Brinton (1996:101–103, 280) for a comparison between pragmatic *now* and ME *anon*.

[10] On *hwæt*, see also §3.2.3.1. Fischer (2007b:289) points out that *hwæt* as a pragmatic marker is followed by SV/XV order, evidence that it stands outside the main clause.

'What [you know]! you spoke many things, my friend Unferth, drunk with beer, about Breca'

It is not possible to say whether the pragmatic marker develops from the complementizer function, which is very old, or directly from the interrogative adverb. In Middle English, *what*, *what ho*, and *what a* function as somewhat different kinds of pragmatic markers: *what* denotes surprise or incredulity, which often turns to contempt or scorn (see Blake 1992), while *what ho* is used for attention-getting, and *what a* is used in exclamations. But again *what ho* perhaps derives from the exclamatory *eala hwæt* in Old English and *what a* from the interrogative adjective, not from the conjunctive use of *what*.

An additional pragmatic marker that might also show the pattern of development from adverb/preposition > conjunction > pragmatic marker is the ubiquitous OE *þa* 'then.' In Old English *þa* may function as an adverb, as a conjunction meaning 'when' (especially in the correlated structure *þa . . . þa* 'then . . . when'), or, as has been extensively argued, as a pragmatic marker denoting foregrounded action, narrative segmentation, or discourse-level shifts (see, for example, Enkvist and Wårvik 1987; Kim 1992):

(6) a. *adverb*: Iohannes **þa** aras: & eode wið þæs hælendes (990–92 Ælfric, *The Catholic Homilies: The First Series* 214.247 [DOEC]). 'John then arose and went towards the Savior'

b. *conjunction*: **Þa** se munuc, **þa** þæt hordern heold, gehyrde þa word þæs hatendan (c870–90 Bishop Wærferth of Worcester, *Dialogues of Gregory the Great* 28.159.15 [DOEC]).
'when he held the treasury, then the monk heard the word(s) of the commander'

c. *pragmatic marker*: **Þa** on sumere nihte hlosnode sum oðer munuc his færeldes . . . **þa** dyde cuþberhtus swa his gewuna wæs . . . Efne **þa** comon twegen seolas of sælicum grunde . . . **þa** cuðberhtus ða sælican nytenu on sund asende (990–92 Ælfric, *Catholic Homilies*, *The Second Series* 10.76–86 [Enkvist and Wårvik 1987:228–229, 235]).
'then one summer night another monk watched his going . . . Then Cuthbert did as he was accustomed to . . . Indeed, then there came two seals from the sea-bottom . . . Then Cuthbert sent the blessed creatures back to the sea'

Little attention has focused on the evolution of *þa* and its syntactic relation to the adverbial and conjunctive forms. Wårvik (1995:348) apparently considers the pragmatic use to be related to the adverbial form, not to the conjunctive form, as the adverb marks foregrounded action and the conjunction backgrounded action. She argues that in Middle English, adverbial *þa* is replaced by *þonne*, which originally marked backgrounded material, while conjunctive *þa/þonne* is replaced by *when*. The foregrounding functions of 'then' are lost in Middle English, and it becomes first a marker of episodic structure and then a mere

sequencer; a variety of other pragmatic markers, *anon, as, so (that), hwæt þa, this*, and especially *when . . . then*, come to replace *þa* (Wårvik 1990:568, 570; Fludernik 1995;2000). However, Schiffrin (1988) points out that *then* can have various pragmatic functions in Present-day English in sectioning off events or other kinds of sequentially ordered units and marking inferences that are warranted by another's prior talk. While she sees the latter as very similar to conditional (and conjunctive) *then* marking the apodosis of a condition (*if* X, *then*Y), she argues for the source of both in the temporal *then*, one via straightforward extension of the temporal meaning and the other via pragmatic inferencing from temporal succession to causal meaning. Although she is not explicit on this point, it would seem that she sees both pragmatic uses of *then* as deriving from the adverbial function.

2.3.2 Clause-internal adverb > sentential adverb > pragmatic marker

This development is implicit in Traugott's early work (1982), where she says that *well* and *right* originate as predicate adjectives. Traugott (1995a) is a detailed study of the rise of *indeed*, *in fact*, and *besides* as pragmatic markers following the cline:

> (full lexical noun >) adverbial phrase > sentence adverbial > pragmatic marker

Traugott describes the development from verb phrase adverbial (VAdv) to sentential adverb (IPAdv) to discourse marker (DM) as follows:

> The developments suggest that there is a diachronic path along an adverbial cline of the type: VAdv > IPAdv > DM . . . The hypothesis is that an adverbial, say a manner adverb, will be dislocated from its typical clause internal position within the predicate, where it has syntactic narrow scope and pragmatically evaluates the predicated event, to whatever position is the site for wide-scope sentential adverbs. As an IPAdv it pragmatically and semantically evaluates the content of the proposition . . . Whatever its syntactic site, a IPAdv that has the appropriate semantics and pragmatics may acquire new pragmatic functions and polysemies that give it the potential to become a DM. Over time these functions may be semanticized either in this position or in a further dislocated position resulting in the new DM function. This stage involves the acquisition not only of new polysemies and morphosyntactic constraints, but also of new prosodic characteristics . . . The form in this new function serves pragmatically to evaluate the relation of the up-coming text to that which precedes, and does not evaluate the proposition itself. (1995a:13)

While a clause-internal adverb typically has scope over the predicate, a sentential adverb has scope over the entire proposition, and an extra-sentential pragmatic

marker has scope over larger chunks of discourse. The adverb will also normally move as a disjunct into sentence-initial position. Importantly, this process involves a widening of scope, or as Traugott and Dasher (2002:40) describe it, a trajectory from "scope within proposition" to "scope over proposition" to "scope over discourse."

Traugott instances the trajectory of *indeed* from full noun to pragmatic marker (examples are cited from Traugott 2003a:640):

(7) a. *clause-internal adverb*: for þe ende **in dede** schulde come aftur þat schulde be euen as þe furst si3t (c1380 *English Wycliffite Sermons* p. 1, 589 [HC]).
'for the end indeed should come afterwards, that should be like the first sight'

b. *sentential adverb*: they [the teachers] somtyme purposely suffring [allowing] the more noble children to vainquysshe, and, as it were, gyuying to them place and soueraintie, thoughe **in dede** the inferiour chyldren haue more lernyng (1531 Elyot, *The Boke named the Gouernour,* p. 21 [HC]).

c. *pragmatic marker*: thereby [the flea is] inabled to walk very securely both on the skin and hair; and **indeed** this contrivance of the feet is very curious . . . for performing both these requisite motions (1665 Hooke, *Micrographia* p. 13.5, 212 [HC]).

The full lexical noun (*deed*) is found in a prepositional phrase (*in deed*) functioning adverbially. This adverbial phrase is located clause internal, within the predicate of the sentence. It then moves to sentence-initial position with a disjunct function. In this extra-sentential position it may then develop into a pragmatic marker with textual and/or interpersonal functions. In addition to *indeed*, Traugott and her colleagues have demonstrated that *actually*, *after all*, *anyway*, *besides*, *in fact*, and *instead* follow a similar course of development (see further §3.2.3.1).

Focusing more on semantic development, Lewis (2002) discusses the historical development of *at least* from a VP adverb to sentence adverb, from propositional (scalar) to epistemic ("rhetorical retreat") and speech act meaning (i.e., the state of affairs is evaluated as beneficial by the speaker). Lewis (2006:52–55) discusses the historical development of *of course*, from a PP (meaning 'as a matter of course') to a "lexicalized" adverb in the late seventeenth century (meaning 'naturally' or 'normally' appearing frequently in causal and epistemic contexts) to a purely epistemic use at the turn of the nineteenth century. In Present-day English *of course* has two uses: as marker of speaker commitment (emphatic yes, and 'as expected') and an intersubjective function in anticipating the hearer's response.

Other studies have proposed much the same course of development for other forms in English. In the evolution of *only* (Brinton 1998), there has been a shift from the numeral *one* to the adjective/adverb *only* meaning 'solely, uniquely' (8a) to the focusing adverb *only* with exclusive meaning (8b). Then in Early

Modern English, *only* begins to function as an "adversative" (= 'but') conjunction/pragmatic marker (8c):

(8) a. *clause-internal adverb*: Eliezer . . . brogt him a wif . . . He luuede hire **on-like** and wel (a1325 [c1250] *The Middle English Genesis and Exodus* 1439–1443 [*MED*]).
'Elizer . . . brought for himself a wife . . . He loved her solely and well'
adjective: Ich geleue . . . on halende crist, his **anliche** sune, ure lhaferd (a1250 *Creed* [Blick 6864] p.138 [*MED*]).
'I believe . . . in the holy Christ, his only son, our lord'
b. *focusing adverb*: ðis **onelich** y knowe, ðat I know not (a1382 *Wycliffite Bible(1) Prefatory Epistles of St. Jerome* 9 [Bod 959] 7.145 [*MED*]).
'this only I know, that I do not know'
c. *conjunction/pragmatic marker*: I am able to walke with a staff reasonable well, **only** my knee is not yet recoverd . . . (1628–32 Barrington, *Letters* 96–97 [HC]).

The development of *only* thus follows Traugott's (1995a) cline.

In Brinton (1999), I argue that *whilom*, the dative plural of *while*, shifts from clause-internal adverb meaning 'at times' and modifying an iterative or habitual event (9a), to a sentential adverb meaning 'formerly' and modifying an entire proposition (9b), to a pragmatic marker meaning 'once upon a time' introducing an episode (9c):

(9) a. *clause-internal adverb*: **Hwilum** mæru cwen, / friðusibb folca, flet eall geondhwearf, / bædde byre geonge . . . (c800 *Beowulf* 2016–2018 [ASPR]).
'at times the famous queen, the pledge of peace between nations, went throughout the hall, urged on the young sons . . . '
b. *sentential adverb*: ȝider com in gangan **hwilon** an meretrix (1100 *History of the Holy Rood-tree* 26, ll. 11–12 [HC]).
'formerly a prostitute came walking in thither'
c. *pragmatic marker*: **Whilom**, as olde stories tellen us, / Ther was a duc that highte Theseus (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* Kn.A 859–860 [Benson]).
'Once upon a time, as old stories tell us, there was a duke who was named Theseus'

This development is entirely consistent with the path proposed in Traugott (1995a).[11]

Brinton (1996:Ch. 4) discusses *anon*, which originates in the OE prepositional phrase *on an(e)*, and grammaticalizes as an adverb meaning 'at once, immediately'

[11] It should be noted that the subsequent development of an adjectival form (as in *the whilom king of Crete*) poses a question for the hypothesis of unidirectionality in grammaticalization (see Brinton 1996).

in Middle English. A conjunction, *anon as* 'as soon as,' develops from the adverb. A further development in the ME period is its use as a pragmatic marker signaling salient action and emphasizing the sequence of events in an ongoing narrative (see further Fludernik 1995:381, 386–387; §3.2.3.1 below). *Anon* also has an internal evaluative function. In Early Modern English *anon* develops as a pragmatic marker serving as a sign of attentiveness in dialogue. The original sense of immediacy of the locative/temporal adverb gives rise first to invited inferences of saliency/importance/sequence and then of willingness/readiness:

(10) a. *adverb*: ȝider he wente him **anon**, / So suiþe so he miȝtte gon (?a1300 *Dame Sirith* 8, ll. 155–156 [HC]).
'thither he went at once as quickly as he could'

b. *conjunction*: "ek men ben so untrewe, / That right **anon** as cessed is hire lest,/ So cesseth love . . . " (1380–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* II 786–788 [Benson]).
'also men are so untrue that as soon as their (sexual) pleasure has ceased so too has their love . . . '

c. *pragmatic marker*: But streght into hire closet wente **anon**, / And set hire doun as stylle as any ston . . . (1380–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* II 599–600 [Benson]).
'But straight into her room she went at once, and set herself down as still as any stone . . . '

d. *pragmatic marker*: *Falstaff*: Some sack, Francis. *Prince Poins [coming forward]*: **Anon, anon**, sir (1598 Shakespeare, *2 Henry IV,* II, iv, 281–282 [Evans]).

On the surface, we would seem to have an instance of the shift from adverb > conjunction > pragmatic marker discussed in the previous section. However, the pragmatic marker appears not to develop from the conjunction but directly from the adverb along the route suggested by Traugott (1995a).

A form that bears some similarity to *anon* is ME *for the nones*. This derives from the prepositional phrase *for þen anes* (with later false morphological division). While it may function as a clause-internal adverb meaning 'for that purpose,' 'for the occasion,' 'for that position,' it is apparently more frequent as a so-called "intensive tag" with clausal scope meaning 'indeed, assuredly' or as a fairly colorless "metrical tag" (presumably, some fashion of pragmatic marker). It would seem to follow the course of change set out by Traugott (1995a), but more detailed study is required.

Another clear example of this course of development is the development of OE *witodlice* 'certainly' and *soþlice* 'truly,' discussed by Lenker (2000). These adverbs derive from the adjectives *witodlic* and *soþlic* (by the addition of adverbial *-e*), themselves derivations from the nouns *witod* and *soþ*. Lenker shows how the adverbs evolve from manner adjuncts with scope within the predicate, or more often, truth-intensifying, speaker-oriented "emphasizers" (11a), to speaker comments with sentential scope which convey the speaker's assertion that his

words are true (11b), and finally to pragmatic markers serving as highlighters and markers of discourse discontinuity (11c) (examples from Lenker 2000: 233–237).

(11) a. *predicate adverb*: Ic eam **soþlice** romanisc. and ic on hæftnyd hider gelæd wæs (993–98 Ælfric, *Lives of Saints,* Eustace 344).
'I am truly a Roman, and I was brought hither in captivity' (Skeat's translation)
b. *sentential adverb*: Wæs he **soðlice** on rihtwisnysse weorcum . . . swiðe gefrætwod (993–98 Ælfric, *Lives of Saints,* Eustace 4).
'Truly he was greatly adorned . . . with works of righteousness' (Skeat's translation)
c. *pragmatic marker*: **Soþlice** on ðam dagum wæs geworden gebod from ðam casere augusto (950–1160 *The Old English Version of the Gospels,* Luke 2, 2).
'Truly, in these days an order was given by the Emperor Augustus'

A somewhat less clear example of this trajectory is the development of the "interjection" *marry* (see Fischer 1998). Originating in the nominal phrase *by (the Virgin) Mary*, this form evolves in the late fourteenth century into a pragmatic marker *marry*, which occurs frequently at the beginning of the second part of an adjacency pair and signals the speaker's emotional involvement. However, while Fischer documents the initial and final stages, he gives no evidence of the middle stage (as predicate adverb).

2.3.3 Matrix clause > parenthetical disjunct > pragmatic marker

Thompson and Mulac (1991b:313), focusing on *I think* and *I guess* in Present-day English, which they term "epistemic parentheticals," propose a synchronic cline of development for the matrix clause-type of comment clause, as shown in the sequence given in (12a–c):

(12) a. **I think** that we're definitely moving towards being more technological.
b. **I think** Ø exercise is really beneficial, to anybody.
c. It's just your point of view you know what you like to do in your spare time **I think**.

I think followed by *that* in (12a) is a matrix clause, *I think* without *that* in (12b) is indeterminate between a matrix clause and a parenthetical disjunct, and moveable *I think* in (12c) is clearly parenthetical, as it is no longer restricted to sentence-initial position. In this position it serves as a unitary particle expressing epistemicity. There is reversal of the matrix clause/complement clause structure, the original complement clause being reanalyzed as the matrix clause

and the original matrix clause now serving as a parenthetical disjunct.[12] Quirk *et al.* (1985:1113) postulate a similar development for the matrix clause-type of comment clause in which there is a "reversal in syntactic roles" between the two clauses, though they admit that the two structures are not "exact paraphrases" (see also Hübler 1983:115; Markkanen 1985:46–47). I will refer to this theory as the "matrix clause hypothesis."

The matrix clause hypothesis recalls Ross's (1973) theory of "slifting" or "sentence lifting" proposed to account for parentheticals such as *I feel, it seems, remember, don't you think*.[13] In contrast to Thompson and Mulac, however, Ross moves the *that*-clause rather than the original matrix clause. For Ross, the rule of slifting "chops a sentence-final *that*-clause from under the domination of a superordinate *S*, deletes the *that*, and Chomsky-adjoins the remainder of the clause to the left of the superordinate *S*" (134–135). Thus, *I feel that Max is a Martian* may be slifted to *Max is a Martian, I feel*.[14] The output of slifting may be followed by "niching" (166), which inserts parentheticals into various niches in the preceding clause. Ross gives detailed syntactic arguments for the existence of slifting, which in the main consist of showing that the parenthetical and main clause interact in various ways and that it is not possible to interpret the parenthetical as merely an adverbial adjoined to the main clause. Hooper (1975:96, 100–101) provides semantic arguments for viewing the original complement clause of assertives as the surface main clause. She argues that interrogative tests can show that a sentence such as *He says he wants to hire a woman* may have a "parenthetical reading" in which "he wants to hire a woman" is the main assertion as well as a "nonparenthetical reading" in which "he says x" is the main assertion. Furthermore, complements of assertives are like main clauses in allowing certain root transformations (99). Ross concludes that there is "a very empirical compelling case" for the claim that "clauses which are subordinate in remote structure can become main clauses in superficial structure" (1973:165).

This analysis (in either form) is rejected by some scholars, who point to the lack of synonymity between the original and derived form (see, for example, Jackendoff 1972; Peterson 1998; Asher 2000). As evidence of their non-equivalency,

[12] Hand (1993:505) argues that the syntactic reanalysis that Thompson and Mulac propose is incorrect. He retains the original syntactic structure but allows the non-constituent NP + V to have a pragmatic function, that of fine-tuning the illocutionary force of the complement. Furthermore, he believes that his pragmatic explanation accounts for Thompson and Mulac's findings concerning where *that*-deletion is most common (501–505).

[13] Similarly, Hooper (1975:93) argues for a transformation that she calls "complement preposing," which allows for the fronting of all or part of the complement clause. In contrast to earlier views that complement preposing is restricted to non-factives, she points out that it is possible with all assertive verbs, whether non-factive (such as *think, believe, expect, say*) or factive (such as *find out, notice, know, see*). She admits, however, that the parenthetical interpretation may be difficult to obtain in persons and tenses other than the first-person present (102).

[14] Markkanen (1985:46) suggests that Ross sees the resulting structure as coordinate rather than subordinating the parenthetical to the original *that*-clause.

Asher (2000:33) notes the acceptability of (13a), but the oddness of (13b), while Peterson (1998:236) observes that (13c) is an interrogative while (13d) is a declarative and thus not equivalent. Viewing the transformation as operating in the other way (from parenthetical to main clause), Stenström (1995:297) points to the lack of synonymity between (13e) and (13f); in (13e), *you see* means 'I want you to realize that' while in (13f) it means 'you realize that.' The notion of 'wanting' is not part of the lexical meaning of *see* but must be pragmatically inferred. She argues further that these sorts of changes work much less well with second-person than with first-person parentheticals because of the oddness of telling an addressee what he or she 'knows' or 'sees':

(13) a. Mary assures us that the party is over. Does she?
b. The party, Mary assures us, is over. ?Does she?
c. Would you believe that John Smith is asking to see you?
d. John Smith, would you believe, is asking to see you.
e. This is the trouble in schools, you see.[15]
f. You see that this is the trouble in schools.

There are a number of syntactic difficulties as well. Both sentence lowering and sentence lifting move non-constituents, a move that is standardly disallowed. Transformational accounts cannot explain the unacceptability of negative parentheticals (as in *John is, *I don't think, a fink*) when they are acceptable as matrixes (Jackendoff 1972:95–96), nor can they account for problems with the use of *any* (*I don't think anyone will solve the problem. *Anyone, I don't think, will solve the problem*) and with tense (*I hope the rain stops on Sunday. *The rain stops on Sunday, I hope*) (Peterson 1998:234ff.). Dehé and Kavalova (2006) reject the transformational approach as well because they say that while it requires the parenthetical to be analyzed as an adjunct, the fact that the parenthetical cannot be focused or moved, does not cause inversion, etc., suggests that it must be analyzed as a disjunct.

Despite problems with this transformational account, it is the only one that has been proposed in the diachronic context, and will be investigated more fully in this study. It can also be extended to original matrix clauses with second- and third-person subjects (e.g., *you know, God forbid*) as well as imperative matrix clauses (e.g., *mind you*); these would likewise necessitate a reversal in syntactic hierarchy in their development from main clause to parenthetical/pragmatic marker.

2.3.3.1 Matrix declarative with first-person subject. I will begin by reviewing diachronic studies of several pragmatic markers which, like *I think* and *I guess*, consist of a first-person pronoun in conjunction with a present-tense verb that may take a complement clause. These include *I think (methinks), I'm afraid,*

[15] Prosodic marks have been omitted.

I'm sorry, I pray you/thee (> pray), I promise you, and *I thank you (> thank you, thanks*). Although the development of these forms would seem to involve a syntactic reversal of the original matrix clause and the original subordinate *that*-clause, as shown in (12) (the "matrix clause hypothesis"), the historical data do not always confirm the sequence of development postulated by this hypothesis.

Palander-Collin (1999; see also §3.2.3.2 below) has shown that diachronically *I think* and *methinks* have followed the path of the matrix clause hypothesis, occurring most often in the first person with zero-marked nominal clauses which immediately follow the verb. This, it is argued, is the context in which reanalysis can occur. The three steps in the development of *methinks* can be seen in the following examples (without any attempt to establish chronological sequence):

(14) a. *matrix clause*: **Methynkyth** that knyght is muche bygger than ever was sir Kay (a1470 Malory, *Le Morte dArthur* 06/13/277 [HC]).
'it seems to me that the knight is much bigger that Sir Kay ever was'

b. *matrix clause/parenthetical*: And lathe **methinkeh**, on þe todir seyde, / My wiff with any man to defame (a1450 *The York Plays* 118, ll. 51–52 [HC]).
'and lately it seems to me, on the other side, my wife with any man to defame'

c. *pragmatic marker*: On lyve **methynkith** I lyffe to lange, / Allas þe whille (a1450 *The York Plays* 72, ll. 103–104 [*MED*]).
'on life it seems to me I live too long all the while'

The politeness markers *pray* (< *I pray you*) and *prithee* (< *I pray thee*) provide a closer parallel.[16] Like *I think* forms, they begin as main clauses and develop into parentheticals. Akimoto (2000) shows that *pray* may be followed by *that*-complements in earlier English, but begins to occur parenthetically in the sixteenth century. Following the matrix clause hypothesis, he argues that *that*-deletion promotes the change from syntactic main verb to what he calls an "interjection." Traugott and Dasher (2002:252–255) likewise trace the evolution of *pray, prithee* from a main clause performative *I pray you/thee* followed by a subordinate clause (a *that*-clause, an imperative, or an interrogative) to a parenthetical and finally to a pragmatic marker:[17]

(15) a. *matrix clause*: Do you approve their judgments Madam, which / Are grounded on your will? I may not do't./ Only **I pray,** that you may understand . . . the difference (1657 Brome, *The Queenes Exchange* I, 64–67 [ED]).

[16] See also §3.2.3.2.

[17] Traugott (2000) addresses the semantic changes in *pray* as well, arguing that *pray* comes to index stance towards the addressee and thus shows both subjectification and intersubjectification.

b. *matrix clause/parenthetical*: **I pray** you doe not stirre till my returne (1632 Hausted, *The Rivall Friends* V, ii, 32 [ED]).
I pray you send down by the post my doublet coat (1675 Pynchon in Mather, *The History of King Philip's War* (1862) 245 [*OED*]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: Short and sweet, **I pray you** (1694 Motteux, *Rabelais* IV. Xlix [*OED*]).
He has chang'd Sides, 'tis true, but Sirs, **I pray**, / Is he the only Scribbler went Astray? (1691 Settle, *Distress'd Innocence* Epilogue [ED]).
Yet let your Wife, **pray**, dy by your own hand (1694 Boyle, *Herod the Great* II, 351 [ED]).

Busse (2002) sees *pray*-expressions in initial position, in spite of their potential indeterminacy, as functioning primarily as parentheticals even in this position in Shakespeare's English. Note that *prithee* undergoes a syntactic reanalysis in the course of its transformation to a disjunct similar to that of *look(ee)* (see Chapter 8).[18]

Evidence against this proposed development, however, is the fact that *that*-complements appear to be the minority form in the earlier periods. In Akimoto's fifteenth-century data, *I pray* is more often followed by a *wh*-interrogative or an imperative, and by Shakespeare's time *pray*-forms are almost exclusively restricted to such complements (Busse 2002:205–206), as shown in the following:

(16) a. **I pray you**, speake for me to master Doctor (1616 Jonson, *The Alchemist* I, iii, 29 [ED]).
b. **I pray you** sir is not your name *Onion*? (1609 Jonson, *The Case is Altered* I, i, 111 [ED]).

Moreover, the timing of the appearance of the various *pray*-expressions is not entirely clear. In Akimoto's data, the object *you (thee)* starts to be deleted in the sixteenth century, and the subject *I* in the seventeenth century. However, in Busse's Shakespearian corpus the full form *I pray you* is much more common than *pray, prithee*, or any form of this expression (2002); in Kryk-Kastovsky's Early Modern English court data (1998:50–51), truncated forms are used sparingly: *I* is present in the majority of cases, and *(I) pray thee/pray you* forms are twice as common as *(I) prithee* forms. *Prithee* is uncommon in the EModE section of the Helsinki corpus, appearing only in the third subperiod (Jucker 2002:225).

Akimoto (2002), in a brief discussion, asserts that the development of *I'm afraid* parallels that of *I think*:

[18] An unresolved question is why *prithee*, which is found in polite contexts, as in requests for information, incorporates the familiar second-person form, *thee*, while *lookee*, which even in the earliest citations seems to occur in colloquial contexts, incorporates the formal second-person form, *ye*. Jucker (2002:225) suggests that *prithee* may be the less polite form of *I pray you*. Brown and Gilman (1989:181, 183–184) argue that *prithee* is a positive politeness marker (showing friendship, affection, and intimacy) while *pray you* is a negative politeness marker (showing deference), a view that might lend support for Jucker.

(17) a. *matrix clause*: Nurse, **I'm afraid**, that you are wrong agen (1669 Stapylton, *The Tragedie Of Hero and Leander* III, 131 [ED]).
b. *matrix clause/parenthetical*: yet *Mary*, **I am afraid** 'twill vex thee horribly / To stay so long. (1679 Fletcher, *Monsieur Thomas* III, 59–60 [ED]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: I'll sing no more; I caught this Hoarseness, **I'm afraid**, Dancing at Drapers-Hall last Maquerade (1696 Hopkins, *Neglected Virtue: or, the Vnhappy Conquerour* Epilogue [ED]).
This Action of *Philander*, **I'm afraid**, / Will lose the People's Hearts (1715 Villiers, *The Restauration: Or, Right will take Place* I, 475–476 [ED]).

However, in Akimoto's data – and in my review of the corpus data – a *that*-complement with *be afraid* is rare in the earlier periods and usually occurs with a third-person subject; furthermore, while parenthetical *I am afraid* becomes more common over time, so does matrix *I am afraid* S (Akimoto 2002:3, 6). This makes an evolution such as proposed by the matrix clause hypothesis and exemplified in (17) somewhat questionable.

Similarly, the development of *I am sorry* (see Molina 2002) might appear to follow the matrix clause hypothesis, but this would require further research in the dating of the changes:

(18) a. *matrix clause*: Captaine, **I'm sorry** that you lay this wrong / So close vnto your heart (1602 Dekker, *Satiro-Mastix* 1609–1610 [ED]).
b. *matrix clause/parenthetical*: **I am sorry** the Bishopric of Fernes is so spurgalled (1635 Laud, *Works* [1860] VII.117 [*OED*]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: Trust me, **I am sorry**; / Would thou hadst ta'ne her room (1679 Beaumont, *The Maids Tragedy* III, ii, 2–3 [ED]).

Focusing on another epistemic parenthetical, Traugott and Dasher (2002:206–209) discuss the development of *I promise (you)* from a content verb (followed by a *that*-clause) "to increasingly pragmatic, discourse-based meanings, as well as to more subjective meanings" (209). Like *I pray, I promise* shows a shift from speech act verb through performative to parenthetical. The parenthetical not only expresses epistemic modality (the speaker's degree of certitude) but is a subjective acknowledgment that the addressee might have doubts about the speaker's message (209). They cite the following early example (2002:207):

(19) He losyth sore hys tyme her, **I promyse** you (1469 Paston I, 542 [*MED*])
'he is wasting his time badly here, actually'

Although Traugott and Dasher do not explicitly discuss the syntactic mechanisms of these developments (apart from suggesting that the parenthetical does

not develop from an adverbial/relative construction), they presumably believe it to follow the course set out by the matrix clause hypothesis.[19]

Finally, Jacobsson (2002), though focusing on the development of *thank you/thanks* as politeness markers, notes that the shortened forms (deriving from *I thank you/I give thanks to you* [*OED*: s.v.v. *thank you, thank*, def. II 5a) had not progressed far in the Early Modern English period (67). Furthermore, his examples suggest that the expression originates as *I thank you* occurring independently or followed by a *for* phrase; thus *thank you* would not seem to require the syntactic reversal seen with *I think* or *I guess.*

Further examples of the development of first-person comment clauses are discussed in §4.4, §4.5, §10.3.3, and §10.4.3.

2.3.3.2 Matrix declarative with second- or third-person subject. In addition to the first-person forms discussed so far, there exist a number of second- and third-person comment clauses. The common pragmatic marker *you know*, whose function is to indicate (presumed or actual) shared knowledge, would seem to show a similar change from matrix clause to pragmatic marker (Brinton 1996:206–209). The ME expression of epistemic certainty, *God woot*, likewise originates in a matrix clause. Interestingly, it has progressed further along the path towards particle status, as witnessed by univerbated and phonologically reduced forms such as *Goddot, Goddoth,* or *Goddote* (Brinton 1996:255–261). Iyeiri (2002) discusses the function of the similar *God forbid*, which might likewise follow the path proposed by the matrix clause hypothesis:

(20) a. *matrix clause*: **God for-bed** þat crewell ore vengaunce In ony woman founde shulde be (c1440 *Partonope of Blois* (Rawl. MS) 11281 [*MED*]). 'God forbid that cruelty or vengeance should be found in any woman'
b. *matrix clause/parenthetical*: **God forbid** I should from the poore withdrawe my hand (1578 Lupton, *All for Money* 755 [ED]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: I bade her come. What lamb! What ladybird / **God forbid**! Where's this girl? What Juliet! (1595–96 Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* I, iii, 3–4 [Evans]).

Further examples of second-person comment clauses are discussed in §4.6 and §6.5.

2.3.3.3 Matrix imperative. Although overlooked by Quirk *et al.* (1985:1112–1118), second-person imperative constructions represent an additional source for comment clauses.

One comment clause in Present-day English that originates in an imperative construction is *mind (you)*. This pragmatic marker is much more frequent in British than in American English, though in the latter dialect it occurs more

[19] The native *hatan* (*behatan, gehatan*) 'to promise' verbs follow a parallel course of development in Old English (Traugott and Dasher 2002:211–214).

frequently in non-initial position (see Algeo 2006:210). In matrix position, *mind* may be followed by a *that*-clause (21a) or an imperative clause (21b). Once reanalyzed as a parenthetical, *mind (you)* is flexible in position and continues to occur with both directive ("you must never . . . ") and non-directive ("there's rummer things . . . ") sentences (21c):

(21) a. *matrix imperative*: "**Mind** that you apply not your Traphine on the temporal Bones, Sutures, or Sinciput" (1686/1689 Moyle, *Abstractum Chirurgiæ Marinæ; or an Abstract of Sea Surgery* ii. vii [*OED*]).
b. *matrix imperative/parenthetical*: "**Mind you** take care of yourself. I'll never forgive you if you don't" (1800 Dickens, *The Old Curiosity Shop* Ch. 9 [UofV]).
"**Mind you** have a vent-peg at the top of the vessel" (1747–96 Mrs. Glasse, *The Art of Cookery: by a Lady* xxii. 349 [*OED*]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: "There's rummer things than women in this world though, **mind you**" (1836 Dickens, *Pickwick Papers* xiv [*OED*]).
"**Mind**, you must never let the *sauté* be too much done" (1827 Ude, *The French Cook* 194 [*OED*]).

Traugott (1995b; also Traugott and Dasher 2002:176–178; Hopper and Traugott 2003:9–13; see also §3.2.3.2 below) discusses the syntactic development of hortatory *let's*, seeing a change from the biclausal imperative, i.e., *Let us go(, will you?)* (22a), to the modalized single-clause hortatory, i.e., *Let's go (, shall we?)* (22b) (note that tag questions differentiate these forms), to a single clause with pragmatic marker, *Let's take our pills now, Johnny* (22c). She dates the appearance of the hortatory construction to Middle English and the pragmatic marker to Present-day English:

(22) a. For love of swete Jhesus, Now **let us** passe skere (a1400 *Lybeaus Desconus* 297 [*OED*]).
'for the love of sweet Jesus, now let up pass unharmed'
b. And now **let's** go hand in hand, not one before another (1592–94 Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors* V, i, 426 [*OED*]).
c. Men are incomplete. Self-sufficiency is not tenable. Forget the Marlboro man. **Let's** get in touch with our feelings and get reconnected in dense relationships (1994 *New York Times Book Review* 9 Jan. 3/2 [*OED*]).

Traugott (1995b:37–38) also discusses the development of *let alone*. This construction begins as a regular imperative directed to a second person (23a) or perhaps as a participial construction (23b). Then in the nineteenth century (*OED*, s.v. *let,* def. IV 18e), the form loses its verbal qualities and becomes a pragmatic marker with the meaning 'not to mention.' In this use, it has the "metalinguistic, epistemic function of denying the informativeness of the member of the set" (Traugott 1995b:38):

(23) a. *matrix imperative*: **Let** them **alone** awhile, and then open the doore (1596–97 Shakespeare, *1 Henry IV* II, iv, 86 [Evans]).
b. *participial construction*: These purging Imprecations **let alone**, / You have the Tyrant's thanks for what is done (1667 Caryll, *The English Princess* iii, 24–25 [ED]).
c. *pragmatic marker*: Are you cherishing the notion that anybody, **let alone** Miss Catherine Linton, would have you for a husband? (1847 Brontë, *Wuthering Heights* Vol. 2, Ch. 2.1, 272–273 [UofV]).

Consistent with the cline of derivation proposed by Thompson and Mulac (1991b) for *I think* comment clauses, imperative matrix constructions also involve loss of the subordinating conjunction and subsequent reversal in the syntactic hierarchy, in which the original matrix imperative (*mind, let's, let alone)* is reanalyzed as a parenthetical disjunct and the original subordinate clause (usually an indirect imperative or interrogative) is reanalyzed as a matrix clause. However, the change from matrix imperative to pragmatic marker also involves a rebracketing. The second-person pronoun, *you/ye,* originally the subject of the complement clause of verb in the subordinate clause, is reanalyzed as subject of the matrix verb:

[mind] [(that) you be not late] > [mind you] [be not late]

Further examples of imperative comment clauses are discussed in §4.4.2.1, §6.4, §8.4.1, and §8.5.

2.3.3.4 Adverbial/relative clause. Quirk *et al.* (1985:1115–1117) point to a second type of comment clause resembling a finite adverbial clause, e.g., *as you said, as you know, so I believe, as it happens.* They observe that a comment clause such as *as you know* is intermediate between an adverbial and a relative construction, and may be equivalent to a sentential relative *which you know* (1116).

To date, little attention has been focused on the history of adverbial comment clauses. It is clear that their development cannot be accounted for by the matrix clause hypothesis as they do not involve any reversal in syntactic relationship. While the details are complex and need yet to be fully explored, the politeness marker *please* would appear to originate in an adverbial clause. The *OED* (s.v. *please*, def. II6c) initially proposes a source for *please* in the impersonal *please it you* 'may it please you' > *please you* > *please* but allows that *please* is now usually seen as a shortened form of the personal conditional *if you please* (functioning as "a courteous qualification to a request") or of the passive of the personal verb, *be pleased*. Chen (1998:25–27) suggests that the personal conditional *if you please*, not the optative *please it you*, should be seen as the source of the politeness marker *please*. Allen (1995) provides support for this claim. She argues that the personal construction with nominative experiencer subject (*if/when you please*), rather than resulting from a syntactic reanalysis of the impersonal construction, as traditionally argued (*OED*:s.v. *please*, def. II6a), is an option added to the

grammar. According to Allen, the two constructions differ pragmatically even in Shakespeare's usage, the personal occurring with actions over which the experiencer can exert some control, and they follow different courses of development: *if it please you* becomes increasingly deferential and finally recessive, and *if you please* becomes restricted to a polite formula.

There is also some controversy about the occurrence of clausal complements with *please*. The *OED* (s.v. *please*, def. I3) notes the existence of clausal subjects (either expressed or understood) with impersonal *please* (24a). While Akimoto (2000:80) remarks upon the existence of personal *please* followed by an infinitive in his eighteenth-century data (24b), Allen (1995:295) finds such constructions to be uncommon in conditionals (e.g., *if you please to take note*) (24c). The infrequency of clausal complements thus calls into doubt *please*'s development from a matrix clause. Rather, it would appear that *please* derives from an adjoined adverbial clause, as in (24d):

(24) a. **Please it** your full wyse discretions, to consider the matier (1423 *Rolls of Parliament* IV.249 [*OED*]).
'if it please your very wise discerner to consider this matter'
b. **Please** then my Lord to read this Epistle (1622 Markham, *Five Decades of Epistles of Warre* v.vii.185 [*OED*]).
c. **if you please** / To shoot another arrow that self way (1596–97 Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice* I, i, 147–148 [Evans]).
d. But tary, I pray you all, **Yf ye please** (1530 *Jyl of Brentford's Test.* [Ballad Soc.] 15 [*OED*]).

If you please becomes fixed and routinized by the nineteenth century (Allen 1995:298) and is rare in Present-day English. *Please*, without either *if* or the subject experiencer, comes to function as a pragmatic marker of politeness by the beginning of the twentieth century. Like *pray*, *please* shows a shift from "a construction with meaning at the propositional level to a pragmatic marker with functions at the sociodiscourse level" (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 257).[20]

Using data from Old and Middle English, Brinton (1996:Ch. 8) argues – contra the matrix clause hypothesis – for an adverbial source for *I think* comment clauses (such as *believe, deem, doubt not, know, leve, suppose, think, trow, understand, undertake, be aware, wene, gesse,* and *woot*) (cf. Aijmer 1997:8–10). I show that historically there is not a correlation between forms occurring without *that* and epistemic parentheticals, nor the clear progression from matrix clause to parenthetical, as shown in (12). Rather, *I think* parentheticals would seem to originate in an adjoined adverbial structure "as/so (< 'which') I think" in

[20] On the replacement of *pray* by *please*, see Akimoto (2000, 2007); Kryk-Kastovsky (1998:51–52).

Old English (25a).[21] The adverbial nature of these clauses is evident in Middle English (25b):

(25) a. "Habbað we to þæm mæran micel ærende, / Deniga frean, ne sceal þær dyrne sum / wesan, **þæs ic wene**" (c800 *Beowulf* 270–72 [ASPR]).
'we have for the famous lord of the Danes a great message; nor shall anything there be secret, so (of this) I think'

b. "Thee were nede of hennes, **as I wene** / Ya, moo than seven tymes seventene" (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* B.NP 3453–3454 [Benson]).
'you have need of hens, as I think, yes more than seven times seventeen'

c. I wol with lusty herte, fressh and grene, / Seyn you a song to glade you, **I wene** (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* E.Cl. 1173–1174 [Benson]).
'I will with lusty heart, fresh and green/ say to you a song to gladden you, I think'

Loss of *so/as* (25c) leads to a change in status for the *I wene* clause, from adjoined subordinate clause (introduced by a complementizer) to parenthetical disjunct; this reanalysis results in an increase in syntactic independence and positional mobility of the clause.

A similar origin (in an adverbial structure) is suggested by Rickford *et al.* (1995) for the development of the topic-restrictor *as far as* (*insofar as, so far as*). In the early structures *as far as* seems to function as a relative:

(26) In sum, he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well as ecclesiastical as civil, **as far as** concerneth actions, and words . . . (1652 Hobbes, *Leviathan* p. 546 [Rickford *et al.* 1995:121]).

This would seem to be equivalent to *He hath the supreme power in all causes . . . which concern actions and words*. However, the subsequent history of this form is different, as *as far as* seems to be reanalyzed as a preposition.

(27) As far as {concerns, touches, regards} NP (earliest attestation 1652)
As far as NP {is concerned} (earliest attestation 1777)
As far as NP (rare before the 1960s)

Méndez-Naya (2007:162–164) proposes two tentative sources for the pragmatic marker *right*, which functions in PDE as an attention-getter, as a response form indicating agreement, and as a sort of tag question (145–146). Earliest instances of the pragmatic marker appear in the last EModE subperiod of the Helsinki Corpus

[21] In Brinton (1996), I analyzed these constructions as "relative" clauses, describing *þæs* as an anaphoric relative pronoun. Fischer (2007a:108) rightly points out that although the constructions originate from relative constructions, they no longer serve as such in Old English. She points out that *þæs* should be translated 'so, thus' and that the clause is best understood as an adverbial clause.

(mid-seventeenth century). One possible source is a relativized construction *that is right*, where *that* has anaphoric function referring to the adjoined clause. Another possible source is the clause *you are right* (see *OED*, *right* a., def. I 14b) followed by a phrasal complement (cf. development of *I mean*, Chapter 5). Both constructions become parenthetical and are then reduced by ellipsis to *right*. Semantically, Méndez-Naya sees a progression from the meaning of 'agreement' to the more "interactive" use to check on whether the hearer is following the discourse (the tag usage) to the "textual" use for attracting attention (163–164).[22]

Further examples of adverbial/relative comment clauses are discussed in §4.6.2, §6.5, §7.3– §7.4, and §10.3.3.

2.3.3.5 Other types. There are two other types of comment clauses that cannot be accounted for by the matrix clause hypothesis.

The first is the nominal relative-type comment clause identified by Quirk *et al*. (1985:1117). In Present-day English this type of comment clause includes forms such as *what's more surprising, what's more serious, what's most significant of all, what's very strange, what annoys me*. Examples of two such structures are discussed in Chapter 9.

The second type is a first-person subject + verb sequence that is originally followed by non-clausal element. An example of such a comment clause in Present-day English is *I expect*. The *OED* (s.v. *expect* v., def. II 6) records the following sense of *expect*: 'to anticipate that it will turn out to be the case *that*; hence to suspect, suppose surmise.' This meaning, according to *Webster's* (s.v. *expect*), is "almost invariably used in the first person." Although this usage has been subject to criticism by prescriptivists,[23] it is a "well-established modern conversational routine" (Wierzbicka 2006:229). Contemporary examples of *I expect* as a comment clause from the BNC, where it is found primarily sentence or clause finally in real or represented dialogue include the following:

[22] Note that although *right* originates as a manner adjunct with the meaning 'straight, directly' in Old English, Méndez-Naya (2007) does not see the adverb as the source for the pragmatic marker. Rather, the adverb is grammaticalized as a focusing or intensifying adverb functioning on the phrasal level with the meaning 'exactly, precisely'; in the process of grammaticalization it undergoes condensation and fixation as well as decategorialization (159). Nor does she think that the pragmatic marker derives from ellipsis of expressions such as *you say right/you guess right/you think right* containing adverbial *right*, because such constructions are not frequent enough historically to serve as the source of the pragmatic marker (161).

[23] The *OED* (s.v. *expect* v., def. II 6) observes that this is a "misuse of the word as a synonym of *suppose*" which "is often cited as an Americanism, but is very common in dialectal, vulgar or carelessly colloquial speech in England." In contrast, Fowler ([2]1965:178) defends the usage as a natural extension of the meaning of *expect* and sees it as firmly established in colloquial usage. *Webster's* (s.v. *expect*) notes that criticism of the usage and its description as an Americanism are widely attested; however, it finds the usage equally common in British and American English and well accepted in colloquial English. Wierzbicka (2006) finds *I expect* to be widely used in dialogue, especially in British English. The comment clause *I expect* is rare in the Strathy Corpus of Canadian English.

(28) a. "God alone knows what Tiw would've done." "Given you a lecture on the sound of one hand clapping, **I expect**." "Aye – ; clapping against the side of my head, I've no doubt!" (1993 Mortimore and Lane, *Lucifer Rising*).
b. He would, **I expect**, have regarded it as his moral duty to pass on any information he might have had (n.d. *New Scientist*).

While initially it might be assumed that this parenthetical arises from a matrix *I expect* clause followed by a subordinate *that*-clause, both synchronic and diachronic data suggest a different origin. Synchronically, *expect* is "relatively common" with a dependent *that*-clause, but it is ten times more frequent with a dependent infinitive (Biber *et al.* 1999:663, 709–710, 989). In earlier English, although there are occasional examples of *I expect* followed by a *that*-clause (29a), it is more often followed by NP complements (29b) and somewhat later by infinitival complements (29c).[24] The earliest examples of *expect* in the sense 'suppose' date from the sixteenth century, while the first instances of *I expect* functioning as a comment clause arise in the mid-seventeenth century (29d–e):[25]

(29) a. And thus to you my promise is perfourm'd, / And **I expect** that yours aswell be kept (1590 Wilson, *The Three Lordes and Three Ladies of London* [ED]).
b. **I expect** no good by her, but suspect a propagation of my misfortunes (1583 Melbancke, *Philotimus: The Warre betwixt Nature and Fortune* 216 [*OED*]).
c. As sooner **I expect** to meete dispaire./ Then thus it is (1600 Anon *The Maydes Metamorphosis I* [ED]).
d. Your Sun that doth require me, **I expect** / With the same minde, as I would doe my Nuptialls (1639 Cartwright, *The Royal Slave: A Tragi-Comedy* I, ii, [ED]).
e. Mr. Mills . . . **I expect**, should take it in snuffe that my wife did not come to his child's christening the other day (1661 Pepys, *Diary* 6 Oct. [*OED*]).

An example of such a structure is discussed in Chapter 5, including a syntactic mechanism for its derivation.

2.4 Conclusion

Study of the development of comment provides evidence for a number of syntactic pathways, or clines, of development. For matrix-type comment clauses,

[24] A search of the *OED* databank yields examples of *I expect* with nominal complements dating from 1583 and with infinitival complements dating from 1710.

[25] Wierzbicka (2006:229) notes growing use of epistemic *I expect* in the nineteenth century, but as shown in example (29d–e), it can be antedated by two centuries.

including those with first-, second- and third-person subjects as well as those formed with imperative verbs, the claim that they develop from matrix clauses and *that*-clause complements, with subsequent deletion of *that*, and reversal of the syntactic hierarchy (see Thompson and Mulac 1991b), is intuitively appealing. However, in actual cases, the chronology of events proves difficult to establish, and there is often a variety of possible complement clauses, including imperatives and interrogatives, which accompany these matrix clauses and possibly even constitute the majority forms. Different pathways of development must be postulated for adverbial/relative and nominal relative comment clauses and for matrix comment clauses which originally take non-clausal complements. These different pathways are examined more fully in the ensuing study in respect to a number of case studies.

Despite the variety of pathways, however, there is a unidirectionality of development from **scope within the proposition > scope over the proposition > scope over discourse**. None exhibits an opposite direction of change. More importantly, the syntactic changes parallel, and work in tandem with, the observed semantic–pragmatic changes: that is, syntactic shifts from an item having scope within and over clausal elements and ultimately over more global elements of the discourse accompany the well-known shifts from content meaning based within the argument structure at the clausal level to pragmatic/procedural meaning at the discourse level.

3 Processes of change

3.1 Introduction

Most diachronic studies of pragmatic markers in English have been carried out in the framework of grammaticalization studies (e.g., Traugott 1982; Brinton 1996; Traugott 1995a). It is appropriate to reassess whether grammaticalization (see §3.2) is indeed the process that underlies the development of pragmatic markers, especially in light of the fact that, on an empirical level, pragmatic markers are often deemed "agrammatical," and on a theoretical level, grammaticalization as a distinct process has been questioned. Some alternative processes suggested as underlying the development of pragmatic markers include a process unique to historical pragmatics, "pragmaticalization" (see §3.3), or more general processes of diachronic change, such as "idiomatization" (see §3.5), "subjectification" (see §3.6), and "lexicalization" (see §3.4) – a process which in other contexts is seen as being a "mirror image" of grammaticalization (e.g., Ramat 1992).

3.2 Grammaticalization

3.2.1 Definition of grammaticalization

Grammaticalization, a process of linguistic change involving morphosyntactic and semantic changes, has been the subject of intense study and debate for over twenty years (e.g., Heine *et al.* 1991; Hopper 1991; Hopper and Traugott [1]1993; [2]2003; Bybee *et al.* 1994; Lehmann 1995 [1982]; Haspelmath 1999; Heine 2003; Roberts and Roussou 2003; Brinton and Traugott 2005; for arguments against grammaticalization see Newmeyer 1998; Campbell 2001 and articles therein). It is not the purpose of this book to enter fully into the debate or to provide a new definition of grammaticalization. I will generally accept the definition of grammaticalization provided by Hopper and Traugott ([2]2003:18): "the change whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain contexts to serve grammatical functions and, once grammaticalized, continue to

develop new grammatical functions."[1] Implicit in this definition is the view of grammaticalization as unidirectional, involving change from lexical to grammatical, and not the reverse. Grammaticalization is typically seen as a gradual rather than cataclysmic change, proceeding in small structural steps, spreading gradually through the language over a period of time.

In order to make the contrast with lexicalization (see below, §3.4.2) clear, Brinton and Traugott (2005:99) define grammaticalization as:

> the change whereby in certain linguistic contexts speakers use parts of a construction with a grammatical function. Over time the resulting grammatical item may become more grammatical by acquiring more grammatical functions and expanding its host-classes.

Very influential in discussions of grammaticalization have been Lehmann's (1995 [1982]) parameters of grammaticalization. Lehmann argues that items undergoing grammaticalization are subject to the following changes:

(a) attrition (126f.): items lose semantic and phonological features and may become monosegmental. Loss of semantic content has traditionally gone under the name of "bleaching."
(b) paradigmaticization (132f.): "grammaticalized elements join preexistent paradigms and assimilate to their other members" (135); they enter into a small, tightly integrated paradigm.
(c) obligatorification (137f.): the choice of items is constrained and the form becomes obligatory.
(d) condensation (143f.): the size of the construction in which items enter is reduced; grammaticalized items come to modify words or stems. This phenomenon has come to be termed "scope reduction."[2]
(e) coalescence (147f.): items become bonded to their hosts, being reduced to affixes or even phonological features. Bonding involves boundary loss, or "fusion," which may be followed by the loss of phonological segments, or "coalescence."[3]
(f) fixation (158f.): grammatical items come to occupy fixed slots.

It is important to remember that not even prototypical cases of grammaticalization (e.g., development of auxiliaries) will exhibit all of Lehmann's parameters.

[1] Hopper and Traugott's definition is based on both Meillet's formulation of grammaticalization as "the attribution of grammatical character to a previously autonomous word" (1958 [1912]:131) and Kuryłowicz's (1965:69) well-known formulation: "Grammaticalization consists in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status, e.g., from a derivative formant to an inflectional one."

[2] Scope reduction figures prominently in discussions of the grammaticalization of pragmatic markers (see below, §3.2.2).

[3] The distinction between "fusion" and "coalescence" follows the terminology of Brinton and Traugott (2005:27); these terms are not always clearly differentiated.

Also very influential in discussions of grammaticalization are Hopper's (1991:22) five principles of grammaticalization:

(a) layering – new layers of grammaticalized forms are continually arising and coexist with older layers (e.g., future *going to* as well as the older *will*);
(b) divergence – when items are grammaticalized, the original lexical forms may continue to exist (e.g., progressive *be going to* continues to exist);
(c) persistence – some traces of the original lexical meaning persist in the grammaticalized forms (e.g., future *going to* retains some of the meaning of purposive action of the original construction);
(d) specialization – within a functional domain, the variety of choices decreases as items grammaticalize (e.g., the loss of *shall* as a future marker in some dialects); and
(e) decategorialization – items undergoing grammaticalization "tend to lose or neutralize the morphological markers and syntactic privileges characteristic of the full categories Noun and Verb, and to assume attributes characteristic of secondary categories such as Adjective, Participle, Preposition, etc." (e.g., *go* in *going to* loses its status as a main verb and acquires auxiliary status).

Heine (2003:579) defines decategorialization as "loss in morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the source forms, including the loss of independent word status (cliticization, affixation)," a definition which combines Hopper's decategorialization with Lehmann's coalescence. Decategorialization typically involves shift from a more major to a more minor grammatical class.

An aspect of grammaticalization covered by neither Lehmann's parameters nor Hopper's principles is "context generalization," the use of a form in new contexts, which Heine (2003) sees as one of the four interrelated mechanisms of grammaticalization:[4] "extension obtains when a linguistic item can be used in new contexts where it could not be used previously" (580). Working from the insight that elements in context (constructions) and not individual lexical items are the input of grammaticalization, Himmelmann (2004) equates grammaticalization with context expansion, arguing for three types of expansion: (a) host-class expansion, (b) syntactic context expansion, and (c) semantic–pragmatic expansion (32–33). Host-class expansion is related to growth in token frequency, as a form undergoing grammaticalization cooccurs in construction with an increasingly large number of different types. This in turn may lead to type frequency.

Beyond the notion of bleaching, a number of other types of semantic changes have been identified as integral to the process of grammaticalization, including metaphorization, metonymization, pragmatic strengthening, and subjectification. Heine *et al.* (1991:45–61), for example, discuss the importance of

[4] Along with decategorialization, Heine identifies "desemanticization," and "phonetic reduction" or "erosion" (2003:579).

metaphorization in the grammaticalization process, in which more abstract concepts are understood in terms of less abstract concepts (51). They point to conceptual shifts such as PERSON > OBJECT > SPACE > TIME > QUALITY, where, for example, an expression of time would be conceptualized in terms of an expression of space. They suggest that metonymy, or what they call "context-induced reinterpretation," also plays a role in grammaticalization in bridging the concepts; Brinton (1996) likewise argues that grammaticalization occurs in contexts where a "shift in point of view," or metonymic shift, from one conceptual domain to another occurs. Traugott and König (1991) present a complementary view of grammaticalization as involving the coding or conventionalization of invited inferences or conversational implicatures that arise in specific, repeatedly used contexts. This type of change is sometimes called "strengthening of informativeness" or "pragmatic strengthening." In Traugott and Dasher (2002), a more elaborated view of pragmatic strengthening is presented, called the "Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change."[5] According to this model, speakers may begin to exploit conversational implicatures that exist, using them innovatively in new contexts; if these implicatures acquire social value and become salient, they become generalized. When these generalized inferences begin to eclipse the original meaning, they can be said to be semanticized as the new coded meaning. Finally, Traugott and König (1991:209) also postulate a semantic–pragmatic tendency in grammaticalization for meanings "to become increasingly situated in the speaker's subjective belief-state/attitude toward the situation."[6] Traugott has expanded upon this idea of subjectification in subsequent work (e.g., 1995b; 2003b), defining subjectification in grammaticalization as "the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or speaker attitude to what is said" (1995b:32) (see further, §3.6).

3.2.2 Pragmatic markers and grammaticalization

My research (Brinton 1996), as well that of others (see especially Traugott 1995a; Brinton and Traugott 2005:136–140), has argued that diachronically pragmatic markers undergo many of the morphosyntactic and semantic changes thought criterial to grammaticalization, provided that the notion of "grammatical function" is allowed to encompass the pragmatic and procedural functions of pragmatic markers.

We see that pragmatic markers undergo decategorialization, or change from more major to more minor word class membership (see, e.g., Traugott 1995a:14; 2003a:642). In the process of decategorialization, they are generally fixed or frozen in form. They undergo desemanticization, or generalization of meaning

[5] This process of change is thought to intersect with grammaticalization and lexicalization, but is not coextensive with either (Traugott and Dasher 2002:282–283).

[6] This is a refinement of Traugott's (1982:253) "Hypothesis A," which states that the meaning changes from "less personal to more personal" in the process of grammaticalization.

(see Traugott 1995a:14), from referential to non-referential (pragmatic or procedural) meanings (see §2.2). The change in meaning involves subjectification, or the expression of speaker attitude (see Traugott 1995a:14; 1995b:32). These changes in meaning occur in specialized contexts via the coding or conventionalization of invited inferences. Finally, pragmatic markers frequently follow Hopper's (1991) principles of divergence, layering, and persistence. They thus follow the unidirectional avenues of change typical of grammaticalization (see Traugott 1995a:13).

Pragmatic markers do not always show phonological "attrition," although some pragmatic markers do undergo phonological reduction, such as *indeed, in fact* /ndid, nfækt, fæk/ (Traugott 1995a:14), *God woot* > *Goddot(h)* (Brinton 1996), *by the Virgin Mary* > *marry* (Fischer 1998), *in faith* > *faith* (Jucker 2002:211–212), *kind of, sort of* > *kinda, sorta* (Denison 2005). It should be noted that in prototypical examples of grammaticalization, forms may also not be phonologically reduced in all instances (e.g., *will, the*). Pragmatic markers, although they are generally fixed in form, are not necessarily fused to their host; however, Traugott (1995a:14; also 2003a:642) observes that the unified spelling of *indeed, besides* crudely reflects the morphological bonding that they have undergone. Lehmann's parameter of "paradigmaticization" is also weakly exhibited in the case of pragmatic markers, as pragmatic markers do not enter into a well-defined grammatical paradigm. Finally, evidence for the restriction of pragmatic markers to a particular syntactic slot (Lehmann's "fixation") is mixed. While many pragmatic markers become fixed in initial position, this position is not obligatory, and some forms, such as parentheticals, acquire increased rather than decreased mobility.

We see many of the characteristics of grammaticalization in the case of *only* (discussed in §2.3.2, (8)). This form shifts from the adjective/adverb *only* meaning 'solely, uniquely' (e.g., *the* ***only*** *reason*) (ultimately from the pronoun *one*) to the focusing adverb *only* with exclusive meaning (e.g., ***only*** *once*) to an 'adversative' (e.g., *you may go;* ***only*** *come back early*) or 'exceptive' (e.g., *I would've asked you;* ***only*** *my mother told me not to*) conjunction/pragmatic marker. The shift from pronoun > free adjective/adverb > focusing adverb > conjunction/pragmatic marker shows a clear progression of decategorialization. *Only* in the 'solely, uniquely' sense is an adjective or "adjunct," while *only* as a focusing adverb is a "subjunct" (Quirk *et al.* 1985:604). Although the status of subjuncts is a matter of debate, they do not participate in clausal structure in the same way that adjuncts do and "have ... a subordinate role ... in comparison with other clause elements" (Quirk *et al.* 1985:566).[7] As a focusing adverb, *only* typically has narrow scope when in pre-position, thus showing an expected decrease in scope from the adjunct, which has scope within the

[7] Subjuncts have no pro-forms and cannot appear in clefts or in alternative negatives and interrogatives (Quirk *et al.* 1985:610–612).

VP.[8] (On the development of focusing *only*, see Nevalainen 1991.) The change from subjunct to conjunction/pragmatic marker represents further decategorialization; while adverbs are intermediate between lexical and grammatical in nature, conjunctions are exclusively grammatical (invariant in form, closed class, functional meaning, etc.). Conjunctive *only* becomes fixed in initial position in the clause and shows an increase in scope as it comes to evaluate the entire clause, not just the focused item. According to Halliday and Hasan (1976:251), conjunctive *only* is phonologically reduced. The grammaticalization of *only* provides evidence of Hopper's "divergence," as *only* is retained as both a focusing adverb and a free adjective/adverb at the same time that it develops conjunctive uses. Moreover, there is "layering" of adversative *only* with older adversative conjunctions and adverbials (e.g., *but, yet, nevertheless, however*). Certainly there is "persistence" as well since the adversative (and exceptive) senses retain the core meaning of exclusiveness and 'oneness.'

The change from 'solely, uniquely' > exclusive sense > adversative sense[9] is also characteristic of the semantics of grammaticalization in that the sense of exclusiveness found in the focusing adverb is an implicature of the meaning of 'oneness' found in the adjunct. Nevalainen (1991:73–83) argues that even in its focusing function, *only* possesses textual (comment-highlighting) and interpersonal (hedging) functions. Conjunctive *only* expands upon the pragmatic functions. In addition to serving cohesive functions, it serves an interpersonal function; Halliday and Hasan (1976:250, 253) note that adversatives such as *only* have an interpersonal function, denoting not 'in spite of the facts,' but 'in spite of the roles we are playing, the state of the argument.' It can also be argued that *only* contributes to negative politeness because it is more deferential to express agreement with the hearer and then reject some of the assumptions lying behind the agreement, rather than express overt disagreement (e.g., *I like your work, only I find your writing very dense* vs. *I find your writing very dense*). Traugott (2003b:127–128) explains how the development of *only* also shows subjectification. Focusing *only* expresses the speaker's "relative ranking of alternatives with a set" and the "exclusion of other possibilities from a set" (127). The pragmatic marker "signals the [speaker's] attitude to the connectivity between what precedes and what follows" by defeasing the conversational implicature of the preceding clause.

Traugott (1995a:15) concludes:

> In sum, the development of [discourse markers] is consistent with prototypical grammaticalization in its early stages, except that in some languages and in some subareas of the grammar it involves increased syntactic

[8] Nevalainen (1991:69ff.) suggests that both local and sentential scope are possible, depending on position.

[9] The 'exceptive' sense is likely reinforced by the exceptive meaning of *but, save,* or *except* with which *only* may cooccur (Brinton 1998:26).

complexity and even freedom, as well as the morphosyntactic bonding within a construction with which we are so familiar. To treat it as a case of something other than grammaticalization would be to obscure its similarities with the more canonical clines.

While there appears to be a consensus about the semantic/pragmatic and morphological development of pragmatic markers, there is less agreement about the question of scope. In contrast to other items undergoing grammaticalization, pragmatic markers apparently do not shrink in the scope of their modification (Lehmann's "condensation"). In fact, as they grammaticalize and acquire pragmatic functions, they come to relate not to smaller linguistic units but normally to larger stretches of discourse (Traugott 1995a:14; 2003a:642); they come to have scope over units of discourse. Traugott (1995a:14) cites a number of examples of scope expansion in grammaticalization and concludes that "syntactic scope increases must be allowed for in a theory of grammaticalization." Tabor and Traugott (1998) challenge the notion of scope reduction (from "loose" to "tight" syntax) in the process of grammaticalization generally, arguing instead for scope expansion (under tightly controlled conditions, the "C-Command Scope-Increase Hypothesis"). Fischer (2007b:280–297) argues against a direct path of scope expansion in the case of pragmatic markers and the other forms discussed by Tabor and Traugott (1998). For example, she sees the shift of clause-internal adverbs into pragmatic markers (see §2.3.2) as involving a separate path: although there is broadly speaking fronting of adverbials, the adverbial comes to occur in a separate, higher clause which occupies topic position and which, by definition, has scope over the rest of the proposition; ellipsis leads to reduction of this clause and rise of the pragmatic marker. Evidence from Old English is the fact that speech-act adverbials are either clausal (*þæt is sarlic þætte* 'it is sad/grievous that') or independent phrases (*to soðe* 'to truth/truthfully'); word order shows that they are independent and outside the main clausal structure.

3.2.3 Studies of pragmatic markers as grammaticalized forms

3.2.3.1 Pragmatic markers in general. Many studies of (non-clausal) pragmatic markers have argued for grammaticalization as the process responsible for their development.

For example, in a synchronic perspective, Romaine and Lange (1991) view the development of *like* as a case of grammaticalization, or change in category membership: from a preposition taking a noun or pronoun as complement, as in *nectarines are* ***like*** *peaches*, to a conjunction taking a sentential complement, as in *It looks* ***like*** *we'll finish on time*, to a focusing discourse maker, as in *and there were* ***like*** *people blocking*. The grammaticalization of *like* shows a shift from non-discourse to discourse uses, from less personal to more personal, and from pragmatically less informative to more informative meanings. It should be noted that Romaine and Lange (1991) express some caution about this "simple linear

model of grammaticalization," suggesting instead that the evolution of *like* may involve "a network of related meanings" (262). Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) likewise see the development of quotative *be like* in terms of grammaticalization, in that it shows "layering" (*like* continues as a preposition and conjunction), "specialization" (*be like* is one of a cohort of verbs used as quotatives, hence "layering"), and "persistence" (*be like* retains traces of meanings of 'comparison,' 'for example,' and 'as if').

In the diachronic perspective, a rich variety of pragmatic markers in English have been understood as resulting from grammaticalization. Traugott (1982:251, 253) sets the stage for such discussions by suggesting that the "conversational routines" *well* and *right*, as in

(1) a. **Well**, don't you want to go?
b. You'll do it tomorrow, **right**?

undergo grammaticalization from propositional items to "grammatical markers at the expressive, interpersonal level." Finell (1989) sees the development of *well* from predicate adjective to pragmatic marker, which involves increased subjectivity, as consistent with the change in grammaticalization from propositional > expressive. In a more fully developed discussion, Jucker (1997; see also 2002:221–224) postulates the origin of the pragmatic marker *well* in the adverb in late Middle English, and traces its change from textual meaning (frame marker) to interpersonal meaning (face-threat mitigator) (see also Traugott and Dasher 2002:175–176).

