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Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

Handbook of the SOCIOLOGY *of the* MILITARY

Edited by
GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

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Handbook of the
Sociology of the Military

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Sociology of the Military

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PART I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

There are at least two reasons, one immediate and practical and one deeper and more mediated, that lie upstream from the writing of this book and that motivate it. The first is that many years ago, when I began to study the military and its dynamics, I looked for a work like this one, a study that would give me an overall view, general but not superficial, of what had been thought, said, and written on the topic. I did not find it then, and I do not find it now, even as the growth of social studies of the military has attained the dimensions, depth, and horizontal development (according to geographic areas) that make it truly indispensable.

It seemed to me then—as it does now—that the most sound and complete scientific approach to the study of the military is the sociological one, although certainly it can be usefully supplemented by historical investigation (especially social history), social psychology, cultural anthropology, and political science in general. Interdisciplinarity is a conquest of the modern scientific approach to every field of investigation, an interdisciplinarity whose reasons are reaffirmed, also in this handbook, by Gerhard Kuemmel, who writes: "The reason for trans-/interdisciplinarity lies in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon in itself and one that cuts through various levels, touches several different contexts, and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpenetration" (see Ch. 24).

The second reason arises from the observation that military matters and, beyond them, the organization of military society are continually mixing in human cultural evolution in its most diverse manifestations. Until the birth of sociology, however, this evidence had never led to scientific investigation, closely reasoned and consistent, of the military phenomenon in itself and as an originating factor of many, often fundamental, aspects of organized life in groups. Indeed, historical investigation has not provided this, even when social history, because it lacks the concrete tools to penetrate the social fact at the moment of its occurrence, Nor has the study of strategy, since it is aimed at immediate application requirements, although global strategy certainly draws on the contribution of the social sciences. Not even law science is suited to this analysis because it investigates the regulatory aspect of institutions, their juridical rather than social reality. Moreover, institutions do not exhaust the gamut of social aggregates, just as law does not embrace all human interactions.

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Sociology, therefore, is the primary tool for investigating the military world and its relations and interactions with other social groups. But even after the birth of sociology as a science under this name (Comte, 1847) it was necessary to await the massive field surveys and the resulting theorizations of the American school to have, in concrete, a special sociology devoted to the military. Prior to this development, which is fairly recent (early 1940s), and in some cases after it as well, the real contributions of sociological investigation on the military appeared in the framework of widely varying disciplines.

But the rise of a special sociology dedicated to the military, determined by an important fact of social life (the Second World War), certainly did not follow any academic planning, but displayed a development that was fully marked by autonomy, diversity, and, at times, also by contradiction, often as a result of concrete, pressing requirements. If we add to these factors of dispersion and disaggregation, already relevant in themselves, the heterogeneity of the cultural formation and environmental background of scholars of the subject, the importance of collecting, rethinking, and comparing what has been said and written on this special sociology is clear.

Military sociology thus falls within the special sociologies[1] and, consistently, within the International Sociological Association there is a permanent study group that deals with this discipline, the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution.

But even among the special sociologies, the one dedicated to the military seems to be "especially special." For centuries, the military world and the military mind-set have constituted a quite different, quite separate environment from the other institutions, groups, and aggregates of civil society, and in part they still do. There are various confirmations of this, found also in the theoretical environment,[2] but it seems to me that the most significant, statistically concrete piece of evidence is the particular dualism of the specialists of the discipline, who are split between academic scholars, working in universities, national research centers, and similar institutions, and the military itself, mostly as officers on active duty or on leave. The reader will find significant data in this regard in the chapter "Social Research and the Military." Indeed, the study of the sociology of the military seems to require, on the one hand, an adequate sociological preparation—as does every other special sociology—and on the other, thorough, possibly firsthand, knowledge of the particular study environment, academic scholars, that of military society.

For these reasons the most representative scholars in this field today are either university professors with long experience as participating observers in various military environments or officers who have had pertinent academic training and have decided to devote themselves to this sector of study. More than in other special sociologies, this "particularity" of the sociology of the military makes one feel the necessity of basic publications, formative and informative, considered important by both newcomers and those who are already well versed in the subject matter but who often feel the need to complete their training or to have a broader overview of the different areas of investigation of the discipline.

Browsing through the literature, one notes not only the absence of a basic handbook, as mentioned above, but also, as pointed out in the careful investigation by Morten G. Ender,[3]

[1] Special sociology defined as a science that embraces a sector of investigation corresponding to an area of group life that can be identified in more or less every type of society and in different historical periods. In this regard see also Boene (1981) and Caforio (1987).

[2] See, for example, Goffman (1961) and Boene (1990).

[3] Ender, Morten G., & Jones, Ariel (2001). "The Treatment of Peace, War, and the Military in Introductory Sociology Textbooks." Background paper presented at the Biennial International Meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, October 19–21, 2001.

that "while military sociology has become a large and growing field, few introductory sociology textbooks discuss the military in depth. However, to date, no studies of the treatment of peace, war, and the military in introductory sociology textbooks exist."

Noting this lack, I had already taken the initiative of publishing a reader (*The Sociology of the Military*, Caforio, 1998b) of the most significant studies of the discipline, divided into six large sectors as follows: "Antecedents", which collected essays on the "founding fathers" of our discipline (who are, generally, also the founding fathers of sociology *tout court*); "The American School", containing the writings by and/or on the American scholars who produced a kind of "renaissance" (or, according to some, a birth) of the sociology of the military starting in the 1940s; and then four sectors that assembled the most significant writings in contemporary sociology of the military subdivided according to subject, namely "A Model for Comparative Research", "The Military Profession", "Armed Forces and Society", and "The New Missions of the Armed Forces."

Now this welcome initiative of the series of handbooks by Kluwer Academic/Plenum gives me the opportunity to complete this work with a true basic handbook. It is dedicated, as stated above, to those who are already scholars of the subject and, naturally, like every handbook, to those who are coming to the sociology of the military for the first time, whether for reasons of professional culture (active officers), as university students, or due to a particular interest from a neighboring discipline, such as the sociology of organization, the sociology of the professions, or the sociology of politics.[4]

The volume I present here is subdivided into six sections which in part reproduce the sectors of the reader mentioned above and in part expand their scope. The first section, "General Introduction," contains this brief introduction and two studies: one is devoted to a brief historical excursus into what was written and said about our discipline prior to the contemporary works, and the second is a study on military sociologists today and on the conditions in which they operate in the various parts of the world.

Next is a section entitled "Theoretical and Methodological Framework", which is dedicated to the theoretical and methodological orientations of the discipline: like the other special sociologies, the sociology of the military has elaborated its own set of interpretive models and theoretical approaches. This thematic excursus is intended to present to the reader and put up for discussion concepts, models, and theories currently employed in social research on the military.

The third section, called "Armed Forces and Society", is devoted to civil–military relations, with all the issues and aspects connected with these relations, including the delicate aspect of democratic control of the armed forces. Special attention is given to the study of the problems of military families, an emerging theme linked to the growing professionalization of armies. This is followed by a section with the all-inclusive title, "Inside the Military", which presents a broad range of studies on aspects of military culture, professional training, and the conditions and problems of minorities in the armed forces.

The fifth section, entitled "Trends in the Military", takes up an aspect of the strong ongoing change in the military, an aspect that I would define as one of structural change. It contains studies on the restructuring of national militaries and its consequences, on the

[4]Within the social sciences field as well, an interdisciplinary approach is today the rule. See, for example, what occurs in scholarly meetings, especially international ones like the International Sociological Association's 2002 World Congress in Brisbane, where the research committee "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" organized joint sessions with the research committees of the sociologists of the professions and the sociologists of education.

transition taking place in many countries from conscription to an all-volunteer force, and on the impact of technological evolution on the military and its members.

Another aspect of change regards the new duties and functions of armed forces in the post-Cold War era with respect to the traditional tasks, a topic treated in the short section called "New Missions". This section deals chiefly with the impact that the new missions have had on the organic features of armed forces and on soldiers' training as observed in its change through the years.

A large reference section, to which all the chapters of the book make reference, terminates the volume and makes it easier for readers to locate the necessary references to expand and delve deeper into the study of the sectors that most interest them.

Twenty-four scholars from 13 different countries have participated in writing the handbook; they are all significant representatives of the major currents of thought and research existing today in our discipline.

CHAPTER 2

Some Historical Notes

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

INTRODUCTION

Even if the sociology of the military became firmly established and, especially, demonstrated its applicability to concrete cases starting with the vast research of *The American Soldier* (see "The American School" below), sociological investigation of the military and of the phenomenon of war preceded it by nearly a century, and was contemporaneous with the first studies commonly considered sociological. Seeking out these roots is not merely an operation of historical interest: Those starting out on the study of this special sociology need to know the paths that have already been trod, of which some came to an end and others produced studies and researches of what we consider contemporary sociology of the military (from *The American Soldier* onward). Our discipline did not develop in some sort of cosmic vacuum, emerging from nothing, but embraced previous contributions to thought and research and very often carried them further. To give just a pair of examples, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz (see below) offered their own solutions to the convergence/divergence dichotomy between the armed forces and civil society already evidenced by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, while Charles Wright Mills's model of the "*power elite*" is clearly indebted to the studies of Gaetano Mosca at the end of the 19th century. Some knowledge of the thought of those I call the "forerunners" here is important, therefore, especially for the novice, in order to build a more complete and broad mental framework of the discipline than would result from study of contemporary sociology of the military only.

A second section is devoted to what I have called "the American School" because its development took place chiefly in the United States and because military sociologists from other countries initially moved within it and according to its schemes. This school begins with the research published in the mid-20th century in *The American Soldier* and remains a fertile one, although here we stop with the most noted authors of the 1980s. The necessary brevity of the section means that only the contributions of a few authors, generally the founders of a scientific current, can be mentioned here. But because the

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worldwide development of the sociology of the military in the second half of the 20th century, with specific regional connotations, issues from the mold of this school—at times also by reaction to some of its schemes—the third, and final, section of this chapter is dedicated to giving an accounting of this development. It is a section that newcomers will find particularly useful for orienting themselves in the panorama of the institutions, now prevalently international, engaged in the subject today.

THE FORERUNNERS

The sociology of the military starts with sociology *tout court*, if not as a specification of a scientific sector, at least in the treatment of the subjects that would later be characteristic of it. Considered by many the founder of sociology (and for certain the one who coined the term), Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*,[1] deals with a number of topics that we would today undoubtedly include in the sociology of the military. As is well known, Comte's analysis of the crisis of the society of his time led him to construct a social history[2] of humanity, a history built according to an evolutionary, linear conception itself based on the principle, from the Enlightenment, of the progress of the human species. In this construction, the military, along with religion, plays a fundamental role, especially before the emergence of the industrial, bureaucratic, and civil aspects of society in a pluralistic sense.

The military aspect of associative life is as old as *Homo sapiens*, Comte observes: Humans' first tools are weapons and the first authority established in the group is that of the military chief; cooperation between humans is imposed as a necessity and a social value, especially for the needs of war. War acts on primitive microsocieties (the family, the clan, the tribe) by diverting them in two directions: On the one hand, individual human aggregates tend to increase numerically to better meet military necessities; on the other, there is an extension of human associations through the subjection of defeated groups to victorious ones. The human species thus converts the impulse that in many animals remains limited to the destructive act of fighting into a means of civilization. Indeed, says Comte, even the typically human institution of slavery is civilizing. Since the slave is a defeated person whose life has been spared, his survival is civil progress, on the one hand, because it avoids useless destruction of the species and a perfecting of the military institution on the other, since it is largely the work of slaves that makes it possible to wage war and have warriors. Morality itself, for Comte, is at the outset mainly a military ethic in that it subordinates the guiding lines of human action to war aims.[3] In the evolutionary blueprint that Comte sees written in humankind's social history, the first institutional situation is the polytheistic primitive society, where the eminent man is the eminent warrior, the dominant society is the one that dominates militarily, and power is the prerogative of the warrior caste.

The polytheistic age is followed by the monotheistic one, which is characterized by a markedly defensive military attitude, partly due to a loss of organization which results in a poor capability of conducting offensive operations. For Comte the growth of monotheism leads to a number of social changes fraught with consequences for the military, such as the

[1] Comte's fundamental work, in six volumes, published between 1830 and 1842. The edition I refer to is the one published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.
[2] Understood as *history without the names of individuals and even without those of peoples*, op. cit., p. 123.
[3] Op. cit., Lecture LIII, p. 551.

separation of spiritual leadership from temporal leadership, the breaking up of centralized authority into numerous local authorities, and the transformation of slavery into servitude. As a result, warfare gradually loses importance, the military leader is stripped of all religious power, armies shrink until they become elitist, and the military spirit declines until it becomes something internal to the military (*esprit de corps*).

With the coming of the modern age, the military undergoes new and radical changes. First, military leaders also begin to lose part of their temporal power, eroded by the bureaucratic organization that is being created in the new structure of the national state. Second, the internal structure of the military is modified: The standing army replaces feudal militias, military leaders come under civilian authority (the problem of political control of the armed forces arises), the international negotiating function begins to be handled by civilian authority as well, and military activities themselves are gradually subordinated to the commercial interests of the nascent national state.[4] The bourgeois society characteristic of Comte's period, increasingly bureaucratizing and controlling military activities, leads him to point to a substantial antimilitarism from which he concludes that war is destined to become increasingly rare and ultimately disappear completely. In particular, Comte sees conscription, instituted during the French Revolution, as the decisive element that would reduce the military system to a subaltern task; for Comte the social significance of conscription is a diluting of military customs and mentality, a muting of the specialistic nature of the military profession, a marked subordination of the military to the complex machinery of modern society.

The social history that Comte constructs helps him, finally, to create sociology as *the last major branch of natural philosophy*,[5] a science that provides the élites who lead the people with a rational basis for operational intervention on the various national societies throughout the world. In these élites he includes military leaders, who, precisely due to their greater awareness of war, must help to rid society of a phenomenon that has become antihistorical and anachronistic in order to institute the conception of that positive society that he believes is coming into being.

Written more or less in the same years as Auguste Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, the chapters that Alexis de Tocqueville devote to the military and to war[6] depart from the same Enlightenment outlook that inspired Comte's work and would later inspire that of Spencer. In de Tocqueville, however, one notes a theoretical caution and an attention to concrete facts that makes his historical predictions less distant from actual future reality. Also, for Tocqueville the sociopolitical emergence of nations appears to move in the opposite direction from war and toward a taming of the military spirit. For the author of *Democracy in America*, this result, which for Comte (and later for Spencer as well) was the result of the process of industrialization of national societies, would instead come from the internal democratization of society. But it would be a partial result and slow in coming, so that *equality of living standards, and the institutions that derive from them, do not exempt a democratic people from the obligation of maintaining armies.*[7] It is therefore important,he concludes, to study the social makeup of armies and the behavior and tendencies of those who compose them. de Tocqueville thus appears to create the subject matter, the topic of

[4] Op. cit., Lecture LV, pp. 77–81.
[5] Op. cit., Lecture LVII, p. 430.
[6] In *De la démocratie en Amérique*, published between 1836 and 1839. The edition I refer to is the one by Gallimard, Paris, 1951.
[7] Op. cit., p. 270.

study, the central object, of what will later be the sociology of the military. And it is not merely superficial: de Tocqueville immediately identifies and explores a number of very concrete themes, such as relations between the armed forces and society, the social origins of officers, the military profession as an instrument of social ascent, and careerism.

In his analysis of the armed forces/society relationship, de Tocqueville takes on what will be the great themes of debate and research in the sociology of the military in the second half of the 20th century: the divergence/convergence of military society and civil society,[8] the problem of political control over the armed forces, and the excessive strengthening of the executive during a protracted state of war.[9] The modernity of Tocqueville's approach to the concrete problems he tackles can be illustrated by reporting one of his passages on political control of the military. After affirming the concept that armed forces are the expression of the country to which they belong, he asserts that the remedy against a possible divergence between their ends and those of society must be found through democratic education of all citizens, when they "will have acquired a virile love for order and voluntarily bent to the rules ..., the general spirit of the nation, penetrating in the particular spirit of the army, will temper the desires and the opinions that the military condition brings into being, will compress them through the powerful pressure of public opinion."[10] It is interesting to note that this concept is taken up in 1960 by Morris Janowitz (see the bibliography), who theorizes that political control over the armed forces will be achieved by educating officers in democratic values and their acceptance and a "rubbing off" of such values from national public opinion.

Although little celebrated by military sociologists today, Alexis de Tocqueville appears to be one of the most interesting precursors of our special sociology, not only for the concrete themes that he dealt with, but also for his scientific approach to their treatment. Indeed, instead of using a prevalently historical method for social investigation, characteristic of Comte, de Tocqueville performed a critical analysis of the social aggregate in a single historical period, in which he was interested, a veritable cutaway of a society and a synchronous comparison of it with other societies. In addition to being innovative, this methodological approach appears to be the only one that can justify sociology as a science distinct from social history. It is also worth observing that this methodology leads de Tocqueville to make use of what later came to be called "*sociological indicators*", an innovation in the realm of research tools as well.

Herbert Spencer, too, adopts a prevalently synchronous, transversal method of investigation, but on the one hand his construction appears much more theoretical than de Tocqueville's and on the other his conclusions are quite close to those of Comte. Spencer lays the groundwork of his sociological science using chiefly the comparative method, producing a synchronous examination of societies at different levels of development. As a unifying principle he uses the biological evolution of the species (Darwin) applied to social aggregates: They constitute for him a superorganic world, set in logical and linear succession to the inorganic and organic ones, with no leap in quality.

The general thesis expressed by Spencer in his fundamental work[11] is that a law governs the evolution both of living organisms and the groups they form, resulting in a natural and

[8] See Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz below.
[9] That which Harold Lasswell would later call the garrison state (see References).
[10] Op. cit., pp. 275–276.
[11] *Principles of Sociology*, published in three volumes from 1877 to 1896. The edition I refer to here is *Principi di sociologia*, published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.

necessary process of development. The evolution of human aggregates is conceived as the set of processes and products that involve the coordinated actions of a large number of individuals. The highest form of superorganic evolution is society; the study of society is sociology. Fundamentally important both for the organic world and the superorganic world is the concept of structure, which designates an entity formed by various mutually dependent parts. The model of structure created by Spencer is homeostatic, that is, change in one of the parts entails change in all the others in order to maintain the system's equilibrium. Individuals and aggregates initially develop at least two fundamental structures, one for acting internally, for the purposes of maintenance, and the other for acting externally, in terms of defence and offence. The structure that acts externally is formed and perfected through war, which is thus the matrix of organized society. It is war that necessitates an authority, a leader, the creation of stable government structures, and a process of aggregation of human groups.

As can be seen, although the route is different, the interpretation of society is similar to that of Comte. Spencer, too, identifies a primitive society, typically military, and a more evolved one in which the activities of maintenance and exchange prevail: industrial society. However, he defines them not so much through a historical process but as general typologies into which the different national societies existing at his time fit more or less separately. The evolutionary law employed by Spencer leads to a development of the social industrial type (a superior society because it aims at individual well-being). Unlike Comte, however, Spencer does not hypothesize a linear evolutionary development, but an alternating one, with periods and episodes that can be strongly involutional.

Spencer, like Comte, materializes the antimilitary spirit of bourgeois industrialism, guided by the Enlightenment idea of human progress. However, the outlook is more critical in Spencer, who sees the possibility of involutional processes and warns that peaceful coexistence between societies is not automatically the fruit of the development of industrial society, but derives from the disappearance of militarism. But incomprehension of the real role of the industrial state, which he shares with Comte, prevents him from identifying the terrible war-making potential of industrial society and leads him to focus on militarism as the principal causal factor of war.

Spencer's analysis of the military remains significant, however. Various aspects of it still appear to be present in many current societies which, according to his classifying criteria, incarnate the mixed type of military–industrial society, so that some Spencerian typologies still constitute a tool for reading and understanding the characteristics of military societies.

Gaetano Mosca brings the 19th century to a close for what constitutes our special sociology and is the first scholar to treat a single, specific theme of this discipline, one that more than half a century later will find concrete, significant development in the work of Charles Wright Mills.[12] First and foremost, Mosca goes beyond the positivist optimism regarding the disappearance of war with the advent of the positive (Comte), industrial (Spencer), or democratic (de Tocqueville) society, clearly pointing to the fact that it is not the military institution that causes war. The military function is destined to continue in every type of society because war is only one of the many manifestations of human nature. The military and its historical evolution are thus worthy of serious study in order to understand what its optimum organization should be in the current historical period. In this

[12] Mosca treats the military especially in Chapter 9 of Volume I of *The Ruling Class* (see References), titled "Standing Armies."

regard Mosca reinterprets the evolution of the military establishment of industrial society, already described after a fashion by positivist thought, affirming that "The great modern fact, nearly general in the nations of European civilisation, of large standing armies which are rigid upholders of the law, deferential to the orders of civilian authority, and whose political importance is scarce and indirectly exercised, if not absolutely without example in human history, represents a fortunate exception."[13] Real political control over the military has therefore been established, but how and why?

In the modern state, says Mosca, writing in 1896, the problem of the supremacy of civilian power is solved in part by the makeup of European armies, where diverse social elements are represented and balance each other, but more particularly by the inclusion of the officer class into what he calls the "*power elite*". In Mosca, the concept of the power elite descends from his identification in society of a number of organized minorities. According to him, in every society there are two classes of people, the governing and the governed; the governing class is a small minority, but it is able to dominate because it is organized. The strength of any organized minority is irresistible, for any individual of the majority who finds him or herself alone and faced with the totality of the minority. According to Mosca it is officers' inclusion in the power elite—the organized governing minority—that ensures armies' loyalty to the state and their subordination to civilian power. This inclusion, with specific reference to American society, will also be registered by Charles Wright Mills over half a century later, but with a different value judgment: While for Mosca the military poses itself as a valid model of development for all of civil society, for Mills the military leadership's increased influence on politics endangers the democratic structure of the state.

For Max Weber the analysis of the military is central to the definition of the modern bureaucratic state.[14] Indeed, he defines the modern state as the human community which, within a certain territory, successfully believes it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. As with earlier scholars, Weber's analysis starts with a comparative historical investigation to define the types of military recruitment and organization characteristic of the different societies and historical periods. Unlike his predecessors, however, he creates typologies of military orders which are not linked to single historical periods or geographic regions or inserted into a process of linear, necessitated social evolution. Among the different typologies, the one of most interest to our field of investigation is the military institution of the modern state where it reaches its full development. In the modern state, characterized by a bureaucratic organization, one does not obey the person, but the rule, instituted in the manner provided by the will of the community. The officer therefore does not differ from the functionary, of which he constitutes only a special category; he, too, must obey a norm which is formally abstract, and his right to power is legitimated by rules that precisely define his role.

For Weber, the bureaucratization of the military is a road on which there is no turning back: Indeed, it is the specific means for transforming community action into rationally ordered social action. The loyalty of the institution is ensured by the fact that the officer is a professional functionary chained to his activity, with all his material and spiritual existence and yet with no power to substantially modify the complex bureaucratic machinery in which he is nothing more than a single cog. This gives birth to military discipline, which is not, for Weber, a social fact in itself, but the *source of discipline in general* because it also

[13] Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 330.
[14] See References, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.

constitutes the ideal model for the modern capitalist company, reintegrated in American scientific management systems and ordinary business discipline. The military, says Weber, having taken many of its organizational forms from capitalism, then restores the objectivity of the concept of discipline to the industrial corporation, which applies it widely. Objectively, because they function equally in service to both a bureaucratic power and a charismatic leader, the duty ethic, conscientious performance, and meticulous training are what make the strength of an army, however it is led, just as they make the strength and competitiveness of a company or factory.

It is interesting to note the profound difference between Mosca's elitist view of the role of the military professional and Weber's bureaucratic view, which will give rise to two distinct schools of thought. We have already described the developments of Mosca's conception; for Weber we can cite the application of his theoretical scheme in the pioneering research on the officer corps conducted by Karl Demeter in 1935 (see References).

In Europe, after Max Weber's studies, the sociology of the military seems to undergo a period of scant interest, where a few treatises (by Joseph A. Schumpeter and Corrado Gini, for example: see References) and empirical studies (see the already cited one by Karl Demeter) still appear, but remain rather isolated. In the United States, by contrast, this discipline still had to find the concrete need that would stimulate a specific study and research. We can thus conclude here, obviously with no pretence of exhaustiveness, the section on the "forerunners" and go on with what I have called the American School to describe that which can be considered the contemporary sociology of the military.

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL

The entry of the United States into the Second World War and the resulting transformation of an army of a few hundred thousand men who lived and operated somewhat on the margins of society into a force of over seven million individuals posed problems to the military that had never before been faced. To solve these problems, the military turned to the social sciences.

There had been earlier sociological investigations on armed forces and conflicts during and after the First World War both in the United States and Europe,[15] but it was an approach that had favored sectoral analyses or study of the phenomena induced by wartime military organization in national societies. These investigations could therefore not constitute a useful precedent for tackling the problems posed to the American administration by the entry into war in 1941. Thus, in 1942 the U.S. Army drew up a Troop Attitude Research Program and formed a Research Branch, to which it called a large team of specialized collaborators, especially sociologists, anthropologists, and social psychologists, headed by Samuel A. Stouffer. At the war's end this group of specialists published a summarizing work which to this day remains as the singular testament to the most extensive field research ever conducted in the social sciences (*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*; the first two volumes of this work are better known under the title *The American Soldier*; see Stouffer under References). It assembles the results of over 200 reports and interviews with hundreds of thousands of soldiers conducted during the research team's 3 years of work (1942–1945).

[15] See, for example, for Europe, under References, Karl Demeter, Corrado Gini.

American sociology at the time featured a recently elaborated theoretical framework too recent and too new to allow full application to the context in which it was formulated or acceptance in university faculties, but which lent itself very well indeed to an application in the area of the military. At issue was the theoretical elaboration of the field studies carried out in the 1930s by the team of Elton Mays at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works in Chicago[16] to determine what particularly affected worker performance. The results of these studies had sharply contradicted previous work that explained the phenomenon of fatigue as linked to psychophysical, physiological, and environmental aspects by demonstrating that the most significant variable affecting fatigue was the behavior of the primary group, that is, the narrow social context in which the worker labored. The primary group therefore became the determinant of individual performance, and attitudes toward the group (the individual's relation to it) proved to be more important than personal aptitudes, which until then were considered the basis for assessing workers' performance. The substitution of the concept of attitude for that of aptitude would be used by Stouffer's research team for sociological investigation on the acclimatization of citizens drafted into the military, and the concept of primary group to investigate the variables that had a bearing on the behavior of combat units. Thus, the research group undertakes the investigation on the acclimatization of draftees,[17] basing itself both on the concept of attitude, understood as the individual's reaction to a social situation, and on that of relative privation in relation to the reference group in which the soldier finds himself. The interest and the fecundity of investigation of this point of view, which overturns the two previous, separate approaches to the problem is evident: Individual behavior as the result of individual aptitudes and the privations of status of the military condition with reference to prior statuses. It both overturns and unites them according to a perspective of investigation proper to social psychology.

Prior status is not completely neglected, however: difficulties of acclimatization, which generate a differentiation in attitudes (statistically measured), are studied by referring them both to the social backgrounds and personal histories of individuals and to the situation of relative privation. Relative privation, in particular, is investigated by examining the structural elements of the military: social stratification, power relationships, control system, general living conditions, and upward and downward flow of information. The completeness of the analysis enables Stouffer's team to indicate the tools and methodologies for modifying dysfunctional characteristics of the military. This is a conceptually fundamental aspect of the research team's work: here sociology shows itself to be a completely operational science, a scientific base capable of producing "social technologies" suitable for eliciting a desired effect in the real world.

If the barracks situation could be studied effectively by Stouffer's team by examining the individual in relation to his primary group, the area where the concept of group expresses all its potential and importance is in combat situations, to which the entire second volume of *The American Soldier* is devoted.

The research team identifies the combat situation as an extreme condition of stress where nearly all the individual's needs are denied gratification; the threats regard the essential aspects of the person (life and physical integrity); radical conflicts are created in values; individuality is often nullified; and anxiety, pain, fear, uncertainty, and powerlessness prevail: The aggression against the soldier's ego could not be more radical. However, examination of cases of voluntary exit from the combat situation (flight, psychological

[16]See Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of Industrial Civilisation*, New York, 1933.
[17]*Studies in Social Psychology ...*, cited, first volume, *Adjustment During Army Life*.

breakdown, suicide, etc.) shows that they are quite rare in percentage terms. There must therefore be some element that offsets all these stress factors and induces the individual to remain in line. Stouffer identifies this element in the primary group and in group cohesion.

The factors of group cohesion, already on display in garrison life, become far more important in the combat situation, where for the individual, deprived of everything, the psychological and affective gratifications offered by the primary group become essential. According to Stouffer, it is essentially the group that ensures the psychological survival of the individual in combat. However, the group could extricate its members from the stress situation without affecting the values of cohesion by getting out of the combat situation altogether. An external factor that prevents the group from fleeing is therefore necessary: the research group identifies this factor chiefly in the existence of a system of interiorized norms, along with a system of real, effective repression exerted by the military. In short, the primary group is induced to fight basically for itself in order to save its existence and internal cohesion in the institutional system in which it finds itself by adhering to those values of the institutional system that it has introjected and inscribed in its own informal code.

The foregoing analysis shows the importance of favoring the natural cohesion of primary groups and avoiding any intervention of the institution that can act as a disaggregating factor. The most important aspect of the group is its defence of its internal cohesion, achieved through a balancing of the roles that the group assigns to its individual members: Among these fundamental roles is that of the natural leader, who is called to carry out a function of active mediation with the institution. The immediate operational indication that follows is the importance of preparing the commander of the smaller unit (noncommissioned officer or lower ranking officer) to become the group's natural leader. He is in the position of being able to assume the natural leadership of the group—provided that he is able to understand and respect the informal code—because he is a member of the group and fully shares in its combat situation, but he is also an element of the institutional hierarchy. The measurable impact—positive and negative—that the publication of *The American Soldier* had on U.S. sociology has been enormous and is demonstrated not only by the vast literature to which it gave rise but also by the application of its methods and results to industrial sociology in the postwar years.

Just as the "American school" produced the first great empirical investigation of the military, it also offered the first great theoretical systematization of the special sociology that studies it. This occurs with Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the state*. Huntington identifies the sector of study as "civil–military relations," understood as an aspect of national security policy. The theoretical framework that the author gives to the subject partitions national security policy into three areas: military security policy, domestic security policy, and situational security policy, the last one referring to changes in the country's sociopolitical situation. The primary objective of this policy is to develop a system of civil–military relations that can maximize military security with minimum sacrifice of the other social values. But, says Huntington, civil–military relations essentially reflect the political relationship between the state and the officer corps, so it is with this professional corps that he mainly intends to deal.

A profession, according to Huntington, is an activity carried out by a particular type of highly specialized functional group; the features that distinguish it from an occupation are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Having defined the features that typically identify the profession, Huntington applies them to the officer corps. First of all, there is

a specific sector where officers exercise exclusive expertise: the management of violence, which Huntington defines as the direction, operation, and control of an organization whose primary function is the application of violence. The responsibility of the military professional lies essentially in the fact that managed violence must be used for socially approved purposes: the officer's *client* is the state and his fundamental responsibility is to the state. The right to practice the military profession is legally permitted to a restricted, well-defined social body which thereby acquires a strong corporative spirit.

It thus appears beyond doubt that the officer corps unites the chief characteristics of a professional body. In particular, Huntington stresses, we are simultaneously in the presence of both a profession and an organization, both of them bureaucratic. As a profession, the levels of expertise are marked by the hierarchy of ranks; as organization, by the hierarchy of assignments, with the former generally winning out over the latter. But the professionalization of the officer is not an established fact from the outset: it is the historical change of the figure of the officer, taking place over centuries, that has marked the passage in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism.

After outlining the characteristics of the military profession, Huntington is concerned with determining how civilian control can be effectively exercised over the military power held by the officer corps. He finds the theoretical foundations of his thought in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and in the study of war of Karl von Clausewitz. From the English philosopher, he takes the conception of a human nature that is essentially conflictual and a condition of nature in which each state is potentially at war against all the others. From Clausewitz, Huntington takes the concept of the dual nature of war, an autonomous sector of science on the one hand, a process whose ultimate aims come from politics on the other. From the well-known Clauswitzian supremacy of politics over war Huntington derives the ethical and practical delimitation of the military profession.

According to Huntington there are two types of political control that can be exerted over the military: subjective control and objective control. The first is exercised by maximizing the power of one or more social groups over the armed forces; the second is chiefly based on the recognition of an autonomous military professionalism and on a rigid separation of the latter from the political sphere. The theoretical bases of Huntington's thought make him lean toward this second type of political control: Once the supremacy of politics is accepted, if the military is an autonomous sector of science and knowledge, the officer must enjoy a professional autonomy of his own. The necessity of minimizing the political power of the officer corps is thus resolved by Huntington by a thoroughgoing professionalization of the corps which renders it politically sterile and neutral while at the same time preserving the elements of power that are necessary for fulfilling the institutional task. Made historically possible by the emergence of a military profession, objective control is the only one that guarantees the supremacy of civil power, precisely because it separates the two spheres of expertise and prevents any political involvement of officers.

The distribution of power between civilian groups and the military group varies, for Huntington, according to the compatibility of military ethics with the prevailing political ideology. The historical model for the relationship between military power and civil power to which this author seems chiefly to refer is that of the German imperial period from 1871 to 1914: His thought shows careful study and deep admiration for the German–Prussian general staff, for its professional approach, and for its relations with the civil power.

Huntington's work in the theoretical and structural organization of the sociology of the military would provide fertile ground worldwide, especially due to the extensive use by subsequent scholars of his systematic structuring of the subject, delimitation of fields,

and identification of problems. It would also give rise to criticism and negative reactions, particularly on the issue of political control over the armed forces, where he is the head of one of the two lines of thought that would dominate American military sociology in the ensuing years. Indeed, the publication of *The Soldier and the state* is followed a few years later by Morris Janowitz' work, *The Professional Soldier* (see bibliography), which lays the groundwork of a different and opposing model of political control over the armed forces.

Janowitz's central thesis is that the military institution must be examined in its process of change because it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to which it belongs. After the Second World War the international context was deeply modified, producing a situation in which military action had much more sensitive politicosocial consequences than in the past: This contributed to a convergence of civilian and military interests and spheres of activity. But the individual national societies were also changed internally, and in the face of this complex of changes the military was called upon to find a series of adaptations.

The first change in the military recorded by Janowitz was a new way of exercising authority. This exercise was closely bound up with the specific role of the armed forces where new conditions of use have accentuated decentralization, dispersion in the field, and autonomy of command at lower levels. This situation caused a gradual mutation of the exercise of authority through certain and precise forms of obedience in a search for consensus and manipulatory procedures. Profoundly changed also was the recruitment of the professional soldier, identified by Janowitz as the career officer. By means of precise statistical analyses, he shows a substantial widening of the officer recruitment base in the United States,[18] due both to the increased size of the military organization and to the growing demand for specific technical skills. This means that the officer corps was no longer a representative entity of a particular social stratum, but rather a separate organism, better represented in the national political reality as a pressure group. The broadening of the recruitment base, along with the growing prominence given to commercial values in democratic societies, led to a change in the motivations of professional choice of the officer corps, where one saw a growing number of officers who considered the military profession more an occupation like any other than a mission. A further consequence of this broadening, says Janowitz, was the diminished social integration of the officer, which naturally descended from his belonging, from birth, to a well-defined social class. And finally, the terms of political control over the armed forces also changed, owing to the growing involvement of the military elite in the country's political choices. This whole complex of changes and their particular impact on the officer corps led Janowitz to give special study to the military profession.

A professional, according to Janowitz, is someone who, as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill that enables him to render specialized services.[19] The officer is therefore a professional and his professionalization occurred gradually, developing especially in the 19th century. The professional soldier is not, however, definable according to a unique ideal: The traditional "heroic" type, who personifies martial spirit and personal bravery, has been progressively flanked by the managerial type, who reflects the pragmatic and social dimensions of modern warfare. In the years following the Second World War yet a third typology emerged, the technological one, which can also be considered as an offshoot of

[18] This is true for the other Western nations as well.
[19] Op. cit., p. 5.

the managerial type. All three typologies are present in a modern army, differently balanced percentagewise, but the emergence of the managerial and technological types seems to have significantly narrowed the difference between military and civilian. Contemporary society thus sees a convergence between these two spheres, which Janowitz judges to be positive and necessary. In this convergence it is the military that draws closer to the mainstream of the society to which it belongs, gradually and continuously incorporating the values that gain broad acceptance in society.

For Janowitz, therefore, contemporary officers must not constitute a separate body from civil society, but be profoundly integrated with it. In the impossibility, and unreasonableness, of isolating the professional soldier from the country's political life, he proposes having representatives of the national political parties participate in the officer's political training. In such a framework the officer will be favorable to civilian political control because he will know that civilians appreciate the tasks and responsibilities of his profession; in addition, he will be integrated in civil society because he shares its common values.

As one readily sees, this is a completely different conception from that of Huntington, one that creates, in the American School (which is not only American), a different and opposing current of thought, particularly on the crucial problem of political control of the armed forces. This gives rise to a dialectic between the divergent model (Huntington) and the convergent model (Janowitz) of the military in its relations with civil society. According to Huntington, divergence is needed for the military to be able to carry out its tasks effectively; according to Janowitz, convergence is necessary, since today's professional soldier is too involved in the country's political choices and needs the full consensus of the society to which he belongs.

In addition to being the founder of a school for his conception of the military professional, Janowitz is important for having anticipated and understood the development of the military's functions from the traditional "shooting war" and the more recent function of deterrence to those tasks of international policing for the prevention and resolution of conflict situations that did not reach full development until the end of the 20th century. His is the conception of a *constabulary soldier*, constantly ready to intervene in any part of the world, dispensing the necessary minimum of organized violence with the aim of achieving an acceptable set of international relations rather than victory in the field. This predicted development also gives rise to his other prediction of a decline in mass armies[20] in favor of leaner armed forces based on voluntary recruitment and increased professionalization. Last, Janowitz's initiatives have had significant impact on the organization of social scientists interested in the study of the military and on the internationalization of the American School.

Outside the currents of thought of these two influential scholars, but operating more or less in the same years, two other American sociologists who elaborated significant theories for this special sociology should be cited: they are Charles Wright Mills and Erving Goffman.

Charles Wright Mills is important for having developed an elitist conception of power that had a wide following in the 1960s and included the officer corps (see also Gaetano Mosca above).[21] With the centralization of the media and of power, contends Mills, certain men come to occupy positions from which they are able to look down, as it were, on the daily

[20]See References, *The Decline of the Mass Army*.
[21]See References, *The Power Elite*.

lives of ordinary men and women and profoundly influence them with their decisions. In contemporary society these men are found especially in the corporate, political, and military sectors, each an area that underwent a process of structural broadening, bureaucratization and centralization of decision making during and after the Second World War. The similarities of the processes and the close-knit relations between the three sectors then led to interpenetration among them. At the top of these three sectors are men who constitute the elite in business, politics, and the military; but since the three sectors converge, these elites tend to unite and act in unison. According to Mills, membership in this power elite is determined not so much by birth (Gaetano Mosca's ascriptive hypothesis) but by the direct, personal selection carried out by the current ruling class: family, college, and the private club are the milieus in which the persons destined for the upper echelons of politics, business, and the military are shaped and selected.

Throughout the world, the relationship between the three sectors that make up the power elite has changed profoundly since the Second World War, says Mills, when reality began to be redefined and thought in military terms and civilian supremacy began to crumble, creating a political vacuum that brought the "warlords" to the top. Indeed, having postulated a military definition of political reality, the rise of the generals to the highest levels of the power elite becomes a necessity. A second consequence is the politicization of the armed forces: thus, in the United States, the existence of Republican generals and Democrat generals is recognized and accepted, says Mills, while in 1951, for the first time, the celebrated MacArthur case called the supremacy of the government over the military into question. A third result of this process of integration is the decline of traditional diplomacy and, in its place, the development of a foreign policy managed mainly according to the ideas of military leaders. This complex of causes and effects has allowed the military leadership to extend its influence in the country to a greater extent than it would have achieved with an actual coup, claims Mills, and could lead to the creation of the Lasswellian garrison state (Lasswell, 1941).

Mills's power elite theory gave rise to a series of studies and researches on the subject, where the most noted intervention is John Kenneth Galbraith's essay, *How to Control the Military* (Galbraith, 1969). But what appears most interesting and current in Mills's work is his pointing to a new and different military professionalism, as well as his approach to the problem of the changed relationship between the officer corps and national society and the related aspect of political control over the armed forces. His arguments are an important contribution to the dialectic opened in American military sociology by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.

The theory of the total institution elaborated by Erving Goffman[22] has not been studied exclusively for the military, but has been widely applied to it in subsequent studies and much research and is thus of basic interest to anyone dealing in the sociology of the military. The environment in which Goffman's conception of the total institution develops is American sociology of the 1950s, where the theories of organization[23] became firmly established. In these theories, which precede it both logically and historically, the total institution finds both a classifying definition and a ready-made conceptual scheme.

For Goffman a total institution is a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of

[22]See References, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates.*
[23]For all, see the works of A. Etzioni and T. Parsons under References.

time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered routine of life. Subdivided into five different classes, the examples given by the author include orphanages, psychiatric hospitals, seminars, and prisons, as well as two installations typical of the military: barracks and ships. One of the fundamental social aspects of modern civilization, says Goffman, is that people tend to sleep, amuse themselves, and work in different places, with different companions, under different authorities, and with no rational overall pattern. By contrast, the chief characteristic of total institutions is the breaking down of the barriers that separate these spheres of life: total institutions are thus contained in a single place (seminary, prison, ship, barracks), are regulated by a single authority according to a rational plan, and unfold in contact with the same group of people; generally a much more numerous group than one's sleep or leisure are shared with in normal life. Last, the total institution is characterized by a dual structure: on one side there is a numerous group of controlled persons (inmates, in Goffman's terminology) and on the other the staff, a much more restricted nucleus which has the task of controlling.

Total institutions, Goffman asserts, are places in which people are forced to become different. The process begins with the destruction of their previous identity: To do this the institution first raises a barrier between the inmates and the outside world (gates, locked doors, walls, fencing, etc.), creating a separateness that leads to the loss of some of the subject's roles. Other losses are produced by the typical admission procedure: the haircut, the medical examination, the shower, the photograph, the confiscation of one's customary clothing, and the assigning of a number and of a place. These operations, also for the way in which they are usually carried out, seem designed to mould the newcomer like an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the institution for processing and smoothing by routine actions.

Once the inmate has been stripped of what he possesses, the institution carries out a replacement: just as it does in the physical sense for clothing, so it does in a moral sense for one's identity. The assignment and acceptance of the type of identification desired by the total institution are favored by means of a system of privileges. Basically, the gratifications that the individual was used to in civilian life and now largely denied are replaced by a system of surrogate gratifications that is generally more modest according to a scale of civilian values, but promoted by the institution and therefore less anxiety generating. Reinforcement is supplied by the institution of punishments, which are generally more severe than any experience the individual has had in the world of his family.

The theory of the total institution has been widely studied, applied, and also criticized by those who, following the publication of *Asylums*, devoted themselves to the analysis of the military. In Europe, in particular, it had a fortunate period in the decade following 1968, when the student movement subjected all institutions to radical criticism. Insofar as it is of interest here, the criticism basically pointed out that for the military the theory is applied only to a peacetime situation; it analyses only a few particular structures of the institution (ship and barracks); and, as regards the Western countries, it is more of historical value than an interpretation of current reality. In other words, in the past, conscription led to phenomena and situations that can be interpreted by drawing on the theory of the total institution, but this situation already appeared to be outdated in these countries when Goffman published his study.

At the height of the divergence/convergence debate, an interesting attempt was made in the United States to reconcile the two sides through a "pluralistic" theory, or "segmented model," as it has also been called. In a sociology of the military that was becoming increasingly mature in the United States in the early 1970s, numerous scholars contributed to

these efforts to reconcile the two theories,[24] but one of them stood out for completeness of formulation and the theorist's marked scientific personality: Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Nowadays, when speaking of the pluralistic model, reference is normally made to Moskos.

Actually, this scholar had already attracted attention with a work that, presented as an investigation on the enlisted man,[25] ended up being a far-reaching analysis of the organizational and institutional aspects of the U.S. armed forces. However, since his initial international renown came for the pluralistic theory that he asserted and developed, that is what I address first. The most complete formulation of this theory appears in a paper that Moskos presented in 1972 at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago and published the following year in a specialized journal (see References). In it Moskos proposes that the historical transformation of the military be interpreted as a dialectic evolution in which institutional persistences (divergent) react against the pressures toward assimilation to civilian life (convergent) present in society at large. In this process of change, the military establishment passes through historical phases of divergence and convergence with respect to civil society.

Even if the phase following the Second World War would seem, according to Moskos, a phase of convergence, this does not mean that it is Janowitz's thesis that is destined to prevail. In reality, says Moskos, a sectional view of the armed forces in transformation does not present a homogeneous institution, but a pluralistic organism where sectors with marked characteristics of assimilation to civil society coexist with sectors that preserve a more traditional military habitus, far removed from civilian mentality. According to this scholar, in the current context the pluralistic solution offers the best probability of combining the two fundamental requisites of a modern military in a democratic country: operational efficiency and political accountability to civilian authority. From this theoretical framework originates the author's best-known contribution to military sociological thought, i.e. his creation of the institution/occupation interpretive model.

Moskos defines as institutional environment the one in which the soldier enters the armed forces mainly through a calling; He identifies with the good of the collectivity, for which he is willing to sacrifice himself; and he looks more for moral than material incentives; and he manifests his possible dissatisfaction vertically along the hierarchy. By contrast, an occupation is defined in market economy terms, with a prevalence of monetary retribution over other forms of gratification; the individual is much more concerned with his own interests than those of the collectivity and he tends to organize and protect himself through pressure groups; the soldier's responsibilities and duties are contractual. Moskos conceives this as an evolutionary model that can be applied to the concrete situation of a given national context to determine the position of the country's military (or parts of it) along a continuum ranging from institution to occupation. For this purpose he developed a series of sociological indicators capable of concretely measuring the above.[26] The ease of practical application of Moskos's scheme to concrete situations roused much interest among

[24] Among whom Zeb Bradford and F. Brown (1973), Amos Jordan and William Taylor (1973), Edwin Deagle (1973), William Taylor and Donald Bletz (1974) (see References).

[25] See References, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*.

[26] The model is first enunciated by Moskos at a conference of the Inter-University Seminar in Alabama in 1976, later published in the article "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization" in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, No. 1/1977, pp. 41–50. A subsequent reelaboration was presented in "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update" in *Armed Forces and Society*, 12(3), 1986, pp. 377–382.

military sociologists, not only in America but more or less all over the world. The interest of many later scholars polarized around Moskos's model, in part with critical tones[27] that led him to make adjustments in subsequent editions of it.

If Moskos takes up different positions from Janowitz regarding the professional military model (pluralistic model versus structuralist model), he appears to be his direct descendant regarding predictions on the future use of the military and its future physiognomy, bringing Janowitz's constabulary concept to concrete development. Moskos begins his analysis of contingents in peacekeeping operations starting with *Peace Soldier* (see References) the result of a field survey conducted in Cyprus in the framework of United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Examining the modes of action of peacekeeping units, Moskos immediately recognizes that the point where the departure from traditional military ethics is most marked regarding the use of force. In the rules laid down for UNFICYP, the limitations on its use are extremely circumscribed and detailed. This results in the emergence of a new, "constabulary" ethic, and Moskos attempts to outline its features and developments, which come into being more in the field than in a theoretical or conceptual setting. But this constabulary ethic clashes with the traditional military ethic. Instead of pointing to a basic contradiction in this clash, Moskos sees an evolutionary process. His thesis is that the glory of war is not an essential ingredient of military honor and if one understands the tendencies internal to national armed forces, where forms of absolute authority have gradually given way to forms of managerial leadership based on persuasion, one must also see peacekeeping as a progression of military professionalism along managerial lines. Also, on the surface, there is a transition from the use of force to the use of persuasion.

Remaining faithful to what was said in the introduction, and therefore ending this historical overview with the 1980s, the last significant contribution by this author that I cite here is his careful classification of the sociology of the military and the bibliographic review that he presents in some later works published between 1976 and 1981.[28] However, it is not possible to conclusively summarize a scholar who is still, in the year 2002, at the height of his research activity and who has demonstrated a singular ability to have a profound influence on various sectors of investigation of the sociology of the military.

Although European and, in some of his works, profoundly Dutch, I include Jacques Van Doorn in the American School because his training and thrust, his points of reference, seem to move within this current of thought (and he is not the only European to do so, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s). Van Doorn reworks Huntington's conception of the military professional as a manager of organized violence. For Van Doorn, war is an abnormal situation, an interregnum between two periods of normality during which only one institution is suited to act, the armed forces: In the final analysis, a study of military problems is a study of violence. The essential function of the military professional is therefore the control and exercise, tendentially monopolistic, of organized collective violence.

Van Doorn approaches the military as a student of complex organizations.[29] This approach leads him to a natural comparison of the two emerging organizations in modern and contemporary times, the military and the industrial company.[30] For both of these organizations the search for improved efficiency is of utmost importance; both have

[27] See, for example, under References, G. Caforio, *The Military Profession: Theories of Change.*

[28] See References; in "Armed Forces and Society," published together with Gwyn Harries-Jenkins in *Current Sociology*, 1981.

[29] For his most significant works for the sociology of the military, see References.

[30] Theorizing what had already been done concretely by the team of *The American Soldier*, which had borrowed models elaborated in the area of industrial sociology in order to apply them to the military.

implemented a breakdown of human activities into simple, coordinated, organized elements. Indeed, both have changed their criterion for the selection of executive personnel from the ascriptive type to the acquisitive.

So if the military is a complex organization, is one who works for the military on a nontemporary basis a professional or a bureaucrat? For Van Doorn the officer corps is an excellent and perhaps unique example of integration between profession and organization and with a history long enough to allow complete observation of the blending process.

Van Doorn carefully analyses the two concepts: he first identifies common characteristics, such as the fact that both professions and organizations are based on special knowledge and skills, according to individually standardized models; both of them require the actors to refrain from personalizing the problems dealt with; in both models the individual positions are acquired through comparative selections of ability. However, according to Van Doorn, the differences are substantial as well: The professional exercises a calling focused on essential values for society, he therefore acts on the basis of a precise code of ethics, while the activity of the bureaucrat consists in relating means to ends following written rules more than a moral code. The professional's loyalty is to his profession and he is judged mainly by his colleagues, while the bureaucrat's loyalty is to the organization and the judgment that counts is that of his superiors. The structure of a profession is horizontal, while that of an organization is vertical, a hierarchy. Applying this analysis to the officer corps, Van Doorn finds that the military is undoubtedly an organization because its structure is rigidly vertical and hierarchic. At the same time, however, officers display the salient characteristics of professionals: a calling centerd on important social values, social responsibility, and corporateness.

But the professionalization of the officer corps is something that developed over time, a phenomenon that, for Van Doorn, can be explained only by the intervention of the state. One characteristic of the military organization is that the state is its client; professionalization was therefore imposed by this essential client in its own interest. This interest is the importance of having a military leadership that is united by a rigorous code of ethics legalized through official recognition and educated through the creation of professional training academies. Consequently, a radical dichotomy internal to the military institution developed between the officer corps and other military personnel, a dichotomy that has survived until recently, with few problems for the institution thanks to a rigid, Goffmanian type of isolation of military society from civil society.

The present (1970s and onward) sees a decline in mass armies brought on by both changed warfare techniques and the crisis of the concept of conscription. Van Doorn analyzed the necessary passage from the draft to the volunteer army and examined all its consequences, with special emphasis on the decline in the social representativeness of the military, as well as the inclusion of values and mentalities typical of the industrial world, such as low mobility of personnel, wage demands, and unionization. This phenomenon, perceptively identified by Van Doorn at its first appearance,[31] spontaneously led to still greater similarities between the military organization and the industrial organization (already theorized by this author), posing to the military a sizeable set of new problems which, prior to its transformation, were germane only to industry.