Meehan (1991) argues that the change in *like* from the meanings 'similar to, approximately, as if, for example' to its function in focus and quotative constructions represents an early stage of grammaticalization.

In Brinton (1996), I discuss the grammaticalization of OE *hwæt*, ME *gan*, and ME *anon* as pragmatic markers. As *hwæt* grammaticalizes into a pragmatic marker, it develops a meaning of 'contextual implication' (= 'so') on the textual level and a meaning of 'shared knowledge' on the interpersonal level (= 'y'know'). In the process, *hwæt* is decategorialized and assumes fixed, initial position, always occurring with a first- or second-person pronoun. It conventionalizes an invited inference; namely, from a questioning of what the hearer knows is inferred an expression of the speaker's belief in what the hearer knows.[10] ME *anon* likewise grammaticalizes into a pragmatic marker, first serving as a marker of sequence on the textual level and then as an evaluative marker of salience or importance on the interpersonal level; the textual meaning conventionalizes the implication of sequence in *anon*'s perfective semantics. In this process ME *anon* loses the cardinal characteristics of a predicate adverbial (decategorializes) and becomes

[10] Dehé and Kavalova (2006) discuss another non-interrogative use of *what* as a pragmatic marker in Present-day English (see §4.3).

more subjective in meaning.[11] A somewhat different kind of change is seen in the case of ME *gan*: from lexical main verb to auxiliary to pragmatic marker. In addition to decategorialization, we see a semantic/pragmatic shift here from the referential meaning 'begin' to the textual function as marker of narrative juncture to the interpersonal function as marker of internal evaluation.

Kryk-Kastovsky (1997) discusses the shift of *now* (and its counterparts in other Indo-European languages) from a temporal adverb to a pragmatic marker expressing speaker attitude as an instance of grammaticalization, or reanalysis from lexical to textual/pragmatic meaning.

Lenker (2000) shows how the OE adverbs *soþlice* and *witodlice* grammaticalize from manner adverb to sentential adverbs to pragmatic markers serving as "boundary markers" of thematic discontinuity. This change involves increased syntactic freedom and scope as well as heightened subjectivity.

Traugott (and coauthors) have discussed a number of pragmatic markers which have arisen from nominal complexes (typically preposition + noun complement). These include *actually* (Traugott and Dasher 2002:169–170), *after all* (Traugott 1997), *anyway* (Tabor and Traugott 1998; Traugott 2003a); *besides* (Traugott 1995a); *indeed* (Traugott 1995a; 2003a; Traugott and Dasher 2002:159–165); and *in fact* (Traugott 1995a; Schwenter and Traugott 2000; Traugott and Dasher 2002:165–169). As pragmatic markers, these forms display a variety of functions: *actually* is additive and confirmative*; after all* refers to justification of some aspect of the proposition (= 'because'); *anyway* justifies what has been said; *as far as* is a topic-restrictor; *besides* conveys an afterthought; *indeed* expresses additivity, the elaboration or clarification of discourse content; *in fact* denotes that what follows is a stronger argument than what precedes. These forms undergo structural decategorialization, semantic change from more referential to less referential, and shift in membership from a relatively open to a relatively closed set, all of which are typical of grammaticalization. However, Traugott and her coauthors observe that, contrary to the direction of change expected in this diachronic process, the grammaticalizing forms undergo an increase rather than a decrease in both syntactic scope and syntactic freedom. Tabor and Traugott (1998: 253–260) discuss *anyway* in the context of a more elaborated argument for scope expansion (strictly defined), rather than scope reduction, as a possible consequence of grammaticalization.

Hoffmann and Locher (2004; also Hoffmann 2005:120–139) discuss the grammaticalization of *in terms of* from a P + NP + P sequence to a unified complex preposition and then to a pragmatic marker in Present-day English. The original meaning 'way of speaking' and 'elements in an equation' broadens to 'notional equivalence' and then to 'the basis of one's attention, enquiries, plans.' More importantly, *in terms of* acquires discourse-specific functions as a hesitation

[11] Similarly, ME *whilom* 'at times' is decategorialized from an adjunct adverbial to subjective pragmatic marker denoting the initiation of a story, episode, or exemplum (see Brinton 1999).

marker or hedge (often signaling insecurity), a topic changer or focuser, a quotative, a marker as subjective evaluation, and a strategy to retaining the floor. Evidence of this "advanced stage of grammaticalization" is the occurrence of atypical complements such as adverbs or adjectives.

3.2.3.2 Comment clauses. Thompson and Mulac's influential (1991b) synchronic study[12] argues that, although *I think* and *I guess* do not represent a "textbook case," they are indeed examples of grammaticalization. Grammaticalization here is the result of a direct correlation between frequency, first-person subjects, and *that*-less complements. The clauses undergo decategorialization of the complement-taking noun + verb sequence into a kind of unitary particle; these expressions also exhibit Hopper's other principles of divergence, layering, specialization, and persistence (Thompson and Mulac 1991b: 324–325). Thus, they can be deemed "straightforward instances of grammaticalization" (325). Kärkkäinen (2003:173f.), a synchronic study, understands the development of *I think* as grammaticalization, but in a "wider sense," namely, the "reanalysis of a common discourse pattern as a structural pattern" (98, 173). She notes that in many cases *I think* is no longer a marker of stance but seems to be grammaticalizing, as a result of high frequency, into a pragmatic marker: "Often the epistemic stance has crystallized into a highly conventionalized discourse-organizational function that resembles that of a discourse marker" (175). In this process, *I think* loses the complementizer *that*, is pronounced with accelerated tempo and reduced accent, is reduced in form, cooccurs with other discourse markers, and acquires some versatility in position (although much less mobility than earlier research has suggested, preferring initial position). It comes to perform "some routine (organizational) task in interaction, without conveying either clear uncertainty or certainty, or serving to soften or reassure" (172). The existence, alongside these newer forms, of older uses in which *I think* carries full stress and semantic content is evidence of divergence (179). Van Bogaert (2006) argues, also from a synchronic perspective, for the grammaticalization of *I believe, I guess,* and *I suppose* with the basic function of negotiating epistemic stance. She notes that all these expressions come to have politeness functions, to serve as markers of imprecision, to express agreement, and to seek confirmation, though each retains a distinctive meaning, in large part the result of the original meaning of the verb. In addition to the acquisition of pragmatic functions, criteria for the extent of grammaticalization include loss of the subordinator *that* – which occurs over 90% of the time with *I guess* and *I suppose* – and non-initial position. She sees *I believe* as least grammaticalized since it occurs most often in initial position followed by *that* and retains the strongest lexical meaning, especially in its "deliberative" rather than "tentative" use. On the other end of the grammaticalization scale, *I suppose* shows the greatest syntactic mobility

[12] See §2.3.3.

and occurs most frequently in British English while *I guess* does so in American English.[13]

Synchronic studies have also argued for the grammaticalization of the formulaic *I don't know* (and its phonetically fused and reduced form *I dunno*). *I don't know* becomes increasingly subjective in meaning, occurring overwhelmingly with verbs of psychological state, and acquires a variety of pragmatic and interactive functions, including expressing speaker uncertainty, prefacing disagreement, reducing commitment to truth, and saving face (see Tsui 1991; Scheibman 2000; Diani 2004). Diani (2004) notes its common cooccurrence with other pragmatic markers (*well, oh, I mean, you know*). Underlying all of the pragmatic functions is the basic meaning of 'insufficient knowledge' (Tsui 1991; Diani 2004), hence conforming to Hopper's principle of persistence. Diani (2004) also points to the continued existence of full (non-pragmatic) and reduced (pragmatic) forms, hence conforming to Hopper's principle of divergence.

Comparing the use of *you know* among different groups of speakers, Erman (2001) observes that older speakers use *you know* primarily for thematic organization and for text editing purposes (for repair and hesitation and for yielding turns), while teenage speakers use *you know* more often to tie discourse together on a textual level and to ensure listener involvement, highlighting a new referent or emphasizing an evaluative statement. She interprets teenagers' use of the expression in a wider variety of contexts and in prefabricated chunks as evidence of the increasing grammaticalization (or pragmaticalization) of *you know*.

A number of other diachronic studies of comment clauses have also been undertaken in a grammaticalization framework. Brinton (1996:253–254) discusses the evolution of *I think* parentheticals as a case of grammaticalization. The construction becomes fixed in the first person, present tense, it undergoes decategorialization from a subject + verb matrix clause to a "unitary epistemic morpheme" (Thompson and Mulac 1991b:315), it undergoes semantic change whereby the implicature of uncertainty in the mental mode of knowing is conventionalized, and it begins to function as a politeness marker with intersubjective function. Palander-Collin (1999:46–63) concludes that the matrix clause *I think* and the impersonal verbal phrase *methinks* have been grammaticalized – or what she calls the "adverbialized" – as markers of evidentiality, opinion, or subjective truth.[14] She sees their development as intermediate between weak and strong grammaticalization (55). López-Couso (1996) points to the gradual univerbation and fossilization of *methinks* < *me þynceð* (first person, OV order), the loss of its verbal origins and decategorialization, and its increased scope and positional mobility as evidence of its grammaticalization. Wischer (2000) considers the

[13] Van Bogaert (2006:139) observes that *I guess* was common in earlier British English (see Brinton 1996:Ch. 8 on its occurrence in Middle English) but fell out of use while persisting in American English. See further §10.2 on *I guess*.

[14] Although Palander-Collin calls *methinks* a "sentence adverbial," its functions and characteristics are comparable to those of a pragmatic marker.

evolution of *methinks* as, in part, a process of grammaticalization, since the form undergoes syntactic reanalysis, phonetic attrition, subjectification, extension of scope, and restriction to certain clausal slots, but she also sees it as, in part, a process of lexicalization (see below).

Hopper and Traugott ([2]2003:9–13) explain in detail how "the development of *let's* illustrates a number of characteristics of grammaticalization" (11), including morphosyntactic and semantic changes; the change proceeds gradually and serves to routinize the discourse function. The evolution of *let's* illustrates "a shift from content means based in argument structure at the clausal level to pragmatic procedural means at the discourse level" (Traugott and Dasher 2002:177).

Brinton (1996:Ch. 5 and Ch. 6) also discusses how the *þa gelamp þæt* 'then it happened that' construction in Old English and *it bifel that* construction in Middle English grammaticalize as textual markers of episode boundaries and metacomments upon the structure of the narrative. Although superficially these constructions remain full clauses, they become fixed in form and highly routinized, attaining a particle-like status in terms of their grounding and function; in Middle English, their functional equivalent is the subordinate *whan*-clause.

The politeness forms *pray* and *prithee* have disjunct-like qualities similar to comment clauses in Present-day English; they serve as pragmatic markers of politeness, asserting the sincerity of the speaker (Busse 2002) or they convey "social deictic" meaning and reflect the speaker's negotiation of the addressee's needs (Traugott and Dasher 2002:254). Akimoto (2000) discusses how in their change from syntactic main verb – *I pray you* and *I pray thee* – to pragmatic marker, they undergo decategorialization and other processes characteristic of grammaticalization, such as layering and divergence. Likewise, Traugott (2000) sees the development of *I pray you/thee* as involving a change from a content verb to a parenthetical and the acquisition of procedural meaning reflecting increased subjectification (see also Traugott and Dasher 2002:252–255).

Akimoto (2002) describes the decategorialization of *I'm afraid* from a "main clause to [a] subordinate clause, and consequently a comment clause or epistemic parenthetical," noting increased subjectification and bleaching of the semantics of the expression.

Moore (2006) details the grammaticalization of Latin *videlicet* (< *vidēre licet* 'one is permitted to see'). Prior to its borrowing into English, it had already evolved into an apposition marker meaning 'that is to say, namely, to wit' (yielding PDE *viz.*); after borrowing, it further developed as a "quotative frame marker" in the restricted context of mixed-code and later monolingual slander records. Moore interprets the development of pragmatic uses for discourse organizing purposes and the functioning of *videlicet* as a pragmatic marker as a case of grammaticalization (255). She notes, however, that the development of this written pragmatic marker differs from that of the typical oral marker.

A recent study of comment clauses is Lindström and Wide (2005; see also §6.5.1 below), which traces the history of the Swedish "grammatical formula[e]" *hör du* '(you) listen,' *vet du* 'you know,' *ser du* 'you see,' and *förstår du* 'you



Figure 3.1 Pragmaticalization (based on Aijmer 1997:2)

understand.' They see these forms as clearly grammaticalized because they are desemanticized (i.e., they have lost something of their literal meaning), pragmaticized (i.e., they have acquired pragmatic functions related to turn-taking management and the achievement of mutual understanding), desyntacticized (i.e., they are not ordered as clause elements in the inner sentence but precede the clause as pre-segments, follow as post-segments, or intercede within the clause), and prosodically reduced. There are phonetically reduced forms as well in which the pronoun is cliticized to the verb (*hörru, hörrö, vettu, serru, fstårru*). The replacement of a variety of (nominal) terms of address with an invariable *du* in the modern period is seen as a process of "on-going grammaticalisation" (230).[15]

3.3 Pragmaticalization

The fact that pragmatic markers do not belong to a readily identifiable word class, typically occupy an extra-sentential position, have non-truth-conditional meaning, and function pragmatically suggests that they may not be part of "grammar proper" and hence do not result from a process of grammaticalization. For this reason, certain scholars (see, e.g., Erman and Kotsinas 1993; Aijmer 1997; Frank-Job 2006) have postulated a process known as "pragmaticalization" distinct from grammaticalization, as shown in Figure 3.1.

In the case of pragmaticalization, a lexical element develops "directly into a discourse marker without an intermediate stage of grammaticalization"; it produces markers "mainly serving as textstructuring devices at [non-sentential] levels of discourse" (Erman and Kotsinas 1993:79). Frank-Job (2006) defines pragmaticalization as "the process by which a syntagma or word form, in a given context, changes its propositional meaning in favor of an essentially metacommunicative, discourse interactional meaning" (361). According to Aijmer (1997:3), the "overriding" distinction between pragmaticalization and grammaticalization rests with the non-truth-conditionality and optionality of items undergoing pragmaticalization. Otherwise, there are many similarities between the two types of change; in fact, Aijmer remarks that "the same principles and processes" are

[15] Lindström and Wide are not always consistent in speaking of these forms as "grammaticalized"; at times they call them "lexicalized" (e.g., 212, 218, 229, 230). Furthermore, the existence of plural forms might suggest that "the process of grammaticalisation/lexicalisation" is not yet complete.

involved in both (2002:19). Both may result in function words, dummy markers, or clitics (Erman and Kotsinas 1993:79), both may involve the development of pragmatic meaning, or the increase in informativeness, and both may adhere to Hopper's (1991) principles of specialization, layering, divergence, and renewal (Aijmer 1997:2–3, 6; 2002:19). The signs of pragmaticalization identified by Frank-Job (2006) – frequency (and cooccurence with other pragmatic markers), phonetic reduction, syntactic isolation, deletability, and "cooccurrence in contiguity" (other items expressing the original meaning) – are equally suitable for identifying grammaticalization. As cases of pragmaticalization, Erman and Kotsinas (1993) describe the development of *you know*, which they see as delexicalized, with no trace of grammaticalization, while Aijmer (1997) points to *I think*, which develops meanings involving the speaker's attitudes to the hearer or the message;[16] Frank-Job (2006) mentions *listen, look, well, okay*, and *here now* as cases undergoing pragmaticalization.

In rejecting the distinction between pragmaticalization and grammaticalization, Traugott (1995a) observes, on one hand, that while clearly grammaticalized tense, aspect, and mood markers are not "as obviously pragmatic" as pragmatic markers, they "surely" have pragmatic functions (and often non-truth-conditional meaning) in most languages. On the other hand, pragmatic markers, though they carry scope over more than the sentence, are indubitably "part of the grammar" (Traugott 1995a, 2003a:643; Traugott and Dasher 2002:158–159). That is, although comment clauses fall outside the core syntactic structure of the sentence, they are not agrammatical, and their adverbial-like function would place them squarely within the grammar of the language.

Waltereit (2002, 2006) argues that the development of pragmatic markers is not a case of grammaticalization; using Lehmann's parameters, he argues that pragmatic markers do not undergo "paradigmaticization," "obligatorification," "condensation," "coalescence," or "fixation"; the only parameter that is minimally appropriate is "attrition": "[t]his rather poor score should exclude them from grammaticalization" (2006:74; also 2002:1004–1006). Although Waltereit does not commit himself to the notion of "pragmaticalization," this perhaps comes closest to the process he envisages.[17] He sees three stages in the development of pragmatic markers, the "historical relics of speakers' strategies for manipulating the structure of the discourse or the interaction" (2006:66; also 2002:1006). Speakers recognize the rhetorical potential inherent in certain forms for expressing textual and interpersonal meanings and use ("abuse") them in contexts that are not justified by their primary meaning. As the textual and interpersonal uses become more frequent, speakers recognize that these forms are being overused or "abused" and they then reanalyze them as pragmatic

[16] However, Aijmer (1998:280) speaks of the "grammaticalization" of *I think* as an "evidential hedge" expressing personal attitude, with subjective characteristics (283).

[17] Waltereit (2002:987–988) also does not see subjectification as explaining the rise of pragmatic markers.

markers in some contexts. Reanalysis involves a semantic change whereby a conversational implicature is conventionalized. Once reanalyzed as a pragmatic marker, the form can be used in additional contexts. Waltereit also points out that many pragmatic markers arise from words or constructions that "already have some properties typical for discourse markers" (2006:75).

3.4 Lexicalization

3.4.1 Definition of lexicalization

As has been observed, there is no general consensus as to what phenomena lexicalization refers to (see Brinton and Traugott 2005:18–22, 32–61).[18] Lexicalization, most widely understood as the production of neologisms, has generally been taken up in two contexts, in discussions of word formation (see, for example, Lipka ^{3}2002) or in discussions of grammaticalization (see, for example, Ramat 1992, 2001). In the latter, lexicalization is seen as the obverse of grammaticalization, or "degrammaticalization," and hence as a counterexample to the theory of unidirectionality.

From a synchronic perspective, lexicalization has been equated with ordinary processes of word formation, such as compounding, clipping, and conversion, or more narrowly, with semantic particularities and idiosyncracies within the framework of word formation. For example, van der Auwera (2002:20) cites the types of compounding and derivation responsible for the formation of *songwriter* < *song* + *write* + *-er* as an example of lexicalization. A type of conversion frequently cited as an instance of lexicalization is the change of a grammatical word into a lexical word (see, e.g., Ramat 1992:550–551; 2001:394; Newmeyer 1998; Hopper and Traugott ^{2}2003:58, 134). Examples include the development of the English verb *down* from the homophonous particle *down* or of the German verb *duzen* from the pronoun *du*. As will be argued below, lexicalization is not the same as, and should not be confused with, ordinary processes of word formation. While such changes result in new lexemes, they occur instantaneously and are created following structural templates in the language.

From a diachronic perspective, lexicalization has been associated with (a) processes of fusion resulting in a decrease in compositionality/increase in dependency, or, conversely, (b) processes of separation resulting in an increase in autonomy.

As a process of fusion, lexicalization is seen in the first instance as the unification, or univerbation, of a syntactic phrase or construction into a single word (see Traugott 1994:1485; Moreno Cabrera 1998:214; Wischer 2000:359). Examples include phrases such as *hand in cap* > *handicap*, which involve some degree of phonological reduction and may be morphologically and/or semantically opaque, and phrases such as *lost and found* 'an area where items which have

[18] See also Brinton (2002), Himmelmann (2004), Lindström (2004), and Traugott (2005).

been left behind are kept for reclaiming,' which are more or less transparent. A second type of fusion is the amalgamation of a compound or complex word into a single lexeme, as in the case of OE *scīr* 'shire' + *gerēfa* 'reeve' > *sheriff*, or OE *īs* 'ice' + *gicel* 'small piece of ice' > *icicle*. Wischer cites the example *hlāf* + *weard* > *lord* of an instance of lexicalization in which a lexeme or lexemes becomes more lexical (2000:359). A third type of fusion included with this kind of lexicalization is the change called demorphologization (Joseph and Janda 1988) or phonogenesis (Hopper 1994), in which a morpheme loses most of its grammatic–semantic content and becomes an indistinguishable part of the word, such as is *on* + *līf* > *alive, at* + *one* > *atone*; cf. what Ramat terms "lexicalization," that is, the development of "linguistic signs formed by the rules of grammar [that] are no longer perceived (parsed) in this way" but simply as "lexical entries" (1992:550–551), such as comparatives or participles that have lost their grammatical status, e.g., *elder, shorn*. The development of idiosyncratic, monomorphemic lexical pairs due to phonological change and morphological loss, such as *lie/lay* or *foot/feet*, is also cited as a case of lexicalization (see Hopper and Traugott [2]2003:135; Traugott 1994:1485; 2005:1706). It is in this sense of fusion that Lehmann (2002:3) defines lexicalization as a process whereby complex units become opaque and irregular and are handled holistically: "Accessing a collocation ... holistically means treating it as an entry of the inventory, as a lexical item." He cites examples such as in English *him* + *self* > *himself* or *be going to* > *gonna* or Spanish *baxo de* > *bajo, a cabo de* > *cabe*. For Lehmann, lexicalization "involves a holistic access to a unit, a renunciation of its internal analysis" (13);[19] it "reduces the inner structure of a unit, shifting it into the inventory" (15).

As a process of separation, lexicalization has been associated with "decliticization," the process by which a clitic becomes an independent word; however, examples of decliticization are rare – and controversial. A more everyday type of change often cited as an example of this type of lexicalization (see, e.g., Newmeyer 1998:549–550; Ramat 1992:549–550; 2001:393) is the change from a bound morpheme to a lexeme, or the change of a (derivational) suffix to an independent word (e.g., *ism, ology, onomy, ocrasy, ade, itis, teen, gate* [< *Watergate*]).

The equation of lexicalization with idiomatization is widespread (see, e.g., Moreno Cabrera 1998:214; Wischer 2000:358; Traugott 2005:1706). Bauer cites compounds such as *blackmail, townhouse,* and *butterfly* or derivatives such as *unquiet, gospel,* and *inspector* as instances of "semantic lexicalization" (1983:55–59), because they lack semantic compositionality (semantic information has been either added or subtracted). Anttila (1989 [1972]:151) adduces examples of lexicalization such as *sweetmeat, Holy Ghost* 'spirit,' *widow's weeds* 'clothes,' and *fishwife*, which are morphologically transparent but semantically opaque. Bussmann considers idiomatization to be the diachronic element of lexicalization, which

[19] Similarly, Aijmer says of lexicalization that it is "a linguistic process which makes it possible to create new wholes or 'gestalts' from the combination of single words" (1996:10).

occurs when "the original meaning can no longer be deduced from its individual elements" or "the original motivation of [a] unit can only be reconstructed through historical knowledge" (1996:s.v. "lexicalization" and "idiomatization"). For Lehmann (2002:14) idiomatization **is** lexicalization in the sense of coming to belong to an inventory. Here and elsewhere lexicalization is generally associated not only with idiomatization but also specifically with semantic demotivation (Lipka [2]2002:113–114; Bussmann 1996:s.v. "motivation"; Wischer 2000:358).

In defining lexicalization, Brinton and Traugott (2005) distinguish it from "ordinary" processes of word formation (clipping, conversion) and from (de)grammaticalization. They also attempt to capture the idea that lexicalization involves change whereby structurally compositional forms become, over time, "decompositionalized." Moreover, they understand lexicalization as involving the development of new non-compositional elements belonging to major lexical classes. They thus define lexicalization as follows:

> the change whereby in certain linguistic contexts speakers use a syntactic construction or word formation as a new contentful form with formal and semantic properties that are not completely derivable or predictable from the constituents of the construction of the word formation pattern. Over time there may be further loss of internal constituency and the item may become more lexical. (2005:96)[20]

3.4.2 Lexicalization and grammaticalization compared

In comparison with grammaticalization,[21] we find that lexicalization is also a unidirectional process, but one which leads to more concrete, "lexical" (contentful) meanings rather than to more abstract, non-referential, functional meanings. Both lexicalization and grammaticalization proceed gradually, in respect to the steps involved as well as in respect to their spread through the language. Like grammaticalization, lexicalization may involve fusion, or the freezing and fixing of collocations (e.g., *pins and needles,* not *needles and pins*), and it may also involve phonological reduction (e.g., *hand in cap* > *handicap, cupboard*). But fusion and coalescence are criterial to neither. Semantic demotivation occurs in both processes: in grammaticalization, it leads to more general and abstract meanings, while in lexicalization it leads to semantic non-compositionality. As discussed above, both metaphorization and metonymization operate in grammaticalization; these processes may also operate in lexicalization, though likely

[20] This definition is indebted to the definitions formulated by Kastovsky (1982:154–165) and Lipka ([3]2002:111). Lipka describes lexicalization as "the phenomenon that a complex lexeme once coined tends to become a single complete lexical unit, a simple lexeme. Through this process it loses the character of a syntagma to a greater or lesser degree."

[21] This section is based on the discussion in Brinton and Traugott (2005:104–110).

metaphor and metonymy of a different type. In lexicalization, metonymy is often based on world knowledge (e.g., *suit* = 'business person'), and metaphor generally moves from less abstract to more abstract but may work in more novel and unpredictable ways than in grammaticalization (e.g., *run-of-the-mill* = 'ordinary').

There are some important ways in which lexicalization and grammaticalization differ, however. Grammaticalization is defined by decategorialization, or reanalysis of category status, involving movement from more major to more minor part of speech. Although changes in category status may be involved in word formation (such as conversions of the type *down* (Particle) > *down* (Verb) or *fun* (Noun) > *fun* (Adjective)), one notes that these changes can work in either direction ("up or down the cline"). Changes in category status are not, however, characteristic of lexicalization in general. Lexicalization is also not generally characterized by bleaching, but involves "concretation," the addition of concrete meaning. Items that undergo grammaticalization tend to have quite general meanings (e.g., *have*), while items that undergo lexicalization often have highly specialized meaning (e.g., *bailiwick* < 'jurisdiction of a bailiff'). The more abstract and non-referential meanings that result from grammaticalization are typically subjective (and intersubjective) and serve to present the speaker's perspective on the situation. The concrete and referential meanings that result form lexicalization do not necessarily function subjectively. An item undergoing grammaticalization occurs in an increasingly large set of contexts (e.g., as *be going to* is grammaticalized as a future marker, it extends from literal motion verbs, to metaphorical motion verbs, to state verbs, as *He is going to hate that*); this is Himmelmann's (2004) "host-class expansion." As such, it becomes more productive as it is repeatedly used to produce further instances of the same type. This will also lead to increased token frequency. An item undergoing lexicalization becomes unanalyzable and does not spread across contexts; it does not become productive. Increased token frequency would not be expected. Finally, grammaticalization phenomena tend to occur cross-linguistically (e.g., deontic > epistemic modality, motion > futurity, deixis > definiteness, intentionality > modality, etc.) and may affect entire semantic or functional classes. Lexicalizations are normally "one-off" occurrences, affecting individual phrases or words rather than classes of items and having no systemic effects.

These similarities and differences are summarized in Table 3.1.

3.4.3 Studies of pragmatic markers as lexicalized forms

As Traugott (1995a:4) observes, the concept of lexicalization captures the univerbation that many pragmatic markers undergo, as well as their acquisition of syntactic independence. Lexicalization would seem to be especially relevant in the cases of pragmatic markers with phrasal and clausal origins. While "lexicalization" or "lexicalized" is often mentioned in the context of pragmatic markers,

Table 3.1. *Parallels between lexicalization and grammaticalization (based on Brinton and Traugott 2005:110, Table 4–4)*

	Lexicalization	Grammaticalization
Gradualness	+	+
Unidirectionality	+	+
Fusion	+	+
Coalescence	+	+
Demotivation	+	+
Metaphorization/metonymization	+	+
Decategorialization	−	+
Bleaching	−	+
Subjectification	−	+
Productivity	−	+
Frequency	−	+
Typological generality	−	+

"+" characteristic of "−" not characteristic of

however, there have been only a few studies that have provided an explicit definition of lexicalization or explored in any detail what would be entailed by this process.

In studying the development of British English *innit* from *is it not?* (through an intermediate stage *in't it*),[22] Krug (1998) uses the definition of lexicalization as a complex phrase becoming a monomorphemic word (see above). He argues that the change involves the form becoming invariant (always *is* and *it*, regardless of the subject, operator/verb, and tense in the main clause), inseparable, and morphologically opaque. There is also desemanticization of *it*, loss of phonological substance, fixing into a semi-institutionalized spelling, and acquisition of pragmatic functions, primarily a turn-taking function.

Wischer (2000) argues that *methinks* undergoes lexicalization, which she defines as a syntagm becoming a new lexical item or a lexeme becoming more lexical. A once productive construction (*me þinkeð*) has been fossilized, partly demotivated, and changed into a symbol; as a result, it is stored as a whole entity in the lexicon and classified as an "adverb" (363). Wischer concludes: "Lexicalization occurs as 'syntactic lexicalization', i.e. the symbolification of a former free collocation, the syntactic pattern of which has become unproductive" (364). Once lexicalized, however, *methinks* immediately assumes grammatical functions as a disjunct marking evidentiality on the discourse level, and according to her definition of grammaticalization (a syntagm becoming a new grammatical

[22] Although Krug's is a synchronic study (1998), he argues that an apparent time study shows that *innit* is spreading and is a true change in progress.

item, a lexeme becoming a grammatical item, or a grammatical item becoming more grammatical), it is grammaticalized (364).[23] The lexicalization of *methinks* becomes clear when it is compared with *I think*, which is not lexicalized, according to Wischer (see also Thompson and Mulac 1991b:324).[24]

Aijmer sees "conversational routines" such as *thank you* as resulting from lexicalization. She believes that there exist degrees of lexicalization, degrees to which a phrase is fixed in form, institutionalized, or culturally recognizable, more or less literal in meaning, or more or less easy to analyze into parts. Thus, she sees conversational routines as only partially lexicalized: they are not fully adverbialized and are only partially fixed (1996:12–13). Schourup (1999:227) speaks in passing of the "parenthetical lexicalized clauses such as *y'know* and *I mean*."

Fischer (2007a:113–116; 2007b:297–311) argues that *I think* type comment clauses result from lexicalization, not grammaticalization: "as formulaic tokens ... they lose some referential content, being narrowed down to a more epistemic, evaluative meaning. In non-standardized languages they are likely to form one lexical unit in the course of time ..." (2007a:116). Arguing against grammaticalization, she asserts that these expressions retain more of their lexical meaning than is usual in grammaticalization, she finds the case for persistence to be overstated, and she argues that decategorialization applies equally to lexicalization as to grammaticalization (but see §3.4.2 above). She believes that there is indeed bonding in the case of *I think* (as with *methinks*) (cf. Brinton 1996) and seems to conclude that bonding argues uniquely for lexicalization. But, of course, bonding – or fusion – may be involved in both lexicalization and grammaticalization (see Brinton and Traugott 2005:105; and above, Table 3.1).[25]

Nonetheless, Traugott (1995a) concludes that pragmatic markers do not undergo lexicalization since they do not behave like lexical items: they frequently do not belong to any major lexical category, and they are syntactically and prosodically constrained. Moreover, Brinton and Traugott (2005) argue that although lexicalization, like grammaticalization, concerns the fossilization of complex structures, those structures that are used to express the major categories, N, V, and A, undergo lexicalization, while those that are used to express functional categories are grammaticalized.

[23] Wischer (2000) argues that that lexicalization and grammaticalization are not contradictory processes; they simply occur on different levels. Both involve syntactic reanalysis, demotivation, fossilization, and conventionalization. However, the semantic changes differ: lexicalization involves the addition of semantic components, while grammaticalization involves the loss of semantic components.

[24] Thompson and Mulac (1991b:324) argue that because *I think* may still undergo negation and questioning, it cannot be lexicalized. However, this possibility is clearly the result of what Hopper (1991) has called "divergence" and does not bear on lexicalization. Fischer (2007a:115; 2007b:310) finds fault with Thompson and Mulac's point for somewhat different reasons.

[25] Fischer (2007b:273) also argues that *instead (of)* must be a case of lexicalization (contra Traugott) because it involves a single token not a type.

3.5 Idiomatization

Although idiomatization is often equated with lexicalization (see §3.4.1), Aijmer (1996:10–11) points out that not all items that are lexicalized are idiomatized, and unlike lexicalization, idiomatization can be strong or weak, complete or partial. Idiomatization needs to be distinguished from lexicalization – and from grammaticalization – although it may operate in both.

Idiomatization is the loss of semantic compositionality, typically involving semantic change from literal to figurative or metaphorical meaning. It has been defined as a "[h]istorical process of semantic change in complex constructions whose complete meaning, originally motivated on the basis of the meaning of its individual components, can no longer be derived from the meaning of those components" (Bussmann 1996:s.v. "idiomatization"). According to Nuccorini, idiomatization is a diachronic process of "metaphorization," "specialization," and "shrinkage of meaning": "the degree of opaqueness of fixed expressions can be measured diachronically against the process of metaphorization they have undergone" (1990:418, 420). Akimoto (1998) defines idiomatization as "the linguistic process, both synchronic and diachronic, of reorganizing certain phrases into fixed/fossilized expressions, whose meanings have become more or less abstract and undecipherable"; he sees the process as including shifts in meaning from concreteness to abstractness, decategorialization of nouns (e.g., *on account of*), rivalry and blending (e.g., *take heed* {*to, at, of*}), and reanalysis.

In addition to the loss of semantic transparency or compositionality, idiomatization involves the lexical fixing and syntactic ossification which characterizes idioms synchronically. Pawley (1986:109–112) cites two major criteria associated with idioms: syntactic restrictions and arbitrariness. The first encompasses transformational defectiveness (e.g., *take the cake*, but not *the cake was taken* [except in a literal sense]) and syntactic ill-formedness (e.g., *once upon a time*). The second includes, in addition to semantic idiomaticity, arbitrary selection of one meaning (e.g., *bullet hole* 'the entry place for a bullet,' not 'a hole shaped like a bullet'), and arbitrary selection of one form (e.g., *take the high road*, not *take the high path*). However, idiomaticity must be recognized as a graded concept, depending upon the amount of syntactic and lexical variability allowed. Nunberg *et al.* (1994) make a distinction between what they call "idiomatic phrases," such as *saw logs* = 'snore,' where idiomatic meaning is not distributed over the parts, and "idiomatic combinations," such as *spill the beans* = 'divulge the information,' where the parts carry identifiable portions of the idiomatic meaning. The latter allow many grammatical modifications, such as adjectival modification (*leave no legal stone unturned*), quantification (*stand a* {*good, fair, excellent, bad*} *chance*), negation (*spill no beans*), pluralization (*drop a hint/hints*), and passivization (*the decks were cleared*), not allowed by the former.

The belief that pragmatic markers are subject to idiomatization is implicit in many discussions, but receives little overt attention.

3.6 Subjectification and intersubjectification

Although subjectification has often been associated with grammaticalization (see Traugott 1982; Traugott and König 1991; Traugott 1995b; §3.2.1 above), it has also been studied as a more general process of semantic change (see especially Traugott and Dasher 2002). Subjectification is

> the semasiological process whereby [speakers/writers] come over time to develop meanings for [lexemes] that encode or externalize their perspectives and attitudes as constrained by the communicative world of the speech event, rather than by the so-called 'real-world' characteristics of the event or situation referred to. (Traugott and Dasher 2002:30)

To the notion of subjectification has been added the related notion of intersubjectification, "a mechanism whereby meanings become more centred on the addressee" (Traugott 2003b:129), or a process whereby "meanings come explicitly to index and acknowledge [the speaker/writer]'s attitude toward [the addressee/reader] in the here and now of the speech event" (Traugott and Dasher 2002:31).[26] In the trajectory of meaning change, Traugott and Dasher trace a path from non-subjective to subjective to intersubjective (2002:40), this change being correlated with changes from truth-conditional to non-truth-conditional meaning, from content to procedural meaning, and from scope over proposition to scope over discourse. They devote a chapter (Ch. 4) to the discussion of subjective and intersubjective meaning in pragmatic markers. The epistemic meanings of *indeed, in fact*, and *actually* are clear examples of subjectification, while the hedging senses of *actually* and *in fact* are the result of intersubjectification. Traugott (1995b) discusses the change of *let's*, *let alone,* and *I think* from main verb constructions to pragmatic markers with "quasi-adverbial properties," focusing on the increasing subjectivity of the constructions as they are grammaticalized. *Let alone,* for example, shifts from an imperative directed at an addressee to an expression of speaker attitude regarding possible alternatives on a scale of inclusion (37–38), while *let's* has undergone increasing subjectivity and intersubjectivity over time, from a second-person imperative to a hortative to an expression of the speaker's "condescending support-style" (36–37) (see also Traugott and Dasher 2002:176–177).

Fitzmaurice (2004) is a diachronic study of three forms in the period from 1650 to 1900, tracing their acquisition of subjective force (in the first person – *I know, I see, I say*), then intersubjective force (in the second person – *you know, you see, you say*), and finally interactive functions (*you know, you see/see, (as)*

[26] Nuyts (2001), in examining the subjective–objective dichotomy comes to redefine objective as "intersubjective." Thus, he defines subjective and intersubjective more narrowly: subjective refers to information that is potentially new/surprising to both speaker and hearer, whereas intersubjective refers to information that is generally known to both speaker and hearer (395–396).

you say/say). Concomitantly, these complement clauses[27] change to pragmatic markers/comment clauses (433, 445). Intersubjective meaning is a speaker's attribution of "particular attitudes, knowledge, and stance to an addressee or interlocutor" (429). Interactive meaning is associated with the dynamics of the communicative process.

Discussing pragmatic markers in Old Italian (e.g., *credo* 'I believe,' *cioè* 'that is,' *(a te) dico* 'I say (to you),' *guarda/guarta* 'look,'[28] *penso* 'I think,' *prego* 'I beg,' *tu sai* 'you know,' *vedi* 'see, look,' *veramente* 'truly'), Bazzanella (2003) rejects the idea that they are grammaticalized but suggests that, although they lack a fully developed "parenthetical feature," they acquire "subjective" and "interactive" (intersubjective) meanings as well as being used for purposes of politeness and intimacy; they also have "metatextual" functions in structuring discourse.

In a detailed study of the development of the French pragmatic marker *enfin* 'at last,' Hansen (2005) argues that it shifts from non-subjective to subjective to intersubjective in meaning (as well as from contentful to procedural and from truth-conditional to non-truth-conditional). From an original temporal meaning 'in the end,' *enfin* develops, among other uses, a synthesizing use (summing up the previous discourse) and then an epistemic use (in which the speaker draws a conclusion based on available evidence); the form is procedural in nature, and "[t]he subjectification of the meaning of the marker is now complete" (53). Further development of an aspectual use also represents subjectification (55). More recent semantic changes in *enfin,* what Hansen calls "interjectional" uses, expressing impatient dismissal, indignation, relief, repair, interruption, and hesitation, express intersubjective meanings.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on processes of linguistic change (apart from the syntactic changes discussed in Chapter 2) that have been evoked to account for the development of pragmatic markers. It has also reviewed studies of pragmatic markers in general, and of comment clauses in particular, that have been undertaken within each framework. The prevailing view is that pragmatic markers undergo many of the canonical changes associated with "grammaticalization." However, because pragmatic markers may be seen as lexical items which enter directly into discourse without acquiring grammatical meanings per se, it has been suggested that the changes they undergo are better described as "pragmaticalization." Furthermore, because comment clauses tend to undergo fusion and be stored in the lexicon as holistic entities, it has been argued that they undergo "lexicalization" rather than grammaticalization. The development of pragmatic markers has also been approached with a focus more exclusively on the semantic changes the expressions undergo. In this context, pragmatic markers, especially

[27] Later, she speaks of "VP governing a complement clause," which must surely be correct.
[28] See also Waltereit (2002) on the Italian *guarda/guardi*.

phrasal and clausal ones, may be seen as undergoing "idiomatization," or the loss of compositional meaning, which is often accompanied by lexical and syntactic fixing. More recently, there has been a focus on the acquisition of meanings in pragmatic markers that are centered on the speaker ("subjectification") and/or the hearer ("intersubjectification"). The case studies in this book follow received opinion for the most part, viewing comment clauses as being the result of grammaticalization, in large part because they undergo decategorialization, lose referential meaning, and acquire functional (pragmatic) roles.

4 Comment clauses with *say*

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the common verb of communication, *say*. Since, as Shinzato notes (2004), mental verbs (such as *think*) and speech act verbs (such as *say*) are two sides of the same coin,[1] it comes of no surprise that verbs of communication can function parenthetically as comment clauses, comparable to the functioning of mental verbs as "epistemic parentheticals" (see §10.2). Below is pragmatic *say* in a number of different parenthetical constructions that will be discussed in this chapter – *(I) say*, *say, I daresay, (as) you say*, and *that is to say*:

(1) a. "**I say**, do you suppose they charged us enough? Sixpence seems so little . . ." (1991 Elgin, *All the Sweet Promises* [BNC]).
Enjoy it to the full, **I say**, and don't feel guilty (1991 *Country Living* [BNC]).
Spoilt brats, **I say**. Money doesn't grow on trees (1993 Maitland, *Cathedral* [BNC]).

b. **Say**, you've got two friends, one Catholic and one Protestant (1991 *Hot Press* [BNC]).
Yet it is not the reality of a naturalistic drama, such as we would find in, **say**, Ibsen or Chekhov (1991 Rendle, *So You Want to Be an Actor?* [BNC]).
It would have been a different matter at Oxford Circus, **say** (1992 Vine, *King Solomon's Carpet* [BNC]).

c. You would like, **I daresay**, if I could give you a clear and definite policy (1978 Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902–1940* [BNC]).

[1] The two types of verbs depict the same phenomena, but *think* does so for phenomena held internally, while *say* does so for reality manifested externally. Shinzato shows how Japanese *ttara* (the grammaticalized form of *ihi* 'say' in the construction *to ihi tara ba*) has discourse functions as an attention getter, a coercive request, and an emphasizer (2004:871).

d. Where are these men when, **as you say**, there are men literally getting away with murder? (1989 *Guardian*, elect. edn. of Dec. 21 [BNC]).
e. "The animals on this world and on others are of common stock, **you say**. Surely you don't now contend that your race and mine have also a common ancestor?" (1992 James, *The Earth is the Lord's* [BNC]).
f. The results of these studies were published extensively in catalogues of private and public collections, and in what in French are termed catalogues raisonnés, **that is to say** complete lists of artists' works (1991 Darracott, *Art Criticism: A User's Guide* [BNC]).

Goossens (1982, 1985), in discussing *say* as a verb of communication, notes uses such as these in which the actional meaning is strongly backgrounded or marginalized, which he terms "(semi-)performative" (1982:98, 123).

This chapter begins by distinguishing the different functions of *(I) say* in Present-day English (§4.2) and then compares *(I) say* to *like* (§4.3). It then goes on to determine the relative chronology of the uses of *(I) say* (§4.4.1) and their relation to one another and to processes underlying their development (§4.4.2). It ends with briefer discussions of a number of other *say*-comment clauses: *I daresay* (§4.5), *(as) you say* (§4.6), and *that is (to say)* (§4.7).

4.2 *(I) say* in Present-day English

I distinguish six major uses of *say* in Present-day English, as illustrated in (2–7). These uses are imperfectly distinguished in dictionaries and grammars (if they are recognized at all), and there is little agreement on the relation of the different uses to one another.

(2) a. **Say** there actually were vultures on his tail (1991 Thomson, *The Five Gates of Hell* 57 [FLOB]).
b. **Let's say** you've inherited Granny's old brass bedstead and just want some chests of drawers for storage (*Homelife* Vol. 6, 24 [WC]).
c. "**What say** he does answer?" (1989 L20 [fiction] 75 [WC]).
d. **Let's say** that I am not intensely miserly and not intensely happy (1998 Van Herk, *Restlessness* 29 [Strathy]).

(3) a. Keep the reconstructed stuff down to, **say**, 5% of the whole (1991 *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* Vol. 11, 18 [FLOB]).
b. New Zealand might play in the international community by, **let us say**, the turn of the century (1986 *North and South* 40 [WC]).
c. A trial of the covering task began when the experimenter placed five (**say**) white horses in a row on one shelf and five black horses in a row on the other shelf (1986 *Research Issues in Child Development* 1 [ACE]).
d. buy a big bottle – **say *about*** 250 mils (1986 F32 [popular lore] 13 [WC]). and then, **say *about*** 1930, semi-rural, though already, I think connected with London (1991 Amis, *Memoirs* 13 [FLOB]).

(4) a. It is impossible to imagine having this obsession about, **say**, Raymond Carver [or] Joyce Carol Oates (1991 *The Guardian* April 18, 8 [FLOB]).
b. "if we'd made MY BRILLIANT CAREER in **say** 1961, it would have passed unnoticed" (1986 Wright, *Brilliant Careers: Women in Australian Cinema* 1 [ACE]).
c. some of the cultural myths surrounding sport, or particular sports, in, **let us say**, Australian culture (1986 Stratton, *Power Play: Essays in the Sociology of Australian Sport* 1 [ACE]).
d. If we ran out of flour or sugar, **say**, we would gather up a few eggs and take them to Mr. Nichols's general store (1992 Karim, *Remembering Malcolm* 6 [FROWN]).
e. that is, with change not over some analytically specified length of time – ***such as*****, say**, 'the life-cycle' or 'two generations . . .' (1991 *British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 42, 4 [FLOB]).

(5) a. "**Say**, isn't that – " Lance started, but Buck answered before the question was even asked (1992 Jack, *Glory Dust* 16 [FROWN]).
b. "**I say**, what's that building over there, on that hill?" (1987 Shonagh, "To the Taj Mahal" 4 [WC]).

(6) a. "**Say**, that's our City," bubbles Dolores (1987 Binney, "Mauve Notes," *Landfall* 11 [WC]).
"**I say**, hospital life certainly suits you!" (1991 *Women's Weekly* 24 [FLOB]).
b. "**Say**, you pronounce Kenya funny – " (1987 Binney, "Mauve Notes," *Landfall* 31 [WC]).
"Old Lloydie, **I say**, let's take a walk, take a break from these fusspot women" (1986 Campbell, *Portrait: A West Coast Collection* 1 [ACE]).

(7) a. these appeared to be grounded on scientific or quasi-scientific notions. **I say** quasi-scientific, because . . . (1987 Curnow, *Look Back Harder* 20 [WC]).
b. Jump, **I say** and be done with it (1986 G46 [belles lettres, biography, essays] 34 [WC]).
Be off, **I say**, with your dirty stockings (1991 McBryde, *Hannah Robson* 26 [FLOB]).
Once a FitzHugh, always a FitzHugh, **I say** (1992 Leigh, *The Hawk and the Heather* 7 [FROWN]).
All my life I never care what people thought about nothing I did, **I say** (1986 *The News* 1 [ACE]).

Let us consider the different uses of *say*. First is the use of *say* meaning 'suppose, assume,' as in (2), occurring in clause-initial position (or following a particle such as *well*). I will call this say^1. Say^1 alternates with *let's say*, and occasionally with *what say*; *let's say* is also quite common. In reference works, say^1 is seen variously as a transitive verb understood as a shortened form of *let's say* (e.g., the

American Heritage, the *Encarta* dictionaries),[2] or as an imperative used in place of a condition (Curme 1931:328; Poutsma 1926:373). The *OED* (s.v. *say* v.1, def. B10a) states that "imperative" *say* develops "on the analogy of expressions like 'let us say?,' 'shall we say?' . . . where the verb has contextually the sense of 'suppose,' 'assume.'" Interestingly, Poutsma (1926:202) terms it a "conjunction."

Next is the use of *say* in clause internal or final position in the senses exemplified in (3–4). When it occurs with a numerical expression, *say*[2] (as in 3) has the meaning 'about, approximately.' A third form, *say*[3], has the meaning 'for example' (4a) or 'suppose' or 'let's imagine' (4b). Scholars do not always clearly distinguish these three senses, but generally agree in classifying *say* here as an adverb (see, e.g., the *American Heritage Dictionary*; the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary*; Poutsma 1926:202).[3] According to James (1978:524), *say* here "normally indicates that the speaker is picking out some specific example which differs in content in some concrete way from other possible examples." She observes that *say* may "refer" forward and backward; that is, it may be either preposed (as in 3a, 4a, and 4b) or postposed (as in 3c and 4d) to the word it focuses. It may also refer at a distance (as in *Julie might,* ***say****, will her estate to Dave*, where *say* refers to *Dave*), though there are rather strict grammatical constraints on how and to what *say* may refer. Goossens (1982:96) speculates that this use of *say*, where it focuses on a specific word or phrase, serves as an important means of expressing tentativeness, and frequently has the sense 'for example,' as a shortened form of "let's say" (see 3b and 4c).[4] Interesting examples where *say* cooccurs with another word meaning 'approximately' or 'for example,' namely 'about' or 'such as,' are given in (3d) and (4e).

Fourth is the use of imperative *say* to introduce a question, as in (5a). *Say*[4] occurs clause initially or following a particle. The *OED* (s.v. *say* v.1, def. B6c) notes that this "absolute" form previously occurred with the dative in the sense 'tell (me, us).' Evans and Evans (1957:433) observe that this construction used to be objected to as an "impertinence," but because of its occurrence in the

[2] Cf. also Diessel and Tomasello (2001:107), who postulate that *suppose* derives from *let us suppose*.

[3] The *OED* combines senses (3) and (4b) ("prefixed to a designation of number, quantity, date, etc. to mark it as an approximate guess or as representing a hypothetical case"), as does Fowler ([2]1965:537) (used "to introduce an hypothesis or an approximation"). Curme (1931:168–169) recognizes only sense (4a) ("introducing an explanation or particularization"), as do Quirk *et al.* (1985:1307–1308) (used for "exemplification," in the sense 'for example'). Jespersen (1946:474) recognizes only sense (3) ("introducing an approximate indication"). The *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* apparently conflates all three senses ("selecting, assuming, or taking as an example or [a specified number etc.] as near enough").

[4] A couple of uses of *let's say* fall outside this categorization: *let's say* or *what say* = 'let's agree' and *let's say* for self-correction:

(i) but **let us** just say that he has conveyed to me, and I hope to you, all the drama of the night (1986 *North and South* 40 [WC]).
(ii) **What say** we leave in the New Year? (1988 Lay, *The Fools on the Hill* 24 [WC]).
(iii) I detect in Collins an attitude, no, **let us say** a hope (1988 Jones, *Splinter* 21 [WC]).

American national anthem, the "Star Spangled Banner" ("Oh, say, can you see by the dawn's early light?") – composed in 1814 – it is now acceptable, though in decline in written material, they feel. The rarity of this use of *say* in the corpora of Present-day English that I examined seems to confirm their feeling. It is not clear whether the one example of *I say* given in (5b) belongs here or in the attention-getting category discussed below.

Fifth is the use of *(I) say* as what is generally termed an "interjection" – *say*[5]. It typically occurs sentence-initially (or following a vocative) or as an independent utterance. My corpora data do not provide evidence for the supposed dialectal difference between British English *I say* and the shortened North American form *say*. Two pragmatic functions can be distinguished: with attention on the speaker, to express a (rather weak) emotional response, such as surprise, regret, anger, disbelief, delight, etc., to what is (about to be) said (6a) or with attention on the addressee, to call or evoke the hearer's attention (6b).[5] I will call the former, subjective use *say*[5a] and the latter, interpersonal use *say*[5b]. James (1973, 1978) identifies the use of *say* when the speaker has just learned something ("Say, it's raining," "Say, did you hear what happened to John?"), but does not discuss it further. Goossens (1982:121) terms this the "absolute" use of *(I) say* and notes its function in attracting attention and expressing surprise. He hypothesizes that in the attention-calling function *say* may be elliptical for "say something" since it elicits the response "yeah," "though such an interpretation is probably no longer relevant for contemporary English" (121). Biber *et al.* (1999:1088, 1097) group *say* with *hey, yo,* and *oi* as "attention signals" belonging to the class of "inserts," which also includes discourse markers; they note that *say* in this function (in American English) can often be impolite, especially when followed by a directive or in combination with a vocative.

An additional use of *I say* is exemplified in (7) – *say*[6]. In (7a), *I say* is used for "introducing a word, phrase, or statement repeated from the preceding sentence (usually in order to place it in a new connexion" (*OED*, s.v. *say* v.1, def. B12a). In (7b), *I say* is used in a more general, emphatic sense; it often occurs in the context of an imperative. The first use, what I will term *say*[6a], is a matrix clause followed by a nominal or sentential object, while the second use, what I will term *say*[6b], is parenthetical. Goossens (1982:95–96) finds a significant number of such "metalinguistic" uses in his corpus, with all speech act types. He considers them to have an emphatic or explanatory function, sometimes with an element of "self-quoting." When *I say* in this sense occurs with questions, he notes, it "seems to act as a device to draw the addressee's attention and shades off" into the use exemplified in (6b). The difference between the use of *I say* in (6b) and (7b) is that in the former, *I say* has an interpersonal function, focusing on the addressee, while in the latter, it has a metalinguistic function, focusing on a particular linguistic form (i.e., "jump," "be off," "FitzHugh").

[5] See the *American Heritage* (s.v. *say*, interj. and *I say*); the *Encarta* (s.v. *say*, def. interj. [informal]); the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (s.v. *say*, def. interj. and *I say, say*); Curme (1931:18).

Table 4.1. *Functions of* (I) say *in PDE*

	meaning/function	position	category	notes
say[1]	'suppose, assume'	clause initial	imperative verb (or conjunction?)	alternates with *let's say*
say[2]	'about, approximately'	clause internal or final	adverb	occurs before numerals
say[3]	'for example, suppose, let's imagine'	clause internal or final	adverb	may be a shortened form of *let's say*
say[4]	'tell me/us'	precedes question clause initial or following a particle	imperative verb	previously occurred with (*to me/us*)
(I) say[5]	(a) to express surprise, regret, anger, disbelief, delight, or some other mild emotional response	clause initial or independent	(quasi-)interjection	
	(b) to call or evoke the hearer's attention	clause initial or independent	(quasi-)interjection	
I say[6]	(a) to clarify or explain	matrix clause introducing nominal or sentential element	subject + main verb	requires exact repetition of words
	(b) to express emphasis	parenthetical – clause initial, final, or medial	(quasi-)interjection	repetition of words may or may not be exact

Table 4.2. *Frequency of* (I) say *types in PDE corpora*

	SAY[1]		SAY[2]		SAY[3]		SAY[4]		SAY[5a]		SAY[5b]		SAY[6a]	SAY[6b]
	say	*let's say*	*say*	*let's say*	*say*	*let's say*	*say*	*I say*	*say*	*I say*	*say*	*I say*	*I say*	*I say*
FROWN	4	4	1	0	24	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	1
FLOB	2	3	11	0	24	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
ACE	2	0	17	1	17	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
WC	0	2	16	1	29	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	3
Strathy[a]	2	16	32	2	160	15	0	0	9	4	4	1	19	19
Total	35 (8%)		81 (17%)		274 (59%)		4 (0.9%)		17 (4%)		7 (2%)		24 (5%)	25 (5%)

[a] academic and fiction subsections

These uses of *(I) say* in Present-day English are summarized in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 gives the numbers of instances of *(I) say* in its different uses found in written corpora of Present-day English.[6] As can be seen, say^3 constitutes the majority form (59%); say^2 is fairly common as well (17%), but say^4 and say^5 are rare in the written corpora, likely because they are the most colloquial of the forms.[7]

Of the various uses of *(I) say* identified, we see that say^4, say^{5a}, say^{5b}, and say^{6b} function as parenthetical comment clauses. Although say^2 and say^3 are parenthetical, they have evolved into simple adverbials in Present-day English; say^1 and say^{6a} are syntactically incorporated into the clause and do not function parenthetically.

4.3 Comparison to *like* and *what* in Present-day English

Some of the uses of *say* bear similarity to PDE *like*, which has been the subject of extensive study. Most immediately, one can point to the use of *say* and of the construction *be* + *like* as verbs of communication. *Say* is the most common verb introducing direct speech (Baghdikian 1977; Goossens 1985) and pragmatically the most neutral, i.e., the default verb (Blyth *et al.* 1990:216, 222; Romaine and Lange 1991:235, 242), while other verbs, such as *go* and *be like,* have more specialized uses. *Be* + *like* is a highly salient feature of the speech of younger people and an interesting example of linguistic change in progress. It has been extensively treated in a large number of articles (including, e.g., Butters 1982; Schourup 1985:43–46; Blyth *et al.* 1990; Romaine and Lange 1991; Ferrara and Bell 1995; Andersen 1997; 1998; 2000; Jucker and Smith 1998; Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999).

More germane for this chapter are certain other, less well documented uses of *like*. In an early study, Schourup (1985:37–57) identifies four functions in addition to the quotative function: (a) before numerals in the sense of 'approximately,' 'about,' or 'around,' (b) after questions, in the sense 'as it were,' (c) in the sense 'for example,' and (d) utterance initially, as a fairly empty hesitation marker. Schourup argues that speakers use *like* in these senses to express "a loose fit between their chosen words and the conceptual material their words are meant to reflect" (1985:42). Even the hesitation marker "suggests that what is to follow is difficult to formulate appropriately or precisely" (1985:56).[8] Jucker and Smith (1998) assert that *like* is a message that the following utterance is

[6] Note that no attempt was made to control for the different sizes of these corpora or the different genres/registers. In the BNC, *I say* (in all its uses) occurs almost exclusively in the spoken and fiction genres.

[7] In Middle English and Early Modern English, as we will see below, say^6 is the majority usage.

[8] Likewise, Andersen argues that *like* is "a pragmatic marker of loose use of language" (1998:148) expressing a "slight discrepancy between speaker's thought and speaker's utterance" (2000:21; see also Siegel 2002).

"not to be taken too literally" (185), the approximator sense indicating that the utterance is not a very accurate likeness of thought and the exemplifier sense that the following expression is not comprehensive. It is obviously in these two senses that *like* compares with *say*: we can, for example, substitute *like* for *say*[2] and *say*[3] in the examples given above, except in examples (3c) and (4d) because *like* does not appear to allow postposing:

(3′) a. Keep the reconstructed stuff down to, **like**, 5% of the whole.
b. New Zealand might play in the international community by, **like**, the turn of the century.
c. A trial of the covering task began when the experimenter placed five (*__like__) white horses in a row on one shelf and five black horses in a row on the other shelf.
d. buy a big bottle – **like** 250 mils.
and then, **like** 1930, semi-rural, though already, I think connected with London.

(4′) a. It is impossible to imagine having this obsession about, **like**, Raymond Carver [or] Joyce Carol Oates.
b. "if we'd made MY BRILLIANT CAREER in **like** 1961, it would have passed unnoticed".
c. some of the cultural myths surrounding sport, or particular sports, in, **like**, Australian culture.
d. If we ran out of flour or sugar, *__like__, we would gather up a few eggs and take them to Mr. Nichols's general store.
e. that is, with change not over some analytically specified length of time – **like,** 'the life-cycle' or 'two generations . . .'

Underhill (1988) identifies an additional use of *like* to mark focused new information; this use is what Romaine and Lange call the non-standard "discourse marker" use, as in *And there were **like** people blocking, you know?*

Schourup (1985) derives all of the different uses of *like* from the notion of approximation. Underhill agrees (1988). While centrally concerned with quotative *like*, Romaine and Lange (1991:62) relate all of the uses to the meanings 'comparison,' 'for example,' 'as if.'

A form with similar pragmatic function, but one which is more limited in its positional and stylistic characteristics is *what*, occurring 95% of the time in this function before a cardinal number (see Dehé and Kavalova 2006), as in:

(8) a. And there's a ledge on one side and I suppose the canal, it's still there, the canal is on only about **what** three or four yards wide (Nottinghamshire Oral History Project: interview [BNC]).
b. And Friends of the Earth it's only relatively new it's only been going properly for **what** two years (1994 York Green Party business meeting: local politics 26 Jan. [BNC]).

Dehé and Kavalova argue that *what* in this use expresses procedural meaning. It "makes accessible certain contextual assumptions along the lines that something (typically, the topic of the utterance) is perceived as either being too little/few . . . or too much/many . . . By following the inferential path guaranteed by *what*, the hearer is led to derive certain contextual assumptions that would otherwise be less accessible" (2006:303).

4.4 Historical development of *(I) say*

4.4.1 Dating of forms

The *OED* dates *say*[1] from 1596. My examples likewise date from the late sixteenth/early seventeenth centuries:

(9) a. **say** they be stript from this poore painted cl[oth] / this outside of the earth; left houselesse, bare / they haue mindes instructed how to gather more / there's no man thats ingenuous can be poore (1590–95 Anon., *Sir Thomas More* [UofV]).
b. Well, **say** there is no kingdom then for Richard; / What other pleasure can the world afford? (1590–91 Shakespeare, *3 Henry VI* III, ii, 146–147 [Evans]).
c. Nay, **say** that either Marl, Chalk, or Lime, or some other fat Earth could be found in some other parts where they are wanting, how much would it inrich those parts? (1653 Blith, *The English Improver* [LC]).
d. But **say**, if our deliverer up to Heav'n / Must reascend, what will betide the few / His faithful, left among th' unfaithful herd . . . ? (1667 Milton, *Paradise Lost* Book XII, 479–481 [UofV]).
e. Now **say**, it venom in the members breeds, / With which her Child the careful Mother feeds (1689 Cowley, *The Third Part of the Works of Mr. Abraham Cowley Being his Six Books of Plants* p. 479 [UofV]).

This usage is still quite uncommon in this period. However, it is significant, given the proposed development from *let's say* that no examples of *let's say* or *let us say* occur in my corpora.[9]

Prior to 1800, I have found only one questionable example of the adverbial use of *say*[2] in the 'about' sense:

(10) To find the number of slaves, **say**, as 284,208 to 259,230, so is 12,644 to 11,532 (1781–82 Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, p. 213 [UofV]).

The earliest example of *say* in this meaning in the *OED* is 1863.

[9] There is one example of *let us say* with the meaning 'let us agree' in Shakespeare:

> Not in love neither? Then **let us say** you are sad, / Because you are not merry (1596–97 Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice* I, i, 47–48 [Evans]).

The adverbial use of *say*[3] in the 'for example' sense appears to be much earlier, though it is still very rare in my corpora:

(11) a. We must get our fortunes committed to some larger prison, **say** (1601 Jonson, *Every Man in His Humour* IV, I [UofV]).
b. When ye shall have done all those things, **say**, We are unprofitable (1666 Bunyan, *The Pilgrim's Progress* [UofV]).
c. that ask'd / How first this World and face of things began, / And what before thy memorie was don / From the beginning, that posteritie / Informd by thee might know; if else thou seekst / Aught, not surpassing human measure, **say** (1667 Milton, *Paradise Lost* Book VI, 635–640 [UofV]).
d. I did not see the Constable, nor **say**, Knock him down (1668 Anon., *The Tryals of such Persons* 1 [LC]).

Note that in the earliest examples *say* is postposed. I have found no clear example of the 'let's imagine, suppose' sense during the EModE period. The earliest example in the *OED* (s.v. *say* v.1, def. B10) dates from 1736:[10]

(12) Pleasure and Pain are indeed to a certain Degree, **say** to a very high Degree, distributed amongst us without any apparent Regard to the Merit or Demerit of Characters (1736 Butler, *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed* i.iii.66).

No adverbial/conjunctive uses of *say* (*say*[1], *say*[2], and *say*[3]) can be found in the Helsinki Corpus.

Frequent examples of *say*[4] before questions – which the *OED* dates from 1200 – can be found throughout the ME and EModE periods. The literal origins of the form are clearer during the ME period, with the cooccurrence, for example, of the indirect object of *say* (13a, c):

(13) a. "**Sei me**, Soð, hwat is ðin rad of ðe forgilte Adame, and of all his ofsprenge" (c1200 *Vices and Virtues, Part 1* 113 [HC]).
'say to me, Truth, what is your advice concerning the guilt of Adam, and all his offspring'
b. "**Saye**," quoþ Porus, "what man is Alisaunder / þat of loos bere so gret sklauder?" (c1400 [?a1300] *Kyng Alisaunder* I, 287 [HC]).
'"Say," said Porus, "what (kind of) man is Alexander that in fame endures such slander?"'
c. But **sey me this**. Wenestow that he that hath nede of power, that hym ne lakketh nothyng? (1380–86 Chaucer, *Boethius* p. 429.C1 [Benson]).
'But say to me this. Do you know that he who has need of power, that he lacks nothing?"

[10] *Webster's* (s.v. *say*) dating of 1596 would appear to confuse the adverbial use with the 'suppose' sense.

d. **Say**, maidens, how es þis? / Tels me þe soþe, rede I (1450 *The York Plays* 120 [HC]).
'say, maidens, how is this? Tell me the truth, I advise'

(14) a. My Lord of Suffolk, **say**, is this the guise, / Is this the fashions in the court of England? (1589–90 Shakespeare, *2 Henry VI* I, iii, 42–43 [Evans]).
b. Why, **say**, fair queen, whence springs this deep despair? (1590–91 Shakespeare, *3 Henry VI* III, iii, 12 [Evans]).
c. **Say**, is your tardy master now at hand? (1592–94 Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors* II, i, 44 [Evans]).
d. But **say**, I prithee, is he coming home? (1592–94 Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors* II, i, 55 [Evans]).
e. **Say**, wall-ey'd slave, whither wouldst thou convey / This growing image of thy fiend-like face? (1593–94 Shakespeare, *Titus Andronicus* V, i, 44–45 [Evans]).
f. Now **say**, what would Augustus Caesar with us? (1609–10 Shakespeare, *Cymbeline* III, i, 1 [Evans]).
g. But **say**, what mean those colourd streaks in Heavn (1667 Milton, *Paradise Lost* Book XI, 879 [UofV]).
h. But **say**, my cousin, what, / Shall we wear these glories for a day? (1700 Cibber, *Richard III* IV, ii, p. 35 [UofV]).

In this usage, *say* occurs sentence-initially, or following a conjunction, adverb, or interrogative (14b–14h). It frequently occurs with either a preceding or following vocative (14a, 14e, 14h). Note the use of the polite request formula *I prithee* in (14d) and pragmatic *what* in (14h).

Certain examples of *I say* before questions, because they exhibit a quite different syntax (e.g., 15b), might better be interpreted as *say*[5].

(15) a. **I saye**, tell me what is it? (1556 Colville, *Boethius* 99 [HC]).
b. Have you, **I say,** an answer of such fitness for all questions? (1602–03 Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well* II, ii, 29 [Evans]).
c. What? **I say**, / My foot my tutor? (1611 Shakespeare, *The Tempest* I, ii, 469–470 [Evans]).

In the *OED* (s.v. *say* v.1, def. B12b), examples of the subjective/intersubjective use of *(I) say* for emotional response or as an attention-getter – *say*[5] – date from the nineteenth century.[11] Fitzmaurice (2002:444) finds both *I say* and bare *say* in British drama from 1700 onwards. I have found a few citations exemplifying the emotive function of *I say* (*say*[5a]) from a century earlier (16a–c), but these uses are not clearly established until the eighteenth century (16d-h):

[11] The 1611 example given there is an example of the emphatic use of *say*, see below.

(16) a. **I say**, ser, I am cumme hedyr to make yow game (c1475 *Mankind* 156 [HC]).
'I say, sir, I have come hither to make you happy'
b. **I say**, sir, I will detest myself also, as well as she (1604 Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure* II, i, 75 [Evans]).
c. only **I say** / Things have been strangely borne (1606 Shakespeare, *Macbeth* III, vi, 2–3 [Evans]).
d. Mr. Faulkland sighed deeply. **Say**, I wish to see you! he repeated, ah, Bidulph! and his voice seemed choaked (1767 Sheridan, *Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph*, p. 278 [UofV]).
e. **I say**, though I have the highest esteem for the favours you have just now granted me (1787 Tyler, *The Contrast: A Comedy* III, i, p. 63 [UofV]).
f. "Right again!" exclaimed Quilp, with another contemptuous look at Sampson, "always foremost! **I say**, Sally, he is a yelping, insolent dog to all besides, and most of all, to me" (1800 Dickens, *Old Curiosity Shop* p. 268 [UofV]).
g. "There's another – and another – **I say!** – I'm dreaming rather fast!" (1800 Dickens, *Old Curiosity Shop* p. 317 [UofV]).
h. "And then you know" – twisting himself about and forcing a foolish laugh – "**I say**, then you know, we may try the truth of this same old song" (1818 Austen, *Northanger Abbey* p. 123 [UofV]).

The attention-getting function (*say*[5b]) seems to be firmly established by the early seventeenth century, as shown by these Shakespearian examples:

(17) a. Nurse! Wife! What ho! What, nurse, **I say**! (1595–96 Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* IV, iv, 24 [Evans]).
b. When, Lucius, when? Awake, **I say**! What, Lucius! (1599 Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar* II, i, 5 [Evans]).
c. Troilus, **I say**, where's Troilus? (1601–02 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida* V, vi, 2 [Evans]).
d. Brother, a word! Descend. Brother, **I say**! (1605 Shakespeare, *King Lear* II, i, 19 [Evans]).
e. But **say** I warn'd ye; / Take heed, for heaven's sake take heed, lest at once / The burthen of my sorrows fall upon ye (1612–13 Shakespeare, *Henry VIII* III, i, 109–111 [Evans]).

Here *I say* frequently accompanies a vocative and serves as a means of calling a servant. When used with an equal, it would appear to be rude or peremptory. It typically occurs sentence finally after a vocative. The usual form is *I say*, though a few *say*'s occur as well, even in British sources.

Both matrix clause and parenthetical uses of metalinguistic *I say* as an emphatic marker – *say*[6] – can be found in the ME and EModE periods. In Middle English, there are examples of *I say* used with an exact word or phrase (or a slight variant of

it) repeated from the previous discourse (18a–c), though most examples date from the late seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries (18d–e). Here, *I say* functions as a matrix clause accompanied by either a nominal or sentential complement; syntactically, *I say* is obligatory:

(18) a. þe derkist niȝt of wynter þou mayst ymagin a clere schinyng liȝt . . . For when **I sey** derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng (a1425 [a1400] *The Cloud of Unknowing* 23 [HC]).
'the darkest night of winter you may imagine a clear shining light. . . For when I say darkness, I mean a lack of knowing'

b. By medicyn outher by bledynge Bledyng **I say** either by veyne or by garsyng (1450 *MS. Bodl.* 423 lf.208a [*OED*]).
'by medicine or by bleeding Bleeding I say either by vein or by scarification'

c. Quick cattel being the first property of any forreine possession. **I say** forreine, because always men claimed property in their apparel and armour . . . (1589 Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* i.xviii. [Arb.] 53).

d. a Vegetable Ointment should perform so much: **I say**, a Vegetable Ointment, for 'tis vulgarly known that by Mercurial Ointments Salivation may be excited (1684 Boyle, *Experiments and Considerations* [SC] 1 [LC]).

e. Rhyme is only a sameness of sound at the end of words. **I say**, of Sound, not of Letters; for as the Office of Rhyme is to content and please the Ear, and not the Eye, the sound only is to be regarded, not the Writing (1702 Bysshe, *The Art of English Poetry*, Section 1 [UofV]).

Note that they may contain the "I say X because/for" formula (18c–d) found in Present-day English (7a).

The use of parenthetical *I say* (*say*^{6b}) for emphasis is common in both Middle English (19) and Early Modern English (20).[12] In fact, during these periods, this usage is the most frequent of all of the functions of *(I) say* identified. As Goossens (1982) suggests for more recent examples, in this usage there is often an element of self-quoting. In Middle English there is more variety in the form of the parenthetical, e.g., *I say to you*, *truthfully I say*, than in Present-day English:

(19) a. Lord, þe oreison of my lif is to þe; ha Lord, **y sei**, þou ert my taker (c1350 *The Earliest Complete English Prose Psalter* 51 [HC]).
'Lord, the prayer of my life is to you, the Lord, I say, you are my sustainer'

b. **I seye** deuyde this midnyht lyne in .9. parties (c1392 *The Equatorie of the Planetis* 22 [HC]).

[12] The earliest example cited in the *OED* (s.v. *say* [v.1], def. B12a) dates from 1220 (with a gap to the sixteenth century).

'I say divide this midnight line in 9 parts'

c. by rightful juggement of God, / **I seye**, forasmuche as man is nat obeisaunt to God . . . (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* I.Pars 336–337 [Benson]).
'by rightful judgment of God, I say, for as much as man is not obedient to God'

d. ȝyf ȝe do þus, **y sey hardly**, / ȝe mow here ȝoure mynstralsy (a1400 [c1303] Mannyng, *Robert of Brunne's 'Handlyng Synne'* 159 [HC]).
'if you do thus, I say certainly, you may here [do] your musical entertainment'

e. For lang, **I say**, it sal noght last (c1400 *The Northern Homily Cycle,* Part II, 82 [HC]).
'for long, I say, it shall not last'

f. Many castels, **I say**, / Grete townes of aray (a1500 [a1460] *The Wakefield Pageants in the Townely Cycle* 28 [HC]).
'many castles, I say, great towns of magnificence'

g. And tyme sal cum, **suthly I say**, / And now it es, þis ilk day (c1400 *The Northern Homily Cycle*, Part II, 81 [HC]).
'and the time shall come, truly I say, and now it is this very day'

h. He nyghed **I saye** to mankynde (1495 Fitzjames, *Sermo die Lune in Ebdomada Pasche* B6V [HC]).
'he drew close, I say, to mankind'

i. **I say**, hye the hens! (c1500 *The Digby Plays* 103 [HC]).
'I say, hasten thee hence!'

(20) a. Come on, sir varlet, I must cut off your legs, sirrah . . . Nay, stand up, I'll use you kindly; I must cut off your legs, **I say** (1601 Jonson, *Every Man in His Humour* V, I [UofV]).

b. Begon, **I say**, thou art a false knave (1608 Tottel, *The Revenger's Tragedy* IV, I [UofV]).

c. For you must remember that a Christian, as he indeed should be, a Christian (**I say**) whose first duty is to follow after that soul-widening grace of Love . . . (1653 Sedgwick, *A Sermon preached at St. Marie's* [LC]).

d. Cease, my son, to hear the instruction that causeth to err from the words of knowledge. **I say,** my brother, cease to hear him (1666 Bunyan, *The Pilgrim's Progress* [UofV]).

e. To examine this, **I say**, I thought the fittest way, if 'twere practicable, would be, to try, whether Amber would draw a light Body in a Glass (1675–76 Boyle, *Electricity & Magnetism* 29 [HC]).

f. But till then, Money must be had, **I say** (1682 Behn, *The City Heiress* II, i, p. 227 [UofV]).

g. Water, water, **I say**; for I am damnable dry (1682 Behn, *The City Heiress* V, i, p. 283 [UofV]).

h. all these actions, **I say**, are performed in the same time (1683 Charleton, *Three Anatomic Lectures* [LC]).
i. if they have not (**I say**) any larger Commission . . . (1692 Hody, *A Letter from Mr. Humphrey Hody* [LC]).
j. These, **I say**, and all like Roots, may be sent as easily and safely as Seeds (1696 Woodward, *Brief Instructions* [SC] 1 [LC]).
k. Richmond, **I say**, come forth and single face me (1700 Cibber, *Richard III* V, iii, p. 54 [UofV]).

I say occurs clause initially (often after a vocative as in 19a or 20k), medially, and finally. Most typical is clause-medial position, in which *I say* focuses on (refers anaphorically to) the preceding noun (19a, 19c, 19f, 20c, 20g, 20h), demonstrative or other deictic (19d, 20e, 20j), negative (20i), adjective (19e), or verb (19g, 20b).

When *I say* occurs clause initially followed by a sentential complement without *that*, it is indeterminate between a matrix clause and parenthetical (see Blake 2002:190–191):

(21) a. Treuli, treuli, **Y seye to ȝou**, the sone may not of hym silf do ony thing (c1388 Wycliffe, *The New Testament* V, 1 [HC]).
'truly, truly, I say to you, the son may not himself do anything'
b. ȝee! **I sey to ȝow** Iohn was moore þan a prophete (c1400 *Wycliffite Sermons* 28 I, 337 [HC]).
'yee, I say to you, John was more than a prophet'
c. **I say** thou are too presumptuous, and the officers shal schoole thee (1592 Greene, *The Scottish Historie of James the Fourth* iii.ii [*OED*]).
d. **I say** thy sister is a bronstrops (1617 Middle and Rowley, *A Faire Quarrell* iv.i [*OED*]).
e. **I say**, these are Consequences what may flow from the heated imaginations of angry Men (1688 Herbert, *A Short Account* [LC]).
f. **I say**, we are become obliged, by all these Motives and Inducements, to enter into a detail of the several Particulars in Controversy (1689 Ferguson, *The Late Proceedings and Votes* [LC]).

Whether this structure is the origin of parenthetical *I say* is discussed below.

4.4.2 The evolution of (I) say

4.4.2.1 Development. The sources of the *say* forms discussed would appear to be of two different types:

(a) *Say*[1], *say*[2], *say*[3], and *say*[4] originate as second-person imperative verbs taking a clausal complement.
(b) *Say*[5] and *say*[6] derive from matrix *I say* (shortened to *say*) with a nominal or clausal complement.

The forms deriving from imperative *say* (*say*[1–4]) follow somewhat different courses of development. As hinted at by Poutsma's description of *say* as a "conjunction," *say*[1] is fossilized in form and reduced syntactically from a matrix clause to a subordinating conjunction (rather like *if*). This change seems to have taken place in the sixteenth century. *Say*[2] and *say*[3] are likewise fossilized and reduced syntactically, here from a matrix clause to an adverb. This change seems to have occurred more recently (seventeenth–nineteenth century), since it is contingent on the prior change of imperative *say* from a main verb to a parenthetical. Note that these adverbial uses are by far the most common uses in Present-day English. The historical evidence points to *let's say* as developing later, rather than serving as the origin of these forms; it is an expansion of the original *say* with the hortative *let's*, which has the function of involving both the speaker and the hearer in the assumption being made (cf. Traugott 1995a:36).

Say[4], while it also originates as a second-person imperative, typically precedes a question and serves as a request for the hearer to provide the speaker(s) with the information required in the following question. Traces of the construction's origin in Middle English include overt expression of the intended recipient of the information ([*say*] *to me/us*) and vocatives denoting the person of whom the request is being made. Syntactically, the matrix imperative first becomes parenthetical and ultimately particle-like. It comes to serve as a comment clause whose function is to both catch the attention of and solicit a response from the hearer. The rise of this form involves a syntactic reversal of matrix and subordinate clause: the original matrix imperative comes to function as a parenthetical comment clause. This development of *say*[4] thus follows a course of development similar to that discussed in §2.3.3.3, except that there is no reanalysis of the subject of the subordinate clause. Note that the rise of the adverbial *say* forms also involves elevation of the original subordinate clause to main-clause status but involves more extensive demotion of the original matrix to adjunct adverbial status. It loses its clausal status altogether.

This development of *say*[1–4] can be graphically represented as in Figure 4.1. Finally, as the examples of *I say* before questions cited above (14) suggest, it would seem that in some cases *say*[4] falls together with *say*[5] denoting emotional response as *say* comes to be less a request to the hearer than an expression of the



Figure 4.1 Development of imperative *say*



Figure 4.2 Development of matrix *I say*

speaker's attitude: the sense of impatience (for an answer) becomes foremost. Further evidence is the following eighteenth-century example, where the cooccurrence of *tell me* suggests that the literal meaning of *say* is now depleted and *say* functions merely as a pragmatic marker (perhaps denoting impatience):

(22) Tell me, **say**, This mighty emperor, . . Has he beheld the glittering front of war? (1741–42 Gray, *Agrippina* 92 [*OED*]).

Say[5] and *say*[6] would seem to develop from matrix *I say* via the path shown in Figure 4.2. This development would be consonant with the matrix clause hypothesis for *I think/I guess* (see §2.3.3): fixing of *I say* in the first-person present, deletion of *that* before the complement clause, and reanalysis of the *I say* matrix clause as a parenthetical/comment clause and of the complement clause as the matrix clause. The catalyst for reanalysis is provided by indeterminate cases of initial *I say* + complement clause without *that*, in which *I say* is indeterminately a matrix clause or an initial parenthetical (see 21). Note, however, that when *I say* is followed by a nominal complement, as with *say*[6a], such a reanalysis does not occur.[13]

A problem for this proposed development is that the matrix clause hypothesis rests on the premise of frequency; Thompson and Mulac argue that the frequency of the *I think/guess* without *that* leads to reanalysis/grammaticalization: "There is a direct relationship between the frequencies of subjects and verbs occurring in target clause [epistemic phrases] without *that* and the frequencies of subjects and verbs occurring as [epistemic parentheticals]" (1991b:317). In the case of *I say* from an historical perspective, however, we are on uncertain ground in respect to frequency. During the Middle English period, in which both *say*[5] and *say*[6] apparently arose,[14] the occurrence of nominal clauses following I *say* does not appear to be frequent. Of the 180 examples of *I say* in the Middle English period in the *OED* databank, only 18% occur with complement clauses; of these 70% occur with an explicit complementizer *that*.

4.4.2.2 Accounting for the development. The different forms of *say* exhibit most of the hallmarks of grammaticalization. This is true whether they evolve into

[13] "I say X because" becomes a fixed expression, and it is this fixedness, rather than the nominal complement, which blocks reanalysis. In the case of *I expect* (see §2.3.3.5) and *I mean* (Ch. 5), both of which occur primarily with phrasal rather than clausal complements, the syntactic shift to parenthetical occurs.

[14] The order in which they become established is difficult to specify.

forms belonging to recognized grammatical classes such as adverbs or conjunctions or whether they evolve into pragmatic markers, which are typically seen as belonging to no clear grammatical class. The same processes apply – to differing degrees – to all of the forms.

There is clear evidence of decategorialization: *say*^{1}, *say*^{2}, *say*^{3}, and *say*^{4} are fixed in the imperative form and lose their verbal behavioral characteristics (such as the ability to be modified by adverbials, to take complements, etc.); *say*^{5} and *say*^{6} are fixed in the first-person singular, present tense,[15] likewise lose the ability to be modified by adverbials, and as parentheticals no longer take objects (normally required of a transitive verb such as *say*). Concomitant with decategorialization is a progression from more major to more minor word class; in all cases, *say* begins as a complement-taking main verb: *say*^{1} shifts to a conjunction; *say*^{2} and *say*^{3} to an adjunct adverbial; *say*^{4}, *say*^{5}, and *say*^{6b} to an pragmatic marker (comment clause).[16] Phonological attrition occurs when *I say* is reduced to *say*.

Say undergoes desemanticization as its concrete meaning as a verb of communication meaning 'speak, utter words' is weakened; however, with the loss of concrete meaning comes the acquisition of more abstract meanings. The shift from referential to non-referential meaning is also obvious in all cases. The 'suppositional' meanings of *say*^{1}, *say*^{2}, and *say*^{3} are epistemic and non-referential, as are the expressive and interpersonal meanings of *say*^{4}, *say*^{5}, and *say*^{6}. In its function as a conjunction, *say*^{1} acquires textual meaning, and *say*^{6} assumes a textual and metalinguistic meaning in its anaphoric function of referring back to something already said (or, sometimes, a cataphoric function).

Subjectification – and intersubjectification – is also most obvious in the development of *say*$^{4–6}$: *say*^{4} expresses speaker impatience (for the following question to be answered); *say*^{5a} expresses speaker emotion and attitude (e.g., pleasure, disbelief, surprise, etc.), *say*^{5b} expresses the speaker's desire for the hearer's attention; *say*^{6} expresses speaker emphasis. The attention-getting meaning of *say*^{5b} is strongly intersubjective; it typically occurs with the vocative in a highly specialized context. In the case of *say*^{1}, *say*^{2}, and *say*^{3}, the epistemic meanings (of supposition, etc) are clearly more subjective than the deontic sense of the original imperatives from which these forms derive (see Traugott 1995b).

There is evidence of pragmatic strengthening or the conventionalization of implicatures. The extended senses of *say*$^{1–3}$ would seem to be invited inferences deriving from the literal meaning of *say* as a verb of communication, namely

[15] Fusion – such as we see in the case of the freezing of the syntagm *I say* – is often identified with lexicalization, since, it is argued, the syntagm comes to be treated as a unified lexical entry (cf. Wischer 2000). We saw above (§3.4.2), however, that fusion characterizes both lexicalization and grammaticalization.

[16] Note that it would not be possible to analyze the development of *say*^{1}, *say*^{2}, and *say*^{3} as instances of pragmaticalization since they continue to function as grammatical items (as conjunction or adverb); in contrast, *say*^{4}, *say*^{5}, and *say*^{6b}, which evolve into pragmatic markers, could be seen as undergoing pragmaticalization (but see §3.3 for arguments against pragmaticalization).

'speak' > 'suppose' > 'for example' > 'about'.[17] In an evidential sense, something that is said to be cannot be taken as fact, but must be assumed or supposed to be. If something is 'assumed' to be, it could be a possible member or exemplar of a set (the 'for example' sense) or, in conjunction with a numerical quantity, an approximate value of that quantity (the 'about' sense).

The emphatic meaning of *say*^{6b} and the emotive meanings of *say*^{5} and *say*^{4} clearly flout Grice's (1975:46) Maxim of Manner (M3: be brief [avoid unnecessary prolixity]), or what Levinson (2000:38) calls the "M-Heuristic" ("what's said in an abnormal way isn't normal"). Attaching *I say* to a statement or prefacing a question with a command to speak is an unnecessary prolixity, inviting the inference that something more is intended, here either an emotional or emphatic overlay to the propositional content. In the other cases, Grice's (1975:45) Maxim of Quantity (Q1: make your contribution as informative as is required) or Levinson's (2000:35) Q-Heuristic ("what isn't said isn't) would seem to operate, the appearance of *say* implicating an inexact quantity (*say*^{2}), a member of a set (*say*^{3}), or a possibility (*say*^{1}).[18] In the process of grammaticalization, these inferences become conventionalized.

Some of Hopper's (1991) principles can also be seen in this case. The *say* forms show "divergence" in that both imperative *say* and main verb *I say* continue to exist with their usual uses as verbs of communication in their normal syntactic contexts. Vestiges of the earlier meaning as a verb of communication, i.e., "persistence," are still present in *say*'s uses as an emphatic marker, marker of emotional response, and attention-getter; it is often still possible to gloss these uses of *say* as 'utter in words,' though this is not the primary meaning. Lastly, we can see "layering" since *say* exists alongside the much older grammaticalized adverb/preposition *about* or the somewhat older *for example*.

Like other pragmatic particles, the *say* forms do not uniformly show "condensation," or reduction in scope: *say*^{1} expands its scope of operation from a single complement clause to the relation between two clauses; *say*^{5} and *say*^{6} likewise expand their scope from a single complement clause to the more global scope of pragmatic markers; only *say*^{2} and *say*^{3} show some degree of scope reduction: rather than modifying the entire clause, they relate in individual words.

The degree of syntactic fixation is also variable: *say*^{1} is unchanged in its fixity, remaining in clause-initial position, *say*^{2} and *say*^{3} acquire some degree of freedom in that they may follow rather than precede their focused item, *say*^{4} is

[17] This inferential chain is suggested by the *OED* (s.v. *say* [v.1], def. B10 – "where the verb has contextually the sense of 'suppose, assume'").

[18] For example, if one says, "I need five helpers," by the Maxim of Quantity, this implicates exactly five. However, if one says, "I need, say, five helpers," where imperative *say* means 'let us say, suppose,' this implicates something much less exact, namely, perhaps five, perhaps four, perhaps three – i.e., 'about five.' If one says "I need some fruit – apples," this implicates only apples. However, if one says "I need some fruit, say, apples," this implicates apples or oranges or bananas or some member of the set of fruit – i.e. "for example, apples."

also somewhat freer in that, in addition to appearing sentence-initially, it can follow the interrogative and occur in some other non-canonical positions. *Say*[5] and *say*[6] clearly acquire greater syntactic freedom as parentheticals in being able to appear sentence-medial and sentence-final as well as sentence-initial.

Finally, we see aspects of idiomatization in the development of *say*. Like idioms, the *say*-expressions show a high degree of lexical invariability; it is not possible to substitute synonymous verbs of speaking in any of the uses.[19] They are also to a great extent syntactically fixed, although some minor variation is possible, such as pre- or postposition of the adverb or (archaically) inversion (*say I*). However, although they have undergone semantic bleaching, they have not undergone a process of metaphoric or figurative change.

4.5 I daresay

Other pragmatic uses of *say* include forms such as *I dare say, I must say,* and *I regret to say* to express modal meaning (tentativeness, certainty) and speaker attitude or stance. Goossens (1982:96, 100) terms these forms, like some of the uses discussed above, "(semi-)performative"; he notes that they overlap in some cases with the *I say* formula used for repetition: "some of these are emphatic, others are used to make a statement more tentative (as are certain second person expressions such as *you might say*), others again are (pseudo-)repetitions of a point made or implied earlier" (96).

Of these forms, perhaps the most interesting is *I dare say*, which is frequently univerbated (*I daresay*) and occasionally reduced (*I dessay*).

4.5.1 I daresay *in Present-day English*

I dare say is predominantly restricted to British English (see *Webster's*: s.v. *daresay* [*dare say*]).[20] The expression is identified as "formulaic" (Quirk *et al.* 1985:139), "fixed" (Jespersen 1946:178), or "stereotyped" (Quirk *et al.* 1985:785). According to the *OED* (s.v. *dare*, def. IIIb), *I dare say* is "almost exclusively" parenthetic. In this use, the meaning of *dare* is said to be weakened or lost entirely (Jespersen 1946:178; Quirk *et al.* 1985:139). However, the full meaning of *dare* can also be retained; the *OED* (s.v. *dare* v.1, def. III a and b) distinguishes between the "proper" and "transferred" sense of *dare say*, and Jespersen points out that the full and weakened sense can occur together in the same context, as in:

[19] An exception is *say*[6a] (e.g., *I* {*say, write*} *quasi-scientific because . . .*), but this formulaic expression is not clearly a pragmatic marker.

[20] Only the BNC contained significant numbers of this form. Searches of the Strathy Corpus yielded two examples, one of *I dare say* Ø and one of *I dare say that*; of the WC corpus two examples, one of *I daresay* Ø and one of *I dare say* Ø; and of the ACE corpus one example of *I dare say* Ø. Even the British FLOB corpus yielded only six examples, two of *I daresay* Ø and four of *I dare say* Ø.



Figure 4.3 *I dare say (that)* in the BNC

(23) **I dare say** she would prefer to go. – I beg your pardon; **you daren't say** anything of the sort (James, *The Soft Side* 47 [Jespersen 1946:178]).

Quirk *et al*. classify *I dare say* as a type (i) comment clause which expresses speaker tentativeness of the truth value of the matrix clause (1985:1114). It is typically glossed 'I suppose, assume, presume.' Poutsma (1926:234) says that it is "expressive of mere degrees of probability." The *Encarta World English Dictionary* (s.v. *daresay*) provides the most complete description of its meaning, claiming it is used (with irritation) "to express the fact that the speaker considers something to be likely or possible" or (with impatience) "to dismiss something that is true but irrelevant." Thus, *I dare say* would seem to qualify as an "epistemic parenthetical" but expresses additional subjective meaning and may serve intersubjective functions in the discourse.

Figure 4.3 presents data from the BNC. As can be seen, the univerbated form *I daresay* is quite common (42% of the total). Furthermore, 93% of the instances of *I dare say*/*I daresay* occur without *that*.[21] In medial and final position *I dare say*/*I daresay* can be interpreted as parenthetical; in initial position, the expressions are indeterminate between matrix and parenthetical interpretations. *I daresay* occurs almost exclusively in the fiction and spoken genres in the BNC.

It has also been suggested that *I dare say* may occur in the preterite (Jespersen 1946:178; *OED*:s.v. *dare* v.1, def. IIIb), as *I daresaid*/*daresay'd*/*dessayed*, although I found no examples of such forms. *I dared say* may occur sporadically in represented speech in narrative (24a), although third-person forms are more common (24b):

[21] Because the 7% of constructions containing *that* include some cases of demonstrative *that*, the percentage of constructions without complementizer *that* in actuality exceeds 93%.

(24) a. I soon rose, quietly took off my bonnet and gloves, uninvited, and said I would just step out to Bessie – who was, **I dared say**, in the kitchen – and ask her to ascertain whether Mrs. Reed was disposed to receive me or not to-night (1847 Brontë, *Jane Eyre*, Vol. II, Ch. 1, p. 15 [UofV]).

b. To which end, throwing still more of sociability into his manner, he again reverted to the unfortunate man. Take the very worst view of that case; admit that his Goneril was indeed, a Goneril; how fortunate to be at last rid of this Goneril; both by nature and by law? If he were acquainted with the unfortunate man, instead of condoling with him, he would congratulate him. Great good fortune had this unfortunate man. Lucky dog, **he dared say**, after all (1857 Melville, *The Confidence-Man*, 1857 Ch. XIII, p. 100 [UofV]).

4.5.2 The development of I daresay

In Middle English, *I dare say that* is the minority form (only three of the sixteen examples in the *MED*, one of the nine examples in the *OED*). During this period the expression takes a variety of forms, e.g., *I dare well say, I dare not say, I dare say briefly, I dare safely say* (25a–b); interestingly *I dare well say* already occurs parenthetically in final position (the earliest examples of unadorned *I dare say* in final position do not occur until later, see (26)). By late Middle English, *I dare say* appears parenthetically in medial position (25c):

(25) a. Gode son, intromytt not yowrsylff in þer cumpeny. þei harde not a mass þis twelmonyth, **I dare well say** (c1475 *Mankind* [HC]).
'Good son, do not mix yourself in their company. They have not heard a mass in this twelve-month, I dare well say'

b. **I dar seyn breffly**, and nat tarye, Is noon suych stoon ffound in the lapydarye (c1440 Lydgate *Secrees of old Philisoffres* 539 [*OED*]).
'I dare say briefly and not tarry, there is no such stone found in the treatise on stones'

c. She nolde, **I dar seyn**, hardely [F certes], Hir owne fadir ferde well (a1425 [?a1400] Chaucer, *The Romaunt of the Rose* 270–271 [Benson]).
'she would not, I dare say, certainly fear her own father well'

In Early Modern English, matrix *I dare that* is rare, and *I dare* occurs parenthetically in medial position and occasionally in final position. Sentence-final *I dare say* dates from the mid-sixteenth century:

(26) a. I should neuer be fayre woman **I dare say** (1560 Anon., *A Preaty Interlude called, Nice Wanton* [ED]).

b. Now the meate by this time is ready **I dare say** (1568 Anon., *A newe mery and wittie Comedie or Enterlude, newely imprinted, treating vpon the Historie of Iacob and Esau, taken out of the .xxvij. Chap. of the first booke of Moses entituled Genesis*, Actus quarti, scæna octaua [ED]).

In initial position, *I dare* without *that* is indeterminate between matrix and parenthetical readings.

The earliest example of univerbated *daresay* dates from the seventeenth century, but univerbation does not become common until the nineteenth century:[22]

(27) a. Your long, and **I daresay** your still beloved Consort, for love and life are not conterminable (c1638 Wotton, *Reliquiæ Wottonianæ; or a Collection of Lives, Letters, Poems, etc.* 477 [*OED*]).
b. Of all men in the world, I suppose that I am the last that has a right to be in love. **I daresay** I shall marry some day (1867–69 Trollope, *Phineas Finn* p. 18 [UofV]).

The reduced form (*OED*: s.v. *desay*) is quite rare, appearing only in the late nineteenth century/very early twentieth century:

(28) a. Mr. Coombes looked. "**I dessay** they're sent for some wise purpose," said Mr. Coombes (1897 Wells, "The Crystal Egg" p. 200 [UofV]).
b. **I dessay** I should have made a very good lord, if I had been brought up to it young (?1875 Robertson, *Dreams; or, my Lady Clara* [ED]).

The development of *I dare say* would appear to be even a clearer case of grammaticalization than *(I) say*. In addition to the fusion and coalescence expected in grammaticalization, there is desemanticization, in which *dare* loses its sense of 'have the courage required' and *say* loses its meaning of 'utter,' the combination acquiring a purely epistemic meaning of 'likely, possible.' With loss of its referential meaning, the form acquires a pragmatic function as a hedge and may acquire more subjectivized meaning of irritation or impatience. There is what Hopper (1991) refers to as "layering," as *I daresay* coexists with older epistemic markers, such as epistemic adverbs, adjectives, and modal auxiliaries. There is also what he calls "divergence" in that *I dare say* can continue to be used with its full meaning 'I have the courage to say,' though this meaning is more frequent in negative structures (*I don't dare say*). Forms such as *I dare not say, I dare well say, I dare briefly say,* which one finds in Middle English, are replaced by the fixed or ossified form *I dare say*. More importantly, we see freezing of modal *dare* without *to* in a declarative, affirmative context. In most dialects of Present-day English, modal *dare* without *to* is found only in interrogative or negative contexts. *I dare say* is decategorialized from a matrix clause to a parenthetical, with particle-like status.

In a study of the replacement of *must* by *have (got) to/got to*, Tagliamonte and Smith (2006:353) note the preponderance (71%) of the older form, *must*, in "lexicalized expressions" such as *I must say* or *I must admit* in British dialects. However, Tagliamonte and D'Arcy (2007) in a comparable study of Canadian

[22] No examples of univerbated *daresay* occur in the Eighteenth-Century Fiction corpus. In the UofV corpus, 36 examples occur in the eighteenth century and 247 examples in the nineteenth century.

Table 4.3. *Frequency of* I dare say *types in EModE corpora*

	I dare say that	*I dare say Ø*			*I daresay*
		Initial	Medial	Final	
OED (1500–1700)	3	8	7	0	1
HC	1	2	2	0	0
LC	4	7	6	0	0
ED	3	109	87	11	0
EEPF	3	26	16	1	0
Total	14 (5%)	152 (52%)	111 (39%)	12 (4%)	1 (.3%)

English find that younger speakers have replaced *must* by *have to* for the most part in these formulaic expressions. They conclude that even discourse rituals are not "frozen" or immutable; they may undergo change in the last stages of grammaticalization. Nevertheless, *dare* in *I dare say* continues to survive, despite receding elsewhere. With a total of 398 examples, the BNC shows the continued viability of *I dare say*/*I daresay*; there does not appear to be any clear replacement for *dare* in this construction.

The syntactic development of *I dare say*, however, does not provide the clear progression from matrix clause to parenthetical suggested by the matrix clause hypothesis. Even in the earliest contexts, *that* is already omitted in the majority of cases and *I daresay* can function parenthetically. Table 4.3 presents the occurrences of *that* following *I dare say* in a variety of EModE corpora. Over 95% of the time *I dare say*/*I daresay* occurs without *that*. Ignoring initial *I dare say* Ø, which may be indeterminate between main clause and parenthetical uses, already 43% of the instances are parenthetical.

In fact, *Webster's* (s.v. *daresay* [*dare say*]) considers the use of *that* a later addition: "Formerly the clause would never have been introduced by *that*, but in recent use *that* is used."

4.6 *(As) you say*

Another form with *say* that functions occasionally as a comment clause is the second-person *(as) you say*. Fitzmaurice (2004) argues that as a pragmatic marker, *you say* has a focusing function and may be interactive: by using it, the speaker is drawing attention to a proposition for his or her own communicative ends while attempting to engage the addressee and keep the interaction going (442–443). Despite these pragmatic functions, Fitzmaurice finds *you say* to be "largely quotative and . . . . descriptive in meaning" in the ARCHER Corpus (442). Its use as a comment clause never exceeds a frequency of 0.1/1000 words (442). Even in its quotative function, however, *you say* is intersubjective because

it expresses "the speaker's interpretation of what the interlocutor has said as well as recapitulating the actual utterance of the interlocutor" (443).

Since *they say* is typically cited as an example of an evidential construction in English, it might be possible, in the first instance, to interpret *you say* as a marker of evidentiality as well. That is, it can be understood as indicating the source of knowledge/mode of knowing of the information expressed, and hence its degree of reliability or the speaker's degree of certainty about it (see, e.g., Chafe 1986:263; Ifantidou 2001:5–7).[23] In general, verbs of communication such as *say, tell,* and *hear* denote language as the source of knowledge. Parenthetical *you say* meets three of Andersen's (1986) criteria for evidentials: it belong to the class of "free syntactic elements," it expresses evidentiality as its "primary meaning, not only as a pragmatic inference," and it is not itself "the main predication of the clause, but . . . rather a specification added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE" (274–275). The subjective aspect, the element of speaker belief or certainty, is also important in evidentiality, as is evident in Crystal's definition of evidential constructions as expressing "a speaker's strength of commitment to a proposition in terms of the available evidence" ([5]2003:s.v. "evidentiality").

However, *you say* is not as obviously a candidate for inclusion in the set of evidential markers as *they say*. In the case of *you say*, presumably the content of the speech is obvious to both interlocutors. Thus, the speaker must have a secondary (non-evidential) reason in uttering *you say*, such as to remind the hearer of what he or she has said on a previous occasion or to confirm understanding or interpretation. Corpus evidence suggests that in Present-day English, speakers use *you say* in two ways:

(a) to query what the interlocutor has said, in which case it is generally an interrogative sentence tag (29a) or
(b) to highlight information expressed by the interlocutor in order to take issue with this information (29b–d).

(29) a. And since then there's just been the two of us. You're an actor, **you say**? (1991 Brett, *Corporate Bodies: A Charles Paris Mystery* [FLOB]).
b. Simple, **you say**, yet how many people force down meals on a diet that they would not dream of choosing if they were not on that diet? (1989 Ashcroft, *Get Slim and Stay Slim: The Psychology of Weight Control* [BNC]).
c. There's a Frank Sinatra song that ends: "Here's to the winners all of us can be." So tell that to the country's 650,000 unemployed **you say**? (1986 Robbins, "The One That Got Away," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 July [ACE]).

[23] Though a matter of debate, it would seem that evidentiality is a subcategory of epistemicity; as Chafe points out, "mode of knowing implies something about reliability but not vice versa" (1986:266).

d. Easy, **you say**, apply back cyclic. Well, yes, it can be that easy if you are only moving fairly slowly . . . (1990 Day, *Learning to Fly Radio Controlled Helicopters* [BNC]).

The first usage is primarily "descriptive" or referential. The second usage is more obviously non-referential as it may accompany information not actually uttered by the interlocutor but implicitly assumed by his or her argument. More importantly, this usage points to the epistemic nature of *you say*, the speaker's (relatively) low level of commitment to the truth value of the accompanying proposition, since it is often used as a means to introduce either an explicit or implicit disagreement.

In contrast, speakers use the adverbial *as you say* to express agreement with the interlocutor's ideas. Often *as you say* has a metalinguistic function in that it accompanies a figure of speech used by the interlocutor and repeated (approvingly) by the speaker (30c–d):

(30) a. But, **as you say**, a fixed identity, a shell, is also a trap, is no solution (1990 Reynolds, *Blissed out: The Raptures of Rock* [BNC]).
b. But, **as you say**, rumours don't have to be true, and the blind assassin has got hold of the wrong rumour (2000 Atwood, *The Blind Assassin* [Strathy]).
c. Or maybe . . . you are planning . . . one of those jaunts to Oxford or Woodstock, to get a breath of old stone **as you say** (1991 Scruton, "A Mistake," *A Dove Descending and Other Stories* [FLOB]).
d. "Yea, such would give me, **as you say**, a foot in both camps. What of the lass herself?" (1990 Wiat, *The Child Bride* [BNC]).

This contrast between *you say* and *as you say* is consistent with the difference in function noted between *as*-comment clauses and their corresponding *as*-less variants (see §6.2.2 for fuller discussion), namely that the *as*-clause asserts the truth of the matrix clause while the *as*-less form does not. For this reason, the *as*-less variant is used for disagreement or interrogation, while the *as*-variant is used for approbation. In (31), *as you say* falls under the scope of the conditional and can thus occur in an interrogative context.

(31) If force was ruled out **as you say**, why were 150 riot police equipped with riot helmets, shields and batons needed (1989 *Guardian,* elect. edn. of Dec. 13 [BNC]).

4.6.1 (As) you say *in Present-day English corpora*

Overall, parenthetical *you say* represents 6% of the uses of *you say* in PDE corpora (see Table 4.4).[24] If instances of ambiguous *you say* (where *you say* is

[24] I have excluded cases in which *you say* introduces direct speech.

Table 4.4. *Frequency of* (as) you say *types in PDE corpora*

	you say (parenthetical)	*you say* (initial)	*you say that*	*as you say*	*so you say*	Total instances of *you say*
ACE	1	1	0	0	0	20
BNC[a]	6	9	11	8	1	100
FLOB	4	3	1	5	0	32
FROWN	5	1	0	0	0	33
Strathy[a]	2	24	13	3	2	100
WC	2	1	0	0	0	26
Total	20 (6%)	39 (13%)	25 (8%)	16 (5%)	3 (1%)	311

[a] Random sampling of 100 instances of *you say*

clause initial and *that* does not precede the following clause) are included, the percentage rises to 19%, and if *as you say* is included, parenthetical uses of *you say* account for almost one-quarter (24%) of the uses of *you say*. The frequency in which *you say* is followed by a full complement clause (with *that*) is low (8%).

4.6.2 The development of (as) you say

Fitzmaurice (2004:445) accounts for the development of *you say* as schematized in (Figure 4.4). This figure suggests that parenthetical *you say* originates as a main clause followed by a complement nominal clause and that *as you say* develops from *you say*.[25] Does the historical evidence bear this out?

The DOEC provides forty-five examples of *ge secgað/þu secge*. These are roughly divided among main clause constructions ('you say that S,' nineteen examples), adverbial/relative constructions (*þe/ þæt ge secgað* 'which you say,' ten examples), and other constructions (sixteen examples). There are no examples of parenthetical 'you say.'[26]

Although there are no examples of parenthetical *you say* in Middle English (see Figure 4.5), instances of initial *you say* followed by a *that*-less nominal clause (32a) – structures which are indeterminately main clause or parenthetical –

[25] See also §6.4, where Fitzmaurice's derivation of *you see* and *see* from *I see* is discussed. Note in Figure 4.4 that she considers *say* to derive from "quotative" *I say*, a position that is consonant with that taken earlier in this chapter.

[26] It is uncommon for evidentiality to be expressed adverbially (e.g. *allegedly, reportedly*) in earlier periods of the language. Instead, as González-Álvarez (1996) observes, "distancing epistemic evaluation" is expressed by a variety of clausal structures (e.g., *hit is sagd þæt, hyrde ic þæt* in Old English; *it is said þat, I have herd þat, as þe people þe told, I have herd seye* in Middle English; *it is said that, I have heard (say), as it was sayd, say they* in Early Modern English). Cf. also Swan (1988:295–296) on the rise of "truth-intensifying" phrases and clauses (such as *it is said that, it is told that*) in Middle English, often under French influence.

Subjective	→	**Intersubjective**	→	**Interactive**
Complement clause		Complement clause		Discourse marker/comment clause
(Epistemic) stance		Epistemic stance		
First person	→	Second person	→	Second person/ Ø person marking
		you say		*as you say*
I say				*say*

Figure 4.4 Proposed development of *(as) you say* and *(I) say* (adapted from Susan Fitzmaurice, "Subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the historical construction of interlocutor stance: From stance markers to discourse markers," *Discourse Studies* 6.4 (2004): 445; with kind permission of SAGE Publications)



Figure 4.5 *(As) you say* in ME and EModE

outnumber initial *you say* followed by a *that*-clause (32b), as do instances of parenthetical *as you say* (32c). When a fronted element precedes *you say* + *that*-less complement, the resulting structure is also indeterminate: *you say* may be interpreted either as a clause-medial parenthetical or as a main clause (32d–e). Note that in (32e), *you say* is set off by commas as if it were parenthetical:

(32) a. **ȝe say** þan þe angell made hir with child, Nay, sum lyke an angell has hyr begiled (c1400 *Life of Saint Anne* (1) (Min-U Z.822.N.81) 767 [*MED*]).
'you say then the angel made her with child, nay, something like an angel has beguiled her'

b. **Thou saist that** we prechen but fallace and fables, and leve the gospel (1402 *Friar Daw's Reply* (Dgb 41) 89 [*MED*]).
'you say that we preach only falsehoods and fables and leave the gospel'

c. We er noght drunkin **als ȝe say**, It ne es bot vnþren tide [Vsp: vndrin] of þe day (a1400 *Cursor Mundi* (Göt Theol 107) 18972 [*MED*]).
'we are not drunk as you say, it is not but the third hour of the day 9:00'
d. A blysful lyf **þou says** I lede; þou woldez knaw þerof þe stage (c1400 (?c1380) Pearl (Nero A.10) 410 [*MED*]).
'a blissful life you say I lead: you would know the condition thereof'
e. Couetise, **ȝe say**, es godd of þe lyuer . . . he hase in his hande a byrnand fyrebrande whare-wit he styrres þe luste of lechery (c1440 *The Prose Alexander* (Thrn) 83/21 [*MED*]).
'strong desire you say is the god of the liver . . . he has in his hand a burning firebrand wherewith he stirs the lust of lechery'

As Fitzmaurice (2004) notes (see above), speakers use *you say* in order to draw attention to a proposition for their own communicative ends. In (32a and c), for example, *you say* accompanies a clause which the speaker then explicitly refutes, while in (32b) there is an implicit refutation of the charge of preaching falsehood and fallacy.

Unambiguous examples of parenthetical *you say*[27] appear in the late sixteenth century:

(33) a. The text itself, **you say**, is sufficient to convince this absurdity (1583 Fulke, *A Defense of the Sincere and True Translations of the Holie Scriptures into the English Tong* x. 391 [*OED*]).
b. Well, on Mistress Ford, **you say**, – (1597 Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* II, ii, 47 [Evans]).

Parenthetical *as you say*, which appears in Middle English (see 32c) remains common in Early Modern English:

(34) a. Your realme to the which you be bothe (**as you saye**) inheritoure, and by your people accercited and vocated vnto (a1548 E. Hall, *Chronicle (The Union of the two Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancestre and Yorke)* 40 [*OED*]).
b. If I speake this rashlie and foolishlie, **as you say**, and your self learned as you boast, and I vnlearned, I shall be the more easily ouerthrowne (1593 Gifford, *A Dialogue concerning Witches* B3R [HC]).
c. Faith, **as you say**, there's small choice in rotten apples (1593–94 Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew* I, i, 134–35 [Evans]).

One continues to find fronted constructions that may be analyzed as parenthetical (35a–b), but by far the most common construction in EModE is clause-initial *you say* followed by a *that*-less nominal clause (35c–d). As in Middle English, the

[27] *Thou say'st* survives into the seventeenth century but is not common.

frequency of clausal complements with an overt *that* complementizer is much lower (see Figure 4.5).

(35) a. O that / I knew this husband, which, **you say**, must charge his / horns with garlands! (1606–07 Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra* I, ii, 3–5 [Evans]).
b. Is this youre sonne, who **ye say** was borne blind? (1611 *King James Bible* [HC]).
c. **You say**, *We preach another Gospel*: You do but *Say* it, and I thank God. *You can Do no more* (1674 Penn, *A just Rebuke to one & twenty Learned and Reverend Divines* [LC]).
d. **You say** you saw him the 29th at *Tixhall* Bowling-green (1685 *The Trial of Titus Oates* IV, 85.C2 [HC]).[28]

Example (35c) makes clear the interactive function of *you say*, as the speaker explicitly comments on the interlocutor's restriction to speech rather than action.

From the mid-eighteenth century to the present, Fitzmaurice finds a rise in use of *you say* in drama, but a decrease in its use in letters from a high point in the early eighteenth century (2004:441).

In respect to Fitzmaurice's (2004) proposal concerning the development of *you say* (see above), there does not appear to be good historical evidence that *as you say* develops from *you say*. In fact, parenthetical *as you say* pre-dates parenthetical *you say*: *as you say* is relatively common in Middle English, while parenthetical *you say* does not appear (in my corpora) until the Early Modern period. *As you say* continues to be common in EModE, it declines in frequency in the modern period, with the possible exception of British English (see the frequency of *as you say* in the FLOB and BNC data given in Table 4.4).

As we saw above for both *I say* and *I dare say*, from the ME period onwards, the frequency of a complement clause (with or without an explicit *that*-complementizer) following *you say* is low.[29] This calls into doubt the aptness of the matrix clause hypothesis for explaining the rise of parenthetical *you say*. Given the early appearance of parenthetical *as you say* (including the existence of the relative/adverbial *þe/þæt ge secgað* 'which you say' in Old English), it might serve as a possible source of parenthetical *you say*. That is, *you say* would evolve from *as you say* via deletion of the adverbial/relative *as*.[30]

When *you say* does occur with a clausal complement, there is typically no complementizer.[31] This is consistent with Rissanen's (1991) finding that historically the zero complementizer is less common with *say, tell,* and *see* than

[28] The use of *you say (that)* is common in trials, because of their evidentiary quality.

[29] In the *MED* databank twenty-four of ninety-six examples of *you say* (or 25%) are followed by clausal complements.

[30] Cf. §6.5 on the rise of *you see* from *as you see*.

[31] *That*-less complements are the majority form in both Middle English and Early Modern English as well as in Present-day English in the corpora I examined.

with *know* and *think*. Moreover, initial *you say* followed by a *that*-less complement becomes increasingly more common over time. These constructions are indeterminate between main clauses and parentheticals; in many instances, as in (35c), the punctuation suggests that they are to be interpreted as parenthetical. Additionally, when a relative or interrogative object pronoun or stressed NP from the subordinate clause is fronted, this results in the indeterminate structures shown in (32d–e) and (35a–b) where *you say* may be reanalyzed as a medial parenthetical. Thus, the contribution of this construction to the rise of parenthetical *you say* cannot be discounted. We must perhaps think of the blending of two constructions, the relative/adverbial *as you say* (with deletion of *as*) and the matrix *you say* and *that*-less nominal complement (with syntactic reversal of main and subordinate clause).

What seems clear from the data, however, is that, at least from Middle English onwards, the complement with explicit *that* following *you say* has not played an important role, even in written documents.

4.7 *That is (to say)*

4.7.1 That is (to say) *in Present-day English*

Goossens observes that *that is to say* 'namely' is one of the "semi-performative" uses of the verb *say* in which its meaning completely recedes. In contemporary grammars of English, *that is (to say)* is classified as a conjunct (Quirk *et al.* 1985:635, 1069, 1262, 1307) or connective (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:779).[32] It introduces a non-restrictive apposition which provides explanation, elaboration, particularization, exemplification, qualification, or reformulation/restatement/correction of a preceding discourse unit (word, phrase, clause) (see *OED*:s.v.v. *say* v.1, def. B4b, and *that* dem., pron., a. and adv., def. B5a;[33] Curme 1931:168–169; Quirk *et al.* 1985:637–638, 1307–1308; Biber *et al.* 1999:876–7; Huddleston and Pullum 2002:779). Quirk *et al.* (1985:1308–1312) see *that is (to say)* as expressing the 'most appositive' (most equal) relationship on the scale of apposition.[34] Specifically it expresses the concept of equivalence, which includes appellation (where the second unit is more specific than first), identification, designation (where the second unit is less specific than first), and reformulation. Quirk *et al.* note that *that is (to say)* may have summative implication when following plural items and the effect of specifying a list when preceding plural

[32] Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1354) also refer to *that is to say* as an "indicator" which clarifies the semantic relationship between a parenthetical and its anchor.

[33] According to the *OED* (s.v. *say* v.1, def. B 4b), *that is (to say)* is "Sometimes used sarcastically to introduce a statement of the real fact which a quoted statement misrepresents or euphemistically veils."

[34] This is the only relationship of apposition where no explicit indicator is needed (Quirk *et al.* 1985).

items (1985:637, 638). It may be used for revision or "reference editing" when the speaker wants to achieve grater accuracy and precision (1312).[35] Appositional linkers such as *that is (to say)* are most common in academic prose and in news (Biber *et al.* 1999:881, 882).

That is (to say) can introduce a wider range of appositives than other connectives such as *namely, viz.*, or *to wit,* including VPs and main clauses; in fact, it can link appositives of most categories to hosts of the same category (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1354–1356). *That is (to say)* may precede or, less often, follow the appositive (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1307), or it may occur in non-initial position within the appositive (Huddleston and Pullum 2002). The position of *that is* and its adjoined appositive is also quite free in respect to the main clause: it may be interpolated or appended to the main clause (anchor). If the anchor is subclausal, *that is* and its adjoined appositive may be adjacent to, separated from, or even within the anchor (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1355).

In Relevance Theoretical terms, Blakemore (1996) sees *that is (to say)* and other apposition markers (e.g., *in short, in other words*) as serving purposes of relevance, not coherence; it contributes to the interpretation of the explicit content of the host utterance. She considers *that is to say* "conceptual" – in large part because it is compositional – but non-truth-conditional.

4.7.2 The development of that is (to say)

According to Mitchell (1985:130–131), *þæt is/wæs/sind* is used in a way equivalent to PDE "parenthetic and explanatory" *that is*:

(36) a. þreo þing bebead se Hælend þam bedrydan: **þæt is**, aris, and ber þin legerbed, and gang (10th c. Feria VI, *Homilies of Ælfric* 184 [DOEC]).
'the Savior commanded three things of the bed-ridden man, that is, arise, bear your sick-bed, and go'

b. þa apostoli **þæt sind** godes bydelas toferdon geond ealne middaneard (990–92 Ælfric, *The Catholic Homilies: The First Series* 353.236 [DOEC]).
'the apostles, that is the preachers of god, traveled over the entire earth'

c. We sceolon faran on his wegas, **þæt is**, on rihtwisnesse and soðfestnessæ simle þeniæn (12th c. The Martyrdom of Saint Vincent, *Old English Homilies from MS. Bodley 343* 350 [DOEC]).
'we shall travel according to his ways, that is, to serve always in righteousness and truthfulness'

Although verb agreement is determined by the number of the complement, already in OE *þæt* is invariable and does not agree with the complement in

[35] Blakemore (1996) identifies a second function in addition to its use as a parenthetical apposition marker: namely, to introduce a separate discourse sequence (similar to *after all, however, so*). This function is not widely discussed.

gender. The complement is generally nominative (Mitchell 1985:533), but may exceptionally follow the case of the element that it elucidates (605). A range of complements, including NPs, PPs, participial phrases, or entire clauses, is possible (131).

OE *þæt is* is undoubtedly strongly influenced by, if not directly calqued on, Latin *id est* 'that is,'[36] as in the following:

(37) Se eahtoðe heafodleahtor is: *cenodoxia,* ***id est****, iactantia uel uana gloria*, **þæt is**[37] gylp on englisc oððe getot, gereht, þæt se mann beo leofgeorn and mid gylpe afylled, þeahðe he nateshwon hergendlic ne si (11th c. Second Old English Letter for Wulfstan 172 [DOEC]).
'the eighth mortal sin is: *cenodoxia*, *id est, iactantia uel uana Gloria* ["that is, boasting or vainglory"], that is pride or vainglory, (when explained in English) that the man is eager for praise and filled with arrogance although he be not at all praiseworthy'

The fuller expression, *that is to say*, first appears in late Old English/early Middle English:

(38) a. And fif æt Wonlonde and þreo atte Fromemouþe atte yle ðan ye, to on see and on on londe, **þæt is to seggende** æt Ore (10th c. King Æthelstan to Milton Abbey, *Anglo-Saxon Charters* 8 [DOEC]).
'and five at Wonlond and three at Fromemouth at the isle, two on sea and one on land, that is to say at Ore'

b. **Det is to seggane**: Gif þa hefdmen of þissere worlde hefden icnawen crist (c1175 *Lambeth Homilies* 123 [*OED*]).
'that is to say: If the head-men of this world had known Christ'

c. **þat is to seien**, þat folc is forgilt wið god (12th c. O.E. Hom. [Morris] ii, 126 [Visser 1969:1466]).
'that is to say, that people becomes guilty against god'

d. Hie was fet of weste wunienge þar he funden was, scilicet in terra deserta in loco . . . uaste solitudinis, **Dat is to seien** on weste londe (a1225 (?a1200) *Homilies in Cambridge, Trinity College* (Trin-C B.14.52) 161 [*MED*]).
'he was fed from a wasteland dwelling where he was found, that is in a deserted land in a place . . . of vast solitude, that is to say in a barren land'

e. Whilom was Rome bilayn about, Wiȝ seuen soudans biset . . . for to strwre [read: strwe] seinte Petres sate, **þat is to seie**, cristendom to felle (c1330 *The Seven Sages* 2622 [*MED*]).

[36] Compare Old Italian *cioè* 'that is,' which functions either as a paraphrase marker or as an exemplification marker; in Modern Italian, it serves as a correction marker (see Bazzanella 2003).

[37] A Boolean search of the DOEC yields fifty-seven examples of *þæt is* in the context of *id est*.

'at times was Rome encircled, by seven sultans besieged . . . in order to ravage St. Peter's seat, that is to say, to fell Christendom '

f. **þis is to seie**, i telle þe: "þe clene of herte, blessed þeih be" (c1330 *Speculum of Guy of Warwick* 413 [*OED*]).
'this is to say, I tell you: "the clean of heart they be blessed"'

g. Do your knauebarns to circumces . . . **þat is to sai** þat þai be scorn O þat ilk lime . . . þat þai are kend fra wommen wit (a1400 (a1325) *Cursor Mundi* (Vsp A.3) 2670 [*MED*]).
'circumcise your male children . . . that is to say, so that they be shorn of that same limb . . . that they are beget from women with'

h. nevere truage schal we gyve, **That ys to seye**, whiles that we lyve (1328 Rob.Brunne, Chron. (Zetsche) 4320) [Visser 1969:1466]).
'never shall we give payment, that is to say, whilst we live'

i. þis book . . . is cleped þapocalips, **þat is to seie**, sheweynges in gost (c1350 *Apocalypse of St. John* (ME version) in *LuSE* (Hrl 874) p.2 [*MED*]).
'this book . . . is called *thapocalips*, that is to say, apparitions of ghosts'

That is to say becomes established as an appositive marker in Middle English (*MED*:s.v. *that* pron., def. 1d).

Because *þæt is* is used in Old English, Visser (1969:1465) believes that "there is the possibility of indigenous growth."[38] However, he concludes that a more plausible theory is that *that is to say* is a calque on the ancestor of French *c'est-à-dire*. This origin is suggested by the *OED* (s.v. *say* v1, def. B4b). Prins (1952:279) is somewhat more hesitant, admitting the possible existence of the construction in Old English but seeing its extensive use in Middle English "at least in part due to F[rench]." I would argue that the existence of late Old English examples of *that is to say* (see 38a–c) does indeed point to native origin, though the reinforcing influence of the French construction seems indisputable.

More common than *that is to say* as an apposition marker in ME is *as who(so) say/saith* (*MED*:s.v. *seien* v.1, def. 2e). In an exhaustive study, Nevanlinna (1974:581) argues that *as who(so) say/saith* has three uses in Middle English:

(a) as an indicator of apposition 'as if he (had) said,' which corresponds to the original Latin personal construction;
(b) as an introducer of something implied (by a gesture or facial expression); and
(c) as an adverbial "comment-clause" meaning 'as it were,' 'so to speak.'

Nevanlinna considers this to be a native construction (see further §7.5).

[38] Visser (1969:1465) suggests that it is also possible that *to secganne* was used in the sense of 'that is to say'; this usage is not attested but can only be inferred from later sources. If *þæt is* and *to secganne* occurred adjacent to one another, Visser hypothesizes, they could be "altered into the syntactical colligation" *that is to say*.

A number of other competitors for *that is to say* exist in Middle English. These include *that is to mean, that is to understand,* and *that is to wit*.[39] Koivisto-Alanko and Rissanen (2002) provide a detailed studied of *to wit*. In Old English, they find the "first stages of grammaticalisation" of *hit/þæt is to witanne* and see it as "approaching a pragmatic expression" (15). They consider *it is to wit* to be modeled on the Latin impersonal construction *sciendum est* (15, 26), but suggest that *that is to wit* translates various Latin expressions. In Middle English, the frequency of *it/that is to wit* falls off (17), and the construction is not yet entirely fixed (26). According to the *OED* (s.v. *wit* v.1, def. BI10a–b) Anglo-French *cestasavoir*, Latin *scilicet, videlicet, id est* are possible sources (see also Visser 1969:1465, 1467). Koivisto-Alanko and Rissanen (2002) agree that a connection between the Latin forms and those in Middle English is not in doubt (26), especially with the increase in scientific writing in late Middle English (see also Visser 1969:1465, 1467). They note an additional use for *that is to wit* in Middle English, that of introducing a new and important piece of information; in this usage, the construction has a subjective quality (24–25). In Early Modern English, *that is to wit* gradually gives way to *it is to wit* (26–27). They do not see *that is to wit* and *it is to wit* as directly connected (27). A shortened form of *it is to wit – to wit –* also makes its appearance. *To wit* could function as an "emphasizing discourse marker" meaning 'indeed,' 'truly'; this usage was strongly epistemic and subjective (23, 25). In Present-day English, *to wit* signals an appositive giving a list or specifying the previous discourse.[40] It is "clearly grammatical" (23) because the original lexical meaning of *wit* has disappeared, and the form is perhaps no longer recognizable as an infinitive. *To wit* is very rare and is limited primarily to legal usage. Grammaticalization occurs because the verb *know* took over the conceptual field of 'knowing' and "the already slightly grammaticalised or pragmatized uses of *wit* suddenly achieved wider currency" (23). The grammaticalized form survives even when the verb itself is lost (29) (on the loss of *wit*, see Rissanen 1993).

Also in Early Modern English we find the first attestation of the Latin appositive phrase *videlicet* (< *vidēre licet* 'one is permitted to see') as well as *scilicet* (< *scire licet* 'it is permitted to know') in English contexts (*OED*, s.v.v. *videlicet* adv. and n. and *scilicet* adv. (n.)).[41] Moore (2006; see §3.2.3.2) records the specialized use of *videlicet* in EModE slander depositions to mark code-switches and to introduce reported speech. Outside of legal contexts *videlicet* is not used

[39] Visser (1969:1466–1467) gives examples of *that is to mean* dating from ME through 1493, examples of *that is to understand* dating from late OE through 1479, and examples of *that is to wit* dating from ME through 1580; the first two expressions are not recorded in the *OED*, but examples of *that is to wit* can be found, dating up to 1587, as well as one example from James Joyce dated 1922. Koivisto-Alanko and Rissanen (2002:16) record examples of *þæt is to understandenne/ongytenne* 'that is to understand perceive' in OE.

[40] The appositive meaning refers to something already mentioned in discourse and shows a decrease in subjectivity.

[41] The *OED* quotation database provides examples of *scilicet* dating from 1387.

for reporting speech. Interestingly, the abbreviated form of *videlicet* (*viz.*) is used earlier than *videlicet* in English texts and is consistently more common (see Moore 2006:262–263).[42]

Finally, a related construction, *which is to say* occurs occasionally in Middle English (the earliest example in the *OED* quotation bank is 1584):

(39) Touchende of Slowthe in his degre, Ther is yit Pusillamite, **Which is to seie** . . . He that hath litel of corage And dar no mannes werk beginne (a1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* (Frf3) 4.314 [*MED*]).
'touching on sloth in its degree, there is yet *Pusillanimite* which is to say . . . He that has little courage and dare begin no man's work'

That is (to say) begins as a "normal syntactical unit" and evolves into a "crystallized or set phrase" (Visser 1969:1464). In earlier periods, as Visser illustrates (1969:1464–1465), all kinds of nouns and pronouns could serve as subject, the infinitive could be separated from the form of 'be' by adverbial adjuncts such as *as much as* or *not else*, and a variety of verbs (*mean, understand, wit*) could occur in the construction. Gradually, the form of the expression became ossified. This gradual fixing of the construction is typical of grammaticalization. Moreover, the selection of one variant – *that is to say* – among a number of variant expressions is the process of specialization in grammaticalization noted by Hopper (1991). In one respect, however, the development of *that is (to say)* seems uncharacteristic of grammaticalization in that the shorter form, *that is,* seems to pre-date the longer form, *that is to say*. Here, foreign influence – the effect of French *c'est a dire* – seems to have played a role.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the pragmatic functions and historical development of a number of comment clauses containing the common verb of communication *say*, including *(I) say, I daresay, (as) you say,* and *that is to say*. These comment clauses take on complex and varied meaning, ranging from textual to subjective and intersubjective. For example, *(I) say* calls or evokes the attention of the hearer, expresses a subjective emotion of the speaker, such as surprise, disbelief, or anger, or serves as a metalinguistic device to emphasize a particular word or expression. The modalized form *I daresay* has an epistemic function in expressing speaker tentativeness, with overlays of intersubjective emotions such as dismissiveness or impatience. *You say* highlights or recalls information expressed (or implicitly assumed) by the interlocutor in order to confirm understanding or to introduce disagreement with or query the truth value of this information. In contrast, *as you say* generally asserts agreement with the interlocutor's ideas

[42] Moore found this to be the case in the Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse (2006:255). A search of the *OED* database provides the earliest example of *viz.* in 1425 and the earliest examples of *videlicet* in 1464.

but may have an additional metalinguistic function in accompanying a figure of speech. *That is (to say)* is primarily connective in function, introducing a parenthetic explanation or elaboration, but it may also have a metalinguistic function in revising or reformulating the accompanying expression.

The syntactic sources of *say*-comment clauses are likewise varied. The bare *say*-form originates as a second-person imperative matrix clause accompanied by an interrogative complement clause. Over time the imperative clause becomes syntactically independent of the interrogative and begins to function parenthetically; the original complement clause assumes main-clause status. Comment clauses based on *I say* (> *say*) and *I daresay* could be assumed to arise as main clauses followed by complement *that*-clauses according to the sequence of events postulated by the matrix clause hypothesis. However, historical evidence for such a derivation is inconclusive because of the infrequency of clausal complements (with or without *that*) following *I say* and *I daresay* in the earlier periods. Evidence for the derivation of parenthetic *you say* from the adverbial clause *as you say*, with deletion of the complementizer, is much more convincing. Initial *you say* + complement clause (without *that*) may also have contributed to the development of parenthetic *you say,* especially in instances with fronted constituents. *That is* apparently arose in Old English as a non-restrictive relative structure in which *that* referred anaphorically to the preceding word or expression (= 'which is'). The expanded form with infinitival *to say* owes much to French influence.