Jacques Van Doorn's most significant contribution consists in combining the concept of the military profession as an exercise in organized violence with that of the ongoing change in the institution and the profession. These two threads are present in all his work,

[31] It would come to full development in Europe as well nearly 20 years later, in the 1990s.

leading him to largely anticipatory analyses that lend themselves to concrete applications and continue to be appreciated by contemporary scholars.[32]

WORLDWIDE DEVELOPMENTS

The extraordinary development of the American School of thought in the sociology of the military encouraged numerous studies and much research throughout the world and, particularly in the Western countries, also of autonomous studies. Outside the United States, however, the differing dimensions of both national states and their military institutions have resulted in the most significant currents and developments occurring more within international organizations than in individual countries. International organizations continue to play an essential role in the debate and development of the sociology of the military and therefore knowledge of them is important for students and scholars alike.

This section, dedicated to developments in the sociology of the military worldwide, therefore confines itself to outlining the historical development of three international institutions in which broad give-and-take occurs to this day. The array of scholars working in this sector of sociology is too vast and too recent to allow summarizing their efforts in a brief outline such as this.

Research Committee 01

Research Committee 01(RC01) *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution*, is one of the 53 research committees into which the International Sociological Association (ISA) is subdivided, each dedicated to a special sociology. It was initially called *Armed Forces and Society* but was renamed in 1980, when its program was expanded to include the field of conflict research. The first meeting of what was to become the RC01 took place at a conference on armed forces held in London in 1964 and chaired by Morris Janowitz. The conference was sponsored by the Research Committee on Political Sociology and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society of Chicago and brought together scholars from the United States and Western European countries.

At the Sixth World Congress of Sociology in Evian (France, 1966), two groups were devoted to the subject. One dealt with "Conflict Resolution and Research in Conflict Resolution" and was headed by Robert C. Angell (United States). Eleven papers were presented and two were published in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III: Working Groups and Round Table Papers*. The other, a working group on "Militarism and the Professional Military Man" headed by Morris Janowitz, became the nucleus of the Research Committee. It was attended by about 70 scholars from Western and Eastern Europe, the USSR, the United States, South America and the Far East, and 36 papers were delivered. The keynote paper by Janowitz appeared in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II: Sociology of International Relations*. A volume of many of the papers presented appeared in *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), edited by Jacques Van Doorn (The Netherlands). A steering committee was established, chaired by Morris Janowitz and including the participation of Jacques Van Doorn. The group was given the status of ISA Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society at the Seventh World Congress in Varna (Bulgaria, 1970).

[32] One of Van Doorn's fundamental works, *The Soldier and Social Change* (see References), receives, for example, a warm introduction by Morris Janowitz.

In 1980 it was proposed to change the Committee's name to reflect the views of some members whose interests lay primarily in nonviolence, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution. The ISA Executive Committee approved the change at a meeting held in Budapest in September 1980 and the Research Committee's new name became *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution*. Since then, RC01 has taken part in all the World Congresses organized by the ISA and has held many interim meetings between one World Congress and the next. The presidents of RC01 have been Morris Janowitz (United States, 1966–1974), Jacques Van Doorn (The Netherlands, 1974–1978), Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (United Kingdom, 1978–1982), Charles Moskos (United States, 1982–1986), Bernhard Fleckenstein (Germany, 1986–1994), David Segal (United States, 1994–1998), and Giuseppe Caforio (Italy, 1998–2002). The objectives of RC01 are as follows: (1) to stimulate research on armed forces and conflict resolution, (2) to establish and maintain international contacts between scientists and research institutions, (3) to encourage the exchange and discussion of relevant research findings, (4) to support academic research and the study of military-related sociology, and (5) to plan and hold research conferences. Membership in RC01 is open to all scientists active in research and/or teaching in military-related social sciences and conflict resolution.

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society

Morris Janowitz was also the founder of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) on Armed Forces and Society, initially based in Chicago. Founded in 1960, the IUS today constitutes an international "invisible college" that includes academics, military officers, students, and researchers in a variety of institutional settings, both public and private. They represent various disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, psychology, economics, international relations, social work, anthropology, law, and psychiatry. The core premise of the IUS is that analyses of military institutions require intellectual collaboration across university, organisational, disciplinary, and national lines. Seminar Fellows provide new perspectives on the study of military professionalism, civil–military relations, social composition of the armed forces, organizational change within armed forces, public policy on defence issues, peacekeeping, arms control, and conflict resolution. The Fellows of the Seminar differ widely in their strategic and political outlooks, but they all hold the common view that objective research on military institutions is a most worthy goal for which we should continually strive. They believe that such research, conducted along scholarly lines, makes an invaluable contribution to citizen understanding of armed forces.

The current (2002) president of the IUS is David Segal of the University of Maryland. The IUS has an elected Council representing various regions in the United States and abroad. The IUS edits a journal, *Armed Forces & Society*. The IUS was the first international organization to bring together scholars of the sociology of the military from different countries; however, it has always been American-led and has moved according to patterns and research themes of fundamental interest to the American School.

European Research Group on Military and Society

As the sociopolitical characteristics of the United States, as well as the size and tasks of its military, are quite different from the European reality, a group of European scholars met in 1986 in Le Lavandou (France) to found a European research association. This association

was given the name *European Research Group On Military And Society* (ERGOMAS). ERGOMAS is an association of European social scientists who study the relationship between the military and society and related phenomena. Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary working groups constitute the core of the association. ERGOMAS promotes empirically and theoretically oriented European research cooperation and international scientific communication. Its purposes are pursued through the activities of Working Groups and the association's Biennial Conferences. Indeed, the founding philosophy of ERGOMAS was to create an organizational framework suitable for promoting the constitution and activity of international thematic study groups within a European framework. The association is thus composed of a centralized organizational body, directed by a chairperson, and several research structures (the Working Groups), which operate in a coordinated manner but are completely independent from the scientific standpoint.

As stated above, the Working Groups are thematic and obviously vary in number depending on the researches in progress. They always have a multinational composition (all research is comparative or supranational) and remain active until the research on the theme has been exhausted. The current (2002) Working Groups are as follows: WG "Public Opinion, Mass Media and the Military," Marjan Malesic, Coordinator; WG "The Military Profession," Giuseppe Caforio, Coordinator; WG "Women in the Military," Marina Nuciari, Coordinator; WG "Globalisation, Localisation and Conflict," Donna Winslow, Coordinator; WG "Morale, Cohesion and Leadership," Paul Bartone and Andreas Pruefert, Coordinators; WG "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," Hans Born, Coordinator; and WG "Warriors in Peacekeeping," Mathias Schönborn, Coordinator.

Since 1986 ERGOMAS has been chaired by Ralf Zoll (Germany), Willem Scheelen (The Netherlands), Lucien Mandeville (France), Marina Nuciari (Italy), Karl Haltiner (Switzerland), Maria Vlachova (Czech Republic), and Marjan Malesic (Slovenia).

For completeness, it should be added that, in the last quarter of the 20th century, many countries (especially in the West) have created national study and research institutes in the military sociology sector; most of them are governmental,[33] but there are also private ones (for more details, see Chapter 3: "*Social Research and the Military*"). In addition, this discipline now constitutes a subject of study in military academies throughout the world and often has an important formative role in officers' basic education.

[33]One can cite, by way of example, the German Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, the French Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, the Italian Centro di Studi Strategici e Militari, and the Polish Military Institute for Sociological Research.

CHAPTER 3

Social Research and the Military:

A Cross-National Expert Survey

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO AND MARINA NUCIARI

INTRODUCTION

The reason why this research is presented in a handbook is to let the reader know who carries out research in the sociology of the military and under what conditions. As the reader can see from the pages that follow, there are common traits that characterize this research in the various countries as well as distinguishing ones: together, thanks to the good number of countries represented in the research, they provide a useful world overview on the subject. Added to this reason is another, that of giving the reader an example of a quite new research methodology in the sector, one that makes it possible to exploit fully the resources offered by the Internet.

The subject of this study is military sociological research. The study is based on an expert survey conducted by e-mail, in successive stages, among a group of colleagues from different countries who agreed to participate. These countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The basic questions we posed to ourselves in this study were of two types. One was of a methodological nature, namely what are the advantages/disadvantages and the prospects offered by a survey carried out by e-mail? The second area of interest regarded content and was aimed mainly at providing answers to the following questions: (1) Who is the typical military sociologist? (2) Who commissions such research, and what procedures do they use? (3) How much freedom do researchers have in this field? and (4) What is the social status of military sociological research in the various countries?

The study naturally falls within the more general context of the relationships between theoretical work and empirical research. In its results, it lends support to the thesis, already authoritatively expressed (Boron, 1999), of a crisis of theoretical studies and the advance

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of a sociology aimed at chiefly pragmatic ends, while expressing no value judgment on this change here. Boron, for instance, argues (Boron, 1999, p. 47 and following) that the discrediting of theoretical work is due to (1) the crisis of the university format; (2) the growing role played by nonacademic institutions (and, for our purposes, the military is undoubtedly one such institution) and private foundations in drawing up research agendas; (3) effects of the social sciences market, which rewards pragmatic, realistic approaches and punishes theoretical ones; (4) the practical approach, which is increasingly demanded by research funders; and (5) what he calls the deplorable consequence of the garbage-in/garbage-out cycle due to the conditions in which the research is performed. The presentation of the study results begins with an analysis and discussion of the data resulting from the research, followed by a paragraph that illustrates the methodological aspects of the research, and ends with some concluding remarks. Last, Appendix B contains the questionnaire used for the expert survey.

Before analyzing the data it is convenient to present the conceptual framework for a multicase research on the military field study (see Figure 3.1) that we used as a guideline for the research. This scheme is then reproposed at the end of the study (see Appendix A), modified in accordance with the results of the empirical survey, under the name "Resulting framework for a Multicase 'Research on the Military' Field Study." Appendix A provides the reader with a quick graphic view of the unfolding of the research and its results.



FIGURE 3.1. Conceptual framework for a multicase "research on the military" field study.

WHO IS RUNNING THE RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY AND HOW ARE THEY DOING IT?

The Typical Military Sociologist

To outline the ideal military sociologist, we can start from the sociodemographic data. Ignoring general national characterizations, a larger percentage are male (76% of the sample), fairly well distributed over the different age groups (see Table 3.1), who mostly began doing research in the sector during the 1980s (see Table 3.2) and for the most part are engaged in military sociology in a prevalent (64.7%) but usually not exclusive way (only 11.4%). The military sociologist's education is quite diversified, where the most numerous group is the Ph.D.s (40.6%; several of them are also officers), closely followed by university professors (37.5%). Officers (19.8%) are rather numerous and are equally divided between active and retired. Most of the university professors teach sociology, but not all: 25% teach military psychology (solely or together with military sociology), 17% teach military history, and 8% subjects that can be grouped under conflict resolution science. The main places where the teaching is done are universities and military academies, each with equal percentages of respondents (40%); 11% teach in war college-type institutions and the remainder elsewhere. Most of them do their research work mainly in state-run research centers (34.4%), but a good percentage do it in universities (28.1%) and some freelance (18.8%); a minority (12.5%) work in private research centers. From this point on, however, the situation begins to appear rather different from country to country.

There are countries in which the researcher says he performs military sociological research chiefly (when not exclusively) in a state-run center and others where the research activity on this topic appears to be more balanced between public and private centers; in both cases there is almost always collaboration with the university. And finally, in a few countries it is the research of the freelancers that appears to be most active and widespread. The first area includes Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. The respondents from South Africa, Slovenia, and Belgium do their research work almost exclusively in universities. Research activity appears to be more evenly divided between public and private in Bulgaria, Italy, Russia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while it seems to be almost entirely entrusted to freelancers, usually in a university environment, in Argentina, India, and Lithuania. The freelancers' contribution is also strong in Austria, Italy, Russia, and South Africa.

This areal division brings the survey to the parties to whom the research is concretely entrusted by the commissioning bodies. Here, too, the general average does not always seem to be significant, given the big national differences. However, this average sees state-run

TABLE 3.1. Distribution of Age in Military Sociology

Age of respondent (Years)	Percentages of military sociologists
30–40	28
40–50	28
50–60	32
Over 60	12

TABLE 3.2. Distribution by Decade

Start to work in the field	Percentage in military sociology
Before 1970	12
In the 1970s	17
In the 1980s	53
In the 1990s	18

research centers in first place percentagewise, followed by the individual researcher, and then the private research center.

In the first group, the commissioning bodies assign the research without distinction to an individual researcher, a state-run center, or a private center. This group includes Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Israel, The Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which shows a perhaps slight prevalence of assignments being given to private centers. In the second group, entrusting research to private centers appears to be rare (or nonexistent). This group includes Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, Sweden, South Africa, and Switzerland, but with the following difference: in Bulgaria, Germany, Russia, and Sweden it seems to be almost exclusively the state-run centers that receive research assignments, while in Switzerland it is normally the individual researcher who is called to do research.[1] Then there is the third group, where there are few or no commissioning bodies and the input to the research often comes from the bottom, the individual researcher, so that, in adjusting the subsequent sets of the questionnaire, we had to replace the expression "commissioner" with "authority who accepts/finances the research." This group is made up of Argentina, India, and Lithuania.

Finding a suitable generalization to connote the work environment of our typical researcher is difficult because in some countries the universities are mainly public and in others mainly private, with all the shades in between, so attributing to the individual researchers a public or private work environment is strongly disturbed by the "university" variable. To generalize nonetheless, we feel it is fair to say that our typical researcher works mainly in a public research center, with strong exceptions in the United States and the United Kingdom. The commissioning bodies, almost exclusively public, alternate in awarding the research to individual researchers; to the public centers where they work; and, where they exist, to private centers as well.

But are there preferences/exclusions in the choice of researcher by the commissioners? In general, the countries where there is no exclusion and/or preference in choosing the researcher prevail, but not by much (55.6% versus 44.4%), and the situation has to be looked at country by country. Here, too, it is possible to divide the countries into groups. In the first, most numerous, group, the respondents state that there is no exclusion or preference in the choice of researchers except what may be dictated by the individual's scientific qualifications. These countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Then there is a country where the respondents' opinions are divided, and this is Germany: two respondents say there are no preferences, while the third states, "I believe there are, but it is very difficult to prove...."

[1] Almost always this term means "applied research."

The absence of preferences and exclusions may be determined by particular local factors, as in Switzerland, for which a respondent says, "In a small country there are often not many experts in the field. You have to rely on those at disposal independently of gender, race, civilian or military, and so on." Countries with reported exclusions or preferences are Argentina, Austria, France, India, Italy, Lithuania, and Russia. Where there are preferences, they seem to be in favor of friends (40%), military people (20%), civilians (20%), and for political reasons (20%). Examples of such preferences or exclusions expressed by researchers of individual countries are as follows:

(1) There is a preference of gender and function, expressed in assertions like "Research is exclusively commissioned to high ranking officers, or clerks/bureaucrats from Ministry of Defence or academy. As usual they are males." (2) There are the added dimensions of acquaintances and political attitude, expressed by responses like "Preferences: in general terms: personal friendship; conservative attitudes of researchers; sex: male; reserve officers; party membership (of course, of the political party in power).... (3) There are also preferences due to acquaintances: "Preferences or exclusion depend upon who knows whom" or "Friends of bureaucrats who belong to the commissioning body."

With these data in mind, therefore, we can say that in many countries our typical researcher is male, a high-ranking officer or functionary (or an ex-officer or ex-functionary) with acquaintances in the usual commissioning body, and politically close to the party in power.

An attempt to learn, in very general terms, the political positions of the respondents was not very successful, as 53% of the sample did not respond to this question, judged by some as "too private to answer." However, the data for those who answered confirm a prevalently sympathetic position to the party in power (28%), with 12.5% professing indifference and 6.3% opposed.

What is the real role that the military sociologist plays, beyond the research activities? We tried to determine this by means of a question asking whether sociologists acted as advisers or experts to the general staff (question 26 in Appendix B). This role is present in several countries: the dual role of adviser and researcher occurs in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States. In the United States, for example, one respondent states:

> There are a few military officers with education in sociology that do act as advisors in personnel matters. The greatest influence is from academics who do research and then present it to military personnel. In a few cases, noted sociologists are consulted directly by military leaders and appointed to commissions and study groups.

Such a figure appears as an adviser in Austria and mostly as a researcher in South Africa. He is an occasional figure ("for specific issues") in Belgium and Switzerland and a composite one ("specialists from psychology and related disciplines") in the United Kingdom. There seem to be initiatives toward hiring such figures in the remaining countries (except for India and Lithuania), expressed in statements like "Until now, connections in the right place (more often than not, political) were the main source of influence. There is now talk of institutionalising social science adviser...." Our typical researcher thus tends also to take on an official role of consulting and/or research for the top echelons of the military establishment. This is already a reality in some countries especially in the United States, while it is in progress elsewhere.

TABLE 3.3. Distribution of Commissioners of Military Sociological Research

Commissioner	Percentage distribution
Public administration	74
State-run research centers	58
Private bodies	51
Private research centres	48
International foundations	22
Military establishment	6
Universities	6
Individuals	6
Others	3
Nobody	3

Driving Forces of Military Sociological Research

To determine what are, generally speaking, the driving forces of research in this sector in the different countries, questions were asked about the commissioning bodies, the existence of research centers particularly dedicated to the discipline, and their nature and composition.

The main commissioner, where there is one,[2] appears to be the state, chiefly in its governmental component dedicated to the sector, the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Another general datum is that there is almost always more than one commissioning body that turns to research centers,[3] so that in Table 3.3 above, devoted to the general average recurrence of the various commissioning bodies, the total percentage is much higher than 100.

As can be seen in the table, many research inputs come from the research centers themselves, both state-run and private, while the initiative of international foundations is also significant. Looking at individual countries, we see that international foundations play an especially important part in the Eastern European countries. The fact that universities have an apparently modest role in commissioning derives from that fact that, in reality, many research centers exist within the framework of universities and therefore university commissioning is in large part absorbed by that item. Something similar can be said for the apparently low incidence of the military establishment: actually, the inputs of the military leadership are often mediated by the public administration; others pass through state-run research centers, which therefore figure as commissioners since they are the ones that concretely set the research protocols.

Looking at individual countries, there are some departures from the prevalent commissioning by the public administration. In one group of countries, private commissioning, either directly by private research centers or other bodies, is more important. These countries are South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, and, although to a lesser extent, Italy, Israel, Bulgaria, Russia, and Slovenia. These last three countries have the particularity that private commissioning is largely constituted by Western international foundations. A

[2] As already pointed out, countries with quite different levels of development of the discipline are examined here.

[3] For example, an American researcher writes: "There are various agencies under the Dept of Defense that sponsor research on sociological issues of military relevance... Some research activities regarding the domain of socialization to the professional military can be found within the military training academies. In a few cases, these centers are under medical branch."

second group of countries (Argentina, India, and Lithuania) is characterized by an almost total absence of commissioning. The input to the research can vary widely and often originates from the researchers themselves, who must seek funding and authorizations on their own.

A second important aspect in seeking to understand the mechanisms of military sociological research is analysis of the research centers, public and private, from the standpoints of the importance given to the discipline, their nature, and their makeup. The importance given to the discipline is drawn first here from the division between exclusively or prevalently dedicated centers (about 70% of the responses), a minority of centers that are only partially dedicated (around 12%), and situations where no center for military sociological research exists (almost 10%).

~~But these general data take on interest and significance only in a breakdown by coun-~~tries. There are countries that have several research centers in this discipline, often an exclusively dedicated one and others that are partially dedicated. This is especially true for the United States, for which one respondent writes: "Only one is a discipline-based center, but many others are multi-disciplinary (primarily military psychology) and some are specifically problem-oriented, e.g., military family institute." On a smaller scale in terms of numbers, having a center exclusively or prevalently dedicated to a few (from two to four) institutes that partially or occasionally deal with research in the sector exists in Bulgaria, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, and Sweden. What emerges in countries like Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Switzerland is a situation with one center, usually state-run, that is dedicated to the discipline and is the only one authorized to conduct research in the sector. This situation produces different results in the various countries, however: while the German respondents, for example, feel that a situation of this type does not influence freedom of research, others affirm: "There is no independent and free research in the field of military sociology with respect to funded research projects. MoD has some kind of 'monopoly.'" In Italy, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom there are only sectors of one or more centers that are dedicated to military sociological research. The most typical (but not the only) case is that of an institute dedicated to strategic studies that also has a department that deals with military sociological studies; alongside it there are other institutes, generally private, that occasionally conduct research in this field. Finally, the responses to our survey show a group of three countries, Argentina, India, and Lithuania, where there seems to be no study or research center in the sector. One respondent describes the situation of this group of countries as follows: "As far as I know, at the moment, there is no (public) real research of Military Sociology as empiric research on the inside of the Armed Forces. When commissioned by the Armed Forces the motivation seemed to be the protection of the Institution, in front of the Society and/or improve its performance." Let us now see in greater detail where these research centers are, how they operate, and what their general makeup is.

In all the countries where centers that carry out research on this subject exist, at least one is supported by the state, most of the time directly under the MoD (in two cases, South Africa and Sweden, it appears to be set in the university structure). In most of the countries examined here research is also carried out, at times prevalently, in private centers. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, and Sweden seem not to have private institutes that deal with this type of research. The private centers are mostly supported by the universities and sometimes by national foundations (Italy and South Africa) or international ones (Bulgaria and Russia).

The modest involvement, in many countries, of universities in military sociological research is ascribed by several respondents to a national culture with little interest in general

for military issues. This opinion is expressed in statements like "Military sociology issues are in general not of broad national interest, outside the military organisation. This is of course reflected in little support for research." Another commented as follows: "Generally low interest in military issues, lack of a broader institutional base for military research (no independent academic research, no institute for strategic studies)." The composition of state-supported research centers is almost always mixed, i.e., with both civilian and military scholars. An apparent exception is Italy, where the personnel making up the research department dedicated to the sector is all military. The exception is only apparent, however: Such personnel have mainly organizational and managerial tasks, while an outside team of scholars, both civilian and military, is selected for each research project. The private research centers generally have an all-civilian composition, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Russia, where career military men are also present. A third significant indicator on the nature and efficiency of the driving forces of military sociological research is provided by the opinions directly expressed in this regard by the scholars who participated in this expert survey. From this standpoint the responses given by the interviewees make it possible to identify three distinct areas: a Western area, an area of Eastern European countries, and an area of Third World countries.

In the first area there is predominant satisfaction with the suitability of the existing forces that drive research, although obviously with individual remarks and proposals for improvement. This satisfaction is not uniform, however: On one end is the extremely positive opinion of the United States, where five respondents of six express themselves with expressions of the following type:

> 'The United States' military does much more social science research than any other country I think of. I would like to see government social scientists, like me, get more freedom to determine what we will work on. I would also like to be able to do more of the work rather than supervising the works of contractors. I believe that in other countries the research is more likely to be done in universities and that should give the scientists who do the work more control over what they are doing.

Opinions are less enthusiastic for countries like Austria, France and Italy, where, one respondent for example, writes the following:

> Among those who make decisions as to the expected value of proposed research projects, not enough are experts: people who are both trained in the social sciences and familiar with the field's classical literature. Many are officers or civilian generalist social scientists who act as if nothing had been written in the military field, in the country or elsewhere. As a result, projects are sometimes awarded to complete beginners who are apt to reinvent the wheel without reference to some central concepts (e.g. "professionalism", "radical" or "pragmatic", "occupationalism"), and often without considering the military's unique characteristics. Also, except for a few individual researchers, there is no consideration of the international dimension: as in my country the number of social scientists doing research in the military field is too small for a proper mutual evaluation of published work at national level, much mediocre work is allowed to stand. Lately, many researchers entered the field because they were attracted by the money on offer to study the future all-volunteer force, but have no intention to invest heavily in the field. Amateurism has become a plague. What is missing in my country is a specialized milieu organized into an 'invisible college' recognized by the military establishment, as in the United States.

In the ex-communist European countries the inputs to research and the organizations that carry it out are often perceived as distorted by interests different from those of the research itself and still limited by the military establishment; however, there is research, it has taken on considerable vigor since the end of the Cold War, and the respondents consider it to be undoubtedly growing. Here, too, there is a range of evaluations, as in this negative one

expressed by a Russian respondent:

> All researches are focused on the struggle for power in coming elections. In big cities, there are priorities of Yury Luzshkov's Movement. In far-away regions, adepts of Egor Stroev screw out ideas of military sociologists. And 'poor' oligarchs let down all private research centers in provinces to concentrate efforts within the mass media (TV, newspapers, magazines, and video markets with the military or police topics). We should remember that unpredictability of elite's behavior in Russia has under-estimate the value and, correspondingly, need in sociological data among potential commissioners.

Other researchers are more optimistic, affirming "According to me these are only the first steps. We have a lot of work to do in the field of military sociology in Bulgaria in the future" and as follows:

> It starts to change for better: earlier it was completely closed for anyone outside the defense establishment itself. We haven't reached, however, the normal for the developed democratic countries situation, where this stuff is published in academic journals and discussed in the larger academic community.

Completely outside this framework is Slovenia, which seems to have attained much more Western standards in this sector as well: it is the common opinion of the Slovenian respondents that military sociological research is considerably developed and free in their country. One of them writes:

> I would describe Slovenian situation as very liberal. Which means that military is open to the research, is aware of sociological aspects which have to be viewed by neutral "outsiders." There are also problems deriving from the lack of sociological military research tradition. Sometimes the commissioners are too liberal, and sometimes too close.

The situation in the Czech Republic, as described by the respondent of that country, appears to be close to that in Western Europe as well.

The last area to be surveyed is the countries of the Third World. The respondents from Argentina, India, and Lithuania consider research inputs in the sector to be almost nonexistent in research centres either nonexistent or hobbled, and the prospects for change still far off. One colleague writes:

> As mentioned before there is not any institution which commissions research projects of military sociology in my country. All activity and proposals are based on private initiative, commitment and interest of researcher. There is a "dream" to create a research centre within a Military academy or other university in order to develop the military sociology in Lithuania.

Another colleague even sees regression:

> There has been advisory work for the public officials and political parties, mainly on civil–military relations. This has been particularly true during the period of return to constitutional rule (1983/9). Some research has been conducted into the Armed Forces, commissioned by the Armed Forces on manpower, recruitment of officers, etc. By now this kind of research is close to zero, for budget constraints.

Procedures Used by the Commissioning Bodies

As already seen in the foregoing sections, military sociological research appears to be prevalently entrusted to state-run research centers, although commissions to individual researchers and private centers are extensive. But if we look at the criteria with which the

commissioning bodies choose the person responsible for the research, it seems interesting to go deeper into that 44.4% of the interviewees, already cited above, who say that in their countries there are preference criteria for choosing the persons to whom research projects are to be assigned.

From the study it emerged, as mentioned above, that the highest rate of preference (40%), where one exists, is for "friends" or "friends of friends": that is, in a large group of countries, knowing the right people in the right places means a greater likelihood of the researcher obtaining assignments. In addition to friendships, or perhaps combined with them, there is political affiliation: the 20% who claim that in their countries there are particular preferences in choosing the person responsible for research attribute these preferences to a criterion of political sympathy or affiliation. It also emerged that 20% feel that there is a preference for military people, but another 20% feel the preference goes to civilian researchers: here, of course, the aggregate datum says nothing and it has to be broken down by country. Thus there seems to be a preference for civilian researchers in the United States, but this opinion is not unanimous, since among the respondents there are also those who claim the choice is often oriented in favor of mixed military/civilian groups. One American researcher writes: "In my experience, many grant agencies prefer a mix of military (active officers) and civilian (university or private research firm) investigators on a research proposal: these proposals often have a better chance to be funded." The preference for a military researcher is specifically expressed for Austria and Lithuania (or possibly a reserve officer).

Although, as has been seen, a large majority of the sample (76%), and therefore, presumably, of the surveyed universe, is made up of male researchers, the commissioning bodies do not seem to demonstrate substantial criteria of preference linked to gender: only two interviewees indicate gender as a deciding element, but only together with other preference criteria. One American interviewee indicated a gender preference for some types of research: "In recent times, female researchers seem to get preference on studies related to gender issues." Almost always (over 80% of the responses) the commissioning body sets the research budget and topic in awarding the research and, for the majority of the respondents (66%), it also sets the time available to the research group. Usually more freedom is left to decide the sample, as well as the research methodologies. Nevertheless, limits are frequently imposed on the researcher, generally consisting in taboo subjects, military units that cannot be investigated, or constraints on the data and results of the research. Nearly 64% of the interviewees report that there are some types of constraints. In particular, divulging the results of the research appears to be subject to restrictions of various kinds in a large group of countries. In other countries, these restrictions range from requiring an authorization for publication to prohibition of publication for some (and at times for many) studies. The description of research authorization procedures by a Dutch interviewee is quite explicit, and as one can read in the following lines, testifies to substantial freedom not only of research but also of initiative for those who are qualified:

> As a researcher I can ask a commander (general or even colonel or lower) for permission to do research. Sometimes I only ask permission of the military to be interviewed. When the research has political implications (media that are interested, et cetera) I try to "cover my back" by acquiring approval from higher ranking military (even generals). Commanders are mostly surprisingly open to give information or co-operation. It is normal procedure that we keep others informed on forthcoming research by way of an official research plan, this research plan contains all research going on at the Military Academy (technical, economic, strategic as well as behavioural research). This research plan also allocated means (money, time) to researchers for a specific research. But some publications I write (like the one on the social origins of cadets) are not planned for, neither have I asked official permission to write on the subject.

Objective reasons are also cited for why research on the military appears destined to grow in the future. For example one British respondent writes: "In recent years, the MoD has become more open about developing a dialogue with academics in the area of military sociology. This is set to continue I think, not least because this area of personnel (broadly conceived) is of critical importance for military effectiveness."

In some countries, however, constraints are also present both on the units on which research may be done and on the dissemination of results. An example is offered by one of the Russian researchers interviewed, who writes:

> Today it is pretty hard to get a permission from the MD officials for a study to be carried out inside the troops and combat detachments. The reports on the study are often considered as classified material with the restricted zone of circulation. Due to mentioned cause it is often impossible to present the results of the study at the civilian scientific meetings, in sociological journals and open media.

Nonetheless, the situation also seems to be improving in the countries of Eastern Europe. For example a Bulgarian interviewee writes:

> Research in the field of military sociology in Bulgaria has more than 30 years of history. This is especially true for the surveys among military personnel, conducted by the Sociological Research Centre of the MoD. The problem was that until 1990 the results were classified, and few publications resulted from these surveys. During the last several years the first steps towards co-operation with colleagues from civilian institutions in the country and military sociologists abroad were undertaken.

And for Russia, too, an interviewee states:

> The application for research in the area of military sociology is likely to be approved by the leading national funds and relevant organizations. Despite all troubles life is going on. The basic problem for Russian scholars is a lack of financial resources for research and even for salaries and wages. The military sociologists are suffering from this reason like others.

In most of the countries of the sample the research budget appears to be agreed upon by the commissioning body and the person responsible for the research. It appears to be fixed *a priori* by the commissioning body in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, and South Africa. In a few of these countries, however (Czech Republic, The Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland), it can be modified during the research on the basis of the actual costs. In some countries (Argentina, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, and the United States) it is all-inclusive; in the remaining ones—the majority—researcher remuneration is a separate item from research costs. Almost everywhere the commissioning body refrains from interfering with the conduct of the research: sample selection, administering questionnaires or conducting interviews, and collection and coding of data are left completely up to the research group, with the sole exception, it would seem, of some interference in sample choice in Argentina. In Poland questionnaires are subject to prior control by the commissioner.

Degree of Freedom in the Research Conducted

The point raised here pertains to an apparently outdated *querelle*, about the relationships between social research and social institutions, or better, between sociology and politics, or even between social researchers and some specific institutions where, like in the military, values and political issues maintain a strong relevance, which become (recalling Janowitz, 1978) particularly intriguing when relating to topics such as war and peace.

To limit the scope of the discussion to the specific field of military sociology, many statements and propositions that have already applied to general sociology as a positive science (the Weberian *Wertfreiheit,*) as a critical science (unmasking contradictions within social institutions), and as an applied science (to know in order to help solving social problems) can easily be applied and discussed. This is especially true when the topics involve the institutional position of the social scientist (within or without the military institution) and of the type of research commissioning (directly from the military or from other "civilian" research centers). In this section there is also a small attempt to renew the discussion about status and role of social research "on," "in," and "for" the military.

In the research conducted among experts and military sociologists, some topics were raised concerning the degree of research freedom as far as military subjects are concerned, i.e., the use of research outputs, possible limitations in circulation of results, and research status (that is, its relevance and given importance by military staff and authorities). As can be seen, these are critical and topical issues in the field of applied research when it is conducted within or commissioned by an institution whose core business is not scientific research (unlike the case of universities or independent research centers). It is by no means an exclusive matter for military institutions, since secrecy, researchers' loyalty, and institutional indoctrination are present and well-known aspects in social research within for-profit organizations or political organizations. But there are good reasons to think that these issues become even more critical when military institutions are involved (Boene, 1990).

As a general remark, when speaking with sociologists and social scientists in general who deal with the armed forces, a common trait arises, about a more or less explicit and more or less widespread mood of "suspicion" and "reticence" on the part of military institutions toward sociology and social scientists in general; such a mood has to be overcome and turned into trust by means of an accurate and somewhat continuous action of explanation, clarification, and reassurance that the research is necessary and that its outcome will be fruitful and the intentions are positively bound to the well-being of the institution. Such a work is necessary when the researcher does not belong to the institution and especially when he or she does not have military status. It is not necessary, or less necessary, when the researcher has military status or when he or she belongs to the military institution (in military research centers or Defense Department research centers), since in those cases hierarchy, obedience, and institutional loyalty are supposed to be internalized traits, thus reducing and in any case controlling any "opportunistic behavior" by the researcher. In this last case, researchers sometimes complain about restrictions in the choice of research topics, pressure in order to get fast and ready-to-use results (at the expense of a deeper and cautious scientific outlook), or even about the perceived underestimation and final uselessness of their work.

In the present research, it is possible to see and to compare these different situations, even though the "occasional" character of the sample (formed by those researchers only whose e-mail address was known to us and within them by only those wishing to answer to our questionnaire) can add a certain bias to our considerations. In any case, we can consider our sample a Delphi-type sample; since all respondents can be easily considered "experts" in their field, the number is not necessarily fixed by any sample/universe ratio, and they answered to the same question sets in an independent and individual way by means of a e-mailed questionnaire. It is not a true Delphi method since there has not been iteration of the interview, but there is chance that the first evaluation of data here presented could

be considered part of an iterative process in order to gain a more stable and self-corrected description of the phenomenon under study.

The topic can be broken down into three aspects: the true freedom in the research path (e.g., choice of topics, researchers, and methodologies), the use of research output (e.g., dissemination and copyright), and the status occupied by social research on military matters within military institutions and in general among the various commissioning bodies.

FREEDOM IN RESEARCH WORK. This is a critical topic. Of course, the main difference is given by a structural distinction pertaining to the status of researchers, since it is assumed that the very place where research should be intrinsically free is within an academic/university framework (universities in general and national centers for scientific research), provided that the single researcher or the research group is totally responsible for the choice of the topic, the conduction of the research in all its stages, and data treatment and dissemination of results, and is the only authority recognized to judge (but not to limit) the work done by professional peers; that is, the scientific community. There is the question of research funding, but also in this case, the difference is given by the source: academic/institutional or private coming from outside. Another difference comes from the type of the research: basic or applied. Freedom in the research work could be put on a freedom scale, varying from a maximum to a minimum, where all these factors assume different ways and weights. (Table 3.4)

We could say that the degree of freedom is normally highest in the first case, when research is done within a university, with public/institutional funds, is basic and results are judged by the scientific community; freedom degree can decrease as we approach the last category, the military research center, where commissioner and funding are internal, the research is almost totally applied, and the control is performed by the institution itself. Of course, this is a very general scheme, since the single case can be considered under more than one category and subdivisions can also change according to different nations and normative legal standards (e.g., between public, state-run universities and private universities). We can take this classification as provisional, and we describe and interpret our data under these different combinations. Adaptations and changes will come later, as a result of our data.

TABLE 3.4. Freedom Scale

Control over Research	Type of Institution	Funding Source	Type of Research Output	Freedom Level
Only or mainly the scientific community	University/National	Public/institutional	Basic (B)	******
	scien. res. centers	Private	Applied (A)	*****
Institution and/or external commissioner	State-run res. centers	Public/institutional	Basic and applied	****
Institution and/or external commissioner	Private res. centers	Institutional, various	Mainly applied	***
Institution	Military res. centers	Institutional	Applied	**

THE RESEARCH PATH. According to our data, there is a generalized possibility for a single researcher to propose a research project to any commissioner (state or private center), even on a private individual basis, and this option is declared to be acceptable in a large majority of cases (i.e., countries): 75% of our respondents are positive to this regard. But this possibility remains more in principle than in practice, since (as it is clarified elsewhere in this chapter) there are selective preferences for state centers to be committed more frequently.

Generally speaking, there is a link between the variety of possible research entitlements and the liveliness of social research in the field: In countries where military sociology has gained a relatively high status, all the three options (state centers, private centers, and single researchers) are chosen, even though with differences among countries; on the contrary, in countries such as Argentina, Lithuania, and India research in the field is rare and usually committed (or permitted and financially sustained) to single researchers acting as the true input source. It is evident, and even obvious, that the general difference is given by the different degree of "institutionalization" received by military sociology in each country: This institutionalization is proved by the presence and activity of research centers totally or partially oriented to this special field; indifferently public, private, or both; and by the existence of courses in the discipline "military sociology" in universities at undergraduate and/or postgraduate level or military academies.

Being mainly state and/or private centers to be entitled for social research, a certain "veto" power over the choice of the very researcher is declared in 10 countries (38%), and these are Austria, Germany, India, Italy, Lithuania, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United States, and Argentina; for some of them, where there are more than one respondent, there are controversial answers, such as for Germany, Sweden, and the United States, where some say that preferences are present and others assert the contrary. This means that countries where there is no declared preference for researchers are Belgium, Bulgaria, Cekia, Israel, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, that is, 9 countries. These preferences are clarified by a minority of respondents (five people only), so that answers cannot be considered to be meaningful with respect to our sample); some say that only military personnel is preferred, some that only civilian researchers are preferred, and some other speak about "friends of bureaucrats belonging to the commissioning body." There are in general certain topics not allowed to be investigated, and this is the case for 41% of respondents (that is, for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and Argentina, of which 6 countries are among those where also control over researchers is exerted by the commissioning body). Only a few respondents indicated what kind of topics are not allowed for investigation, and these are so-called sensitive matters for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Argentina; ethical and unpopular issues for the United States; and ethical issues for Sweden.

As far as control over methodologies is concerned, this peculiar control is exerted in Austria, Russia, Sweden, and in the United States, but in the last three countries experts are divided between positive and negative answers. But control can be enlarged also to more technical aspects of the research path, such as questionnaires (if any) and gender or status of the interviewer. The first is true in the experience of the large majority of respondents, and the only exceptions are in Cekia, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and controversially in Russia. The fact that structured questionnaires are usually submitted to a prior control by the commissioner is a normal procedure in organizational research, and it is linked not only to a will of control over the research process but to the strength of hierarchical power usually exerted over personnel: As long as the military is a highly hierarchical organization,

this power is exerted in order to prevent disloyal behaviors or disruptive consequences for the organization.

The case of armed forces is peculiar also because of the existence of "classified matters," matters which military personnel are not allowed to speak about freely or with nonmilitary people. The second element is given by preferences expressed over gender or status of the interviewer, that is, the person who directly approaches military personnel. In this way control is present in Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Argentina, and controversially in the United States. Types of preferences are not indicated by respondents, only a few speak about preferences of "military personnel" or "military-oriented" people, and very little information is given about gender.

An Index of Control Over The Research Path. In order to give a picture of the situation, a table can be drawn by data shown above, so that a kind of measure of the control degree could be formed. This Index of control over research path is formed by five elements, two pertaining to the researchers involved and three to the content and methods of the research. Presence/absence of each element gives us the level of control exerted in each country, ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 means *no control at all* and 5 means *the highest control in each country*; where controversial answers are presented, half a point is given to the specific element. From the table an index can be formed, ranging from 0 to 5, that is, from a situation where the control is absent to where the control is performed over each element: in order to simplify interpretation, we can divide countries into three groups according to the following classification: 0 to 1.5 points = no and low control, 2 to 2.5 points = medium control, and 3 to 5 points = high control.

Using this classification we have a first group of six countries where the research path seems to be rather free of control (Czekia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom) or at a low level (Bulgaria, The Netherlands, and Switzerland), a second group is formed by six "medium control" countries (Belgium, Italy, Poland, South Africa, Germany, and Sweden), and a third group of five "high control" countries (Austria, Argentina, Lithuania, Russia, and the United States). Regrouped countries are shown in Table 3.5; the Single Countries Index is shown in Table 3.6.

Each group does not seem to be internally homogeneous under some respect, unless we look for different explanations leading to similar results. In the "low control" (LC) group three former Eastern European countries are present, and we could say that this rather free condition could be the result of the generalized liberalization following the overall political and economic changes after 1989.

Table 3.5. Countries by Level of Control over Social Research

Low control (0–1.5 points)	Medium control (2–2.5 points)	High control (3–5 points)
Czekia	Belgium	Lithuania
Slovenia	Italy	Russia
United Kingdom	Poland	United States
Switzerland	South Africa	Argentina
Netherlands	Sweden	Austria
Bulgaria	Germany	

TABLE 3.6. Level of Control over Research Path by Country[a]

Country	R	T	M	TL	I	Index
Argentina	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5
Belgium	N	N	N	Y	Y	2
Bulgaria	N	N	N	Y	Y	1.5
					N	
Czekia	N	N	N	N	N	0
France	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germany	Y	Y	N	Y	N	2.5
	N					
India	Y	—	—	—	—	—
Israel	N	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	Y	N	N	Y	N	2
Lithuania	Y	N	N	Y	Y	3
The Netherlands	N	N	N	Y	N	1
Poland	N	Y	N	Y	N	2
Russia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4
			N	N		
Slovenia	N	N	N	N	N	0
South Africa	Y	N	N	Y	N	2
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	N	N	2
	N		N			
Switzerland	N	Y	N	—	N	1
United Kingdom	N	N	N	N	N	0
United States	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	3
	N	N	N		N	

[a] R = Researcher; T = Topic; M = Methodology; TL = Tool; I = Interviewer; Index = total Y.

But this explanation evidently does not apply to countries such as Switzerland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Making reference to a well-known distinction among countries according to their position along some general cultural dimensions (G. Hofstede, 1997), the three last countries score low in the so-called Power Distance dimension. The PD Index is a measure of the relevance assigned to hierarchy and respect for authority, so that a high score on this dimension describes a country where authority, control, and obedience are largely present and valued, while a low score means more egalitarian and nonhierarchical behaviors are preferred. It seems here that this dimension could be responsible for the variance in the level of control performed, and accepted, over sociological research, at least with respect to the military domain. In the second MC group, Belgium, South Africa, and Italy have high scores on the PD Index, but this is not the case for Germany and Sweden (the PD Index score is low). Because of absence of this kind of data, Poland cannot be judged under this respect, and its rather medium-low control score can probably be explained with the same reasons used for the other former Eastern European countries in the low-control group.

The last, HC, group is formed by Russia and the United States (where military matters were and continue to be of critical relevance because of their international role both before and after the Cold War) and by Lithuania, Argentina, and Austria. Here the PD Index fails in its explicative capacity, since the United States and Austria have low scores, Argentina only has a high PDI score, and for Russia and Lithuania there are no data of this kind.

Another dimension, defined by Hofstede as Uncertainty Avoidance, is supposed to measure the ways through which a culture deals with uncertainty and risk: a high score

on the UA Index (UAI) means that uncertainty is feared and thus overcontrolled by means of rules and restrictions, while a low score means that uncertainty is generally accepted, with the consequence of reducing rules to a minimum and considering new things without anxiety. Also this dimension could give some insight for our topic, since acceptance or anxiety toward science and its output could be differently managed by different cultures coping with uncertainty in different ways. In our case, countries in the LC group—where such data are available at least—have low scores on the UAI (The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but not Switzerland); in the MC group, there are high UAI scores for Belgium, Germany, and Italy (but not for Sweden and South Africa); and in the HC group, the UAI is high for Argentina and Austria, but not the United States. In particular, the United States are a true exception, since their low scores on both indexes should put them in the LC group with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

A second attempt to explain the different levels of control over social research in the various countries could make reference to data collected in the interviews by considering the place where research is usually performed together with the place where the respondent (being a researcher in the field) usually conducts her/his studies. We could assume that control could be (or perceived to be) lower when research is self-commissioned or commissioned by the public administration and performed within state-run centers, run by the Ministry of Defence, where researchers normally do their job. This is because researchers, being submitted to a sort of hierarchical control, are insiders with respect to the institution responsible for the research and control is "internalized" in their role. For research commissioned to freelancers or scholars working in universities, their outsider status can induce the commissioning body to exert stronger control over various steps of the research path. In the LC group, Czekia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Bulgaria are all countries where research is usually conducted within state-run centers run by the MoD, and respondents in these countries generally belong to the same centers. A similar situation is found in the MC group. In the last, HC, group, Lithuania, Argentina, and Austria are countries where sociological research on the military is rare and normally conducted by outsiders, over which control by the commissioner is (or is perceived to be) rather strong and occurs at every step; for Russia and the United States, the situation is a mixture of MoD and private centers, and in fact the level of control is more medium-high than high. As a second step we can investigate which other aspects related with conducting research and its results are put under institutional control in each of the three groups.

The other aspects investigated are more technical elements, such as sample selection; questionnaire administration; interview conduction; questionnaire gathering and data codification; the possible perception of any kind of pressure and its degree; and the control over research results such as copyright, dissemination, and publication of results. Sample selection, questionnaire administration and gathering, interviewees, and data coding, that is, all technical aspects, in all countries are performed by the research group, with the only exception being Argentina, where sample selection and questionnaire administration are done by the commissioner. The feeling of some kind of pressure is declared in 11 countries, notwithstanding their position in the three groups (Czekia, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, and United Kingdom in the first group; Sweden and Germany in the second; and the United States and Austria in the third group). Paradoxically, this feeling is declared by researchers in all but one of the low-control countries, and less in the other two groups where control is higher. This could be the consequence of the degree of freedom left to researchers: Where freedom is high, pressure of any kind concerning time or research results is perceived as disturbing, whereas where freedom is restricted, pressures are to a certain

extent a part of the game. The degree of pressure perceived is high only in Austria, a country at the highest level of control; moderate in the United Kingdom and the United States; rather low or really low in Germany, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and The Netherlands, and absent in Poland (all these countries belong to the first and the second groups, the low- and medium-control levels). Only the Austrian expert affirms that pressure is exerted in order to manipulate results, and one American respondent says that pressures are exterted to change or adapt some contents of the research report; for Czekia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom pressures are also perceived to provide urgency to reach final results.

Research Results

Another critical aspect in the research–commissioner relationship is given by the possibility to disseminate research results. In this aspect the control performed by the commissioner can restrict the scientific evaluation made by professional peers and the process of knowledge accumulation created by the free circulation of research results. Here again there are differences among countries, with some relation to their position in the "control classification" above presented, but also with some generalized traits that indicate that a certain level of control over the dissemination of research results is present everywhere and it is clearly performed by the commissioning institution.

As far as research results are concerned, publication is usually paid for by the commissioner in Slovenia, Bulgaria, and The Netherlands (LC group); in Belgium, Germany, and South Africa (MC group), and the United States (HC group). Selective publication under a commissioner's judgment is another form of results dissemination in Austria, Russia, and the United States (HC group); Bulgaria and the United Kingdom (LC group); and France, Italy, and Poland (MC group). The possibility for the research group to freely publish their research results is declared for Slovenia and the United Kingdom (LC group); for all countries but Italy in the MC group; and for Russia, the United States, and Lithuania (HC group). Independent of the "control classification," an unpublished report for internal circulation is also possible in Belgium, Cekia, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Argentina. The range of possible forms of publication is evidently wide, but the option to freely publish research results is absent in Austria, where the maximum level of control is performed and only selective publication under the commissioner's judgment is possible, as well as in Cekia (where previous control is absent); Italy and in Germany (medium control); and Argentina (high control). Research results are covered by copyright everywhere but in Belgium, Slovenia, the United States, and Argentina, and the copyright holder is in general the commissioner; copyright is held by the research group in Cekia, The Netherlands, Slovenia, and Switzerland (all low-control countries).

Social Research Status

The last aspect to explore involves the status and relevance given to sociological research by the military, independent of the fact that some research may be limited or restricted altogether. It is not unusual for research to be done, but the results are practically forgotten or underestimated. Many times research is performed in order to legitimize a choice already made instead of considering the research results in order to make the choice.

A good indicator of the status of military sociology within the military institution is the presence of sociologists in the role of adviser or expert; such a role can be permanent,

occasional, or absent. Another indicator for the importance given to social research on the matter is the existence of specialized state-run or private research centers. In this last case, specialized centers for social research on the military are present in the large majority of countries; in Switzerland and South Africa there are centers where this specialization is part of a more general orientation, and only Indian and Lithuanian respondents say that no centers at all exist in their countries. In any case, the number of these agencies is very limited; in the majority of cases there is only one and sometimes two or three, like in France and the United States.

These research centers are mainly part of the Defense Department, with the only exceptions being South Africa and Switzerland, where the centers are affiliated with both the MoD and some university. In only two cases, Slovenia and Sweden, are personnel exclusively civilian, and in only one case, Italy, personnel are totally military; everywhere else personnel can have both civilian and military status. In some countries military sociology is also practiced in private research centers, and this is the case for Bulgaria, Cekia, Israel, Italy, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; in four countries these centers have a university affiliation (France, Israel, Slovenia, and the United States), while in Bulgaria, Italy, Russia, and South Africa they are national or international foundations. If in state-run centers the majority of cases present a mixed-personnel structure (civilian and military), in the private centers researchers are mainly civilian, and only in Bulgaria, Russia, and the United States is a mixed structure reported.

Summing up, we review countries where social research on the armed forces is "rather popular" in the sense that it sustains public as well as private agencies, and this is the case for Bulgaria, France, Israel, Italy, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There are countries where social research is conducted only "under the banner" of the Ministry of Defence, such as in Austria, Belgium, Cekia, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland, with some support in some cases from a university; and there are cases with no research centers at all, such as India, Lithuania, and Argentina. Of course, there are differences, especially in the first group of countries, where military sociology seems to have reached a rather institutionalized status: differences are in quantity (e.g., how many centers, level of budget, how many employees, and productive standards) as well as in quality (e.g., quality level of research and selection and control over researchers), but these elements cannot be assessed by means of our questionnaire. In many of the countries where military sociology has a recognized status a sociologist is present as a permanent staff adviser in Austria, Bulgaria, Cekia, The Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Occasionally a sociologist is requested as advisor in France and Switzerland, whereas this opportunity is declared to be absent in Belgium, Italy, and Poland. It appears to be rather obvious that there are no such sociologists in India, Lithuania, and Argentina, where military sociology has a rather low status and surely no institutional position.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Methodology of the Research

This is a quantitative and qualitative research study conducted by means of semistructured interviews. The semistructured interview method was chosen because, since it is an expert survey, the authors are interested in exploring the personal experiences of the interviewees through their feelings and evaluations or even concrete events and situations but

described from their own perspective. The use of a semistructured questionnaire (contained in Appendix B) also made it necessary to use qualitative research methodologies alongside the more prevalent quantitative ones. We consider the use of the two research methodologies a fully positive experience as it allows a multilateral approach to the subject of investigation.