Despite a variety of pragmatic functions and syntactic sources, what characterizes the development of all of the comment clauses with *say* is the process of grammaticalization. All of the forms undergo decategorialization, from freely formed and variable complement-taking clauses to fixed and invariable fused expressions. *I dare say, as you say*, and *I say* involve the elimination of phonological segments as well. Desemanticization, or the loss of concrete meaning as a verb of communication, is followed by the acquisition of the variety of pragmatic functions detailed above (what Himmelmann [2004] calls "semantic–pragmatic expansion"). *Say* comment clauses may also come to be used for purposes of politeness. Subjectification (including the expression of speaker emotion, tentativeness, impatience, and so on) as well as intersubjectification, or focus on the addressee, which is most obvious in the case of *(as) you say*, motivate the semantic changes affecting the *say* comment clauses. Finally, the comment clauses, which come to function parenthetically and convey pragmatic force and thus change in scope, expanding from having scope over the complement to having scope over discourse. This expansion of scope is characteristic of pragmatic markers.

5 *I mean*

5.1 Introduction

In Present-day English, clause-initial *I mean* followed by a declarative clause without *that* is ambiguously a matrix clause or a parenthetical (Biber *et al.* 1999:1076), as in:

(1) As it was he sold the goddamned things at my racket club. **I mean** he was only a member because of my husband (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 105 [FLOB]).

According to Stenström, however, *I mean* is rarely a main clause and serves "almost exclusively" (85% of the time) as a parenthetical (1995:296, 297, 299). The description of parenthetical *I mean* in the *OED* as "a filler, with no explanatory force" (s.v. *mean* v. 1, def. II6e)[1] betrays its status as a pragmatic marker, as do descriptions of it as a "fumble" (Edmondson 1981), a "pragmatic expression" (Erman 1986; 1987), a "discourse marker" (Schiffrin 1987), a "discourse particle" (Goldberg 1980), or a "comment clause" (Stenström 1995:291).

This chapter explores the semasiological and syntactic development of parenthetical *I mean*. In her study of *I mean* in Present-day English, Schiffrin (1987) points out that the development of the pragmatic functions of *I mean* seems fairly transparent, as they can be traced back to the two primary senses of *mean*, namely, 'to intend to convey or indicate' and 'to have as an intention': "the literal meaning of the expression '*I mean*,'" she says, "suggests that *I mean* marks a speaker's upcoming modification of the ideas or intentions of a prior utterance" (302, 317–318). This chapter tests this hypothesized development of pragmatic *I mean* from the literal meaning of the verb *mean*. Beginning with an overview of the form, frequency, and functions of *I mean* in Present-day English (§5.2), the chapter then explores the rise of the different functions in the history of English (§5.3). In §5.4, two possible syntactic origins for parenthetical *I mean* are investigated, while in §5.5 the semantic development of *I mean* is traced, focusing on

[1] Interestingly, the second edition of the *OED* (^{2}1989) fails to identify a parenthetical use of *I mean*.

the conventionalization of invited inferences stemming from the verb's original meaning of 'signification.' Section 5.6 places the development of *I mean* within the context of grammaticalization studies.

5.2 *I mean* in Present-day English

5.2.1 The frequency of I mean

I mean is a parenthetical of relatively high frequency in Present-day English. Stenström finds *I mean* to be the third most frequent marker (after *you know* and *you see*) in the London-Lund Corpus (1995:293). Biber *et al*. note 2000 occurrences per million of *I mean* in American English and 1500 per million in British English (1999:1098). Jucker and Smith record a frequency of one *I mean* every two minutes in the speech of college students, but among the ten pragmatic markers that they count, *I mean* is the sixth most common (after *yeah, like, oh, you know*, and *well*) and constitutes only 4% of the total tokens used (1998:176). Scheibman observes that *mean* is the most common verb of "verbal process," constituting 81% of all present tokens of such verbs in her corpus; furthermore, all instances of *mean* are present, and all but four occur with a first-person subject (2001:74). However, in a sampling of the first 100 instances of verbal *mean* in the BNC, I found only 31 examples of *I mean*.

5.2.2 The meaning of I mean

The discourse-pragmatic functions of *I mean* in Present-day English have been extensively studied.[2] In general terms, one can say that *I mean* may be either metalinguistic, "message-oriented," with focus on properties of code (that is, it modifies the speaker's expressions)[3] or "metacommunicative," with focus on speaker's communicative act (that is, it modifies the speaker's intentions) (Schiffrin 1987:304).

A number of specific pragmatic functions for *I mean* have been identified by some scholars while some of these same functions have been rejected by others. First, it has been seen as a filler, hesitation marker, or staller indicating ongoing planning.[4] However, Erman (1986:146) argues that *I mean* is **not** a hesitation marker since it occurs in fluent speech. Second, *I mean* is a "mistake editor," or marker of self-initiated (self)-repair of a preceding utterance, used to

[2] See, for example, Crystal and Davy (1975:97–98), Goldberg (1980), James (1983), Schourup (1985), Erman (1986, 1987), Schiffrin (1987), Stenström (1995), and Fox Tree and Schrock (2002).

[3] See James (1983:198), Schiffrin (1987:303), and Gerhardt and Stinson (1994:163).

[4] See Lalljee and Cook (1975:305), Edmondson (1981:153), Östman (1981:9), James (1983:201), Swan (1994), Stenström (1995:294), and Fox Tree and Schrock (2002:731, 745).

prevent misunderstanding.[5] Third, *I mean* may provide elaboration, clarification, expansion, explanation, or reformulation of the preceding utterance (= 'In other words what I'm saying amounts to the following').[6] In this function, *I mean* indicates "change in emphasis, direction, or meaning in order to align the conveyed information with the speaker's intended contribution" (Goldberg 1980:215), signals a 'something like' relationship between qualified construction and item in absentia and functions as a voluntary marker of "imprecision," an expression of 'like-ness' (James 1983:194, 198), is a hedge on the Maxim of Quantity or of Manner (Markkanen 1985:59), denotes "non equivalence" where what the speaker says and what the speaker has in mind are not well matched (Schourup 1985:147–148), or serves to "forewarn upcoming adjustments to what has just been said" (Fox Tree and Schrock 2002:731, 741). Finally, *I mean* may serve to express a 'further instance,' in which the general is made more specific,[7] or to sum up, meaning 'the point is' (Gerhardt and Stinson 1994:164).

I mean also expresses of range of speaker attitudes, providing information about the speaker, the speaking situation, or levels of politeness (Fox Tree and Schrock 2002:729). For example, it may function as a "softener" (Crystal and Davy 1975), as a "compromiser" (James 1983) softening the assertive force, or as a mitigator of "the strength of an evaluative statement" by making the speaker less committed (Erman 1986:143; 1987:119). It has been argued that as a "cajoler" *I mean* increases, establishes, or restores harmony between interlocutors; it is interactive, cooperative, and hearer-oriented, thus contributing to intimacy.[8] In contrast, however, it has been argued that *I mean* is **not** interactive or hearer-oriented and usually doesn't request a response (Edmondson 1981; Erman 1986:145, 146; Fox Tree and Schrock 2002:735); it is, in fact, speaker-oriented,[9] serving as the "speaker's modification of his/her own talk" (Schiffrin 1987:299, 317). Moreover, *I mean* may serve as a negative politeness marker since it is deferential and hedges assertions to protect face.[10] Finally, *I mean* has also

[5] See Goldberg (1980:120), Levinson (1983:340, 365), Quirk *et al.* (1985:1313), Schourup (1985:147–148), Schiffrin (1987:300), Redeker (1990:374), and Stenström (1995). In contrast to *you know*, *I mean* denotes less expected or predictable repairs (Fox Tree and Schrock 2002:734).

[6] See Crystal and Davy (1975:97, 98), Goldberg (1980:125, 214), Edmondson (1981:154–155, who says that *I mean* belongs to "the let-me-explain" type fumble), Erman (1986:137, 140, 142; 1987:118), Schiffrin (1987:296, 299, 302, 304), Chafe (1988:14–15), Crystal (1988:49), Gerhardt and Stinson (1994:164), Swan (1994), Stenström (1995:295), Jucker and Smith (1998:174), Biber *et al.* (1999:1077), and Fox Tree and Schrock (2002:735).

[7] See Gerhardt and Stinson (1994:164) and Swan (1994); cf. Erman (1986:137).

[8] See House and Kasper (1981:168), Faerch and Kasper (1982:75), James (1983:198, 202), and Schiffrin (1987:305).

[9] See Edmondson (1981:155), Östman (1981:34–35), and Stenström (1995:294).

[10] See Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]:167), Laljee and Cook (1975:305), Coates (1998:143), and James (1983:198). Laljee and Cook (1975:305) speculate that since *I mean* has "overtones of apology," it "may be interpreted as the speaker not being sure of himself." Fox Tree and Schrock (2002:733, 741) see *I mean* as being associated not only with negative politeness but also with positive politeness, as it is associated with casual speech.

been seen as "evaluative" (Gerhardt and Stinson 1994:168, 182) or "epistemic" (Coates 1998:143; Scheibman 2001:74–75).

In the discussion below, in addition to the "full" meaning of 'intention,' I identify five pragmatic meanings of *I mean*: (a) appositional meanings (repair, reformulation, explicitness, and exemplification), (b) causal meaning, (c) expressions of speaker attitude (evaluation and sincerity), and (e) interpersonal meaning.

5.2.2.1 "Full" meanings. The dynamic meaning of *mean* 'to intend [to do something]' typically occurs with a *to*-complement; however, there are very few examples of *I mean* with this sense in my PDE corpora (*mean* in this context perhaps being replaced by *intend* or other verbs):

(2) **I** didn't **mean to be** rude last Wednesday (1941 Rhys, *Letters* 1 Mar. (1984) 35 [*OED*]).

In contrast, the cognitive meaning 'to signify, to intend to convey a certain sense,' is found in a variety of syntactic structures in Present-day English, such as *I mean* with clausal or phrasal complement, *what I mean is*, and *by* X *I mean*:

(3) a. You misunderstand, sir. **I mean** the debates remain secret, not a word of them leaked to the press or the public (1992 Ludlum, *The Road to Omaha* 68 [FROWN]).
b. **I mean** 'mythology' technically – as the ideal recollection of an event which shapes our current values (1986 Hannaford, *On Being – The Servant's Servant* April 1 [ACE]).
c. What **I mean** is that King's memories and perceptions of the past are, one would expect coloured by the context in which he is writing now (1986 McBride, "Pakeha Ethnicity and New Zealand Society," *Hurupaa* 12 [WC]).
d. By reading **I mean** that I treat the charts as texts and attempt to tease out the assumptions that go into constructing it (1991 Parker, "Reading the Charts – Making Sense of the Hit Parade," *Popular Music* 2 [FLOB]).

However, the sense 'to signify' is rarely expressed parenthetically in Present-day English.

5.2.2.2 Appositional meanings. Closest to the full meaning of *mean* is what Quirk *et al.* call the "appositive" or "appositional" function, where *I mean* serves to "express the content of the preceding item or items in other terms" or to "add another formulation" (1985:637, 638). Typically, the appositional meaning is expressed in the structure *I mean* + phrasal complement. This function has a number of different subvarieties, and in the sense that all focus on code and speaker's use of that code, on the particular expression used – in repairing, reformulating, making more explicit, or exemplifying the code – they are all metalinguistic/metacommunicative. While these meanings are often quite close,

they can be distinguished by use of paraphrases such as *what I mean to say* and *namely* or by features of the context.

Repair: Instances of "mistake editing" or "self-repair" with *I mean* are in fact quite infrequent in Present-day English.[11] *I mean* may serve the function of "mistake editing" or "self-repair," either preceding or following a phrasal category (4a–b) or occurring parenthetically (4c–d):

(4) a. "I'll see you in the morning." She laughed. "**I mean**, afternoon" (1991 Thomson, *The Five Gates of Hell* 46 [FLOB]).
b. "Lucy!" A flustered look crossed Rob's face. "Miss Chalmers, **I mean**" (1992 Savery, *A Handful of Promises* 26 [FROWN]).
c. "How many ... **I mean**, how long is it since you got the first of these?" (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 33 [FLOB]).
d. I don't mind it. **I mean** I mind, of course I mind, but I'm not squeamish (1992 Block, *A Walk among the Tombstones* 19 [FROWN]).

Reformulation: The second appositional function is the use of *I mean* to reformulate the preceding utterance:[12]

(5) a. "I could verify that?" Anna asked. "**I mean**, are there three independent witnesses to this visit?" (1991 Cody, *Backhand* 48 [FLOB]).
b. but I can't remember when anyone spoke so many words to me in such a short time. **I mean** gave me so much attention (1992 Stanley, "The Stranger's Surprise," *Saturday Evening Post* 56 [FROWN]).
c. "I just want to look at the stuff, **I mean**, examine it physically, not experience it emotionally" (1986 Corish, *Greenwich Apartments* 1 [ACE]).

Note that to the extent that *I mean* here expresses contrast, it expresses the speaker's belief and is hence subjective and metacommunicative.

Explicitness: The next appositional function – to make the preceding utterance more precise or explicit – may be glossed by 'namely, that is,' as in these examples:

(6) a. "It could be embarrassing, you see. Politically, **I mean**" (1991 Pearce, *The Mamm Zapt and the Girl in the Nile* 62 [FLOB]).
b. the challenge I am referring to is crucial to our future. **I mean** reform of the American Government (1992 Weekly Compilation of the Papers of the President of the US 10 [FROWN]).
c. I've never heard about one here, a poisonous one that bites, **I mean**, the island shouldn't have spiders but look ... look at this red line (Papaellinas, "Peter Mavromatis Rides the Tail of the Donkey," *Ikons* 1 [ACE]).

[11] The rarity of this meaning in written corpora is perhaps understandable, where planning time and editing possibilities allow for the prevention and/or correction of mistakes.

[12] Quirk *et al.* (1985:638–639) actually treat this usage as "contrastive," not "appositive," since one formulation is *replaced* with another rather than *added* to another; but they are clearly closely related, and both may be glossed with 'in other words.'

d. "It must be so marvellous to use words at all," Firth said. "With that freedom, **I mean**" (1986 O'Sullivan, "Putting Bob Down," *Landfall* 16 [WC]).

Exemplification: The last appositional function – to exemplify – may be glossed 'for instance':

(7) a. Miranda was a star; I was space dust. **I mean**, when she made cheerleader our sophomore year, I got elected treasurer of the Latin Club (1992 Lanning, "I was a Prom Date Renegade," *Teen* 16 [FROWN]).
b. blokes who had lived in the bush all our lives, really understood the hidden feelings of our land or his, really, I suppose. **I mean**, like, he'd spend hours staring at a plant or pretty flower (1986 Weller, "Herbie," *Going Home* 1 [ACE]).

5.2.2.3 Causal meaning. Perhaps the most interesting function of *I mean* is that exemplified in (8), roughly translatable as 'because' or 'I'm saying this because.' This is quite a common parenthetical use in Present-day English:

(8) a. "Don't you think it's time you put that thing away. **I mean**, look at it, it's antique; you could hurt yourself with it" (1991 Royce, *The Proving Ground* 31 [FLOB]).
b. "for the most part it makes little difference. **I mean** the people are dead" (1992 Cook, *Blindsight* 43 [FROWN]).
c. Do we need the one-cent coin? **I mean**, how long has it been since one could buy something for a cent . . . ? (1986 *The Herald* 1 [ACE]).
d. Shouldn't there be lots of places going. **I mean**, with the tax changes? (1986 Corish, *Greenwich Apartments* 1 [ACE]).

As the speaker is being attentive to the hearer's need for explanation, this usage is intersubjective. It is also subjective since the utterance preceding *I mean* usually expresses a personal opinion or view of the speaker.

5.2.2.4 Expressions of speaker attitude. Parenthetical *I mean* or *I mean* preceding or following a phrasal category may express a variety of speaker attitudes.

Emphasis. First, it may express emphasis or assert the veracity of an utterance:

(9) a. I'm not talking about little people although they were. **I mean** real dwarves, with beards, crossbows, and armor (1992 Spector, "His Cool, Blue Skin" 82 [FROWN]).
b. But Cousin Alexander is rich! Really rich, **I mean** (1991 Nash, *Mr. Ravensworth's Ward* 71 [FLOB]).
c. when he might have been the best at this one thing. The very best **I mean** (1987 Kidman, *The Whiteness* 27 [WC]).

In (9a) and (9b) *real* and *really* contribute to the sense of veracity being expressed, but as (9c) shows, an intensifier is not obligatory.

Evaluation. Second, *I mean* may express evaluation or judgment, especially in the context of an evaluative adjective:

(10) a. he'd made a gigantic hole in the sand. **I mean**, it was huge (1991 Steed, *Boxed In* 90 [FLOB]).
b. **I mean**, it's humiliating to be beaten by someone who doesn't even walk properly (1987 Sharp, "Round the Rugged Rocks," *New Outlook* 21 [WC]).
c. then I'm appalled the SK should try to destroy it. **I mean**, that's nothing short of treachery (1991 Robinson, *Artillery of Lies* 26 [FLOB]).
d. What could be more bizarre than a mob of 70,000 heading towards St Heliers Beach for no apparent reason (**I mean**, it wasn't a sunny day . . .) (1987 Sharp, "Round the Rugged Rocks," *New Outlook* 11 [WC]).

Sincerity. Third, *I mean* may express sincerity in the sense 'I'm serious when I say':

(11) a. he will lose unless he concentrates on every point, and **I mean** every point (1991 *Evening Standard* 62 [FLOB]).
b. I'm in this for the distance. **I mean** it (1992 Dove, *Through the Ivory Gate. A Novel* 32 [FROWN]).
c. I would never pick up the phone and call him; *I mean*, I wouldn't do that (1992 Gates, *Chief: My Life with the LAPD* 5 [FROWN]).
d. so you felt like snuggling up to her. Well **I mean**, I wouldn't, but I could recognise the look (1987 Edmond, "Sadie" 12 [WC]).

5.2.2.5 Interpersonal meaning. In phrases containing a second-person pronoun or in an interrogative, *I mean* serves an intersubjective meaning:

(12) a. It is because she isn't that she is successful . . . if you understand what **I mean** (1991 Holt, *Daughter of Deceit* 50 [FLOB]).
b. "If it was, then conceivably Congressman Metcalf resented that and – Well. You see what **I mean**" (1992 Roosevelt, *Murder in the Red Room* 17 [FROWN]).
c. Or the paper does rather. Know what **I mean**? (1986 O'Sullivan, "Putting Bob Down," *Landfall* 22 [WC]).
d. if Smith's orchard would have any ripe apples we could swipe on the way . . . see what **I mean**? (1987 *In our own Write* 52 [WC]).

Although this structure is hearer-directed and intersubjective, as it contains overt social deixis and explicit markers of the speaker's attention to the addressee, it does not elicit or expect a response from the interlocutor. According to the *OED*, this expression denotes "a hope that one has been understood (esp. when one has spoken imprecisely, circumspectly, or euphemistically)" and is used "as an intensifier, or appended to a statement by way of innuendo or insinuation, or as a filler" (s.v. *mean* v.1, def. II6d). The sense of *I mean* is thus "I'm implying more

Table 5.1. *Frequency of* I mean *types in PDE corpora*

	FLOB	FROWN	ACE	WC	BNC[a]	Total
I mean (that) S	1	3	0	1	3	8 (3%)
I mean (parenthetical)	24	25	22	23	48	142 (51%)
I mean NP/AP/VP/AdvP/PP	15	13	6	10	14	58 (21%)
I mean {*it, this, what I say*}	1	6	1	3	1	12 (4%)
what I mean is, *what I mean by* X *is*	1	0	2	1	3	7 (3%)
by X *I mean*, *I mean by* X (*that*)	1	2	1	5	13	22 (8%)
((if)you) {*see, know, understand*} what I mean	3	2	5	4	0	14 (5%)
. . . *what I mean*	0	4	0	0	14	18 (6%)

[a] Random sampling of 100 instances of *I mean*

than I'm saying." As such, it operates by Levinson's (2000) R-Heuristic ("what is said implies more is meant") (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002:23).

5.2.3 *The form and distribution of* I mean

In the PDE corpora, one finds parenthetical *I mean* and several fixed expressions containing *I mean*. The number of tokens of each *I mean* type is recorded in Table 5.1. Over half of the instances are parenthetical *I mean*; *I mean* plus a phrasal complement (NP, AP, etc.) also occurs in significant numbers. The other forms, including an interactive form (*if you* {*see, understand, know*} *what I mean*), an expression of sincerity (*I mean* {*it, this, what I say*}), and several metalinguistic forms (*what I mean is, by* X *I mean,* and . . . *what I mean*), are all relatively uncommon. *I mean* followed by a clausal complement (with or without *that*) occurs very infrequently.

While studies generally agree that *I mean* occurs initially and medially, but rarely in final position[13] the PDE corpora show that parenthetical *I mean* occurs overwhelmingly in initial position, as shown in Figure 5.1.

Note that when *I mean* occurs in initial position, it is not always possible to determine its grammatical status as main clause or parenthetical, although one can be guided by punctuation and meaning.

5.3 Semantic–pragmatic functions of *I mean* from a diachronic perspective

The functions identified in synchronic studies of *I mean* will serve as a starting point for the following study of the historical development of *I mean*.

[13] See Lalljee and Cook (1975:303), James (1983:196), and Stenström (1995:298).



Figure 5.1 Position of *I mean* in PDE

As only three examples of *ic mæne* (none of *ic gemæne*) occur in the Dictionary of Old English Corpus, and none is parenthetical, it was possible to begin the following survey with the Middle English period.[14]

5.3.1 Full meanings

I mean in the sense 'to intend (to do something)' is common in the earlier periods:

(13) a. That is love, of which **I mene** To trete (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 1.15 [*MED*]).
'that is love of which I intend to treat'
b. **I mene** . . . To enqueren which thyng cause of which thing be (1382–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* 4.1009–1010 [Benson]).
'I intend . . . to inquire which thing is cause of which thing'

However, because of its rarity in Present-day English,[15] I do not consider this meaning significant in the semasiological development of *mean.*

[14] Etymologically, *mean* finds its source in OE *(ge)mænan* 'mean, signify, intend, allude, complain of,' which has numerous cognates in the other Germanic languages (see Kroesch 1911:503), likely from Germanic *mainjan. While traditionally the verb is related to the Proto-Indo-European root *men 'mind,' this connection is difficult to explain phonologically. A connection to the root *mei-no 'opinion, intention' (giving *mean* and *moan*) has been made (see Watkins 2000). Wood (1899:130) relates it to the root *me-i-o- 'measure.'

[15] Only 2 of the 100 instances of *I mean* sampled from the BNC carry the 'intend' meaning.

The cognitive meaning 'to signify, to intend to convey a certain sense' is also found in Middle English (14), although the variety of syntactic forms is more limited than in the modern period (cf. 3).[16] In Early Modern English, the formula *by* X *I mean* arises (15); it has a metalinguistic function and may serve to gloss foreign or unknown terms. This structure is still common in Present-day English (see 3d, above):

(14) a. Forto bisette my wordis ... so that thei be not colourabili impugned, and also be chalengid to meene other wise than **y meene** (c1456 Pecock, *Book of Faith* [Trin-C B.14.45] 122 [*MED*]).
'in order to fashion my words ... so that they are not plausibly impugned and also challenged to mean other than I mean'
b. And how **I mene**, I shal it yow devyse (1382–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* 4.1379 [Benson]).
'and how I mean I shall it to you describe'

(15) a. By Mundus continens **I mean** the Compages and frame of the Physical heaven and earth (1638 Mede, *Works* iii. 615 [*OED*]).
b. By a *leather mouthed fish, **I mean** such as have their teeth in their throat, as the Chub or Cheven, and so the Barbel [etc.] (1653 Walton, *The Compleat Angler* ii.55 [*OED*]).
c. "By 'lust' **I mean** those general desirings of our mind after any unlawful object which are forbidden in the tenth commandment" (1677 Gilpin, *Dæmonologia Sacra, or a Treatise of Satan's Temptations* [1867] 63 [*OED*]).

5.3.2 Metalinguistic/metacommunicative meanings

Unequivocal examples of the parenthetical *I mean* used in the first appositional sense – the self-repair or mistake editing sense – do not occur until the Early Modern English period (16):

(16) a. "Take Saffron ... then tease it, **I mean**, pull the parts thereof asunder" (1617 Woodall, *The Surgions Mate* [1653] 344 [*OED*]).
b. Set 'em off Lady **I mean** sell 'em (1625 Fletcher, *The Humorous Lieutenant* iii.i [*OED*]).
c. The chiefe use, **I meane** abuse, of Oaths, is as afore I have said in our Courts of Justice (1653 Robinson, *Certain Proposals in Order to a New Modelling of the Laws* 1 [LC]).

We see that the writer in (16a) replaces the obscure word *tease* with the more common expression *pull asunder* in an attempt to made his meaning clearer to

[16] The only pragmatically-colored usage with the meaning of signification cited in the *MED* is *I mene thus* (s.v. *mēnen* v.1, def. 1a) 'this is what I am getting at.' Variants found in my corpora include: *I mean thus, thus I mean, I mean as thus*. These often stand as independent utterances.

the reader, while the writers in (16b) and (16c) correct obvious mistakes, the incorrect *set* being replaced by *sell* and *use* by its antonym *abuse*.

Examples of *I mean* denoting the second metalinguistic function – to express a reformulation – occur in Middle English (17) and Early Modern (18). However, during these periods, *I mean* precedes a phrasal, not a clausal complement:

(17) a. Ther saugh I Dane, yturned til a tree – / **I mene** nat the goddesse Diane, / But Penneus doghter, which that highte Dane (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* A.Kn. 2062–2064 [Benson]).
'there I saw Daphne turned into a tree – / I do not mean the goddess Diana / but Penneus' daughter, who is named Daphne'

b. . . . don þeire preiers. **I mene** of þeire specyal preiers, not of þoo preiers þat ben ordeynid of Holy Chirche (1425 [?1400] *The Cloud of Unknowing* 74.1–2 [HC]).
'. . . do their prayers. I mean of their special prayers, not of those prayers that are ordained by the Holy Church'

c. The claper of his distouned bell . . . **I mene** his fals tunge (1450 [?1422] Lydgate, *Life of our Lady* [Dur-U Cosin V.2.16] 2.922 [*MED*]).
'the clapper of his distoned bell . . . I mean his false tongue'

(18) a. "And with the same [stabbers] thei slashe me out good God what preatie shiues. Not shiues of bread **I meane** . . . But gobbes of fleshe" (1581 Derricke, *The Image of Ireland, a Poem* ii. F ij [*OED*]).

b. Pandarus: At whose pleasure, friend?
Servant: At mine, sir, and theirs that love music.
Pandarus: Command, **I mean**, [friend] (1601–02 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida* III, i, 23–25 [Evans]).

This function of *I mean* can be identified by using the translation equivalent 'in other words'; thus in (17c) the writer replaces a metaphorical expression with a literal one in order to clarify his meaning: 'the clapper of his distoned bell, in other words, his false tongue.' Parenthetical uses of *I mean* in the reformulation sense occur for the first time in Modern English.

The third metalinguistic function – the explicitness function – is the majority usage in the Middle (19) and Early Modern English (20) periods and examples are numerous:

(19) a. For somme of hem seyn moore, and somme seyn lesse, / Whan they his pitous passioun expresse – / **I meene** of Mark, Mathew, Luc, and John (1387–92 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* B.Mel 949–951 [Benson]).
'for some of them say more, and some say less when they express his piteous passion – I mean Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John'

b. The ladre of heuene, **I meene** charitee, Comandith vs, if our brothir be falle In to errour, to haue of him pitee (1415 Hoccleve, *Address to Sir John Oldcastle* [Hnt HM 111] 1 [*MED*]).

'the ladder of heaven, I mean charity, command us, if our brother is fallen into error to have pity on him'

c. Shuldrys sharpe, **I mene** not reysed with slevys, Off evyl feith is lyklynesse (1450 Lydgate, *Secreta Secretorum* [Sln 2464] 2670 [*MED*]).
'sharp shoulders, I mean, not raised with sleeves, is evidence of evil faith'

d. Salomon conceyved not þe cause of synfull lyvynge of a gonge man, **I mene**, why a gonge man is prompt un-to vicious lyvynge (1450 [c1415] Roy.Serm.[Roy 18.B.23] 267/5 [*MED*]).
'Salomon did not conceive the cause of sinful living of a young man, I mean, why a young man is prompted to a vicious way of life'

These examples show writers using *I mean* in negotiating meaning by presenting more explicit phrasing of the preceding NP, phrasing they believe will make their meaning clearer to readers. The translation equivalent 'namely' can replace *I mean* in these instances, as in (19b) 'the ladder of heaven, namely, charity' or (19c) 'sharp shoulders, namely, not raised in sleeves'.

(20) a. The Puritans are angrie with me, **I meane** the puritane preachers (1589 Marprelate, *Tr., Epit.* A ij [*OED*]).

b. there be land-rats and water-rats, water-thieves and land-thieves, **I mean** pirates (1596–97 Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice* I, iii, 22–23 [UofV]).

c. First the childe is to be taught, how to call every letter, pronouncing each of them plainely, fully and distinctly; **I meane**, in a distinct and differing sound, each from others (1627 Brinsley, *Ludus Literarius or The Grammar Schoole*, 15 [HC]).

d. "Let us now take a Prospect of their Governours, **I mean**, consider the Manners and Maxims of their Nobility" (1677 de la Houssaye, *Government of Venice* 266 [*OED*]).

e. Many of our fierce and staring Seperatists, like their Ancestors of another denomination (the Papists **I mean**) embrace Principles and Ways of Worship, though they understand them not (1682 Pittis, *An Old Way of Ending New Controversies* 1 [LC]).

Here *I mean* seems to restrict the referent of the preceding NP, picking one member of a set of possible referents. Thus, in (20a), not all Puritans are intended, only Puritan preachers.

There do not appear to be pre-modern examples of the last metalinguistic function, viz. to express an example.

In respect to its syntax, *I mean* may occur with an NP (16c, 17a, 17c, 18a, 18b, 19b, 20a, 20b, 20e), a PP (17b, 20c), an AP (19c), a VP (16a, 16b, 20d), or a dependent clause (19d). It may be postposed, as in (18b, 20e), as well as preposed, but parentheticals are common only in the modern period.

5.3.3 Other meanings

The causal sense of *I mean* appears in the modern period. A possible early example of *I mean* expressing emphasis or asserting veracity is the following:

(21) That ech of yow, to shorte with oure weye, / In this viage shal telle tales tweye / To Caunterbury-ward, **I mene it so** (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* A.Prol. 791–793 [Benson]).
'that each of you, in order to shorten our way in this voyage shall tell two tales to Canterbury, I mean it'

However, I have not found conclusive evidence for this usage before Present-day English.

One variety of *I mean* expressing speaker attitude which is clearly attested in earlier English is the sincerity meaning[17] in the sense 'I'm serious when I say':

(22) a. I do no fors, I speke right as **I mene** (?c1450 [?c1390] Chaucer, *Merciles Beute* 31 [*MED*]).
'I don't care, I speak just as I mean'
b. Now god turne all to good, I say as **I mene** (1500 [1460] *Towneley Plays* [Hnt HM 1] 120/131 [*MED*]).
'now god turns all to good, I say as I mean'
c. Mrs. Page: **I mean** it not; I seek you a better husband (1597–1601 Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* III, iv, 84 [Evans]).

In Middle English, when intersubjective or interactive uses of *I mean* (containing a second-person pronoun or in an interrogative) occur in verse, they often seem to be used as empty metrical tags (23a–d), though this does not appear to be their use in Early Modern English (23e):

(23) a. gif þu wolt sen in þi siht God of heuene . . . Vnderstond nu what **I mene** (c1330 [c1300] *Speculum of Guy of Warwick* [Auch] 405 [*MED*]).
'if you wish to see in your sight god of heaven . . . understand now what I mean'
b. And for a time yit thei like; / If that ye wisten what **I mene** (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 6.738–739 [UofV]).
'and for a time yet they like; if you know what I mean'
c. Unnethe myghte they the statut holde / In which that they were bounden unto me. / Ye woot wel what **I meene** of this, pardee! (1393–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* D.WB 198–200 [Benson]).
'Hardly might they the law hold by which they were bound to me; you know well what I mean by this, indeed!'

[17] The *OED* (s.v. *mean* [v1], def. II6c) dates this usage from 1750; all early examples consist of an entire phrase, such as *I mean it*, not *I mean* alone.



Figure 5.2 *I mean* in ME and EModE

d. She dryueth man to purge hem, ye wote what **I meane** (1475 [c1450] Idley, *Instructions to his Son* 1.710 [*MED*]).
'she drives men to purge themselves, you know that I mean'
e. Faith: You know what **I mean**; all carnal and fleshly content (1666 Bunyan, *The Pilgrim's Progress* [UofV]).[18]

5.4 Syntactic development

Two possible syntactic paths of development present themselves based on studies of other first-person parentheticals:

(a) from a matrix clause *I mean (that)* S, as proposed by Thompson and Mulac (1991b) for *I think* and *I guess* in Present-day English (cf. §2.3.3.1);
(b) from an adverbial/relative structure {*as, so, which*} *I mean*, as proposed by Brinton (1996) for the diachronic development of parenthetical *I think, I guess*, etc. from Old to Middle English (cf. §2.3.3.4).

A problem for proposal (a) is that throughout the periods of English, *mean* followed by a *that*-complement is rare. Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of different syntactic constructions with *I mean* in representative corpora of Middle English and Early Modern English (cf. also Table 5.1 for PDE). *I mean* followed by a *that*-clause occurs only 8% of the time, while 69% of the time it is accompanied by a phrasal complement.

[18] The *OED* (s.v. *mean* v.1, def. II6d) gives a 1575 occurrence of "you wot wel what I meane," but cites the first instance of *if you understand what I mean* from 1846.

In the Lampeter Corpus, only one of the three examples of *I mean* followed by a clausal complement contains an explicit *that* and only one of the five examples of the *by* X *I mean* constructions is followed by *that*.[19] Examples of *I mean* plus *that*-complements in the different periods of English are illustrated in (24):

(24) a. **I mene** not **þat** þou shuldist not lawhe, but I wold þat þi lawhyng be not to moche (1460 *The Tree & Twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost* [McC 132] 107/17 [*MED*]).
'I do not mean that you should not laugh but I would that your laughing be not too much'

b. And **I do not meene**, by all this my taulke, **that** yong Iengtlemen, should alwaies be poring on a booke (1563–68 Ascham, *The Scholemaster* 216 [HC]).

c. and as a recognition of what women have already contributed to the life o their Churches. **I mean**, quite seriously, **that** no great emotional investment was involved (1991 Kent, "Women, Ministry, and Apostolicity" 3 [FLOB]).

Note that in all cases in (24) the full meaning of signification (or occasionally intention) is expressed. The usual clausal complement of *mean* in all stages is the infinitive (Visser 1969:1330; Rudanko 1989:22, 43, 80).[20] If *mean* occurs at all with finite clause complements, these are usually indirect questions.

Indeterminate structures with sentence-initial *I mean* followed by *that*-less complements (analyzable as main clause or parenthetical) are attested from Middle English onwards, but again with *mean* in its full sense of signification or intention:

(25) a. And for the love of God, my lady deere, / Syn God hath wrought me for I shall yow serve – / And thus **I mene**: he wol ye be my steere, / To do me lyve . . . or sterve (1382–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* 3.1289–1292 [Benson]).
'and for the love of God, my dear lady, since God has made me to serve you – And thus I mean he wants you to be my guide to make me live . . . or die'

b. **I mene** / Maister Geffrey Chaucer hath translated this sayd werke oute of latyn in to oure vsual and moder tonge (1477–84 Caxton, *The Prologues and Epilogues* 37 [HC]).
'I mean Master Geoffrey Chaucer has translated this said work from Latin into our usual mother tongue'

[19] In Present-day English, *that* occurs commonly in the pseudo-cleft construction, *What I mean is (that)* (cf. 3c) and the *by* X *I mean* (*that*) construction (cf. 3d).

[20] While *-ing* complements with *mean* were possible in earlier English, they are marginal in Present-day English (Rudanko 1989:43; Visser 1973:1879).

c. **I mean**, my lords, those powers that the Queen / Hath rais'd in Gallia have arriv'd our coast, / And as we hear, march on to fight with us (1590–91 Shakespeare, *3 King Henry VI* V, iii, 7–9 [Evans]).
d. "The dean and he are not great; that is, **I mean** the dean is not his creature" (1690 Lady Russell, Letters 5. Feb. [*OED*]).

In respect to proposal (b), it may be observed that adverbial/relative structures with *I mean* are somewhat more common than matrix + *that* clause structures in Middle English and Early Modern English (see Figure 5.2). Representative examples from the two periods are given in (26) and (27), respectively:

(26) a. þis fool wommon, of whom **I mene** (1390 *Northern Homily Cycle: Narrationes* [Vrn] 300/54 [*MED*]).
'this foolish woman of whom I mean'
b. Boecius, þis same of whom **I mene** . . . was a noble senatour (1450 [1410] Walton, *Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae* [Lin-c 103] p. 6 [*MED*]).
'Boethius, this same of whom I mean . . . was a noble senator'
c. And that was thilke time sene / For whan this Pope of whom **I meene** / Was chose (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 2.2829–2831 [UofV]).[21]
'and that was seen at the same time for when this Pope of whom I mean was chosen'
d. That is Novembre which **I meene**, / Whan that the lef hath lost his greene (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 7.1167–1168 [UofV]).
'that is November which I mean, when the leaf has lost its green'

(27) a. But stay thee, 'tis the fruits of love **I mean** (1590–91 Shakespeare, *3 Henry VI* III, ii, 58 [Evans]).
b. Malcolm: It is myself **I mean**; in whom I know / All the particulars of vice so grafted (1606 Shakespeare, *Macbeth* IV, iii, 50–51 [Evans]).

Like *if you know what I mean* in Middle English, the relatives often seem to be empty fillers.

A few unambiguous parenthetical *I mean*s can be found in Middle English (28) and Early Modern English (29). Note that the parenthetical nature of *I mean* can be determined by one of two formal means: either (a) *I mean* is in non-initial position (e.g., 28a, 28c) or (b) *I mean* precedes a non-declarative clause (e.g. 29b):

(28) a. for to holde in love a man in honde, / And hym hire lief and deere herte calle, / And make hym an howve above a calle, / **I meene**, as love another in this while / She doth hireself a shame and hym a gyle (1382–86 Chaucer *Troilus and Criseyde* 3.773–777 [Benson]).

[21] The '*of*' in (26a–c) is odd. Perhaps there is a blending of 'of whom I speak' and 'whom I mean' to give "of whom I mean.'

'for to hold a man in hand in love and to call him dear heart and precious to her and make him a hood over a cap [i.e., deceive him] – I mean, as love another in this while – she does herself a shame and him a deception'

b. & Gif he, þat haþ a pleyn & an open boystous voice by kynde, speke hem poerly & pypyngly – **I mene** bot Gif he be seek in his body, or elles þat it be bitwix him & his God or his confessour – þan it is a verrey token of ypocrisie (1425 [?1400] *Cloud of Unknowing* [Hrl 674] 101.21–22/102.1–2 [*MED*]).
'and if he that has a plain and an open untaught voice by nature, speak poorly and pipingly – I mean but if he be sick in his body or else that it be between him and his God or his confessor – then it is a very token of hypocrisy'

c. Medleth namoore with that art, **I mene**, / For if ye doon, youre thrift is goon ful clene (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* G.CY 1424–1425 [Benson]).
'meddle no more with that art, I mean, for if you do, your success will be gone completely'

(29) a. **I mean**, Master Slender, what would you with me? (1597–1601 Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* III, iv, 61 [Evans]).

b. You depend upon him, **I mean** (1601–02 Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida* III, i, 4 [Evans]).

The meaning of most of these forms is 'namely, that is.'

Despite the existence of some *that*-complements with *I mean* and some relatives containing *I mean*, it seems clear that the origin of parenthetical *I mean* cannot be found in either of these structures (matrix clause + nominal *that*-clause or sentential relative). The predominant structure – *I mean* followed by a phrasal category – is the most likely source of this parenthetical structure. A possible scenario for the syntactic development of parenthetical *I mean* is the following. At first, *I mean* governs a phrasal element ({NP, VP, AP, PP, AdvP}) and has scope within the sentence. The bonds between *I mean* and the phrasal element are weakened or loosened, and *I mean* can begin to be postposed to the phrasal element. The phrasal element is then reanalyzed as an independent element, and *I mean* as a syntactically free parenthetical with scope over the sentence. At this point, *I mean* is extended to the context of clauses and can be pre- or postposed to clausal elements as well, thus acquiring scope over discourse (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002:40).

5.5 Semantic development

While the meaning of the pragmatic marker *I mean* does indeed derive from the original meaning of 'signification,' it does not do so in the simple linear course proposed by Schiffrin (see above). The semantic development can be schematized as in Table 5.2. The categories in the table are not intended to be

Table 5.2. *Semantic development of* I mean

	OE/ME	ME	EModE	PDE
metalinguistic/ metacommunicative	'I intend the previous discourse to signify/ have the meaning' (exx. 3, 14, 15)	'I'm making the previous discourse more precise/explicit' (exx. 6, 19, 20) 'I'm reformulating the previous discourse (perhaps contrastively)' (exx. 5, 17, 18)	'I'm repairing/correcting the previous discourse' (exx. 4, 16)	'I'm exemplifying the previous discourse' (ex. 7)
subjective				'I'm emphasizing the importance/veracity of the previous discourse' (ex. 9; perhaps ex. 21) 'I'm evaluating the previous discourse' (ex. 10) 'I'm serious when I say' (exx. 11, 22)
intersubjective		'I'm implying more than I'm saying' (exx. 12, 23)		'I'm saying this because' (ex. 8)

mutually exclusive, as the metalinguistic meanings 'I'm making this previous discourse more precise' and 'I'm exemplifying the previous discourse' also have an intersubjective quality, with the speaker attending to the hearer's need for more explicitness or for exemplification.

It is not possible to establish a single unilinear course of semantic development, though there do seem to be some unidirectional patterns: for example, metalinguistic meanings tend to precede both metacommunicative/subjective and intersubjective meaning. However, in the case of *I mean* one cannot show that subjective meanings clearly precede intersubjective meanings (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002).

Most of the extended meanings of *I mean* can be understood as invited inferences arising in appositional structures, where a previous element in the discourse is restated or reformulated.[22] By the Gricean Maxim of Manner "be brief [avoid unnecessary prolixity]" (1975:46) or Levinson's "M-Heuristic" "what's said in an abnormal way isn't normal" (2000), hearers will make the inference that the same information is not simply being restated but that some additional information is being presented. Some of the possible inferences are the following:

(a) the information in the previous utterance is being corrected
I'll see you tomorrow morning, I mean, afternoon.
+> 'afternoon is the correct time'

(b) the information in the previous utterance is being more precisely or more explicitly expressed
The situation could be embarrassing, I mean, politically.
+> 'the situation is not generally embarrassing, but the precise way in which it could be embarrassing is in a political way'

(c) a contrastive reformulation of the information in the previous utterance is being presented
I just want to look at, I mean, examine the evidence.
+> 'I do not want to have a (quick) look but rather a thorough examination of the evidence'

(d) a particular example or instance of the information in the previous utterance is being supplied
He really knows how to cook. I mean, he can even make soufflés.
+> 'An example of his ability is his ability to make soufflés (his ability could manifest itself in other ways)'

(e) the information in the previous utterance is emphasized or its accuracy is asserted by the speaker
He's rich, I mean, (really) rich.
+> 'I'm emphasizing the extent of his richness/I'm being emphatic about his richness'

[22] This is foreshadowed by James's remark that *I mean* serves as an appeal to hearer deduction/inference = 'I invite you to interpret the head as a synonym of expressions of *like* significance' (1983:199).

(f) the information in the previous utterance is evaluated by the speaker
It was humiliating to be beaten, I mean, (truly) humiliating.
+> 'My subjective view is that it is humiliating'

(g) the information in the previous utterance is sincerely expressed by the speaker
I felt like walking out. I mean, I wouldn't, but . . .
+> 'I am being sincere when I say that I wouldn't walk out'

(Note that this last meaning often requires more involved expression, e.g., *I mean it.*)

The exact nature of the inference is contextually determined. The 'causal' meaning expresses the reason for the speaker having made the previous statement, as in *It makes no difference what you say. I mean, the damage is already done*. The inference should probably be seen as an extension of the 'preciseness, explicitness' meaning since it makes explicit the speaker's reasons for having reached some conclusion, or the reasons which underlie the speaker's utterance.[23]

5.6 Accounting for the development of *I mean*

On the one hand, Schiffrin (1987:319) designates *I mean* as a "lexicalized clause." On the other hand, Thompson and Mulac (1991b:315) call the analogous forms *I think* and *I guess* "unitary" particles, similar to epistemic particles in other languages. They reject lexicalization (understood here as univerbation) as the process responsible for the formation of *I think* (324), arguing instead for grammaticalization.[24]

I mean would also seem to have undergone many of the changes identified with grammaticalization. In this construction, the verb *mean* is decategorialized, losing verbal characteristics such as the ability to be modified by adverbials or to take phrasal or clausal complements, and it is desemanticized, losing its full lexical meaning and assuming less concrete meanings. As *I mean* evolves from a complement-taking verb to a pragmatic marker, it becomes "adverbialized" in a number of discourse functions and as a consequence shifts from major to minor word class.[25] The construction is frozen in the first person, singular, present tense, and shows some degree of fusion since, although *I mean* is

[23] Cf. *OED* (s.v. *mean* v.1, def. II6b): *mean* can be used 'to signify by an action; (hence, by implication) to have as a motive or justification of an action' especially *what do you mean by?*

What do you mean by saying such a thing = 'Why are you saying such a thing'
I mean by saying such a thing that . . . = 'I am saying such a thing because . . .'

[24] See Chapter 3, n. 25.

[25] A clearer instance of this change is the development of the participle *meaning (that)* as a conjunction in Early Modern English, e.g.:

"Saiyng, when he was diyng: I haue saued the birde in my sosome: **meaning that** he had kept both his promise and other" (1550 Hall, *Chronicle* 2 [*OED*]).

still orthographically two words, adverbial elements (e.g., *really, truly, only*) cannot intercede between *I* and *mean*.[26] *I mean* also undergoes some degree of coalescence, or phonological attrition, tending to be reduced to [əmi:n] or [mi:n] (Crystal and Davy 1975:97). By a process of invited inferencing, *I mean* acquires non-referential (pragmatic or procedural) meanings such as mistake editing, clarification, precision, and exemplification. As discussed above, *I mean* becomes (more) subjective[27] and intersubjective in meaning. However, as is the case with pragmatic markers generally, *I mean* does not lose syntactic scope (undergo condensation); rather, it increases its scope from relating to phrasal or clausal complements to functioning on a global level. Nor does *I mean* become syntactically fixed; as a parenthetical it becomes freer in position, though initial position is still favored.

I mean also exhibits Hopper's (1991) grammaticalization principles of divergence, in which *I mean* continues to be used as a free syntactic combination with main clause status carrying its literal meaning; persistence, in which vestiges of the verb's original meaning of 'intention' are clearly present in the newer, pragmatic meanings of explicitness, reformulation, etc.; and layering where *I mean* comes to replace or complement a number of older forms with similar appositional meaning (see §4.7 on OE *that is* and ME *that is to say*; also Koivisto-Alanko and Rissanen 2002 on EModE *to wit* and Moore 2006 on the use of Latin *videlicet* in ME).

I mean is largely idiomaticized. Like idioms, *I mean* shows a high degree of lexical invariability or fixing; that is, it is not possible to substitute synonymous verbs such as *signify, denote, purport*, or *drive at*. Also, like idioms, the phrase is syntactically fixed, allowing no alteration in tense, mood, or aspect, such as *I meant*,[28] *I should mean*, or *I am meaning*, and no adverbial modification. *Mean* has become semantically opaque to some degree, having undergone semantic "bleaching," though not figurative change. Furthermore, the syntagm *I mean* has become less compositional as it ceases to express a cognitive state of the speaker. Although all of these changes are typical of idiomatization, I would suggest that this process is part of the larger process of grammaticalization at work here.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter suggests that in accounting for the historical development of comment clauses we need to expand the possible syntactic sources to include not only matrix clauses followed by clausal complements, but also subject + verb

[26] Only a few cases of *I only mean* are found in my corpora, and they are not parenthetical.

[27] Because of the presence of the first-person subject, *I mean* is necessarily speaker-oriented.

[28] Logically, one might expect *I meant* rather than *I mean* since the expression is typically referring to the preceding discourse. A reviewer has very helpfully pointed out that the present tense may serve as a marker of the speaker's online discourse.

sequences followed by phrasal complements. It has also argued that the evolution of *I mean* is best understood as a process of grammaticalization rather than lexicalization. Although fossilization of the *I mean* unit, its partial loss of internal structure (evidenced by phonological reduction and the lack of interspersed elements), and its acquisition of syntactic independence are consistent with both processes, what distinguishes this as grammaticalization and not lexicalization is the decategorialization of *I mean* and concomitant change to functional, or operator, status rather than to lexical or major class status (see Brinton and Traugott 2005 and §3.4). Moreover, the apparent regularity of the change in *I mean* – comparable to the development of a number of other subject + verb sequences as comment clauses (such as *I think, I guess, you know*) – is also characteristic of grammaticalization patterns, which tend to affect whole semantic classes and high-frequency items that originally have quite general meanings. By contrast, lexicalizations are more likely to be language-specific and affect individual items of low frequency, often with highly specialized meaning. Finally, the acquisition of subjective and intersubjective meanings, which we see in the case of *I mean*, is characteristic of grammaticalization but not of lexicalization. Idiomaticization, understood as a semantic process involving the loss of semantic transparency, underlies both lexicalization and grammaticalization, but is not in itself able to account for the development of pragmatic markers (and may occur independently of either process, e.g., *spill the beans*).

6 Comment clauses with *see*

6.1 Introduction

Despite being widely mentioned as a pragmatic marker in Present-day English, the comment clauses *(as/so) you see* and *see* receive scant treatment in the scholarly literature. Only one book (Erman 1987) contains a full-length treatment of *you see* in Present-day English, and the history of the form receives brief treatment in Fitzmaurice (2004). This chapter begins with a review of the function of *you see*-type comment clauses in Present-day English (§6.2). It then turns to the rise of these forms in the history of English, focusing first on *(as/so) you see* (§6.3) and then on *see* (§6.4). Section 6.5 discusses the relation of the different forms and accounts for their development syntactically and semantically; a comparison of related forms in Swedish is included (§6.5.1). The chapter ends with a discussion of the grammaticalization of the forms (§6.5.2).

6.2 *You see, as/so you see,* and *see* in Present-day English

6.2.1 You see

Typical instances of *you see* in Present-day English are illustrated below from a variety of dialects:

(1) a. That was his tragedy **you see**, to have failed at so many things, when he might have been the best at this one thing (1986 Kidman, "The Whiteness," *Landfall* 40.2 [WC]).
b. He simply does not have the money to drink. Your grandma controls the purse strings now, **you see** (1986 Cordner, *The Mavis Singing: The Story of an Australian Family* [ACE]).
c. I found all this uniquely reassuring. Everyone knew his place, **you see** (1991 Lee, "Once upon a Time in the Park," *Interzone* [FLOB]).
d. We have, **you see**, been undergoing what is fashionably called an Identity Crisis (1978 Davies, *One Half of Robertson Davies* [Strathy]).

e. I know there are any number of other musical versions and I'm not a Shakespearean actor, yet I feel comfortable with him. **You see**, the musical theatre is overdressed at the moment (1989 *Independent* [BNC]).

As we will see in more detail below, *you see* serves as an explanation or justification for the preceding utterance.

6.2.1.1 Distribution of you see. *You see* is said to be typical of British English. Biber *et al.* (1999:1097) report a frequency of c50/million in American English compared with a frequency of c400/million in British English. Using the Cambridge International Corpus, Algeo (2006:213) finds *you see* to be eight times more frequent in British than in American conversation; he suggests that American English prefers *you know* in instances in which British English uses *you see* but also *now* (211). In both dialects, *you see* is of lower frequency than other common comment clauses such as *I think, you know*, and *I mean*. In a study of pragmatic marker use in the American television series "Friends," Zhang (2006) finds *you see/see* to be the lowest frequency marker among the set including *yeah, I mean, you know, so, well, oh,* and *okay/ok*. *I mean*, the second least common marker, is over twice as common as *you see*, which is itself twelve times less frequent than the ubiquitous *oh*. In the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken (British) English, *you see* is less common than *you know, I think*, and *I mean*; however, while it is half as common as *I mean*, it is more than three times as frequent as the next most commonly occurring comment clause, *I suppose* (Stenström 1995). More importantly, in Stenström's data, *you see* forms a separate tone unit over 60% of the time and is extremely rarely followed by a *that* nominal clause; she concludes that it is "always a comment clause."[1] In contrast, Zhang determines that *I see* has a pragmatic function only slightly over half the time (54%), though she also finds low rates for pragmatic *you know* (52%) and pragmatic *I mean* (18%).

Positionally, *you see* is generally sentence-final, faces backward, and has the entire preceding clause within its scope, according to Stenström (1995:298). It is also most typically found turn final, where it seeks confirmation from the next speaker; when used turn medially, it occurs between arguments, while turn initial, it often introduces an explanation or justification (Brinton 1987:51–53).[2] Table 6.1 presents the numbers of instances of *you see* (that function) parenthetically or independently in a variety of PDE corpora. The data presented here confirm that *you see* is of somewhat lower frequency in varieties of North

[1] The function was determined by surveying the first twenty instances of *you see*.

[2] *You see* sometimes occurs as part of a larger construction such as *if you see what I mean* or *do you see what I mean* (Stenström 1995:294; see Chapter 5). Scheibman finds that *you see* frequently (8 of the 13 instances in her corpus) contains a modal auxiliary as well (2002:96, 98, 117n). The modal variant of *you see* is in fact quite uncommon in my corpora (only 13 instances of parenthetical *you can see* in the BNC compared to 2650 instances of parenthetical *you see*).

Table 6.1. *Frequency of* you see *types in PDE corpora*

	Parenthetical			Independent	Total (all structures)	Parenthetical + Independent (% of total)
	initial	medial	final			
ACE	10	1	2	1	43	33%
BNC[a]	21	2	8	1	100	32%
FLOB	5	3	3	1	25	48%
FROWN	6	1	0	0	41	17%
Strathy[a]	10	4	2	0	100	16%
total	52 (17%)	11 (4%)	15 (5%)	3 (1%)	309 (100%)	

[a] Random sampling of 100 instances of *you see*

American English (FROWN and Strathy). However, it does not bear out Stenström's findings that *you see* is generally sentence-final; it is, in fact, predominantly sentence-initial.

6.2.1.2 Function of you see. *You see* belongs to the type (i) variant of comment clause identified by Quirk *et al.* (1985). That is, it resembles a matrix clause. Quirk *et al.* point to the most general function of *you see*: that of claiming the speaker's attention (1115; see also Stenström 1995:294). Another general function is to mark transitions between information or arguments in discourse (Erman 1987:117; Stenström 1995:294; Algeo 2006:213). A more specific function of *you see* is to provide an explanation for or justification of a previous claim (e.g., Markkanen 1985:62; Erman 1987:117; Crystal 1988:49; Biber *et al.* 1999:1077). For example, the *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI3f) asserts that *you see* is "sometimes appended parenthetically to a statement of a fact known to the hearer which explains or excuses something that provokes surprise or blame" (cf. also the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary*:s.v. *see*). Comparing *you see* to *after all*,[3] Blakemore (1987:89–90) argues that *you see* is used when the preceding utterance requires justification or explanation: it marks the utterance "relevant as an explanation for an event/state of affairs in virtue of the fact that it is a premise for the deduction of the proposition describing that event/state of affairs." Since the need for explanations cannot always be anticipated, *you see* can often act as an afterthought or repair (90). Erman (1987) considers *you see* a means used by speakers to negotiate with hearers to accept their arguments. *You see* is primarily a terminator not a connective (88–90, 117). On the micro-level, it terminates thematized parts of the argument or evaluative viewpoints, while on the macro-level, it terminates units of information or summarizing or evaluative remarks

[3] While *after all* introduces assumptions already held by the hearer and functions as a reminder, *you see* introduces new information (Blakemore 1987:89).

(116–117; see also Crystal 1988:49). For Erman, *you see* is more argumentative than *you know*; *you see* occurs with speakers' evaluations and tries to make hearers accept information overtly, by negotiation, while *you know* occurs with facts and assumes that information is common ground (117–118). For Fitzmaurice (2004:429), *you see*, like *you know* and *you say*, is a marker of intersubjectivity in that it represents the "speaker's rhetorical construction of the *interlocutor's* perspective or attitude." It attributes a particular perspective to the hearer (431). Similarly, Scheibman sees *you* in *you see* as being a generic expression with first-person meaning, by which she means that "the speaker/subject is projecting, or universalizing, her experiences" (2002:98).[4]

A stressed variant of *you see* may also be used to express triumph (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1483n):

(2) "**You see**!" I might have said to him but did not (1991 Jacobson, *Hidden in the Heart* [FLOB]).

6.2.2 As/so you see

As/so you see belongs to Quirk *et al.*'s (1985) type (ii) of comment clauses. Although they initially describe this type as "like an adverbial finite clause introduced by *as*" (1112), they later point out that in many cases *as* is equivalent to *which* and introduces a type of sentential relative clause, i.e. *as* (= *which*) *you see* in contrast to *as* (= *as far as*) *you see* (*it*) (1116). Such constructions are what Potts (2002:624) terms *As*-parentheticals, among which he distinguishes two types: CP-*As* (e.g., *as the FBI eventually discovered*) and Predicate-*As* (e.g., *as were the durians*). He sees *As*-parentheticals as fundamentally different from Adjunct-*as* clauses (e.g. *Jody speaks German **as Klaus speaks English***).[5]

Quirk *et al.* observe that some (but not all) type (i) comment clauses can be converted into type (ii) comment clauses.[6] However, a semantic difference is introduced, as can be seen in (3a) and (3b):

(3) a. George is, as you said, a liar (*but I don't believe it).
b. George is, you said, a liar (but I don't believe it).
c. Alger was not a spy, as Joe claimed.
d. Alger was not a spy, Joe claimed.

[4] In general, Quirk *et al.* (1985:1481) see direct appeals to addressees, as is the case with *you see*, as serving two functions: the speaker is seeking assurance that the addressee is following the argument while at the same time assuring the addressee that he or she is not being underestimated.

[5] It is not obvious to me why Potts calls *as* in such clauses an "adverbial-relativizer." Quirk *et al.* (1985:1116) make clear that the relativizer *as* (in *as you know*) is distinct from the adverbial *as* (in *as it seems*). Moreover, they include the latter among comment clauses (hence not simple adjuncts).

[6] Ross (1973:152n) points to the impossibility of *as*-clauses with certain first-person parentheticals: *I concede/*as I concede, I fear/*as I fear, I regret to say/*as I regret to say, I am sorry/*as I am sorry*.

As you said in (3a) is affirmative. The truth of the matrix is implied; it is stated as fact. The truth-conditions are "George is a liar"; therefore, the continuation ("but I don't believe it") makes no sense (Potts 2002:661n).[7] In contrast, *you said* in (3b) is neutral as to the truth of the matrix. The reason, according to Potts, is that this structure likely derives from slifting, or extraction of the main clause from complement position (i.e., from *you said that George is a liar*); the original complement clause is non-truth-conditional. Blakemore (2006) agrees that in (3b), the speaker is not asserting that George is a liar at all; the thought is not the speaker's. In (3a), the speaker "is asserting that George is a liar and at the same time communicating that this proposition resembles a thought that has been communicated by the audience" (1682; see also Peltola 1982/83:106). Another difference between *as*- and *as*-less clauses is shown in (3c–d). Potts (2002:667, 669) observes that while (3c) is ambiguous ('Joe claimed that Alger was not a spy' or 'Joe claimed that Alger was a spy'),[8] (3d) is not ambiguous, allowing only the former reading.

Potts (2002) argues that "[t]he *As*-clause makes its contribution solely in the form of a conventional implicature associated with *as* itself" (652). Only the declarative sentence, not the *as*-clause, is asserted and strictly truth-conditional. He suggests that "the *As*-clause is a filter: it applies to a proposition, checks that the result expresses a truth, and then passes the proposition on unmodified" (657). For this reason, *as*-clauses cannot interact semantically with the clause they are embedded in (658); it also explains the fact that *as*-clauses cannot adjoin to questions (660). Blakemore (2006) rejects the notion that the implicature is associated with *as* (1681), but she agrees with Potts that *as*-parentheticals are non-truth-conditional; they do not affect the speaker's commitment to the proposition communicated (1683). She goes on to say that the function of *as*-parentheticals is "to indicate how the host proposition achieves relevance."

Despite considerable discussion of the adverbial variant, *as/so you see* is quite infrequent in Present-day English. Figure 6.1 presents a comparison of parenthetical *you see* and *as/so you see* in the BNC and Strathy.

While the frequency of parenthetical *you see* ranges from 19%–23%, the frequency of *as/so you see* is less than 2%. Moreover, there appears to be a clear distinction between *as*- and *so*-forms. *As you see* is almost invariably literal in meaning, making reference to something within the addressee's sight:[9]

[7] Also Asher (2000:36) points out the oddness of similar continuations with parentheticals containing evidential verbs such as *assure, swear, testify, affirm* which assert the speaker's commitment to the matrix clause: *John, Mary assures us, can be trusted, *but I don't trust him.*

[8] If the *as*-clause precedes a negative, there is no ambiguity, as in *Alger was, as Joe believed, not a spy* (Potts 2002:681).

[9] A variant containing a modal – *as you can see* – is considerably more frequent than the simple form, but it is also consistently literal in meaning.



Figure 6.1 ({*As, so*}) *you see* in PDE

(4) a. But I write in the first person, **as you see**, and my technique is to try to tell convincing lies (1986 Corris, "Detective City," *The National Times* [ACE]).
b. **As you see**, I've got this white board which we fill up with all the various activities (1989 Worsley, *Taking Good Care* [BNC]).
c. Now, the library, **as you see**, is very nicely furnished (1985 Beresford-Howe, *Night Studies* [Strathy]).

In contrast, *so you see* is almost invariably figurative, meaning 'you may conclude [from the preceding discourse].' Often it expresses resultative meaning and seems to have a function similar to that of a conjunction (5e).

(5) a. **So you see**, it's the opinion of the majority (and including the crazy fan) that Steffi is great! (1991 *Tennis World* [BNC]).
b. I think that you . . . want to rest for some time in our city, **so you see**, you can stay here because in church we need an organist! (1996 *Queen's Quarterly* Summer [Strathy]).
c. One must always reciprocate with a gift of equal value. In saving your life today, I managed to accomplish that. **So you see**, your life can be spared (1986 le Grand, *The Two-Ten Conspiracy* [ACE]).
d. My grandmother . . . always used to say we were descended from Genghis Khan . . . **So you see**, Lady Di, we're mishpocha (1981 *Washington Post* (Nexis) 8 Nov. L1 [*OED*]).

e. By then all his goats were dead too. It was winter, **so you see** the door was fastened (1988 Fowles, *The Magus* [BNC]).

So you see is more frequently parenthetical than *as you see* as well.[10]

6.2.3 See

On the frequency of *see* in Present-day English, Biber *et al.* (1999:1097) note simply that *see* is less frequent than *you see*. A rough comparison of the BNC and Strathy Corpus suggests that of all instances of *see*, parenthetical *see* occurs 1% of the time in the BNC and 2% of the time in the Strathy.[11]

The *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (s.v. *see*) considers parenthetical *see* as a form used either to ascertain the hearer's comprehension, continued interest, or agreement or to express triumph. According to the *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI3f), it serves as a "refusal to tolerate dissent, or as a mere filler." The *OED* also notes that *see* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI5f) may be used exclamatorily, either with a nominal clause or absolutely in the sense 'Behold!'; it terms this usage a "quasi-*int*[erjection]." For Fitzmaurice (2004:441), *see* functions as an attention-getter, "a sure sign of an interactive discourse marker." It is used clause initially (6a), medially (6b), or finally (6c).

(6) a. **See**, London's Walthamstow happens to be our mutual home, an East End oasis (n.d. *New Musical Express* [BNC]).
But if we do it that way, **see,** we wouldn't be looking at a time-less injury (1998 *Queen's Quarterly* Spring [Strathy]).
b. the art of journalism is the art of bringing to the surface something you can understand, **see,** and seize immediately (2001 *Queen's Quarterly* Winter [Strathy]).
c. here's a lot going on inside her head, **see**. More than you think (1990 Gates, *The Lock* [BNC]).