The questions in the questionnaire were sent to the interviewees by e-mail in successive sets. Administering the questions by e-mail was chosen to achieve the advantages listed below.[4]

1. To overcome problems of time and space. As Craig and Sixsmith (1998) write, "Access to face to face interviewees can sometimes be difficult or impossible to orchestrate due to geographical and time constraints. E-mail interviewing can enable such access, thereby expanding the possible diversity of the research sample."
2. To allow the interviewers to make the most of the opportunity to modify the next set of questions on the basis of the responses given in the preceding set. Sending successive sets of questions at different times makes it possible to expand enormously the amount of time the interviewer has, with respect to face-to-face interviews, to adapt the next question to the answer provided to the previous one. This increases the possibility of feedback accompanied by the possibility of cross-fertilization, given the fact that the interviewer has all the interviewees' answers before administering the next set of questions.
3. To conduct surveys on large samples or samples distributed worldwide at little cost.
4. To give interviewees the possibility of responding at their best convenience in terms of time and place, and with a more meditated language than in oral interviews: As Craig and Sixsmith again (1998) observe, "the asynchronous character of e-mail exchange (sequentially and extended over time) gives recipients time to consider their responses."
5. To simplify analysis of the data: The responses arrive directly on the interviewers' computers and are practically ready to be coded and analyzed, eliminating all the work (and also a certain amount of subjectivity) involved in transcribing the interviews.

These pluses do not allow us to overlook the drawbacks that this system of interviews already involves *a priori* and which we examine as listed in the study by Craig and Sixsmith cited above.

1. Relatively slow and interrupted flow of information: The time interval between one set of questions and the next can make the interviewee less present and less involved in the research objectives.
2. Evaluation of the context: Craig and Sixsmith observe that in face-to-face interviews the interviewer sees the context in which the interview takes place and is therefore able to evaluate whether this context is influencing the responses; this is not possible in e-mail interviews. However, we feel that the prevalent response context, in our case, is the interviewee's workstation, and therefore an entirely favorable one, because it is familiar and is normally without the imminent presence of third parties.

[4]For a theoretical examination of the advantages and disadvantages of an e-mail survey, see Murray and Sixsmith (1998).

3. Nonverbal communication: The full array of nonverbal communication is definitely absent in e-mail interviews.
4. Invisibility and presentation of self: Both the interviewee and the interviewer can give any representation of themselves. This advantage would appear to be particularly significant when the survey deals with personal or family issues, which is perhaps much less-important in our case.
5. The sampling: E-mail surveying can be elitist, especially in certain countries, because it can include only people equipped with a computer and an Internet connection. This problem has little importance in our survey, which is conducted among scholars, the vast majority of whom are now equipped with such systems.

This analysis of the pros and cons made us feel that, for research such as this, at least in the planning phase, the advantages clearly outweigh the possible disadvantages, among which really only not being able to analyze the nonverbal communication remains relevant. We show in the next section what other positive and negative aspects of this survey method emerged as the research unfolded.

In order to avoid the first of the four researcher's "nightmares," well described by Mathew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman (1994),[5] we first carefully identified the subject and the purpose of our investigation. The subject of the survey is "sociological research on the military"; the purpose of the survey is "to find out and compare how social research on the military is carried out in the different countries." The conceptual framework of the research is outlined in Figure 3.1.

Development of the Research

This section is aimed at answering the familiar question, "How should things be set up so that the study could be verified or replicated by someone else?" The research began by putting together a mailing list of 128 scholars (a Delphi-type sample) in the sector who might be interested in participating in a survey like the one we had in mind. All of them were sent an e-mail message describing the purpose and subject of the research and defining in particular the following points

(1) survey times and methods, (2) research methodology, (3) acceptance deadline, (4) possibility of withdrawing at any time, and (5) dissemination of results. All were asked to express explicitly their willingness to participate. A first selection difficulty occurred when a number of messages came back because of erroneous, changed, or expired addresses. The number of messages that reached their destination was 118. Five colleagues asked for further clarification before accepting. Forty-nine colleagues ultimately accepted, representing 25 different countries. The answers to the first two sets of questions showed us at this point that some of the subsequent questions were now superfluous and could be eliminated or grouped together. Six questions were eliminated and, as a result, it was possible to reduce the number of sets actually administered from the six originally planned to five. Below is

[5] "Researchers have four recurring nightmares about data analysis. In the first nightmare, the data are not good. They have not illuminated what they were supposed to. In the second nightmare, systematic error has occurred in the most important data. In the third nightmare, conclusions come out of the wringer of successively more sophisticated analyses looking ever trivial or trite (You spent $77,000 to tell us that?). And in the last nightmare, the data resist analysis, are opaque, even inscrutable." (Matthew and Huberman, 1994, p. 77).

the numerical trend of the responses to the different sets of questions:

Adhesions	49
Responses to the 1st set	33
Responses to the 2nd set	29
Responses to the 3rd set	26
Responses to the 4th set	25
Responses to the 5th set	26

For the purposes of the research, the questionnaires with only one set of answered questions were used as well. The total number of questionnaires examined was therefore 33, representing 20 different countries. Finally, the overall representativeness of the examined sample proved to be good. Taking the percentages of members of RC01 ("Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution") of the ISA as a reference, the distribution by geographic area was as follows:

Region	Expert survey (%)	RC01 Membership rate (%)
United States	19	23
Western Europe	35	35
Eastern Europe	29	17
Other	13	27

Considering that membership in RC01 broadly represents the range of active participation in research in military sociology worldwide, we see that the sample of experts appears quite close, in percentage terms, to the RC01 membership rate for Western Europe and the United States, is above the rate for Eastern Europe, and somewhat deficient for the remaining regions of the world. The greater participation of Eastern European colleagues appears consistent with the enthusiasm they have demonstrated toward research in the sector since 1989.

Final Remarks on Methodology

Researchers' Assessments. A final assessment of the adopted methodology was made by comparing the advantages and disadvantages that we had expected might be involved in carrying out semistructured interviews in successive sets by e-mail and those that actually cropped up as the research unfolded.

Let us first examine the advantages on the basis of prior expectations as follows:

1. Overcome problems of time and space. The hypothesised advantage can definitely be considered confirmed.
2. Allow the interviewers to make the most of the opportunity of modifying the next set of questions on the basis of the responses given in the preceding set. This possibility was confirmed with the limit that, given the delay with which many responses arrived, the time available to the researchers to make adjustments in the next set was actually quite short due to the desire to respect the general timetable of the research.

3. Conduct surveys on large samples or samples distributed worldwide at little cost. This expectation was definitely confirmed.
4. Give interviewees the possibility of responding at their best convenience in terms of time and place, and with a more meditated language than in oral interviews. We have data indicating that this condition was generally fulfilled (see below).
5. Simplify analysis of the data. This condition was undoubtedly fulfilled.

We analyze of the disadvantages as follows:

1. Relatively slow and interrupted flow of information. Analysis of the data leads us to say that the fragmentation of the questionnaire does not seem to have affected the logic of the responses.
2. Evaluation of the context. What was said in the first paragraph holds true.
3. Nonverbal communication. Despite what was stated in the first paragraph, it must be pointed out that some nonverbal information was supplied to us by the different interviewees' ways of answering (answers only to questions; answers to the questions plus clarifying comment; no response to individual questions and a single summarizing, discursive response for all the questions of the set, etc.).
4. Invisibility and presentation of self. As already observed, given the survey topic, the absence of this type of observation does not seem important.
5. Elitist sampling. Our preresearch observation also holds for this point.

However, the following disadvantages not foreseen in the research planning stage emerged:

1. A kind of "loss of interest" during the research, shown statistically by the number of participants at the start and the number of respondents who stayed with the research to the end.
2. The choice of the survey times was no longer completely up to the researchers, but significantly depended on the pace at which the responses flowed in.
3. The semistructured interview was transformed into a free-form interview at times, when the respondent decided not to respond question by question but to write a statement of his or her own on the overall subject of the questions in the set. However, this might also constitute a peculiar characteristic of qualitative research, where, according to S. Kvale (1988), "data are not being collected but rather co-authored."

A final note: In the analysis of the results, general figures were outlined, and then national specificities were often be sought. The latter have often been based on responses given by just one expert who participated in the research for that country. On the one hand, therefore, one must consider the degree of approximation that the indication of such national specificities can have (although in many cases this is a typical aspect of expert surveys); on the other, one must consider that in many medium-sized countries, such as Italy, the scholars who deal with this sector of investigation—not necessarily full time but at least chiefly—can be counted on the fingers of one hand; in others (such as India or Lithuania), it is not easy to find even one. In any case, the individual country data in this study must be considered with caution, more as expressions of probability than as certainties.

INTERVIEWEES' ASSESSMENTS. What was the opinion of the interviewees on the advantages/disadvantages of the method adopted for administering the interviews? Once the interview period was completed, the researchers sent those who participated in the whole

survey an additional e-mail asking for their opinion on the course that had been pursued. Answers were given to this question by 19 interviewees: 16 expressed evaluations of the adopted methodology that were positive on the whole, 2 were neutral (it was like answering a mailed questionnaire), and 1 was negative.

Both in the overall positive responses and in those critical or neutral, observations worth reporting emerge. The first regards a certain initial difficulty that was overcome later. It takes the form of answers like "I was a bit stilted when I wrote the responses to the first questionnaire, but after I got used to it" and "I had a vague feeling that answering through Internet I am not so responsible as doing it in a normal way. And I had to check my answers several times. . . ." A second type of comment expressed the fear that the ease of conducting worldwide surveys over the Internet would lead to a kind of saturation of the method. This type of observation is expressed in responses like "However the easiness of the e-mail survey may enhance the number of surveys per time which might then create quantity problems to the interviewed persons. In fact I participated recently in three e-mail surveys on different topics." Some also point out the difference in validity of a face-to-face interview, with comment like "In a direct, face-to-face interview one could give more in-depth answers and meditate on them" or "Compared to an interview I am convinced that you will never get out the same. But it is quick and cost effective," and a remark we feel is particularly penetrating, "If I did not completely understand the intent of a question, there was no way to get immediate clarification."

Some then point to the technical difficulties of program compatibility that we mentioned earlier, writing, for example, "The major irritant was software problems, and that can probably be worked out" and "I had troubles with technical aspects at the beginning, but I overcame them gradually." For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that the two neutral responses are of this tenor: "An e-mail survey has about the same advantages and disadvantages as a normal mail survey, except for the rapidity."

The only completely negative assessment of the adopted methodology is worth reporting in its entirety. It is as follows: "I find electronic surveys somewhat troubling and I can easily delete them without a second thought. I prefer something hardcopy that I can stare and contemplate. For your survey, because it was specific to military sociologists, I had to force myself to respond on-line. My mailbox is become so full now with administrative items, it becomes a chore to do everything and I am relieved when it is empty."

What do these comments add to what has already been pointed out above? They definitely confirm the obvious difference between a face-to-face interview and one set up as a questionnaire to be filled out, however it reaches the interviewee. In this confirmation, however, a significant problem arises which deserves to be dealt with and if possible solved: that of providing a prompt explanation of a question that is not immediately completely clear.

The difficulties of the initial impact with this new methodology—difficulties which also seem to have contributed to the completely negative assessment reported—as well as the purely technical ones regarding software, are no doubt something that is destined to be overcome gradually as the methodology spreads, while the one regarding overuse of this tool is undoubtedly a significant concern.

APPENDIX A

Below we report the "conceptual framework" of the research complete with the collected data.

Resulting framework for a multicase "research on the military" field study % (*)



(*) Respondents may tick more than one response, so that the total percentage is over 100%

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire

Military Sociological Research in Your Country

Part I—Research Data

FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS

1. Are there research centres in your country that can be considered to be specialized in military sociology?
   1.1 Yes
   1.2 No
2. If yes, what types of centres or institutes are there? (you may check more than one response)
   2.1 State-run research centres ?
   If yes:
   How many____________________
   Who runs them (Ministry of Defence, etc.)____________________
   Composition of personnel (civilian, military, mixed, etc.)____________________
   ____
   2.2 Private research centres
   If yes:
   How many____________________
   Who supports them (universities, foundations, industry, other)____________________
   ____
   Composition of personnel ____________________
3. Who commissions the individual research projects? (you may tick more than one response)
   3.1 Public administration
   3.2 Private bodies (companies, associations, etc.)
   3.3 State research centres
   3.4 Private research centres
   3.5 Other (specify)
   ____
   ____
4. If there is more than one commissioner, please indicate as precisely as you can the percentage of the total research that each one commissions in a year.
   4.1 Public administration ....%
   4.2 Private bodies ....%
   4.3 State research centres ....%
   4.4 Private research centres ....%
   4.5 Other ....%
5. Is it possible for a research proposal made to the potential commissioner by a single (private) researcher to be accepted?
   5.1 No
   5.2 Yes

5.3 If yes, indicate the approval procedure:

____

____

____

6. What is your opinion on the commissioning of research in your country? If you wish you may draw comparisons with what occurs in other countries.

____

____

____

____

SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS

7. To whom does the commissioning body (if any) usually commission the research? (you may check more than one response)
   7.1 To single researchers
   7.2 To a state research centre
   7.3 To a private research centre
   7.4 To others
   (indicate to whom)

   ____

   ____

8. In the choice of the person responsible for the research (or in the acceptance of a research proposal), are there any particular preferences or exclusions, such as active officers, gender of researcher, or other characteristics?
   8.1 Yes
   8.2 No
   8.3 If yes, specify what preferences or exclusions, how they are expressed, and whether they are always valid or only in some cases or for certain types of research.

   ____

   ____

   ____

   ____

*** for the following questions, in countries where there is not a commissioner, you have to read "authority which accepts/finances the research" instead of "commissioner".**

9. What aspects of the research are laid down by the commissioner? (check all the aspects that are laid down)
   9.1 the funding
   9.2 the topic
   9.3 the time available
   9.4 the sample
   9.5 the ways the sample is chosen
   9.6 other ways of conducting the research
   (indicate what they are)

   ____

   ____

9.7 constraints on the dissemination of the results (indicate what they are)

____

____

9.8 outlet of the research

9.9 other (specify)

____

____

10. What do you think of the research aspects that are laid down by the commissioner? Are you able to compare them with the situation in other countries?

____

____

____

THIRD SET OF QUESTIONS

11. The research budget:
    - 11.1 is established by the commissioner
    - 11.2 is agreed between the commissioner and the person responsible for the research
    - 11.3 other (specify)

    ____

    ____

12. The research budget:
    - 12.1 is rigidly set according to an estimate
    - 12.2 can be modified based on actual costs
    - 12.3 other (specify)

    ____

    ____

13. The research budget:
    - 13.1 is a lump-sum amount
    - 13.2 specifies the remuneration of the researchers
    - 13.3 other (specify)

    ____

    ____

14. Are there topics that it is not possible or allowed to deal with?
    - 15.1 No
    - 15.2 Yes

      If yes, what ones?______________________________

      ____

15. Does the research commissioner express methodological preferences?
    - 15.1 No
    - 15.2 Yes

      If yes, are these preferences such as to concretely prevent the use of some methodologies?
    - 15.3 No
    - 15.4 Yes

      If yes, what ones?______________________________

      ____

16. If a questionnaire is used, is it subject to prior control?
    16.1 No
    16.2 Yes
    If yes, what control, and by whom?______________________________
17. In the case of surveys through interviews or participating observation, does the commissioner express preferences/exclusions in relation to the researchers?
    17.1 No, not at all
    17.2 Yes, there is a preference for:
    (specify) ______________________________
    17.3 Yes, there is an exclusion of:
    (specify) ______________________________
18. Who are the following operations normally performed by?
    18.1 Sample selection:
    by the research group
    by the commissioner
    by others
    (specify):______________________________
    18.2 administering questionnaires:
    by the research group
    by the commissioner
    by others
    (specify):______________________________
    18.3 conducting interviews:
    by the research group
    by the commissioner
    by others
    (specify):______________________________
    18.4 gathering questionnaires:
    by the research group
    by the commissioner
    by others
    (specify):______________________________
    18.5 data coding:
    by the research group
    by the commissioner
    by others
    (specify):______________________________

FOURTH SET OF QUESTIONS

19. Briefly, when you conduct empirical research within the military, do you ever feel subjected to any kind of pressure?
    19.1 No
    19.2 Yes

If yes, by whom, on what aspects, and by what means?

19.2.1 If you feel subjected to pressure, please indicate its degree:
high
moderate high
moderate
moderate low
low

20. The outlet of the research is normally:
20.1 publication at the expense of the commissioner
20.2 selective publication based on the commissioner's judgment
20.3 freedom to publish by the director of the research
20.4 a report for the commissioner without publication
20.5 other (specify)

---

21. Is there a copyright on the collected data, or on the finished product (research report, book, etc.)?
22.1. Yes
22.2 No
If yes, who is the copyright holder?
22.1.1 the commissioning body
22.1.2 the research group
22.1.3 a specific agreement is reached each time

23. What do you think of the procedure normally used in your country to disseminate the research conducted in the sector? Are you able to compare it to the procedures used in other countries?

---

24. What is the actual use of the results of the research that is conducted in your country?

---

25. In general, what role and importance does sociological research have for the military in your country?

---

26. Are there sociologists acting as advisors or experts to the General Staff? If so, what are their tasks, and what is their range of action?

FIFTH SET OF QUESTIONS

Part II—Demographic Data

1. What country are you from?________________
2. How old are you?
   2.1 under 30
   2.2 from 30 to 40
   2.3 from 40 to 50
   2.4 from 50 to 60
   2.5 over 60
3. What is your gender?
   3.1 female
   3.2 male
4. Where do you carry out your research work?
   4.1 Within a governmental research centre
   4.2 Within a private research centre
   4.3 Within a university
   4.4 By myself, as free lance
   4.5 Other
   (please specify)________________
5. What are your qualifications?
   5.1 University professor ?
   5.2 Active military officer ?
   5.3 Retired military officer ?
   5.4 Ph.D. ?
   5.5 Other ?
   (please specify) ________________
6. With respect to the party or parties now governing your country, is your political position:
   6.1 sympathetic
   6.2 opposed
   6.3 other
   (please specify)________________
7. Which response best describes study of the military in relation to your field of research?
   7.1 exclusive
   7.2 prevalent
   7.3 one of several
   7.4 secondary or occasional
8. In what year did you begin conducting research on the military?
   ____
9. Have you taught, or are you now teaching, subjects of military interest?
   9.1 military sociology
   9.2 military psychology

9.3 military history
9.4 military law or the laws of war
9.5 other ?
(please specify) ______________________________
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PART II

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS

CHAPTER 4

Models and Explanations for Military Organization: An Updated Reconsideration

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MODEL AND EXPLANATIONS IN THE CLASSIC SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION: THE MILITARY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The classic approach to the consideration of the military as a social phenomenon is no different from the one applied to every other sector of social life. Classic sociology has a total and comprehensive conception of "society," and within the classics we find a general analysis of the various social institutions as considered not only in their peculiarities but mainly in their connections with the general society. The military is one of the many, and basic, institutions considered by classic sociologists according to the various sociological schools, and its features are seen as a distinct set of behaviors, rules, norms, and values coordinated around a defensive or offensive goal (or both) defined by a given society (but generally typical of every society) in their relationships with other, external, societies. The military is considered and explained within the different sociological theories, so that we have a positivistic explanation of the role of the military as a basic feature of the human society since its origins—as in Comte—or an evolutionary consideration of the military structure as a first stage in the society evolution—as in Spencer. Both Comte and Spencer consider the inevitable decline of the military structure and function as a consequence of the development of human society from its primitive features to its highest manifestation, the industrial society (as it was seen and intended in the 19th century).

As it happens many times with the works of the classics, many subjects became areas of research for the succession of sociologists who invented military sociology. One example among many is the natural divergence between military society and civil society, manifesting itself as long as the process of development proceeds toward its goal within the industrial

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society. This is true not only for Comte or Spencer, but especially for de Tocqueville, who considers also the growing democratic consciousness as a possible solution to the dangerous separateness of armed forces from their parent society.

In Weber a not only deeper but also much more articulated analysis of the structure and evolution of the military can be found, where some basic concepts for description and explanation of structural features and processes are given. Concepts like discipline, obedience to formal norms, formal authority, rationale division of roles and attributes, competence, and loyalty to an impersonal legitimate power, in a word, the typical bureaucratic organization, are all tools provided by Weber in the consideration of the military as a social institution and applied to the understanding of a general process such as rationalization and bureaucratization of Western society.

It is not the goal of this chapter to consider the classic tradition of sociology in order to enlighten the "sources" of the military sociology of today, since a task as such has been already done in a previous chapter by Giuseppe Caforio. What it seems important to stress here is that, with a development similar to that of many other specialized fields, the military is also considered by sociologists first within the framework of a general conception of society, and subsequent research topics that spawned military sociology are originally linked to the classic tradition of general sociology.

But to distinguish a classic tradition from a contemporary science is too sharp a division. Military sociology of today does not rely on the classics, but on a second generation of general sociologists who at a certain time in their lives began to define the military social field as a peculiar environment, thus acting as "founding fathers" of this discipline. To maintain this distinction, we define a "modern" sociological tradition, which can appear to be a terminological as well as a conceptual contradiction. This new tradition begins with the possibility of conducting social research in the armed forces and with the correlate possibility of defining the true first lines of a theoretical framework on which to base a new and autonomous sociological discipline.

A MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION: FROM "THE MILITARY IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY" TO THE "SOCIAL RESEARCH ON THE ARMED FORCES"

The contemporary stage for the study of the military in the sociological discipline begins with Second World War. It is not only a matter of historical dates, it is a question related to the entry of sociologists (among other social scientists) within the military institution with all their tools and equipment for empirical research. The development of an empirical sociology based on strict methodological support was already a reality since the publication of Lazarsfeld's work (1963). This "second foundation" of sociology as a scientific discipline meant a detachment from general typologies and the search of more limited research objects that were easier to measure empirically and analyze by means of quantitative tools. Strictly related to this scientific development is the possible existence of an *applied sociology*, which opens the door to a long debate over the role of sociology (better, of sociologists) within society and with regard to politics. Leaving aside the main topic, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, the fact remains that the first example of sociological research empirically conducted over the military, the four-volumes opera *The American Soldier* (Stouffer et al., 1949) had explicit operative goals[1] (Madge, 1962), and it provided an enormous amount of

[1]S. Stouffer et al. (1949). For comments on the background of this research project see J. Madge, *The Origins of Scientific Sociology*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

empirical findings apt to be treated (and to make exercise and experience, I would say) with quantitative methods.

But these developments do not exhaust the variety of topics and "headings" under which contemporary military sociology can be distinguished. The empirical military sociology dates from the Second World War and took place mainly in the United States—thus giving rise to a strong prominence of American studies—but by the end of the 1960s a "European military sociology" began to emerge. Scientific production became wide, and research paths differentiated according to various problematics and theoretical orientations of scholars.

In a first attempt to organize mass of studies on the military, Morris Janowitz proposed a threefold thematic distinction (Janowitz, 1979): studies dealing with the military organization and the military profession, studies dealing with the relationships between the armed forces and society, and studies pertaining to conflicts and war in particular. In this chapter, only the first theme in the janowitzian distinction is considered in order to avoid overlapping with subsequent chapters in this book. Furthermore, only topics where some general theory has been developed are considered, thus avoiding a mere inventory of research areas more or less randomly chosen. Instead a more articulated distinction is used which permits a better description of the variety of thematic issues and a deeper discussion of proposed and applied theoretical models. For the same reasons, we need to add some important time points; therefore, this chapters covers more or less the past 30 years of the 20th century. Thus, thematic areas are defined, where the majority of studies can be located, even though there is some overlap and single authors are attributed to more than one area. The areas are the following: (1) soldiers in combat and noncombat situations, (2) soldiers as a professional group and its changing trends, and (3) the military as a formal organization. These points are presented in the following pages.

SOLDIERS IN COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT SITUATIONS

Under this heading we present a continuation and development of the paths already established in the classic works of Janowitz, Stouffer et al.; that is, the development of a microsociology of the military, where soldiers are defined as combatants, a role where adjustment is necessary, stress is normal, and effective performance becomes crucial. After the Second World War, what has been called "The American School" of military sociology finds in this field many empirical occasions to reflect over combat performance, and these occasions are given by the limited conflicts where Western (but mainly American) armies are involved during the peaceful period of the Cold War. Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands become for the sociology of the military not only "battlefields" but also "research fields," where theories and concepts can be repeatedly tested and developed. The key problem could be summarized by the word "combat effectiveness," and "cohesion" becomes the social situation to be favored and maintained within the troops.[2]

The first attempt to establish a theory of cohesion and effectiveness within combat troops belongs to Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (Shils and Janowitz, 1948), with their

[2]Studies on cohesion and morale cover a very huge amount of literature, and the topic is of major concern more for social psychology and psychiatry applied to the military than for military sociology. In this chapter, only the main studies which can be defined as pertaining to a sociological domain have been recalled, and among them only those that could be considered key essays, either because proposing theoretical innovation or advancement or because of their purpose to study the "state-of-the-art".

study on German Army prisoners during World War II. An updated reading of the essay published just after the end of the conflict, in 1948, gives evidence to the fact that factors influencing combatants' behavior had already been considered by the two sociologists, notwithstanding the emphasis given to the "discovery" of the primary group function, which has someway obscured the relevance of many other cohesive factors. In this pioneer piece of research, the two military sociologists *ante litteram* Shils and Janowitz outlined factors influencing soldiers' behavior in combat. They are as follows:

1. The nature of group relations. In the combat unit, special relations arise among soldiers so that the individual perceives his personal security and chances of survival as dependent on the security and survival of his unit as a whole. The military group tends to substitute in civilian primary groups (such as the family), and it gains a capacity to provide soldiers with physical as well as psychological sustenance, help, and affection; the military primary group plays a general function of sustain for the individual, who feels attached to it and responsible for the group's fate. These positive functions of group relationships would have been, according to Janowitz and Shils, first, to relieve combat stress, and, second, to avoid the use of individual "solutions" such as escape, desertion, and surrender, which would have undermined group's survival.
2. Officers' behavior. The qualities and skills of German officers were examined, underlining their ability to consider and take care of their soldiers as their "children," to attend to their soldiers' well-being, and to be an example for them. The great importance of the quality of leadership is emphasized, insofar as it is used to initiate and maintain group cohesion between soldiers and their immediate leader (what Etzioni defines *rank cohesion,* in order to distinguish it from the *peer cohesion* among soldier), so that both horizontal and vertical cohesion can be assured within a military organization.[3]
3. Organizational patterns. A recruitment and rotation system (in the case of the Whermacht, entire divisions were rotated) was structured in order to maintain group cohesion.
4. Ideology in a broad sense. So-called secondary symbols were used, such as the attachment to the nation (patriotism), political ideals (national socialism), and devotion to Hitler himself. These factors, according to Janowitz and Shils, had no direct and autonomous impact over German soldiers' willingness to fight, but they functioned anyway until they could be linked to the effective functioning of primary groups.
5. Discipline and military values. Of course, discipline and obedience to norms were found to be relevant factors, but to this the concept of "soldierly honor" was added, which was not confined only to officers but extended to every soldier: "For the German, being a soldier was a more than acceptable status. It was indeed honourable."

In subsequent research on the same subject, cohesion is analyzed in order to better enlighten the nature of primary group relationships, but it is evident the "discovery" of other factors that are, even though sometimes differently named, largely included in the

[3] A. Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations,* revised and enlarged edition, The Free Press, New York, 1975.

Janowitz/Shils research. A deeper analysis of group bonding is made on American soldiers engaged in the limited conflicts following the end of the Second World War. Here another "classic" work is the anthropological research done by Roger Little on an infantry (fusiliers) unit of the U.S. Army in the Korean War.[4] In his study, based on participant observation, Little goes deeper into the analysis of buddy relationships, considered as dyadic relations between two soldiers: this special bonding between two soldiers create a reticular network of links, which is the true structure of the group. Each soldier feels affection and responsibility toward his personal buddy, but since each soldier in the unit could function as a potential buddy, then the structure of personal relationships can cover the entire group in this reticular network able to control personal behavior and reduce combat stress.

The definition of buddyship is put under observation by Moskos in his field research on the American enlisted men in Vietnam (Moskos, 1975). Here buddyship stems more from a social contract stipulated on a rational basis in order to assure reciprocal survival in an extreme environment than from a set of feelings based on friendship, altruism, and humane solidarity as it was depicted in previous studies.

Nonetheless, when buddyship is lacking, cohesion is endangered. In their harsh criticism of the American military organization in Vietnam, Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel put in evidence the breaking of the buddy relationship, caused by the individually- based enlistment and rotation system, as one of the reasons for the U.S. military's failure there.[5]

This is by no means the only factor: all elements stressed by Shils and Janowitz are recalled by both Savage and Gabriel and Moskos. According to Savage and Gabriel, in Vietnam the U.S. military suffered true organizational failure; it was unable to keep its structure and functioning separate from and impermeable to civilian society's changing values and attitudes toward the military and the war. Inadequate leadership, a crisis of traditional military values, and the breakdown of group relationships were all factors acting against the cohesion and related combat effectiveness of U.S. military units. In the Moskos study, moreover, the relevance of the ideological factor is stressed: not only a manifest *political ideology*, whose impact is relevant when an ideological orientation is really shared by soldiers (for instance in Liberation Armies or guerrilla units), but a more *latent ideology*, shared by a soldier as a citizen of a civil society to which he feels attached and for which he thinks fighting to be worthwhile; this was the type of ideological commitment latently present among American soldiers in Vietnam, and considered by Moskos able to "inspire" soldiers on the battlefield.

The last valuable study to consider cohesion and effectiveness in combat units deployed in real combat situations is that conducted by Nora Kinzer Stewart on the British and Argentine militaries fighting the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 (Stewart, 1988). In this research, Stewart drew on all the existing literature on cohesion available at that time, and in her empirical analysis she makes a precise and focused hyphothesis on all factors influencing combat effectiveness. At the end of her study, a complex model is offered, where the various elements are linked together: horizontal or peer bonding (primary group relationships and buddyships), vertical bonding (rank cohesion among different ranks: officers, NCOs, and soldiers), organizational bonding (relations toward the military organization at large, military values, patriotism, military traditions and history, internal social norms

[4] Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Soldier Performance," in M. Janowitz (Ed.), *The New Military*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1964, pp. 195–224.

[5] Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective," in *Armed Forces & Society*, 1976, Vol. 2, pp. 340–376.

and rules), and societal factors, added by Stewart as a fourth dimension. This fourth element is important in that, according to Stewart:

> Societal factors which impinge on military cohesion are those of society's attitudes towards the military, in general, or, towards a particular war, in the sense that an adequate defence budget exists for training of men, purchase of supplies and armament and staffing of military hospitals and training of officers.... If the political will be absent or political strategy is incorrect, the military strategy will also suffer....

Thus, among societal factors we find culture, norms, values taken into the military organization from the parent society, size of the defence budget, doctrine and strategy, training, tactics, and technology affecting command-control-communication-intelligence systems, logistics, medical care, and facilities.

Following to a certain extent Stewart's analysis and the discussion presented by G. Harries-Jenkins in a contemporary essay[6] and taking into consideration the literature on cohesion available until 1990, a further elaboration of a general model for cohesion and combat effectiveness was proposed by M. Nuciari in 1990 (Nuciari, 1990). The final, and to a certain extent definite, result is an integrated model in which every factor is accounted for and can be understood in its links and effects on the combat situation considered as a system.

In this model, the subject of observation is the combat unit, considered as the point where two levels of elements are able to influence the unit's cohesion. An internal level embraces the three types of bonding recalled by Stewart. This level is internal in the sense that its elements (or variables) are found directly within the military organization; to a certain extent they are "produced" within the organization itself. An external level embraces three other groups of variables, which belong to the parent society: cultural variables, structural variables, and sociodemographic variables. The external level contains, although differently divided into cultural and structural variables, the societal factors defined by Stewart. A third group of variables is added and kept distinct, the so-called sociodemographic variables, where some characteristics of the population of a given society from which military personnel is necessarily drawn are grouped (levels of education, social origin, and geographic origin). The modality assumed by each variable can be positive or negative in creating and enhancing unit cohesion, and the influence of the external level is not direct but interacts with the modalities assumed by the variables forming the internal level.

The study of unit cohesion was crucial because of its nonlinear link with unit performance. When performance means effective combat behavior, the understanding of factors influencing cohesion, and of the effect of cohesion on combat performance, are obviously of extreme importance for military organization. But cohesion is important as a general factor affecting group performance in military as well as in nonmilitary situations. It is not surprising, then, that a strong impulse has arrived from the new operations other than war, where soldiers are not in situations as risky as that of warfighting, but they suffer from deployment stress anyway. As is outlined in the following pages in this chapter, operations other than combat are often characterized by vagueness, ambiguity, boredom, and sudden or latent risk, and when the sense of the mission is not always clear it can be difficult to motivate soldiers. In other words, stress is part of military nonconventional deployment, for reasons which are partly the same and partly different from those affecting cohesion in combat environments.

[6]G. Harries-Jenkins, "Cohesion and Morale in the Military: The Regimental System," ISA RC No. 01 Interim Meeting, Munich, 1988, published in an Italian translation in M. Nuciari, *Efficienza e Forze Armate*, Angeli, Milan, 1990.

In current times, studies on cohesion are conducted more from the side of social psychology and within medical and psychological units and institutions more or less directly linked to military organization. A good example of this "new season" of contributions to the "old" question of military group cohesion is given by the great amount or research conducted on American units deployed in peacekeeping operations by the medical-psychological staff of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe in Heidelberg (Germany). In these studies in particular, the factor of tempo is considered, since cohesion levels can change according to the Operation Deployment Tempo (the acronym OPTEMPO is used). As one of the final results of this ongoing research program states,[7] cohesion generally increases over the course of a peacekeeping deployment, over the 4 months from predeployment to middeployment, and then decreases near the end of the deployment (which in the observed unit was 6 months, a rather average and common deployment tempo for peacekeeping missions), but still remains higher than in the predeployment period.

In a situation where OOTW for the military are increasing, and military forces are subject to size shrinking, the deployment tempo becomes a crucial variable affecting unit cohesion and performance. As the authors of the above-mentioned study remark at the end of their article: "the related questions of how to facilitate the rapid growth of unit cohesion, and then keep it from being lost, are more important than ever."[8]

SOLDIERS AS A PROFESSIONAL GROUP AND THE CHANGING TRENDS

Here the subject is no longer the soldier at the troop level, but mainly the soldier as a professional, that is, the officer, and the career officer in particular. Of course, also in the research field treated above, officers were part of the subject since leadership and leader performance were among the factors influencing combatants' behaviors. Empirical research on troop cohesion and unit effectiveness makes use of conceptual definitions of the military leader developed in parallel in other sectors of the discipline.

In this specific body of research, the leading term under which to resume theoretical and empirical work in area of military professionals in contemporary military sociology is *change*. The point of departure remains the Janowitz's *Professional Soldier*, with its already classic typology distinguishing between the heroic leader and the manager. Janowitz himself was aware of the ongoing change affecting structures and processes within military institutions after the Second World War, and his reference model was termed the *constabulary force*: that force which "is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory" (Janowitz, 1960). This kind of military is part of a new technological framework where, at the upper level of the conflicts continuum, the development of nuclear weapons and strategic concepts of dissuasion means lead to a transformation of the function of military professionals whereby they become controllers of a machine designed to remain inactive.

In these conditions Janowitz was aware of the fact that professional soldiers could suffer from a professional identity crisis, since "the military tends to think of police activities as less prestigeful and less honourable tasks" and "in varying degrees, military responsibility

[7] Paul T. Bartone and Amy B. Adler, "Cohesion Over Time in a Peacekeeping Medical task Force," in *Military Psychology*, 2001, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 85–107.
[8] Paul T. Bartone and Amy B. Adler, "Cohesion Over Time in a Peacekeeping Medical task Force," in *Military Psychology*, 2001, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 105.

for combat predisposes officers toward low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics, and leads to high concern for definitive solutions of politico-military problems" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 420). Janowitz saw in these changes a challenge to the values typical of the traditional warrior, and of the heroic leader in particular, and the necessity of a balance between this role and another, defined as the *military technologist*:

> The military technologists tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their essential preoccupation with the upper end of the destructive continuum and their pressure to perfect weapons without regard to issues of international politics. The heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the political consequences of limited military actions which do not produce "victory"(Janowitz, 1960, pp. 424–425).

The role of the military managers, then, would have been, according to Janowitz, that of assuring the needed balance between these two roles and the inevitable link with political actors.

The trend predicted by Janowitz in the 1950s and 1960s becames more and more a reality during the subsequent years, and the theoretical analysis of the military profession paralleled this dual emphasis, with the **"warrior"** combat leader on the one side, with all the traditional values such as courage, hardiness, sense of duty, sacrifice, and the like and the vertical orientation to obedience and discipline within the hierarchy; and the rational **manager** on the other, equipped with highly technological weapons and expertise, bound to costs–benefits evaluations, and horizontally oriented toward professional peers, military as well as civilian.

The debate on the "heroic leader vs. manager" dilemma is recurrent, since it affects the very heart of the discussion about change in the definition of the military profession, as it has been stated in the other classic reference, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. In this text the subject becomes definitely centered around a recurrent question pertaining to the nature of the job performed within military organizations. So the debate over the "military profession" was already established in the conceptualizations of Huntington and, further on, in those of Van Doorn, but began to receive new insights from many new social scientists who were contributing information to on the changes occurring at that time. The discussion remained within these terms until the end of the 1980s, that is to say until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since the 1990s, the recurrent changes in the nature of the missions performed by armed forces, while fulfilling the janowitzian "prophecy" of the constabulary force, make it necessary and inevitable to rethink the military profession in light of the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWs), otherwise called Peace Support Operations (PSOs). This new factual situation needs new conceptual frameworks, since the task performed by the military in the various kinds of international missions creates different problems within the armed forces that cannot be understood within the old frameworks. This change does not lead to a theoretical break, but rather to an attempt to enlarge existing typologies so that new forms taken by the military profession could be included.

In order to avoid possible confusion, we can deal here separately with the two periods by means of a terminology proposed by Charles Moskos for this very purpose (that is, distinguishing armed forces according to geostrategic changes): theories and concepts about the military profession in the Cold War (or late-modern) period and new concepts for armed forces in the Postmodern period.[9]

[9]For these definitions, treated also here in further paragraphs, see Charles C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and D.R. Segal, "Armed Forces after the Cold War," in C. Moskos, J. Williams, and D. Segal (Eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1–13.

Theories and Concepts of the Military Profession in the Late-Modern Period

All contributions converge upon the term "*profession*" to define the kind of activity performed by those who practice the management of organized violence. The recurrent meaning of the concept is that defined within the field of the sociology of the professions, according to which an activity can be defined as a profession when it embodies a number of characters such as a theoretical and practical body of theory, a high degree of autonomy and control over the exercise of the activity, an ethic particular to the professional group and a sense of corporateness linking together the professional practitioners. Some other traits can be added, such as the control performed by the professional group upon the diffusion of the specialized knowledge and thus upon the access of new members to the profession. This special autonomy and control are recognized as characteristics of professionals by the larger society in virtue of their vital functional relevance to that same society. These functional fields are usually competences of the so-called "free" or "pure" professionals, but, recalling the Weberian distinction into *autonomous* and *eteronomous* professional work, they also include some professional activities performed within a *bureaucracy*, that is, a private or public organization.

The two situations are actually very similar, the only relevant difference being that of the **independence** of the former (the free practitioner) from and the **dependence** of the latter on a formal organization. In this second case, the monopoly of the activity lies in the hands of the formal organization which oversees practice and knowledge, decides on selection and recruitment of new members, and controls practitioners' activities.

In formal organizations, moreover, professional roles are usually intertwined with a complex role system reflecting the functional structure of the organization, so that the necessary integration of the professional activity leads to a strong limitation of the single professional practitioner's autonomy, discretionality, and control. According to Mintzberg,[10] these limitations are counterbalanced, however, by the very fact that the top level of the organization is often formed by people who belong to the same professional group, as it is the case especially for public-sector organizations (hospitals, universities, and armed forces).

The above characteristics are especially pertinent to the military profession, which has historically developed within a formal organization, the armed forces, which hold the monopoly on organized violence on behalf of the parent society. In the case of the military profession the typical traits of the *profession* are hardly distinguishable from those of the organization, so that the organization determines the contents and boundaries of the military professional's activities. The notion of *ascriptive professionalism*, recalled by Feld, underlines this peculiarity (Feld, 1977).

This idea is supported by various models used to understand the changes in both content and form of military activity in contemporary times: Even though differences are noted among the various nations, all models relate to **armed forces** as an **institution** where military professionals necessarily perform their activities, and the common aim is the understanding of the degree of *convergence/divergence* existing between military organization and civilian society.

With respect to this intrinsic antinomy, a distinction is made among the various role orientations of military professionals by many authors, yet in one way or another they all converge on a similar point of view: the double nature of the true military professional role resulting from its being at the same time a professional activity and having organizational status.

[10]Henry Mintzberg, *The Structuring of Organisations*, Prentice Hall, 1979.

In trying to make distinctions without losing the core concept of "profession," a difference between a "radical professionalism" and a "pragmatic professionalism" is stated first by Arthur Larson (Larson, 1977). He defines the first type as a form of institutional professionalism that is oriented toward a total organization, the military, which is seen as inevitably isolated by civilian society because of its high functional specificity and political neutrality; it is the divergent pole of military professionalism. On the other side, pragmatic professionalism is that type of professionalism which can be found in the various forms of nonvolunteer armies where the citizen-soldier is preferred to the true professional soldier and receives his role definition from the parent society according to its needs and goals. The pragmatic professional, then, is by no means separated from the parent society; it is the convergent pole of military professionalism.

Twelve years later, the same terms were proposed again by David Segal (1986) with a difference in meaning. Wishing to overcome the distinction between the institutional and the occupational concepts of the military (the I/O model proposed by Charles Moskos and analyzed hereafter), Segal defines the pragmatic professional as "a mixture of institutional and occupational concerns," that is, a professional with a specific field of application but who also shares preferences and needs with civilian peers in other fields of expertise. The radical professional, on the other hand, identifies the pure professional orientation of the officer concerned with the somewhat traditional image of the professional soldier.

A similar kind of distinction was made some years later in findings from a cross-cultural empirical study on "The Present and Future of the Military Profession—Views of European Officers" (ERGOMAS, 1996). In this case the empirical content of the typology is extensively described and supported by research data: In their theoretical introduction to the presentation of the research section dealing with professional orientations of officers from eight European countries, G. Caforio and M. Nuciari define a four-type typology where the distinction between a radical and a pragmatic professional is proposed.[11] The typology was developed from distinctions between professional and occupational orientations indicated by surveyed officers. The authors state the following:

> Officers with a professional orientation stress factors which in their job are more linked to specifically military competence and to responsibilities related to the sense of service to the community. . . . In this type, professional satisfaction is chosen for its intrinsic value, and for this reason highly evaluated as a goal in itself. On the contrary, occupationally oriented officers give more importance to mainly instrumental factors, such as salary or job security, or even general working conditions. These two orientations do not result, however, in two opposite poles only, since they are not mutually exclusive but coexistent . . . . The typology can thus provide four types, where the professional and the occupational types are the two "pure" types.[12]

There are two pure types and two hybrid types. Officers who are *indifferent* to both professional and occupational positions, and officers who demonstrate both professional and occupational characteristics; this last type has been called pragmatic professionalism, in order to distinguish it from the radical professionalism of the pure type. In the research where the typology was applied, pragmatic professionals were present in six of eight countries surveyed (in the former Czechoslovakia 34%, in Greece 26%, in Italy 20%, in France 19%, in the United Kingdom 18%, and in Germany 16%), while radical professionals were the

[11] The first publication of this research's results is in *Current Sociology*, Winter 1994, Vol. 42, No. 3 (special edition, G. Caforio ed., *The Military Profession in Europe*). The typology is discussed in G. Caforio and M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type," in *Current Sociology*, Winter 1994, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 33–56.

[12] G. Caforio and M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type," in *Current Sociology*, Winter 1994, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 34.

majority everywhere but in Greece and in the former Czechoslovakia, where occupational and pragmatic professional respectively were prominent.[13]

The results of this research were first published in 1994, and they relied on empirical findings collected in a time span of more than 1 year, covering the end of 1991 to the end of 1992. To a certain extent, it could be said that it closes a research period where typologies for the military profession were intended to explore situations and changes that occurred within the period that Moskos named late modern to distinguish it from what it would have happened just afterward as a consequence of the end of bipolarism. As is outlined below, the new Postmodern period is characterized, at a theoretical level, by research trying to define brand new types of professional officers (and professional soldiers in general), those dealing with operations other than war to a much higher extent than before.

Wishing to give a general picture of research on the military profession in the late modern period, we could say that the common core of all studies related to these models seems to lay in the generalized perception of an ongoing decline in relevance, legitimacy, and prestige afforded by contemporary affluent society to the military profession, which can be defined as a "role crisis," the "deprofessionalization," or the "occupationalization" of the military profession. This process of change is also signaled by a change in value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning from reference patterns based on the assumption of definite responsibilities in favor of the community (the defence of the common good) at the expense of the individual good to individualistic patterns grounded on career and job security, like every other occupation; this change can be defined as a shifting from an institutional/professional orientation to an occupational/bureaucratic orientation.

A possible progressive *deprofessionalization* of the military was proposed by Cathy Downes. This refers to the dilution of its specific content into a number of different areas of knowledge which are not specific to the military and, moreover, which have been "invaded" by civilian "military experts" (Downes, 1985). It also includes the attempts on the part of the military to become aquainted with these new areas of knowledge, which has led to the creation of "internal" experts in nonmilitary matters (that is to say, military professionals who are experts in political, administrative, and financial fields) who run the risk, however, of becoming—and of perceiving themselves to have become—soldiers who have abandoned their own peculiar profession, with related outcomes of confusion and ambiguity concerning professional identity.

New Concepts for the Military Profession in the Postmodern Period

The end of the Cold War era opened up the field of military sociology to pose new questions and ask for adequate answers not always already given by existing theory. As it often happens, reality goes further and "the strength of things" imposes a renewal of subjects and the search for explicative paradigms. As far as the field of the military profession is concerned, the repeated and increasing experience of nonconventional missions, for the armed forces of many countries all around the world, presents a true challenge for the definition itself of the profession of arms. As Reed and Segal note for the U.S. military forces:

> In 1993, for the first time, Army doctrine began to reflect the changing nature of military missions. Field manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army basic field manual for doctrine, explicitly included a section on 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW), which includes peacekeeping and humanitarian

[13]G. Caforio and M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type," in *Current Sociology*, Winter 1994, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 37.

> assistance missions—missions that Janowitz would regard as constabulary. At the same time, the Army began teaching the new doctrine to its junior and senior leaders in the officer basic courses and the senior-level staff schools and colleges. (Red and D. Secal, 2000, p. 60).

One year later, in 1994, British military doctrine began to rely on what it called "the Dobbie's doctrine", explained by C. Dobbie in an essay where an attempt was made to distinguish among different types of new missions (traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement), which because of this diversity would need drastic differences in military personnel's training systems (Dobbie, 1994). A further discussion of Dobbie's doctrine led C. Dandeker and J. Gow to define *strategic peacekeeping* as an intermediate type of mission, thus giving further evidence to the complex and multifunctional nature of the new missions (Dandeker and Gow, 1997).

In almost all essays and contributions dealing with the new missions performed by military organizations a need for new training and education is articulated, but even so this topic is not adequately or extensively discussed. This need for something different in knowledge and ability is expressed as far as officers' education is concerned, for junior as well as for senior officers and for noncommissioned officers down to the lower levels of the command chain, emphasizing the concept of the bottom-up initiative and the relative autonomy of lower hierarchical levels. When educational contents and behavioral guiding principles are in discussion, a reassessment of a professional field is working. When both ethics and competence are at stake, then something relevant is changing—or it has already changed—for a professional group.

Thus, what it seemed to be a crisis of the military profession has turned into a new frame of reference, a different set of factors to be handled in order to rethink the military profession. This new paradigm under which to consider the military role, and the professional military role in particular, has given rise to a new type of soldier: the military peacekeeper.

THE ROLE OF THE OFFICER: FROM THE HEROIC LEADER/MANAGER TO WARRIOR/PEACEKEEPER. This new type is actually not "new." As happens many times, precursors can be found, and previous assessments of "new" problems already exist. In 1976, Charles Moskos, in *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, presented his findings of an inquiry over attitudes and behaviors of the various national contingents serving in the United National peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (the UNFICYP) (Moskos, 1976). In this pioneering research, Moskos explored attitudes toward the change from soldiering to peacekeeping by means of interviews to officers and soldiers from Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, receiving from them the judgment that military professionalism was also appropriate for the new tasks of peacekeeping missions. This is where the statement "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it" shifted from "oral tradition" to written form. To that, Moskos added that "middle-power" officers could better adjust to the constabulary ethic, which he had defined previously as based on two core principles: *absolute minimal force* and *impartiality* (Moskos, 1975).

But after that, the adequacy of military professionals to peacekeeping and other new missions has been submitted to many and highly diverse challenges, not last among them those coming from some side effects of OOTW: the consequences of multiple peacekeeping deployments on officers' and soldiers' careers and the effects of peacekeeping training and duties on combat readiness. The question was not, and it is not right now, whether the new officer should become a peacekeeper, thus definitely abandoning the "heroic leader"

pattern, but whether the new officer is able to include the peacekeeper role within the range of professional tasks requested by the international geopolitical situation. Even though it has been taken for granted that only soldiers can do peacekeeping, time and experience have shown that peacekeeping is not simply one task among the many assigned to the professional soldier of today. The emphasis given to appropriate training and attitude development by social scientists in more recent times is the demonstration that new missions have caused an unavoidable change in the ideal role of the professional officer (and in the professional soldier's as well!).

As it continues to be an empirical science, sociology, and military sociology in particular, draws its objects of study *from* reality and draws *on* reality to find plausible explanations for events and phenomena. Thus, a general theory of the "officer as a peacekeeper" is far from been definitely assessed, but a wide range of empirical research is available nonethelss, where empirical typologies and lists of variables are defined and employed.

There is general agreement on some of the characteristics that peacekeeper should have, and a certain "conventionality" in citing to similar references and literature when explaining one's findings and concepts. The starting point is normally the "constabulary concept" given by Janowitz, which is by no means considered out of date. Reed and Segal, in one of their last studies, published in 2000, make explicit reference to it, underlining the fact that, according to Janowitz, "... with transforming the military profession into a constabulary force... the modern professional soldier must be able to maintain an effective balance among a number of different roles, and to do this, must develop more of the skills and orientations common to civilian managers" (Reed & Segal, 2000, p. 58).

The problem of preparing military personnel was depicted by Janowitz as the necessity of including "more extensive general competence from its military managers and more intensive scientific specialisation from its military technologists" in the career pattern (Janowitz, 1960, p. 425). And Reed and Segal add the following:

> the prescribed career of the future should be one that sensitizes the professional soldier to the political and social consequences of military action and provides the military professional with a broad, strategic perspective of the entire range of the military spectrum. Under the constabulary model, the requirement for the military professional to be well-versed in political–military affairs is critical. (Reed and D. Segal, 2000, p. 59)

When considering studies exploring attitudes toward OOTWS, it is evident that the "peacekeeping culture" has gained, or is gaining, a definite status, not only in societies (Western and Westernized societies, I should say) and in the armed forces, but within military sociology as well. Thus, we already have general typologies where definitions of soldiers as peacekeepers are offered, and we can find many empirical studies where possible strains and contradictions between the *culture of the warrior* and the *culture of the peacekeeper* become evident or are overcome or simply juxtaposed and summed up.[14] While dichotomies seem to be largely overlapping, different terms are used, because each typology is actually more an empirical than a theoretical model, having been constructed on the basis of specific empirical findings. Furthermore, typologies apply mainly to soldiers in general, since empirical research is normally bound to explore behaviors and orientations

[14] We mention here only the most interesting contributions to the development of a "military peacekeeper" theory; see Segal, D. R., Harris, J., Rothberg, J. M., and Marlowe, D. H. (1984); Segal D. R., and Meeker, B. F. (1985c); Miller, L., and Moskos C.C. (1995); Segal, D. R. (1996a); Battistelli, F.(1997); Segal, D. R., Reed, B., and Rohall, D. E. (1998). On Italian units deployments see Ammendola, T. (Ed.) (1999); Reed, B. J., and Segal, D. R. (2000).

among deployed units at the troop level. Empirical distinctions are present in the sense that rank is one of the control (independent) variables used for data cross-tabulations, but officers in themselves are usually not considered a research target, (but one exception is provided below).

Attitudes toward peacekeeping are measured by means of various indicators, expressed as items of questionnaires where a certain comparability, and even reiteration of the same instrument, is assured. Just to give an example of a surveys that aims at defining, to some extent, the various behaviors and orientations typical of military personnel deployed in OOTW, I cite again the survey on the effects of multiple deployments on U.S. soldiers presented by Reed and Segal.

In this research, authors derive the constabulary ethic from the Moskos's work on UN peacekeepers, and the variables are intended to measure the positive/negative attitudes of American soldiers deployed multiple times on peacekeeping missions. The questionnaire's items are grouped into four categories, and each of them can be considered the empirical expression of a trait of the constabulary (or peacekeeping) ethic: (1) Impartiality and reduced Use of Force (the typical constabulary aspects), (2) Appropriateness of Alternative Personnel Resources (peacekeeping is/is not a soldier's job), (3) Unit Appropriateness and Career Enhancement (attitudes toward the specific peacekeeper role with respect to other more traditional soldiers' tasks), and (4) Agreement/Disagreement on Providing Humanitarian Relief as a task for the U.S. Army (the idea of the protective attitude of the military peacekeeper).

The aim of this survey was to analyze not simply soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping operations, but also the impact of multiple deployment on these attitudes, soldiers' morale, and reenlistment intentions. For our purposes here we must stress that the military peacekeeper is to a certain extent "typified" according to four dimensions taken or adapted from previous literature on the subject.

Another attempt to distinguish a "peacekeeper" type of soldier by means of empirical findings has been done very recently in a cross-cultural expert survey where samples of officers from nine countries, with various experience of OOTW, have been asked to evaluate their preparedness for nontraditional missions, difficulties encountered and adjustment, stress, and job satisfaction derived from these deployments.[15] In another chapter, dealing with difficulties and adjustments officers face in their relationships with various actors and agencies active in the many different theatres of deployment, I have made an attempt to demonstrate, on the basis of empirical findings, two internally related hypotheses: the first indicates a relationship according to which military culture (better, the conception of military professional beard on by officers) in the various national units involved in OOTW has an influence, among other aspects, on the ability of officers (in this specific case) to cope with commitments and expectations coming from the many and various nonmilitary actors present in the operation and resulting in a complex and often uncertain role set.

Also in this case, an empirical typology has been drawn from data coming from a questionnaire: A distinction has been made between warriors and peacekeepers, built from questions already used in defining the "good officer" in previous comparative research (Caforio and Nuciari, 1994b) and refined by including elements taken from this specific questionnaire. The hypothesis is that officers showing a professional orientation

[15]Research results are published in the volume *The Flexible Officer: Professional Education and Military Operations Other Than War.* Artistic & Publishing Company, Gaeta, 2001.

TABLE 4.1. Typologies of the Warrior and the Peacekeeper[a]

Warrior	Peacekeeper
Discipline	Determination
To be fit for action	Empathy
Decisiveness	Expertise
Leadership	Ability to easily make friends
Obedience	Cooperativeness
Ability to undergo physical stress	Mental strength
Patriotism	General education
Readiness to make sacrifices	Open-mindedness
Loyalty to the civil power	Taking responsibility
OOTW are NOT a natural part of the military's role	OOTW are a natural part of the military's role

[a]In the three-type typology, Warriors are those who selected four or five items from the "warrior list" and "NO" in the last cell; Peacekeepers are those who selected four or five items from the "peacekeeper list" and "YES" in the last cell. The third type, In-Between or Flexible, is formed by those who selected three items on the one and two items on the other list (and the opposite) and "YES" *or* "NO" in the last cell.

more inclined toward the "warrior" type or more inclined toward the "peacekeeper" type have different expectations of their role in MOOTW theatres; in particular, "warriors" generally find more difficulties in managing diversity and environment turbulence (e.g., many different actors, uncertainty of end-states, and mandate ambiguities), while "peacekeepers" generally feel more at ease with flexibility and cooperative nonhierarchical relationships.

The typology is formed by three types: the *Warrior*; the *Peacekeeper*; and a mixed type, provisionally called *In-Between* (but that could be named *Flexible*). They have been so defined by assuming that each of the two "pure" types can be indicated by a certain mix of attributes pertaining to the "good officer" pattern (Table 4.1): For the "warrior" type, typical attributes are discipline, action readiness, decisiveness, leadership, obedience, patriotism, readiness to make sacrifices, ability to undergo physical stress, loyalty to the civil power, and a rather negative attitude toward MOOTW, considering it not "a normal job" for a soldier; for the "peacekeeper" type, typical attributes include empathy, expertise, cooperativeness, open-mindedness, determination, well-rounded education, sense of responsibility, sociability (ability to easily make friends), mental strength, and a positive attitude toward MOOTW, considering it a normal part of a soldier's job. The third type, defined as the "In-Between" officer, is not simply a midway pattern, and it should not be considered a transitional figure: it is, on the contrary, the empirical evidence of that "flexible" type of soldier who has to cope with a job that "it is not a soldiers' job, but only a soldier can do it."

In our sample, peacekeepers outnumber warriors (38% versus 24% respectively), and another 38% can be classified as "In-Between." Countries where peacekeepers are the majority are Hungary, Sweden, Poland, and France, and those where they are the minority include the United States, South Africa, and Italy; Bulgaria and Russia (37%) are slightly under the sample average. To a certain extent, these findings corroborate the results of other studies, at least for cases where a comparison is possible. This means also that we can rely on the plausibility of our typology.

Looking at the total sample, the distinctiveness given by the typology is rather sharp, and, according to country, we can see cases where an In-Between (Bulgaria, Russia,

South Africa, and Hungary) or a Peacekeeper outlook (Italy) seems to be more adequate in reducing, if not difficulties as such, at least their perception as problems. In the other four countries, the winning strategy seems to be that of the Warrior (France, Poland, Sweden, and the United States). To a certain extent, it seems that the best pattern would be the "In-Between" type of officer, who is, again, not someone in the middle, unable to decide what to do or what to be, but a professional able to combine different qualities, some of them pertaining to the warrior model, and others to the peacekeeper model, in order to adapt his/her performance to the uncertain and variable requests coming from a turbulent environment such as the OOTW theatre often happens to be. Our first hypothesis can be considered confirmed in that the type of military culture is able to influence the military–civilian relationships in the expected sense: officers declaring less difficulties with civilians are mainly those with an In-Between or a Peacekeeper outlook.

But a question remains: is there a chance that the Warrior or Peacekeeper outlook is influenced by the very experience of these unconventional missions? Can we speak of an adaptive process or learning process whereby, despite the fact that mission exposure does not really affect the ability to cope with different actors in the theatre, the shift from a warfighter mind to that of a true peacekeeper is affected? This was the content of our second hypothesis. From findings there is evidence that length of deployment and variety of missions are able to influence at least the cultural framework of officers: A shift from the Warrior outlook to the In-Between to the Peacekeeper type seems to go along the same direction of an increased and prolonged experience of operations other than war, indicating to a certain extent the adjustment of officers to a new definition of their professional role.

The relationship between the type and length of deployment seems to go in the expected direction of the cultural pattern of officers in our sample, while, in a rather tortuous way, experience acquired in the MOOTW is able to affect the military ideal-type, giving room to more flexible and adaptive patterns in the definition of the "good" officer.

How useful, and to what extent, are the above findings for the very pragmatic question of education and training of officers for operations other than war? According to our data, we can say that military culture affects the ability to cope with an uncertain and differentiated theatre where many different actors are present, especially when they are civilians. We can also say that military culture is affected by the mix of experience acquired by officers, and it is pushed to go in a direction where a mixed, flexible, or definitely "peacekeeper" pattern prevails. An educational path adequate to the nonconventional operative theatres should then be oriented to reinforce these attitudes, reducing without eliminating the warriorlike attitudes: The outcome should be a kind of officer able to refer to more than one pattern, to use more than one code system, so that he or she could understand and behave in an adequate way within the highly uncertain and somewhat ambiguous environments where MOOTW are "usually" performed.

THE MILITARY AS A FORMAL ORGANIZATION

As already stated above, in the case of the military profession, organizational processes can determine types, contents, and boundaries of military professional activity, so that typical traits of the profession are barely distinguishable from those relating to organizational position. It is not by chance then, that since the 1960s the organizational approach to

armed forces has developed, particularly in the United States, following theories and results stemming from research conducted in civilian formal organizations such as firms, hospitals, public bureaucracies, and the like. Here the sociological tradition can be found in the continuities from *The American Soldier* in its overall consideration of the military institution. about which Edward Shils—whose contributions to research plans and implementation have been relevant in other ways—said not to be considered as the mere accidental juxtaposition of thousands of primary groups, nor regulating its functioning, as Janowitz stated, according to soldiers' preferences,[16] as well as in the janowitzian theory of the convergence of military institutions with large civilian organizations. The organizational approach to armed forces is evidently nurtured by the development of organizational sociology, which follows to the progressive lessening of the Human Relations School. Organizational sociology stresses the relevance of factors conditioning motivations and behaviors, which seem to follow specific organizational rationalities that are relatively independent from individual wills and manifest goals.

This approach can also be considered the most relevant and fruitful because of its capacity to include and integrate results stemming from research oriented to other areas, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Also in this case the distinction used above can be applied to theories and models developed in the late Modern period and typologies set up for the understanding of the Postmodern period.

Theories and Models for the Military Organization in the Late Modern Period

THE INSTITUTION/OCCUPATION MODEL. The obligatory starting point is the Institution/Occupation (the well-known I/O) model, proposed for the first time in 1977 by Charles C. Moskos. In this model a set of polarized empirical indicators is identified, ranging from an Institutional to an Occupational format of military organization. In his first proposal, two *ideal types* of armed forces are defined that can be considered mutually exclusive to some extent. But after a great amount of discussion, and even severe criticism, and empirical research conducted in many different military organizations, Moskos revised his original proposal and provided a new interpretation that considered the possibility of a "pluralist" military without a zero-sum game effect between the two polar models in the sense that institutional and occupational traits can coexist within a given military force and take different shapes among the services, branches, and echelons.[17]

The variables list for I/O model is well known. Here the list is provided in a somewhat different sequence, based on the latest version, proposed in 1986 (Table 4.2). Moskos calls

[16] Edward Shils, "The American Soldier and Primary Groups," in R. K. Merton and P. Lazarsfeld (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier,"* Glencoe, The Free Press, 1950, p. 19; Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, Sage, 1959, p. 26.

[17] C. C. Moskos, "The Emergent Military: Institutional, Occupational or Plural?", Italian translation in *Forarmes*, Vol. 1(1), 1985, pp. 67–89. Critics and redefinitions of the I/O model are presented in M. Nuciari, "Instituciòn vs. Ocupaciòn: discusiòn, y tentativa de adaptaciòn del modelo I/O a las fuerzas militares italianas," in *Iztapalapa*, Vol. 5(10/11) 1984, pp. 75–80; M. Nuciari, "Professione militare e modelli interpretativi. Alcune note di discussione," in *Forarmes*, Vol. 1(1), 1985; D. R. Segal, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis," in *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12(13), 1986, pp. 351–376.

TABLE 4.2. Military Social Organization: Institutional versus Occupational[a]

Variable	Institutional	Occupational
1. Legitimacy	Normative value	Marketplace economy
2. Role commitments	Diffuse	Specific
3. Basis of compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
4. Mode of compensation	Much in noncash form or deferred	Salary and bonuses
5. Level of compensation	Decompressed, low recruit pay	Compressed, high recruit pay
6. Evaluation of performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmental and quantitative
7. Legal system	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
8. Reference group	Vertical, within organization	Horizontal, external to organization
9. Societal regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
10. Postservice status	Veteran's benefits and preference	Same as civilian
11. Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
12. Spouse	Integrated with military community	Removed from military community

[a]From Moskos (1986).

a military "institutional" when it is "... legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good" (Moskos, 1986, p. 381), and presenting the above reported "institutional" modalities as far as roles, behaviours and relationships with parent society are concerned. This is mainly the traditional image of the military, here intended as a whole, including all ranks, thus avoiding the concept of "military professionalism" as limited to the officers corps. In contrast, "occupational" modalities can be found where the main source of legitimacy is the marketplace economy and "supply and demand rather than normative considerations are paramount.... The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest rather than the interest of the employing organisation" (Moskos, 1986, p. 379). Peculiarities are evident and shape the military "as any other job."

Since its first presentation in 1977, the I/O model has been so frequently considered, applied, tested, and criticized that it has become more a classic frame of reference for conceptual definition than a ready-to-use set of indicators that can be used to measure the shift from one format to the other, as was initially done. Moskos himself, taking into consideration the huge amount of research inspired by the I/O model, proposed an update of the two ideal-types, underlining its capacity "to allow us to move beyond the institutional versus occupational dichotomy to examine the different degrees of institutional and occupational aspects and see where they are in opposition to each other and where they are manifest jointly. Such a dynamic approach comprehends not merely an either-or situation, but a shifting constellation of institutional and occupational features in armed forces" (Moskos, 1986, p. 382).

In the I/O model, modalities assumed by each variable are concurrent in the determination of the whole nature of military organization, so that a specific military organization could be put on an institutional/occupational *continuum* depending on the modality assumed

by each variable. These variables, however, do not have the same nature and the same *specific weight* to determine the position of a specific military organization at a given point on the **continuum.** As Moskos himself states:

> ... military systems are differently shaped, depending upon a country's civil–military history, military traditions, and geopolitical positions. Moreover, I/O modalities will interface in different ways even within the same national military system. There will be differences between military services and between branches within them. I/O modalities may also vary along internal distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned officers, and lower ranks; between draftees and volunteers; and so on. (Moskos, 1986, p. 381)

These variables, in fact, could be divided into *outer variables* and *inner variables* with respect to military system in that some of them are linked to the type of society and are dependent on the dominating cultural patterns and their change, while others are peculiar to the military organization and linked to cultural and organizational patterns typical of military institutions. We could generally refer to the former as **cultural** and to the latter as **subcultural.** Cultural variables such as *Legitimacy* and *Societal regard* are "outer" in that their place of definition is the civil society and its institutionalized value patterns; structural variables such as *Basis, Mode and Level of compensation, Evaluation of performance, Legal system* and *Post-service status* are "inner" in that they define performance rules, but they are nonetheless influenced by general norms of social regulation, so that they could be considered "boundary" subcultural variables. Psychosocial variables such as *Role commitment* and *Reference group* are even more "inner" subcultural variables in that they are strongly influenced by peculiar military subcultural patterns. Last, daily-life variables such as *Residence* and *Spouse integration* come directly from military subcultural patterns which traditionally shape a strongly integrated community, exercise wide-ranging control over members' activities, and demand obedience to community norms.

If we consider the I/O model as a kind of cybernetic model, acting diachronically, we could imagine a range of situations assigning I or O values to each variable, starting from the basic assumption that general society cultural patterns have an influence on military organization inner patterns, so that a change in the former would cause a tension and a readjustment in the latter. Thus, a shifting from I to O modalities in variables 1 and 9 could cause tensions on "peripheral" or "boundary" variables (3,4,5,6,7, and 10) forcing the institution to assume O modalities. Such a change means a noticeable situational change for the members of the organization, who may suffer from the role identity inconsistency deriving from the contradiction between diffuse role commitment [I] and vertical reference group [I] and the new "O-defined" situation. The reaction could follow two different paths of readjustment: (1) assuming O modalities in role commitment and reference group (specific and horizontal respectively), followed, as a consequence, by the readjustment of daily-life variables (residence separated from workplace and spouse removed from military community); or (2) resisting change and trying to come back to I modalities in variables. 3,4,5,6,7, and 10 (this can cause internal conflicts among roles and ranks, owing to the different advantages/disadvantages distribution due to the shift from I to O and any reverse movement) until the inconsistency between O patterns in cultural variables and I patterns in subcultural variables becomes a problem. This possibility is mentioned by Moskos when he says that "...There may even be trends toward 'reinstitutionalizing' the military, either across the board or in specific units" (Moskos, 1986, p. 381).

The applicability of the I/O model has been tested in a wide range of empirical studies in many different military organizations all around the world, and in doing so has become a

tool to measure not only the shift from one asset to another, but also the relative presence of organizational traits belonging to the institutional and/or the occupational poles in current military forces.

With regard to the Janowitzian theory of the convergence between military and civilian organizations, the Moskos model is rather critical: if the fully institutional military is problematic because of its radical divergence from civil society, its occupational side, if fully realized, bears strong risks of inadequacy and ineffectiveness for the specific function assigned to the military. As a consequence, the unavoidable specificity of the military organization is reaffirmed, at least in some of its subsystems, whose maintenance of some institutional divergence from civil society is crucial for the very functional purpose assigned by the same civil society to armed forces.

In finishing with the examination of this model, it could also be applied to address changes that have occurred in the Postmodern period, since these are the changes that have the most relevance for the collectivity. A change as such means a new pattern of legitimacy given to the military organization, based not only on its conventional purpose but also (and sometimes even more) on its "new" tasks. The new type of professional soldier, the "peacekeeper," is a result of a partial "reconstruction" of the role pattern on the basis of different tasks contents, values, and norms, both traditional and new, according to which Institutional and Occupational variables can be applied. And this is what it has been proposed by Moskos himself with a new typological framework, about which we discuss later in this chapters.

ARMED FORCES AS A TWO-SUBSYSTEM ORGANIZATION: THE CAREER STRATEGIES INTERACTIONIST MODEL. With some different factors, another model to explain structure and processes within military organizations is proposed in the same time period. It is worthwhile to mention it here, since for a number of years it has remained relatively unknown with respect to the I/O model, notwithstanding its capacity to also explain the coexistence of the two patterns.

Proposed by Jean-Paul Hubert Thomas, a French sociologist and officer as well, this model is known as the *four strategies model.* Here two analytical levels are present, the micro level (the actor) and the macro level (the system; in this case the military organization). The two levels are seen as a strategic interaction between actor and system where both can define and redefine their intentions on the basis of a limited rationality linked to specific definite goals. The synchronic approach offered by Thomas[18] and criticized by B. Boene[19] using the Moskos model (1984) makes it possible to consider the *different contents* defining military roles as the discriminative variable of *two different rationalities* within military organizations linked to the *different types of goals* pursued.

The micro level includes the individual and his or her career strategy, and the typology applies to those who enter the institution as volunteers at various levels and specialities.

[18]Jean-Pierre Thomas, "Fonction militaire et système d'hommes," in *Stratégiques*, Vol. 12(8), pp. 18–41; see also Jean-Pierre Thomas and C. Rosenzveig, "French NCO's career Strategies and Attitudes," in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 8(4), 1982, pp. 275–301.

[19]Bernard Boene, "The Moskos and Thomas Models Contrasted," in J. Kuhlmann (ed.), *Military and Society: The European Experience*, SOWI-Forum Serie, 1984, pp. 35–66. See also on the same subject M. Nuciari, "Professione militare e modelli interpretativi: Alcune note di discussione," in *Forarmes*, Vol. 1(1), 1985.

Briefly, four career strategies are defined: (1) an *institutional strategy*, with a long-lasting or lifetime career, low task transferability to civilian life, inner reference group, and dominant traditional military values and norms; (2) an *individual or industrial strategy*, with brief service in view of a second civilian career, high task transferability, outer reference group, dominant individualistic values; (3) a *communitarian or initiatory strategy*, with the choice of membership in small, exclusive, and demanding communities such as commandos, parachuting, flying combat aircraft, or the marines; reference group restricted to the community; values and norms are those of the community's unwritten code; and (4) an *unstable or nonexistent strategy*, with brief-term and erratic career orientation, no definite reference group, and no stable values.

To the above four strategies, empirically tested on a large NCOs sample, Boene affirms that a fifth type could be added, defined as the *professional strategy*, with a strong initial and long-lasting career involvement, high role commitment, an ethical code based on the idea of service in favor of the collectivity, and a high level of expectations in terms of self-realization and moral rewards. This fifth type could apply to the professional officer, thus making the model applicable to the whole military organization.

At the second analytical level the four or five strategies have varying degrees of congruence. The military organization as a system is articulated into two subsystems with different rationalities: a *combat-oriented subsystem* and a *technical/administrative subsystem*. Both can be considered as two different types of collective behavior operating simultaneously within the military institution. The two subsystems have different functional goals whereby the combat-oriented subsystem is defined by an essentially *ethical rationality* (even if combined with some instrumental logic) that is mainly focused on mission accomplishment over costs, absolute thinking, an emphasis on the military uniqueness and on the officer/warrior, authoritarian organizational control styles, and an emphasis on rank and seniority. The technical/administrative subsystem is, on the contrary, defined by an *instrumental rationality* that focuses on the optimization of the primary task (that is, the goal of the first subsystem), efficiency, negotiation, technical labor division, collaboration, innovation, and an outward-referred orientation based on the pattern of the technician and of the manager.

The interaction between actor and system produces consistencies and inconsistencies depending on the type of strategy and subsystem: institutional and communitarian strategies are more consistent with the combat-oriented subsystem, while the industrial strategy is more congruent with the other subsystem. The relationship could be reversed by saying that where an instrumental logic prevails, industrial strategies are considered more remunerative, while when the ethical logic prevails institutional strategies have higher consideration. The two rationalities are not mutually exclusive, since both subsystems answer to different functional imperatives in the whole military system. The professional strategy could be consistent with both subsystems: a lifetime career orientation and an ethical basis of role commitment are not in contrast with the logic of the combat-oriented subsystem, while specific and high knowledge and skill, a professional peer-referred orientation, and an emphasis on efficiency and performance optimization are characteristics peculiar to the professional orientation which are coherent with the instrumental logic of the technical/administrative subsystem.

To conclude, what can be drawn from this model is the fact that different individual behaviors interact within military system, with the prevalence of one over the other being strictly dependent on the relative importance achieved by the rationality of one or the other subsystem at a given time.

From the Modern to the Postmodern Military: Models of Military Organizations for the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War era by adding new levels of complexity to the international arena, has given a new impulse to military sociologists in order to find some general trends and definitions to adequately explain the changes occurring in military organizations as a consequence of the global situation following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In 1992, in a Workshop on Sociocultural Designs for the Future Army at the University of Maryland, Charles Moskos proposed for the first time a list of variables aiming to distinguish three time periods within this "brief century" (in the words of Eric Hobsbawn). These periods, or phases, were named "Early Cold War," "Late Cold War," and "Post-Cold War" and were a first attempt to clarify the changes going on in the American military organization.[20] In a later version, published in 1994, Moskos presented a new list where the names were changed because a somewhat different frame of reference had been adopted to distinguish the changes in the armed forces (Moskos and Burk, 1994). Also, fewer military variables than in the first version were included: the perceived threat, the structure of force, the orientation of the public opinion toward the military, the impact on defence budget, the main organizational tensions, the dominant military professional pattern, the number of civilian employees, women's roles in the military, the role of the military spouse within the military community, the position of homosexuals in the military, and the mode of treating conscientious objection. The distinction into three periods, respectively named Early Modern (corresponding to "Early Cold War"), Late Modern ("Late Cold War"), and Postmodern ("Post-Cold War") are now determined by viewing the underlying causes of change in military institutions from a historical perspective. Moskos and Burk address the topic in the following way:

> Students of military history have never embraced the stereotypical view that modern military organization is a rigid, hierarchical, and unchanging bureaucracy... The history of modern military organization is a history of flux. The critical problem for historians and social scientists and for policy makers is to discern the underlying patterns of change and their significance for defining the military social's role, and evaluating its capacity for fighting wars. (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 141)

In order to ascertain these patterns of change, authors stress the fact that no explanation is possible by means of a unique cause and that many factors of a different nature should be taken into consideration under a systemic perspective: "For this purpose, we undertake a systemic institutional analysis, a perspective that tries to account for the organisational importance of long-term historical developments" (Moskos and Burk, 1994, pp. 141–142).

Taking Harold Lasswell's "garrison state" model as a reference, Moskos and Burk intend to identify critical periods of transition in military organisation in order to understand "whether now is another similar period of transition and, if so, what is the new idea of military organization and purpose" (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 142). And they continue:

> Our working hypothesis is that we are indeed in a period of transition away from the "modern" mass army, characteristic of the age of nationalism, to a "postmodern" military, adapted to a newly forming world-system in which nationalism is constrained by the rise of global social organisations. Much of our analysis will consist of a comparison of these two types of military organizations along a variety of dimensions. (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 142)

[20]C. C. Moskos, "Armed forces in the post-Cold War era with special reference to the United States Army," presented at the Workshop on Sociocultural Designs for the Future Army, University of Maryland, College Park, March 1992.

These dimensions are defined in order to give evidence to the main phenomena affecting armed forces in current times, which can be considered both as "new" and as "occurring under different forms" with respect to the past. Changes in military organization are seen as affected (if not simply "determined") by changes in social organization, so that specific types of military organizations could be distinguished according to specific historical periods.

Moskos and Burk "posit three type of relations between the military and society." The first, called the *modern* type, defines the situation as it was since the end of the 18th century to the end of the Second World War, that is, the social organization corresponding to the birth and consolidation of the nation-state. The mass army was the corresponding military organization during that entire period. The second type of military–society relation is named *postmodern*; it emerged after 1989, and it is considered to "persist into the indefinite future." Its corresponding military organization is exactly the topic under discussion in this chapter. The third type was added to better explain the transition from the modern to the postmodern type, and it is called the *late modern* type, dating from the end of World War II to early 1990. The authors are aware that their proposal is drawn from the historical experience of the Western world—and that of the United States in particular, I would add—but they try to keep the dimensions in a form suitable for cross-cultural application. As such, the 11 variables and their modalities in each of the three types of military–society relations are presented in Table 4.3.

A slightly different and, to my knowledge, updated version of this model was published in 2000 in a volume whose goal was the cross-cultural application of the model itself. In this updated version, there are still 11 variables, but some have disappeared while some others have been added (Moskos et al., 2000). The evaluation of the *Impact on the defence budget* and *Organisational tension* are no longer considered, but the *Major mission definition* and *Media relations* variables have been entered. The latest version is presented in the table and the two old variables are added at the end in italics.

Moskos defines this typology as developmental: "A developmental construct posits an ideal-type at some point by which past and present trends can be identified and appraised. The Postmodern military is a developmental construct based on the observation of the past. What is presented is a model, not a prophecy, and may help explain what has happened and predict what is likely to happen." [21]

Looking at the variables contained in the model, they are of a different nature and pertain both to the military organization and to the civilian society. The model, actually, is bound to give evidence not of the changes within one single actor (the military on the one side or society on the other), but of the changes in the system formed by armed forces and its parent society, that is, in the special set of relationships binding a society with its military. We could say then, that some variables pertain to the society, in the sense that society is the place where their modalities are shaped, and some other pertains to the military, in the sense that the military is the place where their modalities are shaped. Variables *pertaining to the society* are the following:

- the *nature of the perceived threat* is shaped by cultural values and orientations and by the relative position of the national society in the international context
- the *force structure*, conscription, or AVF and force size are decided in the society
- the *major mission definition* is partly derived from the perceived threat and it is culturally legitimated by the parent society

[21] C. C. Moskos, *Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm* (C. Moskos, J. Williams, and D. Segal, Eds.), p. 14 (2000).

TABLE 4.3. Armed Forces and Postmodern Society[a]

Armed forces variables	Early Modern (Pre-Cold War; 1900–1945)	Late Modern (Cold War; 1945–1990)	Postmodern (Post-Cold War; since 1990)
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force structure	Mass army	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major mission definition	Defence of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (e.g., peacekeeping and humanitarian)
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesmen; soldier-scholar
Public attitude toward military	Supportive	Ambivalent	*Skeptical or apathetic;* indifferent
Media relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and military community	Integral part	Partial	Removed
Homosexuals in the military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious objection	Limited or prohibited	Permitted on routine basis	Subsumed under civilian Service
Impact on defense budget	*Positive*	*Neutral*	*Negative*
Organizational tension	*Service roles*	*Budget fights*	*New missions*

[a] From Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000, p. 15).

- the *public attitude toward the military* is a result of the societal values and orientations toward military organization and military affairs
- *conscientious objection* depends on cultural values of the society and on formal norms ruling the phenomenon

Variables *pertaining to the military* are the following:

- *the dominant military professional,* while determined by societal variables, it is constructed within the military organization
- *the media relations* are defined within the military as far as means and rules are concerned
- *the number of civilian employees* depends on the "make or buy" strategy chosen by the armed forces to cope with budgetary restriction and rationalization of resource allocation.

The remaining variables (*Women's Role, Spouse position in the military,* and *Homosexuals in the military*) are in my opinion, strongly dependent on changes in the society, but changes in their modalities must cope more then other aspects with structural as well as cultural patterns shaping the military organization. This is the reason why I would consider these variables as *pertaining both to the society and to the military.*

The application of this model to a variety of national civil–military systems has made clear its usefulness at a comparative level, since situations are very different in the various

Western countries where the model has been applied. The impact of specific historic and cultural factors is evident in the different stages at which each variable is found in the investigated countries.[22] Even though some general trends are evident, such as the post-modern redefinition of the perceived threat, the issue of conducting operations other than war, the shift from conscription (the mass army of the Modern type) to the professional voluntary military, the acceptance of conscientious objection to military service, or the issue of women as soldiers, there is a differentiated situation in many countries. Modern as well as Late modern coexist with Postmodern characters, and this demonstrates that the process of change has a discontinuous nature. The set of variables of the Postmodern set will shape the future, or at least one possible (and plausible) future, but this is not a unilinear path.

The fact that many of the countries where the model was tested show an apparent contradiction in the coexistence of characters belonging to the three periods means that the three military and society systems are not mutually exclusive nor sequentially determined: each modality assumed by each variable is influenced by history and culture, on the one hand, and by the choices of decision-makers at any level, on the other. But the coexistence of a number of traits belonging to the same pattern is evidence of the fact that some variables are internally linked and condition each other: a certain perception of threat is logically (and also empirically) related to the force structure and to the major mission of a given military institution and induce changes in the roles of the dominant military professional and also in those of the civilian employees. Other variables are not necessarily linked, such as the position of the spouse, the attitudes of the public toward the military, or the acceptance of homosexuals, and can vary greatly among countries where the other characters become similar.

The model provides good descriptive capacity, and it clearly describes and controls for a number of elements. In cross-cultural studies, it has proved its usefulness for the comparison of different military–society systems, a thing of great importance in a time when globalization far from homologate societies, cultures and consequently armed forces, is creating new needs for a greater ability to cooperate among diversities for shared goals.

[22] Country studies studied in the volume include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, and South Africa.

CHAPTER 5

The Order of Violence

Norms, Rules, and Taboos of Organized Violence and the De-legitimization of the Military

WILFRIED VON BREDOW

Organized violence and order form an odd couple. In the case of democracies, people think of (social and political) order as a self-evident and generally accepted social structure. This social structure, in order to remain accepted and to integrate the members of the group or society, should be free of violence, or at least nearly free of violence, for a certain amount of it must be retained to protect the group and the social and political order. Thus, protection is delegated to special institutions such as the police forces and the military forces. These institutions derive their legitimacy from the state, which claims the monopoly of organized violence. Because of their armament, these institutions are a potential danger to the civil order. Therefore, they are usually tightly controlled by other institutions (e.g., Parliament and the media).

Statistically, democracies have always been and still are exceptions. The majority of states do not respect democratic norms and values, even if they call themselves democracies. For example, ruling elites exist who frequently use violence to maintain internal order. Furthermore, the international order forming the social and political structure between states and other actors with transborder activities is characterized by a high amount of violence and wars. The history of modern states and the modern (Westphalian) system of states can be interpreted as a series of attempts to domesticate internal and external violence and to install a rule of violence-free order that is universal and accepted. In the course of these endeavours, violence and war have intensified and have become even more threatening. Concerning the latter, the assumption of Clausewitz has been refuted—warfare by civilized peoples is certainly not less brutal and destructive than warfare by uncivilized peoples (Clausewitz, 1973, p. 192).

So violence and order, violence and civilization form, indeed, odd couples. The following reflections concentrate on the military as an organization for the handling of violence.

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Is there a chance to minimize and marginalize violence in the international system and to come closer to a globally accepted and respected order between states and other inter-transnational actors? How does the search for such a transformation of international relations affect military organization? And how do the recent developments in military technology and strategy as well as the new missions of the armed forces as parts of peacekeeping operations affect the quest for global order? These are the main questions which guide the considerations of this article.

EQUALITY AND VIOLENCE

Consider the following two statements. Human beings are equal. The disparities in strength, health, wealth, beauty, intelligence, and the chance to lead a decent life are enormous. The first of these two statements is generally accepted and greeted with a certain pathos. The second statement cannot really be discounted, but it evokes a bad feeling. Most utopian visions propagate panaceas to overcome inequalities because they are regarded as unjust, unfair, and the result of a wrong turn in the history of humankind. In this perspective, one of the instruments used to create and support inequality is violence. Violence is used by the elite against ordinary people, by the dominating class to suppress the needs of the lower classes, or by men to keep women dependent. Violence marks the relationship between the top dogs and the underdogs. The latter only have a chance to achieve equality when they are prepared to use violence to fight for their rights.

Thomas Hobbes had quite a different perspective, believing that it is exactly their capacity to kill each other which makes all human beings basically equal:

> Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe. (Hobbes, 1968, p. 183)

The contrast between both perspectives is considerable, but they are not mutually exclusive. Hobbes's view emphasizes equality on the anthropological level; the utopian view comprises two parts, a therapeutical one (which is dubious, to put it mildly) and a diagnosis (which is painfully correct). Both views overlap in the implicit considerations that physical violence between human beings should be minimized and that organized physical violence should be highly legitimized and efficiently controlled. Only then can the mutual threat which is innate to the human condition be contained and defused.

SPECTRUM OF PRESSURES

Any social and political entity which tries to exist for an extended period of time relies on internal norms and rules which are complimented by a collective identity. A collective identity is a catalog of features which the members of this entity (group, society) attribute to themselves and which therefore demarcates members from nonmembers. Evidently, the fact that all members of a group or a society participate in this collective identity and regard it as

something positive decreases the amount of internal physical violence. It does not, however, make violence disappear. Many social groups (e.g., families) can even act as breeding nests of internal violence, at least in certain historical and social contexts.

In Western democracies, physical violence has become increasingly regarded as a rather crude medium in human interactions. The spectrum of pressure given to individuals and groups who behave deviantly or who do not comply with the norms and laws has moved away from physical violence and coercion. Persuasion and manipulation have instead become a more prominent means to achieve the nececessary compliance. As Morris Janowitz has observed, in a "democratic system, persuasion is the process by which political parties come to power and by which they seek to rule, while coercion is circumscribed and limited by the legitimating norms" (Janowitz, 1978, p. 393). This distinguishes democratic systems from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

The move away from violence and coercion not only occurs in the relations between the government and the citizens, but also in the society at large. Teachers and parents are advised to abstain from using physical violence on children in their classes or in their family, and physical violence between husband and wife has become a criminal offence in many Western countries. The death penalty as the ultimate sanction against the breaking of the law is being phased out in many (but not all) democratic societies. This vision of a violence-free society is, however, comparatively new and related to a set of norms and values (human rights) which have not yet developed deep roots in many parts of the world.

POLICE AND ARMED FORCES

From time to time, intellectuals get furious about the tortuous sociopolitical world and therefore, they propose remedies against its heterogeneity and contingencies. Some of these remedies concentrate on the *topos* of the *end of politics*. For example, (muddy) politics will/should be overcome by (clean) technical rationality or by the ubiquitous rule of law. But, of course, even in democracies with a high level of citizen participation, politics prevails. This implies not only the existence of deviant behavior but also the necessity to found and maintain institutions that protect the norms and values of society with the help of organized violence. The most visible of these institutions are the police and the armed forces. In quite general terms, *police forces*, of which there are different types, are responsible for internal order. In dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes, they are used as instruments of the ruler or the ruling group to suppress any attempts to critize and damage their privileges. In a rule-of-law system they function as an auxiliary service that prevents the breaking of the law, chasing away lawbreakers while protecting the legal order and the law-abiding citizens.

The *armed forces* of a modern state usually have the mission to protect the state and society against threats from abroad. In the Westphalian system of international relations, war was regarded as a rather expensive, but under certain conditions a legal way of pursuing national interests. Since the 19th century, an increase of rules for the behavior of soldiers and troops during a war have been codified in terms of international humanitarian law. These rules complement the set of unwritten professional codes which have a somewhat longer (but porous) tradition in the profession of arms (Elias, 1950). After World War I, the legal and political attempts to remove war from the list of permitted political methods of a state gained momentum. The legal use of organized violence has been restricted, both before 1945 by the League of Nations and after 1945 by the United Nations, to acts of defence against

an aggressor and to acts of maintaining or restoring peace in the name of the international community of states. This development has certainly not made war obsolete. On the contrary, both the first and the second halves of the 20th century were characterized by gigantic mass wars, a stunning pace in the perfecting of armaments technology, anticolonial and civil wars, and international terrorism. While wars like the two World Wars, with millions of soldiers who fought for several years on different continents, seem to be outdated now, many kinds of small wars (e.g., low-intensity wars and guerilla warfare) are still fought and will probably continue to be in the foreseeable future (van Creveld 1991; Beaumont 1995). In this context, armed forces have been and are still used as an instrument to demonstrate the powers of an actor (a state, a group of states, or a group within a state) in a symbolic or a violent interaction. It is worth noting here that the concept of armed forces as an instrument in the hands of an actor with political interests is, of course, based on a Clausewitzean view of politics and warfare. This view has often been critized as unduly rational. To mention just one of the critics of Clausewitz, John Keegan (1995, p. 35) contends that war transcends the political framework because it is a feature of a certain culture and sometimes is even its essence.

ANARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Students of international systems should aim to use a clear and simple concept of what makes an international system. Otherwise they will immediately encounter a surprisingly high number of theoretical problems (Buzan and Little, 2000). An international system can be defined as an ensemble of political units with regular political, economic, cultural, and military relations among them, including the possibility of war between them (Aron, 1963, p. 117). The current international system which emerged in the 17th century is the very first global system. Before it, several smaller international systems existed side by side, with little contact between them. Now, the existing international system has expanded over the whole planet and has incorporated all other international systems (or what remained of them).

Evidently, regular relations between states, empires, or other entities within the framework of an international system demand a certain minimum of order. Otherwise, these relations could not develop or would falter if the slightest conflict between the actors turned them against each other. The difference in power and stability between these collective actors may be overwhelming, and they are not fundamentally equal like individuals are in the Hobbesian perspective. Because of this difference and inequality, it is necessary for an international system to generate rules which counterbalance the existing correlations of power by guaranteeing the rights of the weaker actors in the system.

The current international system is characterized by a relatively quickly increasing number of rules and regulations; by an expanding corpus of international law; by international regimes; and, last but not least, by a tendency to create a functioning world opinion. Some students of international politics contend that this produces in the long run an *international society* (or a world political system). On the other hand, this development, if it really occurs, does not (yet) fully eradicate the anarchical feature of this system, which exists in the absence of a powerful and generally accepted political agency above the level of states. The rules and regulations of an international system have to be agreed upon by the sovereign states. They do so more or less voluntarily. If a state acts against its international duties, only the group of other states (plus the international organizations they have founded) can try to lure it back on common ground.

The terms of consensus and dissent in international politics are often violent terms:

> It is war and the threat of war that help to determine whether particular states survive or are eliminated, whether they rise or decline, whether their frontiers remain the same or are changed, whether their peoples are ruled by one government or another, whether disputes are settled or drag on, and which way they are settled, whether there is a balance of power in the international system or one state becomes preponderant. (Bull, 1977, p. 187)

War and organized violence are certainly not the exclusive mechanisms for the maintenance and change of order, but they have been and remain extremely important. For all other means, including economic power and ideologies, are in danger of losing ground if they are unable to mobilize, in cases when it seems necessary, military protection.

MODERATED ANARCHY

Anarchy in an international system is always moderated anarchy. Otherwise there is no chance for a system to develop. The moderation of anarchy in an international system consists mainly of the regulation of violence. This can be attempted in different ways and with different goals.

First, a more radical and comprehensive approach was elaborated by some of the early bourgeois philosophers of history, like Benjamin Constant (1767–1830), Auguste Comte (1798–1857), and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). For them, the future of humankind was strongly determined by industrial production and trade, which could be organized so that all peoples might profit from it. War and military forces were, in their eyes, nothing but relics of a period that was over, and they predicted that they would soon disappear. Order between peoples and nations could be established and developed without resorting to violence. This was, of course, very naive and much too optimistic a vision of the future. But it had a strong and lasting impact on the minds of many people. Since the mid-19th century, the quest for a violence-free world and a world government has generated ideologies and political movements which were, at certain places and at certain times, not without political influence.

Second, a modern humanitarian *ius in bello* emerged during the mid-19th century. Although it did not really lessen the dangers or cruelty of war, this humanitarian war law forbade some of the more beastly developments in war fighting by legally excluding specific munitions, particular ways of behavior on the battlefield and toward noncombattent civilians, and by emphasizing certain minimum standards of professional military fairness. Furthermore, it slowly (much too slowly, in fact) raised the public consciousness concerning war atrocities.

Third, the most advanced and probably most successful moderation of the anarchical constellation in the international system on the level of organized violence has been the domestication of nuclear weapons. It is not nuclear weapons per se which seem to exercise a pacifying influence on their owners (Waltz, 1999, p. 97). For example, during the East–West conflict in its phase as the Cold War, nuclear weapons created a sufficient amount of mutually assured deterrence, so much so that the nuclear powers refraned from actually using these weapons in conflicts—and not only between them, but altogether.

Fourth, while there is almost no sign of a breakthrough in general and comprehensive disarmament, the concept of arms control has developed into a partially successful tool for making armament processes, in strategic terms, less irrational. Arms control played an

important role in the détente phase of the East–West conflict (starting on tiptoes after the Cuban missile crisis in autumn 1962), but it continued to moderate and regulate the security relations in some regions of the globe, e.g., between the United States and Russia and on the European continent.

These perspectives and concepts, different as they may be, have one thing in common—they all somehow contribute to the moderation of organized violence in the anarchical international system. The first concept is more or less openly based on the premise that order between human beings can and must be organized in a way that organized violence disappears completely from people's lives. The three other concepts do not stipulate a fundamental contradiction between order and organized violence. Rather, they try to restrain organized violence and to keep it as tightly under political control as possible. Political scientists like to call the violent but moderated anarchy of the Western system of states the Westphalian system of international relations. Some of them are busy preparing its obituary.

THE ANTICIPATED END OF THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM AND THE WARS OF A THIRD KIND

The main actor in this Westphalian system of international relations or "model of Westphalia" (Held 1995, p. 78) is the *sovereign state*. It is defined by its territory and borders, by its population, and by its internal order. The state has the monopoly of legal physical violence as well as over the processes of lawmaking, the settlement of disputes, and law enforcement. The international system is mainly an interstate system. It is anarchical (Bull 1977) insofar as there are no political authorities above the states. States can only rely on their power and on their leaders' ability to make rational use of it. International politics is dominated by the national interests of states and the ways to best realize these interests. Conflicts between states are settled by power either in a diplomatic (nonmilitary) or, if regarded as effective and comparatively cheap, in a military way. The actors' attempts to mutually balance their power, political and military alliances to provide for collective defence, and a minimalist set of binding rules for the behavior of states characterize the Westphalian system.

The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded in the centuries after the peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück of 1648. Still, it makes sense to analyze the expansion of this system from Europe over the the whole planet with the help of this model. During the 20th century, however, the structures and principles of this globalizing international system slowly began to change. Toward its end, the key pillars of the Westphalian system seemed to be cracking. The main reason for this development is the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organize their societies, to remain the central institution of their citizens' loyalty, and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond the borders. National economies are becoming more and more interdependent, which minimizes the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement a national economic policy. Ecologic problems can only be dealt with on a macroregional or global scale—states as single actors are mostly helpless in ecological problem solving. The resort to war as a traditional step in a mixed strategy to realize national interest is either illegal and/or much too expensive. This is, however, only part of the overall assessment of future violence. In some regions, organized violence and war will accompany humankind

into the years ahead. Even in Europe, border conflicts and interethnic wars continue to occur. On some continents, internal wars have become quite "normal," as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships.

In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this category, Roger Beaumont (1995, pp. 20–23) lists among others "dirty war," "guerilla war," "insurgency/counterinsurgency," "limited war," "proxy war," "surrogate war," and "low-intensity operations." W. J. Olson (1995, 9) proposes "small war" as catch-all term, defining it as "a largely intrastate conflict between a government and some internal, substate opponent or a short-lived interstate conflict between opponents that are unable, on their own resources, to sustain major conflict."

For Lawrence Freedman (1993, p. 43), this prototypical military conflict is a function of the instability and weakness of a state. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different and even opposing groups, when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and to sustain law and order, the consequence may well be the development of internal violent clashes. Small wars or wars of the "third kind" are usually local wars, insofar as the latent and manifest reasons for the outbreak and continuation of organized violence are rooted in a narrow geography. On the other hand, they threaten to spread all over the planet because of the "services" provided by globalization. Territory and control of certain geographically defined areas play an important role in these wars but only on the level of "official" war aims and the motivation to fight. The fighting itself can be transferred into other regions, e.g., into the urbanized parts of the world. There are enough examples which illustrate this horizontal escalation: the fight between Turks and Kurds in Germany and acts of terrorism by certain North African fundamentalist or radical groups in Western Europe.

These *wars of a third kind* are certainly not a completely new phenomenon, and the literature on guerilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to illustrate the tactics and strategies of this kind of warfare. It combines primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and an ultramodern prpaganda. Their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide. In such wars "there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no point d'appui, and no respect for the territorial limits of states" (Holsti, 1996, p. 36).

If this kind of war is indeed going to become the dominant type of war, many a traditional wisdom of the Clausewitzean politicomilitary thinking will have to be reconsidered. Martin Van Creveld predicts the replacement of the conventional battle "by skirmishes, bombings, and massacres. The place of lines of communications will be taken by short, covert approaches of a temporary nature. Bases will be replaced by hideouts and dumps, large geographical objectives by the kind of population-control that is achieved by a mixture of propaganda and terror." (van Creveld, 1991, p. 207).

In international relations theory, we are currently debating the arguments about the decline of the state as the most powerful actor in the international system and the deconstruction of the state's sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber, 1995; Elkins, 1995). Many a participant of these debates does not hide his or her impatience in dismissing the state altogether. This attitude is often based on the conviction that a post-Westphalian world will be more peaceful, dominated by justice, and probably also better equipped to deal with the growing range of global problems, threats, and risks which states and their international organizations are appearently unable to manage.

There is certainly some evidence to support this anticipation. One bitter irony, however, is obtrusively obvious—the dangerous wars of a "third kind" are mostly emerging in areas

and out of political constellations where the state has fallen in disarray, is falling apart, or is not powerful enough to establish and protect law and order according to the premises of the Westphalian system.

THE END OF TERRITORIALITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE

The 20th century witnessed a permanent reformulation of the military space. This term refers to the volume and expansion of the space in which military actions are planned and actually take place. Military technology and military strategy have been globalizing this space and thus blurring the line between *inside* and *outside*. Social science theories in this field still lag behind, for "they are explicitly concerned with the politics of boundaries. They seek to explain and offer advice about the security and transgression of borders between established forms of order and community inside and the realm of either danger (insecurity, war) or a more universally conceived humanity (peace world politics) outside" (Walker, 1993, p. 18).

The other dimensions of the globalization process (economy, ecology, and communication) provide ample illustration of the concept that our lives are firmly integrated in nets of decisions, actions, and developments all over the world. At this time there is no actor on the planet who can reasonably think he or she disposes of the necessary means to effectively protect his or her territory against influences from the outside (a territory is defined here as a sphere which "belongs" to an individual or collective actor). It is especially in this sense that I speak of the end of territoriality.

This recognition has considerable consequences. One of them leads us back to the current problems of international order. Nuclear weapons and their carrier systems demonstrated rather emphatically the emergence of a single global security landscape. Local wars of a "third kind" do not reverse this development; on the contrary. Violations of the local or regional peace can always escalate into threats to international security and order. Such escalations produce terror, misery, destruction, and death. They are also a permanent dark challenge to human dignity.

Security in the broader sense of the term has both a local and a global character. This is also true for those aspects of security where the military is involved. The organization of the armed forces is relatively expensive (and not only in terms of money and resources). The modern state, the basic element of the Westphalian system, was rather successful in monopolizing the business of organizing armed forces. Even after the era of European imperialism and colonialism came to an end, the dominant ideas and concepts about security and security landscapes were always defined through the perspectives of the concerned states' national interests.

The advent of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction changed this perception, but only in part. A nuclear war between East and West would have had devastating worldwide consequences. The potential global threat posed by nuclear and (to a lesser degree) also by biological and chemical weapons has survived the East–West conflict and is, albeit with a restricted urgency, still with us.

The wars of a "third kind" developed in the shadow of the nuclear confrontation. Mostly confined to a certain local or regional context they became slowly more and more

"international" because of the role of the media and because of the corresponding wish of the local actors to attract the world media's attention. This cycle started to develop in the 1950s. It was accompanied by the steadily growing tendency of local wars to break out of their narrow geography (e.g., by projecting acts of terrorism into the metropolitan areas on other continents and by collecting support wherever a group of partisans of the common cause was to be found). The global security landscape is therefore not just about superpowers and the consequences of their attacking each other with weapons of mass destruction. Instead, it has become the framework for all kinds of local political and military conflicts. Territorial containment of such conflicts is certainly not impossible, but the risk of horizontal escalation never goes away.

The considerably higher number of local wars and intrastate wars as compared with the number of traditional ("Westphalian") inter-state wars after 1990 taught us a lesson: Globalization breeds all kinds of conflicts which are easily turned into violent confrontations. These clashes have the potential to spill over to other regions. It is therefore absolutely reasonable, in a realist perspective, for the leading states of the international system to think about military intervention in the name of maintaining international order.

There is an unavoidable paradox here. In order to contain local wars or, even more usefully, to prevent the outbreak of such wars, an international security effort is necessary. Such an effort, e.g., in the framework of the rules and regulations in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, means the internationalization of this conflict or war. Territorial containment is not possible solely through regional actors but requires the involvement of important actors from outside the region.

This is the international or global aspect of the current debate about the possibilities and limits of military intervention. The history of such demands for interventions and/or executed interventions is not really encouraging. We know of many cases where this kind of collective action did not take off, did not take off in time, or did not provide the results hoped for. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with humanitarian interests are often busy trying to stabilize this unstructured public moral stance and transform it into governmental action. It is only fair to add that many NGOs are also working in those trouble areas, providing relief and often enough cooperation with the peacekeepers sent by the UN or other international coalitions.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE AHEAD?

Some political scientists contend that war and organized physical violence will disappear, once the state is replaced by other organizations (Krippendorff, 1985). A moderate version of this expectation is the assumption by military theorists and, for that matter, peace researchers that the era of large-scale interstate wars (mass wars) has definitely come to an end. Considering the many conflicts that may emerge as a consequence of scarce vital resources (like water), this may also be too optimistic an assumption.