See collocates quite frequently with *here* and with *now*. The *OED* points out (s.v. *see* v., def. BI5f) that *see here*, like *look here*, is "a brusque form of address used to preface an order, expostulation, reprimand":

(7) a. "**See here**," said the doctor doubtfully, "it isn't usual for a man to walk into an empty house at four in the morning and come out with another man's cheque for nearly a hundred pounds" (1991 Border, *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: Oxford Bookworms Edition* [BNC]).

[10] In the BNC, 69/80 cases (or 86%) of *so you see* as opposed to 48/80 (or 60%) of *as you see* are parenthetical.

[11] These figures were arrived at by comparing instances of *see* preceded **and** followed by a punctuation mark (this includes initial sentence boundaries) with all occurrences of *see*. Not all instances of parenthetical *see* are pragmatic in function, however (see below).

b. "**See here**, Lily. You mean you know this man? I mean, from somewhere else?" (1992 Jack, *Glory Dust* [FROWN]).
c. "**See now**, there's a lot of people who will speak to you friendly out on the street and there's a lot more of them who'll speak to you inside their own homes" (1991 Brewer and Magee, *Inside the RUC* [BNC]).

In some occurrences, *see* seems to function much like *you see* in that it occurs with an explanation or justification for the preceding clause:

(8) a. Anyway, I think it was a bit our fault, like. **See**, we used to visit him every day. But then . . . we didn't go to see him (1991 Anderson, *Paper Faces* [BNC]).
b. She takes sleeping-pills, **see**, for the pain (1990 Gates, *The Lock* [BNC]).
c. you can stop asking questions and making deductions about where I been or what's passed my lips, **see**? One thing I'll not abide, and that's a suspicious wife (1988 Gidley, *Armada* [BNC]).

For instance, in (8b) the phrase *for the pain* explains why she is taking sleeping pills or in (8a) the clauses following *see* explain why it was *a bit our fault*. In the majority of cases, *see* seems to be a means by which the speaker confirms the continued attention or understanding of the hearer. Despite the hearer focus of *see*, the expression seldom occurs at the end of the speaker's turn and thus rarely elicits a response from the hearer.[12] Sometimes, *see* seems to be self-rather than other-confirming (a self-directed comment by the speaker confirming that he or she is getting the story straight). An extension of this meaning seems to be a sequential sense in which *see* means something like 'first':

(9) a. You find out where he goes, **see**. Then you hide in the bushes (1990 Lawhead, *A Tale of Anabelle Hedgehog* [BNC]).
b. Find a young guy, just married, **see**. Buy him a cup of coffee or a beer (1986 Dunlop, *In all Directions* [BNC]).

The triumphant sense which we saw above (2) with *you see* is also a possible function of *see*, often explicitly accompanied by *(I) told you*:

(10) a. "Sweet Ride" is surfing with Syd Barrett. **See**? Told you. Belly are a gorgeous enigma (1992 *New Musical Express* [BNC]).
b. "Red for port, green for starboard." "**See**, I told you it's easy" (1993 Evans, *A Dangerous Diagnosis* [BNC]).

[12] Considering 100 random examples of sentence-final *see* followed by a question mark in the BNC – the form most likely to elicit a reply – I found only 13 instances that were in fact followed by a response.

See can still be used parenthetically in a literal sense, but this is minority usage:

(11) a. they are not alike. **See**, the younger has hair the colour of freshly gathered corn, but the other, his father, is dark (1992 James, *The Earth is the Lord's* [BNC]).
b. "I can see a little light. **See**? In the corner of that high window" (n.d. Robinson, *Goshawk Squadron* [BNC]).
c. No doors, **see**? No way out, no way further in (1993 Darvill-Evans, *Deceit* [BNC]).

The independent use of interrogative *see?*, as illustrated in (12), can be considered distinct from the non-interrogative forms in (8) and (9):

(12) a. Rosen produced the record card and held it out towards Eileen. "**See?** Two prescriptions for quinalbarbitone and two for dexamphetamine sulfate" (1991 Mace, *Shadow Hunters* [FLOB]).
b. "**See?**" said the voice behind him. My partner's sick. It's too hard for him to travel like this (1992 de Buys, "Devil's Highway," *Story 40*, [FROWN]).
c. "I thought it was my own house. I was brought up here. **See**?" (1992 Stewart, *Stormy Petrel* [BNC]).
d. **See**, that's a stone, **see**? Say you're eight stone they make you put that waistcoat on, it's nine stone (1987 *Suffolk Sound Archive Oral History Project* [BNC]).

Note, however, that *see?* functions much like *(you) see*, ranging from literal (11a), to ambiguous (11b), to non-literal, pragmatic meanings (11c). Example (11d) presents an interesting example in which *see* is used in both ways in the same sentence.

6.3 History of *as/so you see* and *you see*

In the *OED* (s.v. *see* v.1, def. BI3f), the first example of parenthetical *as you see* dates from 1300, the first example of parenthetical *you see* from 1657, and the first example of parenthetical *see* from 1952. An advanced search of the *OED* quotation bank for *so you see* provides examples dating from 1626. The *MED* (s.v. *sēn* (v.1), def. 7b) records the phrases *as thou seest* and *as ye sene* among others with the meaning 'as you see, as you can see.' Since def. 7a in the *MED* reads "To be able to see with the eyes; have or employ the faculty of sight; also *fig.*," however, it is unclear whether 'as you see, as you can see' is to be interpreted literally or figuratively. However, def. 21 explicitly refers to the figurative meaning of *see* 'to perceive, realize, discern, understand, know' and cites the expressions as *I se, as thou seest, as ye haven sene, ye sawe wel*, and *as thou seest of*. The figurative meaning 'to perceive, discern, understand' seems to have been possible in Old English (see Bosworth-Toller:s.v. *seon*, def. III). The *OED* notes the earliest

examples of *see* with a cognitive sense as occurring in OE with a dependent clause or indirect question (s.v. *see* v.1, def. BI3b). Dictionary evidence does not, therefore, provide a clear scenario for the development of *(as/so) you see/you see/see*, although it does suggest that *you see* may be a shortened form of *as you see* and *see* a shortened form of *you see*. In contrast, synchronic studies (see §6.2.2) have argued that the source parenthetical *you see* lies in a construction in which *see* is followed by a clausal complement, a development consistent with the matrix clause hypothesis.

6.3.1 Old English

A search of the DOEC provides approximately 200 examples of *you see* (singular and plural); in about 10% of the cases, *see* is followed by a *that*-clause, and in a couple of cases by a *how*-clause. Although the cognitive meaning may occur when *see* is followed by a *that*-clause (13a), it is not restricted to *that*-clauses (13b), nor do *that*-clauses necessitate a cognitive reading of *see* (13c):

(13) a. **Gesihst þu** nu **þæt** þa rihtwisan sint laðe & forþrycte, forþam hi þinum willan woldan fulgan, & þa unryhtwisan seondan up ahafene þurh heora won dæda & þurh heora selflice? (c888 *King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae* 3.9.24 [DOEC]).
'do you see that the righteous are loathed and afflicted because they would follow your will, and the unrighteous are raised up on account of their perverse deeds and through their self-love'

b. Ic þe bidde for Gode þæt þu þis ne forhæbbe, ac þæt þu cume, and **þu** me þonne **gesihst**, swa swa God wile (early 11th c., *The Old English Life of Saint Mary of Egypt* 837d [DOEC]).
'I ask you for God that you do not keep this back but that you come and you then see me as God will'

c. Grapiað & sceawiað gif ic gast were þonne næfde ic flæsc. & ban: Swa swa **ge geseoð þæt** ic hæbbe (990–92 Ælfric, *Catholic Homilies: The First Series* 301.55 [DOEC]).
'touch and look, if I were a ghost then I would not have flesh and bone which you see that I have'

Overall, cognitive readings are rare: *see* is typically followed by an NP complement and has literal meaning. There do not appear to be any examples of *as so you see* or *you see* functioning parenthetically in Old English.

6.3.2 Middle English

As in Old English, the majority of instances of *you see* in Middle English are followed by an NP complement (often with a predicate adjunct) and carry literal meaning. However, clausal complements become more common (see



Figure 6.2 (*As*) *you see* in ME

Figure 6.2), ranging from 16%–37% of the total instances of *you see*. Again, while *that*-complements seem to favor figurative interpretations (14a), they are not exclusively so (14b):

(14) a. Heere may **ye see that** if that women were nat goode, and hir conseils goode and profitable, / oure Lord God of hevene wolde nevere han wroght hem, ne called hem help of man, but rather confusioun of man (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* B.Mel 1104–1105 [Benson]).
'here may you see that if women were not good and her advice good and profitable, our Lord God of heaven would never have made them, nor called them help of man but rather confusion of man'

b. "Well," seyde sir Percyvale, "what woldist that I ded? **Thou seest** well **that** I am on foote" (c1470 Malory, *Morte dArthur* [HC]).
'"Well," said Sir Percival, "what would you have me do? You see well that I am on foot."'

Both parenthetical *you see* and *as you see* are infrequent, though the latter is somewhat more common.[13]

[13] Because of some overlaps in form between *sēn* v.1 'to see' and *seien* v.1 'to say' (particularly *seist, seiest*), these figures must be seen as approximate.

As noted above, the *MED* (s.v. *sēn* v.1, defs. 7b and 21b) lists *as you see* as a possible structure in Middle English. I have found twenty-eight examples of parenthetical *as you see*. These begin to appear in the fourteenth century and become more common in the fifteenth century. The expressions permit some variability, with the presence of modals and adverbials in addition to the singular/plural distinction (e.g. 15b, 15c):

(15) a. ȝe ssolle vnderstonde þat in þe firmament beþ Planetes yliche clere sterren seuene, **as ȝe seþ** [*B* vr. sene] (c1325 (c1300) Robert of Gloucester, *Chronicle*, Version A (Clg A.11) 2436 [*MED*]).
'you shall understand that in the firmament are planets like seven clear stars, as you see'

b. God men, i am, **als yee now her se**, An ald man (a1400(a1325) *Cursor Mundi* (Vsp A.3) 5335 [*MED*]).
'good men, I am, as you now here see, an old man'

c. þis is my loued son ... In whom I haue, **as ȝe may seen**, Euer wel a payed ben (a1400 (a1376) *Cursor Mundi* (Trin-C R.3.8) 12876 [*MED*]).
'this is my beloved son ... in whom I have, as you may see, always been well pleased'

d. Spermatic partiez forsoþ ar regendred in childre ych day, **as ȝe se** (?a1425 Guy de Chauliac, *Grande Chirurgie* (ME version 1) (NY 12) 73b/a [*MED*]).
'sperm-producing parts in truth are regenerated in children every day, as you see'

e. I am come here, in lyke wyse **as ye see** (c1440 *Generydes, a Romance* 102 [*OED*]).
'I am come here in like manner as you see'

f. Of hys presens we were ryth glad; But, **as þou seste**, he hath forsakyn us sone (a1450 *Castle of Perseverance* (Folg V.a.354) 2587 [*MED*]).
'of his presence we were very glad; but, as you see, he has forsaken us at once'

g. For, **as ȝe sen at eye**, in tyme of tempest ... as longe as þe rote of þe tre kepith hym faste ... so longe þe tre schal nout fallyn (a1500 (c1410) *Dives and Pauper* (Htrn 270) 1.357 [*MED*]).
'for, as you see with your eyes, in the time of a tempest ... as long as the root of the tree keeps itself fast ... so long the tree shall not fall'

For the most part, instances of *as you see* in Middle English seem to carry literal meaning, although some examples are ambiguous or point in the direction of non-literal meaning. For example, in (15c), one cannot imagine that there is visual proof of the speaker's pleasure with his son; rather, the addressee must simply understand or infer the speaker's state. In (15e), *in lyke wyse* might mean 'in the like or same manner,' in which case *as you see* can have concrete meaning,

but it might also mean 'also, as well, moreover,' in which case *as you see* would have non-literal meaning.[14]

I found five examples of parenthetical *you see*:

(16) a. A-rer up min hous an heiȝ, þat, **þou sixt**, fallez to grounde (c1300 *South English Legendary: St. Francis (1)* (LdMisc 108) 56 [*MED*]).
'raise up my house on high, that, you see, falls to the ground'
b. Sir, **þou sest**, þis þing is cler, þat ich haue yschewed þe (c1330 (?a1300) *Arthur and Merlin* (Auch) 1553 [*MED*]).
'Sir, you see, this thing is clear, that I have shown you'
c. Ryȝt swych shal be þe prest As þe lewed man lyue, **þou sest** (a1400 (c1303) Mannyng of Brunne, *Handling Sin* (Hrl 1701) 10963 [*MED*]).
'right so shall be the priest as the lewd man lives, you see'
d. þou þat art curious of questiouns, **þou seest**, [etc.] (a1450 (1408) Vegetius, *De Re Militari* (ME prose version) (Dc 291) 72a [*MED*]).
'you who are inquisitive with questions, you see'
e. "Schir", said the fox, "it is lenterne, **ye see**; I can not fische" (c1470 Henryson, *The Moral Fabillis of Esope* IX. (*Wolf & Fox*) viii [*OED*]).
'"Sire", said the fox, "it is Lent, you see; I cannot (eat) fish"'

Examples (16a–b) seem to be literal in meaning, referring to something that is within the view of the addressee, while (16c) seems ambiguous. Examples (16d–e), in contrast, clearly have a cognitive meaning, that is, 'you understand.' They thus serve as early examples of the pragmatic functioning of parenthetical *you see*.

In addition to examples such as those in (16), in which *you see* is medial or final, there are a number of indeterminate cases where *you see* is sentence-initial followed by a nominal clause without *that*.

(17) If **ȝe se** ȝour houndis have good wil to renne And draw a weyward fro ȝow, þan sey . . . "Swef, bon amy, swef!" to make hem soft to go (1450 "My dere sone wher . . . " (Lamb 491) 115 [*MED*]).
'if you see your hounds have a good will to run and draw away from you, then say . . . "Swift, good friend, swift" to make them go softly'

6.3.3 Early Modern English

In Early Modern English (see Figure 6.3), there is a small increase in the frequency of parenthetical *you see*, while the frequency of parenthetical *as you see* remains constant. At the same time, the frequency of *you see* followed by a *that*-clause decreases. Instances of sentence-initial *you see* followed by a clause with a zero-complementizer – structures which are indeterminate between main

[14] The *OED* (s.v. *likewise,* defs. 1–3) dates the former meaning from 1449, the latter from 1509.



Figure 6.3 *({As, so}) you see* in EModE

clause and parenthetical interpretations – increase markedly, especially in the oral register illustrated in the ED corpus.

As you see is parenthetical in the majority of instances (60%); in non-parenthetical uses, it is often part of a *so ... as* or *such ... as* construction. Although *as you see* is usually literal in meaning, there is a significant number of instances where it must be interpreted non-literally and pragmatically. Example (18a) is an interesting example in which the addressee (*good reder*) is explicitly evoked:

(18) a. I have laboured **as you see** (good reder) like a poore gleaner or grape gatherer (1582 Bentley, *The Monument of Matrones* Pref. Biij [*OED*]).
b. I went to her, Master [Brook], **as you see**, like a poor old man. but I came from her, Master [Brook], like a poor old woman (1597 [rev. 1600–01] Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* V, i, 15–17 [Evans]).
c. By my troth sir **as ye see**, / Acornes are good enough for such as hee (1600 Anon., *The Maydes Metamorphosis* V [ED]).

Instances where parenthetical *you see* is pragmatic (non-literal) in meaning become more common in Early Modern English:[15]

[15] These data would seem to call into question Fitzmaurice's claim (2004) that the "interactive function" (as attention getter) for *you see, you know, you say* appears late (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).

(19) a. We that are maried to yong wiues, **you see**, / Must haue a speciall care vnto their honestie (1594 Anon., *A Knacke to Knowe a Knaue* [ED]).
b. 'Tis a spell, **you see**, of much power. You know the way home again (1607–08 Shakespeare, *Coriolanus* V, ii, 96–97 [Evans]).
c. A gentleman of so pleasing, and ridiculous a carriage; as, euen standing, carries meat in the mouth, **you see**. (1616 Jonson, *The Fountaine of Selfe-love, or Cynthias Revels* V, iv, 32 in *Wks.* I [*OED*]).
d. His bitter cup of death and crucifixion! Sweetened (**you see**) by speedy reviviction (1652 Sparke, *Scintillula Altaris, or a Pious Reflection on Primitive Devotion* (1653) [*OED*]).
e. Because, **you see**, the present Government has 1,900,000 l (1657 Crowwell, *Letters and Speeches* (ed. Carlyle 1845) 21 Apr. II. 582 [*OED*]).
f. Humility then **you see** is not sheepiness, but loftiness of mind (1663 Patrick, *The Parable of the Pilgrim* xi. (1665) 68 [*OED*]).
g. Captain, to entertain a little sport till they come: make him believe, you'll charm him invisible, he's apt to admire any thing, **you see**, let me alone to give force to't (1664 Anon., *The Puritan, or The Widow of Watling-Street* IV [ED]).

Clause-initial cases of *you see* often seem loosely adjoined to the following clause, which expresses the main idea of the utterance; they may thus be understood as parenthetical. Sometimes they are even punctuated as if they were parenthetical (see 20a–c):

(20) a. Arthur **thou seest**, Fraunce cannot bolster thee (1591 Anon., *Iohn King of England* [ED]).
b. Rodorick, **thou seest**, all wayes are stopt to flie, / Be desperat then, fight brauely, and so die (1605 Anon., *The History of the Tryall of Cheualry* [ED]).
c. **Thou seest**, no wheat Heleborns can bring: Nor barly, from the madding Morrell spring (1605 Sylvester, tr., *Du Bartas his Divine Weekes and Workes* II. i. 321 [*OED*]).
d. Ignorance and credulitie are your sole meanes to obtaine that blessing. **You see** your greatest Clerkes, your wisest Politicians, are not that way fortunate (1612 Chapman, *The Widdowes Teares* I, i [ED]).
e. **You see** I was content (though much against my minde) that you should haue kept your vow of virginitie (1619 Anon., *Two Wise Men & all the Rest Fooles* VII, ii [ED]).
f. Come, faith I will resigne her, and **you see** Diana will like thee nere the worse for't (1680 Behn, *The Revenge, or A Match in Newgate* II, ii [ED]).
g. *for **you see** the Jews are Mistaken*, and do you think to be more *Infallible* than they that God planted with Miracles (1687 James, *Mrs. James's Vindication of the Church of England* [LC]).

It is not always easy to distinguish between actual seeing and metaphorical seeing (understanding); nonetheless, it seems that *you see* in many of the examples in (20) is non-literal in meaning and functions pragmatically (certainly 20d–g, possibly 20a).

So you see appears in Early Modern English for the first time in the sense 'therefore,' but it is rare until Late Modern English (nineteenth century):

(21) a. **So you see**, by this maine Accident of Time, wee lost our Traffique with the Americans (1626 Bacon, *The New Atlantis* 16 in *Sylva* [*OED*]).
b. **So you see** I am not asham'd of my Name nor my Face neither (1697 Vanbrugh, *The Relapse* I, 58 [HC]).

6.3.4 Later developments

Using the ARCHER Corpus, Fitzmaurice (2004) finds a slow rise in the frequency of *you see* in drama from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, but a decline in the second half of the twentieth century; in letters, the peak of usage is actually earlier, in the second half of the nineteenth century (434–435). In this respect, *you see* differs from *you know*, which shows a marked rise in frequency in both letters and drama beginning at the start of the nineteenth century. Distinguishing between what she calls the "stance marker" and "discourse marker" functions of *you see*,[16] Fitzmaurice sees an increase in the discourse marker function, particularly in drama, from the beginning of the nineteenth century. This proclivity to drama may, she suggests, have to do with the more interactive nature of the genre, as evidenced also by the typical use of *you see* with terms of address (440).

6.4 History of *see*

A number of sources have been proposed for the pragmatic marker *see*:

(a) First, it may be a shortened form of *you see*. According to the *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI3f), *you see* may, in colloquial usage, occur parenthetically without the second-person subject. An analogous development has been postulated for the pragmatic marker *know* in Colloquial Singapore English (Wee 2003). Wee sees the change from *you know* to *know* with loss of *you* as being possible because this dialect is a pro-drop language; *know* develops by analogy with other monosyllabic discourse particles in this

[16] The difference between these two functions is not explicitly defined, but it seems that when *you see* is initial followed by a complement clause, Fitzmaurice considers it a stance marker, whereas when it is parenthetical, it becomes a discourse marker or comment clause, "maintaining the same interactive function whether it occurs initially, medially, or finally (2004:430–431). Furthermore, when it is "less clearly targeted at capturing the addressee's understanding of a situation than grabbing his or her attention," then it is a discourse marker (439).

dialect, including *wat*, *ma, meh, lah*, and *lor*. However, although *you know* and *know* have similar discourse functions, Wee notes distributional and collocational differences: *know* is restricted to final position and cannot cooccur with other discourse particles.

(b) Second, the *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI3f) also notes that the independent interrogative *do you see?* may have the same force as *see*, thus suggesting a second possible source.

(c) Third, the *OED* suggests that the "exclamatory" or "quasi-interjection" use of *see* derives from the imperative (s.v. *see* v., def. BI5f). Likewise, the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* – because it views the form as an interjection – likely sees its origin in the imperative *see!* (cf. the origin of *look!* or *listen!)*.

It is the goal of the following historical study to try to determine the best explanation for the source of *see*.

Fitzmaurice (2004:440) suggests that the discourse marker use of *see* may "arguably" derive from *you see*. At the same time, she notes its use initially in the imperative form (and hence not as a shortened form of *you see*) with an object of visual perception.

Because the source of *see* is problematic, I treat its history separately. The high frequency of the verb *see* and the failure of most search engines to recognize punctuation makes corpus searches for parenthetical *see* very difficult. However, an expedient is to search for common collocations containing parenthetical *see* such as *see now* and *see here*, which also provide examples of *see, now* and *see, here*.[17] *See now*, because it contains a temporal rather than a spatial adverb, is more likely to yield non-literal meanings than *see* with the spatial adverb *here*.

Examples of parenthetical *see here* and *see now* date from the sixteenth century.[18] While in their early uses, they typically express literal meaning (22a, 23a), there are some examples which do not seem to make reference to any visual object or scene and should be interpreted to mean 'understand [this to be the case]' (22b, c and 23b):

(22) a. **See here**, my friends and loving countrymen, / This token serveth for a flag of truce / Betwixt ourselves and all our followers (1589–90 [rev. 1594–95] Shakespeare, *1 King Henry VI* III, i, 137–139 [Evans]).

b. **See here** he [*sc*. Aristotle] doth vary. Refuse not his councell, Nor his wordes dispise (1557 Seager, *The Schoole of Vertue and Booke of good Nourture* 526 in *Babees Bk.* [*OED*]).

c. **See here**, what would make Indians weep, / And force the Monsters of the deep; / Shed teares into the brinie maine (1649 Anon., *The Famous Tragedie of King Charles I* Epilogue [ED]).

[17] Another expedient is to search for *see* followed by a nominative pronoun, e.g., *see I, see she*, etc.

[18] The *OED* cites example of *see now* dating from 1440.

(23) a. **See now**, they whisper / Some priuate order, (I dare lay my life) (1606 Chapman, *The Gentleman Usher* III, i [ED]).
b. **See now** whether pure fear and entire cowardice doth not make thee wrong this virtuous gentlewoman to close with us (1598 Shakespeare, *2 King Henry IV* II, iv, 325–327 [Evans]).

A passage from *Gammer Gurton's Needle* (1575) seems to alternate literal and non-literal uses of *you see* in a mockery of the expression:

(24) HODGE: Bym fay sir that ye shall,
What matter so euer here was done, ich can tell your maship all
My Gammer gurton heare **see now**, sat her downe at this doore, **see now**:
And as she began to stirre her, **see now**, her neele fell in the floore, **see now**.
And while her staffe she tooke, **see now**, at Gyb her Cat to flynge, **see now**,
Her neele was lost in the floore, **see now** is not this a wondrous thing, **see now**?
Then came the queane Dame Chat, **see now** to aske for hir blacke cup, **see now**:
And euen here at this gate, **see now**: she tooke that neele vp, **see now**.
My Gammer then she yeede, **see now** hir neele againe to bring, **see now**
And was caught by the head **see now** is not this a wondrous thing, **see now**
She tare my Gammers cote **see now** and scratched hir by the face, **see now**
Chad thought shad stopt hir throte, **see now** is not this a wondrous case, **see now**?
When ich saw this, ich was wrothe **see now** and start betwene them twaine, **see now**
Els ich durst take a booke othe, **see now** my Gammer had bene slaine, **see now** (1575 Anon., *Gammer Gurton's Needle* III, i [UofV]).

Pragmatic uses of parenthetical *see here* are quite regular by Late Modern English (mid-nineteenth century):

(25) a. Or, if he begins to bluster, you may be down upon him with *insomnia Jovis,* reveries of Jupiter – a phrase which Silius Italicus (**see here**!) applies to thoughts pompous (1840 Poe, *Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque* Vol. 1, p. 225 [UofV]).

b. "**See here**, Miss Burney, you know what I said about the Racks – " (1842 Burney, *Dr. Johnson and Fanny Burney* p. 139 [UofV]).
c. "**See here**, wife! I was never so beaten with anything in my life" (1847 Bronte, *Wuthering Heights* Vol 1, Ch. 1.4 [UofV]).
d. In spite of the frowns of Fate, / I'll not yet the game forsake. / 'Gainst ye all round, **see here** – I stake / My case of diamonds – (1850 Lacy, *Robert the Devil* I, i [ED]).
e. **See here**, Dutchy! ye hain't been foolin' us, have ye? (1864 Trowbridge, *Cudjo's Cave* (1868) iv. 18 [*OED*]).
f. "**See here**, young woman, do you run a private inquiry agency?" (1892 Kipling and Balestier, *Naulakha* xvii. 204 [*OED*]).

Throughout the EModE and much of the LModE periods, parenthetical *see* continues to function as a second-person imperative, directed at the addressee to cast his or her eyes upon something in the immediate context:

(26) a. **Se**! yonder gois a fayr yong man! (c1440 *Alphabet of Tales* lxxix. 61 [*OED*]).
b. **See, see**. here comes the man we went to seek (1598–99 Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing* V, i, 109–110 [Evans]).
c. **See** here appeares a Hand ... And marke how well 'tis muscled (1644 in J. Bulwer, *Chirologia, or the Naturall Language of the Hand* a4 [*OED*]).
d. **See**, here he comes ... a pretty turn'd fellow (1699 Vanbrugh, *The False Friend* II. i [*OED*]).
e. Four Women more, Captain, with a Child apiece! **See**, here they come (1728 Gay, *The Beggar's Opera* III, i [UofV]).
f. **See,** here is the biggest conch. And this one is a pinnidae (1817 Austen, *Sanditon* [UofV]).
g. But **see**! here is a powerful cosmetic. With a few drops of this in a vase of water, freckles may be washed away as easily as the hands are cleansed (1846 Hawthorne, *The Birthmark* p. 1028 [UofV]).

The pragmatic uses of parenthetical *see* appear at the very end of the nineteenth century:[19]

(27) a. "**See**, now," said he to the princess, "the Master will be coming after me before long. When he comes he will ask for the ruby ring, and he must have it, but I have a trick in my head to meet that" (1887 Pyle, *The Wonder Clock* Ch. 5, p. 54 [UofV]).

[19] One early example, although it appears to refer to mental processes (*iudge*), actually refers the hearer to a visual scene (a man reading): **Se, se**, woulde you iudge him a foole So sadly as he readeth on his booke! (c1568 Wager, *The Longer Thou Livest, the more Foole thou Art* 684 (Brandl) [*OED*]).

b. "**See** – I know it's wickedly mean of me – but couldn't you manage to sit somewhere near them and hear what they are saying?" (1896 Le Gallienne, *The Quest of the Golden Girl* p. 232 [UofV]).
c. "None, none," said the Ape-man, – "none escape. **See**! I did a little thing, a wrong thing, once. I jabbered, jabbered, stopped talking. None could understand. I am burnt, branded in the hand" (1896 Wells, *The Island of Doctor Moreau* p. 109 [UofV]).
d. "**See**," she went on, "I want to be truly unselfish. I know how generous you are" (1901 Malet, *The History of Sir Richard Calmady: A Romance* [UofV]).
e. "What grace, what freedom! A bird hath not less care for the fretting of the waves. **See**!" he said (1901 Wallace, *Ben-Hur, A Tale of the Christ* Ch. 1 [UofV]).
f. "I'm from the *Journal*," he began, "not regular on the staff, but I send 'em Harlem items, and the court reporter treats me nice, **see**! Now about this accident; could you give me the name of the Young lady?" (1906 Davis, *The Scarlet Car* Ch. III, p. 126 [UofV]).

Note that these examples pre-date the *OED*'s 1952 example by over fifty years. The timing of the appearance of *see* concurs with Fitzmaurice's (2004:440–441) findings that pragmatic *see* appeared in the late nineteenth century in American texts in the ARCHER Corpus.[20]

It would seem that instances of *see?* as an elliptical form of *do you see?* arise contemporaneously:

(28) a. "Now I've got what I wanted. **See**? I'm one of the public" (1886 Locke, *Simon the Jester* Ch. IV, p. 41 [UofV]).
b. I've been out of work, **see**? I was in 'orspital for three months (1886 Locke, *Simon the Jester* Ch. XXII, p. 301 [UofV])
c. But when he bought this Hammond property for $14,400, he made out the check for $17,400; – he'd had a windfall, so he could pay me what he owed me, **see**? I got my money (1905 Deland, *Many Waters* [UofV]).
d. "That breed is particularly murderous, isn't it? It makes the sawmills crowd still more afraid of having anything to do with him – **see**?" he exulted, candidly (1906 Conrad, "A Desperate Tale: An Anarchist," *A Set of Six* [UofV]).

Fitzmaurice notes another structure, what she calls "collaborative and interactive" *let's see/let us see/let me see*. According to the *OED* (s.v. *see* v.,

[20] The majority of instances I found were American, but we see example (27c) – albeit a somewhat ambiguous example (is the Ape-man asking the hearer to understand that he did a little thing wrong, or is he asking the hearer to look at his burnt hand?) – from a British writer above.

def. B I 15), these expressions are used when "the speaker is trying to recall something to memory, or finds it necessary to reflect before answering a question." *Let me see* occurs parenthetically with pragmatic meaning as early as Middle English: the *MED* (s.v. *lēten* v., def. 13d) notes *let me* "as a verbal filler to gain time for thought" (28a). In Early Modern English such uses are common (29b–d). While parenthetical *let's see/let us see* can have literal meaning during this period (29e–f), it does not begin to have non-literal meaning until the mid-eighteenth century (29g–i):

(29) a. But now, sire, **lat me se**, what shal I seyn? / A ha! By God, I have my tale ageyn (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* D.WB 585–586 [Benson]).
'But now, sir, let me see, what shall I say? Aha! By God, I have my tale again'

b. Abyde – **lette me se** – take better hede Cockes harte! it is Cloked Colusyon! (c1520 Skelton, *Magnyfycence, a Goodly Interlude and a Mery* 595 [*OED*]).

c. Stay now **let me see**, oh signior Snow-liuer I had almost forgotten him (1598 Jonson, *Every Man out of his Humor* (1601) L4 [*OED*]).

d. What breeches wore I o' Saturday? **Let me see**: o' Tuesday my calamanco . . . o' Thursday, my velure; o' Friday my calamanco again (1605 *Lond. Prodigal* I. i. 223 [*OED*]).

e. **Let vs see,** be bolde. (c1567 Udall, *Ralph Roister Doister* III, vi [ED]).

f. **Let's see** these pockets; the letters that he speaks of May be my friends. He's dead; I am only sorry He had no other deathsman. **Let us see**. Leave, gentle wax, and, manners, blame us not (1605 Shakespeare, *King Lear* IV, vi, 256–259 [Evans]).

g. **Let's see**, what have I said? Ay, by my Soul, you have nabbed me cleverly (1741 Richardon, *Pamela* III. 335 [*OED*]).

h. A good, pretty Legacy! **Let's see**; I find myself Heir, by this generous Devise of my very good Friend (1756 Foote, *The Englishman Return'd from Paris* I [ED]).

i. Good lack, good lack, an old Acquaintance, indeed, Cousin Hartop! We were at Hereford 'Sise together – **Let's see**, wonderful, how long ago? 'Twas while I was courting Dame Winny; the Year before I married her – Good now, how long? **Let's see** – That Year the Hackney Stable was built, and Peter Ugly the blind Pad fell into a Sawpit (1754 Foote, *The Knights: A Comedy, in Two Acts* I [ED]).

The change from *let me see* to *let us see* is a politeness phenomenon, a special case of the editorial 'we.'

Subjective →	**Intersubjective** →	**Interactive**
Complement clause	Complement clause	Discourse marker/comment clause
(Epistemic) stance	Epistemic stance	
First person →	Second person →	Second person/Ø person marking
I see	*you see*	*you see* *see*

Figure 6.4 Proposed development of ({*I, you*}) *see* (adapted from Susan Fitzmaurice, "Subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the historical construction of interlocutor stance: From stance markers to discourse markers." *Discourse Studies* 6.4 (2004): 445; with kind permission of SAGE Publications)

6.5 Accounting for the development

Fitzmaurice (2004:433, 445) postulates a three-stage development for *you see*/*see* as shown in Figure 6.4.[21]

This figure seems to suggest the following:

(a) that the second-person construction, *you see,* develops from the first-person construction, *I see* (the arrows in the table above are original); Fitzmaurice argues that the subjective function is a "precondition for the development of the intersubjective and interactive functions" (445);
(b) that parenthetical *I see* and *you see* develop from main clause constructions followed by nominal complement clauses;
(c) that *as you see* plays no role in the development of *you see*; and
(d) that *see* develops from *you see* (although Fitzmaurice is not explicit on this point).

I take up these points in order. First, there appears to be no data supporting a relation between the first- and second-person constructions. Parenthetical *I see* occurs sporadically beginning in late Middle English; see (30a), which is ambiguously parenthetical since clause-initial *I see* is followed by a *that*-less nominal clause; (30b), which is parenthetical but literal in meaning; and (30c–d), which are parenthetical and non-literal in meaning. Such examples become more common in the sixteenth century (30e–h); parenthetical *as I see* arises at about the same time (30i):

(30) a. **Y see** ye wylle speke riotesly and oute of the waye (a1450 *The Book of the Knight of La Tour-Landry* (1868) 21 [*OED*]).
'I see you will speak in an unrestrained manner and out of the ordinary'

[21] She proposes a similar development for *I know* > *you know*. For *say*, she proposes two different developments, from *you say* > *as you say* and from *I say* > *say* (on *say,* see §4.4). In the case of *you see*, she omits any mention of *as you see.*

b. Sexe galeys [read: galegs], **I see**, of sable with-inn, And iche one has a brown brase with bokels twayne (c1450 (c1353) *Wynnere and Wastoure* (Add 31042) 157 [*MED*]).
'six pairs of shoes, I see, with sable within, and each one has a brown fastening and buckles two'
c. Occasions sekes he now, **I se**, how he may make my lordschep lese (c1450 (a1425) *Metrical Version of the Old Testament* (SeldSup 52) 12433 [*MED*]).
'occasions he seeks now, I see, how he may make my lordship less'
d. Allas, thus is my lyf brought to an ende; / My deeth, **I see**, is my conclusioun (1500 (?c1370) ?Chaucer, "Complaynt d'Amours" 22–23 [Benson]).
'alas, thus is my life brought to an end; my death, I see, is my conclusion'
e. Full ofte **I se** my husbande wyll me rate / For this hether commyng of our gentyll curate (1533 Heywood, *A Mery Play betwene Iohan Iohan the Husbande/ Tyb his Wyfe/ & Syr Ihan the Preest* [ED]).
f. Nowe synne **I see** requireth eternall damnation (1566 Wager, *The Life and Repentaunce of Marie Magdalene* [ED]).
g. Summum Ius, **I see**, is Summa Iniuria: / So these wronges must be salued some other way (1578 Whetstone, *Promos and Cassandra*, part ii (1578) II, v [ED]).
h. None of you both, **I see**, but are in fault; Thus simple men, as I, do swallow flies (a1592 Greene, *The Scottish Historie of James the Fourth* IV. V. iv [*OED*]).
i. You returne thus *sea-wrackt **as I see** (1594 Lodge and Greene, *A Looking Glasse for London and Englande* (1598) F2 [*OED*]).

Although the first-person parentheticals arose roughly contemporaneously with the second-person parentheticals, there does not appear to be any direct connection between the two constructions. In general, *I see* seems to have very different pragmatic functions than *you see*. Biber *et al.* (1999) classify *I see* among response forms to assertions but point out that *I see* (and *really*) are stronger than simple backchanneling devices such as *yeah, uh huh, sure, okay* in showing "a high degree of interest in what the previous speaker had to say" (1091–1092). Similarly, Scheibman points out that *I see* "may be so bleached of propositional substance than [sic] it can function as a backchannel, or minimal response – a cooperative device used in conversation to indicate participation, interest, or support" (2002:98). The *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. B I 3f) notes that *I see* is "often used *colloq.* in assenting to an explanation or argument," while the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (s.v. *see*) glosses this expression as 'I understand (referring to an explanation etc.).' Thus, it could be said that *I see* functions not in parallel to, but in contrast to *you see*. While *you see* is a signal used by the speaker to indicate that an explanation or justification follows and to solicit the hearer's acceptance or understanding of the explanation, *I see* is used by an addressee

to denote acceptance of – or at least acknowledgment of – what the speaker has said. Apart from the fact that both forms express stance, there does not seem to be any direct line of development from *I see* to *you see*.

Second, there is strong evidence against the derivation of *you see* from a main clause construction followed by a *that*-clause (following the matrix clause hypothesis).[22] The relatively low frequency of *that*- and *that*-less nominal clauses following *you see* in the earlier periods (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3) casts doubt on the structure *you see that* S as the source of parenthetical *you see*.[23] Even the spike of *that*-less clauses following *you see* in Early Modern English provides little support for this derivation as these represent indeterminate parenthetical constructions. Moreover, the frequency of interrogative clauses following *you see* is equal to or greater than the frequency of *that*-clauses.

Third, I would argue that *as you see* is central to the development of *you see*. As we saw above, *as you see* assumes pragmatic function in the late fourteenth/early fifteenth century (see 15c) and *you see* in the late fifteenth century (see 16e). Parenthetical *as you see* thus appears earlier and more frequently in Middle English than parenthetical *you see* and could serve as a source for the latter construction. Furthermore, as suggested by Quirk *et al.* (1985; see §6.2.2) *as* in *as you see* can be understood as an relativizer not an adverbial, i.e. *as you see* = 'which you see'; thus, the deletion of *as* can be accounted for since object relativizers are freely deletable. This proposal is similar to the origin of *I think*-type parentheticals proposed in Brinton (1996; see §2.3.3.4).

An advantage of this proposal is that it accounts for both *as you see* and *you see* at the same time without the necessity of postulating their independent (and unrelated) origins. Moreover, it does not suggest that *as you see* develops from *you see*, for which there is no good evidence (just as there appears to be no evidence that *as you say* develops from *you say*; see §4.6.2). However, the semantic and syntactic differences between *as* and *as*-less parentheticals in Present-day English (see §6.2.2) pose a problem for this proposal. Semantically, the *as*-parenthetical is affirmative, the truth of the matrix clause being implied, while the *as*-less parenthetical form is neutral concerning the truth of the matrix. Syntactically, *as*- and *as*-less parentheticals present with certain syntactic differences (Ross 1973).[24] I would argue that these differences could well have developed after

[22] Or the process of "slifting" argued for by Potts (2002) in the synchronic dimension.

[23] The derivation of *I see* from *I see that* is also uncertain, since *that*-complements are rare in the earlier periods. In the *OED* quotation bank, there are 173 examples of *I see* in the fifteenth century (the century prior to the rise of parenthetical *I see*). Only 9 of the 173 (or 5%) are followed by a *that*-clause and 27 (or 16%) by a *that*-less clause when they occur clause initially. In addition, 6 (4%) *how*-clauses and 2 (1%) *what*-clauses are present. *I* see is more often followed by an NP + predicative adjunct complement. It is possible that *I see* derives from the adverbial/relative clause, but the frequency of *as I see* is also very low.

[24] Considering *as you see* and *you see* from a purely synchronic perspective, Ross concludes: "whoever is tempted to capitalize on the semantic closeness of certain parentheticals and *as*-clauses will have a tough syntactic row to hoe" (1973:152n). He comes to this conclusion because of differences in the syntactic behavior of the two expressions, e.g., the fact that negative *as*-clauses are not possible



Figure 6.5 Development of *as you see, you see*, and *see*

the two constructions became distinct, namely late Early Modern English/early Late Modern English. There would certainly have been time for them to develop distinctive syntactic and semantic characteristics, and one would in fact expect that they would become differentiated in certain (systematic) ways.

Finally, the derivation of *see* from *(as) you see* presents a number of difficulties. It provides no explanation for the large gap in time between the rise of parenthetical and pragmatic *as you see* in the sixteenth century and the appearance of parenthetical and pragmatic *see* in the late nineteenth century. It fails to show any obvious relation between parenthetical *see here/see now* and *see,* nor does it relate parenthetical *see* to other constructions with which it bears an obvious kinship, namely parenthetical and pragmatic verbs of perception (see Chapter 8 on *look*; §8.5 on *hark, listen, hear*). These are all conventionally derived from imperative forms. The development of parenthetical *see* requires a reversal of matrix clause and subordinate clause status similar to the matrix clause hypothesis. That is, there is a change from a structure such as (31a) to a structure such as (31b):

(31) a. $[\text{See}]_{\text{matrix-imperative}}$ [the answer was very easy to find]$_{\text{subordinate-nominal clause}}$
b. $[\text{See}]_{\text{parenthetical}}$ [the answer was very easy to find]$_{\text{matrix clause}}$

Once this change occurs, the parenthetical acquires positional mobility and can be moved to final or medial position.[25] Therefore, of the three possible origins for *see* listed in §6.4, I reject the first (*you see*) and argue for the third (imperative of *see*). However, the second – shortening of interrogative (*do you) see?* – does, I think. play a role. There seems to be a certain amount of blending of the two constructions *see!* and *(do you) see?* structurally and semantically. Both may be followed by interrogative clauses (e.g. *see what . . . ! do you see what . . . ?*) but also by declarative clauses (*see that . . . !, do you see that . . . ?*). In examples from Present-day English, we see that both *see!* and *see?* have an interrogative quality. See Figure 6.5, which summarizes the proposed developments of *as you see, you see,* and *see.*

after negative sentences, whereas negative matrices are; negative *as*-clauses can follow positive, but negative matrices cannot; *as*-clauses allow double negatives, but matrices do not; *as*-clauses can follow questions, but matrices cannot; and *as*-clauses are freely embeddable whereas matrices are more restricted (1973:151–152n).

[25] The derivation of *look* is more complex than that for *see* since it requires syntactic rebracketing whereby the subject of the subordinate clause is reanalyzed as subject of the matrix clause; this yields the forms *look you* and *lookye/lookee* (see §8.4.1).

6.5.1 Comparison with 'you see' in Swedish

A recent article on the history of comparable forms in Swedish provides cross-linguistic evidence concerning the source of *see* (if not *you see*). Lindström and Wide (2005) discuss the history of Swedish *hör du* '(you) listen,' *vet du* 'you know,' *ser du* 'you see,' and *förstår du* 'you understand,' which they see as "close relatives of discourse particles of the type *you know* and *you see* in English."

Lindström and Wide consider three plausible origins for these forms: (a) as interrogatives, (b) as directives, and (c) as declaratives with inverted order. In regard to the first proposal, the expressions show the verb-first order of interrogatives, but do not retain interrogative meaning. In regard to the second proposal, subjects are not usually expressed in imperatives, but they may be added for emphasis, or the pronouns may be interpreted as vocatives. However, although *vet* and *hör* are ambiguous, *förstår* and *ser* are clearly indicative, not imperative. The third proposal perhaps finds a parallel in the development of *tycker jag* 'I think,' *tror jag* 'I believe,' *ser jag* 'I see,' and *vet jag* 'I know/I suggest' as "parenthetical clauses" (217). Lindström and Wide suggest that the inverted forms might derive from a structure such as *det förstår du* 'that understand you,' with subsequent deletion of *det*. On comparative evidence (with Icelandic), they conclude that "the imperative is, in Scandinavian languages, a generally available source for discourse particles originating from verbs of seeing, looking, listening and hearing, whereas this is less common for verbs of knowing" (219). They note that *ser* is "lexicalised as an interjection in the bare imperative form," *se/si* 'see,' in Swedish (219).

Upon examination of the diachronic evidence, Lindström and Wide conclude that *hör du* clearly derives from the imperative occurring in sentence-initial position. It functioned early in the imperative as an attention-getter, approximating its contemporary uses, namely to initiate moves, to mark change of addressee, or to express change of discourse mood. In its development as a pragmatic marker, it has been reanalyzed as non-imperative. For the other forms, they postulate an anaphoric *det* 'that' and development via "sedimentation of a presenting utterance-initial matrix clause" (227); however, because the forms occur both sentence-initial and sentence-final and are ambiguous morphologically, they are unable to determine whether the origins are indicative declarative (i.e., *(det) ser du*, *(det) vet du*, or *det förstår du*) or interrogative (i.e., *ser du (det)*, *vet du (det)*, or *förstår du (det)*). Loss of (*det*) and clitization yields the particles *serdu, vetdu,* and *förstårdu*.

Thus, the development of these cognate expressions in Swedish offers partial support for the proposed development of *see* in English, as it understands the constructions in some cases ('listen') to derive from the imperative and in other cases to derive from the interrogative or indicative ('you know,' 'you see,' 'you understand'). But clearly the Swedish evidence suggests the complexity of development of these forms.

6.5.2 *Grammaticalization*

The *see*-forms that have been examined in this chapter can be seen as having undergone the process of grammaticalization, as it affects pragmatic markers generally. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries *as you see* shows considerable variation with the presence of modals and adverbials, e.g., *as you may see, as you now here see*, but it generally becomes ossified in form and undergoes fusion; apart from the distinction between singular and plural forms, *you see* is relatively fixed from the beginning, and *see* (*see here, see now*) is likewise invariable over time. More importantly, all of the forms undergo the decategorialization characteristic of grammaticalization. Imperative *see* changes from a full complement-taking verb to an invariable particle-like form, to the extent that it is treated as an interjection or "quasi-interjection" in dictionaries. *As you see* changes from a fully formed and syntactically integrated adverbial/relative clause to a parenthetical, with the complementizer deleted. Parentheticals are decategorialized in the sense that they do not retain the ability to function as matrix clauses or govern other clauses.

The semantic changes affecting the *see*-forms are also typical of grammaticalization. First, they are desemanticized in that the concrete visual perceptual meaning of *see* is bleached or widened to a more abstract meaning of general cognitive perception. This is the well-known instance of *metaphorization* from the physical to the cognitive domain, from physical sight or vision to knowledge, intellection, or mental "vision" (Sweetser 1990:33). Second, the *see*-forms exhibit *pragmatic strengthening* in that the invited inference (see Schwenter and Traugott 2000:10) 'what is visible must be believed' is conventionalized as part of the meaning of the expression. Third, the *see*-forms undergo subjectification and intersubjectification. Most obviously *let me see/let us see* express subjective meanings. The triumphant *you see!/see!* likewise express the speaker's subjective emotions. *You see* often occurs with the expression of speaker evaluation. The other uses of *(as) you see* are more obviously intersubjective, such as the general function of the expressions in claiming the speaker's attention. More specifically, *you see* is a means used by speakers to negotiate with hearers to accept their arguments. It signals the fact that speakers recognize the hearers will need justification or explanation for the claims made. This is the social aspect of intersubjectivity, or the speaker's attention to the hearer's self. For Fitzmaurice (2004:429), *you see*, like *you know* and *you say*, is a marker of intersubjectivity in that it represents the "speaker's rhetorical construction of the *interlocutor's* perspective or attitude." It attributes a particular perspective to the hearer (431).

Both desemanticization and subjectification/intersubjectification are aspects of the shift from referential to non-referential (pragmatic) meaning. A further aspect of this shift is the use of these *see*-forms for purposes of negative politeness. When the speaker realizes that an utterance might provoke surprise or blame (i.e., be a face-threatening act), he or she may use *you see* to claim mutual understanding and thus avoid the face threat. In using *you see*, the speaker is

following Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]:117) seventh strategy of negative politeness, that of presupposing, raising, or asserting common ground. Like *you know*, *you see* effects a point-of-view "flip" because in fact the hearer usually does not know the information conveyed by the speaker; it has the effect of drawing the hearer into the discourse, encouraging the hearer to follow the emotional trend of the discourse, or simply jogging the hearer's memory as to the necessary details (120). By using *you see*, the speaker not only presupposes but in fact asserts the hearer's knowledge (124). The use of *you see* may also show that the speaker and hearer are acting as cooperators (125); as Fitzmaurice (2004) points out, *you see* often means "I'm sure you understand that." *Let us see* also presents the speaker and hearer as cooperators in recalling and presenting the information of the discourse.

Finally, *see*-expressions exhibit Hopper's quality of divergence in that *see* continues to have its original perceptual meaning in certain (ungrammaticalized) uses.

Like most pragmatic markers, the *see*-forms do not undergo phonological attrition or coalescence except to the extent that the complementizer *as* is deleted. Rather than scope reduction, they undergo scope expansion. In their change to parentheticals, both the imperative *see*, which initially governs a subordinate clause, and the adverbial/relative clause *as you see*, which initially relates to a matrix clause, come to be more loosely attached and to have more global scope. This is accompanied by increased syntactic freedom as they may occur in various positions (initial, medial, final) in respect to their host clause.

6.6 Conclusion

In sum, we have seen that the verb *see* participates in a number of different comment clauses. *You see*, which is characteristic of British English, is a neutral marker (i.e., does not assert truth value); it typically occurs sentence-initial and is used to provide an explanation or justification of the preceding utterance. It can also be used to make hearers accept the information presented. *As you see* is an affirmative marker which asserts the truth value of the utterance it accompanies. While *as you see* functions primarily in a literal sense, *so you see* functions more often in a figurative sense meaning 'as you may conclude.' The bare verb *see*, which collocates frequently with *here* and *now,* serves as an attention-getter and may function to ascertain the hearer's comprehension or agreement. Both *you see* and *see* also have a triumphant usage (= 'I told you so').

Regarding the development of *see*-comment clauses, there does not seem to be evidence for any relation between *I see* and *you see* (contra Fitzmaurice 2004). Parenthetical *as you see* and *you see* arise roughly contemporaneously, as does *I see*. As *that*-clause complements are rare in the earlier periods (NP complements being the most common), derivation of *you see* from *you see that* S should not be entertained. Rather, it appears that parenthetical *you see* derives from adverbial/relative *as you see* with deletion of the complementizer. Moreover,

parenthetical see (*see here*/*see now*) cannot be understood as deriving from *you see*, as such a derivation would not explain the three-century gap in the appearance of the two parenthetical structures. Like *hör du* '(you) hear' in Swedish, *see* likely derives from imperative *see*. There may also be some conflation with a second construction, *do you see?,* and its shortened form *see?*.

Finally, as we have seen in the case of the other comment clauses studied in this text, the *see* forms undergo changes characteristic of grammaticalization, including fusion, decategorialization, metaphorization, subjectification/intersubjectification, and loss of referentiality.

7 *If you will* and *as it were*

> Language may be regarded as a vast body of water, an ocean **if you will**, with rivers, streams, rivulets pouring into it (Cohen 2005; emphasis LJB).

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the development of two comment clauses deriving from adverbial clauses, that is, belonging to Quirk *et al*.'s (1985) second type of comment clause. Both serve a metalinguistic function, denoting that the speaker views the accompanying expression as imprecise, inappropriate, or unusual in some sense. The chapter begins with an examination of the pragmatic functions of these expressions in Present-day English (§7.2). The histories of these expressions will follow: *as it were* derives from Old English (§7.4), whereas *if you will* is of much newer provenance (§7.3). Section 7.6 discusses the semantic and syntactic developments of these comment clauses.

7.2 *If you will* and *as it were* in Present-day English

Neither *as it were* nor *if you will* receive in-depth attention in grammars and dictionaries of contemporary English. The *OED* (s.v. *will* v.1, def. BI17) notes that parenthetical *if you will* is sometimes used "to qualify a word or phrase" and carries the sense 'if you wish it to be so called, if you choose or prefer to call it so.' It provides examples dating from Old English to the late nineteenth century. Webster's online (s.v. *will*) glosses *if you will* as 'if you wish to call it that.' The *OED* observes that parenthetical *as it were* (see *as* adv. [conj. and rel. pron.], def. BII9c) is used "to indicate that a word or statement is perhaps not formally exact through practically right," glossed as 'if it were so, if one might so put it, in some sort.' It cites examples from Chaucer to the late nineteenth century. Quirk *et al*. (1985:618–620, 1074n) classify both expressions, along with other finite forms (e.g., *if you like, as* X *puts it, if I may so put it*) and non-finite (e.g.,

so to speak/say, to quote X),[1] as "style disjuncts" expressing a "metalinguistic comment," that is, making overt reference to the linguistic means of expression. They note further (1985:1095–1096) that *if you will* belongs to the metalinguistic subclass of "indirect" or "open" conditions (dependent on an implicit speech act), including *if you like, if that's the word for it, if you see what I mean*, which suggest that the wording is not precise or that "it should not be misunderstood in some sense not intended by the speaker."[2]

Quirk *et al*. note that because of their metalinguistic meaning, these expressions are often co-opted as general hedges (1985:618). The NTC's *American Idioms Dictionary* ([2]1996:16) concurs that *as it were* is sometimes used as a qualifier of an assertion "that may not sound reasonable," and Chen (1998:24) sees *if you will* as a marker of "linguistic tentativeness." In an recent online discussion, Pullum (2003) compares the epistemic hedge *if you will* as used by "old fogeys" to the pragmatic marker *like* in the discourse of younger speakers; both function as "a way to signal hedging about vocabulary choice – a momentary uncertainty about whether the adjacent expression is exactly the right form of words or not." In response, Lieberman (2003), while admitting that *if you will* and *as it were* are similar to *like* in some regards, observes that *like* is both quantitatively denser and qualitatively broader than the other variants. Finally, in addition to serving as hedges, some metalinguistic comments can also be used as emphasizers, where the speaker draws attention not only the nature of the event described but also to the exaggerated nature of the language used to describe it (Quirk *et al*. 1985:619).

7.2.1 Present-day English if you will

Although taking a prescriptivist approach, Shapiro and Shapiro (1993) make some astute observations concerning *if you will* in Present-day English. They note that *if you will* has attained the frequency of a "verbal tic" such as *you know* or *like* (328), thus underlining its status as a comment clause. The primary function of *if you will* is "to attenuate or neutralize the force of words" (327). They observe a relatively recent shift in the meaning of the expression from 'if you wish to call it that' to 'if I may be allowed to call it that' and suggest that speakers are thereby seeking the sanction of hearers for the use of particular words. They see this as the speakers' abnegating responsibility for their own language and as entailing movement away from concentration on the speaking subject. For this reason, they claim, *if you will* is especially common with "tropes" as speakers are reluctant to say anything out of the ordinary (329). By use of expressions such as *if you will*, speakers "seek to obliterate potential conflicts, oppositions, or

[1] Some of these metalinguistic phrases, for example *so-called, so to speak, what is called,* have a negative connotation, that something is being improperly or incorrectly described (see, for example, *OED*: s.v. *so-called*, def. 2). This connotation is not present in *as it were* and *if you will*.

[2] Quirk *et al*. (1985:1096) label *if you will* as a formal variant, but corpus data do not support this claim.



Figure 7.1 *If you will* in PDE

even differences" and establish "a solidarity between Ego and Other" (330). Interestingly, a posting by Patrick Frey on his blog *Patterico's Pontifications* (2006) concerning his dislike of *if you will* brings responses which underlie the duality of meaning of *if you will*. Some respondents understand the expression as meaning 'if you choose to' or 'you know you *ought to,* but *will* you?' while others understand it as meaning 'pardon my terminology' or 'if you will accept my usage of the term.' One respondent suggests that in the former meaning the expression should be *if you would*.[3] Shapiro and Shapiro are critical of the latter usage – designating this usage part of "wimp English" – as it "substitutes feeling for thought and submerges the referential in the phatic" (330). We will explore more fully below (see §7.3) the semantic role of *if you will* in respect to subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as well as its function in terms of negative politeness, and take issue with some of the conclusions reached by Shapiro and Shapiro.

A study of instances of *if you will* in the BNC and the Strathy Corpus seems to suggest that the expression is more fully grammaticalized as a pragmatic marker in Canadian English than in British English (see Figure 7.1).

First, parenthetical uses are more common in Canadian English than in British English (69% as compared with 30%). Second, among the parenthetical instances of *if you will*, British English shows a much higher percentage of examples with the literal meaning 'if you are willing, if you want to,' the original meaning from which the metalinguistic meaning develops (56% as compared

[3] The hypothesis – that *if you will* in its original meaning of 'if you are willing' is more commonly expressed by *if you would* in North American English – is not born out by the Strathy Corpus (but cf. Simon 2002).

with 13% in Canadian English), as we will see below (§7.3). Finally, the majority of forms occur in spoken texts (55/79 or 70% of parentheticals in the Strathy Corpus) or in representations of speech or quoted speech in written texts.

In Present-day English, *if you will* is used in a variety of metalinguistic ways. As noted by Shapiro and Shapiro, the expression is common with metaphors and figures of speech (1a and b). It also occurs in sequences of words where the speaker appears to be searching for the correct formulation (1c). The metalinguistic nature of *if you will* may be emphasized by enclosing the qualified expression in quotation marks (1d) or by explicitly commenting on the adequacy of the expression (1e). The qualified word may be a foreign word (1f) or one which the speaker feels is too elaborate or "fancy" for the context (1g). *If you will* may occur with characterizations that the speaker feels the hearer may not accept (1h) or that the speaker doesn't entirely accept but feels the hearer may want or expect (1i).

(1) a. In this light, Gump represents a form of ideal American: a virtuous innocent free from both prejudice and sophistication, a law-abiding Huck Finn**, if you will** (1994 *Queen's Quarterly* [Strathy]).
a kind of updated Orange Juice for the crossover generation, **if you will** (1991 *New Musical Express* [BNC]).

b. But it was kind of an issue that was brushed under the carpet **if you will** (1994 Gawthorp, *Affirmation: The AIDS Odyssey of Dr. Peter* [Strathy]).
It's prudent for any company that has enjoyed that sort of growth to cover your bets, **if you will** (1991 *Computer Dealer News* [Strathy]).

c. Yet it is a logical ending, a romantic ending, **if you will**, but one drawn into reality (1986 Fisher, *The Bright Face of Danger* [BNC]).

d. When I reflect upon the nature of my experiential life, my "inner" life **if you will**, I become aware of the presence of structure (1985 Crook, *The Evolution of Human Consciousness* [BNC]).

e. The one point or the one area where discretion **if you will**, used – or discretion, if I can use the word discretion, was used was in the case of operators who were trying to substitute experience for education (2000–01 *Walkerton Water Tragedy Inquiry* [Strathy]).

f. This is the fundamental philosophical fact, the grundrisse **if you will** of our enterprise (1997 *Queen's Quarterly* [Strathy]).

g. My superior self had taken over – call it the result of time-shock**, if you will** (1991 Aldiss, *Frankenstein Unbound* [BNC]).

h. After the war this culture became something more – became an ideology **if you will**, a symbol of a different civilization (1998 *Queen's Quarterly* [Strathy]).

i. it is needed to counterbalance any propensity towards the state's collective needs – ; totalitarianism **if you will** – ; which a move towards a nationally prescribed curriculum might bring with it (1991 Brighouse and Moon [eds.], *Managing the National Curriculum* [BNC]).

> this boy . . . had grown so imperceptibly but so intimately into the very soul of her being; give him up with all his strength, and virility, and – yes, and coarseness, **if you will** – but sincerity too (1989 *NeWest Review* [Strathy]).

If you will typically follows the word it qualifies, but occasionally it may precede it:

(2) Jim Bob and Fruitbat jokingly suggested that it might be vaguely amusing to tie in the, **if you will**, "concept" of the album with a foreign press conference to promote it (1992 *New Musical Express* [BNC]).

In one instance in each corpus, *if you will* is mentioned rather than used:[4]

(3) I privately doubted whether the House would be impressed by George's habit of interlarding his speeches with '**if you will**' every six or eight words (1990 Forsey, *A Life on the Fringe: The Memoirs of Eugene Forsey* [Strathy]).

As noted by Quirk *et al.* (1985), there are examples where the metalinguistic meaning of the expression seems rather weak, and *if you will* seems to function as a more general hedge, meaning something like 'if you are willing to accept what I am claiming' or even 'indeed':

(4) a. Today, states continue to attempt to striate the remaining smooth space within their territorial boundaries, resisted by peripheral urban groups, rural communities, the stateless nations of the Fourth World and (**if you will**) the forces of nature (2004 *The Canadian Geographer* [Strathy]).
b. This is similar, **if you will**, to the accounting and engineering professions, which have peer review processes (2003–04 *Canadian Appraiser* [Strathy]).

Finally, the metalinguistic meaning may be expressed by full clauses, such as the following:

(5) The cooling of microelectronic chips is, **if you will forgive the paradoxical turn of phrase**, the hottest area of heat transfer engineering at the moment (1986 *Perspectives: Profiles of Research at Queen's University* [Strathy]).

7.2.2 *Present-day English* as it were

In contrast to *if you will*, all instances of *as it were* in both the BNC and the Strathy Corpus are parenthetical and metalinguistic. Although *as it were* and *if you will* are equally common in the Strathy (122 vs. 114 examples), *as it were* is much more common than *if you will* in the BNC (1000 vs. 263 examples).

[4] The BNC example occurs in a linguistics text.

Unlike *if you will*, *as it were* does not appear to be characteristic of speech: only 22 of the examples in the Strathy occur in spoken texts. Also in contrast with *if you will*, *as it were* frequently precedes the word it qualifies: in the Strathy 74 examples follow, 47 examples precede, and 1 example constitutes an independent utterance.

Despite these differences, *as it were* occurs in many of the same contexts as *if you will* and serves the same metalinguistic function. For example, it is common with figures of speech and clichés (6a), as well as with more original metaphors (6b). The qualified word may be set off by quotation marks (6c); it may be a foreign word or phrase (6d), an unusual native word formation (6e), or a word that is unexpected or suggestive in context (6f):

(6) a. this policy, which was designed to reconstruct Saint-Roch, did not, **as it were**, deliver the goods (2003 *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* [Strathy]).
the composer's father, Leopold, unwittingly started the rot over two centuries ago when he took the six-year-old Mozart to market, **as it were**, on the celebrated tour of Europe's courts and palaces (1985–94 *Economist* [BNC]).
Along may come a sudden additional stress, the last straw on the camel's back, **as it were** (1987 Gibson and Gibson, *Homeopathy for Everyone* [BNC]).

b. It is the business of critical biography to make the two overlap – to bring some of the furniture out to the garden **as it were**, and spread flowers all over the house (1989 Keefer, *Reading Mavis Gallant* [Strathy]).
They are a disgrace to society, sir, a sort of moral pestilence **as it were**, and should be shunned by every honest man (2004 *Canadian Jeweller* [Strathy]).
Possibly, there are one or two apparent links between Miller and myself which I have not yet tackled, but most of these are mere trimmings, minor coincidences, or the accidental pen droppings, **as it were**, of an already admitted indolence (1990 Potter, *Hide and Seek* [BNC]).

c. on the government scale [it] is substantially different from that of either Australian Labor or American Democrats; it has "drifted away," **as it were**, towards the centre (1990 Nevitte and Gibbins, *New Elites in Old States* [Strathy]).
so proud were we five of our "country estate," **as it were**, that there was seldom an evening without visitors (1986 Dunlop, *In all Directions* [BNC]).

d. Insiders say Jean Chretien sees her as a female version of himself, a scrappy petite gars, **as it were**, a tough underdog who can always be expected to mount a come-from-behind win (1996 *Saturday Night* [Strathy]).

e. It's de-conglomerating itself **as it were** (2004 *Ivey Business Journal* [Strathy]).
a feeling of being understretched **as it were**, less than fully challenged (1987 Tranter, *Flowers of Chivalry* [BNC]).

f. rather he approached it with infinite precautions, stalking it [Cézanne's mature work], **as it were**, now from one point of view, now from another (1991 Darracott, *Art Criticism: A User's Guide* [BNC]).
(the Barren Land and Hatchet Lake bands) came in after break-up, Egenolf would allow them a few days to visit, and commingle, **as it were** (1990 *The Beaver* [Strathy]).

One example in the Strathy Corpus shows an interesting redundancy, with both *in a word* and *as it were* in the same sentence:

(7) The forest, **in a word**, formed, **as it were**, the gloomy and impenetrable walls of the prison-house, and the bright lake that lay before it the only portal through which happiness and liberty could be secured (1982 Atwood, *Second Words* [Strathy]).