Optimism is currently growing on different levels of the discourse on military violence and war. Some observers claim that democratic societies would have serious problems in mobilizing their citizens for the purpose of waging war if the enemy is also a democratic society. They conclude that the risk of war among authentic or well-established democracies is close to zero (Russett, 1993; Weard, 1998, p. 13). A democratic political system and, even more important, a democratic political culture keep organized violence at bay. To prove

this argument, different and sometimes slightly contradicting reasons are offered. Elman (1999, pp. 442–448) makes the distinction between the dyadic and the monadic vision of democratic peace. The dyadic vision asserts that democracies do not fight each other but develop peaceful mechanisms to solve clashes of interest between them. The monadic vision is more radical. Its proponents argue that true democracies are essentially peaceful. Both visions or observations, as their adherents prefer to say, are based on an anti-Hobbesian worldview. Once people have overcome the repressions of a predemocratic regime and are free to participate in defining their common interest in a state or another political unit, they will voluntarily abstain from violence. Organized violence in democracies is only useful as an instrument of defence and self-protection. When the number of true and well-established democracies in the international system is growing, the general level of organized violence in the system will decline.

The main problem with this assertion is that it rests on many uncertainties. One of them is the definition of *true* or *well-established democracy.* Among the nearly 200 states of the current international system, only a minority can be regarded as democracies, and even apparently well-established democracies are never safe against antidemocratic developments. It would be naive to believe in a kind of democratic teleology. When we observe the stable establishment of peace among nations who have previously met time and again on the battlefield, as in the case of France and Germany, we might add the democratic structures on both sides of the border to the list of reasons for this fortunate historic turn. But this is, of course, a very long list and comprises many other and probably more influential reasons. In short, democratization of the international system, in case it really occurs and does not remain a post-Cold War myth, is hardly making international politics more peaceful. In fact, organized violence is often legitimized in the name of democratization. International politics in the 21st century will most certainly see nothing resembling democratic peace. This implies that any student of this issue will have to come to terms with the employment of organized violence and its impact on local, regional, and international order.

NEW MISSIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Democratic peace may be a utopian concept. But the military element of a modern state's security policy is undeniably embedded in a larger set of nonmilitary doctrines in the pursuit and protection of national interests in the international system: "In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important" (Nye, 1990, p. 179). This assessment is probably too general with regards to both the past and the present situation. It serves, however, as a reasonable point of departure for a quest into the current attempts on the international political theatre to arrange for a new and hopefully somewhat more humane order of violence. If it is futile to think of the abolition of organized violence in politics, it is all the more necessary to search for a legal and political framework which channels organized violence so that its damages are contained. In other words, we have to analyze the political conflicts in the current process of globalization (*descriptive level*). We must also design the institutional conditions to minimize the temptation of escalating these conflicts within the military sphere or to effectively deescalate military conflicts. Such processes of deescalation and peacekeeping must be legitimized by the international community (*prescriptive level*).

The combined wisdom of military strategists and sociologists indicates the following developments:

1. The era of mass army warfare between states seems to have come to an end.
2. The kind of war which will be most frequent in the years ahead will be a small, mostly intrastate, kind of war.
3. The violence in such wars is fueled by the enormous energy of collective (ethnic, religious) hatred. Face-to-face killing with primitive weapons is combined with the use of sophisticated armaments and equipment. Terrorism on both the local and the international levels is used as a tool to gain attention, to collect resources, and to deepen insecurity.
4. Far-reaching horizontal escalation of local wars is always possible within a very short period of time.
5. The international media act as magnifiers or minimizers of local wars. The globalization of the media and the mobilizing power of their reports on atrocities against human beings also generates a fragile and superficial, but sometimes highly emotional, determination in the people of other countries to provide humanitarian relief to the victims and to punish the perpetrators. The media do not cover all such conflicts; some conflicts are simply overlooked. Whether the first or the second effect is chosen depends also on internal media constraints.
6. Postindustrial societies like the Western countries, other industrialized countries, and the developing countries of the formerly so-called Third World are entangled in networks of (asymmetric) interdependencies. With the exeption of few economic sectors, these societies suffer from war and organized violence in the international system.
7. Western countries express a strong material interest in the maintenance of international peace and order. This material interest is compatible with an idealistic (moral) interest in containing misery and suppression.
8. The armed forces of many countries have entered a process of deep structural change which allows for a broader range of military missions—not only the traditional missions of deterrence and defence, but also missions of conflict deescalation in order to reinstall peace and order.

VIOLENCE AND ORDER

Among human beings, violence is ubiquitous. Violence in its virtual and real forms indicates the fragility of any web of order for a group or society. In social and political relations, violence does not mark the breakdown of order, but functions as an important part of it. Only eruptive and spontaneous violence endangers the existing order, and if it is not contained, it may well cause fatal damage to it.

Containing violence is one of the permanent challenges for social organizations which organize the collective survival of people (families, clans, communities, and states). The modern territorial state is unthinkable without its successful claim on the monopoly of legitimized violence. It is only with this concentration and organization of violence that the latent violence between individuals and groups within a state can be controlled, channeled, and defused.

Organized violence between states is deeply embedded in the structure of international systems. An international system is not viable without a minimum of order which is accepted by the member states. Ideally, the acceptance of an international system permanently increases and thus expands the quantity and quality of codes, norms, rules, and regulations for the international behavior of the member states. One of the aims of such a process is to minimize organized inter-state violence.

In a functioning state, organized violence is concentrated in public organizations like the police, the gendarmerie, and the armed forces. The emergence of organized violence

outside the public sphere is an indicator of problems of legitimization which the state has to face. In an international system, which is nearly exclusively state-centerd, organized violence is a phenomenon between states only. International systems have never been exclusively state-centered, and especially today, the current international system is characterized by a growing number of nonstate actors. The future of the modern state is seen, at least by some observers, in rather bleak terms. Some of them (van Creveld, 1999) predict the decline and fall of the state both as the dominant actor in international relations and as the controller of violence.

Other observers prefer a brighter future for the state or the development of international relations. Democratic societies neither want nor need organized violence to flourish (Weard, 1998). They expect a democratization of the international system. Democratic structures within a state function as a great incentive for the strengthening of peaceful and nonviolent means of communication with other states. Trading states are basically nonmilitary states. These two perspectives seem to represent the two extremes of the spectrum. They contradict each other, but their proponents can find some empirical data which support their views.

A third perspective on the future of organized violence tries to combine the other two and to emphasize the enormous difficulties emerging from the current leap of globalization for the current international system. The rearrangement of the international system not only on the state-centered, but also on the nonstate, level encourages all kinds of violent moves. It is therefore necessary to expand and to strenghten the international acceptance of an order of violence which concentrates on two aims. First, it is to minimize the amount of organized violence in the international systems by an array of measures ranging from arms control and partial disarmanent to peaceful settlements of conflicts and incentives for nonviolent behavior. Second, it is to punish the deviant behavior of ousiders and *rogue* actors with military means which are both effective and based on a multinational consent. For the international order of violence is, more than ever before, a concern of the global community.

CHAPTER 6

The Military and the Use of Force

Corporate Interests and War

THOMAS LINDEMANN AND MICHEL LOUIS MARTIN

The differentiation between political and military functions was institutionalized at the end of the 18th century, and since that time the way the military[1] relates to the application of force and war has been lengthily debated. Discussions were initiated by scholars such as Tocqueville and ideologues such as Jaurès or Liebknecht and continued into the early 20th century with historians such as Delbrück and Vagts and political scientists such as Mosca and Lasswell. They became more systematic with the development of "military sociology" by Andreski, Janowitz, and Huntington and "security studies," notably by Allison and Betts and many others recently in light of civil–military relations in the post-Cold War period.

All try to answer the question by taking into account either the nature of military personality or that of the institution proper. For some, the military, when it does not exhibit belligerent traits, is seen as naturally prone to alarmism and the defence of various postures that could lead to war. For others, on the contrary, the military is considered more circumspect than civilians in the area of international security, aware first of its hazardous nature and second of the consequences of any unconditional use of force for their own personal and professional interests as well as for society.

The purpose of the present chapter is modest. It does not seek to bring forth new evidence, only to perhaps put the existing information in perspective (in view of a more detailed study). Rather than trying to evaluate the weight of corporate interests, it points out that the link of such interests with the advocacy of force is complex and is affected by various extraneous conditions while the relation seems more immediate with offensive-oriented doctrines and alarmist assessments, two war-connected factors.

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[1] This voluntarily vague term encompasses all of those who, by their functions or ranks, are able to influence, directly or obliquely, the decision-making process regarding military affairs; essentially, senior officers.

It ought be said, in terms of relevance, that though its primacy in inter-state relations seems challenged by more constabulary techniques, the use of force remains the ultimate function of the military, whose concern with the upper end of the destructive continuum is still central. Moreover, in numerous countries (Pakistan, Russia, China, and the Middle East), the military establishment constitutes a powerful sociopolitical and economic operator, and in Latin America or Africa, it is always in position to assert its point of view.

MILITARY INTERESTS AND WAR

The Weberian ideal of modern bureaucracy as a neutral agency whose actors would be devoted entirely to the realization of purely objective ends formulated by the parent political institution is a pedagogical tool intended to present an ideal while at the same time deemphasizing a more complex reality. And as any other organization, the military, often considered the epitome of bureaucratic development, functions according to modalities in which the superior interests that are supposed to justify its *raison d'être*—national security and defence—are rivaled and penetrated, if not invaded, by some of its members, collectively or individually, preoccupied equally by prestige, resources, and power (Schumpeter, 1953).

For or Against the Use of Force

In terms of corporate interests, war seems to offer plentiful opportunities for the military. Even the simple prospect of a conflict is likely to afford the armed forces with renewed means and resources, and for its members it is a factor that enhances their social as well as political status. When the confrontation is engaged, the political powers that be, if they do not want to be accused of jeopardizing the nation's survival, feels obliged to pay greater attention to the military's demands, voiced in material and financial terms as well as in terms of political autonomy. Further, critics of the armed forces would then be prevented from organizing themselves, since they would be considered agents at the service of the enemy. In some cases, such as in Wilhelmian Germany or in France at the beginning of World War I (Craig, 1955; King, 1957), war favored even the autonomy of the military and sometimes a prolonged war could allow the military to take over. A victorious war demonstrates the "centrality" of the military as guardians of the nation and thus reinforces its prestige and social position, such as it was the case of the Prussian military after its victories against Denmark, Austria, and France at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century.

The nature of the political regime does not always change this situation, as authoritarian and democratic systems, even if they dominate their military establishment, are both tributary to its expertise and hence often in position to make its viewpoint prevail; during the Cold War, the American military had generally exaggerated the Soviet threat to justify their budgetary demands, feeding in turn the arms race (Allison, 1974). Preoccupations with corporate interests could also lead to war; for some, the U.S. engagement in Vietnam was partially linked to the military interest in increasing their appropriations (Galbraith, 1969).

However, the argument also works the other way around and the defence of corporate interests could be equally seen as leading the military to resist, and even oppose, the application of force. Officers in particular form the group which has the most to lose in a conflict in case of defeat, not so much from a human point of view, since it is their vocation, but from an organizational standpoint (Cohen, 1998). The notorious reluctance of the U.S. military to use force in the post-Cold War period resulted from organizational disintegration induced

by the Vietnam war (Petraeus, 1989), and, for that matter, led to a doctrinal refurbishing, and stringently controlled military intervention and use of force (Campbell, 1998). Though other reasons intervened, it remains that in general (there are very few exceptions), military establishments in Latin America and North and Sub-Saharan Africa have not encouraged the use of force against another state.

More conscious about the detrimental effects of war, the military would be far more reluctant to apply force, if not more pacifist, than civilians. Actually, their endemic unsatifaction with the means at their disposal and search for alternate solutions became the institutional goal and in the end a substitute to warfare; but it was seldom argued that increased armaments make war practical or desirable (Betts, 1977; Huntington, 1957).

Moreover, if the vocation of the soldier includes dying for his country, this does not signify that he is ready to do so under any conditions. Rationality, individualism, and other "postheroic" trends linked to increasing prosperity have deepened this feeling (Luttwak, 1994; Keagan, 1997). The American Army, for example, was reluctant to get involved any ground operations in Iraq and Kosovo because it would be the one to sustain heavy casualties (Holland, 1999). Last, when the military occupies power, the chances of going to war are even smaller, obviously because its eminent position, which facilitates the satisfaction of corporate interests, could be at stake in case of a defeat. In this regard, the Falklands War, declared by General Galtieri, head of the Argentinean military junta, in 1982 is an exception which is explained, as is shown, by other considerations.

Actually, these two viewpoints are contradictory only in appearance. Benefits of war exist simultaneously with costs. Preferences for or against depend on specific conditions. The nature of the prospective conflict, for instance, is an important one. The military will tend to convince civilians not to go at war when they believe that only limited means will be used and would argue, should they consider themselves fully armed and prepared, for a full-fledged application of force. The reluctance to engage in limited war, as has been the case with the initial opposition of Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf to intervene in Iraq and General Powell again in Bosnia, proceeds not from a pacifist stance but coincides with their corporate interests, as in limited war military operations are likely to be more closely monitored by civilians concerned with avoiding further escalation (Avant, 1996/1997; Feaver, 1996).

Threats on Corporate Interests

Logically then, when it is satisfied by the *status quo*, the military will probably abstain from pleading for the use of force, while it will more certainly be tempted to do so should its corporate interests be threatened. The threat can have an internal or an external origin. So, the military will be inclined to advocate the use of force in a climate of "contested institutions," for instance, during a political transition or if emerging political forces question the rules of the political game (Dassel, 1998). War offers the armed forces an opportunity to weaken opposition groups. It should be noted that war is the preferred option when the military has no other means to protect its interests, notably if a *coup d'état* is not foreseeable (because of internal divisions in the military or probable opposition of the opinion). Similarly, given the fact that in medium or minor powers, armed forces are generally lesser institutions, the military will tend to react when the prestige of their country is or risks declining. War will then be a strategic choice either to prevent or alleviate such a possibility.

There is no lack of illustrations. It was when the Argentinean junta led by General Galtieri became criticized and contested by various democratic movements that it decided to confront the United Kingdom over the Falklands' sovereignty and succeeded in mobilizing

the support of the whole nation, even of groups heretofore against him (Abós, 1984). The Indonesian military's mounting animosity against Malaysia was related to the growing fragility of the Sukarno regime, besieged by a powerful Communist party which questioned the military's numerous amenities (Hindley, 1964). The Prussian military's aggressive views in European affairs before 1914 has its origins in the rise of social-democrats in the *Reichstag* and the growing recruitment of commoners in the officer corps; for most of them, war would offer the opportunity to save traditional values, as well as their class interests (Fischer, 1977). The bellicosity of the Japanese military in the 1930s was similarly fueled by perceived internal threats. By the end of 1920s, the authority of Meiji regime was less absolute and new groups were claiming both its democratization and the subordination of the armed forces to civilians. Internal rivalries, interservices feuds, notably between the Navy and the Army, further fed military unrest, each branch seeking hegemony over the defence system (Maxon, 1957). Very certainly, it will be imperative, in any case politically wise, to insure, given their present status, the military establishments of China or North Korea adequate compensations and corporate guaranties should these countries decide to engage in political reforms without risking war-mongering reactions from their armed forces (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).

The decline of a country's national prestige is also a source of aggressiveness from the part of the military, which will tend to oppose any policy perceived as weakening the country and even advocate the use of force or, if opportunity exists or the geopolitical context permits, to take initiative in operations they judge as contributing to that prestige. The colonial "adventurism" of French *troupes de marine* in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period which followed their 1870 defeat can be explained in this way. Similarly, it was the perception of France's international downgrading in the make of the defeat of 1940 and later that of Dien Bien Phu in Indochina which drove the military not only to oppose the decolonization of Algeria, but also to escalate the conflict against rebellious forces of the National Liberation Front, taking, for example, the unhappy initiative to bomb Sakiet Sidi Youssef in February 1958 (Cohen, 1994) after having warned President René Coty that it would not tolerate any capitulation (Duroselle, 1990).

Conversely, satisfaction with the *status quo* seems to induce more peaceful behavior. This is especially true in praetorian situations when the military occupies power (Andreski, 1992; Bienen, 1985). After General Suharto's coup, the Indonesian military became conciliatory with Malaysia to the point of participating in the setup of ASEAN in 1967, a peaceful attitude which was also that of the three Latin American rivals, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (Dassel, 1998; Passarelli, 1998). This type of situation not only allows the military to cope with any corporate grievances, but also renders it ill-adapted to conventional interstate conflicts since, generally, when occupying political power, its operational capacities are reoriented toward domestic missions.

Checks to the Bellicose Expression of Corporate Interests

If the military's attitude toward the application of force is related to sensitivity about corporate interests, its actual expression depends on other variables, such as the autonomy of the institution, the means at its disposal, its cohesion, and the international environment.

Recent and widespread political changes, under the form of democratic transitions, at least of authoritarian unwinding, have undoubtedly frustrated the corporate interests of many military establishments around the world. Yet it was without any major consequences,

since all these transitions have operated rather pacifically (at least at the inter-state level). In some cases, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, this was due to the role of Western European states, Russia, and the United States. In other cases, this is simply due to the lack of resources. In Latin America, these resources not only had been converted for domestic tasks, but in general they were rather weak. At the end of the 1980s, defence expenditures reached 1.3% of the GNP (Sanchez, 1994). The African military was in an even more dire situation (Martin, 1997).

The military institutions of major powers seem, in principle, to have more possibilities to act. However, should they be ready to do so, even well-equipped ones are often likely to be confronted by a number of difficulties. These can be organizational or moral. The lack of enthusiasm among French officers to deepen involvement in Indochina is partly linked to their poor cohesion at the time (La Gorce, 1963), a situation which is similar to that of the Russian military on the eve of the first Chechnya War, with prestigious generals, such as Lebed and Gromov, warning the Douma against the difficulties of such an intervention (Novitchkov *et al.*, 1995).

Strong and legitimate civilian control of the military is another obstacle for the belligerent expression of corporate frustrations. Despite important restrictions in defence budgets of most Western nations after 1989, there was no protest expressed in such terms among armed forces. This certainly relates to the political strength of civilians to impose their decisions. An assertive political power, as that of the French Fifth Republic, facilitates the dismissal or the pushing aside of dissenting voices. The selection of key military authorities, notably the armed forces chief of staff, is an efficient means to maintain "ideological" discipline in the ranks. And should civilians show their determination, they discover that "conservatism and corporatism make room for a sometime surprising plasticity" (Cohen, 1994).

A continuously assertive political power can even go as far as "civilianizing" the military. A well-targeted recruiting policy, the "politicization" of certain top leadership, and "civic" teaching, together with the instillation of a "debellicized" vision of the world (the *Innere Führung* concept is a good illustration thereof), are subjective means which will inevitably transform the culture of the military and bring it closer to mirroring society. Thus, military institutions, notably in democratic regimes, tend to avoid advocating the application of force not only because of the constraints of civilian control but also because they have interiorized the pacific norms of the parent societies (Berger, 1996) and developed a "reconstructed" civilianized posture. Restrictions in the use of force could then be the result of a genuine culture of restraint inside the ranks, the best examples of which are the German (Pajon, 2001) and the Japanese military (Buck, 1975) and those developed today in Eastern Europe (Danopoulos and Zirker, 1999) and Vietnam (Hervouet and Thayer, 2001). In such a system of subjective control, the civil–military differentiation is weakened, even made "concordant" (Schiff, 1995)—the ideal of which is the "citizen-soldier"—and it is why corporate considerations play only a marginal role.

In any case, the professional expertise of the military operates as a further check to any unrealistic advocacy of force by politicians; so quite often the military has a pacifying impact on the civilian appreciation of a given strategic situation. A recent study on the Pakistani military shows that it has often opposed the use of force against India (twice in 1947 and once in 1951, over Kashmir), whereas civilians were favorable to it (Schofield, 2000). Their pacific stance was for that matter exclusively motivated by tactical reasons (the superiority of the Indian forces) and they were therefore concerned about initiating such a confrontation. The opposition by a number of German generals against Hitler's adventurist policy results from a more realistic strategic appreciation than that of the regime. The corporatism of a

submissive military institution operates therefore in a moderating sense; it cannot decide war, but because of its expertise, it is able to dissuade the civilians to do so.

In sum, military corporate interests, autonomy, resources, and prestige are often threatened by internal and domestic (e.g., political transitions and budgetary restrictions) or external (e.g., loss of areas of influence) changes, and when the military institution is sufficiently strong (in terms of resources) and differentiated from civilian power, the military will be inclined to favor and request the use of force. Conversely, when their social position is stable or when they are torn by contradictory currents, in reorganization, or weakened, they will be more hesitant to engage in war.

The link between corporate interests and military proneness to war is therefore complex and not very easy to assess in general, as they include a large number of intervening variables. It has no global value, insofar as it does not pretend that military favor war more systematically than civilians. Grand theories in this area are empirically fragile. To postulate the pacific character of the military from the U.S. case would be as excessive as deducting its bellicose character after the Prussian case. Military preferences are always contingent to a wide range of conditions.

CORPORATE INTERESTS, OFFENSIVE-BASED DOCTRINES, AND ALARMISM

If the relationship between military corporate interests and proneness to war is difficult to predict, there are, however, other characteristics of the military which are more directly articulated with their interests and more likely to open onto war. These include their preferences for offensive-oriented doctrines and their tendency to alarmism.

Offensive-Oriented Doctrines as a Corporate Strategy

The reasons why offensive doctrines fit military corporate interests are numerous and familiar enough not to be detailed. First, they present psychological and moral advantages to the point of being commonly exalted as an integral component of the warrior's culture (Lindemann, 2001). They greatly enhance the prestige and the self-esteem of the armed forces, feeding at the same time a feeling of superiority against the enemy. Offensive-based warfare is viewed as the only path to a decisive victory, while in defensive-based warfare there is the connotation that the adversary cannot be crushed. Furthermore, offensive-based warfare is seen as providing a rationale for military action and as such it serves to structure the organization. Its French advocates, such as General Foch and Colonel de Grandmaison, were inspired not only by Napoleonic tradition and other philosophies of action, but also by the fear that a purely defensive strategy would jeopardize troops' morale and dampen commanders' stamina and leadership (Ortolani, 2002).

Somehow defensive-based warfare also implies a devaluation of the military, since a protracted and indecisive war is a poorly attractive option, likely to lessen the status of military institution. Offensive-based options, on the other hand, carry the promise of short decisive confrontations, which in turn offer the proof that investment in the military is worthwhile (Snyder, 1984a). The Wilhelmian military establishment was keenly aware that its prestige derived from the swift victories against Denmark, Austria, and France, hence its interest in putting into work the Schlieffen plan (Ritter, 1956; Lindemann, 1998).

The ambiguous view of nuclear deterrence, particularly in ground forces, was fed partly by the corporate frustrations it was perceived to create. Fewer combat opportunities contribute undoubtedly to status devaluation, the feeling that strategic efficiency will henceforth be derived from the credibility of political power and no longer from the capabilities and the merit of the armed forces. In the "nuclearized" French defense, for example, the Army has no other functions than to serve as a "warning" before using nuclear retaliation (Martin, 1981). This "no-battle" prospect induced a strong feeling of frustration among young senior officers in combat units, especially, which was expressed in various propoposals advocating other options, alongside or in place of nuclear deterrence, aimed at reinstating an offensive role for the Army, under conventional forms or not (Martinot-Leroy, 1999). The Soviet military attachment to the concept of victory through a battle of annihilation (Garthoff, 1953; Sokolovski, 1963), together with its earlier reluctance for nuclear deterrence, proceeds from the same feeling. The interest of the U.S. and Soviet military for an antimissile defence could also be interpreted as being an indirect means to reenter the offensive option through the first strike.

To prestige and positive self-image, offensive-based doctrines have obvious material and organizational advantages, guaranteeing the well-being of the institution and its members. They evidently call for larger resources than defensive postures, since the task of conquest and destruction, they suppose, is more difficult to fulfill than that of preserving resources which suppose logistical and technological know-how only possessed by the military.

Moreover, as any other large bureaucratic organization, the military develops "organizational routines," establishing typical procedures to manage standard situations (Allison and Halperin, 1974). Such routines, or standard operating procedures, allow a large number of average individuals to treat, without excessive effort and investment, a large number of cases. They also respond to the exigency for establishing some discipline and predictability in the conduct of military operations. Offensive-based doctrines are precisely adapted to the organizational need for reducing uncertainty and program standardized scenarios. The Schlieffen plan, in which defeat of the French was programmed for the 6th week, is an example, though military rigidity should not be exaggerated (Förster, 1995). Moreover, in war, being competitive by its essence, the initiator has the advantage of fighting on in its own terms, whereas defenders are obligated to be flexible and adapt to strategies of the adversary (Posen, 1984).

It should be said, however, that this link between a military inclination for offence-based doctrines and the satisfaction of corporate interests could be affected under certain conditions. Cultural or institutional factors have sometimes modified military preferences for offensive-based doctrine. The French military attachment to a defence-oriented strategy in the 1930s has been interpreted as its reluctance to use short-term conscripts for anything else than defence against Germans (Kier, 1995). The British defensive-based (and successful) tactics in Burma, in contrast to the more offence-based American ones in Vietnam, would be related to the nature of the political regime (Avant, 1994).

Offensive-Oriented Doctrines and Civilian Control

It is true, indeed, that firm political control can affect the logic between corporate interests and offensive-based warfare, but its assertiveness is linked less to the nature of the constitutional power structure, which is very diversified along the parliamentary/presidential continuum (Shugart and Carey, 1992), than, for example, to the dominant type of warfare

technology. There is little doubt that the centrality of nuclear weaponry in modern defence systems has considerably "civilianized" their management by facilitating the reinforcement and the thoroughness of political control, given the nature of the system of threat entailed.

Prenuclear periods were characterized by various forms of civil–military balance. Yet the military had always some margin of autonomy. Before World War I, when the military enjoyed a good deal of autonomy, all European military staffs used elaborate offensive-based plans. Even when it was admitted that decisions concerning war and peace were in the exclusive domain of civilians, the preparation and the conduct of war nevertheless belonged unquestionably to the military realm (Ritter, 1965), hence the multiplication of offence-based doctrines and regulations and, conversely, the disinterest for defensive options. An offensive-oriented doctrine, given its technical complexity, has the advantage for the military of preserving its autonomy with regard to civilian interference, far more than defensive strategies, which are technically more amenable to civilian monitoring (Snyder, 1984b).

Given the considerable risks induced in cases of uncontrolled confrontations, nuclear technology led to the development of a more assertive civilian control on strategic options and military plans, generally defence-oriented, which, in any case, they are able to master more easily than those related to conventional offensive doctrines. The features, technical and intellectual, of nuclear weaponry, its use, and the threat system it generates are fairly accessible to civilians. Actually, the concept of deterrence is a largely nonmilitary product, elaborated on and refined in the United States by thinkers and politicians such as Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, and Henry Kissinger.

Nuclear defence, so to speak, invalidates military power. It entails a quasi-automatic deepening of civilian control which gradually encompasses even strictly conventional aspects. The French doctrine of deterrence, for example, is exemplary in its tight integration of conventional echelons to nuclear tactical and strategic levels; even smaller overseas post-colonial operations are monitored by the political power. In this case, nuclear deterrence allowed the head of state to wield its power not only over the military, but also over the whole state system (Chantebout, 1986), giving France the look of a "nuclear monarchy." In the Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence has further intensified a military subordination already insured by Communist modes of subjective control (Colton, 1979). The above-mentioned reluctance of French and Soviet officers to use nuclear deterrence and their inclination toward a more active defence also stemmed from their need to escape the civilian assertiveness such a type of defence implies, hence the search by political powers to exclude once and for all potentially destabilizing offensive options via the arms control and the ABM treaty (Klein, 1991).

The end of the Cold War era might change this situation by giving more autonomy to the military (Snider & Carlton-Carew, 1995). With the decreasing centrality of nuclear weaponry, the military seems again in a position to intervene in the area of doctrinal choices. In this regard, it could be suggested that the new missile defence policy recently developed in the United States appears to be the rehabilitation of an offensive-based strategic option. Even if it functioned only partially, it would indeed allow the military to foresee a preemptive strike in case of an acute crisis with a secondary nuclear power, and the country would then be protected from an "assured destruction." Though this is largely theoretical, a missile defence system could signify the reluctance of the military to function in a purely defensive wait-and-see posture. Indeed, the precise role of the U.S. military with regard to this program ought be carefully explored. But it has strongly supported it and since it has successfully

convinced civilians of the possibility of threat from rogue states, its status has reinforced (Blin, 2000).

Corporate Interests and Alarmism

A last dimension of the linkage between corporate interests and war is the military predisposition to alarmism. This tendency is professionally built in and linked to the primacy given to the preservation of national security. Concentration over the various aspects of this mission tends to induce a number of professional deformations materialized by a state-centered and Hobbesian perception of international politics, which in turn encourages nationalism and prevents empathy toward other nations (White, 1970; Booth, 1979). Moreover, the functional requirements of discipline and clarity, the habit of conforming to orders, and the need for well-defined missions reinforce this somewhat "autistic" inclination, notably, problems with questioning "certitudes," among which is the fearful and hateful character of the enemy (Swomley, 1964). This demonization is facilitated by the licence to kill given to soldiers, as it is easier to eliminate a dehumanized adversary.

This obsessive concern with threats, which are always magnified and perceived as pending, and the functional demand to be prepared to the worst, feed a continuous implicit dissatisfaction with existing troop and equipment levels. Alarmism, therefore, is another cognitive mechanism by which an institution structures its members' perceptions of their environment, resulting in "perspective effects" (Boudon, 1992), and predisposes them, in the case of the military, to excessive and selective attention to security affairs. Of course, it tends to vary according to different factors, civil–military relations, the nature of political regimes, and so on, but also according to the members' positions in the hierarchy—it is higher among senior officers (Abrahamsson, 1972) or older officers as shown by a recent survey of Chinese officers (Shambaugh, 1999/2000).

Yet often the military also uses such perceptions to consolidate their corporate interests, even if it means exaggerating them. Alfred Vagts (1958) provided numerous examples of what amounts to a "military protection racket" (Feaver, 1996). Corporate interests were at odds with both professional and objective threats assessments of the U.S. military's capabilities during the Cold War and the Vietnam War (Galbraith, 1969; Allison, 1974). Eastern military establishments, the Soviet one especially, purposefully overestimated the Western nuclear buildup not only to obtain higher defence appropriations, but also to strengthen discipline through a mobilization of the minds. Gross overestimation of Iraqi forces by the U.S. Army was partly linked to its advocacy for the use of overwhelming force that would give it victory in the battle.

There have even been cases of purely fabricated or imagined threats. During the Franco-Austrian war of 1859, the British Navy, in order to increase the number of battleships, attempted to persuade Prime Minister Lord Palmerston of a French landing near Brighton and a possible attack on Portsmouth. In the 1920s again, and despite the good relationship between England and France, the British military warned the government about a naval French clandestine landing of troops on England's coast (Carver, 1998).

Some aspects of the situation of the U.S. military in the post-Cold War period could be understood through this linkage between alarmism and corporate interests. The U.S. defence expenditures for financial year 2003 will be comparable to Cold War budgets and higher than those of the European Union members together. Despite the vanishing Soviet threat, the U.S. military budget remained relatively stable after a period of transition, and arms

production is still running high (Gholz and Sapolsky, 1999/2000). This evolution coincides with the elaboration of a new threat system based on "asymmetry," with its new villains, the rogue states, sheltering terrorist organizations and constituting a nuclear danger.

The so-called zero-dead war doctrine could also be interpreted in this light. If casualty aversion could be linked to the rise of individualism and prosperity, as already mentioned, its satisfaction goes along with military corporate interests. Its being put into practice requires a formidable investment in technologically advanced equipment and weaponry, vastly superior to those of any adversary. A recent revision of the *Bottom-up Review* clearly indicates that the United States wishes to be able to face all possible hypotheses, since they should be capable of conducting simultaneous operations in several different theatres of war. Thus, extensive definitions of security and doctrines such as the zero-dead offer unprecedented prospects of resources for the military.

Offensive-Based Doctrines, Alarmism, and War

Offensive-based doctrines and spirit as well as alarmism are undoubtedly connected to the use of force, but interestingly more or less so in the minds of the military. The link between offensive-based doctrines and war has been amply demonstrated (Van Evera, 1999; Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984a). Actually, offensive-based doctrines even tend to precipitate war, especially when engaged with mobile modern equipment, given the advantage to surprise the adversary, preempt its attempts to protect itself, or enhance its capacities to react (Lebow, 1981; George, 1991). In 1914, the German military pushed the engagement for fear that the continuing improvement of railways in Russia would compromise the Schlieffen plan, which postulated a slow mobilization in this country. The 1940 attack in the Ardennes, the Pearl Harbor bombardment, and the Six-Day War proceeded from that logic. Offensive-based plans always imply the risk of waging an initially unwanted yet ultimately opted for war because of the threat of technical imperative not to compromise the success of military operations based on surprise and swiftness.

Moreover, the ideology of offensive-based doctrines which continue to operate once conflicts are engaged tends to lead to escalation. The need for swift decisive action induces an all-out application of force which can result in unwanted secondary wars, for example, if outside powers refuse the defeat of the assailed state or when their trading interests are jeopardized (cf. The Spanish–American War in 1898, the entry of the United States against Germany in 1917 and against the Chinese in Korea in 1950). The second Chechnya War in 1999 is a result of the brutal handling of the first one by Russian troops in 1994–1996.

Alarmism also relates to war. It leads to an exaggeration of the adversary's hostility, while contributing to its demonization; it justifies the use of force as soon as the balance is favorable. The Six-Day War in 1967 is a case in point. The so-called domino theory put forth by the military induced American civilian leadership to take a belligerent posture in Vietnam. But the nature of the linkage between alarmism and the use of force is more complex than that between offensive-based doctrines and war. Alarmism, if expressed in too excessive a fashion, can even have reversed effects. In fact it is the overstatement of enemy's intentions rather than that of its equipment which has this effect. To evaluate an adversary as militarily stronger than it really is could eventually dissuade engaging it. The examination of Prussian military objectives for a preventive war against Russia (1871–1892) shows that General Waldersee's and his staff's obsession with Russia's bellicosity led them to demand, at the end of the 1880s, a punitive action, while civilian power with

Bismarck was concerned with preventing the formation of a Franco-Russian alliance and succeeded by signing a treaty of reassurance with Russia in 1887. Yet, in the end, alarmism, which favors corporate demands (as, for instance, during the vote for the defence budget at the Reichstag), did not directly lead to war, but it nevertheless favored the rapprochement between France and Russia, as Prussia's military succeeded later in convincing Bismarck to instate economic sanctions against Russians. The British Navy's warning of a possible French landing in England in order to procure reinforcements for Portsmouth's surroundings served no purpose whatsoever.

Another example is the role of the military in the decision to use the atomic bomb in Japan in August 1945. Military authorities were at the time in charge of estimating American losses in case of an invasion of Japan. In communicating a largely exaggerated evaluation—between half a million and a million men, whereas in reality it would have been 50,000—the American military profoundly influenced the decision to use the atomic bomb (Alperovitz, 1995). This estimate was based on the doubtful belief that, upon an American invasion, the entire Japanese population would rise up to defend the empire. Some generals even went so far as to affirm that there would be no distinction between civilian and military and saw enemies everywhere.

In sum, even though offensive-oriented ideologies and doctrines as well as alarmist postures constitute objective correlates of war, the military does not seem as aware of it as civilians; this explains perhaps why it tends to favor offense and to be alarmist rather than advocate war in order to defend its corporate interests.

CONCLUSION

Among the various correlates of the use of force and war waging, those related to the military establishment are critical, an issue generally somewhat neglected. Some of them are related to the logic of bureaucratic functioning, as for example, interservice rivalries or the composite effect of various local rationalities or perceptions. Others are linked to corporate interests and conditions which favor their expression, their satisfaction, and their frustration, or, on the contrary, which mitigate their effects on the advocacy of force by the military.

This is the perspective proposed here, and one that is generally less often developed. The analysis did not pretend to be exhaustive at all. Simply, it intended to deal with the various theoretical and empirical contradictions inherent to the topic. It has no other claim than to suggest further reflection on an issue which, in any case, requires further empirical research.

CHAPTER 7

Military Mobilization in Modern Western Societies

JAMES BURK

All modern societies mobilize people to serve in the military. The question is how to do so. There are many possible institutional arrangements from which to choose, ranging from voluntary, local militia service to universal compulsory national service. Once made, the choice is consequential along at least three dimensions. It affects the prospects for winning war because the mobilization plan determines the size and affects the quality of the military force. It also affects formation of foreign policy because the mobilization plan presupposes a force structure and force structure determines the viability and variety of military options available for use in the conduct of foreign affairs. And it affects the way the military is integrated with—to influence and be influenced by—the society it is formed to protect, depending on who is drawn into military service and who is left behind. In this brief survey of military mobilization, it is shown that modern societies consider all three of these dimensions, war, geopolitics, and domestic political culture, when establishing institutional arrangements to raise a military for war. But they give these dimensions different weight at different times for reasons we have to explore.

My attention is confined to the national societies of Europe and North America whose military prowess since the 17th century has made their militaries a model for others to fear and to follow. It is further confined to the period beginning in the late 18th century and running to the present. It was in the late 18th century that aristocratic forms of military mobilization were first challenged by the invention of a mass armed force, raised by conscription and associated (though not exclusively) with democratic social movements. By the late 19th century through most of the 20th century, mobilization for a mass armed force was the dominant practice among European societies. But, over recent decades, beginning before and then accelerating after the end of the Cold War, mobilization for mass armed forces has given way to mobilization for an all-volunteer professional force.

Here then is the question this survey hopes to answer: What explains the long-term secular trend that sees the rise of mass armed forces at the expense of aristocratic forces and then the fall of mass armed forces in favor of all-volunteer professional forces? Is it a matter

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to be explained by the "imperatives of war"—assuming that the changing nature of war determines the kind of armed forces societies will raise? Is it explained by the "imperatives of geopolitics"—so that a country's size and place within a system of states so determines the conduct of foreign policy as virtually to impose the kind of military it must raise? Or is it explained rather by the "imperatives of political culture"—aristocratic, democratic, egalitarian, or liberal?[1] To raise the questions in this way is to pose the problem in a misleading way. While we can analytically distinguish these three dimensions as factors that influence how societies raise their armed forces, there is (as is shown) no reason to suppose that they operate independently of one another and even less reason to suppose that any one factor provides a complete explanation. Nevertheless, the last of these imperatives—the influence of political culture—is more important than customarily realized, not only for military organization but also for the way we think about the military in mature democratic societies.

The survey is divided into three parts. To begin, I offer a historical review of the trends in mobilization that are most important here. Next, I examine three theories that have tried to interpret these trends to explain why they have occurred and what their significance has been. To conclude, I briefly consider some implications of the decline of the mass armed force and the rise of all-volunteer forces for civil–military relations and the meaning of citizenship in democratic societies.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Throughout most of the 18th century, the armies of Europe were built on an aristocratic model. Standing armies of the crown, they were officered by members of the nobility, manifesting an integration of political and military elites. Elite integration worked to ensure the loyalty of the army to the crown as shared ties of land, family, and ideology forged an identity of interests between the military and the ruling class and brought about a "blending of the management of military and civil affairs" (Rosenberg, 1958, p. 38; Janowitz, 1977, p. 187; Hintze, 1975, p. 202).

Nevertheless, the military was not yet a national institution. It was a dynastic institution under the control of the crown. In Otto Hintze's (1975, pp. 199–200) words, while the army was the "backbone" of the centralizing state, it was still "a foreign body in the state." The old idea that all men were obligated to defend their community and its interests was not forgotten and was still in some cases relied on (as in the Swiss cantons), but it was not the principal justification for raising and maintaining a military and it figured little in military practice (Paret, 1992a, p. 55). Rulers were reluctant to put arms in the hands of their subjects, as they knew such a practice had egalitarian consequences that might undermine aristocratic dominance. Instead, the lowest ranking members of the realm—"the sweepings of city streets and sons of poverty-stricken peasants"—were pressed into the military's rank and file; or, better yet, foreign mercenaries were hired for the task (McNeill, 1982, p. 137; Howard, 1976).[2] These men were made into a disciplined and obedient fighting force by repeated drill.

[1] My language and way of framing these questions is borrowed from Cohen (1985), but should not be taken to represent his argument.

[2] Deborah Avant (2000: p. 46) notes that it was not only the crown that preferred to hire mercenaries rather than natives for the armed forces. Captains in the military "believed that mercenaries fought better than natives" and so they "preferred to furlough the natives and retain only the foreigners under arms."

By the end of the 18th century, this aristocratic model of military organization was challenged by another, borne of the democratic revolutions in America and France. The new revolutionary democratic model rested on an identification of the military with free citizens who served as citizen soldiers and were inspired (at least in theory) by "national enthusiasm and democratic ideas of liberty" (Hintze, 1975, p. 205). Like most revolutionary challenges, this one was not completely new but found precedent in past practice, nor was it completely triumphant over the aristocratic model as soon as it appeared.

The roots of the democratic model were sunk deep in the soil of ancient thought and practice in the city-states of Greece and Rome. Vivid in 18th century Enlightenment thought was the idea that those ancient republics drew strength from the willingness of male citizens to bear arms in their defense—and that the republics collapsed when that willingness waned.[3] Based on this ancient example and drawing on an early intimation that the state was a national political community, theorists began to consider the idea that all men who belonged to the community were citizens who were obligated to perform military service when called on by the state (Paret, 1992a, p. 56). Still, this was an idea that had little direct application before the American and French Revolutions, though (often feeble) militia systems in colonial North America and Europe helped preserve the idea of a community-based military obligation (Delbrück, 1990[1920], pp. 185–186, 236–237, p. 451).

What the American and French Revolutions effectively established was a format for a mass armed force based on the mobilization of citizens for military service. It conceived of the citizen-soldier as an individual ideal and of the nation of citizen-soldiers as a nation in arms. In the minds of many revolutionaries, the principle of universal obligatory military service by citizens was consistent with—even an embodiment of—a democratic regime (Janowitz, 1983a, p. 31; Paret, 1992b; Kestnbaum, 2000). The institution of conscription was the primary means by which this principle was implemented in practice. Conscription was a practical, not theoretical, requirement. Initially, compulsion was used to make citizens perform their military obligation only after volunteering to fight in war had flagged, demonstrating that national enthusiasm and patriotic sentiments were not enough, by themselves, to raise a military force of the size political elites believed was needed.[4] Yet, even when compelled, coupling civil and military obligations helped align state and individual interests as military service built "a stronger awareness of national community" (Paret, 1992b, p. 45).

Of course, the connection between compulsory military service and democratic regimes is precarious; it is certainly not necessary. There is a logical conflict between the democratic ideal of liberty that leaves citizens free to decide when and how they will perform military service and the ideal of egalitarianism that ensures that the burdens of maintaining a political community are equally shared among all members of the community (Cohen, 1985). Revolutionaries recognized the conflict. In 1789, while some revolutionaries in France thought every citizen should be a soldier and sought conscription to ensure it, others thought conscription was a "despotic method" and worried that "the spirit of liberty" was being invoked "to support a most obvious and cruel slavery" (Paret, 1992a, pp. 58–59).

[3] This was an important theme, for instance, in the writings of Adam Ferguson, Edward Gibbon, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Adam Smith. It was also an important idea in the earlier writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Pocock (1975) shows how this theme influenced political thought in America.

[4] For more on this point see Royster (1979) and Paret (1992a). Note that Britain was late to adopt the mass army model—not doing so until the middle of the First World War—and was, like the revolutionaries in the United States and France, moved to do so only after the volunteer system had collapsed. For the British case, see Adams and Poirier (1987).

American revolutionaries held similar doubts about conscription. Summarizing those doubts, Charles Royster (1979, p. 68) writes, "a standing army departed so far from the American ideal of personal freedom that they were unable, in conscience or in fact, to force a man to serve for as long as he was needed, even while they could explain why he ought to want to do so." In both cases, however, conscription was resorted to before the revolutions were done.

The French *levée en masse* was conducted on a much larger scale than any compulsory military service during the American Revolution and it had far greater historical importance as a model for others to follow. The *levée,* decreed in 1793, aimed to mobilize the entire French nation: young men for battle; married men for work forging arms and transporting provisions; old men to repair public places and preach the ideology of revolution; women to make tents and clothes and to serve in the hospitals; and children to turn old linen into lint (Ralston, 1966, p. 66). The military effect was dramatic. All unmarried men 18 to 25 were liable to be drafted and, as a result, by 1794 the French army grew to an enormous 770,000 men, giving France numerical superiority over the aristocratic mercenary armies it had to face (Delbrück 1990[1920], p. 396).

In theory, such a mass armed force of native citizens conferred an important military advantage over the smaller aristocratic armies of mercenaries. In practice the matter is not so clear. The Napoleonic wars did not provide a decisive test of the comparative worth of the aristocratic and mass army models. What can be said with certainty is that France's mass armed force represented a new pattern of direct rule between the government and its citizens, a pattern that, with respect to military manpower policies, would be copied in the future by other nations throughout the Western world (Tilly, 1990, pp. 107–114; Paret, 1992a, pp. 65–66).

The Prussians were the first to do so, in reaction to their defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.[5] It is often the case that military defeat paves the way for reform. In this case, there had already been a party of liberal reformers who sought to move away from the aristocratic military model to rely more heavily on native manpower. The reformers thought such a step would help address problems of manpower shortage that had arisen in part because of difficulties recruiting mercenaries in the midst of the Napoleonic wars. They also thought it good politics to end the isolation between the military and society, to mobilize the state and the people in pursuit of a national ideal. Not until after the defeats of 1806 could they persuade the king and others (liberal and conservative) to embrace their ideas. The reforms after all were untested, many doubted the wisdom of adopting a policy of conscription to raise a mass army, and the country was still under the thumb of France.

By 1813, after Napoleon's armies were destroyed in Russia, Prussia was free to adopt reforms allowing the creation of a mass army and, by this time, the political forces had shifted in favor of reform. With old barriers to the policy felled by "an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm," conscription for a national army of citizens was introduced (Howard, 1976, p. 87). The effects on force size were quickly apparent as the army grew from 60,000 in December 1812 to 270,000 by the fall of 1813. In addition, a reserve force of similar size was created, the *landwehr,* which permitted men to elect their own officers and "in which service was compulsory for all men of military age who were not called up into the army itself" (Howard, 1976, p. 87). Following the defeat of Napoleon, despite the absence of real military necessity for them, the reforms were made permanent in the army law of

[5]Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the Prussian reform movement draws on Posen (1993, pp. 95–99), Paret (1992a, pp. 68–72), and Avant (2000, pp. 59–63).

1814. But unlike the French system of the mass army, which was originally grounded in the aspirations of a revolutionary democratic social movement, the Prussian reforms were essentially conservative. While military service became a widely shared experience, that experience was under the firm control of the regular army, increased the dependence of the middle classes on the state, and reinforced the power of the crown and the landed nobility (Paret, 1992a, p. 72). The reformers were removed from positions of power, the *landwehr* were not well-trained, and the officer corps was once again the preserve of aristocrats (Howard, 1976, pp. 94–95).

This is not to deny that some social change had taken place. The reforms removed all foreigners from the army, turning the army into a national force; they overcame the division between warriors and citizens; and they made the state an object of interest for the rulers and the ruled. But the democratizing influence of these reforms was limited by making universal military service "an extension of the institution of the standing army" and ensuring that "the army owed allegiance to the Crown, not the [representative] constitution." This, of course, stands in sharp contrast with what happened in England after its revolution of 1688 (Hintze, 1975, pp. 206–209).

We might pause at this point in the historical narrative to note more precisely what we mean when we talk about a mass armed force. The term is ambiguous because it may refer to the size, homogeneity, or mobilization of the army. In fact it refers to all three (van Doorn, 1975). As we have seen, movement from an aristocratic to a mass army model results in a substantial increase in force size. More important is that the mass army is putatively homogeneous. This refers in part to the technological basis of military force, in which military experience is predominantly the experience of the combat infantry soldier. Sociologically more significant, it also refers to the state's reliance on native citizens to serve in the force and to the end of its use of mercenaries of various nationalities as soldiers in the army. This paves the way for wars between nations as opposed to dynastic wars between professionals (Howard, 1976). Most important, the mass army depends on the state's capacity to mobilize its people to fight in defense of the state. The capacity to do so is only partly administrative. It is also an ideological achievement that rests on the conversion of subjects into citizens. How this conversion is legitimated and institutionalized has important consequences for whether the mass armed force will be part of a democratic or authoritarian regime.[6]

Widespread adoption of the mass army model did not occur until after 1870. After the Napoleonic wars, almost every European country—France included—either maintained or returned to the aristocratic model of military organization. Mass armies briefly appeared on the field of battle in the United States, during its Civil War, but this experience did not influence manpower policies elsewhere, nor did it result immediately in the adoption of a mass army policy by the victorious Union forces once the Civil War was over. Only Prussia maintained a military system based on "extensive and nearly universal conscription of citizens" (Kestnbaum, 2002, p. 118), but its doing so seemed to confer no military

[6]This point requires more study than it has received. It is well-known that the French mass army, born in a democratic revolution, nevertheless was an instrument of an authoritarian regime, as was the mass army of Prussia. Talk of French or Prussian citizenship cannot alter the fact. In contrast, the army mobilized to fight the American Revolution was never a mass army—despite the use of conscription, it was a mixed force composed of a relatively small regular army augmented by militia. It never became an instrument of an authoritarian regime. On the contrary, the ideology of the citizen-soldier formed in that conflict helped to ensure that the political settlement following the revolution's success was a democratic one (Burk 2000). The open question is what accounts for these different outcomes.

advantage. Prussian troops had not performed well in combat against the Poles in 1831 and the Danes in 1848, nor did they provide effective support for the crown during the internal civil disturbances of 1848 (Posen, 1993, p. 103; Vagts, 1959, p. 191). Matters changed after 1857, when Moltke, the Chief of Staff, reorganized the General Staff and King William I pressed to revive Prussian military power despite parliamentary resistance. The army bill of 1860 brought the *landwehr* under the control of the regular army, reenforced the requirement that males serve 3 years with the regular army, and added a requirement that they serve 4 years with the reserves before passing on to the *landwehr*. These requirements greatly expanded the military's size.[7] In addition, new attention was paid to the speed and efficiency of the army's mobilization, supply, and deployment. As a result, the Prussian army became a large, "rapidly mobilizable, well-trained, professionally-officered mass army" (Posen, 1993, p. 104; Howard, 1976, p. 100; Fuller, 1992, pp. 113–121). Most important, it proved to be effective in battle, defeating Austria in 1866 and prevailing again in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871.

These victories against major powers elevated the attraction of the mass army over the aristocratic army model even though it was far from clear that the manpower policies were either solely or principally responsible for Prussia's victories. The victories appeared to demonstrate the effectiveness of the mass army and the appearance was sufficiently strong to cause other nations, beginning with France, to emulate their Prussian rival (Avant, 2000; Posen, 1993, pp. 109–113; Challener, 1955). Conscription-based mass armies composed of citizen soldiers became commonplace.

While clothed in the ideology of democracy, decisions to adopt the mass army model after 1870 reflected judgments by conservative political and military elites about what was necessary for military security and domestic order (Kiernan, 1973). They were wary about democratizing tendencies and relied on military training (as they relied on compulsory education) to teach the virtues of order, discipline, and obedience—virtues that were required not only for military effectiveness, but also for workers in new industrial employments. The results were not always what was hoped for. Only in France and Germany did compulsory military service become an essential part of public life; and even in France young conscripts thought of their time in the military as "a mere blank, or interruption of life, a disagreeable duty to be got through as best might be" (Kiernan, 1973, p. 150). Attempts by the Italian government to establish conscription in Sicily helped cause an out-migration of youth from the region, which was not staunched by legislation that barred men younger than 32 from leaving the country. In Spain, a special levy of conscripts for service in Morocco "provoked a general strike at Barcelona" (Kiernan, 1973, p. 151). Nonetheless, as compulsory military service became a habit it worked to integrate the "average individual" into the life of his country—an observation confirmed by Eugene Weber's (1976) study of the effects of military service on the French peasant's sense of national identity.