Thus, we see that although there are some differences in their distributions (in syntactic position, genre, and dialect) as well as some differences in their degree of fixity and exclusivity as comment clauses, *if you will* and *as it were* are very similar in their pragmatic function. We turn now to the histories of these forms.

7.3 The rise of *if you will*

Parenthetical uses of *if you will* are attested in both Old and Middle English. However, as shown by the data in (Figure 7.2), parenthetical forms are relatively infrequent. Non-parenthetical *if you will* is most typically followed by an infinitive.

In its early parenthetical uses in Old English (8) and Middle English (9), *if you will* has referential or propositional meaning: 'if you are disposed or willing to, consent to' (*OED*, s.v. *will* v.1, def. BI6) or 'if you choose to' (*OED,* s.v. *will* v.1, def. BI7) do something. The parentheticals may occur in initial, medial, or final position.[5]

[5] The structure *if you will that* is also occasionally encountered in the early period, but does not play an important role in the development of parenthetical *if you will*:

> **If þou wilt þat** God, ouir þi defautes alle, Be propicius lord, of his hie mageste, Whan þou to him for mercy haue nede to calle (1440 Capgrave, *The Life of St. Norbert* (Hnt HM 55) 576 [*MED*]).
>
> 'if you will that God, over all your sins, be generous lord, of his high majesty, when you have need to call on him for mercy'.



Figure 7.2 *If you will* in seven historical corpora

(8) a. ealswa þu miht nu, **gif þu wilt**, æt God gebiddon þæt þes man gehæled wurðe (c1000 *The Old English Life of St. Giles* 218 [DOEC]).
'also you might now, if you will, entreat of God that this man be healed'

b. And þa andswerade him pantaleon & he cwæð, **Gif þu wilt**, þonne æteowige ic hine þe (late 11th c. *The Old English Life of Saint Pantaleon* 370 [DOEC]).
'and then Pantaleon answered him and he said If you will, then I will reveal him to you'

c. Gif þu wille þæt þin wamb sie simle gesund þonne scealt þu hire þus tilian **gif þu wilt** (10th c. *Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Starcraft of Early England*, Book II 214 [DOEC]).[6]
'if you wish that your womb be continually healthy then you should attend it thus if you will'

(9) a. Wep **if thow wolt**, or lef, for out of doute, / This Diomede is inne, and thow art oute (1382–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* V, 1518–1519).
'weep, if you will, or leave it, for doubtless, this Diomede is in and you are out'

b. **If þou wolt**, þei shul pase, And com not in his hond, percase (a1400 (a1325) *Cursor Mundi* (Trin. Cambr.) 4002 [*OED*]).
'if you will, they shall pass and not come into his hand, perhaps'

[6] Note the double occurrence of *gif þu wille/wilt*; the first is a main clause followed by a *þæt* clause, the second is parenthetical.

c. Mo ðanne fif ðusende besantes of gode þohtes, and of gode . . . woerkes, ðu mihtest habben biȝeten, **ȝif ðu woldest** (a1225 (c1200) *Vices & Virtues* (1) (Stw 34) 17/21 [*MED*]).
'more than five thousand bezants of good thought and of good . . . works you might have acquired, if you would'

Parenthetical *if you will* often occurs in the context of an imperative or a modal with directive force (8a, 8c, 9a, 9c) where it can be understood as elliptical, with the meaning 'if you are willing to do so.' The occurrence in directive contexts is even more common in Present-day English:

(10) a. Finally, reflect, **if you will**, on how drastically humanity has changed the biosphere during its brief strut on the terrestrial stage (1991 *New Scientist* [BNC]).
b. "And you could answer a question, too, **if you will**" (1991 Wright, *Never such Innocence* [BNC]).

If you will in its pragmatic sense 'if you are willing to call it that' does not appear until the modern period. The earliest examples, in which the parenthetical precedes the word it qualifies, date from the mid-sixteenth century.

(11) a. it is a false promise of the deuell, which draweth vs away from the truthe of God. Or, **if you will**, it is oyle defiled with the lyeng of the deuill (1561 Norton, *Calvin's Institution of Christian Religion* [EEBO]).[7]
b. Milet: A straunge maladie.
Sapho: Mileta, **if you wilt**, a Martiredom. But giue me my lute, and I will see if in songe I can beguile mine own eies (1584 Lyly, *Sapho and Phao* III, iii [ED]).
c. Why, any thing: / An honorable murderer, **if you will**; / For nought I did in hate, but all in honor (1604 Shakespeare, *Othello* V, ii, 293–295 [Evans]).
d. His communication was still seasoned with savoury parenthesises and breakings off, or, **if you will**, aposiopesises (1618 *Hist. P. Warbeck* in *Harleian Miscellany* (1793) 63 [*OED*]).
e. These Ferrets (or **if you will** Iesuites) (1626 Owen, *Speculum Jesuiticum, or the Jesuites Looking-glasse* (1629) 66 [*OED*]).

As in Present-day English, *if you will* often qualifies metaphorical expressions (11a, e) or unfamiliar or complex words (11d). In example (11c), the speaker, Othello, by using *if you will*, assumes that his hearers will not accept his characterization of Desdemona's murder as "honorable"; in the subsequent clause he gives his reasons for this characterization (*naught . . . in hate, but all in honor*). In (11e), in contrast to (11a), *if you will* precedes the literal term (*Iesuites*) as opposed

[7] The first examples of metalinguistic *if you will* in UofV and the *OED* are found in this English translation of Calvin's text and may translate Latin *sī vīs*.

to the metaphorical term (*Ferrets*) and takes on the meaning 'if you prefer' rather that 'if you will.'

The metalinguistic meaning is sometimes explicitly invoked:

(12) a. I can with ease translate it [my uncle's will] to my will; / Or **if you will, to speak more properly**, / I will enforce it eas'ly to my love (1594–96 Shakespeare, *King John* II, i, 513–515 [Evans]).
b. A mighty Wittycism, (**if you will pardon a new word!**) but there is some difference between a Laugher and a Critique (1677 Dryden, *The State of Innocence and all of man, Apol. Her. Poetry* c1b [*OED*]).

If you will can also function as a more general hedge (as in Present-day English, see examples at (4)). In (13a), although the expression occurs in the context of an unfamiliar word, the speaker uses *if you will* in the sense of 'rather.' In (13b) it carries the sense 'if you are willing to accept what I am claiming.'

(13) a. The whole Triumvirate, or **if you will**, Quatrumvirate are included (1684 Goddard, *Plato's Demon; or the State-physician Unmaskt* 53 [*OED*]).
b. Gravity . . . depends entirely on the constant and efficacious, and, **if you will**, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty God (1696 Whiston, *A New Theory of the Earth* IV.i.§2.218 [*OED*]).

Examples such as these call into question Shapiro and Shapiro's argument (1993) that the shift in meaning from 'if you wish to call it that' to 'if I may be allowed to call it that' or perhaps 'if you will allow me to call it that' is "relatively new." In fact, most of the examples cited above allow the hedge interpretation 'if I may be allowed to call it that' (e.g., in 11d *An honorable murder, if you will*, can be understood to mean 'an honorable murder, if you are willing to call it that' but also 'an honorable murder, if you will allow me to call it that' and possibly even 'an honorable murder, if you will allow me to claim it to be so') (see further §7.6.1).

7.4 The rise of *as it were*

According to Visser (1970:42; 1972:921), there are no instances of *as it were* in Old English. The DOEC yields five examples of *swa hit wære*, none of which is parenthetical. One example is translatable as a conditional 'as if it were' (14a). In three of the OE examples *wære* is an auxiliary verb followed by a past participle (*wære . . . gedon, wære . . . ahwylfed, wære . . . gefylled*), and in one example *swa* is part of the construction *swa hwæþer swa* 'whichever of two.' The DOEC also provides four examples of *swylce/swelce hit wære*. It too may mean 'as if it were' (14b). The example given in (14c) possibly represents an early example of the parenthetical metalinguistic meaning 'so to speak':

(14) a. Brohte þær sume smyrenesse swiðe swete of myrran & of oðrum deorwyrþum wyrtum, & geworhte efne **swa hit wære** hundteontig punda gewæge (late 10th c. *The Vercelli Homilies and Related Texts* 277 [DOEC]).
'brought there a certain very sweet ointment made of myrrh and other precious spices, and wrought just as if it were the weight of a hundred pounds'

b. And nu doð men þam gelicost syððan, **swylce hit wære** idel spell and unsoð (c1000 Wulfstan, "Sunnandæges spell" 252 [DOEC]).
'and now men afterwards act like him as if it were an empty and untrue account'

c. & mon geseah **swelce hit wære** an gylden hring on heofonum brædre þonne sunne (c871–99 *The Old English Orosius* 10.123.20 [DOEC]).
'and was seen as if it were (as it were?) a golden ring in the heavens broader than the sun'

Conditional *as it were* NP in the sense of 'as if it were' continues to be common in Middle English. This clause typically contains an NP complement and functions as an adjunct adverbial expressing hypothetical comparison (see Quirk *et al.* 1985:1110):

(15) a. God dude lete reyne adoun, **As hit were** flour, gret foysun (170/38 [*MED*]).
'God caused to rain down, as if it were flour, great plenty'

b. His comb was redder than the fyn coral, And batailled **as it were** a castel wal (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* B.NP 2859–2860 [Benson]).
'his comb was redder than fine coral and notched with crenellations as if it were a castle wall'

c. Þe woundys of handes and feet are rounde, þe wounde in the syde is auelonge, **as hit were** of a speer (c1450 (?c1425) *Life of Saint Elizabeth of Spalbec* (Dc 114) 107/33 [*MED*]).
'the wounds of the hands and feet are round, the wound in the side is oblong, as if it were from a spear'

d. And þis mekel mervaile . . . The day wex als dirke **As hit were** mydniȝte (a1500 *Awntyrs of Arthur* (Dc 324) 73 [*MED*]).
'and this great marvel . . . the day waxed as dark as if it were midnight'

By the first half of the fourteenth century, parenthetical *as it were* in its metalinguistic function becomes common; *as it were* may precede or follow the word it qualifies (16).

(16) a. Seint Thomas was . . . in huding, **as hit were**, In the hous of Seint Bertin, for he him abussede there (c1300 *South English Legendary: Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury* (Hrl 2277) 70/1380 [*MED*]).

'Saint Thomas was . . . in hiding, as it were, in the house of Saint Bertin for he concealed himself there'

b. Hi seye an aungel . . . a ffayr ȝong man **as hit were**, Ycloþed in white cloþes (a1325 (c1280) *South English Legendary: Temporale (Passion of Christ)* (Pep 2344) 1828 [*MED*]).
'he saw an angel . . . a fair young man as it were, clothed in white clothes'

c. A lond þai neiȝed neiȝe, A forest **as it ware** (c1330 (?a1300) *Sir Tristrem* (Auch) 375 [*MED*]).
'a land they approached near, a forest as it were'

d. Treuþe yloȝe and oþ ybroke is **ase hit were** al on (1340 Don Michel, *Ayenbite of Inwyt* (Arun 57) 65/20 [*MED*]).
'truth deceived and oath broken is as it were all one'

Interesting double constructions with *that is* or *so is said* are occasionally encountered:

(17) a. Anoþer maner fleisch þer is þat is glandelose, **þat is as it were** accornis (c1400 *Lanfranc's Cirurg.* 28 [*OED*]).
'there is another type of flesh that is glandulous, that is as it were [shaped like] an acorn'

b. Malencoly is bred of trowbled drast of blode and hath his name of melon that is blak and calor that is humour, **so is sayd as it were** a blak humour, for the colour therof lynyth toward blackenes (1495 *Trevisa's Bartholomeus De Proprietatibus Rerum* (de Worde) IV. xi. 95 [*OED*]).
'melancholy is bred of troubled sediment of blood and takes its name from *melon* that is black and *choler* that is the humor, so it is said as it were a black humor, for the color of it tends towards blackness'

In its metalinguistic function in Middle English, *as it were* is used in many of the same contexts as in Present-day English, for example, with metaphors (18a) and with unfamiliar or unusual terms (18b). In (18c), *as it were* occurs in an explicitly metalinguistic context.

(18) a. Thy wisdom is **as it war** the see, that for gretenes may nott be drawe owte (a1475 *The Revelations of Saint Birgitta* (Gar 145) [*MED*]).
'the wisdom is as it were the sea that on account of greatness may not be drawn out'
The tunge of a bacbyter es, **as it wer**, a thre-egged swerde that sleeȝ thre soules wyth oon stroke (c1450 *Speculum Christiani (2)* (Hrl 6580) 60/31 [*MED*]).
'the tongue of the backbiter is, as it were, a three-edged sword that slays three souls with one stroke'

b. The gnatte . . . haþ in his mouþ a pipe, **as hit were** a pricke, and þerwiþ he þurleþ þe fleische for to souke þe blood (a1398 John of



Figure 7.3 *As it were* in seven historical corpora

Trevisa, *Bartholomaeus's De Proprietatibus Rerum* (Add 27944) 147a/a [*MED*]).
'the gnat . . . has in his mouth a pipe as it were a prick and therewith he pierces the flesh in order to suck the blood'
if a man . . . falles in-to vndiscrete ymagynacyone, **as it ware** a frensye þe deuelle entirs þan by fals illumynacyons (c1440 (?a1396) ?Hilton, *Angels' Song* (Thrn) 18/35 [*MED*]).
'if a man . . . falls into indiscreet imagination, as it were a frenzy, the devil enters then by false illumination'

c. It sufficeþ to a Cirurgien for to knowe þat bolnyng, aposteme, inflacioun, ingrossacioun, eminence . . . or growyng bene namez, synonemez **as it war**, signifying þe same þing (?a1425 Guy de Chauliac, *Grande Chirurgie (1)* (NY 12) 20b/b [*MED*]).
'it suffices for a surgeon to know that swelling, inflammation, inflation, protrusion, protuberance . . . or growing are names, synonyms, as it were, signifying the same thing'

Figure 7.3 shows the relative distribution of the two meanings of *as it were* – conditional 'as if it were NP' and 'as it were/so to speak' – in corpora of Middle and Early Modern English.

By Early Modern English, parenthetical/metalinguistic *as it were* (19) has virtually replaced conditional *as it were* (20). Note that Shakespeare makes heavy

use of *as it were* in the mock learning of Holofernes' speech in *Love's Labor's Lost* (19d):

(19) a. we must grope, **as it were**, in the dark, and onely ghess at the true reasons of things by similitudes and comparisons (1665 Hooke, *Micrographia* [HC]).
b. whereby Purging and Bleeding by Taxes, must be, **as it were**, our constant Diet (1668 Culpepper, *A Discourse Showing the many Advantages which will Accrue to the Kingdom by the Abatement of Usury* [LC]).
c. [She] makes our profession **as it were** to stink afore the face of the gods (1607–08 Shakespeare, *Pericles Prince of Tyre* IV, vi, 135–36 [Evans]).
d. Most barbarous intimation! yet a kind of insinuation, **as it were** *in via*, in way, of explication; *facere,* **as it were**, replication, or rather *ostentare,* to show, **as it were** his inclination (1594–95 Shakespeare, *Love's Labor's Lost* IV, ii, 13–16 [Evans]).

(20) a. Fled to his house amaz'd./ Men, wives, and children stare, cry out, and run,/ **As it were** doomsday (1599 Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar* III, i, 96–98 [Evans]).
b. Lift up your countenance, **as it were** the day/ Of celebration of that nuptial, which/ We two have sworn shall come (1610–11 Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale* IV, iv, 49–51 [Evans]).

The conditional 'as if it were' sense dies out after the sixteenth century; thereafter, *as it were* is exclusively metalinguistic.

7.5 Foreign influence

The rise of *as it were* in Middle English raises the question of the native origin of the construction. Can it be attributed to either French or Latin influence? Is it a direct calque?

The influence of French on the rise of *as it were* seems questionable. First, we find rare examples of *swelce hit wære* with metalinguistic meaning in Old English (see example 14c). Second, there are no parallel constructions in French which could serve as a direct source of *as it were*. In Modern French, *as it were* must be translated with very different constructions, such as *pour ainsi dire, en quelque sorte, soi disant*. In a exhaustive discussion of a comparable construction in Middle English, *as who say/saith* 'as if one said, as if to say, as one may say, as some say,' which appeared in the first half of the thirteenth century, Nevanlinna (1974) dismisses the importance of French models. She notes that there were Latin, Old English, and Old French constructions with the speaker identified (e.g., *ac si/quasi dicat/diceret, swelce he cwæde, swylce ic/he þus cwæþe, assi cum il/ce/ceu diet*) as well as Middle English equivalents (*as if/though/as he seide*). However, *as who(so) say/saith* (whose origins are somewhat difficult to explain [579]) appeared in the *Ancrene Riwle* (c1225) prior to the comparable OFr. *come*

qui disse (ModFr. *comme qui dirait*).[8] In its use as a comment clause, where it may alternate with *as it were* and *that is (for) to say* (599), the expression *as who(so) say/saith* is, Nevanlinna suggests, equivalent to Lat. *quasi* 'as men say' (Mod Fr. *comme on dit*).

The influence of Latin *quasi* on the rise of *as it were* cannot be discounted. *Quasi*, an adverb used in hypothetical and real comparisons in the sense 'somewhat like, almost, not far from' (Lewis 1984:s.v. *quasi*), while not the immediate model for *as it were*, clearly influenced its use. John of Trevisa makes frequent use of *as it were* in his translations of Latin, frequently in place of *quasi* in the original (21a), and it appears in later translations from the Latin as well (21b–c):

(21) a. Lucius Comodus was emperour, **as it were** [Lat. **quasi**] þrittene ȝeere (a1387 John of Trevisa, *Higden's Polychronicon* (StJ-C H.1) 5.37 [*MED*]).
'Lucius Comodus was emperor, as it were, thirteen years'

b. That most dangerous Captaine having . . . markt . . . where . . . the Easterne winde blew stint **as it were** [Lat. ***quasi*** *ad constitutum*] (1618 Bolton, *Florus* II. vi. (1636) 98 [*OED*]).

c. All the Perfection of a Mundane Soul, may perhaps be attributed to God in some sense, and be [*printed* he] called, **Quasi** Anima Mundi, **As it were** the Soul thereof (1678 Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*. I. iv. 561 [*OED*]).

In its conditional use 'as if,' Lat. *quasi* is variously translated in Middle English as *as* or *as though*:

(22) a. He spac, **as** redende [Lat. **quasi** legens] to me, alle these wrdus; and Y wrot in the volum with enke (a1382 *Wycliffite Bible* (early version) (Dc 369(1)) Jer.36.18 [*MED*]).
'he spoke, as if reading to me, all of these words, and I wrote in the volume with ink'

b. She [the ostrich] is maad hard to hir sones, **as thoȝ** thei be not hiris [Lat. **quasi** non sint sui] (a1382 *Wycliffite Bible* (early version) (Dc 369(1)) Job 39.16 [*MED*]).
'she [the ostrich] is hardened to her sons, as though they be not hers'

c. Þise passions ar regionalez & **as** war of heritage [Lat. **quasi** hereditarie; **Ch.(2)*: **as þogh** þai were of heritage] (?a1425 Guy de Chauliac, *Grande Chirurgie* (1) (NY 12) 49b/a [*MED*]).
'these passions are peculiar to a certain region and as if it were by natural inheritance'

Evidence of the popularity of *quasi* (likely taken from French, not Latin) is its use in English in the sense 'as it were' (*OED*:s.v. *quasi* adv. and prefix); however,

[8] Prins (1952:59) admits to finding no early examples of *comme qui diroit*; however, he believes that the "foreign ring" of *as who should say* "strongly suggests" French influence.

the usage does not appear to have become completely naturalized, as it is often used in the context of Latin words (see 23a, c). Again, Shakespeare makes use of it in Holofernes' mock learned speech (23d):[9]

(23) a. Þere were in þat place so many wondirful tornynges and wendingges, and þerfore it was yclepid laberinthus, **quasi** labens intus, an inslippe, for a man myȝte slippe or slide in so fer he schulde neuere conne come out aȝen (a1450 (1408) Vegetius, *De Re Militari* (Dc 291) 60a [*MED*]).
'there were in that place so many wonderful rotations and turnings and therefore it was called a labyrinth, as it were labens intus, an inslipping, for a man might slip or slide in so far he should never be able to come out again'

b. Whereof he was moche angry, and **quasi** half in Despair (1485 Caxton, tr., *Thystorye of the knyght Parys and the fayr Vyenne* (1868) 30 [*OED*]).
'whereof he was very angry and, as it were, half in despair'

c. He was callyd Seneca, **quasi** se necans, for he . . . sloch himself (a1500 (a1415 Mirk, *Festial* (GoughETop 4) 193/15 [*MED*]).
'he was called Seneca, as it were, the killer, because he . . . killed himself'

d. Master Person, **quasi** [pers-one]. And if one should be pierc'd, which is the one? (1594–95 Shakespeare, *Love's Labor's Lost* IV, ii, 83–84 [Evans]).

In sum, it seems that Latin *quasi* influenced the frequency of *as it were* in Middle English but did not account directly for the rise of the form. Tellingly, the occurrence of *as it were* in Old English that we see in the *Orosius* above (14c) appears to be entirely independent of the Latin original (see Sweet 1883:235).

7.6 Accounting for the development of *if you will* and *as it were*

7.6.1 The development of if you will

As we saw above, OE and ME examples of parenthetical *if you will* typically occurred in directive contexts (with imperatives and modals) and focused on the action to be carried out. They could be understood as elliptical for 'if you are willing [to do so].' They addressed the hearer's negative face and were thus strongly hearer-oriented. This function continues to be common in Present-day English. The first examples of metalinguistic *if you will* appear in the sixteenth century. How does the semantic shift from 'if you are willing [to do so]' to 'if you are willing [to say so]' take place? I would suggest that it is the following type of indeterminate context (a "bridging context") in which the semantic reanalysis could occur (although the example cited in (24) dates from slightly later than the earliest examples of pragmatic *if you will* that I have found).

[9] The *OED* attributes the first use of *quasi* in English to Caxton (see 23b), but (23a) represents an earlier attestation.

(24) Call them **if you will**, Popish fooles, and addleheads (1641 'Smectymnuus,' *An Answer to a Booke entituled An Humble Remonstrance* §16.205 [*OED*]).

In (24), the imperative allows the interpretation 'if you willing to do so,' but the verb of communication (*call*) invites the inference that supplies the metalinguistic sense 'if you are willing to say so.' Once this implicature is made, *if you will* can be extended beyond the context of verbs of communication and the meaning of 'if you are willing to say so' can be conventionalized.

Chen (1998) treats the development of metalinguistic *if you will* as a case of what he calls "de-conditionalization," as the *if*-clause ceases to function as the protasis in respect to an apodosis. In explaining the meaning of the more overtly metalinguistic *if you don't mind the expression*, Blakemore (2006:1678) clarifies Chen's notion of de-conditionalization. She observes that when one says *If you don't mind the expression, he is a real bully*, the parenthetical no longer acts as a condition on the propositional content of the adjoined clause but rather on the act of saying itself. The utterance can be paraphrased 'If you don't mind the speaker using the expression "bully," the speaker will use it'. Thus, the consequent of the condition must be supplied through "pragmatic enrichment . . . in which the proposition expressed is integrated into an assumption schema of the form *the speaker says that P*" (1678). In the case of *if you will*, pragmatic enrichment provides the apodosis *the speaker will use the term*. Furthermore, the shift in meaning from 'if you wish to call it that' to 'if I may be allowed to call it that' which Shapiro and Shapiro (1993) see as "relatively recent" seems to be inherent in the pragmatic enrichment necessary to interpret the metalinguistic use of *if you will*. Looking at an early example of metalinguistic *if you will* such as example (11b) *A straunge maladie . . . if you wilt, A Martiredom*, it is clear, given the change in speakers, that the speaker is saying not 'if you wish to use the term "matiredom"' but rather 'if you will allow me to use the term "martiredom."' The shift from the metalinguistic to the general hedging function can be explained in a similar fashion: if one is calling X Y (if one is calling the *maladie* a *matiredom*), then it can be inferred that one is claiming, at least tentatively, that X is Y (that the *maladie* is a *matiredom*). This implicature allows the originally metalinguistic form to be extended to non-metalinguistic contexts and serve as a general hedge on the speaker's claims.

According to Chen (1998), de-conditionalization is an instance of degrammaticalization.[10] Yet the development of *if you will* shows many of the hallmarks of grammaticalization. *If you will* becomes fixed and fused and functions as a unified whole. Apart from the variation between *thou* and *you* in earlier English (and present-tense inflected forms of *will*), the phase seems to be entirely invariant.

[10] It is not clear to me in what respect this change represents "degrammaticalization" as Chen defines it (1998:23) as the *if*-clause neither acquires a "lexical function" nor falls into disuse.

The *OED* quotation bank, for example, yields only one example of parenthetical *if you would*, and it is used in a literal sense:

(25) Yeah; that'd be really swell, **if you would** (1965 Lurie, *The Nowhere City* IV. xxi. 237 [*OED*]).

More evidence of the fixing of this phrase is the fact that *will* is functioning in its earlier sense as a main verb (rather than auxiliary) here. Contra Chen, it could be argued that the de-conditionalization that *if you will* undergoes is not degrammaticalization but decategorialization. That is, although on one level it functions as the protesis to an implicit apodesis (which must be supplied by pragmatic enrichment, see above), on the surface it functions more like an illocutionary adverbial such as *frankly* or *seriously*. That is, it loses its clausal qualities (such as the ability to take complements, be modified by an adverbial, and so on) and functions as a disjunct adverbial, or comment clause. Like all grammaticalizations, we see this change occurring in a localized context, that of directives. Once grammaticalized, *if you will* is no longer restricted to such contexts but spreads to non-directive contexts; i.e., it undergoes "syntactic expansion" (Himmelmann 2004:33).

Most importantly, the semantic changes undergone by *if you will* are characteristic of grammaticalization. The meaning changes from literal and concrete, i.e., relating to action ('if you are willing [to do so]') to more abstract and metalinguistic, i.e., relating to language ('if you are willing [to say so]', 'if you will allow me [to say so]'). There is also a change from propositional to non-propositional meaning. In non-parenthetical cases, such as *If you will wash the dishes, I will dry them*, *if you will* clearly contributes to propositional meaning; *if you will* cannot be deleted without altering the meaning of the utterance. In parenthetical cases, even in concrete cases, such as *Wash the dishes, if you will, and I will dry them*, it could be argued that the parenthetical does not contribute to propositional meaning. It has taken on a non-referential function, a pragmatic function, and serves purposes of negative politeness. *If you will* functions as a means of negative politeness, a redressive action addressed to the hearer's negative face (Brown and Levinson 1987 [1978]:129). By making the hearer's willingness to perform the action expressed in the directive conditional (*if you will*), the speaker employs the strategy which Brown and Levinson characterize as 'Don't coerce [the hearer],' or more specifically, 'Don't assume [the hearer] is willing/able to do [the action]" (172).[11] The expression is strongly hearer-oriented. The non-propositional and pragmatic function of *if you will* is perhaps even clearer in its metalinguistic role. One could also argue that, like illocutionary adverbials and parentheticals, *if you will* is non-truth-conditional (Ifantidou 2001). *If you will* undergoes subjectification and intersubjectification, as is characteristic of grammaticalization.

[11] In attempting to explain the use of the subjunctive *Would you/could you (pass the salt?)* in indirect directives (as opposed to *Will you/can you [pass the salt?]*), Searle (1975:78–79) suggests an underlying *if you will* or *if you please*.

It changes from a form which is entirely hearer-oriented ('if you are willing to do so,' 'if you are willing to say so') to one which is subjective ('if I may say so')[12] and then, more often, intersubjective ('if you will allow me to say so'). The speaker realizes that the terminology used might not be acceptable to the hearer and inserts *if you will* as a means of smoothing the way for its acceptance. As Quirk *et al*. (1985:1095) note, an expression such as *if you will* "explicitly or implicitly calls for the hearer's agreement." Finally, as a politeness marker with intersubjective meaning, the scope of *if you will* expands from local to global, a change we see in the grammaticalization of pragmatic markers generally.

In comparison with *as it were*, the grammaticalization of *if you will* is in a fairly early stage. Because of its appearance much later, only in the EModE period, we see more evidence of "divergence" (Hopper 1991), that is, the continued existence of *if you will* in its original meaning and function. We also see a greater variety of related forms such as *if you like/ if you please*.[13] An additional sign of the early stage of its grammaticalization is its restriction, to a large extent, to spoken contexts.

7.6.2 The development of as it were

Metalinguistic *as it were* originated in a clause of hypothetical comparison 'as if it were NP' in late Old English/early Middle English, possibly influenced by Latin *quasi*. How does this adverbial clause come to be reanalyzed as parenthetical and what becomes of the NP complement?

Syntactically, it seems as if the complement of *were* is reanalyzed as an appositive. We see how this might be possible in an example such as (18b), repeated below. That is, *a pricke* is reanalyzed as an appositive to *a pipe*, leaving a free-standing *as hit were*:

(18) b. The gnatte . . . haþ in his mouþ a pipe, **as hit were** a pricke, and þerwiþ he þurleþ þe fleische for to souke þe blood (a1398 John of Trevisa, *Bartholomaeus's De Proprietatibus Rerum* (Add 27944) 147a/a [*MED*]).
'the gnat . . . has in his mouth a pipe as it were a prick and therewith he pierces the flesh in order to suck the blood'

Once this reanalysis occurs, *as it were* becomes syntactically independent (parenthetical) and is free to move. As the examples cited in this chapter show (such as 6b–e), *as it were* frequently occurs in the position following the word it qualifies.

[12] Thus, in contrast to Shapiro and Sharipo (1993; see above), I argue that the development of *if you will* does not represent an obliteration or abnegation of self, but initially shows an increase in subjectification followed by intersubjectification. Only in the sense that *if you will* serves purposes of negative politeness and concerns itself with the "face" of the addressee could it be said to represent anti-subjectivity.

[13] I am grateful to Graeme Trousdale for this point.

Semantically, the meaning of hypothetical comparison of the original structure is preserved in the metalinguistic use, as we can see in (18a), repeated below:

(18) a. The tunge of a bacbyter es, **as it wer**, a thre-egged swerde that slee3 thre soules wyth oon stroke (c1450 *Speculum Christiani (2)* (Hrl 6580) 60/31 [*MED*]).
'the tongue of the backbiter is, as it were, a three-edged sword that slays three souls with one stroke'

Here, the tongue of the backbiter is being compared (figuratively) to a three-edged sword. This meaning of comparison explains the common use of *as it were* with metaphors, clichés, and unusual or unfamiliar words. The development of the pragmatic marker *like* (e.g., *and there were* ***like*** *people blocking, you know*?) from prepositional and conjunctive *like* presents an analogous change. Romaine and Lange note that the meaning of 'similar to' in *like* persists; the pragmatic marker "invites the hearer to infer a comparison, either actual or hypothetical, between what follows it and something preceding it" (1991:246, 244).

As *as it were* develops it become increasingly fixed and fused; particularly telling of this ossification is the preservation of the subjunctive verb form *were*.[14] A further sign of this fixing is the development of indefinite or general meaning in *it*; *it* no longer has anaphoric reference. We even find cases in which *as it were* continues to have comparative meaning ('as if it were') but in which *it/hit* does not agree with its referent:

(26) a. At Glyndalkan aboute þe oratorie of Seint Keynewyn wilewys bere apples **as it were** appel treen, and bee more holsom an sauory (1387 John of Trevisa, *Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden* tr. 1387 (Rolls series 1865–86) I. 365 [*MED*]).
'at Glyndalkan around the oratory of Saint Kenwyn willows bear apples as if it [they] were apple trees and be more wholesome and savory'

b. Embrouded was he, **as it were** a meede Al ful of fresshe floures. whyte and reede (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* A.Prol. 89–90 [Benson]).
'Embroidered was he as if it [he] were a meadow all full of fresh flowers, white and red'

c. Fro man to man a-boute he skyppis; Thei fel afftir him **as hit were** shepis (c1425 (c1400) *Laud Troy Book* (LdMisc 595) 9694 [*MED*]).
'from man to man about he skips, they fell in after him as if it [they] were sheep'

[14] A fixed expression with the indicative, *as it was*, with the meaning 'as things were, as was the case' first appears in the nineteenth century.

As it was, I came off with a fit of the mange, and it was a good escape (1822 W. Scott, *Familiar Letters* 4 Sept. (1894) II. xviii. 149 [*OED*]).

d. Þu myssespendist þi tyme; þu ȝeuist þe to bying & selling . . . **as it wer** a man of þe werld (a1438 Kempe, *The Book of Margery Kempe,* Book 1 *A* (Add 61823) 127/23 [*MED*]).
'you misspend your time; you give yourself to buying and selling . . . as if it [you] were a man of the world'

During the process of grammaticalization, *as it were*, like *if you will*, loses its clausal qualities and becomes particle-like, functioning as a disjunct adverbial, or comment clause. It undergoes decategorialization. It also loses its propositional and truth-conditional meaning, as is expected of pragmatic markers.

As it were does not acquire the subjective[15] and intersubjective qualities of *if you will*; it is much more impersonal in meaning. Nonetheless, it still serve purposes of negative politeness; by inserting *as it were*, the speaker seeks to lessen the imposition of his or her phraseology (and the beliefs or opinions implied by this phraseology) on the hearer.

As it were is a device falling under Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]:131) second strategy of negative politeness: avoid "presuming or assuming that anything . . . is desired or believed by [the hearer]" (144). Specifically, it is one of the numerous adverbial clauses found in English that serve to hedge illocutionary force (162) by suspending the sincerity conditions. In its impersonal nature, *as it were* also falls under Brown and Levinson's seventh strategy of negative politeness: impersonalize the speaker and hearer; avoid *I* and *you* (190ff.). In this respect, it contrasts markedly from *if you will*, which centrally involves both speaker and hearer. It might be argued that the impersonal nature of *as it were* permits it to have a stronger focusing function than *if you will*. Both the advanced grammaticalization of *as it were* and its impersonal nature account for its extension beyond oral (and interpersonal) texts to a full range of genres.

7.7 Conclusion

If you will and *as it were* are comment clauses with metalinguistic meaning[16] serving purposes of negative politeness in Present-day English. Parenthetical *if you will* typically occurred in directive contexts in Old English and Middle English and focused on the action to be carried out. This function continues to be common in Present-day English. The first examples of metalinguistic *if you will* appeared in the sixteenth century. Semantic shifts in this expression involved implicational changes from 'if you are willing to do so' to 'if you are willing to say so' to 'if I may be allowed to say so' and 'if you will allow me to say so.' *As it were* originated as a clause of hypothetical comparison meaning 'as if it were NP.' This usage died out in the sixteenth century. Metalinguistic (and parenthetical) uses appeared

[15] It could be argued that the subjunctive mood expressed by *were* is intrinsically subjective.

[16] See Kay (1983) for an analysis of the non-finite comment clause *loosely speaking*, which serves a variety of metalinguistic functions.

in late Old English/early Middle English, possibly influenced by Latin *quasi*. Both forms undergo grammaticalization (fixing and fusion, desemanticization, decategorialization, acquisition of pragmatic/politeness functions), although *as it were* is in a more advanced stage of grammaticalization than *if you will*. *If you will* seems to have more subjective/intersubjective functions, while *as it were* is more impersonal.

8 Comment clauses with *look*

8.1 Introduction

In Present-day English, parenthetical *look* occurs with pragmatic meaning, as exemplified in (1):

(1) a. "**Look**," he said, deciding to trust her, "can I tell you something?" (1991 Kelly, *The Forest of the Night* 889 [BNC]).
b. "**Look**, if you don't mind, Sue, I'd rather we skipped the biographical stuff" (1985–94 *Punch* 1296 [BNC]).
c. "**Look**, writers aren't perfect, I want to cry; any more than husbands and wives are perfect" (1985 Barnes, *Flaubert's Parrot* 510 [BNC]).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of imperative forms of *look* as comment clauses. Following an examination of *look*-forms in Present-day English (§8.2), this chapter will survey the history of these forms (§8.3), focusing on the variant forms of *look* (§8.3.1–§8.3.3). The syntactic and semantic development of *look*-forms will be considered (§8.4), with the form *lookit* receiving separate treatment (§8.4.2). A comparison will be made to similar developments in other sensory verbs (§8.5). The last section (§8.6) puts the development of *look*-forms in the context of grammaticalization studies.

8.2 *Look* and its variants in Present-day English

Parenthetical *look* can be found in a variety of forms in Present-day English:

(2) a. **Look**, my Bill doesn't include any blanket condemnation of unofficial strikes (1969 *Listener* 614/1 1 May [*OED*]).
b. "**Now look**, I'll come with you. Pass me the torch, Mick. Now we'll see what's going on" (1991 Herbert, *Railway Ghosts and Phantoms* [BNC]).
c. "**Look here**, Mr. Percival: youre not supposed to insult my sister" (1914 Shaw, *Misalliance* 86 [*OED*]).
d. "**Now look here**. You want to copy these letters in here" (1913 Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers* [UofV]).

e. "**Look, you**," he said, finally turning to the chief inspector, "what do you think you're doing?" (1991 Barnes, *A Midsummer Killing* [BNC]).
f. But **look ye**, Starbuck, what is said in heat, that thing unsays itself (1851 Melville, *Moby Dick* p. 162 [UofV]).
g. "What is good enough for granfer is good enough for us, **look'ee**" (1930 *Daily Express* 10/3 [*OED*]).
h. "forsooth! Why, **look thee**, hadst thou been other than thou art, I would have had thee whipped out of my house" (1891 Pyle, *Men of Iron* [UofV]).
i. "**Looky here** . . . Burn it all, all I was tryin' to do was see what she'd do flat out on an open road" (1943 Dickson, *She Died a Lady* v. 38 [*OED*]).
j. "**Lookyhere**, Tom, do you know what day it is?" (1876 Twain, *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* [UofV]).
k. "**Look-a-here**, child, what are you talking about?" (1912 Porter, *Pollyanna* [UofV]).
l. "**Lookit**. I'm local and I know the way of things here" (1987 Anthony, *No Enemy but Time* 362 [BNC]).

While corpus evidence suggests that some of these forms (particularly *lookit, lookyhere,* and *lookahere*) are restricted to (North) American English, and are perhaps regional, others, especially *(now) look (here)* and *lookee (here)* are found commonly in British English as well.

As the examples in (2) illustrate, this use of *look* occurs predominately in initial position.

8.2.1 The meaning of pragmatic look-*forms*

Though many dictionaries ignore the pragmatic marker use of *look* completely, the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* lists *look* (also *look here*) as an "interjection" which calls attention or expresses a protest; *lookit* is also described as an interjection "demanding attention or expostulating" (def. 1), while *looky* is an intransitive verb "demanding attention." Likewise, the *OED* has an entry for *lookit*, describing it as an interjection with the meaning "Listen!," and recognizes idiomatic uses of the imperative of *look* (s.v. *look* v., def. I4), including the forms *look you, look'ee, look here, looky here,* and *look-a-here,* "used to bespeak attention: = 'see,' 'behold,' 'lo.'" The most recent edition of Fowler's *Modern English Usage* (Burchfield [3]1996:469) sees *look you, look here* (also *looky here, look-ahere*), and *lookit* as a "way of bespeaking attention," equivalent to 'Listen!.' The *Dictionary of American Regional English* (*DARE*) lists *lookee* (*lookie, look(e)y*) and *lookat/lookit*, but attaches no meaning to these forms. The *English Dialect Dictionary* records an interjection *look* used as "an exclamation of lamentation, doubt, or uncertainty; an expletive used parenthetically with little meaning" as well as a variety of expressions, including *lookee de zee, look thee but,* and *look*

ya/ye/yo(u), all "used to call attention to anything: behold, lo, see" (s.v. *look*, defs. 10 and 12).[1]

In a study of the attention-getting function, Romero Trillo (1997) argues that speakers use attention-getting markers when they feel that they are not being listened to or when they want to emphasize an important part of their utterance (208). Romero Trillo finds that verbs meaning 'look' and 'listen' in their attention-getting function are much less common in English than in Spanish (219). He suggests that the lower rate of usage (by a factor of ten) may be explained by social constraints on the use of these forms in the formal register, or by the fact that the written form itself is a guarantor of attention.

The literature on pragmatic markers, while concurring for the most part that *look* is an attention-getter, proposes a number of other functions. Keller and Warner (1979:8) categorize *look* and *lookit* (as well as *now, now really, listen, of course, well, you know,* and *you see*) as casual attention-getting openers; they also see *look* as an expansion link which restates the subject and has the sense of "getting it straight" (1976:24). Fraser (1988:27–28) designates *look*, along with forms such as *heh, listen, now, say, see,* or *here,* as a topic marker with the specific function of refocusing on part of the topic at hand. Stenström (1994:39–40, 74) classifies *look (now)* with *heh* and *listen* as exponents of the communicative act of "Alert," whose function is to attract the other party's attention. While not explicitly discussing *look*, Schiffrin (1987:243) cites *now look* as an example of *now* in its function of focusing attention on the speaker's new move in contrast to what has preceded.

A discussion of *lookit* on the American Dialect Society Discussion List, as well as brief mention by William Safire in his column on language in the *New York Times Magazine* (1999), suggests that there is an exasperated or even aggressive tone to *look(it)*. This subjective/expressive aspect is expressed in various sources: the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* points to the *look*-forms "demanding," rather than merely asking for, attention; Keller and Warner observe that *look* has the sense of 'fighting back' (1976:24); and Stenström claims that Alerts are louder and higher in pitch than the surrounding discourse and act as excellent interruptors (1994:74). Schourup (2004:554) explains the note of "harshness, urgency, or exasperation" by analogy with set exclamatory expressions such *dammit, fuck it, screw it,* or *watch it*.

As comment clauses, *look*-forms thus seem to have an interpersonal or intersubjective function, meaning something like 'pay attention,' 'heed me,' or 'listen (up).' They function as an appeal to the listener to pay attention to ('listen carefully to me when I say . . . '), accept the premise of ('believe me when I say . . . '), or perform the action requested in the following proposition. They can be understood as expressing epistemic certainty and strengthening the argumentative position of the speaker, thus operating both on a scale of epistemic

[1] The equation of *look* in this use with "empty" forms such as "lo" and "behold" and the description of it as a filler or expletive are suggestive of its status as a pragmatic marker.



Figure 8.1 Meaning of parenthetical *look* in PDE

commitment and on a scale of rhetorical strength (see Schwenter and Traugott 2000).

It should be noted that the *look*-parenthetical forms may retain literal (perceptual) meaning. However, the literal meaning is definitely the minority form. A random sampling of 100 examples of *look* in the BNC and the Strathy Corpus yielded the results presented in Figure 8.1.[2]

Lookit is more likely than parenthetical *look* to carry a literal sense, namely, 'look at (something or someone)' (see *OED*: s.v. *lookit*, def. b; Burchfield [3]1996: s.v. *look*). This is the form common in children's language, as in *Lookit the funny man, Mommy*.[3]

8.2.2 Morphosyntactic origins of look*-forms*

The origins of all of the *look*-forms, apart from *lookit,* would appear to be relatively unproblematic. An initial hypothesis would be the following:

(a) *(now) look (here)* is originally the imperative form of the verb with optional adverbials;
(b) *look ye/look'ee/looky* derives from imperative *look* + the second-person plural *ye/you* (pronounced [yə]) and perhaps *thee* by analogy; and
(c) *lookyhere/lookahere* is likely a contraction of *look* + *ye* + *here*.[4]

[2] Searching for *look* with a following comma helped to isolate parenthetical uses of *look*.
[3] Here we might point to the comparable German form *guck mal!*.
[4] The *a* is not an epenthetic vowel (see Mathews 1946:21) or a reduced form of *at* or *on* (see *DARE*: s.v. *look*, def. 1).

The origin of *lookit*, however, is much less clear. The *OED* (s.v. *lookit)* refers to the "arbitrary final element," without suggesting a derivation. A number of different origins for *lookit* have been proposed:[5]

(3) a. look at it > lookit
b. look ye > looky > lookit
c. look at > lookit

Schourup (2004:549–551) explores all three possibilities before opting for *look at* as the source of *lookit.* The first source (a) is semantically and phonologically plausible, but he admits that this proposal would require *lookit* to be derived, via reanalysis, from more elaborate structures such as *look at it this way* or *look at it from our point of view*, which would be odd (549–551). Derivation (b) from *look ye*, though showing some parallels with forms such as *dammit,* would be "phonologically convoluted." The third source (c) *look at* would thus seem the most credible source, according to Schourup. *DARE* (s.v. *look*, def. 2) suggests that *lookit* is a "pronunciation spelling" deriving from *look at*, but none of the examples it cites contains the supposed source *lookat.* Schourup (2004:552–555) admits that *look at* without an object would be "deviantly incomplete," but he suggests that the reduced form *lookit* was reanalyzed as an independent verb (a "semantically complete marker"), pointing to non-standard uses such as *Lookit at that, Eddie!*, and uses in child language such as *Lookit, Mommy!*[6]

Following an examination of the data below, I am going suggest a derivation which has more historical support.

8.3 The dating of *look*-forms

8.3.1 Matrix look

In Old English and Middle English, the form that most resembles the current pragmatic marker use of *look* is non-literal imperative *looke* with a following nominal clause in the sense 'to see to it (that sth. take place or not take place), take care' (see *MED*: s.v. *lōken*, def. 9; see also *OED*: s.v. *look* v., def. I3b). The nominal clause is preceded by a variety of subordinating conjunctions, including *that, what, how, whan (that), who (that)*, and *which*, as shown by the examples

[5] Members of the American Dialect Society Discussion List suggest other, less plausible origins, including: (a) *look here > lookit here*; (b) *look at this > lookit this > lookit*; (c) *look at me when I'm talking to you > look at me > lookit*. One participant suggests that *-it* has nothing to do with the pronoun *it*.

[6] Schourup (2004:552) does not find the lack of an attested univerbated form *lookat* to pose a problem for this analysis because he claims that reduction occurred before fusion. However, there are other reasons for rejecting this hypothesis (see below).

in (4). However, the conjunction may also be omitted, as in the ME examples given in (5). The subject of the subordinate clause is frequently second person, as exemplified by additional ME examples in (6):

(4) a. **loca þæt** þu ne offrige þine lac on ælcre stowe (10th c. Theodulf of Orleans, *Capitula* 11.371.1 [DOEC]).
'look that you not offer your sacrifice in every place'
b. þonne **loca** ðu her **hu** þu scealt þin gear rihtlice gefadian (*Rules for Finding Movable Feasts* 1.1 [DOEC]).
'then look you here how you shall rightly arrange your year'
c. **Looke that** thyn herte be murie everemo (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* B.NP 2815 [Benson]).
'look that your heart be merry ever more'
d. **Looke** wel **that** ye unto no vice assente (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* C.Phs 87 [Benson]).
'look well that you agree to no vice'
e. **Looke how that** vertuouse wordes and hooly conforten hem that travaillen in the service of Crist (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* I.Pars 652 [Benson]).
'look how virtuous and holy words comfort them who work in the service of Christ'

(5) a. Nou **loke** anon thou be withdrawe (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 5.2812 [*MED*]).
'now look at once you be withdrawn'
b. Bot **lok** thou dele noght withal (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 1.1225 [*MED*]).
'but look you do not deal therewith'
c. Bot **loke** wel thou noght despise / Thin oghne lif (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* 8.436–37 [*MED*]).
'but look well you do not despise your own life'

(6) a. **Loke ye** do it well in wrytt (1460 *Towneley Mysteries* vii. 106 [*OED*]).
'look you do it well in writing'
b. **look ye** take no discomfort, for there nis no bands of knights under heaven but we shall be able to grieve them as much as they may us (1470 Malory, *Le Morte Darthur* [UofV]).
'see you take no discomfort'
c. and **look ye** be at Mawtby wyth me (1420–1504 *Paston Letters, Part 1* [UofV]).
'and see you be at Mawthby with me'

In Early Modern English, non-literal, imperative *look* with a following nominal clause (with or without subordinating conjunction) continues to occur. As Schmidt (1971 [1902]:s.v. *look*) notes, this form of *look* is often "used to lay some stress on what one is going to say":



Figure 8.2 Imperative *look* in ME and EModE

(7) a. make me one of your sorte! and **loke, what** that I can doo for you (c1555 Mowntane, *The Autobiography of Thomas Mowntayne* [HC]).
b. **Look that** you take upon you as you should (1593–94 Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew* IV, ii, 109 [Evans]).
c. **Look what** I speak, my life shall prove it true (1595 Shakespeare, *Richard II* I, i, 87 [Evans]).
d. **look when** I am king, claim thou of me / The earldom of Hereford (1592–93 Shakespeare, *Richard III* III, i, 194–195 [Evans]).
e. **looke** thou come to mee to morrow morning (1619 Deloney, *The Novels of Thomas Deloney* 77 [HC]).

The constructions *look* + *that*-clause and *look* + *wh*-clause are archaic in Present-day English (*OED*:s.v. *look* v., defs. I3b and 13d), the last example of the latter dating from 1692.[7]

Figures for the syntax of imperative *look* in Middle English and Early Modern English in the Helsinki Corpus are presented in Figure 8.2. One can see a large decline in the occurrence of *look* + (*that*-)clauses and a smaller decline in the occurrence of *look* + *wh*-clauses. Increase in the use of *look* + PP/NP/Adv

[7] *Look* may still be followed by a *wh*-clause when it has literal meaning 'to apply one's sight to ascertain (*who, what, how, whether*, etc.)' (see *OED*:s.v. *look* v., def. I2a). The *OED* notes that this is "Now only used when the question is regarded as capable of being answered at a single glance."

in Early Modern English relates primarily to literal uses of *look*, though some examples of non-literal *look* (in the sense 'consider') can be found:

(8) a. ye that be prelates **loke** well to your office, for right prelatynge is busye labourynge and not lordyng (1549 Latimer, *Sermon on the Ploughers* 24 [HC]).
b. **Look** then a little further, and see if this Trugh can be proved more firly thus, to wit, that there cannot be two sovereign Goods which differ in themselves (1695 Preston, *Boethius' On the Consolation of Philosophy* 136 [HC]).

8.3.2 Parenthetical look you/ye/thee/thou > lookee

In Early Modern English, examples of *look you* used parenthetically with non-literal meaning become frequent:[8]

(9) a. There, an't shall please you, a foolish mild man, an honest man, **look you**, and soon dash'd (1594–95 Shakespeare, *Love's Labor's Lost* V, ii, 580–582 [Evans]).
b. **Look you**, if you take the matter otherwise than is meant, Captain Macmorris, . . . (1599 Shakespeare, *Henry V* III, ii, 125 [Evans]).
c. **Look you**, she lov'd her kinsman Tybalt dearly, / And so did I (1595–96 Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* III, iv, 3–4 [Evans]).
d. *L.C.J.* **Look you**, Friend, you say you went with Col. *Penruddock* to search the House, did you find anybody there? (1685 *The Trial of Lady Alice Lisle* IV, 120C1 [HC]).

This form can still be found in certain varieties of Present-day English.[9] Early Modern English also provides similar examples of parenthetical non-literal *look ye* (which survives into the nineteenth century in American English) (10a) and *look thee* (with sporadic modern examples) (10b); however, I have found only LModE examples of *look thou* (10c), an obvious archaism:

(10) a. "Why, **look ye**, we must collogue sometimes, forswear sometimes" (1604 Marston and Webster, *Malcontent* v. ii [*OED*]).
Look ye, Mr. *Reynard*, The *Woodcocks* of *Kent* are an Ancient Family, and were the first that oppos'd *William* the Conquerour (1703 Baker, *The Tunbridge-walks* I, i [ED]).
"**Look ye** here," says he; "let's argue the insult" (1851 Melville, *Moby Dick* Ch. 31, 143 [UofV]).
b. **Look thee**, 'tis so. Thou singly honest man . . . (1607–8 Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens* IV, iii, 523 [Evans]).

[8] Of the seventeen examples of *look you* in the HC (see Figure 8.2), eight contain *you.*

[9] *Look, you two* is quite natural in current English: "Now **look you two**, I'm having none of that in the back of my cab!" (1991 Ripley, *Angel Hunt* [BNC]).

Look thee, Sweetheart, the World's an Ass, and Common Fame a Common Strumpet (1684 Otway, *The Atheist* II [ED]).
Why, **look thee**, *Edward Chip*, thou may'st be mistaken in me, I can conform in many things, rather than leave so good a House, and so good People (1731 Coffey, *The Devil to Pay* III, iii [ED]).
But, **look thee** here, my girl; my man's an old friend too (1863 Trollope, *Rachel Ray* Vol. 2, 72–73 [UofV]).

c. **Look thou**, underling! that thou obeyest mine (1851 Melville, *Moby Dick* Ch. 134, 612 [UofV]).

All of these expressions may continue to be used parenthetically with concrete meaning, as in (11):

(11) a. this most excellent canopy, the air, **look you**, this brave o'erhanging firmament (1600–01 Shakespeare, *Hamlet* II, ii, 299–301 [Evans]).
b. **Look ye** how they change! / Their cheeks are paper (1599 Shakespeare, *Henry V* II, ii, 73–74 [Evans]).
c. Here's a sight for thee; **look thee**, a bearing-cloth for a squire's child (1610–11 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale* III, iii, 114–116 [Evans]).
d. **Look you**, hereabout it was that she kennel'd; **look you**, here it was indeed, for here's her young ones, no less than five (1676 Walton, *The Compleat Angler* [HC]).

Univerbated and phonologically reduced *lookee* (alternately spelled *look'ye, lookye, look-ee, look'ee,* and *looky*) appears for the first time in Late Modern English. The earliest examples that I have found are late seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries (12a). It continues to appear throughout the eighteenth century in various forms (12b). The reduced form occurs commonly in collocation with *here* (occasionally *there, yonder*) in the nineteenth century. It is a favorite expression in Charles Dickens and Mark Twain (12c–d). The latest examples are from the early twentieth century (12e):

(12) a. **lookee**, I don't fear ye, and if you'll do any thing upon the square, say the word, I'm ready (1697 D'Urfey, *A New Opera, Call'd Clinthia and Endimion* V 83–85 [ED]).
"**Look'ee** Serjeant, no Coaxing, no Wheedling, d'ye see" (1706 Farquhar, *Recruiting Officer* i. i [*OED*]).
Look'ye, Madam, I'm none of your *Romantik* Fools, that fight Gyants and Monsters for nothing (1707 Farquhar, *The Beaux Stratagem* 65 [HC]).
b. **Looky**! Lord Bishop in Behalf of my Neighbours, Countrymen, and Friends, now present, I speak (1746 Macklin, *Henry the VII* IV, iii , 29–31 [ED]).
Lookye, old gentleman, / If you've a liking to them, you must down / With the hard money (1767 Thornton, *The Shipwreck* III, iv, 40–42 [ED]).

c. "Now **lookee here**," he said, "the question being whether you're to be let to live" (1861 Dickens, *Great Expectations* Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 37 [UofV]).
d. "**Looky here**, Bilgewater, what'r you referrin' to?" (1884 Twain, *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* [UofV]).
e. **Looky here**! Ye'd oughtn't said that, Eben (1925 O'Neill, *Desire under the Elms* [*OED*]).

An interesting development of this collocation is the unified form *lookahere* (*look-a-here*) or *lookyhere* found in American sources (see *DARE*: s.v. *look*, def. 1) in the nineteenth century:[10]

(13) a. And now **look-a-here**; you ain't got no manner of business foolin' around here just now (1895 Crane, *The Man and Some Others* [UofV]).
b. "**Lookyhere**, Huck, what fools we're making of ourselves" (1876 Twain, *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* [UofV]).

Again, all of the *lookee*-forms retain their concrete meanings in other contexts:[11]

(14) a. This rite concluded, the visitor's eye fell upon the basket deposited by Della. He emitted tokens of pleasure. "**Looky! Looky! Looky there**! That ain't any good pile o'stuff – oh no!" (1914 Tarkington, *Penrod* Ch. XIII, p. 97 [UofV]).
b. **Look a here**; I've got a pair a earbobs and a handkercher pin I'm a goin' to give you (1863 Alcott, "A Day," *Hospital Sketches and Camp Fireside Stories* [UofV]).
c. I'm a-waiting for your reply. I'm a tremblin', miss. **Lookye here**. (Holding out his hand.) (1903 Gilbert, *Ruddigore* I [ED]).

Clear parallels to *lookee* are found in the British dialect forms *sithee* (also *sithe*) < *see thou* and *seesta* < *seest thou*; these are defined as "an exclamation used to attract attention, or for emphasis . . . freq. used as a mere expletive" (see *English Dialect Dictionary*: s.v. *sithee* and *seesta*). However, the *OED* (s.v. *see* v., def. BI5f) observes that this form is unrecorded in Middle English and is "apt to be confused with the interrogative *see you?* do you see?."

[10] Mathews (1946:21) argues against *a-here* as an Americanism, pointing out that it is simply *-ee here* in a "slightly different form."

[11] These forms can still be found in colloquial Present-day English, for example, a variant of the *boogie board* (small surfboard) is the *looky board*, which has a small window in it through which one can view the sealife underneath. A related form may be the noun *lookyloo*, an Americanism denoting 'a person who views something for sale with no genuine intention of making a purchase' (*OED*: s.v. *lookyloo*), as in: *In good weather, there can be a steady stream of tire-kickers and lookee-loos checking out the iron, talking cars, haggling or just hanging out* (2006 *The Globe and Mail*, May 25 p. G.13 [CNS]). However, the *OED* sees the *-y-* here as a diminutive suffix, not a reduction of *ye*.

8.3.3 Parenthetical look ({here, now})

The *MED* (s.v. *lōken*, def. 4c) recognizes a distinct use of imperative *lok (her)* meaning 'look here!, see here!, behold!, lo!' ME and EModE examples appear to be primarily literal in meaning (15a–e):[12]

(15) a. Lo Abigayl, by good conseil how she / Saved hir housbonde Nabal whan that he / Sholde han be slayn; and **looke**, Ester also / By good conseil delyvered out of wo / The peple of God (1392–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* E.Mch 1369–1373 [Benson]).
'lo Abigail, on account of good advice, how she saved her husband Nabel when he should have been slain, and look, Esther also on account of good advice delivered the people of God from woe'

b. **Loke here**, dame, vn-loke your dur; a-lacke we haue no lykur (1500 *Is tell yw* 3 [*MED*]).
'look here, woman, unlock your door; alas we have no liquor'

c. Lo, heir he faileis, se thar he leis, **luik**! (1513 Douglas, *The xiii Bukes of Eneados of the Famose Poete Virgill* Exclamatioun 18 [*OED*]).
'lo here he falls, see where he lies, look!'

d. **Looke**, **looke**, poore Foole, / She has left the Rumpe vncouer'd too (1630 Middleton, *A Chaste Maid in Cheapside* [HC]).

e. **look, look,** you may see all busie, men and dogs, dogs and men, all busie (1653–76 Walton, *The Compleat Angler* 210 [HC]).

f. *Ma*. Lo, thy Hand-maid is even here.
Dame. **Look, look**, I say, nay, again I say unto thee, **look**, nay, Administer as a Holy Sister ought unto thy Master (1684–87 *Pepys' Penny Merriments* 150 [HC]).

It is significant, however, that *looke* in (15a) and (15c) alternates in a series with another pragmatic marker, *lo*. The literal meaning is weakened in (15f), which dates from the last part of the EModE period.

It is only in Late Modern English that uses of parenthetical *look*, *look here*, and *look now* with non-literal meaning become common:[13]

(16) a. 'tis as impossible for thee to want a Friend, as – as – **look now**, I can't do't for the soul of me (1701 D'Urfey, *The Bath, or, The Western Lass* I, i [ED]).

b. Well, well – hear me, pettish boy, hear me. Why, **look now**, thou dost not attend (1796 Colman, *The Iron Chest*, I, ii [ED]).

c. **Look here**! Let's send the kid down by the porch to reconnoitre (1815 Grahame, *The Golden Age* [UofV]).

[12] Of the seventeen examples in the Early Modern English section of the HC (see Figure 8.2), only five are non-literal, three of which contain *look you*.

[13] See also §6.4 on the development of imperative *see*.

d. "**Look**, Madame Crawley, you were always *bon enfant*, and I have an interest in you, *parole d'honneur*" (1848 Thackeray, *Vanity Fair* lxiv [*OED*]).
e. Now, **look here**! I am going to tell you something that will surprise you (1859 Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities* [UofV]).

8.3.4 Univerbated lookit

The form *lookit* (generally spelled as a single word) appears in the early part of the twentieth century primarily in North American texts.

(17) a. **Lookit**. Can't you come back and stay with me? (1922 Lewis, *Babbitt* [UofV]).
b. **Lookit,** listen to me (1926 *Society for Pure English Tract* xxiv. 124 [*OED*]).
c. **Lookit,** Tracy: don't you think you've done enough notes for one day? (1939 Barry, *Philadelphia Story* 6 [*DARE*: s.v. *look*, def. 2]).
d. **Lookit**, kids. I'll be in and buy you a drink, soon as you get settled in your hotel (1940 Lewis, *Bethel Merriday* 224 [*DARE*: s.v. *look*, def. 2]).
e. You'd like to stop and talk to them and say "**Lookit** kids, life isn't a bowl of cherries and straighten up and fly right" (1970 *DARE* Tape CA 185 [*DARE*: s.v. *look*, def. 2]).
f. To illustrate the point, he could hold up your Form 69, on which you waived away every last one of your rights and say, "**Lookit** here, pistonhead . . . " (1991 Simon, *Homicide* [Neufeldt 1999]).
g. Mayor Daley: "Now **look it**. I don't give a goddamned what it is, you vote for anything the president wants . . . " (1999 *San Francisco Examiner* April 11 [ADS-L]).
h. It was a bad day for Prime Minister Paul Martin as well when he had to point out "**Lookit**! Canada is not a police state" (2004 *Canada and the World Backgrounder* [Strathy]).[14]
i. "And if they simply said '**Lookit**, we're going to take you for a drive and we want you to point out certain landmarks if you recall them,' which is what I assumed happened here, that's good police work because it helps them to recall" (2006 *Star – Phoenix* A.6 [CNS]).

For a summary of the dates of appearance of the various *look*-forms, see Figure 8.3.

[14] *Lookit* was apparently a favorite expression of the former Prime Minister of Canada, at least to judge from a letter to the editor which warned: "If Paul Martin says 'Lookit' one more time, I'll scream" (2005 *Globe and Mail* Dec. 14, p. A18 [CNS]).



Figure 8.3 Dating of non-literal imperative *look*-forms

8.4 The development of *look*-forms

8.4.1 Look (you)

Examination of forms of *look* from Middle English to Modern English thus confirms the initial hypothesis that the pragmatic marker originates in a construction with imperative *look* – but with the addition of a subjoined nominal clause introduced either by *that* or a *wh*-word. Semantically, *look* has lost its concrete perceptual meaning in these constructions and has come to mean 'to direct the intellectual eye . . . to turn or fix one's attention or regard' (*OED*:s.v. *look* v., def. I3). Syntactically, the imperative form normally occurs sentence-initially, and the subject of the subordinate clause is frequently second person. Once the subordinating conjunction is omitted, reanalysis, or rebracketing, of the construction occurs; here, the subject of the subordinate clause is adjoined to the matrix clause and reinterpreted as its subject. This rebracketing leads to reversal of the matrix and complement clause and is the source of parenthetical *look you/ye*.

(18) [Look] [{that, whether, how, etc.} you hear me] >
[Look] [you hear me] >
[Look you] [hear me]

In other words, *hear me* changes in status from complement to matrix clause, and *look you/ye* changes its status from matrix clause to parenthetical sentence disjunct. A subsequent step is univerbation of parenthetical *look you/ye* to *looky/look'ee*. Further condensation of the phrase *lookee* + *here* leads to *looka-here/lookyhere*. By this sequence of events, parenthetical *look ye* is first to arise, while parenthetical *look* ({*here, now*}) appears later since it involves an additional change, namely the loss of the subject pronoun.

8.4.2 Lookit

I would like to suggest, however, that *lookit* follows a somewhat different path of development from the other *look*-forms, deriving rather from *look to it*. The construction *look to* + NP goes back to Middle English (see *MED*:s.v. *lōken*; def. 8b; also *OED*:s.v. *look*, def. IV21) and shares with the *look* + subordinate clause construction the non-literal meaning 'to pay attention to, give heed to, to take care of (sth.).' It occurs commonly in the imperative (*OED*:s.v. *look*, def. IV21d). The form of this construction undergoes significant development in Early Modern English: when the complement of *to* is pronominal (namely *it*), it may be reduced to *'t*, and the resulting phrase *look to't* can then be used parenthetically as a sentence disjunct. Note that the context for this change is significant since the pronoun (*it*) can be seen as pointing cataphorically to the following clause, which in the process of the change acquires independent status. While the phrase *look to't* often functions as a command to a servant or subordinate to attend to, or look after, some task, there are instances, even in the earliest records, where it has quite a different sense, functioning as a kind of warning to the listener:

(19) a. **Look to't**, think on't, I do not use to jest (1595–96 Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* III, v, 189 [Evans]).
b. **look to't**. / I know our country disposition well (1604 Shakespeare, *Othello* III, iii, 200–201 [Evans]).
c. For if thou dost, **look to't**, Ile have thee guelded (1647 Fletcher, *The Humorous Lieutenant* II, iv, 236 [ED]).
d. **Look to't**, I'll rowse you and your minions, / Out of St. *Johnses* ere a week be spent (1659 Chettle, *The Blind-Beggar of Bednal-Green* I, 487–488 [ED]).
e. **Look to't**, ye Rascal, and carry things discreetly, or you'll be hang'd, that's certain (1682 Behn, *The City Heiress* [UofV]).

This usage continues into Late Modern English, with eighteenth and nineteenth century examples:[15]

(20) a. obey me in this, or **look to't**; I'll never give you a Groat, no, nor my Blessing neither (1729 Odell, *The Smugglers. A Farce in Three Acts* I, ii [ED]).
b. But – **Look to't**, for if we be not married e'er next morning, By great love that is hid in this small compass, Flavia and myself will steal you both away (1773 Garrick, *Albumazar. A Comedy* V [ED]).

[15] There is a relative scarcity of nineteenth-century examples, perhaps the fault of the corpora that I used. The colloquial nature of *look to't* – evidenced by its appearance primarily in drama – would also account for its rarity in standard printed documents.

c. Look you, execute them better than the last, **look to't** – the count and his companion rest at Kelmar's (1813 Pocock, *The Miller and his Men, A Melo-drama, in Two Acts* I, v [ED]).
d. No sign of Edwin! Dost thou mind thy task? **Look to't**! and when the cakes are fit to turn, Call, and I'll come! (1859 Knowles, *Alfred the Great; or The Patriotic King* II, ii [ED]).

Here, *look to't* has the hallmarks of a pragmatic marker, perhaps even conveying the sense of urgency or exasperatedness of the modern marker. I would suggest that the shift from *look to't* to *lookit* is a case of further phonological reduction.[16]

On the basis of one reference to *lookit* in child language in 1917 (see *OED*:s.v. *lookit*), Schourup (2004:554) argues that *look at* is better motivated, chronologically, as a source for *lookit*. However, I believe that that the much more widely attested *look to't* form, found throughout the EModE and LModE periods provides a stronger basis for the development of *lookit*.[17]

It would be tempting to see *lookit* as involving a reanalysis similar to that seen above, namely, of *look to it* from matrix clause to disjunct and of a *that*-clause from subordinate to matrix clause, as follows:

(21) Look to it that you obey me > look to it you obey me > look to't, you obey me

However, there is little evidence for the starting point for this construction. There are very few early examples of the construction with *that*:[18]

(22) a. and therefore **look to it, that** thou dost not prevaricate with me (1685 *The Trial of Lady Alice Lisle* IV 114C1 [HC]).
b. but for thy own part, **look to't** that I don't meet thee hereafter (1691 D'Urfey, *Love for Money or The Boarding School* V, iii [ED]).

This *lookit* must be distinguished from the *lookit* with concrete perceptual meaning. It seems fairly clear that the literal *lookit* derived from *look at*; the form still functions as an imperative and is followed by the NP object of *at*:[19]

[16] Schourup (2004:548) sees a problem phonologically in the development from *look to't* to *lookit* since there would be no reason for a "robust [u] vowel" to be reduced. He points to the "usual spelling" of *too't* in Shakespeare's plays. Although *too't* is common in the folio and quarto editions, *to't* is also found.

[17] Schourup (2004:555–556) notes that in his proposal the development of *lookit* is not exceptional syntactically since it depends on "the prior development of a marker use for *look*, which presumably itself depended on a rebracketing and reversal," but he admits that "descriptive simplicity" should not be a determining factor in choosing one derivation over another.

[18] The ED corpus, for example, has 187 examples of *look to't* and 158 examples of *look to it*, but only 1 example of each of these constructions followed by a *that*-clause.

[19] Another *look*-pragmatic marker is the following:

"But **look at you**, Mother, you don't fuss at all" (1991 Binchy, *Circle of Friends* [BNC]).

Again, *look* appears to be devoid of its perceptual meaning. The expression serves as an expression of admiration or approval. I hypothesize that it is an elliptical form of *let* {*me, us*} *(have a) look at you*. Note that, if it were a command to the addressee, it would need the reflexive *yourself* rather than *you*.

(23) a. "Hello, **lookit** 'is whiskers," he said genially (1894 Crane, *The Men in the Storm* [UofV]).
b. "**Lookit** this idiot," they will say. "He picked Philly to win the Stanley Cup" (2006 *The Ottawa Citizen* Oct. 4, p. C.12 [CNS]).
c. **Lookit** ol' John Muckler in Ottawa, his hair turning whiter with every loss (2006 *The Gazette* May 15, p. C.1 [CNS]).
d. Conversation dwindled to "wow" and "**lookit** that" as our minivan dipped and climbed between sheer limestone cliffs dyed blood red by iron (2006 *Prince George Citizen* May 13, p. 38 [CNS]).

8.5 Comparison to other sensory verbs

The auditory verbs *hark(en), listen,* and *hear* seem to have undergone developments similar to the perceptual verbs *see* and *look*. All have uses as attention-getting pragmatic markers.[20]

The now rather archaic *hark* bears a striking resemblance to *look* in that it occurs as an attention-getting pragmatic marker in conjunction with the second-person pronoun, *you, ye*, or *thee* (24a–d). Moreover, a phonologically reduced form *harkee* (*hark'ee, harky, harkye*) (see *OED*:s.v. *hark* v., def. 2c) arises contemporaneously with *lookee*. An interesting doubly marked form is (24d). The fused/coalesced form (24d–h) is common in the eighteenth century and occurs sporadically even into the nineteenth century:

(24) a. Come do not hide 'em, for rough objects, **hark ye**, / Ye have betrayd your self, that sigh confirms me (1647 Fletcher, *Love's Pilgrimage* III, iii, 27–28 [ED]).
b. *Aur.* Say I doe. / They will not tire I hope?
Ang. No not with you, **hark you** sweet Lady (1609 Jonson, *The Case is Altered* II, iv, 27–29 [ED]).
c. **Hark thee** *Rafe*, there's money for thee (1679 Beaumont, *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* IV, i, 126 [ED]).
d. "Ho! Here's *Lucy* coming – **Harkee you**, pray, why did you make me / wait so long?" (1700 Centlivre, *The Perjur'd Husband* IV, ii, 4–5 [ED]).
e. Yes, I think I do, and **harkee**, don't you believe because you are a God, that you should play the Devil with me (1697 D'Urfey, *A New Opera, Call'd Cinthea and Endimion* V, 82–83 [ED]).
f. **Hark'ee** lads, I must have no grumbling (1775 Sheridan, *St. Patrick's Day* [*OED*]).
g. But **harky** *Curtius*, by your favour, this is but a / Scurvy tale to carry to your Mistress; /I hope you are not in earnest? (1671 Behn, *The Amorous Prince* III, ii, 81–83 [ED]).

[20] Romero Trillo (1997) muses that visual verbs are better attention-getters than auditory verbs because looking is "emblematic of the close attention that an addressee would pay to a particular object" (220).

h. **Harkye**, fellow, who are all these people/assembled in my antechamber (1813 Cumberland, *The False Demetrius* IV, 163–64 [ED]).

Harkee is recorded as both an American and a British dialect form (*DARE*:s.v.v. *hark*, def. 1b, and *harky*; *English Dialect Dictionary*:s.v. *harky*, def. 1 (2)).

In the modern period, a comparable use of *listen*, though not recorded in dictionaries of contemporary English, can be found in American sources. In some instances, the concrete meaning of *listen* is weakened, and the imperative functions as a kind of attention-getting or truth-asserting pragmatic marker, often in conjunction with *now*, *here*, or *up*:

(25) a. look here – **listen here**. It wasn't my fault (1899 Norris, *McTeague* [UofV]).
b. "Safe! From Blackie? **Now listen**. There never was a safer, saner, truer, more generous friend" (1911 Ferber, *Dawn O'Hara, the Girl who Laughed* 123–124 [UofV]).
c. "**Listen here**! Are you going to get off that bench?" (1915 Bower, *Jean of the Lazy A* [UofV]).
d. "**Listen**, you gaddam peasoup, you're too fast with your mouth" (1945 MacLennan, *Two Solitudes* [*OED*]).
e. But **listen up** you pitiful poetry people: just deal with it (n.d. *The Face* 276 [BNC]).

Interestingly, the *MED* records a use of *listen* (def. a) and *listenen* (def. a) "in commands or calls for attention," often with *nou*, suggesting a older provenance for this usage.[21]

The verb *hear* has followed a somewhat different path than the other auditory verbs. It has become fixed in two formulaic expressions, the *hear ye, hear ye* cry of town heralds and the *hear, hear* phrase used in parliamentary debate to express admiration, indignation, etc. (deriving from *hear him, hear him*; see *OED*:s.v. *hear* v., def. 13a). However, *DARE* notes a use of the imperative with "the expectation of compliance" (s.v. *hear*, def. 2b), as in *You clean your room now, hear?*, presumably deriving from *do you hear?*. The *English Dialect Dictionary* also notes the dialect expressions *hear you* and *thee*, which are "exclamations expressive of surprise or emphasis" (s.v. *hear*, def. II (4)).

8.6 The grammaticalization of *look*-forms

A final consideration is whether the *look*-forms that have been examined in this chapter can be seen as having undergone the process of grammaticalization. Forms of *look* would seem to be no exception, as they undergo changes characteristic of grammaticalization:

[21] Moreover, *to lithe* (*MED*: s.v. *lithen* 'listen') is a "more or less empty metrical tag" in Middle English.

(a) **decategorialization**: *look*-forms change from full complement-taking verb to an invariable particle-like form;
(b) **fusion**: *look* fuses with *ye/you*, with *to't*, or with adverbs such as *now* and *here;*
(c) **coalescence**: in the case of *look ye*, there is reduction of [lʊkji] > [lʊkjə]; in *lookee*, we see reduction from [lʊkji] to [lʊki]; in *lookahere* there is further reduction of the infixed [ji] > [jə] > [ə]. In the case of *look to't*, we see reduction of *to't* from [tuɪt] > [tuət] > [tut] or [tət]; when fused with [lʊk], the initial [t] is dropped to give [lʊkət/lʊkɨt].

(Neither (b) nor (c) is a necessary feature of the grammaticalization of pragmatic markers. Pragmatic markers frequently remain syntactically independent, phonetically fully realized forms.)

(d) **desemanticization**: the concrete perceptual meaning of *look* is bleached or widened to a more abstract meaning;
(e) increase in **pragmatic meaning**, involving a shift from referential to non-referential (or non-pragmatic to pragmatic) meaning: *look*-forms acquire interpersonal (expressive/rhetorical) meanings;
(f) **pragmatic strengthening**: for *look*, there is conventionalization of the invited inference of attentiveness and care involved in looking (intently). Furthermore, the epistemic quality of *look*-forms results from conventionalizing the invited inference 'what is visible must be believed' (see Schwenter and Traugott 2000:10);
(g) **subjectification**: *look*-forms acquire metatextual intent, coming to encode features of the speech event (of commanding), that is, the speaker's attitude of impatience, exasperation, or even aggression that is implied by the direct imperative form;
(h) **divergence**: *look, lookee (here),* and *lookit* all continue to have their original perceptual meaning in some uses.

However, there are ways in which the development of *look*-forms is not characteristic of grammaticalization, though it is consistent with the development of pragmatic markers generally. First, *look*-forms expand rather than shrink in scope: rather than relating merely to the event expressed in the complement clause, they come to relate to the entire speech event. Second, to the extent that *look*-forms change in regard to syntactic fixation, they become somewhat less fixed since they are no longer restricted to initial position (though they normally occur there).

Comparative semantic evidence is provided by Waltereit (2002) on the development of the Italian pragmatic marker *guarda/guardi*, which he sees as evolving from the imperative *guarda* 'look.' Because of the implicature of the imperative that the speaker has something important to say that requires the attention of the hearer, this verb lends itself to "improper use" in contexts where there is in fact nothing urgent to look at but where the speaker wishes to interrupt or self-select

Table 8.1. *Development of* look

Free collocation	Fixed formula	Univerbated Form/Pragmatic marker
look (that/how) [. . .]	look you/ye (here) [. . .]	lookee (here) > look (here) lookahere
look to NP	look to it > look to't	lookit

at turn-taking. When the meaning 'Listen to me I have something important to say' is conventionalized, *guarda* has become a pragmatic marker.

8.7 Conclusion

In Present-day English, the imperative verb *look* can occur parenthetically in a number of different constructions, including *look* {*here/now*}, *lookee, looka-here,* and *lookit*. As a parenthetical, *look* is often not used as a concrete verb of perception but carries non-concrete meaning. The parenthetical functions as a comment clause whose primary function is that of attention-getting. It may have additional functions, such as refocusing, emphasizing, or 'setting the record straight.' *Lookit*, in particular, seems to carry strong interpersonal meanings and may convey speaker exasperation, urgency, harshness, or even aggression.

The development of *look* comment clauses is summarized in Table 8.1. The earliest constructions with imperative verb *look* in Old and Middle English are free collocations of imperative verb + complement clause (*that*-clause or *wh*-clause) or of verb + prepositional phrase. Some of these constructions are semantically polysemous or ambiguous, with both concrete/perceptual and non-concrete meanings possible. In the Early Modern English period, these constructions become fixed syntactically (i.e., restricted to complements with second-person subjects or to *to it* complements). The *look you* construction undergoes rebracketing and reanalysis; the *look to it* construction is reduced morphologically. A resulting reversal in syntactic hierarchy converts the original subordinate clause into a matrix and the original matrix into a parenthetical comment clause. In the final stage, the constructions may form single words (be univerbated) perhaps with further phonological reduction (i.e., *lookee, lookit*). Thus, in the case of *look* as we saw before in the case of *see* (see §6.4), imperative verb structures constitute an important source of comment clauses.

9 *What's more* and *what else*

9.1 Introduction

The third type of comment clause identified by Quirk *et al*. (1985:1112, 1117) resembles a "nominal" or free relative clause. The examples they list include *what's more surprising, what's more serious, what's most significant of all, what's very strange*, and *what annoys me*. This chapter examines two constructions, *what's more* (§9.2–§9.4) and, in less detail, *what else* (§9.5).

9.2 *What's more* in Present-day English

In the *what's more* construction, according to the *OED*, the *what*-clause is "a prefatory (usually parenthetic) qualifying clause" (s.v. *what,* def. CI3b); *what* has a relative (or allied) use and *more* is a pronoun meaning 'something of greater importance or significance' (*OED*: s.v. *more*, def. BIc). While *what's more* normally stands in extraposition, it is sometimes interpolated and stands in apposition to some word or phrase or even an implied idea (Poutsma 1917:971; Jespersen 1961 [1927]:113; Curme 1935:46).

The variants of parenthetical *what's more* encountered in Present-day English are *what's more, what is more,* and *what was more*, as illustrated below:

(1) a. It's called being generous. **What's more**, you don't have to be cashed-up (2001 *Heat* 27 Oct. 120/1 [*OED*]).
b. "Speaks Welsh like a book, the professor" and, **what's more**, he also writes it like a book though he learnt it late in life (1960 *Sunday Times* 27 Nov. 11 [*OED*]).
c. A FILM is a film and a play is a play. **What is more**, they have, for the most part, entirely different audiences (1991 *The Guardian* 18 April, p. 13 [FLOB]).
d. Nonsense – ; it is the quickest way to learn and, **what is more**, is never forgotten (1990 Maidment, *I Remember, I Remember* 127 [BNC]).



Figure 9.1 *What's more* in the BNC

e. It was annoying being diverted like this. **What was more**, she didn't like the way her mother tried so hard on occasions (1986 Loukakis, "The Cheerfulness of the Bush," *Vernacular Dreams* 12:1 [ACE]).
f. She had spent a fear-filled night beneath a stone slab in the meat cellar and, **what was more**, completely alone (1991 Elgin, *All the Sweet Promises* 896 [BNC]).

A random sampling of 100 occurrences of *what's more* in the BNC[1] shows the distribution given in Figure 9.1. On the basis of this small sampling, as well as the evidence of the other corpora of Present-day English generally, one can make a number of generalizations concerning *what's more* in Present-day English. *What's more*, while it occurs in a wide range of genres, including journalism, fiction, and popular lore, is very frequent in academic and other non-fiction writing and is uncommon in the oral genre. Typically, parenthetical *what's more* occurs sentence externally as a separate tone group in initial position (see examples 1a–c, e); 62% of the BNC data occur in this position. Sentence externally, it may follow a coordinating conjunction, almost invariably *and* (1b) or *but*. Parenthetical *what's more* occurs only rarely sentence internally, prior to a conjoined predicate or phrasal element (see 1d, f); 8% of the BNC data are found in this position.

[1] In the BNC, there are 376 examples of *what is more*, 341 examples of *what's more*, 70 examples of *what was more*, and 4 examples of *whats more*. I have sampled a proportionate number of each form.

What's more may be syntactically incorporated into the sentence (non-parenthetical), in which case it modifies the following adjective (as in 2); this occurs 28% of the time in the BNC sampling:

(2) a. **What was more** exhilarating to a poor man than a sudden influx of unearned cash, springing from a seemingly limitless fertile source (1981 Rendell, *The Best Man to Die* [BNC]).
b. But **what is more** important is that Gale's book loses much of its impact because the science is not there . . . (n.d. *New Scientist* [BNC]).

While a large variety of adjectives may occur in this position (e.g., *polemical, enjoyable, pleasing, interesting, contentious, pertinent, natural*), the adjective *important* is by far the most common (twelve of the twenty-eight instances in the BNC sampling). In a minority of cases when an adjective is present, the construction forms a pseudo-cleft sentence (twelve of twenty-eight instances in the BNC sampling), half of which have a following *that*-clause (see 2b). The *what's more* + adjective construction has been omitted from this study, which focuses on parenthetical *what's more*.

9.2.1 The meaning of what's more

In the *what's more* construction, the *what*-clause is generally seen as functioning as a speaker "comment" on the clause that follows (Poutsma 1917:971; Curme 1935:46; Quirk *et al.* 1985:1112). According to Jespersen *what's more* is "a special kind of clause, in which the speaker (writer) interrupts the flow of the sentence to give as it were his own comment on some idea or expression"; psychologically it functions as a "mental parenthes[is]" (1961 [1927]:113). More specifically *what's more* is seen as expressing expansion, addition, or elaboration, what Keller (1979:224) calls a "subject-expansion link," Quirk *et al.* (1985:663) call "listing-additive-reinforcing," and Fraser (1999:948) calls "elaborative." Elaborative discourse markers are those that "indicate a relationship in which the message of S2 parallels and possibly augments or refines the message of S1" (Fraser 1999:948). As an additive marker, *what's more* is often equated with conjunct adverbials, such as *above all, also, furthermore, in particular, moreover, on top of it all, to cap it (all) (off), too* (see Quirk *et al.* 1985:635; Fraser 1999:948; *OED*:s.v. *what*). *What's more* (and its variants) is the only finite clausal conjunct (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1069).[2]

9.2.2 The synchronic development of what's more

Quirk *et al.* (1985:1117) suggest that a parenthetical such as *what's more surprising* (3a) might correspond either to the main clause of the cleft structure in (3b) or to

[2] Fraser (1999:948) adds the additional clausal conjuncts *that is (to say)* (see §4.7) and *I mean* (Chapter 5).

the nominal relative clause in the pseudo-cleft structure in (3c). The change from either (3b) or (3c) to (3a) involves a syntactic reversal in which the *that*-clause becomes the main clause:

(3) a. What's more surprising, he didn't tell his parents.
b. It's more surprising (that) he didn't tell his parents.
c. What's more surprising is that he didn't tell his parents.
d. He didn't inform his parents, which is more surprising.

However, Poutsma (1917:971) notes that although sentences such as (3a) and (3c) are "practically the same" in meaning, they are "entirely different construction[s]." It is also important to note that Quirk *et al.* (1985) do not speak of "derivation," merely of "correspondence."

Grammars also point to a parallel between following *which*-clauses, serving as sentential relative clauses (as in 3d), and preceding *what*-clauses (as in 3a) (Poutsma 1917:971; Quirk *et al.* 1985:1117). The construction with *which* is said to be earlier than that with *what* (Jespersen 1961 [1927]:14–115; Curme 1935:46). However, the two constructions are not entirely equivalent. *He is fond of music, which I am glad to hear* cannot be transformed into *What I am glad to hear, he is fond of music*.[3] Sentential relative clauses can never be initial (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1118, 1120): **Which was more surprising, he didn't inform his parents*.[4]

9.3 The history of *what's more* and related constructions

9.3.1 What's more

The earliest example of the *what's more* construction[5] that I have found dates from the end of the sixteenth century:

(4) Nay **what is more**, tis said he doth pretend, / To worke our ruine, and our fatal end (1598 Brandon, *Octauia, Tragi-Comedy* IV, 121–122 [ED]).

In the seventeenth century, the construction becomes more common. It is typically sentence internal, preceding and having within its scope a noun, adjective, preposition, or verb phrase (see Figure 9.2). It occurs in a range of text types, including science (5a), high verse (5b), popular verse drama (5c, d), and prose (5e):

(5) a. And **what is more**, the same water distill'd from a gallon to a pint, a fourth part of that pint will make a curd (1676 Guidott, *A Discourse of Bathe* [LC]).

[3] Poutsma notes, however, that *and what I am glad to hear, he is fond of music* may be acceptable (1917:1348).

[4] Poutsma finds a now archaic construction consisting of *more* alone (i.e., *which is/was more*) extending even into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1917:1120, 1348).

[5] In the following discussion, *what's more* refers to both the contracted and the uncontracted form.



Figure 9.2 Position of *what's more* in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries

b. but to know / That which before us lies in daily life, / Is the prime Wisdom, **what is more**, is fume, / Or emptiness, or fond impertinence (1667 Milton, *Paradise Lost* Bk. 7, 829–832 [UofV]).
c. As I am a very woman, I like *Signiour Soranzo*, well; / hee is wise, and **what is more**, rich; and **what is more** then that, / kind, and **what is more** then all this, a Noble-man (1633 Ford, *'Tis Pitty Shee's a Whore* I, 175–177 [ED]).
d. You will destroy the life, and **what is more**, / The Honor of an unfortunate Lady (1671 Etherege, *She Wou'd if She Cou'd* V, i, 256–257 [ED]).
e. You have the Authority of a Father, or **what's more**, of a Friend over me (1692 Gildon, *The Post-boy Rob'd of his Mail* Bk. 1, Letter 5 [EEPF]).

In the eighteenth century, the construction is still predominantly sentence internal (6a–c), though sentence external instances, in which *what's more* occurs sentence-initially and refers to the entire clause, can be adduced (6d–e) (see Figure 9.2):

(6) a. he hath been to see the wounded gentleman, who is out of all danger of death, and, **what is more**, declares he fell upon poor Mr. Jones himself (1749 Fielding, *Tom Jones* Bk. 18, Ch. 3 [UofV]).
b. I am Sir, your most humble servant and **what is more**, Your sincere friend (1776 *Letters of Delegates to Congress* Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon, June 10 [UofV]).

c. I vanish: but if I don't appear, / And **what's more**, appear perfect, hoot at me (1783 Dudley, *The Magic Picture* i, 40–41 [ED]).
d. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and **what is more**, their goodness is determin'd merely by the pleasure (1739 Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* Bk. III, Part I, Section II [UofV]).
e. **What's more**, I wish we're not bereft / Of what small Reputation's left (1735 Kelly, *The Plot* p. 13, 108–109 [ED]).

By the nineteenth century, sentence-external forms are strongly preferred (by about three to one, see Figure 9.2).

9.3.2 Which is more

It would appear that the *which is more* construction mentioned by grammarians of Present-day English pre-dates the *what is more* construction and dies out fairly early. The oldest examples date from Shakespeare (1599), and the construction is relatively common throughout the seventeenth century. However, only a sprinkling of examples can be found in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and no examples occur in the modern corpora. Typically, it occurs sentence internal and has within its scope a word or phrase (7a–e); much more rarely it is sentence external and has an entire clause within its scope (7f–g). In the latter case, it is always sentence initial, never sentence final, thus, resembling *what's more* constructions rather than sentential relative clauses.

(7) a. Mad as May-butter, / And **which is more**, mad for a wench (1647 Fletcher, *The Noble Gentleman* I, i, 32–327 [ED]).
b. A gentlewoman, a maid, nay **which is more**, / An honest maid, and which is most of all, / A rich and honest maid (1611 Barry, *Ram-Alley* III, i, 95–97 [ED]).
c. I am a wise fellow, and **which is more**, an officer, and **which is more**, a householder, and **which is more**, as pretty a piece of flesh as any in Messina (1598–99 Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing* IV, ii, 80–82 [Evans]).
d. it hath shaken the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers and, **which is more**, of the saints (1651 Hobbes, *Leviathan* Chap 2.31 [UofV])
e. You may, and **which is more**, you must (1679 Fletcher, *Thierry and Theodoret* IV, i, 103 [ED]).
f. let him be what he will; base, old, or crooked, / hee shall have Me: Nay, **which is more**, I'll love him. / I will not be denyde (1647 Fletcher, *The Prophetesse* I, i, 95–97 [ED]).
g. But **which is more**, the *Magnetical Needle*, hath no certain *Pole* in the Earth at all (1649 Gregorie, *The Description and Use of the Terrestrial Globe* [LC]).

9.3.3 What was more

A later development is the *what was more* construction. Examples of the construction are not frequent until the nineteenth century,[6] when they may be found in passages of free indirect speech or thought:[7]

(8) a. Such a conclusion could not pass unanswered by Mrs. Weston. She thought well of Frank in almost every respect; and, **what was more**, she loved him very much, and her defence was, therefore, earnest. She talked with a great deal of reason, and at least equal affection (1815 Austen, *Emma* Ch. 48 [UofV]).

b. Tom sat up in bed, and rubbed his eyes to dispel the illusion. No. The chair was an ugly old gentleman; and **what was more**, he was winking at Tom Smart (1836 Dickens, *Pickwick Papers* Ch. 14 [UofV]).

c. the barber hinting that this would be a safe proceeding, because the captain was necessarily a party disinterested, and, **what was more**, could not, from the nature of the present case, make anything by a breach of trust. All of which was listened to with some surprise and concern (1857 Melville, *The Confidence-Man* Ch. 43, p. 368 [UofV]).

d. He rubbed his eyes, examined into the fact, and really found that while he had been dreaming of other matters, she had actually grown into a woman, and **what was more**, had fallen in love (1824 Irving, *Tales of a Traveller* p. 63 [UofV]).

As in the case of *what is more*, *what was more* is generally sentence external (8a–b), though sentence internal examples can be found (8c–d).[8]

9.4 Accounting for the development of the *what's more* construction

The equivalence of the *what's more* construction with pseudo-cleft sentences, cleft sentences, and sentential relative clauses is suggestive of historical

[6] An unusually early example of this construction occurs in a brief narrative in a speech from an eighteenth-century play:

> 'Till now, were my Arrivals always honour'd; / The thund'ring Ordnance loudly welcom'd me, / And **what was more**, the Sov'raign of the World / With gracious Looks, and open Arms receiv'd me (1704 Trapp, *Abra-Mule: Or, Love and Empire. A Tragedy* I, ii, 54–57 [ED]).

[7] In order to show the reported speech context, I have given slightly larger passages of surrounding text.

[8] I was able to find only one example of *which was more*:

> I believe I never fir'd my Gun once off, though I never went out without it; and **which was more**, as I had sav'd three Pistols out of the Ship, I always carry'd them out with me, or at least two of them, sticking them in my Goat-skin Belt (1719 Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe* Ch. 12 [UofV]).

But interestingly, *which was more* appears as *what was more* in another version of *Robinson Crusoe* contained in the University of Virginia corpus.

derivation. However, in these constructions *more* modifies an explicit adjective, *What's more* A *is that*, *It's more* A *(that)*, or *which is more* A (cf. 3b–d above) and are thus all problematic as sources of the parenthetical *what's more* construction. Although such constructions certainly occur in early stages of English, there seems little reason to suggest an elided adjective in the case of parenthetical *what's more* – an adjective which would not be predictable from the wide variety of different adjectives, such as *surprising, remarkable, crucial*, *impressive,* etc., that may occupy this position. The *OED* definition of *more* as a pronoun with the sense 'something important' points to *What's more* as a complete construction, without the necessity of postulating an elliptical adjective. Proposing the sentential relative construction (3d) as the source of the *what's more* construction raises the additional difficulty that it can never occur in sentence-initial position, while the *what's more* construction typically occupies this position. One could postulate pseudo-cleft and cleft sentences without explicit adjectives (i.e., *What's more is (that)* S or *It's more (that)* S) as the source of the *what's more* construction, but the historical corpora (UofV, *OED*, ED) yield no examples of these constructions.

The historical evidence points to the coexistence of two adjectiveless parenthetical constructions, *what is more* and *which is more*; these are roughly contemporaneous and seem to function in a similar manner. In fact, the *OED* suggests that *which* (def. BII11) in this context means 'that which' and is equivalent to *what*. In the beginning, {*which, what*} *is more* is clause internal and functions as an relative adjunct adjoined to a phrasal category, NP, AP, PP, or VP (see examples 5b–d, 6a–c, 7a–c). It has narrow scope. Gradually, the relative clause acquires sentential scope, also typically moving to sentence-initial position. Here it has a conjunctive (additive, reinforcing) function. Note that the proportion of sentence-initial *what's more* increases from 27% to 73% from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century (see Figure 9.2). *What is more* begins in the nineteenth century to develop interpersonal (expressive/subjective) meanings in addition to its conjunctive meanings and comes to serve as a comment clause. The pragmatic meaning can be clearly seen in the following nineteenth-century examples in which the speaker contrasts what follows *what is more* with what precedes it. *What's more* in these examples comes close to the meaning of 'adversative' *however* and seems to express the speaker's sense of surprise/disbelief/etc. at the contrast.

(9) a. Well may it be doubted; for, had I really loved, could I have sacrificed my feelings to vanity, to avarice? – or, **what is more**, could I have sacrificed her's? (1811 Austen, *Sense and Sensibility* Part 3, Ch. 3.1, pp. 320–321 [UofV]).

b. However, I defied him, and the consequence is, I'm forbidden the house, and, **what is more**, he says he will not come to the office while I remain a partner (1853 Gaskell, *Ruth* Ch. 31 [UTEL]).

c. The truth is, that women try marriage as a Refuge, far more numerously than they are willing to admit; and, **what is more**, they find that marriage has justified their confidence in it (1868 Collins, *The Moonstone* Bk. 3, Ch. 5 [UTEL]).
d. An excellent man, who only wanted somebody to manage him; and, between ourselves, he found somebody to do it; and **what is more**, he throve on it and grew fat on it, and lived happy and died easy on it (1868 Collins, *The Moonstone* Bk. 2, Ch. 2 [UTEL]).

The shift of *what is more* that occurs over the Late Modern English period is thus similar to the development of pragmatic markers of adverbial (non-clausal) origin, as discussed by Traugott (1995a) from clause-internal adverbial to sentential adverb to pragmatic marker (see §2.3.2). Specifically, there seems to be a change from adjectival relative to nominal relative to pragmatic marker.

The development of the comment clause *what's more* exhibits signs of grammaticalization, including decategorialization (from relative clause to particle-like status), loss of referential meaning (as the relative pronoun loses its clear anaphoric reference), acquisition of pragmatic functions (comment functions), and increasing subjectification (expression of speaker attitude). The pragmatic/subjective meanings of the construction involve the conventionalization of invited inferences, namely, if something is "more" than what one might expect, then it can inferred that it might be surprising, disturbing, etc. The *what's more* construction conforms to Hopper's (1991) principle of specialization in grammaticalization in that the *which is more* variant is lost and the *what is more* variant remains.[9] Despite alternation between the contracted and uncontracted form, the construction can be said to be fixed and fused, allowing no adverbial modification or changes in mood or aspect. However, the rise of the past tense variant (*what was more*) would seem to run counter to the fixing expected in grammaticalization. As suggested above, this form likely arose in the specialized context of represented speech and then came to be used by analogy outside this context.

9.5 *What else*

9.5.1 What else *in Present-day English*

The *OED* (s.v. *what* pron., a.[1], adv., conj., int. (n.)) lists two uses of *what else*:

(a) "whatever else there may be" and then with "loss of the relative force, anything else, anything and everything" (def. CI4d);

[9] The loss of the *which*-variant may be part of a larger change in relative clause formation. The *OED* (s.v. *which,* def. BII11) lists nominal relative clauses with *which* as obsolete; its last example dates from 1719.



Figure 9.3 *What else* in PDE

(b) "in elliptical phr[ases]" "what else should be the case?," "used as an emphatic affirmative reply: = certainly!" (def. AI5a).

Looking at *what else* in Present-day English, Lenk (1998:189–202) distinguishes between the propositional meaning of *what else* ('indirect inquiry for some indetermined additional or different thing') and its function as a pragmatic marker. She finds that although *what else* is infrequent, a large majority of its uses are as a pragmatic marker.[10] In its primary pragmatic function, *what else* is speaker-oriented, used when speakers "have lost the train of thought they were following and are retracing it, or when they want to recall an additional aspect they consider worth mentioning, in order to add something important to what they had said before" (192). It serves as a means for the speaker to claim continuation of a turn, while it also reveals explicitly that the speaker is verbalizing planning. Lenk also sees *what else* as serving as a "general elicitation marker" "used to reorient all participants in the conversation to another topic or item in a list" (201); as such it is hearer-oriented. Lenk notes that *what else* may occur in longer phrases, such as *what else have I been doing?* or *what else has happened?*, in which the exact nature of the speaker's mental search is verbalized.

A sampling of 100 instances of *what else* from the BNC compared with all instances of *what else* in the Strathy shows the distribution given in Figure 9.3.

[10] 86.6% in the British data, 77.7% in the American data.

I have classified *what else* according to function, whether it serves as a pragmatic/rhetorical (i.e., speaker-oriented) question, whether it carries literal meaning, forming either a main clause interrogative (such as *What else is there?*) or part of a nominal relative clause (such as *I know what else it is* or *not knowing what else to say*), or whether it occurs in an idiom (such as *God knows what else* or *who knows what else?*). Pragmatic/rhetorical uses form the majority of instances of *what else*.

In the *OED*, the last citation for definition (a) given above is 1873. In PDE corpora, instances in which *what else* occurs without an adjoined relative clause are rare (see 10a). However, full nominal relative structures can still be found (10b–d), including instances with infinitival relative clauses (10e):

(10) a. "I was so overrun with the spirit of superstition that I adored all things (both the High Place, Priest, Clerk, vestments, service and **what else**) belonging to the Church" (1988 Symonds, *Alternative Saints* [BNC]).
b. The price reflects **what else** is available in the pub. The food operation, for example, is not viable on its own (1991 *What's Brewing* [BNC]).
c. I had no idea **what else** I might do, but I just did not want to play tournament golf (1991 *Golf Monthly* [BNC]).
d. I would really like to know **what else** the hon. minister had to say (2002 Alberta Legislative Assembly Hansard [Strathy]).
e. "Gazzer's outside," said Marie, not knowing **what else** to say (1990 *The Lock* [BNC]).

The *OED* definition (b) cited above is frequent in Present-day English, in the sense 'would you expect anything other.' This may be placed either immediately before (11a) or after (11b–c) the noun it modifies, or it may serve as an independent unit (11d). Occasionally, it may also be a final sentence tag (11e) or sentence-initial opener (11f) modifying the entire sentence.

(11) a. Of course, on Monday nights they settle down to watch – **what else** – "Murphy Brown" (1992 *Saturday Evening Post* [FROWN]).
b. Highlights from the past include 400 class members (clad in blue tunics, **what else?**) taking part in the 1968 Norfolk Show (1990 Medau Society literature [BNC]).
c. Doubled up with pain, I found support between two Lada cars (**what else?**) and emptied my insides with great gasping spouts (1988 Girling, *The Best of Sunday Times Travel* [BNC]).
d. Beyond the barrier lay some of the most toxic chemicals known, awaiting destruction by fire. **What else?** A vast, smoke-blackened furnace; 100 people to do the work; massive investment (1989 *Independent*, election edn. of Oct. 3 [BNC]).
e. "We come here to see all these gorgeous girls, **what else?**" Carl said. "The women are just beautiful, unbelievably beautiful" (1992 *The Dallas Evening News* [FROWN]).

f. Is not this lass sister, half-sister to my daughter? she asked herself. **What else,** since she is of my lord's begetting? (1999 Wiat, *The Child Bride* [BNC]).

What else serves as a comment clause here. It has a metacommunicative function in that rather than referring to the propositional content of the utterance (the described action), it refers to the speaker's and hearer's attitudes. It is subjective and intersubjective as it calls on the hearer to agree (implicitly, seldom overtly) with the speaker's beliefs concerning the expectedness of the action described. That is, although it is possible to interpret (11a) as the speaker's assertion that they might have watched some other program, the overriding meaning is that the speaker believes that the hearer would agree that their watching "Murphy Brown" is thoroughly to be expected and is consistent with the actions and beliefs of the participants.

In contrast, the use of *what else* in an affirmative reply, with the meaning 'certainly' – also mentioned in definition (a) – seems to be fairly uncommon in Present-day English:

(12) a. "So you think that Allingham's death was by natural causes?" "Oh, of course! **What else**? There's no mark of violence. No sign of poison," Sir Richard answered (1992 Harding, *The Nightingale Gallery* [BNC]).
b. "Wy [sic] did you come at all?" "To see my lord and master, **what else**!" she laughed (1990 McGrath, *The Charnel House* [BNC]).

The pragmatic speaker-oriented function identified by Lenk (1998), in which the speaker makes explicit reference to his or her retrieval of information, typically in a list, is common in Present-day English. It can even be found in written texts, where not only is it a stylistic device to mimic colloquial language, but it serves to emphasize the information which follows:

(13) a. "Lucky Harriet," said Mark. "**What else**? Ah yes; a Secretary at the Ministry of Industry wants you to ring him" (1991 Kilby, *Man at the Sharp End* [BNC]).
b. I wasn't too happy about that but never mind. Erm, **what else**, last week I had a meeting with Mike and Yvonne from D T I and Phil (1994 Northern Development Company: meeting, Rec. on 18 Jan [BNC]).
c. It is hard for parishes to know what exactly they can do for the unemployed. They can of course pray for them, and to give that prayer high priority. But **what else**? To come together to help the unemployed has led many churches to take part in Unemployment Sunday (1992 *Shrewsbury Diocesan Catholic Voice* [BNC]).
d. The Premier League, however, is not without its critics. For Middlesbrough, it offers a guarantee of greater riches. But **what else?** It does not necessarily guarantee premier football (n.d. *Northern Echo* [BNC]).

9.5.2 The history of what else

Beginning with definition (a), we find frequent examples in Early Modern English of *what else* in the sense of 'whatever else' as the final element of a list:

(14) a. Theyr reseruations were as wel . . . in vittailis, whether flesh, fishe, corne, bread, drinke, or **what els**, as in money (1579 *Expos. Termes Law* s.v. *Reservation* [*OED*]).
b. Let all the customarie rights of funerall, / His knell or **what else** be solemnly obserued (1609 Anon., *Everie Woman in her Humor* [ED]).
c. All the buz of Drugs, and Myneralls and Simples, / Bloud-lettings, Vomits, Purges, or **what else** / Is coniur'd vp by men of Art, to gull / Liege-people (1629 Ford, *The Lovers Melancholy* IV, i [ED]).
d. Of madding, singing, smiling, and **what else,** / Receive your native valours, be your selves, / And joyne with Brutus in the just revenge / Of this chaste ravisht Lady, sweare (1638 Heywood, *The Rape of Lvcrece. A true Roman Tragedy* [ED]).

The *OED* definition (CI4d) suggests that the usage exemplified in (14) is a reduced relative clause. However, full relative clauses occur considerably less frequently in Early Modern English:

(15) a. My purse, my servants, and **what else** I have / Are all at your command (1664 Anon., *The History of Sir John Oldcastle, the good Lord Cobham* [ED]).
b. **what else** you are to execute upon occasion, you sufficiently know: and therefore I abbreviat my Lecture (1647 Beaumont and Fletcher, *Loves Cure, or The Martial Maid* III, v [ED]).
c. This, and **what else** we shall present to night / Unto this Round, we offer as a Rite (1639 Zouch, *The Sophister. A Comedy* Front Matter [ED]).

In respect to definition (b), the "extended" sense of 'certainly' in an emphatic reply can be found in Early Modern English:

(16) a. Eteocles: And wilt thou then I vse some other reade?
Creon: **What else**? be still awhile, for haste makes wast (1573 Gascoigne and Kinwelmersh (trans.), Euripides' *Iocasta: A Tragedie* II, ii [ED]).
b. Justice: Put on your best coate, and let your fellow Marke goe to the Constable & bid him aide me with all the speed hee can, and all the power, and provide pen and inke to take their Confessions, and my long sword, I cannot tell what danger wee may meete with; you'le goe with us?
Curio: Yes, **what else**? I came to that end to accuse both parties (1647 Fletcher and Beaumont, *The Coxcombe* V, i [ED]).

In the entry for definition AI5a of *what*, the *OED* gives one example of the 'certainly' sense dated 1591, but none of the 'what else would you expect' sense. The latter sense does not seem to occur in either Early Modern English or in Late Modern English. The first example in the *OED* quotation bank dates from 1968. I have found examples dated from the late-nineteenth century:

(17) a. And then we'll speak in turn of you – **what else**? / Your love, according to your beauty's worth, / For you shall have some noble love, all gold (1888–94 Browning, *In a Balcony* p. 27 [ED]).
b. "What on earth possessed him to undertake such a task?" "The love of a beautiful woman – **what else**?" (1915 Dixon, *The Foolish Virgin* p. 350 [UofV]).

Note that like the examples given in (12), these are ambiguous. For example, (17a) could be interpreted either as 'We'll speak of you – What else would we speak of' or 'We'll speak of you – What else would you expect.' Likewise, (17b) could be interpreted as 'He was possessed by the love of a beautiful woman – What else would have possessed him' or 'He was possessed by the love of a beautiful woman – What else would you expect.'

Certain EModE examples seem to have the function of retrieval of information by the speaker:

(18) a. But I se my father, but what now may I do? may I go to hym? **what els**, Father I haue synned into the heuen and before the, nor here after I am not worthy to be called thy sonne (1540 Palsgrave, *The Comedye of Acolastus* V, v [ED]).
b. Oh **what else** sir, hee's perfection it selfe, full of manners, / But not an acre of ground belonging to 'em (1611 Dekker and Middleton, *The Roaring Girle Or Moll Cut-Purse* I, i [ED]).
c. You hit it – **what else** – she is cunning – looke yee, / Pray lend your hand forsooth (1638 Ford, *The Fancies Chast and Noble* II [ED]).
d. all you host of heaven! O earth! **What else**? / And shall I couple hell? O fie, hold, hold, my heart, / And you, my sinows, grow not instant old, / But bear me [stiffly] up. Remember thee! (1600–01 Shakespeare, *Hamlet* I, v, 92–95 [Evans]).

9.5.3 Historical relation of the what else *forms*

Among the many propositional uses of *what else*, we have seen the specialized usage (def. (a) above) in which *what else* has the sense 'anything else, anything and everything,' especially as the last element in a list. *What else* in this usage is common in Early Modern English (14), but falls out of use in the nineteenth century, perhaps being replaced by *whatever*. According to the *OED what else* here is a reduced relative clause. However, the historical data call this derivation into question, as relative clauses are not as frequently attested in Early Modern



Figure 9.4 Dating of pragmatic uses of *what else*

English (15). The relative structures have increased in frequency over time (see 10b–d), and are especially common in semi-fixed expressions such as *God knows what else . . . , I don't know what else . . . .*

The sequence of appearance of the pragmatic uses of *what else* is not altogether clear. The interpersonal use of *what else* as an affirmative reply meaning 'certainly' appears in Early Modern English (see 16); although this usage may be found in Present-day English, it is not frequent (see 12). The metacommunicative sense 'what else would you expect' appears very late (late Late Modern English) (see 17); contra the suggestion in the *OED*, therefore, the 'certainly' sense does not seem to be an extension of the 'what else would you expect' sense. The subjective use of *what else* as a self-retrieval device also appears in Early Modern English (see 18). Note that all of these uses are still current in Present-day English (see Figure 9.4).

Although *what else* enters into the construction of nominal relatives (both finite and non-finite) in Present-day English, it would appear that the pragmatic uses of the expression derive not from reduced relative constructions, full relatives being rare in earlier English. Rather, it derives from the interrogative use of *what else* in full questions, with subsequent ellipsis.

As with *what's more*, the development of *what else* seems to involve grammaticalization. *What else* changes from a full interrogative clause to a fixed expression with particle-like status (fusion and decategorialization). Consistent with the grammaticalization of pragmatic markers, it expands to have scope over discourse and may occupy different syntactic positions. While it retains its propositional meaning in many instances (persistence), it develops a variety of pragmatic uses – to express emphatic agreement ('certainly'), as a self-retrieval device ('what more? what comes next?'), and in the sense 'what more would you expect?' – and comes to serve as a comment clause. These pragmatic meanings are both subjective and intersubjective. The 'certainly' sense is subjective in that it expresses speaker attitude. The self-retrieval use is in the first instance subjective as it is a means for the speaker to recall information or recover his/her train of thought and emphasize it, but it may also be intersubjective as it serves

to reorient the hearer to the topic at hand. The 'what else would you expect' sense is obviously intersubjective as it asks (rhetorically) for the hearer's opinion, but it is subjective in that it serves as a means for the speaker to assert his/her opinion on a state of affairs.

9.6 Conclusion

Both *what's more* and *what else* serve as comment clauses – with very different functions – in Present-day English. *What's more* occurs sentence initially in written discourse and expresses an expansion or elaboration of the preceding discourse. It may also express speaker emphasis or other speaker emotions (such as surprise, incomprehension, criticism, etc.). *What else* seeks hearer confirmation concerning the truth, certainty, or expectedness of the accompanying information ('would you expect anything other?') or is a means by which speakers recall their train of thought and reorient hearers towards it ('what more should I say?' 'what should I add?'). While both of these expressions can and do occur in nominal relative constructions in Present-day English (as in *I don't know* ***what more I can do****, I don't know* ***what else he wants***), only the comment clause *what's more* actually originates in a relative construction. *What is more* (also *which is more*) starts as a relative clause modifying a clausal element; *which/what* loses its clear anaphoric qualities, expands its scope and moves to sentence-initial position, thus becoming a sentential relative. The comment clause *what else* is apparently an elliptical interrogative clause. Despite different syntactic developments, however, both *what's more* and *what else* undergo grammaticalization and acquire subjective and intersubjective meanings.

10 Epistemic/evidential parentheticals – *I gather* and *I find*

10.1 Introduction

To date, most work on comment clauses has focused on first-person parentheticals, the so-called "epistemic parentheticals" such as *I think* and *I guess*. Detailed synchronic studies of *I (don't) think* (see Thompson and Mulac 1991b; Persson 1993; Stenström 1995; Aijmer 1997; Simon-Vandenbergen 2000; Kärkkäinen 2003), *I don't know* > *I dunno* (Tsui 1991; Scheibman 2000; Diani 2004), *you know* > *y'know* (Goldberg 1980; Markkanan 1985; Erman 1987; 2001; Schiffrin 1987; Crystal 1988; Stenström 1995; Fox Tree and Schrock 2002), *I guess* (Thompson and Mulac 1991b; Van Bogaert 2006; Kärkkäinen 2007), *I suppose/I believe* (Van Bogaert 2006) as well as *you see* (see §6.2.1.2) and *I mean* (see §5.2) have established a variety of pragmatic functions for these comment clauses, such as hedging, politeness, or discourse-organization. Despite their designation as "epistemic," they have been shown to express authoritativeness/conviction as well as uncertainty/tentativeness (see Aijmer 1997 on the "tentative" and "deliberative" uses of *I think*).

Diachronic studies, while less numerous, have examined *I think (methinks), I'm afraid, I'm sorry, I pray you/thee (> pray),* and *I promise you* (see §2.3.3.1 and §3.2.3.2 for reviews of these studies). Most recently, Wierzbicka (2006) has argued that epistemic parentheticals arise in the first half of the eighteenth century and are causally related to the rise of English Empiricism, which emphasized the limitations of human understanding and led to the need to specify the epistemic status of utterances. Not only are epistemic parentheticals more frequent in English, she suggests, than in other languages (37, 206),[1] but they are more numerous and more precisely differentiated. She provides a very fine-grained semantic analysis of *I think, I suppose, I guess, I gather, I presume, I believe, I find, I expect, I take it, I understand, I imagine, I bet, I suspect,* and *I assume* in

[1] Wierzbicka (2006) considers epistemic parentheticals to be a uniquely characteristic feature of the English language and what she calls "Anglo" culture. For a review of Wierzbicka's work, see Dancygier (forthcoming).

contemporary English. As I argue below (see also Brinton 1996), epistemic parentheticals of the *I think* class arise much earlier and are in fact well established in Middle English. However, this chapter, after presenting a review of the work on epistemic parentheticals (§10.2), will focus on the rise of two parentheticals that are indeed of later origin: *I gather* (§10.3) and *I find* (§10.4).

Apart from Wierzbicka's analysis, grammars and dictionaries of English contain no discussion of parenthetical *I gather* or *I find,* nor is either form listed among the set of comment clauses provided by Quirk *et al.* (1985:1114–1115). Nonetheless, as the ensuing discussion will make clear, both forms function as comment clauses (albeit fairly infrequent ones compared to *I think* or *I guess*). In addition to an epistemic meaning of speaker uncertainty or tentativeness, both serve an evidential function as well. That is, they provide "the kinds of evidence a person has for making factual claims," such as direct evidence, evidence plus inference, inference (evidence unspecified), or reasoned expectation (Anderson 1986:273–274). In addition to epistemic and evidential functions, *I gather* and *I find* serve interactional and politeness functions characteristic of pragmatic markers.

10.2 Epistemic/evidential parentheticals

A subclass of clausal parentheticals expressing "epistemic, evaluative, or evidential stance" (Thompson 2002) was first discussed by Urmson (1952). He begins by observing that certain verbs, such *know, believe, guess, suppose, suspect, estimate*, and *feel*, which he calls "parenthetical verbs," are typically used in the first person of the present tense. In such cases, these verbs do not give "psychological descriptions" (484); rather, they are used "to indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made" (485). Urmson admits that there are indeed non-parenthetical uses of these verbs even in the first person, present tense, though for some verbs (such as *believe*) the parenthetical use is basic (491–493). He sees parenthetical verbs as comparable in function to sentence adverbs, such as *unfortunately* (cf. *I regret*), *certainly* (cf. *I know*), and *probably* (cf. *I know*); however, the adverbs have a greater degree of "impersonality" (487).[2] He concludes that parenthetical verbs do not have "any descriptive sense but rather function as signals guiding the hearer to a proper appreciation of the statement in its context, social, logical, or evidential" (495). Thus, parenthetical verbs, in their function as aids to "the understanding and assessment of what is said rather than being a part of what is said" (496), are like pragmatic markers.

In another early discussion, Benveniste (1971 [1958]) astutely emphasizes the different meanings of verbs such as *believe, suppose, presume,* and *conclude* in the first person, as contrasted with other persons. He notes that in the first person,

[2] Compare Markkanen (1985:52–53, 58–59) on the use of sentence adverbials or modal verbs in Finnish as equivalents to epistemic parentheticals such as *I think* in English when they express speaker uncertainty and function as hedges on illocutionary force.

these verbs do not indicate an "operation of thought" but rather indicate an "attitude": "By including *I suppose* and *I presume* in my discourse, I imply that I am taking a certain attitude with regard to the utterance that follows" (228). Use of such a "personal verb form" converts an impersonal utterance into a subjective one.[3] Benveniste further notes that when the verbs are followed by *that* they denote the real thought operation, not the personal verb form (228–229).

Hooper (1975; also Hübler 1983:116–118) identifies a class of "assertives" which allow "complement preposing" (see §2.3.3), or the formation of parentheticals, especially in the first person present tense. Among non-factive assertive verbs, certain verbs such as *think, believe, suppose, guess, expect, appear, imagine,* and *figure* may be deemed "weak":[4] "the semantic content of a weak assertive predicate in its parenthetical sense is reduced to the extent that it makes no assertion in itself but, rather, only describes the speaker's attitude toward the truth of the asserted proposition, which lies in the complement" (Hooper 1975:101). Evidence for the "weakness" of these verbs derives from the behavior of tag questions, which are formed on the complement not the main clause (*I think this car needs a tune-up, doesn't it? *don't I*), from the existence of neg-raising (*I think these living conditions are not suitable = I don't think these living conditions are suitable*), from use of the sentence pronominal *so* not *it*, and from transparency in regard to sentence adverbials (*Fortunately I think he's already gone = It's fortunate that he's gone* not **It's fortunate that I think)* (103–111). Hooper further notes that weak assertives form a closed class, the only source for new ones being strong assertives that undergo "a reduction in semantic content that takes place through usage over a period of time" (112).

Banfield (1982:81–87) distinguishes a similar class of parentheticals, which she calls "discourse parentheticals." Discourse parentheticals encompass a much narrower range of verbs (e.g., *see, suppose, imagine, think, suggest*, *fear, suspect*) than "narrative parentheticals" (or reporting clauses) (e.g., *say, sigh, intimate, whisper, growl*). They express the speaker's, not the subject's, point of view and have certain formal properties: their tense is independent (they are not subject to sequence of tense), there is no restriction in anaphora, subject–verb inversion is excluded, and they permit syntactic (but not semantic) negation and question.

Bolinger (1989:126ff.) identifies a set of forms, such *as I suppose, I presume, I hope, I trust, I guess, I imagine, I assume, I know*, which function as "question-markers," as assessments of truth (*I suppose*) or expressions of authority (*you say, I understand, I infer*). He notes that these manifest "varying degrees of

[3] Nuyts (2001), in arguing for subjectivity as a category separate from epistemicity, observes that "mental state predicates" such as *think* (German/Dutch *glaube(n)*) are inherently subjective because of the syntactic structure with a first-person subject in which they occur (391, 393). In this respect they differ from modal adverbs, modal adjectives (in the *it is X that* construction), and modal auxiliaries, which are neutral in regard to subjectivity (389–393).

[4] Strong assertive parentheticals may represent specific speech acts (e.g., *I admit, I swear, I allege, I predict*) or combine mental acts with evaluative attitude (e.g., *I suspect, I hope, I agree*) (Hübler 1983:116; also Hooper 1975:95).

stereotyping" (130) and qualities of "tagginess." Some reaffirm (*I know*), some question (*I trust*), some express uncertainty (*I know, I don't know*), and some have their literal meaning (*I assume, I surmise*), these differences being attributable to the lexicon, not intonation (131).

In a Relevance Theory framework, Blakemore (1990/1991) compares parentheticals containing *think, know, predict, conclude, guess,* and *warn* with discourse connectives such as *after all, moreover,* and *so* in that in both cases, the meaning of the items is procedural rather than conceptual (211). They do not contribute to propositional content but help the hearer "draw the right kind of inferences from the embedded proposition" (205–206; cf. also Jucker *et al.* 2003:1763). Blakemore contrasts these parentheticals with performative verbs (such as *beg, advise, permit*); while both performatives and parentheticals guide the hearer in the processing of the embedded proposition, performatives contribute to the meaning of the proposition and thus express conceptual information (210–211).

Similarly, in a cognitive framework, Verhagen (2001) identifies certain predicates, e.g., *it has been claimed, it is puzzling, it should be added,* as "mental space builders," which although syntactically matrix clauses are actually "separate discourse segments." These predicates "all evoke some mental state or process of a subject of consciousness" (345). The syntactically embedded clause in fact presents the most important information.

Thompson (2002) discusses what she calls "Complement-Taking-Predicates" (CTP), the five most common verbs being *think, know, see, guess,* and *remember*. With the exception of *see,* the majority occur with a first-person subject and constitute "formulaic fragments" (131) that express evidentiality, epistemicity, or evaluation.[5] Thompson argues that there is no evidence that the complement clause is an object, nor that it is subordinate: "in the majority of cases, the complement 'overrides' the 'main clause', and the 'main clause' is there to provide speaker stance towards the assessments, claims, counterclaims, and proposals" (134). Especially when used as an independent fragment there is evidence for the "discourse marker status par excellence" of CTPs (144).

Corpus studies have confirmed the frequency of these forms. Wichmann (2001) finds that "stance-marking comment clauses" such as *I think* and *I suppose* are the largest group with a "detached function" in ICE (the International Corpus of English) Great Britain.[6] She equates them with sentence adverbials or pragmatic markers (183). Aijmer (1997:9) calculates a relative frequency for *I think* ranging from 17–51 per 10,000 words, depending on genre, in the London-Lund Corpus (93% of which are followed by a *that*-less complement). In a corpus of American English, Scheibman (2002) finds that among verbs of cognition, 86% of the first-person present-tense forms are formulaic expressions (*I think, I guess, I don't know*) which function epistemically, act to mitigate assertion or

[5] Thompson (2002:138) lists *find* among the "evidential" CTPs but omits *gather*.

[6] At the same time, she finds them the "least typical" of the detached elements as prosodically they are like vocatives, reporting clauses, and adverbial phrases in being integrated.

disagreement in conversation, express speaker point of view, or serve purposes of negative politeness (67); 81% of all verbs of verbal process in the present tense are *I mean*, which also functions epistemically (73), and 89% of second-person verbs of cognition are *you see* (74), which has an interactive function (i.e., speakers use it to check on hearer knowledge, encourage hearers to attend to their assessments, or solicit support for their evaluative stance) (75).

It is perhaps significant that epistemic/evidential parentheticals are acquired very early in the history of the individual. Diessel and Tomasello (2001) show that nearly 50% of the earliest finite complement clauses acquired by children in fact occur with "formulaic" or "propositionally empty" uses of *think, guess, bet, mean,* and *know* functioning as epistemic markers, attention-getters, or markers of illocutionary force. These clauses contain first- or second-person subjects, verbs in the present indicative with no auxiliaries, modals, adverbs, or PPs, and a Ø complementizer. Diessel and Tomasello view these clauses as clausal operators, not full-fledged main clauses, which are rather loosely adjoined to the complement clause. Moreover, the complement clauses are neither formally nor conceptually embedded. They identify three classes of these operators: epistemic (*think, guess, bet, mean, know*), deontic modality (*wish, hope*) and discourse directives (*see, look, remember*).[7] Diessel and Tomasello argue that the fact that children learn formulaic uses before assertive or performative uses of these verbs points to diachrony and ontology proceeding in opposite directions (135) since formulaic uses are related historically to performative use through grammaticalization (106).

In contrast to the acquisition facts, Wierzbicka (2006) argues that epistemic parentheticals have a relatively late origin in the history of the language, namely, the first half of the eighteenth century (207).[8] Moreover, she attributes their rise to "culture-specific historical explanations" (39). Their appearance is causally related to the influence of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), which asserted a distinction between knowing and thinking, emphasized the limitations of human understanding, the tentativeness of much of what we say, and the importance of evidence, and led to the need to specify the epistemic status of utterances. Epistemic parentheticals thus represent an "Anglo cultural script." Wierzbicka admits that detailed historical studies of epistemic parenthetical verbs would be necessary to establish the postulated causal connection (between Locke, English Empiricism, and the rise of epistemic parentheticals). She merely briefly notes the different epistemic situation one finds in More's *A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation* (1557), where *I suppose* and other epistemic parentheticals are used to express confidence and vouch for truth rather than express epistemic modality (242–243). She shows that consideration of

[7] Diessel and Tomasello (2001) observe that the verbs *say, tell,* and *pretend* have more semantic weight and are not used in purely formulaic ways. Note that these verbs would belong to Banfield's category of "narrative parentheticals" (see above).

[8] Some arise even later. Wierzbicka (2006:231, 239) dates the appearance of *I take it* and *I assume* as late as the twentieth century.

the larger context calls into question the epistemic nature of the Shakespearean example (from *Measure for Measure*) cited by the *OED* (s.v. *believe*, def. II7) as the earliest example of epistemic *I believe* (244–245). However, other Shakespearean examples can readily be adduced where *I believe* is both parenthetical and epistemic in meaning; in (1a) Iago uses parenthetical *I believe* to suggest, misleadingly, that he does not have certain knowledge of what has happened. Moreover, already in Middle English *believe* could have the weakened meaning 'to have (a certain) opinion or conviction; think, believe' (*MED*, s.v. *bilēven* v.2, def. 5), and *I leve* (the more common verb than *bileven* in the period) could be found with a meaning comparable to the modern parenthetical (1b). In (1c), the *as*-clause, *as I bileue*, expresses more certainty:[9]

(1) a. Yet surely Cassio, **I believe**, receiv'd / From him that fled some strange indignity / Which patience could not pass (1604 Shakespeare, *Othello* II, iii, 244–246 [Evans]).
b. But, tolde I yow the worste point, **I leve**, Al seyde I soth, ye wolden at me greve (1382–86 Chaucer, *Troilus and Crisyde* I 342–343 [Benson])
'but, if I were to tell you the worst point, I believe, even if I told the truth, you would take offense at me'
c. He is to wys, in feith, **as I bileue** (1396–1400 Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales* G.Cy 644 [Benson]).
'he is too wise, in faith, as I believe'

Brinton (1996:Ch. 8) illustrates in detail the wealth of first-person verbs which function parenthetically and are clearly epistemic in meaning in Middle English, including *I leve, I gesse, I trowe, I suppose, I thynke, I undertake, I wene, I woot*. Therefore, while Wierzbicka's semantic analysis of epistemic parentheticals in modern English is impressive, I question her thesis concerning their origin in the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, there have been changes in the inventory of epistemic markers over time, but the origin of many can be traced to Middle English, if not earlier.

10.3 *I gather*

10.3.1 Frequency of I gather *in Present-day English*

Overall the frequency of *I gather* in Present-day English is very low. Figure 10.1 presents figures from the BNC and the Strathy Corpus on the structures in which *I gather* is found.

Parenthetical *I gather* (in medial and final position) constitutes 19–25% of all occurrences. British English seems to prefer *I gather* in medial position rather than final position (thirty-two medial; twenty-four final), while Canadian English

[9] See §6.2.2 on the function of *as*-clauses.



Figure 10.1 *I gather* in PDE

prefers *I gather* in final position (five medial; nine final). The structure *I gather* Ø S, which is indeterminate between a matrix clause and a parenthetical, is much more frequent in British English than in Canadian English (constituting over 50% of the total instances of *I gather*), suggesting an overall higher occurrence of parenthetical *I gather* in the former. Other parenthetical structures incorporating *I gather* are *from what I gather, so I gather*, and *as I gather*, but they occur infrequently. Biber *et al.* (1999:663) include *gather* among those verbs that govern a *that*-clause, but not among the twenty-seven most common. It should be noted that *I gather* occurs with relatively high frequency with a *that*-clause complement with explicit complementizer (17–19% of all cases of *I gather* in the two corpora). Finally, in respect to genre distribution, Biber *et al.* (1999:688) point to the frequency of *gather* in academic prose. However, parenthetical *I gather* seems to be characteristically oral. Of the fourteen instances in the Strathy, nine occur in speech, four in fiction (in represented speech), and only one in academic prose. Wierzbicka (2006:211) likewise points to the frequency of *I gather* in dialogue.

10.3.2 Meaning/function of I gather *in Present-day English*

The *OED* (s.v. *gather*, def. I10) notes the cognitive meaning of *gather* 'to collect (knowledge) by observation and reasoning; to infer, deduce' dating from the

EModE period. In her detailed analysis of the meaning of *I gather*, Wierzbicka relies closely on this definition (2006:210–211). She argues that *I gather* expresses "subjective uncertainty or caution" and has a clear evidential basis. Collocating frequently with *from*, *I gather* suggests that the speaker "collects" information from some source. But, as Wierzbicka points out, although the source of knowledge may be reliable – what one sees or hears, for example – what is collected is "*hypothetical* knowledge rather than genuine (reliable) knowledge" (211). She thus suggests the following paraphrase of the meaning of *I gather*:

I think know that it is like this
I don't say I know
I think like this because I know some other things now

Wierzbicka sees *I gather* as intermediate between thinking and knowing. Consistent with her general thesis, she concludes that "*I gather* illustrates the post-Lockean emphasis on the limitations of one's knowledge, on the scrupulous acknowledgment of those limitations, and on the importance of evidence for whatever claims to knowledge one may be making."

Corpus evidence seems to support Wierzbicka's analysis for the most part. Cases in which the speaker bases his or her knowledge on actual subjective experience would seem to be rather uncommon:

(2) a. "Mr Pinder, **I gather**," began Montgomery. "Do sit down" (1988 Shepherd, *Black Justice* [BNC]).
b. so we'll make it 1:15, and there are two witnesses scheduled for today, **I gather**? (2000 RCMP Public Complaints Commission Hearing [Strathy]).
c. I lay there, thrashing against the coarse sheets . . . "You didn't appreciate the monastic atmosphere, **I gather**?" (van Herk, *Restlessness* [Strathy]).