In Europe, only Britain failed to adopt the mass army model, as did its offspring in North America. In Britain, though, there were demands for conscription after the turn of the 20th century (Adams and Poirier, 1987). At the same time, there was a movement in the United States for military preparedness emphasizing the ideal of the citizen-soldier and the value of compulsory military service (Pearlman, 1984). Still, Britain clung to its model of an aristocratic and volunteer army even after the outbreak of the First World War. Only when enduring the toll of that conflict over 2 years had made it no longer possible

[7]Barry Posen (1993, p. 103) writes: "The Prussians were thus able to field 355,000 soldiers against the Austrians [in 1866], and, with the allies of the North German Confederation, a million in 1870."

to rely on volunteers did Britain finally resort to conscription to raise a mass army.[8] The following year, when it entered the war, the United States immediately switched from its small volunteer force to establish a conscripted mass army. These mass armies were demobilized and conscription was halted in both countries when the war ended, but there was no doubt among military planners that the mass army format would be used again should war resume. The mass armed force had established itself as the standard model for mobilizing manpower for war, and it remained the standard model (with some exceptions) through the Second World War until the end of the Cold War.

Yet to say that the mass army was the standard model through the end of the Cold War, while true, can be misleading. It was evident by the 1970s, if not before, that among the Western nations allied in NATO there was a transition underway from the mass army toward an all-volunteer professional force in which only some serve, with this service being their primary occupation (Janowitz, 1972; van Doorn, 1975; Martin, 1977; Kelleher, 1978). The evidence for such a shift was found partly in the establishment of all-volunteer forces in Britain in 1962 and in the United States in 1973. It could also be seen in European countries that maintained conscript-based forces when their reliance on conscripts fell, as measured by the conscription ratio, that is, by the proportion of conscripts in the regular force (Kelleher, 1978). Also telling was that, from 1961 to 1986, the average number of months conscripts served in the armies of the NATO alliance fell from a minimum of 18 to a minimum of 12 months. Obviously, this fall was affected by the decision by Britain and the United States to create all-volunteer forces. But if these two countries are dropped from the analysis, the average minimum length of service still declined substantially, from 20 months in 1961 to 15 months in 1986 (Burk, 1992, p. 46). Based on these and other indications, there was by the mid-1980s widespread consensus among students of military mobilization that the Post-World War period "witnessed a great trend away from semi-trained, primitively equipped, mass conscript armies towards more streamlined, highly professional forces" (Bond, 1986, p. 214).

The end of the Cold War in 1989 quickened the pace of this movement away from mass armies toward volunteer professional armies. Karl Haltiner (1998) has documented the extent of change for the countries of Western Europe. In the mid-1990s, only Britain and Ireland had adopted the all-volunteer professional mode, but the situation was clearly in flux. Belgium in 1992, The Netherlands in 1993, France in 1996, and Spain in 1997 all decided to abolish conscription and establish a volunteer professional force. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and The Netherlands the conscription ratio had already fallen below 50%. In fact, the conscription ratio was above 66% only in Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Switzerland. Perhaps more important, the extent of the military mobilization of society had declined by a third, as measured by the military participation ratio, from its average of 6% from 1970 to 1990, to its average of 4% in 1995. These data are sufficient for Haltiner to conclude that in the 1990s we have seen the definite end of the mass army in Western Europe. A confirmation of the claim, if one is needed, might be found on the battlefield of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 in which the United States soundly defeated the conscript-based

[8] Raising a mass army to fight in the First World War caused political and military elites to be concerned about whether the young men recruited into the army were sufficiently well-educated to grasp the reasons for the conflict and the need for their efforts to fight for their country. To address these concerns, the army established in service educational programs that would develop the soldier "not only as an efficient fighting man, but also as a citizen" (Mackenzie, 1992, p. 5). Such programs were conducted during World War II as well.

mass army of Iraq, which was a large and battle-tested force, with its previously untested all-volunteer professional force.

In summary, as we move from the late 18th to the early 21st century we observe two revolutionary shifts in the military mobilization models followed by the countries of Western Europe and North America. First, there is a shift from the aristocratic to the mass army model that begins with the American and French Revolutions and is consolidated after 1870 following the defeat of France's professional force by Prussia's mass army in the Franco-Prussian War. The mass army model remained the standard model for military mobilization from that point through the World Wars and after. But before the end of the Cold War, for reasons we have not begun to consider, a second shift away from the mass army toward an all-volunteer professional force could be seen. After the Cold War ended, movement away from the mass army accelerated and the professional force is evidently becoming the new standard model for military mobilization. The questions that we now need to address are why these changes in force structure occur when and how they do, and how they affect civil–military relations and the meaning of democratic citizenship in the societies where they occur.

THEORIES OF CHANGE

Sociological studies of different mobilization models have concentrated on the recent transition from a mass army to a volunteer professional army. Transition from the aristocratic to the mass army was more or less taken for granted and considered to be a starting point for analysis rather than something to be explained. Building on the foundation laid by Morris Janowitz (1972), the central theoretical problem was to document and explain the decline of the mass army.[9] Janowitz (1978, 1983a) also examined the rise of the mass army, but the aim, as we shall see, was not to explain its origins. It was rather to examine the effects of the mass army on the rise of parliamentary democracy in the West.[10]

More recently, social scientists engaged in military studies have been concerned with explaining the origins of the mass army. This new focus may have to do as much with changing patterns of social science inquiry as with the development of the subject matter itself. Social science research in the middle of the 20th century was predominantly concerned with the present and with matters of public policy relevance. Certainly that remains true for a great deal of social science research today. Yet, in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a resurgent interest in the conduct of comparative historical research, much of which focused on social revolutions and formation of the modern state.[11] Recent studies that explain the transition from the aristocratic to the mass army are part of this resurgence and reflect the twin ambitions of historical sociology to represent fairly the complexity of the phenomenon

[9] The leading works in this tradition are Janowitz (1972, 1978, Chap. 6, 1983a), van Doorn (1975), Martin (1977), Kelleher (1978), Moskos and Wood (1988), Segal (1989), Boëne and Martin (1991), Burk (1992), and Haltiner (1998).

[10] Janowitz (1978, pp. 184–205) also challenged the argument that mass armies necessarily have egalitarian consequences. But this theoretical claim and the evidence for it were never fully developed, so I do not discuss them here.

[11] I say "resurgent interest" because comparative historical work was common among the first generation of "classical" sociologists. Subsequently, the method was relatively neglected with the rise of reliance on social surveys. For a history of this resurgence see Smith (1991). Key works in the genre include Skocpol (1979), Giddens (1985), Mann (1986, 1993), Tilly (1990), and Goldstone (1991)—which is not to neglect the classic work of Moore (1966) that provided a template for others to follow.

to be explained and yet to construct analytically rigorous models to explain how and why the phenomenon occurred.

From Aristocratic to Mass Armies

The birth of conscription, Meyer Kestnbaum (2002) has forcefully argued, was not the result of a binary policy decision simply to switch from an aristocratic to a mass army format. Rather, it was a complex event that, in his words, "lies at the intersection of three distinct historical processes" (p. 119). These are the emergence of national citizenship as an organizing political principle, the formation of state policies to compel military service in the line army based on national citizenship, and the mobilization of "the people" for war. Kestnbaum exaggerates when he says these are distinct historical processes. It seems obvious to me that, empirically, they are at least partially overlapping events. Nevertheless, his main points are well taken, that the birth of conscription is a complex process in which these three analytically distinguishable phases occur simultaneously and reinforce one another and that, without any one of them, we would not have the birth of conscription or the mass army. Of course, one wants to know why this event occurs when it does. While it was not Kestnbaum's purpose to provide a causal model, he notes that the birth of conscription and the mass army occurs at the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries because, in that period, some states were drawn into wars that threatened their future and the independence of the people and did so to such a degree that political and military elites were willing to consider the radical possibility of mobilizing the popular classes into national politics, of converting subjects of the crown into citizens of the nation.

It is possible to model the process in greater detail. Barry Posen (1993) does so in order to clarify the relationship between nationalism and war. The relationship, he thinks, is a reciprocal one in which each effectively intensifies the other. The problem is to explain how the relationship got started in the first place and why it spread across the states of Europe in the 19th century. Posen begins his explanation relying on the premises of "structural realism;" that is, he thinks nationalism results from the structure of the international system. He accepts the realist position that international politics are anarchic and that states wishing to be autonomous have to compete for their security. That competition causes states to monitor carefully the military capabilities of their neighbors (or any potential enemy) relative to their own. One result of monitoring is that states imitate those military practices of others that they believe are successful. Among the examples of such imitation is the adoption of the mass army in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Critical to his theory is that imitating the practice of the mass army helped spread nationalism across Europe.

Why would it do so? What is the connection between the mass army and nationalism? Posen argues that the mass army has two essential qualities: It is a large army that, most important, has the "ability to maintain its size in the face of the rigors of war"; and by mobilizing and training new recruits to replace losses, it can "to a very large extent retain its 'combat power' " (p. 83). In practice, such an army can appear only under certain historical circumstances: a general increase in population size and wealth, the spread of literacy, a political revolution stressing the ideals of egalitarianism, and technological developments in the weapons of war that encourage dispersing rather than clustering infantry forces. These circumstances prevailed in varying degrees across Europe in the late 18th century.

To appreciate their importance for the development of nationalism, we may begin with the observation that the Seven Years' War in the mid-18th century made it clear that

European armies had become "too good at making war the old-fashioned way.... Casualties of 20 percent or more per battle were common... [and] infantry casualties could not be replaced at the pace they were incurred" (Posen, 1993, p. 90; McNeill, 1982, Chap. 5). One solution to the problem was to disperse infantry forces, making them less vulnerable to new firepower technology. But dispersing troops posed problems for command and control, it put greater demands on a soldier's motivation and initiative, it taxed efforts to coordinate troop movements, and it still required a means of replacing casualties. The problems could be addressed. But addressing them assumed that new recruits were available in sufficient numbers, that they could be quickly trained, and that they were willing to become soldiers. The numbers could be provided by population growth and increased wealth that, together, would allow the state to divert more young men to military from economic pursuits. What about the rest? Political and military elites came to realize that they could affect the training and motivation of soldiers by teaching them (and the young male population at large) how to read and by instructing them in the culture and history that they "shared" with the larger society. That is, they could address the military crisis, at least in part, by taking direct action to cultivate key elements that we associate with nationalism: a group identity based on a shared culture and history that requires a state structure of its own to thrive. Doing so, however, was also to embrace a revolutionary, if still formal, egalitarian ideal for all members of the nation.

Before the French Revolution, these ideas, while circulating, found no ready institutional expression. With the French Revolution, they coalesced—more gradually than deliberately, as elites responded piecemeal to problems as they arose—to transform the French army of the old regime into the mass army of the revolution. Posen (1993, p. 94) believes it is a mistake to suppose this institutional transformation was solely a product of the political revolution itself, as if once the revolution began, the French army was immediately a representative "nation in arms." Before the revolution, there was already a surplus population, a supply of young men without work for whom the revolutionary opportunities tied to military service were welcome. But, after they were mobilized, there was, "a sustained political campaign to educate and motivate the armies... and to forge powerful emotional bonds between the army and the civilian population" (Posen, 1993, p. 94). Cultivation of nationalism and the mass army occurred together, reinforcing one another. Resort to conscription after volunteering failed made the armed forces more representative of the whole society. People mobilized into war service moved from their primordial communities to learn that there was a larger France. Leaders increased the emphasis on teaching literacy within the army and disseminated political propaganda in army camps (much of which was read aloud by those who could read to those who could not). And civic festivals were held, at first spontaneously, but soon under careful control of the political elite, that brought soldiers and civilians together to celebrate the ideals of the revolution.

The result was an effective military solution to the problems encountered in the Seven Years' War. The French mass army was large and its ties to the public helped sustain troop morale. Given the effectiveness of conscription, it could take and replace casualties without losing its military effectiveness. That meant it could "engage in frequent battles of great violence" without reducing its prospects for victory (Posen, 1993, p. 93). The lesson was not lost on France's competitors, as shown by Prussia's move to imitate the French model. This argument, which adopts the logic of a functional explanation, can be stated in general terms.[12] When changes in the international system undermine traditional military practices and jeopardize a state's success at war, then political and military elites cast about for

[12]On the logic of functional explanations, see Stinchcombe (1987, pp. 80–101).

solutions to the problem—for ways to reform the military structure—that will make success at war more likely. Should reforms instituted by one state seem to resolve the problem, those reforms are likely to be imitated by others. In this case, Posen argues, the institutional reforms that led the French from an aristocratic to a mass army only worked together with the cultivation of nationalism. Not only was the military model likely to be imitated by others, but so also was the cultivation of nationalism. Because nationalism and mass armies were linked at birth they were inseparable afterward. As one spread throughout Europe, so did the other.

While Posen's argument provides a plausible account of the rise of the mass army and the reasons for its spread, it suffers from a problem common to many functional theories. It understates the degree to which historical outcomes are contingent on local choices from among a variety of alternatives, each one of which may at least be seen as viable under the circumstances. To be fair, Posen (1993, p. 86) did not attempt a decisive test of his argument; his more modest aim was to determine its plausibility by seeing how well it accounted for the invention of the mass army during the French Revolution and its imitation by the Prussians shortly thereafter. Yet before embracing Posen's theory wholeheartedly, we should wonder why after 1814 until the 1870s only Prussia adopts the mass army format, while other European powers (France included) retain some variant of the aristocratic model. What we need is a theory (more refined than Posen's) that can do two things. First, it should take seriously the contingent nature of historical events. Second, it should account for the invention of the mass army in the French Revolution, the latency of the mass army model in Prussia from 1814 to 1870, and the widespread acceptance of the mass army model following 1870.

Deborah Avant (2000) provides such a theory. Like Posen, she argues that the period from the mid-18th century onward was one of "material and ideational turmoil." She notes the material pressures brought on Europe's international system by rising population growth and the subsequent push for territorial expansion. These pressures intensified international competition and increased the prospects for large-scale conflict. She also notes that liberal Enlightenment ideas encouraged a new way of thinking about the relations between states, soldiers, and citizens. An important implication of natural law and social contract theories was that the sovereignty of the state rested with the members of the political community, not the throne. But, "if sovereignty rested in the people," Avant (2000, p. 44) writes, "the defense of sovereignty was an obligation held by all." There was a clear link between belonging to a political community and citizenship and between citizenship and the obligation to perform military service. By this logic, "citizens were representatives of the state—not just more or less willing subjects" and so it was "more difficult for rulers to distance themselves from the actions of their citizens." In short, it would seem as if both material and ideational circumstances converged in a way encouraging for a transition from aristocratic to mass armies. So far, Avant's argument complements Posen's theory.

But Avant goes on to argue that the mass army was not the only proper or possible response to the material and ideational demands placed on the international system at this time. She contends existing limits on order and supply suggested that smaller aristocratic armies would perform better than mass armies (which is not to deny that tactical innovations favoring force dispersal may have been required). Defenders of this alternative could also have drawn support for their claims from Enlightenment thought. After all the aristocratic army was composed of long-term servers who were disciplined by drill. It was a professional army, by the standards of the day, engaged in a thoroughly rationalized military practice, and the virtues of expertise based on rational knowledge, embodied in this force, were Enlightenment virtues—in tension with democratic ideals to be sure, but virtues nonetheless. Nor should we suppose that the mass army had clearly demonstrated its superiority over

the aristocratic armies on the field of battle. Prussia's defeats at Auerstadt and Jena could be explained either by crediting the power of France's citizen army or by pointing to the "ineptitude" of Prussia's field leaders, with the latter a matter that could be remedied without radical organizational reform (Avant 2000, p. 47). The problem for theory, then, is to explain why states choose one military model over another when the evidence suggests that either might have met the challenges they faced.

Avant (2000, p. 42) argues, "individual states were more likely to move toward citizen armies when they had been defeated militarily and when the ruling coalition was split or indifferent about the reforms tied to citizen armies." This argument assumes that the climate for institutional reform is prepared by conditions of material and ideational turmoil. But whether conservative or new ideas for institutional development prevail depends on other intermediary factors. The reason why is that institutionalizing new ideas is likely to have distributional consequences within the political community. Typically, aristocratic rulers were reluctant to embrace citizen armies because they worried that arming citizens would have egalitarian consequences undermining their position of power and privilege. Under these circumstances radical change is unlikely to occur unless there is a dramatic exogenous shock to the country—most often a military defeat—that discredits prevailing wisdom and institutional practice. But such a shock, by itself, is not sufficient to determine the course of change.

As elites deliberate about how to respond to the challenges they face, they must define the problem and identify how it might be solved. Avant calls agreements about these definitions "focal points;" once the focal point has been reached, then institutional reform is possible. Whether reform is radical, mild, or simply reinforces the status quo depends on the relative unity of the dominant elite. The more ideas are shared, the more likely that a focal point will "emerge spontaneously." Such focal points are "likely to be automatic, commonsensical, and therefore conservative" responses to the problem that "fold new problems into old solutions" (Avant, 2000, p. 49). When elite opinion is divided, when there is greater uncertainty about how to respond, then focal points are more likely to be constructed, with new coalitions created to build support for reform. Such reform proposals are more likely to lead to radical change. Assuming divided opinion among elites, a radical outcome is most likely to occur when elites suppose that no proposed solution will have important distributional consequences or, perhaps more likely, when they cannot agree on but are split about what the distributional consequences of any proposed solution should be.

In sum, Avant believes that the shift from aristocratic to mass armies occurs when there is material and ideational turmoil, followed by an exogenous shock to the country and elites are divided about how to respond. These conditions prevailed in France during the revolution and in Prussia in the period 1806–1814. If there is only turmoil without an exogenous shock and elites are divided about military policy—as the Prussians were in the late 18th century—then there may be many plans for military reform, but no real prospects that these plans will be adopted. Alternatively, if there is turmoil with an exogenous shock and yet elites quickly agree about what how to respond, then there may be reform, but the reforms are likely to be narrow in scope and conservative. This was the case in Britain following its defeat in the American Revolution.

But Avant does not argue that the probability of transition from aristocratic to mass armies is determined solely by domestic considerations. Like Posen, she believes that states monitor the military practices of their neighbors and potential enemies. When a state adopts a military format that is successful—i.e., it "wins wars, [and] fits with prevailing ideas" (Avant, 2000, p. 43)—it is likely to become a model that other states will follow. It establishes a new international definition of what a military is and how it should be raised, trained,

and used in combat. The presence of an established model has the effect of quelling the turmoil about what the military form should be. That does not mean that every state in the system will immediately adopt a newly established form—though, as we have seen, many states did adopt the mass army model in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Domestic considerations interact with international demonstration effects. In effect, a newly established model provides divided elites a new focal point around which to build a coalition for reform. This happened in Britain in the 1870s following embarrassments in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. While Britain did not yet embrace the mass army, the Cardwell reforms moved away from the aristocratic army model by making it clear that it was British citizens who should fight for British interests, "while making it illegal for its citizens to fight for other interests" (Avant, 2000, p. 65).

Avant's theory provides a useful explanation of change from the aristocratic to the mass armed force, one that is general, but sufficiently nuanced, as it allows for variation in outcomes depending on the experience of particular countries. The generality of the model suggests that it might also be usefully applied to explain the transition from the mass army to the all-volunteer force in the late 20th century. What Avant's theory fails to take seriously, in sharp contrast to Posen, is the connection between deciding to build a mass army and the cultivation of nationalism. Avant is skeptical of this connection because she doubts the success of the French Revolutionary army depended on the nationalist and ideological motivations of the soldiers. She suggests that attributing military success to the spirit of the French soldiers was a myth cultivated by revolutionary leaders "to enhance the legitimacy of the revolution and their place in power" (Avant, 2000, p. 56).[13] Here is an instance, however, when we might take myths seriously. Myths may obscure judgments about the technical competence of different forms of military organization, but they are still important for understanding the social and political consequences of adopting a mass army over an aristocratic army.

From Mass Armies to All-Volunteer Professional Forces

The most extensive consideration of the societal effects of the mass armies is found in the work of Morris Janowitz (1971, 1978, 1983a, 1991).[14] His major claim is that the transition from the aristocratic to the mass army helped bring about the fundamental democratization of Western societies and that the decline of mass armies requires refashioning of the citizen-soldier ideal. The argument underlying this claim is subtle and many qualifications are needed to ensure that it is not misunderstood. One cannot simply assert that mass mobilization of citizens for military service is a democratizing force. We have observed many times that aristocratic political elites were aware that the conversion of subjects into citizens and arming citizens for military service would exert an egalitarian influence in their societies. These distributional effects of the mass army were matters to be controlled to the furthest extent possible. Prussia was perhaps most successful in exercising this control, requiring in its constitutional arrangements that the military was allegiant to and commanded

[13] Avant relies on Blanning (1996) for her historical evidence on this point. The issue engaged, about the ideological motivations of soldiers and the importance of these motivations for military success is a controversial one and as yet unresolved. For contrasting arguments on the matter, see for example Bartov (1992), Shils and Janowitz (1948), McPherson (1997), Linderman (1987).

[14] Janowitz, more than any other, is responsible for establishing military studies as a subfield within sociology. See Burk (1993).

by the king and not controlled by the parliament. Its mass army was a "monarchical-civil-service regime" and "the officer corps had its own direct representative at court" (Janowitz, 1978, p. 176).[15] The theoretical problem is to explain why mass armies and parliamentary democracies emerge simultaneously in the West and, supposing that the connection is not merely fortuitous, to consider not only why mass armies have declined since 1970, but also how their decline may affect the future course of parliamentary democracy.

Janowitz (1991, p. 224) offers two reasons to explain the simultaneous rise of mass armies and democracy in the West. The first is grounded in the normative meaning of citizenship, associated with a requirement for military service and with a model of civic participation. The second is grounded in the restraint of military elites that had the opportunity and means to intervene in politics, but refrained from doing so.

The ideologies of the American and French Revolutions supported a normative definition of citizenship that bridged mass military service and the rise of democratic civic participation, exemplified by the extension of the franchise to groups previously excluded from the political process (Janowitz, 1991, p. 236). They did so by creating a "nationalist symbolism" that stood in contrast to traditional and local community attachments. This symbolism supplied a basis for the political legitimacy of the revolutionary leaders, a rationale for demanding sociopolitical change, and (as Posen believes, but Avant doubts) "a particularly effective basis for organizing the armed forces." The legitimacy of the citizen armies of the revolutions was based on their role in defending the ideals of the revolution: individual freedom and social and political justice. Arming the "ordinary person" and declaring a broad "right to bear arms" forwarded the political aims of the nationalist revolutions and at the same time recruited new social elements into the military and political arena, formally as equals. Service in the revolutionary army enlarged "the concept of who were effective members of the polity" and "supplied a key ingredient in the expansion of the electorate." In short, "the duties and obligations of the armed citizen set the framework for the concept of the electorate in civil society." Once established, the ideal of the citizen soldier made military service an important pathway to political inclusion for previously excluded groups; it was a powerful democratizing force. In the United States, for example, no one could become a citizen through the first half of the 20th century—no matter how old or which sex—who would not promise to bear arms in defense of the country.[16] And prior service as a citizen soldier "has been a powerful asset for candidates seeking election to the Senate and the House of Representatives" (Janowitz, 1978, p. 180).[17]

The evolution of military service as "a hallmark of citizenship" and of citizenship as "the hallmark of a political democracy" (Janowitz, 1991, p. 226–227) was not an inevitable development. It was possible because the military leaders of the mass armies did not intervene to redirect political movements toward a more conservative path. This meant the military elite, part of the ruling class under the aristocratic model, "had to be depoliticized or politically contained" (p. 227). This occurred to some degree owing to the broadening of the social origins of the officer corps, making it more representative of the people. But this was not the most important element. In fact the officer corps remained a reservoir of

[15]In this regard, one should not overlook the Russian army in the 19th century, where conscription was compatible with "serflike [sic] sociopolitical relations" (Janowitz 1991, p. 224).

[16]Unlike minority groups who have often struggled to gain political rights through military service, conscientious objectors have struggled not to lose political rights as a result of their refusal to perform military service (Burk, 1995).

[17]Recent data suggest that this observation may no longer hold after the Cold War (Bianco and Markham, 2001).

conservative political traditions and attached to the "heroic model" of military service inherited from its aristocratic past. Perhaps unexpectedly, this conservative and "heroic" model of the military officer may have facilitated parliamentary forms (as it would have facilitated authoritarian regimes) insofar as it enacted the value of personal allegiance to the ruler—which means to the parliament in an evolving democratic state. Critical to the officer corps's political restraint, Janowitz believed, was socialization in and acceptance of a professional military ethic, based on allegiance to the constitution, that required obedience by the officer corps to appropriate elected officials and proscribed the officers direct intervention into politics. This ethic, like the normative definition of the citizen soldier, was grounded in the republican ideologies of the American and French Revolutions. These revolutionary ideologies—especially in the American case—made it difficult for military leaders to seize and hold political power. "In the United States," Janowitz (1991, p. 237) writes, "historians emphasize George Washington's political commitment to civilian rule, but this in turn represented the pervasive ideological and normative definitions of the American Revolution."

Despite the important role that mass armies played in promoting the rise of parliamentary democracy in the West, it was not inevitable that the mass army model would continue to be the predominant format for military mobilization and organization. We have already seen that during the Cold War the mass army began to give way to the all-volunteer professional army. Janowitz (1972) was the first to examine the trend, to offer an explanation for it, and to try to discern its consequences. The decline of the mass army marked the "end of an epoch" in which military service was for many an "act of political affirmation" and an "expression of popular nationalism" (p. 12). What caused its decline?

Janowitz (1978, p. 183) posited three related causes. First, the destructive impact of the world wars, especially the potential for nuclear destruction following the end of the Second World War, called into doubt the military relevance of mass armed forces and the ideal of the citizen soldier. Under these new conditions, armies could not be mobilized for war and demobilized for peace, enabling intermittent military service by citizens. A continuously mobilized force was required, still large, but smaller than the armed forces raised for the world wars. The primary aim of this force was not to fight, but to help deter the outbreak of any large-scale war. Second, he noted the effects of affluence and higher education on the willingness of citizens to perform military service. High levels of income and education, he believed, produced "opposition to the style of life of the military establishment, resistance to military authority, plus a new diffuse, moral criticism" that refused to defer to any authority; this undermined the legitimacy of compulsory military service and tarnished the ideal of the citizen soldier. "Literacy, patterns of mass consumption, and political rhetoric have emerged as more important than military service as hallmarks of citizenship" (Janowitz, 1972, pp. 13–14). Finally, and as a consequence of the first two trends, there has been "an attenuation of nationalist sentiments." That was not to say that nationalist sentiments have disappeared. "Feelings of national identity remain deep-seated and are readily mobilized in periods of tension and crisis" (Janowitz, 1978, p. 183). But expressions of nationalism are muted. They are diluted by "powerful feelings of transnationalism" and increased acceptance of the ideals of a pluralist society, and this "weakens the very foundation of popular military service" (Janowitz, 1972, p. 14). Under these conditions, an all-volunteer force has greater legitimacy than a mass army dependent on conscription.

Janowitz wondered how a weakened sense of nationalism and the decline of mass armies would affect parliamentary institutions. Unlike the classical sociologists who believed that the recession of military institutions automatically promoted democratic

well-being, Janowitz believed that the citizen-soldier ideal encouraged and legitimated popular participation in politics and that an army composed of citizen soldiers contributed to civilian control of military institutions and the use of force.[18] Underlying his belief was an understanding that effective citizenship and integration within society must be cultivated (Janowitz 1983a).[19] They depend on programs of civic education that engage citizens. The programs must be participatory. The foundations of citizenship and democratic society were not formed through classroom instruction in civics, but through direct experience within the community, cooperating with others to meet real community needs. The ideal of the citizen soldier is important because the need for military security is real and it is a need that citizen-soldiers have for many years been able cooperatively to meet. But with the decline of mass armies, Western states no longer require universal or nearly universal military service from their citizens. When being a citizen soldier is not a widely shared experience, it loses value as a form of civic education. Those who volunteer for service in the professional army may believe that their participation is a positive experience, enlarging their capacities as citizens. But even that belief may be undermined if the meaning of military service is not located within a larger communal framework.

How would Janowitz prevent this negative outcome? He offered two suggestions that essentially reformulate his earlier argument to explain the simultaneous rise of the mass armies and democracy. First, he would generalize the ideal of the citizen soldier, embedding military service in a larger program of national service that includes nonmilitary service projects. Once established, a program of national service would ensure that citizens cooperate together to serve a common good, turning them into more effective citizens. It would create a societal context within which military service in an all-volunteer force could still be valorized as an embodiment of the citizen-soldier ideal; it would preserve the association of military service with democratic civic participation (Janowitz, 1983a). Second, he would reinforce the social restraints that contained the political behavior of the professional officer corps. Without supposing that social origins directly determine political behavior, he noted that with the transition from a mass army to an all-volunteer professional force, "social recruitment re-emerges as a more relevant variable, since recruitment becomes less representative" (Janowitz, 1991, p. 233). The danger is that an officer corps, isolated from the larger society, is more likely to feel compelled to operate inappropriately as a political pressure group to influence national security policy.[20] To prevent this from occurring, Janowitz (1983b, pp. 74–76) advocated new programs of professional military socialization. He proposed an explicit program in the political education soldiers that would show the connection of their professional military activities to the attainment of national and transnational purposes. The aim was to ensure that military goals were always seen as means to the ends of a democratic society.

[18] His position should not be confused with an unqualified assertion that preparation for war and military conflict during the era of mass armies automatically promoted democracy. On the contrary, he explicitly argued that parliamentary control over the military was strained by preparations for war that create a strong military–industrial complex and that war created societal tensions that weaken democratic political institutions (Janowitz, 1991, p. 225).

[19] For elaborations on this position, see Moskos (1988), Gorham (1992), and Burk (2000).

[20] Janowitz's concerns were based on an extension of his theory rather than strong evidence. Only recently have data become available to test the proposition that transition from a mass army to a volunteer professional army might create a "gap" between the military and society that is problematic for democratic well-being—and these data are confined to the United States. Feaver and Kohn (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the data and discussion of the issue.

IMPLICATIONS

This survey of changing patterns of military mobilization has shown that the way in which states recruit armies for war has consequences beyond those directly tied to military organization and the immediate prospects for military victory or defeat. Changing from aristocratic to mass armies in the late 18th and 19th centuries was part of a larger social transformation from aristocratic to democratic societies. Converting subjects previously excluded from political participation into armed citizens mobilized to defend the state helped forge dynastic states into nations and empowered citizens to become active participants in the civic life of the nation. Yet, as we have just seen, the close connection between the rise of mass armies and democratization in the West raises questions about the likely social and political consequences of the displacement of mass armies by volunteer forces over the past 50 years. The questions are pressing as the historical evidence for a determining relationship between patterns of military mobilization and political forms is more far-reaching than this survey has noted so far.

In his study of the city, Max Weber (1981, p. 319) argued that cities in the West were revolutionary political units established on the basis of a "brotherhood in arms for mutual aid and protection, [and] involving the usurpation of political power."[21] The members of this brotherhood were those designated as citizens and their union was the basis for democratization. How far democratization would proceed was historically variable. Its extent was limited by the degree to which citizens were able to provide their own military equipment and subsequently to prevail in battle against a military organization of knights or individual warrior heroes. In other words, democratization was most likely during those historical periods when a disciplined infantry held the advantage in battle. The point is obviously relevant to our study of the rise of mass armies. "Military discipline," Weber (1981, p. 325) wrote, "meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was compelled to secure the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms, and along with arms, political power into their hands." But when military organization depended on the valor of knights (as in feudal Europe) or on centralized state bureaucracies (as in the ancient irrigation societies of Asia), no notion of citizenship and democratic social organization was likely to emerge. For our purposes, his argument implies that as the rise of mass armies enhanced prospects for democracy so the current rise of volunteer professional armies lessens the prospects for a highly participatory democratic culture.

It is well beyond the purpose of this survey to judge whether that implication is true. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to resist a mechanistic hypothesis contending that the decline of mass armies is a dark cloud hanging over the future of democratic regimes in the West.

First, while it is true that the rise of democratic regimes was associated with the revolutionary mobilization of citizen soldiers for war, we should not suppose it was the sole factor required to establish democratic regimes or that the factors required to establish democracy are necessarily the same as those required to maintain it. The liberal democratic regimes established in the West were established and are maintained in part by their economic strength, which creates vested interests in this political form across broad segments of the population (Stephens, 1993). Moreover, democratic institutions—like the rule of law—once established, have a life of their own and while not self-sustaining, they may nevertheless develop strong constituencies that protect and use the institutions to expand the benefits of

[21] Randall Collins (1975, pp. 355–364) offers a formal summary of the logic of this argument.

a democratic regime. This process has been particularly evident in the legal history of the "rights revolution" in the 20th century (Epp 1998). Note also that these internal developments that strengthen democratic practices are increasingly reinforced by an international system that punishes regimes deficient in these regards.

Second, we are not confronted with a simple linear model that argues mass armies create citizens that build democracies (much less with a model that argues the loss of mass armies undermines the institution of citizenship on which democracies depend). To see the limits of such a model we have only to remember that adopting the mass army was not everywhere necessarily a democratic force. The mass armies of Napoleon and Prussia in the 19th century served regimes that were democratic to a quite limited degree. The mass armies of the Germans in the Second World War and the Soviet Union in the 20th century served regimes that were not democratic at all. Where the invention of mass armies and the ideal of the citizen soldier did promote democracy was in places where the geopolitical threats of large-scale ground conflict were happily at a minimum, as they were for Britain and the United States, at least until the middle of the 20th century. Also important to recall is the role played by the ideologies that, during the American and French Revolutions, defined the meaning of mass armies in terms of their contribution to a democratic republic. These ideologies provided the substantive rationale for the citizen soldier ideal and for the subsequent political restraint of military elites. Without this ideological direction in favor of democracy, the political effects of the invention of a mass army would have been open to question. In short, the political significance of any form of military mobilization and organization is socially contested and constructed at that time of its formation.

If these arguments are correct, then the consequences for democracy of the rise of the volunteer professional in place of mass armies is not strictly determined, but is historically contingent. The consequences will unfold as a product of debates about the ideal of the citizen-soldier and political restraints on the professional officer corps, and the debates will be shaped by the fact that they occur in the context of an already-existing democratic community. Whether the outcome of these debates, in the end, promotes or undermines democratic values depends on whether a persuasive case is made—mythic or other—that even the partial and voluntary mobilization of citizens for military service is an integral part of the democratic project.

PART III

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

CHAPTER 8

Civil–Military Relations

VLADIMIR O. RUKAVISHNIKOV AND MICHAEL PUGH

INTRODUCTION

What is the relationship between civilians ("people without arms"), the society at large, and the military ("people with arms") established as a separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question has a long history that goes back to antiquity, to the very beginnings of military organization in civilian societies.[1] In each country the answer to this question is deeply influenced by national history, sentiments, and traditions. It depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country, subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements, and so on. Public perceptions of military personnel, the prestige of the military officer's profession, public opinion toward defense and foreign policy of the regime and certain actions of the army, and so on, determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently changing because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.

Civil–military relations have many dimensions and can be viewed from different perspectives. Those dimensions include relationships in the spheres of power and politics, economics and media, science and technology, culture and history. For reasons of space we are not able to consider all dimensions and aspects of the problem in this chapter. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First we summarize principal phases in the development of civil–military relations theory that have occurred in the past century. A comprehensive overview of the numerous publications in the field is simply impossible, and we refer only to a very limited number of publications in English, mainly to volumes with large sets of

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[1] By "arms" or "weapons," we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of in war, such as firearms and swords. The term "*military*," as a sociological category, is interpreted as "an acceptance of organized violence as a legitimate means for realizing social activities. Military organization it follows, are structures for the co-ordination of activities meant to ensure victory on the battlefield. In modern times these structures have increasingly taken the form of permanent establishment maintained in peace time for the eventuality of armed conflict and managed by a professional military" (Sills, 1972).

country studies and/or cross-national and comparative researches. Then we consider the issue of civil control of the military in democracies without discussing any particular country case. In the following section we focus on social and cultural changes in the armed forces and wider society. We tackle some areas that have been problematic in civil–military relations in the past and that perhaps will continue to be problematic in the future, such as the issue of military conscription and the cultural gap between society and professional army, the integration of women in the armed forces, and the adjustment of the demobilized military to the civilian way of life. In the next section the issue of civil–military relations within the international peace support operations is touched. Peacekeeping today is no longer what it used to be because of the scale of the task, the resources, and the institutions, military and civilian, involved. It became clear from both UN and NATO experiences that the civilian dimensions of complex peace support operations are crucial for success of the missions. Conclusions extrapolated from the previous discussions are presented in the final section.

BASIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD

For an appropriate understanding of the evolution of civil–military relations through the centuries, one has to scrutinize the records of history, the ideas of philosophers, insights of poets, and folk wisdom. We note that only in the 20th century did political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and economists attempt to study the relationship between the military and society with the theoretical and empirical tools of social science and arrived at results which were more precise and accurate than the accumulated wisdom of the ages.

Among those influential scholars who appreciated the importance of military factors in shaping societies in the first half of the 20th century, one can start by mentioning Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca. Weber's views on this problem were stated most explicitly in the monumental treatise *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1922) and in the masterly essay *The Economic Theory of Ancient State*. Since the 1920s Weber's works have been translated into many languages and reprinted many times (Gerth & Mills, 1972). Mosca discussed the factors which determine the amount of military influences in politics in *The Ruling Class* (1939), which once was praised as "one of the most illuminating treatises on politics ever written" (Andzelewski, 1962). As for military sociology, Stouffer's work on *American Soldier* (Stouffler et al., 1950) was considered one of the pioneering studies on the sociology of army social structures, personnel, and social psychology, which was based on scientific methods presented in a systematic form. From the 1950s to the 1980s American political scientists examined civil–military relations as an interaction between the armed forces, political elites, and citizenry, focusing on the influence of the military high commanders on the making of foreign and defense policy. Major theories applicable to Western democracies were developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janovitz. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of theoretical refinement, influenced strongly by the end of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in the United States (Smith, 1951; Ekirch, 1956; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Goodpaster & Huntington, 1977; Finer, 1962, 1988. For discussion of the impact of these theories and their limitations, see Feater, 1996).

Historically, military personnel have been trained and motivated to protect the entire nation from external invasion and the ruling regime from domestic unrest as well as to conduct wars for foreign policy objectives. With regard to Western democracies, theories of civil–military relations that evolved at the end of the 1960s also assumed that the major

task of armed forces was to defend society from external enemies and to project force in support of foreign policy externally.[2] The military was presumed not to be a major actor in the domestic polity, although most Western militaries did have domestic missions and were assumed to be responsive to civilian control on a nonpartisan basis. However, there was disagreement between *two* major theoretical approaches on how civilian control was to be executed. The first one can be labeled the "political science approach" while the second can be named the "sociological" one (though these labels are rather tentative). Samuel Huntington and his followers advocated the first approach in numerous works, while the roots of the second lie in American military sociology and the work of Morris Janowitz.

With reference to the U.S. pattern, the political science approach assumed that a formal body of laws and regulations, and a formal chain of command, would make the military responsible to society, given that a civilian head of state served as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces; a civilian legislature approved its budget; and that the head of state and the legislators, as elected officials, represented the will and interests of the people more broadly, with checks and balances existing between government departments. According to this approach, the military should be professional.[3]

The sociological approach developed from the assertion that genuine civilian control of armed forces could be completely realized only when the military is integrated into the broader network of societal relations. Without going into details, we would simply indicate the principal idea of this approach: civilian control of the military could be realized on the basis of social networks; not professional warriors, but citizen-soldiers, either conscripts or reservists, would better link the military to its host society through their civilian roots.

As the history of the 20th century shows, the operation of civil–military relations in the West reflects aspects of both models. In Western countries there is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military: The legal and political arrangements varied widely and the patterns of civil–military relations therefore differed from country to country. In addition to specific legal and constitutional arrangements, civil–military relations are influenced by a country's historical traditions and particularly its military history; economic and social conditions; the evolution of its internal political landscape; and, certainly, by the international security environment, primarily the country's inclusion in alliances. Last, politics is shaped by the personalities of the military and civilian national

[2]According to well-established theories of civil–military relations, "the concept of the military as a permanent establishment maintained solely in support of foreign policy objectives presupposes the development of a *civil society* based on consensus. In such a society, the armed forces are called upon to cope with domestic disorder only in extraordinary circumstances, this task being relegated largely to civilian police forces. However, the incapacity of party governments to resolve vexing internal problems, including an inability to mobilize the 'home front' in support of national goals, has on many occasions led the military to do more than provide coercive power for use against external enemies. Their role in this regard has been especially important in those newly emerging nations whose civil institutions and sense of national identity have not yet had sufficient time to develop" (Sills, 1972, p. 305).

[3]Before proceeding further the meaning of the term *"professional military"* should be made very clear. It means those "who pursues a lifetime occupational career of service in the armed forces, where to qualify as a professional, he must acquire the expertise necessary to help manage the permanent military establishment during period of peace and to take part in the direction of military occupation if war should break out. Career commitment and expertise, the hall mark of any professional set the professional military personnel apart from those other personnel in the armed services who are merely carrying out a contractual or obligatory tour of duty or for whom officer status primarily represents, as it often did in former times an honorific part-time into which military skill enters only as a secondary consideration" (Sills, 1972, p. 305).

leaders and their informal relationships, which might also influence the balance of civil–military relations. They create differences between countries and very often within the same country between successive governments and from one minister of defense (and chief of staff) to another.

During the Cold War period Western scholars paid some attention to civil–military relations in socialist countries, yet their conceptualization and interpretation of the processes unfolding in the Soviet bloc were limited and scholastic in many regards due a lack of reliable empirical information (see Kolkowicz, 1967; Herspring and Volgyes, 1978; Adelman, 1982; Kolkowicz & Korbonski, 1982). They came to the subject primarily through an interest in the role of the military in the internal politics of the countries they studied and often emphasized that in the socialist party-state system the armed forces were under the close control of the ruling Communist Party. Considering its various consequences, they discussed differences between the models of civil–military relations in Western democracies and those in the socialist world (see Perlmutter, 1981; Sandscheider & Jurgen Kuhlman, 1992; Barany, 1991). We do not discuss here the extent to which the Western theories of civil–military relations were in agreement with the reality or contradictions between different theories. And, of course, there were theories of civil–military relations in socialist states that evolved in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War period that differed from Western ones, but space precludes discussion of these theories.

Scholars of civil–military relations in the developing world (with its high proportion of military coups as well as revolutions and guerrilla wars) in their turn were concerned with the role of the military regimes, violations of human rights, and/or democratization. Again, detailed analysis is not possible here (but see, for instance, Cammack et al., 1988, Chap. 4). The 1990s were characterized by theoretical reformulations driven by the three historical developments that changed the world–the end of Cold War, the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, and the disintegration of the USSR. These closely interrelated phenomena directed attention to a link between democratization and civil–military relations in transitional societies (Danopoulos and Zirker, 1996; Bebler, 1997; Joo, 1996). They also had compelled a worldwide rethinking of the roles and new missions of armed forces and changing relationships between the military and civilians under the conditions of new global trends (Diamond and Plattner, 1996; Danopoulos and Watson, 1996).

The relationship between the military and the state, societal structures, and institutions forms the core of the complex set of civil–military relations. Despite the very importance of this point, we have to stress that the entire set of issues relating to civil–military relations cannot be reduced to the political control of armed forces. Essentially, the military, as a subsystem of society, is characterized by distance from the people and a distinct noncivilian subculture and substructure. The need for such distinctiveness is related to the tasks, functions, and responsibilities which are assigned to military. Sociologists in many countries conducted numerous surveys of military and civilian opinion covering a wide range of issues, including foreign policy and security policy, civil–military relations and basic cultural values, public attitudes toward the military and military service, and the format of armed forces and the issue of conscription (Manigart 1992; Manigart, 1996; Mueller, 1994; Parmer, 1994; Rukavishnikov, 1994). The studies integrated the survey data with other historical, sociological, and interpretive data to address the following issues: the nature and civil–military gap in attitudes, values, perspectives, and personal backgrounds of the officers and soldiers; the factors that shape the gap and whether and how the gap matters at all for military effectiveness; military education and civil–military cooperation [see collections of studies in *Forum International-SOWI* Vol. 6, 1987, Vol. 15, 1991; with respect to the most

recent studies of the U.S. civil–military gap see Hosti, 1997; the special issue of *Armed Forces and Society,* Winter 2001, Vol. 27(2)].

As for the most recent achievements in military sociology, we have to mark the in-depth analysis of civil–military relations on the eve of the 21st century in both Eastern and Western European countries, which was carried out by an international team of scholars and based on solid theoretical frameworks and common empirically measured social indicators (Kuhlman & Callaghan, 2000). In this cross-national sociological study for each country scholars considered the impact of the weight of history on the evolution of civil–military relations, the legitimacy of armed forces in public opinion, the proportion of economic resources directed to the military, and the extent to which military personnel (and their families) are integrated successfully into wider society. They were concerned with public perceptions of defense policy and functioning of armed forces, including issues of recruitment, retention, and transfer of military personnel back to civilian society; the living standards of military families and challenges to a traditional way of military life; and so on.

Since the end of the Second World War, the set of functions of national military forces was enlarged and now includes international peacekeeping operations and other kinds of operations other than war. In turn, this led to a new dimension of civil–military relations theory—the problem of interaction of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international agencies, the local civilian population, the media and the military contingents involved in peace operations and conflict resolution (M. Williams, 1998).

The relationship between the media and the military, which became the subject of scientific inquiry, is also an important dimension of civil–military relations theory in the second part of the 20th century. Media forms the social image of the military and shapes public attitudes toward the missions of armed forces (with regard to the Balkan crisis see Malesic, 2000). Because soldiers are also exposed to mass communication, it can change the social outlook of soldiers along with other influences. Democracy assumes a free press for the dissemination of information. However, in wartime, one country's news is another country's intelligence, and a "psychological propaganda" or "information war" unfolds. For instance, from the Vietnam War to the contemporary "war against international terrorism" announced after the terrorist attack on New York and Washington in September 2001, the United States is wrestling with the issue of fulfilling the public's right to know while maintaining the rights of the soldiers on the battlefield not to be compromised and put at unnecessary risk by the news media of their own country (Sharkey, 1991; Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995; Kennedy, 1993; Hammond, 1988, 1996).

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Debates on the military and society deal primarily with political power and the state. The ever-relevant question of "who guards the guardians?" was a central issue in Plato's dialogue *The Republic,* written some 2500 years ago. In presenting what he considered to be the right order of society, Plato described the military state as a deviation. Juvenal in ancient Rome had raised the same question. The question that confronted ancient Greece and the Roman Empire continued to confront nations in the 20th century.

In any country, the status of civil–military relations is inseparable from the democratic (or nondemocratic) nature of the state, on one side, and the motivations and goals of the officer corps, on the other. The military's attitude toward the current regime may be crucial for the state's progress. Although the military is characterized by relative aloofness, it is not

divorced from politics and has often intervened in domestic matters. There is a direct link between the political system of a country and its propensity to use violence in international relations and at home. Military interventions, military rule, and the withdrawal of the military from politics are processes common to various historical periods, cultures, and regions. The last century was not unique. And at the very beginning of the 21st century there are states where the military leaders, who are not accountable to parliament or to the nation, are still in power.

The very salience of military interventions into politics and military coups invites comparisons and raises the question to what extent civil–military relations are dependent on different patterns of economic and cultural development, traditions, and other elements of political cultures; types of political regimes; and forms of social organizations of society (we cannot discuss this issue in detail, see one of approaches in Luckham, 1971).

Unsurprisingly, the central issue in the modern theories of civil–military relations is that of civilian control of the military. Currently, in the literature concerning the subject, the term "civilian control" is used interchangeably with "political control." *Civilian* here simply indicates the preeminence of civilian institutions, based on popular sovereignty, in the decision-making process concerning defense and security matters. The major point is this: The control of the instruments of violence must be firmly in the hands of *legitimate civilian* authorities. This means that control of the military has to be based on *democratic* principles.

What does "democratic principles" mean and how do they work in practice? Let us briefly touch on the issue. Democracy means the sovereignty of the people; it means that the authority of the state rests in the hands of its people. One of the basic tenets of representative democracy is that politicians who exercise political power are responsible to those who have elected them and in whose name they formulate and implement policies. The military command has no similar constitutional accountability to the nation. Thus, the democratic principle requirement follows from the premise of popular sovereignty that only democratically constituted (elected) civilian authority can legitimately make policy, including defense and security policy. Democracy requires the accountability of the government in power to the parliamentary legislature as well as to the independence of the judiciary. Both military and civilian citizens must also respect and support such principles of democracy as tolerance of differing opinions, open debate, a free press and exchange of ideas, and regular elections in which the losers accept defeat and the winners understand that they will have to face another election before long. The minority must have the chance of becoming the majority at the next election. This presupposes a multiparty system. These are the basic essentials of pluralistic democracy. Closely related to them is the principle of the equality of citizens in a democratic state.

Democratic control is always a two-way process of interaction between the military elite and the civil authorities (military–government relations) as well as between the military as a whole and its host society at large (military–society relations). The democratic government, the civilian executive authority, has the power to determine the size, type, and composition of the armed forces; to define the military and national security doctrines and concepts of military reforms; to propose budgets; and so on; for which it needs confirmation by the legislature. In these activities it has to rely on the expertise of civilian and military experts. Therefore, representatives of the military establishment always have great influence on the decision-making process. And generals can—and should, if needed—express opposing or critical views in the internal debate on the main strategic options both in parliament and government.

The very idea of civilian control must be truly accepted by the officer corps, at least in liberal democracies. It means that the military agrees with the supremacy of civilian authorities (the democratically elected president, parliament, and government) over the military commanders. At the same time the military as a whole must clearly understand that they are the servants, not the masters, of civilian society. It should be noted also that models of civil–military relations developed in the mature Western democracies assume not only an *apolitical* military, but also a *nonpartisan* military, while in other societies, where the military is closely intertwined with the state, this is not the case. When a prominent member of the armed forces *publicly* expresses political views, he is acting like a politician. And, as some authors argue, he thereby loses credibility as "a neutral civil servant and guardian of the state" (see Kohn, 1997a, 1997b).

The following statement may surprise some readers, but the American people have traditionally opposed a large standing military. One of the American Founders, Samuel Adams, summed up this traditional American attitude well:

> It is a very improbable supposition, that any people can long remain free, with a strong military power in the heart of their country: Unless that military power is under the direction of the people, and even then it is dangerous.... [A] wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it; for the maxims and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government. (Clinton Rossiter, 1963, p. 26)

The introduction of basic democratic principles into security and defense policy making begins through *legal means*. This requires extensive legislative work and continuous refinement, but is relatively straightforward. For instance, among the legal requirements of civil–military reform, which occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, were changes and additions to the national constitutions as well as to legislation relating to the armed forces and defense. Such amendments have had to regulate in a better and/or different way than under communist rule; for example, national constitutional provisions referring to war and peace and the state of emergency; the respect to international treaties and conventions; constitutional guarantees for human rights and freedoms for both civilians and soldiers; the division of power and relations between the head of the state (the president), the parliament, the Supreme Security (or Defense) Council, the Minister of Defense, and the General Staff. They included specific regulations and laws concerning the jurisdiction of military courts and prosecutors, the scope of the military and state secrets, and so on. Among the most important changes was the law that guarantees the right to conscientious objection from active military service and allows the performance of so-called "alternative" or "civilian" service for conscripts.

The process of shaping new civil–military relations in ex-socialist countries has been interrelated with a set of processes that determined the future image of society, including democratizing the society and politics, developing *civil societies*, performing market reforms and radical transformations of social structure, reorienting security and foreign policy, and reforming the army. One may agree with the view that the degree of civil control of the military is a good indicator of the depth of democratization process in each transitional country.

In formerly socialist-governed states, the Party's claim to exercise control did not mean that civilians were in charge of the military. The military were brought into the Party. In the chief political decision-making bodies relating to security the military exerted control over themselves because they had the monopoly of expertise and civilian expertise was lacking (Manig, 1997, pp. 26–27). Nevertheless, the principles of political control and Clausewitzian political subordination were assimilated by the military. Indeed, it is notable that

even where the military in parts of Europe had excessive influence on security policy or were used for internal repression, there are fewer instances of rule by the military and praetorian intervention in politics than in noncommunist or anticommunist states (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile in Latin America, for example, and in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and many places in Africa). The principle of party control, though deviating from civilian control in daily practice, became part of the culture and ideology of civil–military relations that could be asserted in times of crisis (with exceptions in Poland and Romania when the political system collapsed). Military rule was widely considered to be illegitimate. Institutionalized civilian supremacy was based up consensus about where legitimate sovereignty lies; consensus about processes for making policy decisions, including procedures for political succession; and a capacity in the civilian sector to defend its rights through legal means (Finer, 1962, p. 226). Even in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army's military successes did not persuade people to overwhelmingly endorse its candidates in local and national elections, though the KLA's accountability to both international and local civilian authorities must remain in doubt (Cooper, 2000).

The postcommunist states have undoubtedly made progress in reforming their civil–military relations, but whether civilian control of the military in these countries is still more a formality than a reality remains to be seen. We are cautious in this respect because the problem of civil control cannot be reduced solely to the legal and constitutional sphere. Even in new NATO states, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, which have made great strides in this respect, considerable problems still remain. First and foremost, the problem of building a system of democratic and civilian control in the postcommunist context is simply a much bigger and more difficult one than is generally recognized. Second, what makes matter even worse is that reforming civil–military relations is just one of many problems that these new democracies have faced. Reforms in the economic, social, and political spheres were much more crucial for the transition toward democracy and market economy than the reform of the military system. As a result, there was a tendency for civil–military reform to be pushed to the bottom of the political agenda. Although reforms in the army are in the focus of attention of the public and authorities, only in the past few years have the governments of postcommunist countries (and of the Western countries that are providing advice and assistance to their democratisation) come to realize how complex and multifaceted a job it is. To a large degree, the specific problems of reforming of civil–military relations differ from one postcommunist country to another, and, of course, the deficiencies in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, differ qualitatively and quantitatively from those of the Russian or Central Asian post-Soviet states [for a discussion of the situation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in the first half of the 1990s see Szemerkenyi, 1996. For an in-depth analysis of transformations of civil–military relations that occurred in the bulk of Central and Eastern European states and the status of the army in these countries by the end of the 1990s, see Kuhlman & Callaghan, 2000. See also: Special Issue: Army and State in Postcommunist Europe (D. Betz and J. Lowenhardt eds.), *The Journal of Communist and Transition Politics,* Vol. 17(1), March 2001. For the connection to the present situation in Yugoslavia see Vankovska and Wiberg, 2000; Hadzic, 2000; Minic and Lopandic, 2000].

Civilian control of the army includes the achievement of a degree of *transparency* in the sphere of *defense spending* and *defense planning*. In a democracy the government is obliged to keep citizens informed. Information is a debt to be paid to the public. Citizens have the right to know what their government plans and intends concerning the deployment of the armed forces.

The parliament has a certain power over the generals through control over the defense budget. Control over the defense budget means that military manpower and basic organizational issues are subject to parliamentary budget appropriation review and approval. Some countries further reinforce parliamentary supervision of the armed forces by increasing the authority of their respective Defense Committees or by instituting the office of a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. However, in many cases parliaments are not very effective in overseeing the implementation of the military budget and certain problems have arisen. Debates concerning investments in the military sphere reflect political parties' goals and the different visions of national interest and priorities in domestic and foreign policy. Defense budget allocation has become a subject of considerable lobbying.

The public at large has a certain interest in controlling defense spending and military planning, bearing in mind the magnitude of expenditure on modern armed forces and the limited size of financial, material, and human resources of the nation. This means that the defense budget and all proceedings relating to it must be open to public scrutiny. In this regard the media monitoring parliamentary debates and exposing public opinion toward defense spending, military reform, and security policy serves as an important channel of political communication, as the guardian of democracy. It is very important function of the media because in many cases military affairs are, to a large extent, hidden under the cover of secrecy.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY

Civil society has a vital role to play in cultural transformation of the security sector in postconflict societies.[4] Although the concept of civil society is imprecise and difficult to capture. It can be defined as an emancipatory political alternative to authoritarianism "where progressive values and political practices can be articulated and counter-hegemonic institutions can be created" (Gershman and Bellow, 1995, p. 3; Cox, 1999). Not all nonstate associations exist to guard against the threats from power-holders; some may be dedicated to racism and violence or, like the mafia, may be illegal or declared so. Furthermore, the Western model of "majority rule," imitated in postconflict situations can, of course, lead to abuse of power in mixedethnic societies (Vankovska, 2001). In an idealized system of civil–military relations, the separation of powers, political pluralism, and the engagement of civil society seem to be indispensable conditions for a nonpoliticized military and a nonmilitarized society. As various researchers have argued, structures, rules, and training policies may change the operations of armed forces, but one of the most difficult challenges is to change the mentality of the military, their political masters, and of society at large (Manig, 1997, p. 25). This requires development that goes beyond reform of structures and replacement of personnel.

Security sector reform in transitional societies has tended to focus on the following areas: (1) reforming the uniformed security branches and training parliamentarians and civil servants, (2) supporting the establishment of structures of proper civilian control over the military, (3) training members of the military in international humanitarian law and human rights, and (4) strengthening national parliamentary oversight of the security apparatus. But these areas do not necessarily address the problem of military/social attitudes. A structure

[4]This section draws on continuing research, *Security Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies* for the Centre for Defence Studies, London, which is being carried out by Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper.

of civilian supremacy does not necessarily ensure a successful transformation of attitudes. Civilian control can be exercised for narrow personal or party interests and the suppression of political opposition. In Croatia under President Franjo Tudjman, for instance, army staff and the officer class were expected to be members of Tudjman's Croat Democratic Union or face dismissal (Zunec, 1996). Nor does military professionalism guarantee transformation. According to Samuel Huntington, it may be possible to change attitudes by appealing to the concepts of "legitimacy" and "professionalism" in order to keep the military out of politics (Huntington, 1957, p. 74). However, "professionalism" can be interpreted as loyalty to some higher authority, such as "the nation," and thereby escape political control. In many coup-prone states, nationalism and the need for strong central government have provided gilt-edged invitations for the military to intervene (Finer, 1962, p. 210). Moreover, as Alice Hills has noted with respect to civil police, standards of professionalism are culturally dependent and often skill- and status-based, rather than linked to moral choices (Hills, 2000, p. 4).

A transformation in civil–military mentalities requires something additional to structural reform, a culture of civilian supremacy, and a reliance on professionalism. It also requires the creation of a security policy community that stretches beyond the military and politicians. For framing a transformative approach to civil–military relations, it is therefore important to note a difference of emphasis between (1) civilian control and management, which is constitutionally established through law and formal decision-making processes; and (2) civil–society engagement, which is largely a matter of political and social mobilization. These are not absolute differences because the mobilization of civil society can also be formalized as constitutional reform. For example, since Slovenia became independent, tribunals that hear claims for conscientious-objector status have a statutory obligation to include NGO representatives, such as peace activists, on their panels.

The importance of civil society is in its role in creating an awareness of issues, debates, and security policy options. Rights-based women's groups, experts in the media, researchers, and professionals such as health workers can make important contributions to the formulation and implementation of policy (Lode, 1997; Sørrensen, 1998; Solheim, 1999). Let us take the case of Southeast Europe and Yugoslavia, in particular, as examples. Yugoslavia has been engaged in this process since 1995 through an NGO, the Centre for Civil–Military Relations, which was established to advocate change in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Many members were forced into early retirement after 20 or 30 years of service in the Yugoslav National Army. Since 1997 the Centre has publicly promoted the concept of transparency in civil–military relations and democratic control over the Armed Forces. One of its main objectives has been "to animate [the] professional and political interest of citizens, their associations, political parties, parliamentary and state organs for a modern arrangement of civil-military relations in the FR Yugoslavia." It has been highly critical of the Kostunica government for lack of energy in reforming the military and allowing an "old guard" in the upper echelons of the military to remain in post (Hadzic, 1997, 2001). Southeast Europe may be generally far more modernized than Africa, but the level of civilian expertise or interest in defense and security policy may be extremely low (Vankovska, 1999:36). Consequently, greater investment might be directed toward introducing processes that reduce the possibility of the miniaturization of societies and the alienation of the military from society. The FRY has a more developed security policy community than elsewhere. Nevertheless throughout the region, investment could be used to gain the widest possible support for the definition of new military functions and security

doctrines (UK Department for International Development, 1999b, p. 4). The civil society groups are bound to operate primarily at a domestic level. But civil–military relations in the wider world of deterritorialized threats to values and, in Europe at least, increasingly integrated security institutions create new problems for civil–military relations. Indeed, the powerful democratic states that exercise protectorates in Southeast Europe exhibit their own democratic deficit. There is negligible parliamentary control over security matters or transparency in decision making when security issues move into intergovernmental arenas and military purposes are ill-defined. Eventually, external actors may not be able to maintain the contradiction of supporting democratic civilian control within war-torn societies, while their own security forces become the arm of a self-appointed "International Community" that projects force and manages conflict without democratic transparency authority or accountability.

Three organizational categories can be identified as follows: veterans' organizations, educational groups, and functional associations.

Veterans' Organizations

These groups might be expected to take a keen interest in military affairs, but they vary widely in their goals and objectives. There is no inherent predisposition for them to adopt transformative approaches. Indeed, veterans' organizations are not necessarily interested in depoliticizing the military or in curbing any praetorian political aspirations the military might have. Some are simply military coups or paramilitary units in waiting. Others are committed to civilian primacy, but are highly partisan. However, others are driven more by the welfare needs and employment of former soldiers, and they can be highly critical of secrecy and intransigence in military establishments.

Educational and Intellectual Groups

Within the academic/educational sector, courses and research programs on issues ranging from military history to disaster response are a significant source of debate and contesting theories. Institutes studying military policy, strategy, and defense are a recognized feature of many societies. They may be close to the prevailing military culture, overwhelmingly realistic in outlook, and dependent on cultivating government politicians. But they will also often take a provocative line. NGOs engaged in campaigning and/or consultancy can present clear alternatives to existing military policy. An interesting and successful experiment in South Africa from the mid-1990s saw NGOs involved in the drafting of the country's 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions (Williams, 2000, p. 88).

Functional Associations and Voluntary Groups

These groups have a direct or indirect role in forming public opinion on military issues and include the following: (1) trade unions and employers affected by changes in military expenditure and industrialization; (2) emergency services and Red Cross/Crescent organizations might be involved in formulating rules governing the use of the military in civil

disasters and emergency relief (Military aid to the civil authorities in nonpolitical civil emergencies has considerable transformative potential. The widespread criticism of the Turkish military's performance following the earthquake of August 1999 demonstrates that failure to participate effectively in disaster relief can damage the reputation and credibility of military institutions.); (3) women's groups affected by the mobilization and demobilization of soldiers might be engaged in discussions concerning rules on conscientious objection, recruitment policies, and the welfare rights of military personnel; (4) church and welfare groups with interests in humanitarian, moral, and philosophical aspects of security policy; (5) environmental groups interested in protecting or managing areas affected by military despoliation or training; (6) media organizations and journalists' associations that have a commitment to investigative reporting; and (7) rights-based groups, such as the branches of Amnesty International, local citizens forums, and local Helsinki Citizens Assemblies.

In the context of security-sector transitions, civil groups can be singled out for support if they foster bottom-up democratic processes for building trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion, and pluralism. Engaging civil society may mean funding training, workshops, and conferences and the provision of legal materials. It may also mean subsidizing broadcasting or publications, such as special issues of journals that incorporate the views of nonuniformed commentators. It can also mean helping local NGOs to put forward their views on issues such as conscientious objection and freedom of information legislation and the welfare of the military. Examples can be found in overseas development policies. Specific programs in Africa have included (1) a Netherlands–Mali initiative that has involved civil-society organizations in the formulation of a code of conduct on the role of the security sector in society; (2) UK funding for the provision of legal materials and training to NGOs and professional organizations to underpin reform of, and wider access to, justice systems in Rwanda; (3) Finnish and Swedish support to NGO projects for education and policy-making access on a range of democracy and rights-based programs in Africa; and (4) Norwegian and British funding for seminars and training on democratization for defense researchers in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Chalmers, 2000, pp. 11–12). The United Kingdom's development policy even includes the idea that "The voices of the poor can be strengthened by supporting those parts of civil society that help poor people organize to influence decision makers.... Promoting effective and inclusive systems of government, including an accountable security sector, is an essential investment in the prevention of violent conflict" (UK Department for International Development, 1999a, pp. 25, 27–28).

In summary, effective democratic control of the military in any democratic country is hardly conceivable without the active participation of NGOs and other parts of *civil society*. Therefore the level of interaction between the military and NGOs is an indication of the quality of the relationship between civil society and the army in the given country. As noted above, NGOs have different tasks. Some of them are working with the military to increase the public credibility of the armed forces. Others are monitoring civil rights violations of draftees and soldiers in some countries and armies (space precludes discussion of such problems as draft dodging, the status of minorities and homosexuals in armed forces, severe bullying of junior soldiers, and so on).

Because of the importance of human rights monitoring, we emphasize that members of armed forces—whether conscripts or volunteers—are citizens in uniform. Like all other citizens they have and enjoy a number of inalienable basic civil rights. Therefore, citizens

in uniform cannot be deprived of their basic civil rights during their term of service. In principle, these rights continue to obtain. Restrictions may indeed be imposed on the exercise of civil rights for those serving in the military, but only where this is required by the exigencies of keeping the military organization functioning. If restrictions must be imposed, legal provisions are necessary in every single case. This means that in a democracy the rights and duties of soldiers on active duty must be defined and protected by law. Military superiors do not have absolute power over their subordinates, but may only issue orders for military purposes and must respect their subordinates' human dignity. The national laws regulate the extent to which the basic rights of soldiers could and should be restricted due to military exigencies. Differences in legal tradition and historical background play a role here. Although in some Western countries, Germany, for instance, active and passive suffrage as well as freedom of association is unrestricted, there are more restrictive laws governing these rights in other democracies. Freedom of religion is an undisputed right in all democratic countries, which leads to the establishment of military pastoral care.

To resume, the establishment and maintainance of effective civilian control of the military is a way to redefine the status of armed forces on democratic lines. It is a complex process of incorporating the military into a system of democratically ruled societal institutions. It is a nonstop process in any country because the ongoing changes in the international environment coincide with a profound systematic change in domestic and external politics. Success or failure of this process could have a direct effect on the future of the world.

CHANGES WITHIN THE ARMY AND WIDER SOCIETY

In most countries armed forces have to be reformed to meet the challenges of a rapidly transforming world. They must adapt to a totally different global political-strategic landscape. Change within the military should correspond to transformations within a society.

There is a permanent tension between the demand of maximizing the military efficiency, which implies the recognition of the substantial autonomy of military organizations, the definite format of professional armed forces, and so on, and societal fears of a loss of control of the professional military, which tends to be increasingly distanced from the civilian society. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many American analysts argued in favor of maintaining conscription, rather than changing to an all-volunteer military force, out of a concern that replacing the conscript—the prototype of the citizen-soldier—with a volunteer would produce either a praetorian or mercenary army and that this would fundamentally alter the nature of civilian control of the military. The experience of certain states (for example, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom) with volunteer forces has demonstrated that one can have a volunteer military that is neither praetorian nor mercenary, and the continuation of military conscription is being broadly questioned in modern democracies such as France. At the same time it has become clear that only wealthy states can have a genuine professional army due to the huge costs. In postcommunist societies, for instance, the model of a semiprofessional, mixed force, where a certain proportion of personnel consists of conscripts, is used.

The transition toward the professional army does alter cultural aspects of civil–military relations, and some of these need to be addressed. According to American studies, there

are some disturbing evidence and trends pointing to a growing chasm between the professional military and civilian society. There are three sources of the widening gap: civilian ignorance of the military arising from the absence of widespread military experience in the postconscription era; politicization of the military accompanied by a growing estrangement from civilian values; and the post-Cold War security environment (Ricks, 1997). In short, the American military are significantly more Republican and conservative than civilians, and the military—civilian gap in partisan and ideological identification is widening (Hosti, 1997, p. 18). That is certainly the case with respect to differences between the military and civilian society.

According to poll data, the degree of respect shown by civilians to the armed forces varies considerably among nations. Therefore, in some societies the officers and ensigns are certain that civilians are respectful and sympathetic, while in others they feel indifference toward them. The reason evidently lies in the fact that attitudes toward the military, their missions, and the army's organization and functioning correspond to the evolution of the value-attitudinal system of the entire nation, to the mentality of civilian society, and the popular perceptions of external threats as well as to media–military relations and the current state of the national economy. This is why the emergent alienation between the military and society and the difference in the patterns of political orientation have been considered a cause for alarm in the United States. Yet it is easier to diagnose a problem than to prescribe a solution for bridging the sides.

The differences in values, attitudes, and political inclinations between citizens in uniform and civilians is a large subject which cannot be discussed in detail in this chapter. In each country the picture differs from others in important features for many reasons rooted in history. It depends on the character of the army's relationship with the civilian society and political power and on its mentality and spirit. Allegiance to the military oath and the "Motherland" are synonymous with patriotism. Whereas patriotism and greatness of the state rank first in the systems of the United States and Russian civilian and military values (as in many other armies and nations), they are not paramount in some armies and societies (for instance, in the Ukrainian army and society in the early 1990s). We have emphasized this point because, the military insist, the army is a guardian of basic national values, since the greatness of a state is determined by the might of its army to a large extent (we must say here that this is a very traditional perspective that does not allow for economic strength, the health and welfare of the population, and protection of the vulnerable).

The tendency to reshape armed forces as a professional military organization is likely to continue. Conversely, the growing distance between the society and its soldiers is giving rise to many problems: for example, ambivalent public reaction which has developed in recent years when armed forces have been used as a mean of conflict settlement and restoration of peace outside the national borders. A significant part of the public can become frustrated and lose some of its faith in the efficiency and effectiveness of the troops because it becomes evident that military intervention cannot solve the political problems that have ignited the intrastate conflicts. The military, in turn, can become resentful toward civilian society for unfair reactions which should have been directed at politicians.

Despite the fact that many peacekeepers/peace enforcers are satisfied with their personal job performance during missions, military reluctance to engage in intervention has been documented. As early as the 1960s sociologists have noted that soldiers have been uninterested in participating in low-prestige constabulary activities because such operations are ultimately driven by politics and the ends are not clear. Of course, military reluctance is attributable to various reasons that differ from country to country. But first and foremost

is the absence of clear-cut victories (with the regard to views of the American military, see Goldstein, 2000).

Nowadays most military missions are multinational in scope. This implies, of course, many problems, including legitimizing certain actions. Intervention in internal conflict is not always easy to explain in terms of an obligation to restore peace and order or to contain local and regional conflicts that threaten to spill over; it is easier to understand it as serving purely national security and geopolitical considerations. For instance, some people in the West interpret Russia's interventions in the conflicts on the territory of the former USSR as a new variety of the old Russian imperialism. The effects of peacekeeping in the Balkans remain a contentious issue as well. Many citizens in the intervening European countries ask for a precise calculation of costs and results. Others raise questions like "Are we really concerned? Why do our boys have to go there and perhaps even die?" As a result, while civilian leaders, whether motivated by humanitarian concern or by foreign policy objectives, have sought to employ armed forces in situations "other than war" outside national borders, civil–military relations in some countries have become slightly strained.

The question of the cultural gap has been an important area in civil–military relations theory in the past and will continue to be problematic in the future. It has a link with the other changes that have taken place in the militaries of democratic nations in recent decades, in particular with an increase in gender integration in the armed forces. Military service has traditionally been a masculine domain, but as part of the ongoing societal transformations and democratization, which call for extending citizenship rights and obligations to previously excluded groups, women in some countries have demanded, and been granted, increased opportunities in the military. There have been sharp debates on the participation of women in the military. Proponents have argued that it is the right of women, as citizens, to serve. There are economic reasons why women choose a military career. Opponents have argued that the presence of women in the military undermines military effectiveness and therefore threatens national security. In general the proponents have prevailed. This change may also be considered an argument in favor of those who regard military service as a form of employment and consider the growing number of women in the armed forces as an indicator of the trend toward greater gender equality not only in the economy, but also in other sectors.

The end of the Cold War resulted in cuts in military expenditures and a reduction in the size of the armed forces of former foes (so-called peace dividends). The positive development of being able to reduce the amount spent on defense had been coupled with severe personal problems for professional personnel affected by a reduced military. Recent research has shown that wealthy Western states have had to provide more opportunities for people suddenly undergoing a career change than has been the case for the ex-military in the Central and Eastern Europe. The long-term economic crisis in the postcommunist states has severely aggravated the problem of adaptation of to civilian life for former military personnel.

Thus it is evident that a healthy economy is vital, both for a better adjustment for military personnel demobilizing to a new civilian life and for the flourishing of a democracy itself. As for political consequences, the lesson drawn from the results of the parliamentary elections in Russia in the early 1990s is as follows: if military and ex-military people are too destitute, they have little inclination for reasoned political debate and can succumb to the views of populist or extremist (rightwing nationalist) groups that promise much but yet deliver only hardship and oppression. The stakes of political combat are lower when there is, as some Americans say, "another game in town."

CIVIL–MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

In addition to relations between the military and wider society in domestic environments, in this chapter we must also consider the relationship between military and society when troops are deployed abroad in the context of humanitarian activities and peace support operations. We are not concerned with matters of civil–military relations arising from military conquest and occupation on the one hand and civil emergencies and natural disasters on the other, but with the particular framework of peace support operations. In this context, two phenomena can be observed: the involvement of military forces in "humanitarian" work, and the concept of civil–military cooperation.

First, the military have often carried out humanitarian activities, and some authors argue that "military humanitarianism" is not an oxymoron because military action has often defended humanitarian values. In practice armed protection and military involvement can be beneficial in preventing or mitigating human suffering (Weiss, 1999). Military operations, including traditional peacekeeping missions, have long involved a civilian affairs element, which includes activities that can be defined as "humanitarian." In peacekeeping missions, as in Cyprus and Lebanon, humanitarian relief has been provided with impartial and neutral intentions (Pugh, 1996; M. Williams, 1998.). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, development of conditionality (i.e., adherence by parties to the Dayton Agreement) has been important in military and international provisions (Siegel, 2001). In the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises, Albania, and Macedonia, the construction of refugee camps was a direct consequence of political and strategic intervention by the military. In the last case, camps were not always appropriately planned or managed, but few commentators would doubt that the military have areas of expertise and capacity that are ancillary to humanitarian purposes, especially in road building and general engineering, logistic support, and mine clearing. This trend toward using the military in "political humanitarian" work does not, of course, turn the military into humanitarians, and there are various problems in civil–military relations (discussed below) as a consequence.

Second, civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) in peace support missions that are intended to overcome some of those problems encompass a broad range of actors and activities. CIMIC is defined by NATO for situations where external forces supply military security as follows: "The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (NATO, *NATO Civil–Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine,* AJP–09, Provisional Final Draft, 2000, paragraph 102).

In messy internal conflicts external forces are dependent on local civilian authorities and populations for resources and freedom of movement and on external civilian organizations for advice and information. In the United States and the United Kingdom, civil–military cooperation grew out of army civil affairs branches that were capable of providing civil emergency relief and undertaking public works. In Operation "Provide Comfort" for Northern Iraq in 1991 the U.S. forces set up a Civil–Military Operations Command Center (CMOC). In Somalia, Civil–Military Liaison Centers were used to brief civilian agencies (see Kennedy and Ken, 1996) In Rwanda, the U.S. military again provided CMOCs to coordinate with civilian activities that were already being coordinated by the UN's Rwanda Emergency Office. Such forums facilitated dialog, mutual awareness, exchange of information, and requests by civilian field workers for military logistic support. The development

of CIMIC as a doctrine in the United States, United Kingdom, NATO, and the Western European Union began to be codified with the development of a new strategic concept (SC99) in the late 1990s. SC99 emphasized that "civil environment protection," that is to say, good relations between Allied forces and civilian organizations, was crucial for effective military operations (NATO, *MC 411/1: Nato Military policy on Civil-Military Co-operation,* Available at: G:/OPS2001/Doc/MC/MC411/090201.doc 2001).

There has also been a pressing need to define relations on matters of civilian protection. Although an absence of military protection is the rule in most civilian relief missions, in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, for example, civilian organizations considered that maintaining independence, neutrality, and impartiality were no longer adequate protection against deliberate attacks on workers and supplies. Faced with the prospect of suspending their activities, they turned to peacekeepers for security (which the UN Commission for Refugees, as the "lead agency," did in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or to local police and armed guards (as Oxfam did in Somalia). Military protection, especially in coercive peace support operations, remains a thorny issue because it compromises traditional humanitarian principles and associates civilian humanitarians with goals that have little to do with humanitarian action.

Unsurprisingly, the roles of external military and civilian components in humanitarian actions have developed in an increasingly integrative way. NGOs have often had close relationships to the state, by taking on state contracts or otherwise drawing on government funding. Military and humanitarian action became blurred in the Balkan and Afghanistan (2001) emergencies. Many NGOs also worked closely with national military forces in Albania and Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis. But humanitarian organizations did not seem to notice that the diplomats and the military had their own agendas, which were more about NATO's credibility and the exercise of power in the European security system than about the crisis itself (Chomsky, 1999).

The coercive orientation of peace support operations may improve physical access to conflict zones and serve to protect populations, but significant problems can also occur. First and foremost, the civil–military relationship is subordinate to strategic purposes, as in Kosovo, leading to conditions being placed on the exercise of humanitarian principles. CIMIC operations give priority to supporting a military mission in all circumstances, so as to "create civil–military conditions that will offer the Commander the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages" and "[give] the military commander a 'carrot' to compliment his 'stick' in gaining compliance" of agreements such as the Dayton Peace Accords (Pugh, 1998, 2000) Military initiatives to institutionalize the relationship, since the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia subsequently led to a dilution of humanitarian independence. NGOs lost their independence through close association with one side in Kosovo and Afghanistan where humanitarian concerns were dictated by political factors (on Kosovo, see Rieff, 1999). The role of international organizations, and notably the UNHCR, which was already depleted by reduced state funding, was further overshadowed by the strategic goals of state élites (Morris, 1999). Second, the military (and police forces as part of peace-building missions) are the servants of states, commissioned by their governments. They command state resources, regular funding, logistics capabilities, a pool of labor, and the backing of state sovereignty. Even in multinational missions when military contingents are under the "operational" control of a nonnational commander, strategic command remains with the individual national governments, which set up national reporting and control structures. The civilian sector has a more diffuse relationship to state power. International civil servants working for UN aid agencies are sent by organizations whose

policies are indirectly molded by states and deal with state authorities, but which may also develop a corporate loyalty. Further, the statist and strategic basis of military interventions run counter to the potential for humanitarian organizations to foster a transnational ethic that would not only preserve humanitarian principles but also contest statist assumptions about conflict, development, and power.

CONCLUSION

We believe that over time and across nations, higher levels of democracy have been achieved by a larger number of states (although much of this is cosmetic and certainly not economic). Unquestionably, in democracies proper civil–military relations require civilian control over the military. Therefore we assume that a more limited range of models of civil–military relations than existed in the previous century will characterize the 21st century. However, the world will not settle on a single model: There is no one model appropriate for all nations. Foreseeing a future convergence among models of civil–military relations, we have to remember that states are approaching it from very different starting points, reflecting different national histories. Change in the pattern of civil–military relations in each country is a part of the further democratization of society. Democracy is an ideal toward which human societies work: It is a process, not an existential state. The postcommunist era is now more than a decade old, yet the transformation of civil–military relations to democratic norms is still a difficult political issue in many ex-socialist countries.

Democratic associations of civil society can play a transformative role in changing existing mentalities. This need not be limited to budgetary and performance oversight, but could include development of structures and regulations. The role of civil society groups would also be to mediate and translate security issues between the wider society and the defense establishment. They can make military questions meaningful to society and to resonate social concerns to the defense establishment. Such a transfer of knowledge can also occur by other means: official statements, military press briefings, and the election of parliamentarians with an interest in security matters. But official statements are only the beginning of dialog; press briefings can be easily manipulated and parliamentarians are elected only every few years and do not usually devote much time to defense issues (except, importantly, through standing committees). Obviously, transformation cannot occur without a solid constitutional foundation, a system of accountability, some concept of freedom of information, and a degree of consensus about what needs to be kept secret for strategic reasons rather than maintaining military privilege and power. But there also needs to be a level of knowledge and understanding of security issues in society and a willingness in the military to accept social change and civil society influence in a "security policy community" (Gow & Birch, 1997, p. 10). And it should be a genuine "contest" in which civilians are empowered to alert society and challenge power-holders. Only then will it be possible to build a security policy community of mutual respect.

The problem of the military affecting the government is a concern in any democratic society. Hence, if the citizen-soldier disappears along with conscription, as armies become increasingly professionalized, the risk of praetorianism may increase as well. In this regard de Tocqueville's wise thought that the remedy for the vices of the military is not to be found in the military itself but in its host society should not be forgotten. The armed forces cannot be strong if the army is backed by a weak economy and alienated from civil society. Generally speaking, what is needed to avoid a military coup is not a "democratic army," which is a

contradiction in terms, but an army within and for democracy. For this, armed forces are needed which willingly submit to the primacy of democratic principles in which the rule of law obtains and whose members not only view themselves as "citizens in uniform," but are also regarded and accepted as such by their civilian counterparts.

The last decade of the 20th century was one of radical change. Historic alignments have shifted and there are unheard-of opportunities for international cooperation between old adversaries. It is unfortunate that not all of the results of these changes have been positive: Ethnic antagonisms have surfaced with a new vengeance, upsetting prospects for stability in many regions of the world. Military interventions in the internal conflicts and civil wars in the Balkans and in the territory of the former USSR revealed many contradictions and raised questions concerning the aims of military actions and their moral and juridical justifications in the eyes of the public (e.g., protection of human rights of minority and prevention of attempted ethnic cleansing versus defense of the national integrity against the separatists and external aggressors, to name the most salient points). Sometimes those actions and the behavior of the military and governments involved in actions were characterized more by delusion and double standards than by civic values (Rukavishnikov, 2001). As far as the armed forces and their new constabulary missions are concerned, this was a development that questioned many traditional concepts. Furthermore, it erodes the traditional social and political links between societies and their military.

The international security environment is unlikely to change dramatically over the short run and, in any case, we would hardly want to see a drastic change for the worse in conflict resolution activities. We would prefer to see a defining of the roles of armed forces in peace support missions in compliance with national constitutions and international law. Armed forces may only be deployed within an ordered legal framework, including compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the subsequent documents as well as with international agreements and humanitarian law. Peace missions and interventions in the name of global security require a multinational mix of armed forces in order to broaden the international legitimation of the operation. This means that the development of a new context of relations between the military and national/international society is emerging.

Because the international system is also unlikely to change in ways that significantly reduce or eliminate global security problems and contradictions of national interests, an almost implausible scenario would posit a further essential reduction in the size of the armed forces of major global actors. But in the long-run the military must shrink, in the great powers as elsewhere. The leading countries are thus likely to have a military that is professional, also well prepared for operations "other than war," and respected by civilians.

CHAPTER 9

Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Relevance, Issues, and Research Agenda

HANS BORN

Basically, the subject of the democratic control of armed forces refers to the question "Who guards the guards?" This enduring question was raised as far back as in classical Rome by Juvenal.[1] Democracy always implicitly presumes unlimited civilian supremacy over the command of the armed forces—anything short of that defines an incomplete democracy (Luttwak, 1999). But what exactly is democratic control, and how can we conceptualize it? Generally speaking, a state's system of democratic control is a product of its system of government, politics, history, and culture. Aditionally, as there are many different cultures and political systems, many different norms and practices of democratic control also exist. Consequently, and for better or worse, there is no single, definitive normative model for democratic control. At least several models are present, some of which appear to contradict others. The main question of this chapter is "How can democratic control be conceptualized?" The following questions relating to the issue are addressed: (1) What is democratic control?, (2) What is the relevance of democratic control?, (3) How can democratic control be achieved?, (4) What are specific problems of democratic control?, and (5) How can democratic control be studied?

WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?

A vast number of authors have conducted research and defined "democratic control." I briefly summarize several definitions of democratic control in order to distinguish some main points of attention.

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[1] 'Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies?', Juvenal, *Omnia Romae*, VI, p. 347.

Huntington (1957, p. 80) argues that civilian control has "to do with the relative power of civilian and military groups.... Civilian control is achieved to the extent to which the power of the military groups is reduced. Consequently, the basic problem in defining civilian control is: how can military power be minimized? In general, two answers exist [civilian subjective and civilian objective control]."

The Czech Government[2] views democratic control "as a feedback process in the overall process management of the Czech military, and it is affected by the constitutional authorities" involving "the gathering and analysis of information on the status and operations of the Czech military in its principal aspects and adequate power to enforce decisions." It is a process of open communication between the supreme country authorities and the topmost leadership of the Czech military.

Pelle en Van Schendelen[3] distinguishes three different meanings of parliamentary control: steering (*ex ante*), influence (*dumque*), and check (*ex post*).

In Stefan Sarvas' view,[4]

> democratic control implies respecting democratic norms. It is not only control in the strict sense, but includes also guidance by political actors who provide democratic management. Democratic control always implies civilian control, but civilian control is not necessarily democratic control. For example, the political oversight of the Czech communist regime over the military forces was civilian, but not democratic.

Chris Donnelly of NATO defines democratic control as "the government direction of military activity and parliamentary oversight of both government and military".[5]

The Canadian Douglas Bland puts forward "the theory of shared responsibility." Bland's thesis is that

> civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused. (Bland, 1999, p. 9)

Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey,[6] from England, are of the opinion that

> democratic control refers to the political function and position of the military—that is to say, their relationship with the institutions and patterns of political power in the society concerned. Democratic control is the control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state. Democratic control forms the core of civil–military relations, which involve wider issues: the broader attitudes to the military; the military's ethos as to what its roles should be; and the economic role of the military.

[2] Ministry of Defense, *White Paper on Defense of the Czech Republic*, Prague, 1995, p. 56.

[3] Pelle and Van Schendelen, *Problems of Control in Constitutional Law*. Rotterdam: Erasmus University, dissertation, 1991.

[4] Stefan Sarvas, The shift from the transitional to democratic agenda: *Problems and future of democratic control of armed forces in the Czech Republic*. Paper presented at the ERGOMAS conference in Stockholm (1998), p. 2.

[5] Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem", in *NATO-review*, 1, 1997.

[6] Andrew Cottey et al., *Civil–military relations in Central and Eastern Europe: Democratic control of the armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe, a framework for understanding civil–military relation*, University of Nottingham, 1999 (available at: www.nottingham.ac.uk/politics/civil-military/Overview/theoretical%20Framework.htm).

Kuhlmann and Callaghan (2000)[7] argue that democratic control is about integrating the military into democracies. The primary reason for this perspective is their main concern about "how the military's use of coercive force is made to serve legitimate, democratically determined ends without causing prejudice to the professional autonomy the military needs to perform its job effectively." Within this perspecptive, Kuhlman and Callaghan address the broader link between armed forces and society such as the media; information technology revolution; military family; public perception of the armed forces; issues of recruitment/retention of officers; relations with the military–industrial sector; and, last but not least, the weight of history.

According to Biljana Vankovska (2000)[8] civilian supremacy and parliamentary control are the cornerstones of democratic control. Rudolf Joo (Joo, 1996) argues that democratic control contains societal, institutional, as well as procedural aspects. In his view, democratic control refers to a broad view.

It appears that a consensus exists among scholars that democratic control implies at least civilian supremacy and parliamentary control. However, beyond this, one encounters many contrasting views on democratic control. Analyzing the previous mentioned definitions, the following contrasting perspectives can be identified.

(1) Scope: Narrow scope versus broad scope on civil–military relations. The narrow scope focuses on civilian supremacy and parliamentary control. The broad scope takes the complete civil–military relations into account, focusing on integrating the military into society. (2) Actors: In line with scope, a narrow scope involves only the parliament, the government, and the military. The broad scope involves social institutions or actors as well. Some authors regard the relationship between the politicians and the military as adversarial, whereas others see control as a matter of shared responsibility between the political and military leaders. (3) The quality of control: Control also refers to the quality of control in terms of *ex ante* control (e.g., directional and proactive), control in the sense of influence and *ex post* control (e.g., audit). Also, the control relation can be a command relation (e.g., orders and formal power) or a negotiating relation (e.g., tit-for-tat). (4) Civilian control does not equal democratic control: Civilian control is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic control. (5) Power bases: Democratic control refers to the military's relative position of power in society, especially in relation to the political leaders. An asymmetrical power relation between political and military leaders exists, i.e., the political leaders possess formal power, whereas the military leaders posses information, expertise, and relation power (connections, alliances).

WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?

Democratic control is not an end in itself, but serves some purpose. I mention below some scholarly views on the purpose (sense, reason) of democratic control.

According to several authors, the control of the armed services is an essential element of any democracy. Democracy mostly implicitly presumes an unlimited civilian supremacy

[7]Juergen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, *About the primacy of politics over military matters: (West-) Germany's approach of integrating the 'Bundeswehr' into democracy*. Dissertation, 2000, p. 5–7.
[8]Biljana Vankovska, NATO war over Yugoslavia: Civilian control in focues. Research paper of the Copenhague Peace Research Institute (2000) (available at: www.copri.dk).

over the command of the armed forces. In fact, a democracy without this supremacy can hardly be called a democracy at all.[9] Therefore, the civilian control of the armed forces can be regarded as an indispensable element of democracy. In my view, the relevance of democratic control for established democracies is not so much the fear of a *coup d'état*, but the alignment of the goals of the political and military leaders.

In addition, democratic control serves the function of a desirable myth in society. Democratic control is a part of the constitution of every democracy. However, it seems to be an established fact that the elected representatives do not posses a wide-enough span of control for effective oversight of the armed forces. From a constitutional/theoretical point of view, the minister is responsible for all deeds of the military, but in practice he is only accountable for the main lines of the Defence policy (see section 4 'The fourth might in the trias politica' under question 4). Despite the gap between theory and practice, it is important that we believe in the ideal of civilian control. From this perspective, democratic control is more of a "beacon in the sea" rather than an established practice.

With respect to the purpose of democratic control, Marco Carnovale (Carnovale, 1997) mentions, among others, two main reasons for democratic control. First, democratic societies with democratic control of the armed forces are less prone to wage war. Second, democratic control provides the military with legitimacy. Therefore, it justifies the bearing of arms by just one group in society.

According to Huntington, military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: the functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and the societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant in society.[10] Democratic control fulfills an essential role in balancing the two imperatives in order to avoid the military becoming either too weak or too strong. Actually, the functional and the societal imperatives refer to the civil–military paradox: how to defend a democracy with an undemocratic organization.

The September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, DC give new meaning to functional and societal imperatives. The terrorist attacks made it clear that not only the armed forces but also other security sector organizations, such as the intelligence services and border guards, need broader and greater powers for combating terrorism effectively. However, the democratically elected representatives in government and in parliament have to balance the need for a stronger functional imperative, on the one hand, with the need for protecting civil liberties, on the other hand. Security organizations that are too powerful could threaten the civil liberties of the citizens and, therefore, the democratic way of life.

Sam Sarkesian (Sarkesian, 1981) states that "the generally accepted idea of acceptance of the military in democratic societies as an apolitical organisation, characterised by civilian control and supremacy is, in practice, mere ignorance of history and reality." Therefore, Stefan Sarvas argues that

> the armed forces prompt express concerns in every society and it is up to the democratic controlling institutions to supervise the parameters within which the military is allowed to mediate its interests. The professional military corps interprets world events in a way that enables them to achieve the greatest share of sources. Not only institutional and corporate loyalties, but also the personal interests, are voiced by professional soldiers. (Sarvas, 1999)

[9]See, for example, Edward N. Luttwak, 1999, op. cit., p. 99. Or see R. Dahl, *On Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
[10]Samuel Huntington, 1957, op. cit., p. 2.

To sum up, the purposes of democratic control are
(1) to protect the human rights of all members of society,
(2) to align the goals of political leaders and military leaders,
(3) to legitimize the use of force,
(4) to curtail the discretionary powers of the military within certain parameters and to avoid autocratic rule, and
(5) to balance the societal and functional imperative, in fact to manage the Janusian character of the armed forces.

HOW CAN DEMOCRATIC CONTROL BE ACHIEVED?

The answer to the question "How can democratic control be achieved?" is simultaneously the answer to the problem of the civil–military paradox.[11] This paradox refers to the question "How can a democracy be defended with an undemocratic organization?" or "How can it be guaranteed that a democratic society possesses a strong protection force while preventing that force from becoming too dominant in the society?"

Several answers or models have been developed for solving this paradox. I start with three classic models: Samuel Huntington's objective civil control (as opposed to subjective civilian control); Morris Janowitz's approach of integrating the military in society; and, third, Jacques van Doorn's ideas on achieving democratic control in transition or radically changing countries. After discussing these general models, some more practical approaches and instruments are addressed.

Huntington: Divergence of Political and Military Decision Making

In his classic book *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1957) perceives objective civilian control as the only proper type of democratic control. This type of control is aimed at the maximization of professionalism within the military by separating political and military decision making. The political leaders formulate the goals and some broad conditions for military operations and the military commanders carry out the military operations. The political leaders do not interfere in military operations, while military commanders do not influence policy.

With this outlook, the military officer is a neutral and autonomous professional who carries out the political goals *sine ira at studio*. Given this separation, I call this model of political–military relations the *divergence model*.[12] Huntington rejects subjective civilian control of the armed forces. Subjective control aims to maximize the power of a political party that is in government. Political leaders try to control the armed forces by appointing high-ranking generals who are political friends of the political party in power.

[11] Hans Born and Max Metselaar, "Politiek-militaire betrekkingen (Political-military relations)," in Hans Born, Rene Moelker, and Joseph Soeters (eds.), *Krijgsmacht en samenleving: Klassieke en eigentijds inzichten (Military and society: Classical and contemporary viewpoints)*. Tilburg: University Press, 1999, p. 87. See also: Peter D. Feaver, *Delegation, monitoring and civilian control of the military: Agency theory and American civil–military relations*, Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, 1996, pp. 3–8.
[12] Hans Born and Max Metselaar, op. cit., pp. 76–83.

The criterion for occupying a high military position is not so much military professionalism, but political loyalty. For example, the communist regimes practiced subjective civilian control since communist rule implies (1) definition of the military's mission by the central committee, (2) political apparatus in the military units from the regiment upwards, (3) party cells in the military units, and (4) penetration by the secret service.[13] Huntington devaluated this type of control because it corrupts the professional quality of the armed forces.

Huntington influenced how Americans think about civil–military relations to a large extent. For decades, officers of the U.S. armed forces had to learn Huntington's ideas by heart. As the United States is a global superpower, they influenced the way of thinking about civil–military relations in many other (Western) countries as well. It seems that objective civilian control is put forward as *the* only objective way of looking at civil–military relations. However, in his article on democratic control in Switzerland, Karl Haltiner showed that the Swiss civil–military relations model makes use of subjective control.

Switzerland is a federal state, one of the oldest democratic and civil societies in Europe, where the people have traditionally had an aversion against centralized state power and a "deeply rooted mistrust of military professionalism."[14] During peacetime, Switzerland has no military commander-in-chief at all. In times of crisis the parliament appoints a general and it "is almost evident that not only military but also political and lingo-cultural aspects play a role in the parliament's appointment of the military commander-in-chief."[15] The Swiss case of political–military relations illustrates that subjective civilian control can be a justified way of dealing with the military. Hence, there is no best model for political–military relations, but specific political and cultural factors determine the choice of model.

Janowitz: Convergence of Political and Military Decision Making

Another approach is the integration approach forumulated by Morris Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960), who focuses on the integration of the values of the military and the society. According to Janowitz, civilian control of the constabulary force (e.g., the armed forces as an international police force and as one of the instruments of the government for international policy) can be achieved by integrating the soldier as much as possible in society. Janowitz asserts that the officer in the constabulory force "is sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs. He is subject to civilian control, not only because of the 'rule of law' and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values."[16] In this view, democratic control is carried out by committing the military leaders to the political goals. In addition, it is not realistic to make a distinction between policy and implementation or between government and administration. The reason is that during military operations, and especially peace missions, military commanders have to make many military decisions with political implications. For example, the way that military commanders in Bosnia are carrying out the peace agreements in the field or are dealing with war crimes influences the higher policy. Janowitz's approach therefore, does not seek to separate politics from military affairs, but

[13]Stefan Sarvas, 1998, op. cit., p. 3.

[14]Karl Haltiner, Civil–military relations: separation or concordance? The case of Switzerland. Paper presented at the ERGOMAS interim meeting, Birmingham, 1999, p. 4

[15]Karl Haltiner, op. cit., p. 5. The commander in chief is called a "general-elect."

[16]Morris Janowitz, op. cit., p. 420

to search for the complementary roles of the political and military leaders. I call Janowitz's model the *convergence model* because it strives to bridge the gap between the military and the society as well as the political system.

Control of the Armed Forces in Radically Changing Societies

Special attention should be given to democratic control in countries that are involved in radical social changes. Jacques van Doorn (van Doorn, 1969, p. 12) researched some communist states in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War as well as African states during the decolonization era. He concluded that these states used three ways to ensure political control of the armed forces.

The first mechanism is "control by recruitment and selection." The political leadership tries to ensure that only soldiers with the desired social/political qualifications are selected. For example, in the mid-19th century the officer corps of Russia consisted predominantly of noblemen. However, in 1930, 75% of the Russian officers corps came from working-class or a peasant families. Van Doorn called this process in Russia (and other former communist states) the "proletarization of the officers corps." In former colonial countries a similar process occured: the replacement of the White officers by officers who were born in Africa or India.

The second mechanism is called "control by indocrination." In one party, the political loyalty of the political officer is guaranteed by the membership of the military professionals to the party. In addition, in military academies considerable time is devoted to political studies.

The third mechanism mentioned by Jacques van Doorn is called "control by organization." This is achieved by the integration of the army organization and the political party organization. The elite who rules the party (in a one party state) simultaneously rules the army.

The three mechanisms mentioned by Jacques van Doorn can be labeled subjective civilian control. Constantine Danopoulos argues that the implementation of democratic control in the former communist states after 1989 was achieved by four different ways,[17] which can be qualified as instruments of objective civilian control.

The first instrument is the depoliticization of the armed forces, which refers to removing and keeping the military away from everyday party politics. Second, the removal of party influence. This involves the severing of the once close and often symbiotic relationship between the military and the communist party. Third, Danopoulos mentions democratization, related to defining the military's role and mission as well as activities, and bringing the military under the control of the legitimate and democratically elected politicians. Democratization is achieved by setting up clear lines of command and responsibility between the government, the president, and the military leaders. Professionalization is the fourth element of the implimentation of democratic control. Professionalization means that the military carry out their political leader's orders in a neutral way.

It is interesting to observe that the shift from communism to liberal democracy was accompanied by a shift from subjective to objective democratic control of the armed forces. This shift can be explained by the fact that during communism the armed forces were the sword and the shield of the ruling communist party. The communist rulers appointed

[17] Constantine Danopoulos, "Introduction," in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, (eds.), *The military and society in the former Eastern bloc*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, pp. 2–7.

TABLE 9.1. Four Strategies and Corresponding Structures of Democratic Control and Their Positive and Negative Consequences[a]

Strategy	Structure	Positive elements	Negative elements
Appeasement	Gives military elites the capability to retain political influence within the new regime	Allows for the transitioning regime to survive (short term)	Does not gain control of the military outright and creates long-term leverage by military over civilians
Monitoring	Gathering information on the military by the civilian authority to establish policy to counter any insurrection	Allows the civilian authority to be forewarned and counter attempts to plot coups	Unless accompanied by an aggressive strategy, i.e., divide and conquer, government may not have leverage to react
Divide and Conquer	Fragment the branches of the military and/or officer corps to unbalance the military's ability to react	Aggressive strategy that can neutralize the military until civilian control is firmly established	Military's understanding of strategy may employ counterinitiatives by rallying firm support against new regime
Sanctioning	The fear of punishment to insure compliance to civilian authority	The carrot and stick, promotions versus imprisonment	Government must be able to back up its posture

[a]From Trinkunas (1999).

political friends to influential positions in the army. In a liberal democracy, however, the armed forces are supposed to protect the constitution and not a specific party or regime.

A Practical Approach: Some Concrete Strategies and Tools

In addition, specific strategies, tools, and instruments are developed for exercising democratic control. Harold Trinkunas presents an interesting overview of four strategies for democratic control (Table 9.1).

Trinkunas, however, uses the term "*strategy*" incorrectly. Strategy refers to proactive behavior or activities, but the instruments mentioned by Trinkunas are reactive instruments. These instruments are not aimed at future situations, but at the management of a past or present crisis in political–military relations.

While temporarily working at the Western European Union (WEU) Institute for Security Studies in Paris, Rudolf Joo[18] formulated eight instruments of democratic control: (1) a clear and legal constitutional framework; (2) a significant role for the parliament in legislating and budgeting on defense and security matters; (3) transparency of defense and security policy; (4) hierarchical responsibility of the military to the parliament via a civilian organ of public administration, i.e., the minister of defense; (5) professional officer corps that respects civilian authority; (6) division of tasks, i.e., military and political leaders respect each others responsibilities; (7) a civil society with democratic institutions with consensus

[18]Rudolf Joo, *op. cit.*, p. 5

on the role of the military; and (8) a nongovernmental security community consisting of independent academics, media experts, as well as advisors to political parties.

Types of Control and Their Instruments

As previously argued, democratic control can be divided among vertical control, horizontal control, and self-control. Vertical control refers to parliamentary and govermental control of the armed forces. Vertical control can be exercised by the political leaders via six instruments: budget control, legislation, micromanagement, appointments of generals, parliamentary inquiries, and the use of countervailing powers within the armed forces (e.g., interservice rivalry).[19] In addition, horizontal control is carried out by societal institutions, i.e., the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, external research institutes, military unions, integration of civilian and military law institutes, and national ombudsmen. These institutions have an interest in the functioning of the armed forces and therefore monitor and influence the armed forces. These institutions can be regarded as the bridges between society and the armed forces. They enhance the essential social values that can be found in the armed forces. Horizontal control aims at the integration of the armed forces in society. Horizontal control is especially important in countries where conscription—the "natural bridge" between society and armed forces—is abolished.[20]

Self-control is the third type of democratic control. Self-control is essential in the importance of the monopoly of violence in any society and the fact that the military is granted a certain amount of autonomy in order "to win the battles" for their political leaders. Self-control of the military, within the context of democratic control of the armed forces, means social responsibility, i.e., that the military leaders (officers corps) respect civilian rule as well as human rights. Respect means that these values are not dictated top-down, but that the soldiers internationalized those values via education and training. Self-control refers to the political neutrality of the military officers corps and to the safeguards within the armed forces that guarantee the existence of a democratic officers corps.[21]

The main conclusions concerning achieving democratic control are as follows:

1. The way political–military relations are crafted depends on typical social, cultural, and historical factors. A single model for democratic control does not exist.
2. An important variable is whether the political–military relationship is regarded as an adversarial or as a cooperative relation. Are the politicians and military generals each others' friends or foes?
3. Another important point concerns whether democratic control is achieved by the separation or integration of the political–military decision making. The former is based on Huntington's objective civilian control (I refer to this as divergence because the military is separated from the political system and society) and the latter is based on Janowitz's conception of the political–military relations of a constabulary force, in which the military officer is integrated in the society (convergence).
4. Another issue is that democratic control differs from one society to another. It seems that democratic control has a different shape in the so-called emerging democracies as opposed to already established democracies.