A highly formalized use of *I gather* denoting subjective experience is the introduction/greeting frame illustrated in (2a). More often, however, speakers do not seem to rely upon direct evidence for their claims. Rather, the information presented is the result of reasoning, inferring, or deducing. Speakers may reason from information that they have learned, that they have recognized the significance of, or that they have only just remembered. Their subjective uncertainty may be due to the fact that the information is partial, incomplete, or imperfectly remembered (3b), or, frequently, hearsay (as in 3c–e). They may be expressing a mere opinion (based on facts), such as (3a), where *I gather* seems equivalent to *I think* or *I believe*:

(3) a. A Labour government, **I gather**, would bring no end of creative difficulties (1992 *Daily Telegraph*, elect. edn. of 5 Apr. [BNC]).

b. "They had known each other for some time before they married, though, hadn't they?" ventured Greg. "Oh yes – ; years. They met some time in 'thirty-eight, **I gather**" (1992 Barnard, *Posthumous Papers* [BNC]).
c. "That's another reason, **I gather**, why the selection of a nurse has been difficult. Mrs Hamilton wasn't confident that the agency nurses she interviewed would respect her desire for confidentiality on the subject" (1993 Darcy, *A Private Arrangement* [BNC]).
d. a colleague of mine returning from a remote part of Kenya commented on the habit among pregnant women of eating a particular sort of yellowish mud. The practice, which **I gather** is fairly widespread in Africa, appears to be effective in warding off anaemia (n.d. *New Scientist* [BNC]).
e. "And he's not the resentful type." "But mischievous, **I gather**. The head said he doctored the fruit cup, or something" (1993 Barnard, *Little Victims* [BNC]).

We can see in examples such as (3a) that such expressions of uncertainty may serve purposes of negative politeness in that the speaker does not wish to impose his or her opinions on the hearer.

I gather can also be used in an interrogative context in which the speaker is asking for confirmation from the hearer. Such uses are clearly intersubjective in nature:

(4) a. It's that bit in the front which **I gather** was an extension, am I right? (1991 Harlow Women's Institute committee meeting, 4 Sept. [BNC]).
b. "It's all been a bit bloody, **I gather**." "Yep." She brought him up to date with what had happened (1991 Tanner, *Folly's Child* [BNC]).
c. "There are four people in the office, **I gather**?" "That's correct" (2000–01 Walkerton Water Tragedy Inquiry Oct–June [Strathy]).

A fuller parenthetical structure serving the same epistemic and evidential purposes is *from what I could gather*:

(5) a. Norwich won at Arsenal and at Aston Villa the other week – ; convincingly too, **from what I gather** (n.d. *Today* [BNC]).
b. It was a ghostwriter, the same fellow who wrote that awful book about Turkey, oh you know . . . *Midnight Express* – another great anti-Muslim book **from what I gather** (1996 *Queen's Quarterly* [Strathy]).

In function, *I gather* seems to bear some resemblance to *I guess* in that both display the inferential processes of the speaker. Kärkkäinan (2007) argues that *I guess* is a subjective evidential (rather than epistemic) marker which, especially in its sequence-initiating function, exhibits the speaker's reasoning process, which is based on evidence "provided by prior discourse or by visual or sensory evidence, and also via inference (i.e., with no overt evidence in sight)" (212). Van Bogaert (2006) argues that *I guess* shows the speaker drawing an inference at the moment of speaking based on very little or no evidence. Similarly, Wierzbicka

(2006:210) considers *I guess* as an expression of spur of the moment or ex promptu thought, with no reflective component. All three see *I guess* as retaining some of its referential or propositional meaning, namely, "the act of hazarding an opinion for which one knows one doesn't have a sufficient basis" (Wierzbicka 2006:210). Finally, Van Bogaert (2006) argues that *I guess* has undergone grammaticalization, with Kärkkäinan (2007) pointing to the telling phonological reduction of *I guess* to *guess*.

10.3.3 Rise of I gather

A cognitive meaning of *gather* 'to conclude (sth.), infer, understand' is available already in Middle English (see *MED*, s.v. *gaderen* v., def. 3). Examples of *I gather* in Middle English are consistently followed by an NP complement. The earliest instances of parenthetical *I gather* occur in the adverbial structure *as I gather*, appearing first in the late sixteenth century. These may include a *by/from* phrase denoting the source of the information expressed. Example (6c) would seem to indicate that, like parenthetical *I gather* in Present-day English, *as I gather* can be used to refer to hearsay knowledge:

(6) a. So farre **as I gather** by the substance of your letters (1576 Fleming, *A Panoplie of Epistles* [*OED*]).
b. Yet **as I gather** by my comming forth, / Being then sixe, it cannot now be lesse / Than halfe an hower past seuen (1599 Anon., *A Warning for Faire Women* [ED]).
c. Harke, **as I gather**, / That great Ship was *de Castro* call'd your Father (1653 Dekker and Ford, *The Spanish Gipsie* III [ED]).
d. "A strange Alteration indeed!" says Adams, "**as I gather** from some Hints which have dropped from Joseph" (1742 Fielding, *Joseph Andrews* Vol. 1, Chap. III [18cF]).
e. The time's at hand my lord, the enemy hearing of succours daily flocking to us, is marching, **as I gather**, towards our camp (1790 Colman, *The Battle of Hexham* I [ED]).

The first clear examples of parenthetical *I gather* date from the late-nineteenth century. Already in these early uses *I gather* may denote information that is gained through reasoning and deduction rather than first-hand experience:

(7) a. The daughter, **I gather**, is no longer living! (1871 Eliot, *Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life* [UofV]).
b. These performances, **I gather**, are to impress upon you that he is a free man and your equal (1889–98 Kipling, *American Notes* [UofV]).
c. "That sum, **I gather**, will be sufficient to remove your father's objection to your marriage with Mr. Hughes" (1909 Cabell, *The Certain Hour* [UofV]).



Figure 10.2 *I gather that* vs. *I gather* Ø over time

The syntactic origin of parenthetical *I gather* is somewhat unclear. The rarity of adverbial *as I gather* structures throughout the history of English and the 300-year gap between the appearance of parenthetical *as I gather* and parenthetical *I gather* argue that *as I gather* is an unlikely source of *I gather*. Postulating the development of parenthetical *I gather* from a matrix clause followed by a *that*-clause – the matrix clause hypothesis – encounters difficulties as well. Although a *that*-clause is the most common complement during the Early and Late Modern English periods, the structure *I gather* Ø S – a necessary second step in parenthetical development – shows no increase in frequency during the crucial period (mid- to late-nineteenth century). As can be seen in Figure 10.2, which shows the frequency of *that* and zero-complements with *I gather* in the *OED* quotation bank and the University of Virginia Modern English Collection, zero-complements do not become more common relative to *that*-complements during this period. However, Ø-complements are now more common in Present-day English (cf. Figure 10.1).

A possible source for a relative structure in which the fronting of the relative pronoun results in a structure where *I gather* (+ PP) might be seen as parenthetical:

(8) a. The seco∼d poynt which **I gather** of Christs Priest-hood is, that seeing he fulfilled the figures of all the bloody sacrifices offred by the Priests of the order of Aaron (of which order he himselfe was not) it were absurd to say, that he fulfilled not the special & proper sacrifice of Melchisedech of whose order he was (1602 Fitzherbert, *A Defence of the Catholyke Cause* [EEBO]).

b. this spirituall good, which **I gather** from thy divelish spite, should make thee weary of this way, and pull in thy hornes (1631 Bolton, *Instructions for a Right Comforting Afflicted Consciences* [EEBO]).
c. though I saw / Money put in his hand by divers Gallants: / Men of great place and worship; which **I gather** / Are to be of the Riflers (1653 Brome, *The Damoiselle, or the Ordinary* III, i [ED]).

Even closer in structure to parentheticals are the sentential relative clauses given in (9), where deletion of the object relative pronoun yields a parenthetical structure.

(9) a. yet vpon better aduise he changed his opinion: which **I gather** by these two Circumstances (1608 James, *An Apologie for Iohn Wickliffe* [EEBO]).
b. for it should seeme thou art attached for that whereof thou wast never guilty, which **I gather** from what hath happened to mee (1638 Tatius, *The Loves of Clitophon and Leucippe* [EEBO]).
c. where, by sinning wilfully, I understand an utter rejection of Gods tender of this sacrifice of Christs blood, which **I gather** from the Apostle in the words that follow (1658 Blake, *Vindiciae Foederis* [EEBO]).
d. he will acknowledge nothing to be the Rule of Christian Communion (as far as I can judge) but the Creed: which **I gather** from those words (1668 Wright, *Anarchie Reviving* [EEBO]).

Despite difficulties with the matrix clause hypothesis for accounting for the rise of *I gather*, it remains perhaps the best account.

10.4 *I find*

The verb *find (out)* belongs to the class of verbs termed "semifactives," along with other such other verbs as *know, discover, notice, observe, realize*, and *see* (Hooper 1975:92). Unlike true factives, which express a subjective attitude, semifactives denote a process of knowing. Like "weak assertives" (see above), semifactives may function as parentheticals in which the original complement functions as the main assertion (*You've reupholstered your couch, I see*) and especially when in the first person present tense are behaviorally similar: they are ambiguous in questions (*Did you learn that he had lied? Yes, I did, Yes, he had*), they are ambiguous under negation (*I didn't find out that the flight had been cancelled*),[10] tags are formed on the complement clause (*I see you have bought a new car, haven't you?*), and they allow root transformations. The semantic content of the semifactive is reduced in the parenthetical (114–121). Although Hooper does not include *gather* among her list of semifactives, we can, with confidence, place it among this class.

[10] However, the non-parenthetical reading ('did not find out') is preferred. I have trouble getting the parenthetical reading.



Figure 10.3 *I find* in PDE

10.4.1 Frequency of I find *in Present-day English*

In general *I find* is of much higher frequency than *I gather* in Present-day English. As can be seen in Figure 10.3, which displays the constructions in which *I find* occurs in 200 random examples from the BNC and the Strathy, I *find* is most often found with an NP complement, typically with an accompanying adjunct, as in (10a). The idiom *I find it* + A is common (10b), as is *I find myself* + A (10c). When *I find* takes a clausal complement (10d), it is one-third more likely to take a *that*-complementizer than a zero-complementizer. The occurrence of *that* with *find* is "notably common," more than 100/million (Biber *et al.* 1999:663); Aarts and Aarts (1995:166) also observe that *find* has a "marked preference with the subordinator *that*." According to Biber *et al.* (1999:669) an explicit *that*-complementizer occurs most often in fiction, then academic prose, then news, and finally conversation.

(10) a. As I shall suggest, **I find** the ideas of these individuals extremely valuable (1992 Staiger, "Film, Reception, and Cultural Studies" *Centennial Review* 36 (1) [FROWN]).
b. **I FIND** it unspeakably horrendous that you suggest putting down dear old Fred Bassett (1986 "Fred just Has to Stay, his Loyal Fans Say," *Fifty Fifty* 29 October [ACE]).

c. **I find myself** asserting New Zealand ignorance of the example of American poetry (1987 Manhire, "Breaking the Line: A View of American & N.Z. Poetry" *Islands* 3 [WC]).
d. **I find that** whenever I try to point out a flaw in his writing, I fail (1991 *The Guardian* [FLOB]).

Despite overall greater frequency of *find*, parenthetical *I find* is of much lower frequency than parenthetical *I gather*. While parenthetical *I gather* constitutes an average of 22% of all instances of *I gather* in both North American and British English, parenthetical *I find* constitutes only 2% or less of the total cases of *I find*. The much smaller number of indeterminate *I find* Ø S structures also contributes to the lower frequency of parenthetical *I find*. Moreover, where we saw that British English seems to make more frequent use of parenthetical *I gather*, usage of parenthetical *I find* is roughly equivalent in the two national idioms. The BNC evidence points to *I find* occurring primarily in the spoken and fiction genres. Wierzbicka (2006) claims that parenthetical *I find* is primarily sentence final, but again the BNC evidence points to its occurring predominately in medial position.[11]

Although instances of *as I find* occur, they are rarely parenthentical. In the 200 instances of *I find* tabulated, only one parenthetical example was found in each corpus.

10.4.2 Meaning/function of I find *in Present-day English*

The *OED* (s.v. *find* v.) gives two descriptions of *find* which are relevant to the meaning of *I find:*

(a) "to discover or perceive on inspection or consideration; to perceive or recognize the presence of. Sometimes approximating to the sense of Fr. *trowver*: To consider (a quality, circumstance) to be present" (def. I5a);
(b) "to discover, come to the knowledge of (a fact or state of thing) by experience or trial . . . Also, in a more subjective sense (cf. Fr. *trower*): To feel to be (agreeable, disagreeable, etc.), to consider or regard as (ridiculous, excellent, etc.)" (def. I6a).

Likewise, Aarts and Aarts (1995:169–170) list five senses of *find*, two of which are relevant here:

(a) "to discover (by chance or experience) that something is the case; to become aware of";
(b) "to regard as, to look upon."

They note, however, that the two senses are difficult to distinguish (170).

[11] A search of *I find* followed by a punctuation mark in the BNC yielded forty-seven parentheticals, nineteen in final position and twenty-eight in medial position.

Subsumed under these definitions are the two idioms noted above: *find it* + A (*OED*, s.v. *find* v., def. I6a) and *find oneself* (*OED*, s.v. *find* v., def. I5c). The latter means 'to perceive oneself to be in a specified place or position, or condition of body or mind. Also in a weaker sense: To come to be (in the course of events).'[12] Wierzbicka (2006:221–222) sees the former, the "so-called subject-raised construction" *I find it/that* + A, to be consistent with the *OED*'s definition of *find* as expressing something ridiculous/ludicrous. She observes that in addition to implying a personal experience, this form expresses personal opinion that results from such experience (evidenced by its frequent collocation with the adverb *personally*). Thus, it has elements of thinking ('consideration'), knowing ('coming to the knowledge of'), and experience ('knowing something because of what happened to me') (221).

Turning to parenthetical *I find*, Wierzbicka (2006:222–223) argues that although it need not always refer overtly to the speaker's experience, it must be anchored in it; for example, the information stated in the clause to which *I find* is attached cannot be based on hearsay. She sees *I find* as having no evaluative component: there is "no reference to what the speaker feels, only to what has happened to him or her" (223). Contrasting the *I find it* A construction and the *I find* parenthetical, she points out that the first expresses a "running thought," while in the second the "speaker is making a statement (qualified by the parenthetical phrase)" and can hence "sound more factual and objective" (223). Finally, she observes that *I find that* is intermediate between these two constructions (224), with the *that*-clause suggesting more general applicability (= 'generally speaking').

Wierzbicka (2006) concludes that all instances of *I find* have an element of personal experience and of personal opinion derived from personal experience (224).[13] *I find* also serves as an acknowledgment that experience gained through personal experience is limited (224) and does not need to be shared by others (225). In its expression of personal experience and the limited knowledge gained from it, *I find* is similar to *I sense* (226).

Taking a similar view, Persson (1993:3) suggests that *I find* (Swedish *finner*) is equivalent to one use of *I think*, namely, to express a subjective impression based on direct observation, e.g., *I think she is beautiful* = *I find her beautiful*. This denotes an "unpremeditated sense impression" in which there is "a direct link between the perception or mental stimulus and the resulting proposition without any intervening thought process" (8, 15). However, while Persson believes that this use is comparable to the use of German *finden*, Swedish *tycker*, and French *trouver*, Wierzbicka (2006:224–225) argues that the cognate forms found in other European languages are more limited in scope than the comparable English form since they are restricted to personal, subjective experience only and cannot be

[12] Cf. French *se trouver*, German *sich befinden*.

[13] The aspect of 'personal experience' in *find* is not captured in grammars of English. Quirk *et al*. (1985:1180–1181) include *find* among "private verbs" which express an intellectual state or intellectual act that is not observable, while Biber *et al*. (1999:666) categorize it as a "mental verb."

used with statements of fact or objective knowledge resulting from personal experience.[14]

The ICAME evidence suggests that parenthetical *I find* is most often used to refer to what is visible/tangible to the speaker or to that which results from the speaker's actual experience:

(11) a. Meanwhile, I've asked Joni's mum to show me the scrapbook she's made, entitled "The Life and Times of Roberta Joan Anderson." I want to tweak my memory as ti [sic] when this talent first showed up.
And it's here, **I find**, in the early sketches of deer and landscapes, the pastels of dogs and vases, the pencil drawing of a teacher . . . (2000–02 *CBC Magazine* [Strathy]).
b. it is some days since I have found anything to eat. Hunger, **I find**, is not a condition to relish, and there was me thinking I had a small appetite (1993 Storm, *Sign for the Sacred* [BNC]).
c. I unlock the front door. For once, **I find**, Timmy is not asleep. He is sitting at the top of the stairs, sobbing (1992 Frayn, *A Landing on the Sun* [BNC]).
d. A useful technique with steps, **I find**, is to apply a thin line of paint under the ridges of the steps (1991 *The Artist's and Illustrator's Magazine* [BNC]).
e. But I drop stitches, **I find**. Knitting a cardy for my granddaughter. Very fancy pattern (1993 Lee, *Dark Dance* [BNC]).

Occasionally the element of personal experience seems to be somewhat attenuated, and *I find*, similar to *I gather,* refers to what the speaker reasons from previous knowledge or simply thinks; that is, it can be replaced by *I think* or *I believe*:

(12) a. IT'S IMPORTANT to get out and about with ministers, **I find,** but opening state houses with Phil Goff on a wet Wednesday morning is possibly not my idea of a good time (1986 Welch, "Political Diary: Mixed blessings," *NZ Listener* 20/12 [WC]).
b. "You told me to help Estabrook if he needed it." "Helping him hire an assassin isn't what I had in mind." "Chant was very discreet." "Death makes you that way, **I find**" (1992 Barker, *Imajica* [BNC]).
c. generally the most difficult men to deal with, **I find**, are men who for whatever reason, are actually inadequate, a little bit sensitive to women being competent (n.d. *Misogyny*: television discussion [BNC]).
d. "A lot of women in bands, **I find**, are mushy and tokeny" (1991 *New Musical Express* [BNC]).

[14] Wierzbicka suggests that French *constater* may be closer to *find*, but not identical. It expresses objective knowledge based on analytical thinking as well as evidence and is hence (unlike English) intersubjectively valid.

10.4.3 Rise of I find

In Middle English *find* can already be used in its cognitive sense 'to discover, find out, or learn by inspection, investigation, observation, or reflection' (*MED*: s.v. *finden* v., def. 7). *I find* typically occurs with an NP argument; clausal complements are rare, but typically contain an explicit *that* S (13a). The *I find it* A construction (13b) and the *I find myself* construction (13c) are already in existence.

(13) a. Of fauutis **I fynde þat** frist dede engendre Cursidnesse and combraunce amonge þe yonge lordis (c1475 (c1399) *Mum and the Sothsegger* (1) (Cmb Ll.4.14) 3.113 [*MED*]).
'of mistakes I find that the first deed engenders cursedness and sinfulness among the young lords'

b. Wher so that I reste or I trauaile, **I finde it** evere redy to assaile Mi resoun (1390 Gower, *Confessio Amantis* (Frf 3) 8.2220 [*MED*]).
'whether I rest or work, I find it ever ready to assail my reason'

c. **I fynde my silf** withouten recoueraunce (c1450 ?Charles of Orleans, *Poems* (Hrl 682) 24/707 [*MED*]).
'I find myself without relief'

More interesting is the fact that *as I find* parentheticals occur (14) as well as occasional *I find* (15) parentheticals:

(14) a. In olde dawes, **as I fynde** (a1425 (?a1400) *Romance of the Rose* (Htrn 409) 2838 [*MED*]).
'in old days, as I find'

b. Both of French and of Germayn kynde Was þis man . . . and ferþermor, **as I fynde**, Whan in his modir newly conceyved was he [etc.] (1440 Capgrave, *Life of Saint Norbert* (Hnt HM 55) 101 [*MED*]).
'this man was of both French and German blood . . . and furthermore, as I find, when in his mother he was just conceived'

c. With yat word, **as I fynd**, He fel doun stark blynd (a1475 (a1400) "Man ȝyf þat . . . " (incipit) (Hrl 3954) 348 [*MED*]).
'with that word, as I find, He fell down completely blind'

(15) a. A goode fryday, **ich fynde**, a felon was ysauede That vnlawefulliche hadde ylyued al hus lyf-tyme (c1400 (?a1387) Langland, *Piers Plowman*, C Version (Hnt HM 137) 12.255 [*MED*]).
'on Good Friday, I find, a felon was saved that unlawfully had lived all his lifetime'

b. Foure forlange, **I finde**, þe flode was o brede (c1450 (?a1400) *Wars of Alexander* (Ashm 44) 3833 [*MED*]).
'four furlongs, I find, the water was in breadth'

Despite its early appearance, parenthetical *as I find* falls out of use. The latest examples date from the mid-nineteenth century:

(16) a. In a greater proportion along the east coast; and greatest of all, **as I find**, in the North Country (1841 Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History* i. 30 [*OED*]).
b. At the present day, and in this country, **as I find** by my own experience, a few implements, a knife, an axe, a spade, a wheelbarrow, &c., and for the studious, lamplight, stationery, and access to a few books, rank next to necessaries (1854 Thoreau. *Walden, or Life in the Woods* [UofV]).

The structure does not function as a parenthetical in Present-day English; that is, *as* is not a relative pronoun in this structure. Rather it functions as a conjunction expressing mode (manner or degree) or reason (see *OED*: s.v. *as* adv. [conj. and rel pron.], defs. BII and BIV).

Parenthetical *I find* becomes more common in the seventeenth century:

(17) a. For ech best **I finde** studys safety to keepe, & shunnith death & decay (1556 Colville, *Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy* [HC]).
b. It cannot be, **I find**, / But such a face should bear a wicked mind (1593 Shakespeare, *The Rape of Lucrece* 1539–1540 [Evans]).
c. My breath **I find** will faile me, – your pardon Duke (1620 Anon., *The two Merry Milke-maids* IV, iii [ED]).
d. And yet why so? sith since I call to mind, Than the Clementes none were more unkind, Than Innocents more nocent none **I find** (1640 Fuller, *Joseph's Coat* (1867) 237 [*OED*]).
e. It is the first, **I finde**, that was ever imposed by any who had been Members of the Commons House after a Parliament dissolved (1649 Prynne, *A Legall Vindication of the Liberties of England [. . .]* [LC]).
f. Must my lodging be your vaulting~school still? Thou hast appointed a wench to come hither, **I find** (1672 Wycherley, *Love in a Wood* IV. v [*OED*]).
g. so it is, that my meaning, **I find**, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood (1690 Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* [UofV]).

Again the source of parenthetical *I find* is problematic. Assuming the main clause hypothesis, that is, that parenthetical *I find* originates in a main clause structure with a clausal *that*-complement, we encounter two problems. First is that such structures are relatively uncommon compared to those with NP complements. In the *OED* quotation bank in the period 1500–1700, where there are 283 examples of *I find*, only 51 (or 18%) contain *that*-clause complements; of these 20 contain an explicit *that*-complementizer, 31 a zero-complementizer. Although there is a increase in *I find* with zero-complementizers relative to *I find* with *that*-complementizers during this period (see Figure 10.4), this trend seems to have been reversed in Present-day English (cf. Figure 10.3), where *that*-complements are more common than zero-complements.



Figure 10.4 *I find that* vs. *I find* Ø over time

A second problem for the matrix clause hypothesis is the meaning difference between parenthetical *I find* and matrix clause *I find* noted by Wierzbicka (2006; see above). Given the early appearance of relative/adverbial *as I find* and its continued existence until the mid-nineteenth century, it seem more likely that parenthetical *as I find* gives rise to *I find* through ellipsis of *as*.

10.5 Grammaticalization

As we have seen in all of the previous chapters, grammaticalization processes seem to operate in the development of *I gather* and *I find* as pragmatic markers. Foremost is the process of decategorialization whereby full complement-taking clauses and/or adverbial/relative clauses are downgraded to invariable particle-like epistemic parentheticals; clausal status is reduced to something resembling adverbial status. *I gather* and *I find* undergo fixing and fusing – for example, they no longer allow modals or adverbial modifiers – but, like most pragmatic markers, which typically remain phonetically fully realized forms, they do not show coalescence. Desemanticization, or the loss of concrete meaning and acquisition of more abstract cognitive meanings, applies to both verbs at an early stage in their development. These expressions also undergo a shift from referential to non-referential (pragmatic) meaning as they cease to denote cognitive acts but rather express speaker attitude, namely epistemic and evidential meaning.

As first-person parentheticals these forms are inherently subjective; in addition, they acquire intersubjective meanings in certain uses where they seek confirmation from the interlocutor.

The development of *I find* and *I gather* also exemplifies Hopper's (1991) principles of layering, divergence, and persistence. First, they represent more recent epistemic markers, alongside older epistemic forms such as modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs. Second, both expressions continue to be used with concrete meaning in matrix clause and adverbial clause uses. Finally, the original meanings of *find* and *gather* persist to a certain extent in the pragmatic uses of the parentheticals. We saw above that parenthetical *I find* is always tied to personal experience and cannot be used for hearsay evidence; this connection to personal experience can be seen in both of the relevant meanings of *find* cited above, 'to discover or perceive on inspection . . . ' and 'to discover . . . by experience or trial.' In contrast, implicit in the meaning of *gather* is the idea of 'collecting from elsewhere, from outside'; this meaning permits parenthetical *I gather* to be used frequently for information gained through hearsay.

10.6 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed work on first-person present-tense parentheticals (commonly known as "epistemic parentheticals") beginning with Urmson (1952) and extending to Wierzbicka (2006). Although categorizations of these forms differ, there is a consensus that they are subjective, modal (epistemic), and frequently evidential. Rather than denoting a thought act, they express speaker viewpoint, attitude, or evaluation and hence function as comment clauses. Because they do not contribute to the propositional content but rather guide the reader to the proper interpretation of the adjoined clause, they also function as pragmatic markers. Some epistemic parentheticals, such as *I think* and *I guess*, are of high frequency in discourse, and the acquisition facts suggest that these forms are learned very early as formulaic phrases. Wierzbicka's (2006) argument that epistemic parentheticals are causally linked to the rise of Empiricism in the eighteenth century is not supported by the diachronic facts, however, since many of the common epistemic parentheticals, such as *I believe* or *I guess*, can be traced to the Middle English period.

After this review, the chapter focuses on two epistemic parentheticals that have previously received little attention, *I gather* and *I find*. Although *find* is in general a much more common verb than *gather, I gather* functions as a parenthetical relatively more frequently. Both are characteristic of oral genres and speech in fiction. The overarching function of both parentheticals is epistemic, or the expression of speaker doubt or uncertainty. However, both also serve an evidential function in denoting the source of the speaker's knowledge. Typically, the source is direct experience, what the speaker sees or hears. The parentheticals express both personal experience and the personal opinion derived from that

experience. The experiential nature of *I gather* may become somewhat weakened, however, and it thus comes to express knowledge based on reasoning or inferring; in this sense, it is interchangeable with *I think* or *I believe*. *I gather* is also commonly used to denote hearsay knowledge. Historically, both *gather* and *find* can have cognitive meaning already in Middle English. Both parenthetical *as I find* and *I find* can be found in Middle English, but parenthetical *as I gather* does not appear until the late sixteenth century and parenthetical *I gather* until the late nineteenth century. Accounting for either form by the matrix clause hypothesis is problematical as *I find/gather that/Ø* S is a relatively rare construction type and the form with zero-complementizer does not increase over time, as would be expected. For *I find*, the construction with explicit complementizer is still more common in Present-Day English. Thus, although *I gather that* S is a plausible source for parenthetical *I gather*, it seems better to derive parenthetical *I find* from the adverbial/relative *as I find*.

11 Concluding remarks

11.1 Introduction

The foregoing study has involved a corpus investigation of the diachronic development of a number of "comment clauses," or sentence disjuncts of clausal origin, that are based on common verbs of perception and communication, such as *look, see, say,* and *mean.* These comment clauses assume diverse syntactic forms: present-tense verbs with first-person subjects (*I say, I daresay, I see, I mean, I find, I gather*), with second-person subjects (*you say, you see*), and with third-person subjects (*that is to say*), adverbial/relative structures (*as you say, as/so you see, if you will, as it were, as I find, as I gather, what's more*), and imperative clauses (*look, see, hark, listen, hear*).

The chapter will first review the theoretical background of this study (§11.2) and will synthesize the results of the case studies in regard to the syntactic sources of comment clauses (§11.3). It will end with a possible interface with another theoretical model as well as some directions for future research (§11.4).

11.2 Background of the study

Several assumptions, which are explored in the first three chapters of this work, underpin the case studies, namely, that comment clauses are parenthetical pragmatic markers of clausal origin (§11.2.1), that in their historical development comment clauses undergo grammaticalization (§11.2.2), and that in contrast to the well-understood development of non-clausal pragmatic markers, the prevailing view of the origin of comment clauses – what I have termed the "matrix clause hypothesis" – is problematic in a number of ways (§11.2.3).

11.2.1 Parenthetical pragmatic markers

Comment clauses such as *I think* or *you see* exhibit many of the characteristics of the larger class of parentheticals: they lack a syntactic connection with their anchor clause (sharing only linear adjacency), they are positionally mobile, they

are semantically independent and non-truth-conditional, and they share a "comment" function, which can be understood broadly as the expression of speaker attitude or stance. Furthermore, they retain non-parenthetical uses.

Comment clauses and parentheticals raise two similar questions. The first question relates to the indeterminate status of clausal parentheticals and comment clauses in initial position. While it has been argued that the presence or absence of *that* may resolve this indeterminacy, the frequent deletion of *that* in spoken English and the complexities of *that*-deletion in the history of English both call into question the validity of this argument. The second question relates to the proper syntactic derivation of these forms. Some scholars argue for an "extraction" analysis in which parentheticals begin as syntactically integrated elements (typically main clauses) and once the syntactic bond is broken then move into positions within or adjacent to the anchor clause. A variant of this proposal involves movement of the *that*-clause (rather than of the main clause) to a higher, matrix position (what Ross [1973] calls "slifting" or sentence lifting); a process of "niching" may then move the parenthetical to various positions. In contrast, other scholars argue for a "parenthetical" analysis in which the parenthetical begins as a syntactically independent element and is then inserted into or attached to the anchor clause.

Comment clauses likewise exhibit many of the features of pragmatic markers in that they lack propositional or referential content (have little semantic content) but rather serve pragmatic or procedural functions, with scope over the entire clause. Comment clauses frequently have textual and interpersonal (subjective and intersubjective) functions typical of pragmatic markers. They are optional elements in the sense that their omission does not render the discourse ungrammatical or incomprehensible, though it may cause pragmatic or processing difficulties. Comment clauses are syntactically free from the rest of the clause and positionally mobile, often occurring in initial position. Like pragmatic markers, they are characteristic of oral or speech-based discourse.

For these reasons, this work has assumed that comment clauses are parenthetical pragmatic markers. What sets comment clauses apart from other parentheticals and pragmatic markers is their clausal origin. Pragmatic markers are more often "short" items such as *well* or *right,* while parentheticals range from single words, such as *understandably*, to entire sentences, such as *there's no harm in saying so*. As Quirk *et al.* note (1985:1112–1113), comment clauses are either finite clauses (sometimes syntactically defective), such as *I think, as you see*, or *what's more important,* or non-finite clauses, such as *to be honest, strictly speaking,* or *stated bluntly*.

11.2.2 Pragmatic markers and grammaticalization

A number of synchronic studies of comment clauses, including studies of *I think, I guess, I believe, I suppose, I don't know,* and *you know*, have noted that these forms have undergone, or are undergoing, grammaticalization. Changes

typical of grammaticalization affecting these forms include decategorialization (often correlating with the loss of *that*), acquisition of discourse, pragmatic, and politeness functions, increased subjectivity, positional mobility (but often with preference for initial position), divergence, persistence, and layering (Hopper 1991), and, on occasion, phonological attrition (e.g., *I dunno, y'know, guess*) (see §3.2.3.2 for fuller details).

In respect to their diachronic development, it has been suggested that comment clauses undergo grammaticalization (or pragmaticalization), lexicalization, or both. For example, studies of *I think, me þynceð* > *methinks*, *þa gelamp þæt* 'then it happened that' > *it bifel that*, *I pray you/thee* > *pray/prithee, I'm afraid, let's,* and *videlicet* 'that is to say, namely' > *viz.*, have all pointed out features of grammaticalization that apply to these comment clauses. Other studies of *I think* as well as of *you know, listen*, and *look* have suggested that because of the agrammatical nature of pragmatic markers, their development is more accurately described as pragmaticalization. In contrast, the development of *isn't it* > *innit*, *I think, thank you,* and *I know* have also been argued to be cases of lexicalization, not grammaticalization (see §3.2.3.2, §3.3, and §3.4.3 for fuller details).

Upon initial examination, it would seem that the development of comment clauses, as syntactic phrases, is an obvious example of lexicalization, a process typically equated with the univerbation of syntactic phrases, with semantic demotivation and idiomaticization, and with complex units becoming irregular and opaque and thus being treated holistically (as "lexical items"). However, following the work of Traugott (1995a) and Brinton (1996) on pragmatic markers and Brinton and Traugott (2005) on the distinction between lexicalization and grammaticalization, this work has assumed that the development of comment clauses – *qua* pragmatic markers – is most accurately understood as grammaticalization (a process encompassing pragmaticalization, idiomaticization, and subjectification among other types of changes), not as lexicalization.

As argued in Brinton and Traugott (2005)[1] both lexicalization and grammaticalization may involve fusion (the freezing and fixing of forms) and coalescence (the loss of phonological segments subsequent to fusion). Comment clauses all exhibit such freezing, with the elimination of adverbial and modal modifiers and fixing in person and tense. Coalescence in comment clauses is less rarely encountered than in other instances of grammaticalization, although it may occur, as in cases such as *I don't know* > *I dunno, you know* > *y'know, God woot* > *Goddot(h), I pray thee* > *prithee, look to it* > *lookit, I dare say* > *I daresay* > *I dessey, vidēre licet* > *videlicet* > *viz., look you/ye/thee* > *lookee,* and *what is more* > *what's more*. More often, there may be some ellipsis of phonological content[2] without actual bonding, as in cases such as *I pray you/thee* > *pray, by the Virgin Mary* > *marry,*

[1] See §3.4.2 and Table 3.1.

[2] In one case studied in this book, there is expansion of the comment clause from *that is* > *that is to say* and a consequential increase in phonological content (see §4.7).

I say > *say, I guess* > *guess, it is to wit* > *to wit, as you say* > *you say, as I find* > *I find, as you see* > *you see, say to me/us* > *say,* and *look you* > *look.*[3]

Both lexicalization and grammaticalization may involve bleaching and desemanticization, often the result of metonymic or metaphoric change. However, there are differences in respect to the semantic changes involved. Grammaticalization typically begins with words having very general meaning, such as the verbs of perception and communication, *say, see, look,* and *mean*, which form the comment clauses studied in this book, whereas lexicalization begins with words with highly specified meanings. Grammaticalization leads to abstract meanings, such as the metalinguistic, metatextual, or epistemic/evidential meanings of the verbs in comment clauses, while lexicalization leads to semantic non-compositionality and typically specialization rather than generalization of meaning. In the comment clause *I dare say*, for example, *dare* loses the meaning of 'have courage to' and *say* the meaning of 'utter in words' and the clause becomes a marker of epistemicity. In fact, Wischer (2000) argues that grammaticalization entails a loss of semantic features and lexicalization an addition of semantic features. In contrast to lexicalization, grammaticalization involves subjectification (or the encoding of speaker attitudes and perspectives) and intersubjectification (or the encoding of meanings focused on the addressee), as, for example, in the comment clauses *I say* coming to express speaker emotion or emphasis or the change in the meaning of *if you will* from 'if you are willing to say so' to 'if you will allow me to describe it so.' Himmelmann (2004:33) argues that grammaticalization always involves "semantic–pragmatic expansion," whereas lexicalization may or may not show such expansion (and may even show contraction). In the case of comment clauses, and pragmatic markers generally, there are changes consistent with such expansion in which the forms acquire procedural and pragmatic meanings replacing their propositional and referential meanings, for example, when *mean* in *I mean* weakens its meaning 'intend' or 'signify' and assumes metalinguistic meaning of repair, reformulation, and exemplification. Politeness functions are often part of the pragmatic meanings that develop during grammaticalization, such as the use of *you see* to claim mutual understanding and thus avoid a threat to negative face. Moreover, grammaticalization, but not lexicalization, involves the conventionalization of invited inferences, which we see, for example, when the comment clause *look* conventionalizes in its pragmatic function the implicature 'what is visible must be believed.'

The development of comment clauses exhibits the "principles of grammaticalization" identified by Hopper (1991), decategorialization, persistence, layering, and divergence. As argued in Brinton and Traugott (2005), the feature that most clearly distinguishes lexicalization and grammaticalization is **decategorialization**. Although lexicalization may show changes in class membership through

[3] Of Lehmann's features of grammaticalization, Waltereit (2002:1004–1006; 2006:73–74) sees only phonological "attrition" as appropriate to pragmatic markers and thus rejects grammaticalization as a process accounting for the development of pragmatic markers (see below).

conversion, for example, these are not unidirectional, but may involve movement either to a more major word (e.g., *up* [Adv] > *up* [V]) or a more minor word class (e.g., *round* [A] > *round* [Adv/P]). Decategorialization always involves a change in the direction more major to more minor. In the case of comment clauses we see a shift from a fully formed clause governing a complement (phrase or clause) to a syntactically defective, frozen clause which has lost its clausal behavioral characteristics, such as the ability to take adverbial or modal modifiers, to govern a complement, and so on. In fact, it has, as Thompson and Mulac (1991b) note, assumed a "particle-like" quality. These changes clearly represent a process of decategorialization.

In addition to decategorialization, persistence, or the retention of some trace of the original meaning, is evident in comment clauses, as when *mean* in the *I mean* comment clause retains aspects of the senses of 'intend' and 'signify,' or *find* in the *I find* comment clause retains aspects of the meaning 'discover by experience.' Layering, or the presence of newly grammaticalized forms alongside older such forms, can be seen, for example, in the coexistence of the newer *I mean* and the older *that is (to say)* or *to wit*. Divergence, or the ability of grammaticalized forms to retain their original functions in certain contexts, is true of all of the comment clauses studied in this text, except perhaps *I daresay* and *as it were*.[4]

What also argues for the view of comment clauses as resulting from grammaticalization rather than lexicalization is the possibility of cross-linguistic parallels (see, e.g., Lindström and Wide 2005; Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2006). In contrast, lexicalizations are typically one-off, language-specific events.

There are thus strong arguments to seeing the development of comment clauses as an instance of grammaticalization (not lexicalization), despite Waltereit's (2002; 2006; see n. 3) argument that pragmatic markers fulfill only one of Lehmann's (1995 [1982]) six diachronic parameters of grammaticalization (see §3.2.1). Since comment clauses do not belong to established grammatical paradigms, they obviously fail to undergo "paradigmaticization," and since they are grammatically (though not discoursally) optional elements, they fail to undergo "obligatorification" in Lehmann's terms. In general, it can also be said that they do not undergo "fixation" as their position in respect to the anchor is variable. However, as initial position is often preferred, there might be evidence for seeing comment clauses as "semi-fixed."

Rather than rejecting the view of comment clauses and pragmatic markers generally as undergoing grammaticalization, I would suggest that Lehmann's parameters are salient but not necessary features of grammaticalization. Traugott (2003a:630) has suggested that although the features "that Lehmann highlights are strong and viable tendencies in changes that lead to certain new form–function relationships, such as case and tense-aspect-modality, they cannot be

[4] Hopper's principle of "specialization," which involves the choice of one grammaticalized variant among several within a functional domain, is not as obvious in the case of comment clauses.

generalized to all domains of grammatical function." Tabor and Traugott (1998) have rejected Lehmann's concept of "condensation," or scope reduction, as a necessary aspect of grammaticalization. In fact, what one sees in the case of pragmatic markers is the feature of grammaticalization that Heine (2003) terms "context generalization" or Himmelmann (2004) terms "syntactic expansion," in which a grammaticalized form comes to pertain to a larger number of contexts, such as clause initial/medial/final position.

Finally, this work has assumed that "pragmaticalization" is subsumed within grammaticalization. The processes are, in some ways, indistinguishable since grammatical forms have pragmatic functions and pragmatic forms have grammatical functions. As Diewald (2006:405) points out, the pragmatic functions of discourse markers are "genuine grammatical functions which are indispensable for the organization and structuring of spoken dialogic discourse." Likewise, Traugott (1995a) has suggested that many grammatical distinctions, such as tense, modality, or aspect, carry pragmatic meaning. In arguing for pragmaticalization, Aijmer (1997) points to the non-truth-conditionality and optionality of pragmatic markers as setting them apart, but it is now well recognized that many elements of sentence grammar, such as sentence connectives, share these attributes. Even on the syntactic level, the view of pragmatic markers as "agrammatical" should be rejected; while not syntactically integrated with their anchor clauses, they are, like disjuncts adverbials generally, an essential part of sentence grammar.

11.2.3 Syntactic development of pragmatic markers

Both synchronic and diachronic studies of pragmatic markers have led to quite a clear understanding of the syntactic development of non-clausal pragmatic markers (§11.2.3.1). In contrast, the view that clausal pragmatic markers arise as main clauses, the "matrix clause hypothesis," while intuitively appealing does not seem to be borne out by existing case studies (§11.2.3.2).

11.2.3.1 Non-clausal pragmatic markers. The development of non-clausal pragmatic markers is represented in Figure 11.1 as a trajectory or pathway of change.[5] Synchronic studies of forms such as *why, like, so,* and *now* point to the existence of a cline as in (a) in Figure 11.1, in which decategorialization from preposition/adverb > conjunction > pragmatic marker is accompanied by change in the scope of the unit modified or governed, from phrase > clause > discourse. However, diachronic studies, e.g., of OE *hwæt* 'what, lo, also, thus' and *þa* 'then,' do not show conclusively that pragmatic markers develop via conjunctions, but suggest instead that they may derive from adverbs without any intermediate state.

[5] As Traugott (2007a) notes, such pathways (sometimes called "clines" or "schemas") represent extrapolations made by linguists from changes observed over stretches of time and across quantities of diverse data. They are not knowable by individual speakers at any point in time.



Figure 11.1 Syntactic trajectories from adverb to pragmatic marker

This is represented by arrow (b) directly from adverb to pragmatic marker in Figure 11.1. In the development of a wide variety of historical forms, including OE *witodlice* 'certainly' and *soþlice* 'truly,' ME *whilom* 'once, formerly,' *anon* 'at once, immediately,' and *for the nones* 'for the occasion,' and ModE *only*, *indeed, in fact, besides, anyway, actually, instead, at least, of course,* and *after all*, there would appear to be extensive, and convincing, historical evidence for the cline from predicate adverb > sentential adverb > pragmatic marker as shown by arrow (c) in Figure 11.1 (cf. the cline proposed in Traugott 1995a). What distinguishes (c) crucially from (a) is that in its initial step, (c) does not involve a categorial shift and decategorialization (from adverb > conjunction), but rather only a shift from narrow to wide scope (from scope within the proposition to scope over the proposition), with the category of the item (adverb) remaining the same.

Consistent with the trajectory set out in Figure 11.1 is the more general unidirectional cline proposed by Stenström (1998):

lexeme(s) > sentence connective > discourse marker

This cline has the advantage of incorporating the trajectories (a) and (c) shown in Figure 11.1, providing a scenario for both conjunctions and sentential adverbs (disjuncts) as types of sentence connectives.

11.2.3.2 Clausal pragmatic markers: the matrix clause hypothesis. Studies of the syntactic origin of clausal pragmatic markers (i.e., comment clauses) have typically opted for a version of the "extraction" analysis proposed for parentheticals (see above). This analysis – most fully articulated by Thompson and Mulac (1991b) – argues that the comment clause originates as a matrix clause, typically a first-person pronoun + present-tense verb, accompanied by a complement *that*-clause, as in *I think that the world is flat*. The shift from matrix clause to pragmatic marker generally begins with deletion of the complementizer of the dependent clause. This loss leads to structural indeterminacy; that is, in a structure such as *I think the world is flat*, the *I think* may be understood as either a main clause or as a parenthetical. Structural indeterminacy allows a reversal in syntactic hierarchy: the original matrix clause is reanalyzed as a parenthetical and the original complement clause as the matrix clause. The parenthetical acquires positional mobility and may be moved to sentence medial or final position (as

in *The world is, I think, flat* or *The world is flat, I think*). It also undergoes a change in scope: the original main clause had scope over a proposition (the *that*-complement) but the parenthetical now has scope over the clause and ultimately over larger units of discourse. I have referred to this proposal as the "matrix clause hypothesis."

Historical accounts of a number of first-person comment clauses, including *I think/methinks*,[6] *I pray you/thee > (I) pray (you)/prithee, I'm afraid, I'm sorry, I promise you*, and *I thank you (> thank you, thanks*) have, for the most part, assumed the matrix clause hypothesis. This hypothesis has been extended to second-person and third-person comment clauses such as *you know* or *God forbid/God woot*. Intuitively, it also seems feasible to extend the matrix clause hypothesis to comment clauses which originate as main clause imperatives, such as *mind (you), let's,* and *let alone,* since these forms involve a comparable reversal of the syntactic hierarchy.

However, the historical evidence in the diachronic studies does not always provide the support needed for the matrix clause hypothesis. Thompson and Mulac (1991b:317) argue that the syntactic reanalysis central to this account depends upon *that*-less clauses being the most frequent complement found with the target clause (the clause to be reanalyzed as parenthetical). But the historical facts often reveal that the *that*-clause complement – the postulated source construction – is a minority form in earlier stages of the language, that *that*-deletion does not increase over time, or that *wh*-interrogative or imperative complements as well as phrasal complements may be more frequent than *that*-complements. Thus, the motivation for reanalysis seems to be absent in many of these cases. For the imperative matrix clauses, an additional rebracketing may also be required, in which the subject of the subordinate clause becomes the subject of the parenthetical: [*mind*] [*that you be not late*] > [*mind*] [*you be not late*] >[*mind you*] [*be not late*]. Finally, in some cases, the timing of changes is inconsistent with the steps proposed in the matrix clause hypothesis, with parentheticals pre-dating matrix clauses.

Despite such extensions of the matrix clause hypothesis, it cannot account for two of the three types of finite comment clauses identified by Quirk *et al.* (1985:1112), namely, the adverbial/relative type (such as *if you please > please, as I understand*) and the nominal relative type (such as *what's more important*). It also cannot account for first-person subject + verb sequences, such as *I expect*, which historically occur primarily with phrasal complements and only rarely with finite clausal complements. The case studies in this work were chosen in part to extend the study of the syntactic origins of comment clauses to these other types of comment clauses and in part to put the matrix clause hypothesis to more extensive examination in the case of first- and second-person matrix-type comment clauses and imperative comment clauses.

[6] In the development of *methinks*, the dative experiencer fuses with the impersonal verb *thinks.*



Figure 11.2 Diachronic sources of comment clauses

11.3 Results of case studies

The results of the case studies in this work suggest that the diachronic sources of comment clauses are more varied than previously assumed and that the syntactic developments are considerably more complex and less clear historically than might be expected from a straightforward extension of the matrix clause hypothesis. Figure 11.2 summarizes the diachronic sources that fall out from the case studies in this book.[7]

The figure also provides approximate time lines for the development of the different forms. The timespan that sees the rise of the greatest number of comment clauses is late Middle English/Early Modern English periods (mid-fourteenth–seventeenth centuries), accounting for twenty-nine of the forms studied. Seven arise is the Late Modern period and five in Present-Day English. Only two can be dated to an earlier time period: *that is*, which arises in Old English, and *say (to me/us)*, which arises in early Middle English. Again, the development of comment clauses differs from that of non-clausal pragmatic markers, many of which arise in earlier periods (see Brinton 1996), though there is loss and renewal of forms over the history of English.

11.3.1 Shortcomings of the matrix clause hypothesis

Of the comment clauses included in the foregoing study, eleven could in theory be accounted for by the matrix clause hypothesis and its extension to second-person forms and imperatives; these include *I find, I gather, I say, I daresay, I see, I mean, you see, you say, say, see,* and *look*.[8]

On the basis of the historical evidence, however, the matrix clause hypothesis seems to account for relatively few forms studied. Only the comment clause *I say*, in its use to express mild emotion (*say*^{5a}), to evoke the hearer's attention (*say*^{5b}), and as an emphatic marker (*say*^{6b}), the comment clause *I daresay*, the comment clause *I see*, and possibly the comment clause *I gather* may be seen as potentially arising in a matrix clause. Even here, the evidence is not entirely convincing, and in none of these cases can an argument for the matrix clause origin be made with complete confidence. The difficulty in each case is the rarity of the source construction, a matrix clause with a following *that*-clause, in the earlier periods. For *I say*, only 12% of the earliest occurrences are followed by a *that*-clause with an explicit complementizer and 6% by a *that*-clause with a zero-complementizer. For *I see*, comparable figures are 5% and 16%, respectively, with an additional 5% of the instances of *I see* followed by *how*- or *what*-complements. *I daresay* provides perhaps the strongest evidence for the matrix clause hypothesis, with 52% of the instances accompanied by clausal complements with a Ø

[7] The comment clause *that is (to say)* has been omitted from the figure because it is the only third-person form and the only clause that arises in Old English.

[8] As *hark, hear,* and *listen* were not studied in detail (see §8.5), they are omitted from the following discussion.

complemenizer, though only 5% with a *that*-complementizer (see Table 4.3). The matrix clause origin of *I gather* is problematic because in the crucial period of development, clausal complements with zero-complementizers do not become more frequent in respect to complements with *that*-complementizers (see Figure 10.2), as would be predicted by the matrix clause hypothesis.

The first-person comment clause *I mean* might also be assumed to arise in a matrix clause. However, in its earliest occurrences, it is only very rarely (8% of the time) followed by a clausal complement; rather, in 69% of cases, *I mean* is accompanied most often by a phrasal complement (NP/VP/AP/PP/AdvP) (see Figure 5.2). This suggests that if the matrix clause hypothesis is to be maintained, a subtype must be recognized. For this subtype, the original matrix clause would again be reanalyzed as a parenthetical, but the process by which this occurs would not depend upon complementizer deletion or syntactic indeterminacy. Rather the bond between *I mean* and the phrase it governs is loosened, and *I mean* is reanalyzed as a syntactically independent element that is free to move; when pre- or postposed to a clause, it acquires scope over the sentence and ultimately over discourse.

In the case of the remaining comment clauses that might be assumed to be derivable by the matrix clause hypothesis, including the other first-person present-tense forms, *I find* and *I gather*, and the second-person present-tense forms, *you see* and *you say*, the evidence for the presumed source construction is weak. Only 15% of the occurrences of *you see* are followed by a *that*-clause with an explicit complementizer in Middle English (falling to 6% in Early Modern English), while 15% are followed by a *that*-clause with a zero-complementizer (falling to 10% in the later period) (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). For *you say*, the earliest records show 17% with explicit *that*-complementizers and 47% with zero-complementizers, but there are other arguments in this case for rejecting the matrix clause hypothesis (see below). *I find* has 7% *that*-full clausal complements and 11% *that*-less clausal complements in the early periods. Although there is an increase in *that*-less forms in comparison to *that*-full forms during the relevant period of development (see Figure 10.4), this trend is reversed, with *that*-forms being marginally more common with *I find* in Present-day English (see Figure 10.3); in fact, clausal complements are less common than other types of complements in the modern period. These cases must, once all of the historical data are surveyed, be accounted for in different ways (as is discussed in the following section).

The failures of the matrix clause hypothesis to explain the origin of comment clauses suggest the possibility that the "parenthetical" analysis (see above), in which the parenthetical begins as an independent element and is then attached to or inserted into the anchor clause, may have validity. However, the difficulty for this hypothesis is the syntactic incompleteness of comment clauses, or the absence of obligatory complement structures in cases such as *I say* or *I mean*. The problems inherent in both analyses thus prevent a conclusive choice between them.



Figure 11.3 Syntactic trajectories from matrix clause to comment clause

11.3.2 Other syntactic sources for comment clauses

The foregoing study has provided more conclusive evidence for the syntactic origins of the other comment clauses listed in Figure 11.2. These include imperative matrix clauses and adverbial/relative clauses.

Imperative matrix clauses are the source of a number of bare verb forms, *say, see, look, hark,* and *listen*, as well as of periphrases, *let's see* and *let me see,* which function as comment clauses in Present-day English.[9] In earlier periods of the language the verb *look* univerbated with second-person pronominal forms (*ye/you/thee*), giving *lookey*;[10] this form is still occasionally found, as is the uncoalesced *look you.* Again, development of the imperative forms requires a syntactic reversal in which the original matrix clause (the imperative verb) is reanalyzed as a parenthetical comment clause and the original complement clause is reanalyzed as a matrix clause. In the case of imperative structures, however, the complement clause is frequently not a *that*-clause, but more often an imperative or interrogative clause, which may or may not be introduced by a complementizer. While the crucial step of complementizer deletion postulated for the matrix clause hypothesis may not occur, I propose that there must be an intermediate stage during which the syntactic status of the two clauses in indeterminate, thus allowing for reanalysis. Figure 11.3 summarizes the syntactic reversal found in the case of first-person present-tense and imperative comment clauses (assuming some version of the matrix clause hypothesis).

For *lookey,* there is also rebracketing of the structure, where the second-person subject of the subordinate clause is reassigned to the matrix clause, as follows: [*look*] [*that ye be not late*] > [*look*] [Ø *ye be not late*] > [*look ye*] [*be not late*].

As can be seen in Figure 11.2, adverbial/relative clauses represent an important syntactic source for comment clauses (eight of the forms studied), including both those that retain this syntactic form in Present-day English (such as *if you will*) and those that do not (such as *you say*). Unlike the matrix clause hypothesis, derivation of these forms does not involve reversal of the matrix/subordinate hierarchical structure, though it does involve status change of the adjunct adverbial/ relative clause to a disjunct parenthetical, with accompanying increase

[9] See also the discussion of *mind (you)* in §2.3.3.3.

[10] A comparable univerbation occurred with *hark* and the second-person pronoun.

in its positional freedom and in its scope of modification, from scope within the proposition to scope over the discourse. Within this category, a number of different paths of development can be identified. In some cases, an adverbial structure such as *if you will*, *as it were*, and *so you see* begins as a syntactically incorporated adjunct adverbial. Over time semantic changes lead to a loosening of the syntactic connection between the adverbial and the matrix clause. For example, *if you will* changes from meaning 'if you are willing [to do so]' to 'if you are willing to call it so'; it becomes what has been termed an "indirect conditional," that is, a conditional not on the propositional content of the apodosis but on the speech act itself. This entails an increase in scope and reanalysis as a disjunct adverbial clause, or comment clause. A similar analysis based on diachronic evidence can be made that the pervasive first-person epistemic parentheticals (*I think, I guess, I know, I suppose*, etc.) originated in an adjoined adverbial construction {*as, so, thus*} *I think,* etc. not in a matrix clause (see Brinton 1996:Ch. 8).

In other cases, such as *as you say, as you see,* and *as I find*, the source construction would appear to be a non-restrictive relative clause (= 'which you say,' 'which you see,' 'which I find') that may assume wide scope as a kind of sentential relative. Optional deletion of the relativizer yields the forms *you say, you see,* and *I find*; these may exhibit syntactic independence and moveability and come to function as comment clauses. In the cases of *(as) you see*, *(as) you say*, and *(as) I find*, the relative structure appears earlier and more frequently than the matrix-clause-like structure, suggesting that it serves as the source construction. The development of *as I gather* is somewhat less compelling. Although one might expect a similar course of development, the rarity of *as I gather* during all stages of the language and the large gap between the appearance of *as I gather* and of *I gather* calls this course of development into question. I would also not rule out the possibility that in all of the cases the *as*-less forms perhaps represent a blending of two constructions, the relative form with deletion of *as*, as just described, and a matrix clause form where *wh*-fronting or topicalization of an object yields a structure in which *you see/you say/I find* can be analyzed as a parenthetical in medial position (e.g., *These are books which* ***you say*** *are interesting*).

The development of the nominal-relative type *what is more* can likewise be classified with the adverbial/relative type. *What is more* (earlier *which is more*) begins as an adjunct relative clause adjoined to a phrasal element. Again, change in the scope of modification creates a kind of sentential relative, a disjunct adverbial that functions as a comment clause. The trajectories of development from adverbial/relative structures to comment clauses are summarized in Figure 11.4.

Because adverbial/relative structures and the rarer nominal relative structures begin life as adjuncts and do not undergo a syntactic reversal from matrix clauses, their shift to comment clauses is relatively seamless. It is accompanied by pragmatic changes and alterations in scope similar to those seen in the development of adverbial-type pragmatic markers (cf. Traugott 1995a).



Figure 11.4 Syntactic trajectories from adverbial/relative clause to comment clause

Finally, it should be observed that several comment clauses may arise from interrogative clauses or tags. Although *see* has been explained as deriving from an imperative matrix clause *see,* there may be some conflation of the imperative *see!* and the interrogative *see?* (deriving from *do you see?*). The use of *hear* with the 'expectation of compliance' can be explained as an elliptical form of interrogative *do you hear?.* And, finally, *what else* in its pragmatic senses of 'what else would you expect?' or 'certainly' or as a device for self-retrieval of information appears to derive from an elliptical question.

This study of comment clauses in the history of English has thus established the need for a more complex typology of finite comment clauses than postulated by Quirk *et al*. (1985), one that includes not only comment clauses that resemble a syntactically defective matrix clause, those that resemble an adjunct adverbial/relative clause, and those that resemble a nominal relative clause, but also a type of comment clause that resembles a matrix imperative clause. It has shown that despite the intuitive appeal of Thompson and Mulac's (1991b) account of the origin of comment clauses in matrix clauses and their development via a process of complementizer deletion, syntactic indeterminancy leading to reanalysis and a reversal in syntactic hierarchy, followed by moveability, the diachronic evidence in individual case studies does not typically support such an analysis. In the few cases in which the matrix clause hypothesis is plausible, the scarcity of the source construction, i.e., a *that*-clause complement with or without an explicit complementizer, undermines this account, especially because in Thompson and Mulac's (1991b) theory, reanalysis is a consequence of the frequency of indeterminate structures. An alternative to the matrix hypothesis which postulates the origin of comment clauses in independent clauses is likewise problematic because it does not explain the syntactic incompleteness of most comment clauses. Yet another possible origin in structures involving the fronting of nominal objects (e.g., *Here is the book which I gather you wanted*) finds some support in the history of the constructions studied here. The case studies supply much stronger support for a number of other syntactic sources for comment clauses, including declarative matrix clauses with phrasal complements, imperative matrix clauses followed by a variety of complement structures, adjunct adverbial and/or relative clauses, nominal relative clauses, and interrogative tags.

11.4 Directions for future research

This study has focused on a number of frequently-occurring comment clauses in English, but many more remain to be studied in detail, including first-person

forms such as *I'm sure, I assume*, or *I bet*, second-person forms such as *you know* or *you must admit,* third-person forms such as *it seems* or *they say,* and adverbial/relative forms such as *as it happens, as you know,* or *if you please* > *please.*[11]

A promising new approach to the study of comment clauses is offered by Construction Grammar.[12] This theoretical model, which has been developed over the last twenty years, is currently being adapted as a diachronic model of change, i.e., emergent constructions or "constructionalization," and being used as a means of accounting for the changes involved in grammaticalization (see Bergs and Diewald forthc.; also Traugott 2007a; 2007b; forthc.; Trousdale forthc.). Comment clauses would seem to be constructions *par excellence*. De Smet and Cucykens (2007:188) have defined a construction as "an automated, routinized chunk of language that is stored and activated by the language user as a whole, rather than 'creatively' assembled on the spot." Constructions may range from relatively frozen and non-compositional to relatively productive and compositional (Kay 1997:126; Fried and Östman 2004:16, 23) but must occur with a high degree of frequency and be accessed holistically. Constructions are seen as constituting a hierarchic system of increasing abstract schemas, from constructs (attested tokens) to micro-constructions (individual construction types) to meso-constructions (sets of similarly behaving micro-constructions) to macro-constructions (high-level schemas) (see Traugott 2007a:§1.2; 2007b:§3; forthc.:§2).[13]

There are several aspects of Construction Grammar which make it a particularly appropriate framework for the study of comment clauses. First, it is usage-based; it "bases its generalization on actually occurring data, in whatever form" (Fried and Östman 2004:24). Second, it makes no a priori distinction between types of grammatical patterns, between "core" grammatical patterns such as *Bill loves Mary* and "peripheral" patterns such as *see you,* nor does it privilege one type of pattern over the other (Fried and Östman 2004:12, 15–16; also Kay 1997:126). As comment clauses have traditionally been seen as belonging to the periphery, indeed as being "agrammatical," it is important that Construction Grammar recognizes their centrality. Third, Construction Grammar asserts that there is a pairing of form and meaning and that meaning includes not only semantic meaning but also pragmatic meaning. Pragmatics is placed on an equal footing with the other linguistic levels and is seen as part of the conventions of grammar: "any of the kinds of information that have been called 'pragmatic' by

[11] For preliminary discussions, see Brinton (1996:206–209) on the rise of *you know* and §2.3.3.4 above on the development of *please*.

[12] A brief overview of Construction Grammar is Kay (1997), with Fried and Östman (2004) providing a more complete and up-to-date account. Publications in the field of Construction Grammar may be found at www.constructiongrammar.org.

[13] In the case of ditransitives, for example, micro-constructions would distinguish *give* NP NP from *send* NP NP; meso-constructions would distinguish constructions such as *give*/*send* NP NP taking *to* from constructions such as *buy* NP NP taking *for*; and macro-constructions would include all ditransitives (see Traugott forthc.).

linguists may be conventionally associated with a particular linguistic form and therefore constitute part of a rule (construction) of a grammar" (Kay 1997:123). Construction Grammar would thus seem particularly well-designed to account for comment clauses, whose primary function is pragmatic.

For some time, it has been recognized that grammaticalization applies to constructions, not individual words: "It is the entire construction, and not simply the lexical meaning of the stem, which is the precursor, and hence the source [of grammaticalization]" (Bybee *et al.* 1994:11). In fact, constructions are both the input and output of grammaticalization. In a Construction Grammar framework, grammaticalization is seen as involving three types of unidirectional change:

(a) from less to more schematic;
(b) from less to more productive ("entrenchment"); and
(c) from more to less compositional.

Thus, grammaticalization consists of "both increased entrenchment and increased schematization"; it is "the entrenchment of schemes" (Trousdale forthc.:§3). Grammaticalization leads to the formation of meso-constructions and ultimately to the formation of micro-constructions in the following way (see Trousdale forthc.:§4): speakers identify commonalities between constructs, and a micro-construction begins to emerge. As this micro-construction entrenches (becomes more frequent), a meso-construction develops that captures extensions of the original construction and similarities among constructions. Once this has occurred, less schematic (less grammaticalized) constructions may inherit properties from higher up in the taxonomy, acquiring further grammatical properties. Note that such changes may involve reconfiguration of the macro-construction as well, as it acquires new members and properties.

Construction Grammar might well offer insights into the development of comment clauses,[14] which can be illustrated briefly in the development of the "epistemic parentheticals." In Middle English, a large variety of verbs (*believe, deem, guess, know, leve, suppose, think, trow, understand, undertake, wene,* and *woot*) combine in the present tense with first-person subjects to form individual constructs. These constructs are quite varied in their syntax; e.g., the verb *trowe* occurs in the structures *I trowe, trowe I, as I trowe, so trowe I, I trowe so, I trowe ek wel, and þat trow I,* etc. From the contexts in which these forms appear, speakers would begin to deduce that the expressions often do not carry concrete meaning (that is, do not denote mental actions) but have come to express subjective epistemic uncertainty. Deletion of the complementizer *as* would lead to the frequency (entrenchment) of the form *I trowe.* Speakers' recognition of the similarities in function as well as increased incidents of *I trowe* without *as* would lead to the emergence of a micro-construction *I trowe*, which is more abstract in the sense that the syntactic variability of the constructs is eliminated

[14] See Traugott (2007a) for a brief discussion of pragmatic markers in a Construction Grammar framework.

in favor of the structure first-person pronoun + simple present tense of the verb (without complementizer and without adverbial or modal modification). Similarities among first-person present-tense constructions with *leve* and with other verbs such as *guess* or *deem* would ultimately lead to the formation of a set of similarly behaving constructions consisting of *I* + present-tense verb of cognition, i.e., a meso-construction. Less grammaticalized forms (those showing some variety in their syntax), would begin to inherit the more abstract properties of the meso-construction and be drawn into the set. Thus, we could account for the later rise of epistemic parentheticals such as *I assume, I find, I gather, I presume, I suspect, I expect, I estimate*. *I presume, I reckon,* or *I suspect*. Instead of focusing on the development of individual comment clauses in isolation, a constructional approach allows, as Trousdale notes (forthc.:§4), for the capturing of "generalizations across a set of forms which display similar properties, and which have developed in a particular set of ways over time."

The diachronic study of comment clauses is a rich area of study, intersecting with many different types of change, including semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic change (and occasionally phonological and morphological change). Although to date, the development of comment clauses has been modeled primarily in terms of grammaticalization, other theoretical models, such as Construction Grammar, offer potentially exciting new avenues of approach.

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