[19] Hans Born and Max Metselaar, 1999, *op. cit.*
[20] Hans Born (2000), op. cit., pp. 20–21.
[21] Hans Born (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

5. Democratic control is not limited to top-down parliamentary/govermental control of the armed forces. Democratic control also concerns horizontal control by social institutions as well as the self-control of the military officer corps. Top-down control is based on the constitutional power of the political leaders to control the armed forces. I have previously argued that this is partly a myth due to the limited span of control of the elected politicians vis-à-vis the military leaders. Horizontal control is an indirect way of controlling the armed forces; it refers to the influence of social institutions. Self-control is self-imposed control, i.e., the internalization of democratic values by the military.
6. Many concrete strategies and instruments can be used to achieve democratic control. However, there is no golden rule and no "best strategy or instrument." Every instrument has both advantages and disadvantages. It seems that some instruments of democratic control do have a reactive character. Maybe the word "*control*" as such is a reactive concept and not a proactive concept.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RELATING TO DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

Some Inherent Problems of Democratic Control

Bland[22] mentions four problems which should be considered when studying or practicing democratic control. The first problem is the "praetorian" problem[23]: curtailing the power of the military establishment. In casu, curtailing the problem can be regarded as the "bottom-line" problem of democratic control, whereas the efficient management of the civil–military relations is the next problem. The second problem is that to discipline the army in such a way as not to cause harm to the state and its citizens (in terms of crimes and other misdemeanors). According to Bland, the third problem is that of double subordination[24]: whether soldiers should obey the state (constitution) or a particular government that is in office. Regarding this problem, Huntington identifies three cases in which it is justified that a soldier disobeys his/her political leaders: (1) when political orders are incompatible with military professionalism, (2) when political orders are illegal, or (3) when political orders are incompatible with basic morality (Huntington, 1957, pp. 70–78).

According to Bland, the fourth problem is what Huntington (1957, p. 20) calls the problem of the relationship between the expert military versus the nonexpert minister. Therefore, the minister who is controlling the military is dependent on the expertise of that same military. Morris Janowitz also addresses this problem. He argues that "the military seek to pepertuate an exclusive professional juridiction" about issues related to irregular warfare, limited warfare, and military assistance. The formulation of standards in these areas are expected "to be the responsibilities of the civilian authorities, although these standards cannot evolve independently from the military" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 420).

[22] Bland, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.
[23] Based on Huntington (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, p. 231.
[24] Based on Michael Howard (1957). *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil–Military Relations.* London: Eyre and Spottiswoods, p. 12.

Post-Cold War Issues

Sam Sarkesian and Robert Conner (Sarkesian and Connor, 1999, p. 29) distinguish three issues of civil–military relations in the Cold War era: (1) the degree to which the military profession should reflect society and yet maintain its professional integrity; (2) the degree to which the military must adhere to its primary purpose, its *raison d'être*, and still engage succesfully in operations other than war; (3) to what degree, if any, the military profession should engage in politics within the [American] political system.

Bernard Boëne and Christopher Dandeker predict that the political control of the armed forces will become both more complicated and more problematic due to the social transformation in civil–military relations. They state the following:

> the future will see a return to radical professionalism, due mostly to the restoration of prestige, more frequent opportunities for military action, drastically reduced military establishments, and social contexts for which the "post-modern" label provides a convenient short-hand description. The consequences in civil–military relations will include stronger identities, more forcefully expressed interests, and less flexibility on the military side, while politicians, as is already the case in a number of countries, will exhibit a degree of diffidence, or at least less assurance, in dealing with military matters.[25]

Erosion of the Primacy of the Politics

Some specific problems regarding democratic control can be labeled as the erosion of the primacy of the politics.[26] The erosion of the political primacy regarding the armed forces is enhanced by three long-term social developments: the horizontality of society, the military as the fourth might within the Trias Politica, as well as the internationalization of the politics.

HORIZONTALITY OF SOCIETY AND EROSION OF THE POLITICAL PRIMACY. I previously argued that social institutions are "responsible" for the horizontal control of the armed forces. Horizontal control has a parodoxical effect on the control of the armed forces. On the one hand it strengthens the democratic control and leads to armed forces which are embedded in society. On the other hand, horizontal control weakens the primacy of the parliament and the government because of the fact that the control is not excercised by the politicians alone, but also by other social institutions. The media, NGOs, unions, research institutes, as well as other social institutes watch the deeds of politicians in parliament and the government, holding them responsible for all (mis-)deeds within the armed forces. Therefore, horizontal control restricts the power of the parliament and the government.

On a more abstract level, the horizontalization of society or the networked society[27] implies that legitimization of the politics is not taken for granted. Politicians are increasingly

[25] Bernard Boëne and Christopher Dandeker (2000). "Armed forces, state and society in Sweden: a view from a wider European perspective," in Christopher Dandeker and Alice Weibull (eds.), *Facing Uncertainty: Report No. 2*, 2000. Karlstad.

[26] Hans Born (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 29–33.

[27] Bram Peper (1999). Op zoek naar samenhang en richting: een essay over de veranderende houding tussen overheid en samenleving (In search of coherence and direction: an essay on the changing relation between state and society). [Available at: www.nrc.nl (July 12, 1999).]

regarded as one of the many actors who are able to intervene in society. Politicians have to negiotate with other actors in society. The days when politicians could impose their will on other social actors without argumentation or discussion are gone. An example is the dispute between the Dutch government and the Dutch military labor unions about the right to strike. The Dutch government regards itself as the only actor who is legitimized to *give* this basic right to the soldiers, while the Dutch military union thinks that they can legitimatly *take* the right to strike based on the European Social Charter.

However, horizontalization applies not only to the relationship between politicians and citizens, but it also has implications for the internal governmental relations, i.e., the relation between politicians and the military. Traditionally, this relationship is characterized by the Weberian ideal-type: the military is supressed by the goals of the elected politicians, within the legal framework.[28] The relation between politicians and the military can labeled as a vertical command relation. However, this relationship is increasingly becoming a negotiating relation. Politicians no longer give their civil servants orders, but they sign management contracts with the military concerning the desired quantity, quality, and price of the services. These agreements are confirmed by contracts.

This new situation is caused by the recent wave of privatization and efficiency increasing measures within the government sector especially in Western Europe. Within the military, governmental agencies are increasingly becoming independent "business units" which have a "budget" responsibility. What are the consequences of this new policy of treating the military more and more as a business with budget responsibility? First, giving lower commanders budget responsibility can increase the efficiency of the military. The limitation is, however, that military leaders acquire a position in which they can regard themselves as equals to the political leaders, with whom they can negotiate about the policy implementation. In a democracy, however, this would be a dangerous erosion of the political primacy.

The Fourth Might in the Trias Politica and the Erosion of the Political Primacy. The Trias Politica divides the power of the state into three branches: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the juridicial branch. However, since the 1970s, concerns have been expressed about the power of civil servants as being a fourth power, in addition to the three constitutional powers.[29] The argument is that the span of control of the minister is no match for the size of the ministry and the complex work of the civil servants. A minister has neither the time, the energy, nor the knowledge to control the work of all the civil servants. Due to the complexity of the tasks, a civil servant is responsible not only for the implementation of the policy, but also for the development, decision making, and evaluation of the policy.[30] This trend can be witnessed with regard to the military. Military commanders enjoy discretionary powers and have to take decisions with sometimes major political consequences. In another study,[31] I observed that especially the politicans are playing second fiddle in policy fields of weapon acquisition, international peace missions, and disaster relief operations. In these fields, politicians lean heavily on the expertise and information of the military leaders.

[28] Max Weber, *op. cit.*

[29] C. Crince le Roy (1976). *De Vierde Macht: Een Hernieuwde Kennismaking (The Fourth Might: A Renewed Introduction).* Den Haag: VUGA.

[30] Ed van Tijn et al. (1998). *De Sorry-Democratie: Recente Politieke Affaires en de Ministriële Verantwoordelijkheid.* Amsterdam: Van Gennip, pp. 9–11.

[31] Hans Born and Max Metselaar, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRIMACY. Numerous governments, especially in Western Europe, are members of international organizations, like NATO and the European Union (EU). These governments have to share their power with the leaders of NATO and EU. In fact, national governments have to give up a part of their sovereignty. The EU especially took over some policy areas of the national governments, such as the monetary policy. The EU has not yet touched the national defense policy of its member states. During a Euro summit held in Portugal in February 2000, the European Defense Ministers endorsed a timetable for creating a rapid reaction force of 50,000 to 60,000 men by 2003.[32] However, disagreement amoung the EU member states has slowed the process of creating a real European army. Therefore, at the moment NATO is the most important organization in Europe regarding defense matters. NATO, unlike the EU, is only an intergovernmental organization. Formally, all member countries have a right to veto any of the decisions taken by NATO councils. However, there are two limitations. First, according to the NATO treaty, national governments transfer the operational command over their armies to NATO supreme commanders in times of war and crises. Second, although all NATO member states are equal in terms of formal decision-making rights, it is evident that the United States possesses the political and military leadership of NATO. Recently, during the Kosovo air bombing campaigns, it appeared that the ground targets were mainly selected by the French, British, and American representatives. Smaller countries like The Netherlands or Norway had no real voice in these matters.[33] Therefore, international cooperation is most certainly a third factor in the erosion of the primacy of the national politics.

This analysis shows that the democratic control of the armed forces is a problematic issue, not only in "new" democracies, but also in the established democracies. First, there are some inherent problems connected to the democratic control of the armed forces. These problems refer to an effective management of the monopoly of violence in a democratic society. Notably one inherent problem is that it seems that, in particular cases, soldiers have the right or even the duty to disobey political orders when these orders are illegal or immoral. Second, the post-Cold War era brought about new problems to the democratic control agenda. The security landscape drastically changed with new types of threats. Militaries are not always enthusiastic about the new tasks. Military professionals do not regard operations other than war as their core business, whereas the political leaders most certainly want to address new threats and challenges. Relevant questions are concerned with how to convince the military to fulfill these new tasks and how to balance old and new tasks. Moreover, it seems that sometimes the military wants to address new wars with old warfare methods, like the aerial bombardments during the war in Kosovo (with little operational value). Martin Shaw[34] predicts that the military will continue to use old doctrines and weapon systems in peace missions only to justify the presence of a mass army with access to weapons of mass destruction. Or to sum up: the new security landscape forces the military to take up new tasks which are—in their own eyes—rather alien to traditional military culture/professionalism. Third, the primacy of the politics over the armed forces is in decline, due to long-term

[32] Associated Press, Monday February 28, 2000.

[33] Letter of the Dutch Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense to the Chairman of the Parliament concerning the Evaluation of the Kosovo crisis, March 22, 2000, pp. 26–27.

[34] Shaw, M. (2000). "The contemporary mode of warfare? Mary Kaldor's theory of new wars," *In Review of International Political Economy*, 7(1), pp. 171–180. (Available at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/kaldor.htm.)

processes, i.e., the horizontality of society, the military as a fourth power in the Trias Politica, and the internationalization of the military.

HOW CAN WE STUDY DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?

The post-Cold War era requires a new look at the democratic control of the armed forces. The post-Cold War brought about more attention to peace missions and enormous reforms of the military in nearly every country and, as previously described, military activity increasingly is taking place at an international level. Regarding these developments, accelerated after the end of the Cold War, I propose five fields of attention for future research on democratic control of the armed forces.

1. *Changing perceptions of security.* This theme explores the perceptions of the actors about security and each other. The basic question is "How do the civilian authorities and the military perceive security and the role of the guardians of the state within the post-Cold War security context?" There is much here to explore and at various levels (among political elites, among military specialists, between elites and public, between military and political leadership, and between countries).
2. *Internationalization of democratic control.* Nowadays militaries are no longer solely a national affair. Increasingly militaries internationalize in the field of strategy, planning, production, training, and implementation of force. Only a few countries, if any, remain sovereign when it comes to the management of the monopoly of violence. For example, the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO had major consequences for the militaries involved. Their parliaments had to adopt new laws and strategy documents and increase the defense budget and their militaries had to reform their organization as well as the training of the soldiers. The question is "What is the influence of the internationalization of the militaries for the civilian oversight of the military?" This question is not only relevant for the former communist countries, but for the Western countries as well. For example, the recent NATO bombardements during the Kosovo war in 1999 revealed tension points between the smaller NATO member states and the NATO HQ regarding where decisions were made and when and how the air campaign was to be carried out. This theme gives insight in the international pressures which erodes the monopoly of violence of nation-states.
3. *Changing role of the nation-state in security policy.* This issue concerns the roles of the various state security agencies (e.g., military, intelligence, and police) and other state agencies (e.g., development assistance, finance, environment, and health) and how current trends (more ambiguous and complex threats) are forcing closer cooperation on the ground and in intelligence sharing in traditional and various non-traditional missions (e.g., peacekeeping, disaster response, and counternarcotics).
4. *Alternative democratic control.* This theme refers to the question "Are there viable alternative ways of democratic control next to the hierarchical control of elected/appointed civil authorities?" This theme refers to role of civil society and NGOs with regard to the functioning of militaries. Few studies exist on this theme. It could include studies into the constraints and opportunities that local and foreign NGOs have experienced in promoting security awareness, monitoring the military,

and so on. It could also include how aid and humanitarian agencies interact with military forces, both at the policy-making level domestically and on the ground in theatres. Another alternative to top-down control by civil authorities could be the bottom-up democratic control or impact of conscripted soldiers (and their unions).

5. *Democratic control and armed forces restructuring*. This is an interesting topic because nearly all militaries in the post-Cold War period are confronted with reforms, budget cuts, layoffs, as well as changing tasks and missions. The processes are not in the interest of the militaries or in concordance with the traditional role and culture of the military per se. Militaries are not that keen on becoming smaller or to fulfill the new peace missions. What was the impact of the restructuring of the armed forces on the democratic control? What are the main obstacles of reforming the armed forces?

All the fields mentioned above are influenced by the social transformations of civil–military relations in the post-Cold War period. It is necessary for scholars start researching these upcoming issues in an interdisciplinary fashion and for them leave behind the Cold War research framework and start researching the new parameters of the democratic control of armed forces.

CHAPTER 10

The Military as a Tribe among Tribes

Postmodern Armed Forces and Civil–Military Relations?

BERNARD BOËNE

From the mid-1990s onward, scholars in the field of military studies both in Europe and America have taken to using the term "postmodern."[1] Though there is some recognition that the trends which became apparent after 1989 had been at work in the West for some time prior to that watershed (Boëne and Dandeker, 1998), they often use it rather loosely to refer to the transformations under way in the post-Cold War era.

More precise meanings, however, have been variously attached to that label by philosophers and social scientists for the past 20 years. This chapter endeavors to explore the extent to which these meanings can be fruitfully applied to armed forces and their relationships with state and society in so-called advanced Western nations today. In other words, it will try to assess the relevance of the postmodern concept(s) as a tool of analysis in the study of present-day military institutions and civil–military relations: whether it is true that armies, navies, and air forces are becoming "networks of organized anarchies, flat hierarchies given to decentralized decision-making, units with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity and permeable boundaries" (Daft and Lewin, 1993) and with what kind of impact on their social and political environment. Key dimensions will be examined along the way: changing roles,

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[1] Early use of the term "postmodern" in the military field was by American authors: see Charles Moskos, "Armed Forces in a Warless Society," in J. Kuhlmann and C. Dandeker, (Eds.), 1992, pp. 1–19; and Charles Moskos and James Burk (1994). For more recent American assessments making it the main tool of analysis, see Charles Moskos, John A. Williams, and David R. Segal, (2000b). For a dissenting opinion, see Bradford Booth et al. (2001), "Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?", *Armed Forces & Society*, 27 (3) 319–342. Yet, the term has caught on in Europe, as evidenced in the rather large share of European contributions to the above-mentioned edited volumes, and other, separate pieces, notably by Italian authors. But while some authors have embraced it enthusiastically, others use it much more cautiously. See note 4.

self-conceptions and bases of legitimacy, erosion of long-standing organizational formats, adjustment to tight budgets, mission complexity and unpredictability, real-time media coverage, the rise of multiculturalism, the new standing of military élites and soldier–statesman relations, and so on. Though occasional reference will be made to recent American developments, illustrations will mainly be drawn from Western European contexts.

THE MEANINGS OF POSTMODERNITY

The "postmodern condition" has followed partly from the decline and fall of millenarist utopias: from the disillusionment with progress born of the dialectics of modernity so profoundly analyzed by Raymond Aron over 30 years ago (Aron, 1969), but also, after several decades of domination by the organizational model of society, from the distrust of concentrated power and its attendant dysfunctions. A second source has no doubt been the rise of horizontal societies made possible by affluence and complexity. Affluence, allowing individuals to satisfy their needs through private purchasing power rather than through collective organization, tends to loosen social bonds; it also tends to spontaneously flatten social hierarchies.[2] Complexity, increasing the degree of interdependence, bestows a *de facto* right of veto on the bottom layers of society (at least on those actors inside the system), thereby fulfilling Mannheim's "fundamental democratization" prophecy (Mannheim, 1940). Finally, after several decades of increasing cultural and epistemological relativism[3] in science, a situation has arisen where nihilism is dominant: there are no longer true and false ideas, but a variety of opinions made respectable by "universal benevolence" (Taylor, 1989).

The weakening of universalism has meant that metasocial references—reason, history, emancipation of the working class, modernization—have lost much of their grip on the "postmodern" imagination. All that remains of modernity is the reign of instrumental rationality, and the power and will to bring criticism to bear on established values and ideas, which now makes for an almost complete indetermination of ultimate ends.

Indeed, one of the most visible (and earliest) traits of "postmodernity,"[4] i.e., the last few decades as proponents of the concept see them,[5] is its *hypermodern* character. The pace of

[2] Michel Forsé (1989). Applying an "entropic" paradigm to the study of large social entities over long periods, the author shows that the most stable social structure, to which social processes tend spontaneously, is a pyramid characterized by an inverse exponential profile, in which relative inequality is constant. When the system is closed and material or symbolic resources are scarce, such a pyramid has a narrow base and tapers to a considerable height, betraying a high concentration of power, riches, or prestige; when they are in abundance, differentials decrease, producing a pyramid that is more broad-based and flat. Opening the system, as is the case today with the liberalization of world trade and other globalization processes, introduces a measure of negative entropy, thereby (temporarily) increasing differentials.

[3] Cf. the works of M. Granet, B.L. Whorf, R. Needham, P. Winch, A.V. Cicourel, T.S. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, D. Bloor, B. Barnes, K. Hübner, and others. For a pointed critique of such trends, see Raymond Boudon (1995).

[4] Not every author, of course, accepts the term and agrees with the view of history it conveys. Some, like Anthony Giddens, while they see much the same trends developing, argue that the present stage cannot in any meaningful sense be regarded as being *beyond* modernity and prefer the phrase "radical modernity" because it emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity. Sharing that view, a number of French authors now use the word "surmodernité" to the same effect. The present writer agrees with that fundamental assessment: despite his skepticism, his use of "postmodern" here is value neutral.

[5] The list of such authors, from Jean-François Lyotard (who coined the phrase in the late 1970s) and Richard Rorty onward, is long, and the concept has been applied to a huge number of fields. The synthesis presented here seeks to locate its central dimensions: the elements on which leading proponents agree explicitly or implicitly and the way commentators and critics see them.

technological change has accelerated, bringing about an acceleration of history, exacerbating the dialectics of "progress" and generating a powerful trend toward globalization. On the other hand, complexity and uncertainty, heightened by the often-paradoxical quality of trends produced by technology, have led to a constant renewal of *avant-gardes*, and of their aesthetic, moral, and cognitive visions. The world of culture has taken on a kaleidoscopic, ephemeral quality.

Opposed to hypermodern, but (as Touraine observed in the early 1990s; Touraine, 1992) effectively functioning as its complement, is the *antimodern* aspect of postmodernity. This refers to the cultural fragmentation produced by the loss of an overarching, socially meaningful vision with a claim to universal validity. Societies in which the power implied by rational control of collective destiny is deeply distrusted, where no social group or discourse can credibly assert a monopoly on meaning, run the risk of losing their fundamental unity. When it comes to values and interests, the balance between public and private tips strongly in the latter's favor. In such societies, all values tend to be equal: There can be no absolute ideals, except perhaps life and tolerance, as it were by default, or because they contribute to (but do not guarantee) peaceful systemic regulation. "Postmodern" here is taken to mean postsocial and antipolitical.

The third, and most central, meaning of postmodernity is *posthistoricist.* Without criteria by which to discriminate between values, cultural forms in a given society become synchronic rather than diachronic: Instead of succeeding one another, they coexist in time, thus bringing about extreme forms of pluralism. Language and experience tend to replace values and designs: Anything goes, as long as it exhibits an air of authenticity. Such being the case, diversity increases *within*, but decreases *among* societies. Native cultural traditions are subverted by instrumental interests and globalizing trends, or by a dominant, least-common-denominator culture (Touraine, 1992).

Last, but not by any means least, is postmodernity's *antihumanist* naturalistic quality. Living in the present and having to choose, without a reliable value map or historical references, between innumerable cultural forms and lifestyles leads to a fragmentation of personalities. Schizophrenic attitudes and pastiche of older forms become normal forms of adaptation and expression. Where violent political conflict is averted, systemic regulation is left to the market, i.e., to an impersonal, blind mechanism. Finally, with the "social question" having lost a great deal of its importance, the "natural question"—protection of the environment against pollution or technologies devoid of any meaningful insertion in society and culture—tends to become uppermost (Moscovici, 1988). The sum total is that economy, polity, and culture come to be entirely disconnected.

POSTMODERN MILITARIES IN POSTMODERN SOCIETIES?

How effective are these notions in the analysis of post-Cold War military institutions and civil–military relations? Let us examine the four meanings outlined above one by one.

Hypermodernism

Technological innovation, which in the 1920s and 1930s, had produced well-publicized doctrinal conflicts between modernists and traditionalists within the military, became a more or less routinized process in the aftermath of World War II. Yet, at the close of the century, the sheer critical mass of technological novelties, as part of the "third industrial wave" based

on the generation, gathering, processing, and dissemination of information, has allowed many observers to speak of a "military–technological revolution" (cf. Snow, 1991; Toffler, 1993), conducive to a larger "revolution in military affairs."[6] Electronics, computers and microprocessors, information technology, artificial intelligence and robotics, telecommunications, specialty materials, avionics and airframes, precision weaponry, computer-aided design and manufacturing, biotechnology, and catalysis and other chemical processes figure prominently in the list of major advances. The United States enjoys a substantial investment lead in most of these domains, but European powers, in isolation or—increasingly—in cooperation (notably between France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Sweden) have become players in that movement, including in fields such as intelligence-gathering through satellites where they were formerly highly dependent on American assets.

Now these developments are bound to affect the rules of the military game,[7] for instance, by enhancing the role of instrumental rationality in a domain in which it was traditionally mitigated by nonrational human and social factors (Boëne, 1990). Most of them involve dual-use (civilian and military) technologies, thereby accentuating the convergence between the two spheres noted by Morris Janowitz nearly 40 years ago (Janowitz, 1960). Some, like the variable-lethality weapons announced as in the pipeline and projected to be operational within a decade in France and no doubt elsewhere, will further blur the already-fuzzy difference between war and the maintenance of public order and somewhat change the meaning attached to the use of military force. Information warfare, likewise, by disorganizing the enemy's data systems or confounding his awareness of events and assets could even substitute psychological for actual warfare.[8]

Though designed to be user-friendly and easy to operate by nonspecialists, these new high-tech weapons also generate new layers of complexity for those in charge of logistics, doctrine, coordination, intelligence, command, and control. They entail higher development, production, and maintenance costs, as well as a greater need for educational sophistication and training among (at least) commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Not unlike the inhibition of total war through mutual deterrence which soon followed upon the advent of weapons of mass destruction over 50 years ago, this in turn leads to intriguing paradoxes.

One such paradox, apparent for nearly 2 decades, is known as "structural disarmament," or Augustine's Law.[9] As budgets (downsized or not) cannot possibly catch up with spiraling investment costs, the number of big-ticket items bought to equip the armed services are lower with each new generation of weapons. There will, for instance, be fewer *Leclerc* main battle tanks or *Rafale* aircraft than there were *AMX* or *Mirage* previously in the French Army, Air Force, or Naval Aviation. The new geopolitical context and ensuing "peace dividend" pressures of the 1990s added to the trend, but certainly did not start it. Nor will the rise in military budgets made likely by the "war on international terrorism" in the 2000s put an end to it.

[6]The literature under this heading is abundant and growing fast. To restrict references to books published in the last few years: W. Perry (1997), L. Freedman (1998), R.O Hundley (1999), D.C. Gompert et al. (1999), R.F. Laird and H.H. Mey (1999), H. von Riekhoff and T. Gongora (2000), and R. Matthews and J.M. Treddenick (eds.) (2001).

[7]The revolutionary potential of such technological developments is also perceived by critics, notably among "socially responsible" peace activists: see, for instance, Chris Hables Gray (1997).

[8]See Peter D. Feaver, "La guerre de l'information," pp. 225–249, in Boëne and Dandeker (Eds.) (1998), *op. cit.*

[9]This "law" was named after the leading figure in American defense industry and government circles who first drew attention, in the early 1980s, to downward trends in the armament inventories of high-tech armed forces. He foresaw that, if allowed to go unchecked, such trends would leave the U.S. Air Force by the year 2016 with but one aircraft, so sophisticated, versatile, and costly that it would by itself exhaust the Air Force's entire equipment budget.

What is more, military managers are often reluctant to use, and risk losing, these scarcer, more expensive weapons systems when the gain at stake is much lower than the possible loss (as was the case with the 1995 punitive air strikes in Bosnia and other instances), thus to some extent inhibiting the use of armed force. This paradoxical mechanism now also affects highly trained human resources. When the call came for junior officers to reinforce Army units' cadre assets in the Saudi desert as part of the French contribution to the Gulf War, some battalion commanders were reported to have spontaneously refrained from designating their Saint-Cyr graduates (supposedly the best the officer corps has to offer) on the grounds that their very expensive training made them too precious to be wasted in what they regarded as a sideshow.

Another paradox is that costly weapons and human assets geared to high-intensity warfare may not be relevant in the nonfrontal, low-intensity kinds of military action that are the more probable sort in which they would be used or involved. The Cold War, colonial wars, Vietnam, and Afghanistan had taught the forces of highly developed nations that, mainly due to moral and political constraints, they could not decisively subdue poor guerrilla fighters armed with submachine guns, light antitank weapons, or cheap surface-to-air missiles, whenever their foes enjoyed internal (civilian) and external (military) support. Though the objectives pursued in the post-Cold War use of force differ substantially, the same legitimacy and pragmatic constraints, only redoubled, have clearly applied to places like Somalia or Bosnia. Such were apparent also to a degree during the 1999 Kosovo aerial bombing campaign.

The latter campaign was paradigmatic: a harbinger of the new Western way of war at a distance, guided by electronic and human intelligence, satellite surveillance or sensors, and supplemented on the ground by special forces and friendly indigenous forces—a style confirmed and hardened in Afghanistan after the tragic events of September 2001. So the high-intensity assets seem mainly to serve the purpose of setting the parameters of power differentials underpinning world political order.[10]

Such developments and paradoxes are therefore the continuation and deepening of past—modern—trends, already conspicuous in the Cold War, or prior to it.[11] The motives may have changed and the level of resources allocated to the military decreased, but

[10] It is worth noting that while high-intensity warfare remains possible, it looks improbable in the current context (especially if Western powers are to battle terror networks and the militarily inferior states which shelter them). Yet, armed forces continue to be designed and structured as if they were to wage major wars. This serves conventional deterrence purposes, pointing to the continued relevance of the Clausewitzian notion that military potential, as distinct from its actual use, structures international politics. But, within the framework of the new Western way of war, the status of air power (including cruise missiles) differs from that of conventional land forces in that the former is more or less regularly used in military interventions, whereas for a variety of reasons (fear of casualties, of "quagmires" and of its domestic or international political fallout), use of land power is restricted, which raises problems as to the utility and status of armies. Noteworthy also is the fact that the air power technology used in the latest interventions is not always the most sophisticated to date as precision-guided weapons have often proved less precise than made out to be.

[11] Technology, over the long term, has increased the destructive power of weapons to such an extent that it limits the rational uses of armed force in the cause of national interests, as well as its legitimacy among populations who, from Verdun and the Somme onward, even more so after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have had every reason to fear a great war. Once the threshold of instant mass-destruction capabilities was crossed, as Janowitz observed, military organizations became "constabulary forces" seeking viable international relations rather than strategic victory and applying, where possible, the minimum degree of coercion to achieve the limited effects intended by their political masters. The post-Cold War era may have removed the structural conditions for a major confrontation (at least for a decade or two), it has abolished neither the sources of local or regional conflict, nor the Western attitudes toward war that are the end product of a century-long learning curve.

the drive for technological superiority will live on, subject to hypermodern acceleration and multifaceted paradoxes, until such time as cost becomes truly prohibitive and a quantity/sophistication trade-off finds a satisfactory equilibrium. Technologically driven instability will continue, requiring constant adaptation, periodic reorganization, new operational doctrines, and tolerance for seeming contradictions.

While the resource side of military issues points in the direction of continuity, the loss of a focal enemy's massive doorstep threat, on the other hand, has brought considerable change as regards the ends assigned to armed forces.

The meaning of security in the eyes of Western society has been substantially altered. In the first post-Cold War decade, North America felt invulnerable and acted on that presumption. The picture was more nuanced in Western Europe. A 1996 survey conducted in Paris on threat perceptions revealed fears centering mainly around terrorism, pollution, and drugs.[12] The White Paper, published in 1994 by the French Ministry of Defense,[13] did not contradict such perceptions and simply added extremist religious or nationalist movements and proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons to the list. Similar, or closely related, sentiments could be found in neighboring countries. A Swiss sociologist wrote: "In the reformulation of threat priorities, Security Report 90' reflects the changed threat awareness among the Swiss population. As investigations show, the interviewed people attach more importance to ecological and economic fears, to aspects of foreign infiltration as a consequence of international migration, and to internal insecurity than to military threats".[14] A German colleague of his concurred[15]: "The concept of security has by now virtually no military connotations. Whether someone feels secure or not has little to do with defense and the Bundeswehr." The list of quotations to the same effect could be lengthened at will. The result was that military institutions were now considered to be of secondary importance. As a logical consequence, their budgets were reduced everywhere, in some countries by as much as 30 to 50%.

It is obviously too early to venture definitive assessments of the situation created by the egregious attacks of September 11th, 2001, on American soil. But one thing is clear: North America no longer feels invulnerable, and national security is back on everyone's mind. The same applies to Western Europe, which to its dismay discovered that terrorist networks had found havens in many of its nations. Defense budgets are expected to rise. Yet, it is unclear whether these events have marked a new watershed and invalidated the analyses and concepts which prevailed in the 1990s. After all, international terrorism had been high on the list of threats earlier, and its sudden and spectacular dramatization will serve to increase vigilance and resources devoted to the fight against it rather than to change the equation in any fundamental way. Indeed, while one can expect intelligence, special forces, and homeland defense to be given distinctly higher priority, it is fair to say that these assets and missions are at the periphery of military institutions; the latter are likely to take a backseat to police forces and CIA, FBI, or similar agencies in the battle against unconventional networks. In the United States, significantly, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, partly drafted after September 11th, somewhat tones down the radical changes the proponents of the "revolution in military affairs" had in mind. The early 21st century may reinvigorate states and partly reverse some of the previous decade's main trends (notably

[12]See *Le Figaro*, February 19, 1996.

[13]*Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, Paris: La Documentation française (1994).

[14]Karl Haltiner and Eduard Hirt, in Moskos, Williams, and Segal (Eds.), *The Postmodern Military*, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–223.

[15]Bernhard Fleckenstein, *ibid.*

as regards security budgets), it does not seem anywhere near imposing a sea-change on the core elements of armed forces.

This is no to say, however, that Western militaries are left entirely without missions to perform; quite the contrary. Deterrence of nuclear war remains, albeit in the background. So does the capability to fight conventional wars of varying magnitude and to project rapid reaction forces in bids to prevent local conflicts from destabilizing an increasingly interdependent world. The post-Cold War era has provided more numerous opportunities for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. Verification of arms control accords; containment of nuclear proliferation and drug trafficking; aid to civil authorities, at home and abroad, in cases of natural or human-made disasters; and infrastructure support, to name but a few, also figure in the possible roles of latter-day military organizations. It should be noted that, in the post-Cold War era, many of the above missions bring external and internal security much closer than used to be the case in terms of concerns, resources, and modes of action, a fact that the recent priority accorded to the fight against terrorism will only accentuate.

The difficulty during the 1990s was that there was no consensus on priorities, and controversy was rife within as well as without the armed forces. Defense policy doctrine was often uncertain, and calls were heard for revisions, as witnessed, for instance, by a series of referendums in Switzerland (or the cool reception given to its "Army 95" plan); the fact that the prescriptions (though not the analysis) of the 1994 Defense White Paper in France, deemed too cautious, were all but abandoned after 1995; the debate that raged around the Bett Report in Britain; and the hesitant compromise between the old continental mobilization and the new expeditionary force concepts in Germany. Today, the strong consensus on security does not seem to translate into easy agreement on what is to be done and how. The instability and identity problems which have resulted from uncertain defense roles do not look as if they will disappear.

Uncertainty also undermines planning efforts. While everybody knows that the more probable interventions in the new context will be a mix of selective strikes, peace support, and humanitarian assistance operations, there is no determining in advance where, when, and with what specifications and requirements they will take place. These missions are by nature multifunctional, and more often than not multinational, which makes for added complexity. In such situations, a larger measure of versatility becomes a must, but the meaning of versatility, or flexibility, is itself subject to debate[16]: Should one maintain the fullest possible range of capabilities (at the possible cost of sacrificing strategic mobility due to resource constraints) and concentrate on smaller, more agile light forces which are easier to project far afield or try to achieve a compromise, which in reduced budgetary circumstances may mean excessive multitasking, stretching both equipment and personnel to the limit?

Cold War militaries, despite the transformations occasioned by technology, still resembled mechanistic, input-driven Weberian-style bureaucracies, governed by the search for effectiveness and geared to predictable roles. The image they evoked, to use a metaphor favored by management specialists, was that of a continent. Today, uncertainty and stringent resource constraints have brought the search for *efficiency* into the equation and turned them into organic, effects-led matrix organizations made up of temporary, custom-designed task forces best adapted to unpredictable missions to be performed by skilled, highly trained personnel. Their image, to pursue the metaphor, is that of a shifting, intricately woven archipelago.

[16] This was the case in Britain with the "Options for Change" debate from 1990–1991 onward. See Christopher Dandeker (1996).

In sum, if hypermodernism refers to technologically driven complexity, paradoxes, accelerated change, and instability, as well as to indeterminate ends and uncertainty, then today's military institutions are definitely hypermodern.

Antimodernism

The sociopolitical embodiment of modernity (whether or not its consequences were intended by its proponents) was the sovereign nation-state. This classically comprised a common culture spread through highly normative socialization that turned individuals into citizens; an internal market whose size and homogeneity made economies of scale and mass production possible; and collective political purpose implemented by bureaucratic machinery, of which a mass armed force, geared to the defense of national territory and international status, formed an essential part. Citizenship implied political participation (rights) as well as conscript military service (obligations). The latter, made necessary by the huge manpower requirements of total war, was the condition of the former. The key words were sovereignty, citizenship, mass, and homogeneity.

Western nations have gone through a steady erosion of these attributes in the past 3 decades: They no longer are classic nation-states. For one thing, the normative and expressive contents of socialization have been seriously weakened by relativism and the reluctance on the part of socializing agents, such as teachers at all levels, to continue acting on behalf of national establishments. The influence on cultural traditions of a much freer circulation of ideas and popular media expression catering to world audiences has powerfully added to that trend. For another, economic globalization, large immigration flows, major risks (nuclear power station dysfunctions, climate change, etc.), and the growing dematerialization of production have no less considerably reduced the importance of borders and nationality. Horizontal societies do not like to be governed or influenced by far-off centers of power, public or private; such centers, saturated by the inflow of information, can no longer cope with loads of decision making that have become too heavy for them.

As a result, decentralization processes became a dominant feature of the 1980s in most countries' administrative and economic institutions. Conversely, the pressures of intensifying global economic competition, reinforcing the effects of an earlier wish, fed by too many vivid memories of the consequences of rampant nationalism, to minimize the risks of political rivalry turning into military conflict, have led to the emergence at the regional level of supranational blocs (Western Europe chief, and the most advanced, among them[17]) whose eventual status, after decades of uneasy transition, still wavers between federation, confederacy, and free-trade area. In other words, national sovereignty has been nibbled at by transfers of power to local as well as supranational echelons and is becoming a faint shadow of its former self.

Finally, citizenship has been enlarged from political to social and economic and emphasizes rights at the expense of obligations: The link between political participation and service under arms has weakened to the point of disappearing.[18]

[17] This is in sharp contrast to developments in Eastern Europe, where the three federations created after 1918 (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the USSR) and frozen by communism and the Cold War have disintegrated. Over 20 new states and a little under 10,000 miles of new borders have appeared on the map since 1991. This master countertrend toward fragmention is to be seen in other (mostly less "advanced") parts of the world.

[18] This was a recurrent theme in Morris Janowitz's later works, notably. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* (1983). See also David R. Segal (1989).

Just as homogeneity and mass are no longer required by an economy in which the processing and dissemination of information have displaced or added to earlier factors of wealth, the armed forces have become capital-intensive and no longer need to be manned by huge numbers of unskilled personnel. Due to the central role played by mass media, and to a growing feeling that politics is irrelevant to the lives of ordinary people, political participation has tended to turn into a spectator sport. In the new geopolitical context, the result of having removed major military conflict and territorial insecurity from the heart of Europe, the most conceivable missions will take place at the periphery, or much further afield, and are unlikely to involve the majority of a nation's youth, or stir its blood.

As a consequence, conscription will no longer be the norm when it comes to procuring military manpower. In non-European areas of the Western world, the new organizational format has already been in existence for a few decades. But as of 1990, when the Cold War ended, only four European countries had all-volunteer forces: Britain, Ireland, Malta, and Luxembourg. In 1992, Belgium unexpectedly did away with the draft as did by The Netherlands soon thereafter. France, supposedly thc mother of modern universal conscription, announced in 1996 that it would take the plunge by 2002. In those three countries, the sudden shift revealed how hollow the rhetoric on the sociopolitical value of youth citizen service had become (Van der Meulen and Manigart, 1997), which may explain why plans to substitute civilian forms of mandatory conscription for the military draft eventually came to nothing (and why volunteer schemes of civilian national or community service fare so poorly: Individualism has taken its toll on citizenship, and while there is no shortage of volunteer associations assuming a variety of socially useful roles, few volunteers relish the thought of serving as part of a bureaucratic state organization).

More recently, other nations, including Italy and Spain, have made it known that they would join Belgium, The Netherlands, and France. The surprisingly sudden and strong momentum of the all-volunteer bandwagon[19] is bound to affect the terms of the debate in other countries where conscription still hangs in the balance, as was seen notably in Germany 2 years ago (though German politicians are markedly reluctant to move all the way in that direction). Even in those few remaining countries (Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2000), professionalization is on the rise in *relative* terms, while conscript duty is shortened. Even in Switzerland, the classic militia system has come under attack at the hands of politicians and senior civil servants.[20]

Another sign of the weakening of citizenship in the 1980s and 1990s was the growing numbers of secular objectors. In most countries, conscientious objection (CO) had seen its criteria of admissibility broadened by the courts in the 1970s and 1980s. The post-Cold War era made it easier for young people to apply for CO status, since the lack of a direct threat rendered dodging the military draft socially more acceptable. In France, while absolute numbers had remained low, the percentage had more than trebled over a few years. In Spain, the proportion of young men opposed to the draft reached heights close to three-quarters (Busquet-Bragulat, 1991), and applications for CO status had risen sharply, too. Switzerland decriminalized objection by referendum and instituted civilian

[19]In the late 1990s, a Swiss sociologist, on the strength of an expert survey, predicted that the old mass armed force model would be abandoned by all but a handful of European nations, namely those which still feel militarily threatened on their borders or which have constitutional provisions against professionalization of the military: Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Switzerland. He added that in the Swiss case a sea-change could not be ruled out. See Karl Haltiner, "Le déclin final de l'armée de masse," in Boëne and Dandeker (Eds.) (1998) *op. cit.*

[20]Haltiner, *op. cit.* The share in Swiss public opinion of those favoring an all-volunteer force has risen from 10% to over one third between the 1970s and 1995.

alternatives to militia service. In Germany, where the right of conscientious objection, established by the Basic Law in 1949, takes precedence over compulsory service (instituted by a mere statute in 1956), COs have gone from some 6,000 in the 1960s, 35,000 in the 1970s, and 55,000 in the mid-1980s to between 120 and 160,000 in the 1990s (on average 30% of an age cohort) (Klein and Kulmann, 2000). There can be no doubt that such a master trend reflected a much weakened legitimacy of conscription and further weakened it.

If the military expression of national citizenship has suffered, so has that of sovereignty. There may not be a European defense identity as yet, but the number of bi- or multinational formations is growing by the day: Eurocorps (France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Luxemburg; soon to be transformed into a European Rapid Reaction Force), Eurofor (Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal), Euromarfor (ad hoc composition), German–Dutch Corps, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, European Air Group, European Satellite Center, EU Military Headquarters.[21] This comes on top of traditional or more recent arrangements within NATO (combined joint task forces and a European security and defense identity), and the movement is powerfully aided by the necessity of pooling resources at a time of downsized forces and dwindling budgets.[22] While major players like Britain or France still retain autonomous capabilities, other countries, notably Belgium, The Netherlands, and Germany, have placed all or nearly all of their forces under multinational command. Fleckenstein writes[23]: "The Bundeswehr is on its way to becoming a truly post-national army."

Peace support and humanitarian operations, for reasons of cost and external legitimacy, spontaneously tend to be multinational.[24] Their multiplication since the early 1990s has thus added to the trend underlined above. But they have also revealed a new trend affecting civil–military relations. For the first time since the post-World War II period and the colonial wars that followed, officers are entrusted with extramilitary tasks of a political nature. This stems partly from dealings with local populations and authorities, but also from the intimate blending of military and diplomatic action in peace support operations, as well as from relations among national contingents. Contradictions between national and international chains of command, crisscrossing lines of political and military authority[25] in such theaters have led military officers, reluctantly at first, to take political stands and decisions. Thus, Somalia placed an Italian general in a position to arbitrate between orders from Rome and from New York; Bosnia saw a British general publicly defend UN action there against attacks from conservative U.S. politicians, a French general ignore or openly defy the UN secretary-general's authority, and French and British officers assume positions in Sarajevo that differed from the official stance of their respective ministers of Defense within

[21] The same applies to defense industries, downsized and restructured along European lines in the past decade.

[22] It is worthy of note that military officers, contrary to what some commentators expect, are usually more pro-European than public opinion at large in their respective societies. This is especially the case in Britain and France, where one might have expected more nationalist orientations on their part.

[23] Fleckenstein, *op. cit.* Also see Paul Klein, "Vers des armées post-nationales," in Boëne and Dandeker (Eds.), (1998) *op. cit.*

[24] The only major intervention of that kind in which a European power decided to go it alone was the commitment of French troops to Rwanda following the genocide which took place there in 1994. The main reason was that other European nations initially refused to participate.

[25] United Nations interventions of the early 1990s were notorious for such dysfunctions, due to the lack of concentrated military expertise and organizational assets at the top. Lack of effectiveness was one primary reason for subcontracting peace support missions to NATO or other regional agencies.

NATO[26]; in 1996, a French general was recalled to Paris after he had called in question the applicability of the Dayton accords. Such interstitial room for political maneuvering, though it is probably inescapable (just as it was during the initial Allied occupation of postwar Germany) and does not necessarily entail sinister consequences, is bound to make civilian control more complex (as was seen when official inquiries sought to disentangle the political–military threads in the UN Protection Force's failure to prevent the Srebenica massacre of 1995), and on occasion more problematic.

This comes at a time when the lower profile of armed forces and the infusion of some *Idealpolitik* into foreign and defense policy has strengthened the military's legitimacy. Somehow, now that they are in a less central position and appear no longer dedicated solely to the defense of *national* interests, the services are seen in a more favorable light (van der Meulen, 2000). The general public look upon military action to support peace and to aid the suffering as more noble, and probably less threatening or demanding, than traditional defense tasks.[27] Scholars have noted this trend throughout the West, with few exceptions. It translates into high approval ratings, which make the military a (in many cases *the*) most trusted public institution in many countries.[28] A more legitimate and politically more active military in a period of indifferent values and discredited politicians (not to mention other public institutions) makes for some change in the sociopolitical landscape.

Yet, the idea that states are subject to moral imperatives similar to those imposed by conscience on individuals tends to depoliticize the use of armed force. Universal benevolence demands that something be done whenever atrocities are committed in the world at large, and strong public opinion movements to that effect promptly arise. Selective media attention, governed by professional norms and cultural proximity (or colonial memories) accounts for the unequal treatment reserved for the various theaters of possible intervention. No concert of European powers could possibly succeed where the United States will not even try: in playing world peace gendarmes and in guaranteeing a New World Order rendered futile by a lack of universally accepted political norms.[29]

As a result, even though national interests are never far beneath the surface and tend to cap the amount of expenditure devoted to Idealpolitik objectives, peace support and humanitarian interventions appear to be dictated less by well-thought-out policy than by national and international outcry against intolerable goings-on. If their origins are governed by public opinion, so is sometimes the way they come to an end. The value placed on life tends to tip the scales the other way when effectiveness leaves much to be desired and casualty levels begin to rise among peace soldiers.

[26]"Who's in Charge in Bosnia? NATO and UN Fight it Out," *International Herald Tribune*, October 3, 1994.

[27]Congruence between peace support or humanitarian missions and dominant (individualist) values in civilian society is no doubt part of the interpretation. Yet, it is not the sole factor: With the draft gone, military action becomes a spectator sport (as Martin Shaw remarked). In addition, a slow, little-noticed rise in the valuing of order in the public sphere over some 20 years may play a part: How else can one account for the fact that the police, which does not take much part in peace support operations overseas, today also achieves high approval ratings?

[28]See Fleckenstein (Germany), Haltiner (Switzerland), Boëne and Martin (France), in Moskos, Williams, and Segal (Eds.) *op. cit.*; also, Boëne and Dandeker (Eds.) *op. cit.* The latest Eurobarometer survey (November 2000) squarely places the military as the most trusted public institution in the EU at large. Approval ratings are in the 70–90% range, which represents a substantial increase over 2 decades in most Western countries.

[29]Wilfried von Bredow, "The Profession of Arms as Social Work?" Presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, 1993 Biennial Conference, 22–24 October, Baltimore, Maryland.

Contrary to what has been observed in the United States, where intolerance of casualties effectively ended American efforts in Somalia in 1993 after 18 U.S. soldiers had been killed in 1 day,[30] European attitudes toward loss of life among "miles protector" troops (von Bredow, 1994) are less clearcut and seem to vary from one country to the next. The explanation is hardly straightforward. Germany withdrew its contingent from Cambodia when one of its medics died; France, on the other hand, with upward of 100 dead over 10 years, continues to be present in most troublespots where Western interventions are taking place.[31] Another factor is that countries with a colonial past—Britain, France, and Italy—seem more tolerant of casualties involved in expeditionary uses of force. But even then, there is no telling what public attitudes would be if French casualties, instead of being evenly spread over a number of years, were concentrated in time and place: Belgian reactions after the deaths of 10 Blue Helmets in Rwanda suggest they might be stronger and more negative.

Finally, the modalities of peace support operations and their evolution through time is also subject to public opinion influence. When in Bosnia during the spring of 1995 political deadlock, ineffective peacekeeping military postures, hostage taking, and humiliation threatened growing doubts in the press, media, and the public at large, President Chirac argued for the use of military muscle to enforce existing norms and agreements, convinced the United States to intervene, and started a movement which led out of gridlock to the Dayton accord. When NATO was entrusted by the United Nations to intervene on its behalf, greater effectiveness made for stronger public support. Likewise, the Kosovo aerial bombing campaign of 1999 elicited unease when, after a while, it appeared inconclusive, and applause when Serbia eventually caved in. It is true, however, that September 11th, 2001, gave the president of the United States a strong and clear mandate to beef up security, and—to varying degrees—other Western governments have seen popular support increase for similar measures. But rapid victory in Afghanistan, though it is unlikely to solve the problem of international terrorism entirely, appears to be eroding that support as "business as usual" (and, in some regards, more critical) attitudes gradually resurface.

To sum up, national sovereignty and citizenship are less basic in the way western armed forces function than used to be the case (though this is truer of Western Europe and other allies than of the United States), while the Clausewitzian rationale governing the relation between politics and the use of armed force is being weakened, at least in the more probable post-Cold War instances of such use, by ambivalent and somewhat superficial public attitudes which tend to limit rationality. If, then, by "antimodern" is meant postnational and antipolitical in the sense of distrust of power in the hands of élites expressing and implementing rational political purpose, without a doubt the military find themselves in a distinctly more antimodern situation than in earlier eras.

[30] Careful examination of American attitudes toward casualties, as James Burk, Peter Feaver, and others have shown, suggests that the general public is less shy than politicians if the goals of intervention are deemed worthwhile. In fact, it would appear that following the tragic deaths of 18 Rangers in Somalia, a majority of the American public were in favor of a continued effort to restore peace and order there: see S. Kull and I.M. Destler (1999).

[31] In the French case, until the draft law was suspended recently, public opinion hardly reacted to casualties as long as draftees were not committed against their will: volunteers are supposed to know the risks involved and are better paid to face them than they would normally be at home. However, if in the future French AVF volunteers were disproportionately drawn from underprivileged strata and ethnic minorities, there is reason to believe that American-style "fragility of legitimacy" would probably become the norm.

Posthistoricism

The flattening of value systems and the extreme forms of pluralism it entails are reflected in many aspects of today's armed forces. One of them is the equivalency established between military and more secular civilian forms of service wherever conscription is retained.[32] Another is the rise of multiculturalism among the troops. Due to demographic "troughs", and because military service is seen as demanding, all-volunteer forces find it more difficult to recruit the young white males that until recently formed the bulk of their human resources. They therefore tend to tap recruitment pools hitherto neglected—women and ethnic minorities—not only for pragmatic reasons ("business case"), but also to enhance their image as equal opportunity employers, thus satisfying one of the newer legitimacy constraints ("equity case"). Britain and The Netherlands are implementing new procurement policies along these lines, though many in the forces are ambivalent at best about them.[33]

Such being the case, it is only a matter of time before cultural diversity displaces social representativeness as the criterion by which to judge the acceptability of the armed services' social composition. When societies were tightly integrated and military service was regarded as a citizen's obligation, the system was considered fair only if the military's rank-and-file did not become the preserve of the underprivileged: if the middle and upper classes were duly represented in proportions approximating those in society at large. Under an all-volunteer format, the social composition of the military reflects that of the working population, which means that unless incentives can entice upwardly mobile types, the rank-and-file will be made up of the less educated. Those who feel discriminated against and ill at ease in civilian society—among them many second- or third-generation immigrants, though propensity to enlist varies from one ethnic minority to another—will be attracted to an institution subject to public scrutiny, in which discrimination is distinctly less and where the functional need for internal cohesion translates into "brotherhood of arms." In other words, they will reproduce the African-American community's strategy in the United States. Today women and homosexuals, tomorrow no doubt other groups handicapped by social stigmas of one sort or another, find it convenient, conditional upon support from activist groups outside, to turn the armed forces into a symbolic battleground of choice with a view to achieving complete equality. In many countries, rather than plain fact, these trends assume the status of an hypothesis based on the evolution noted in the United States since the 1980s and assumptions on the effects of shifts to all-volunteer forces. But in other nations, the outlines of such trends are clearly there, and processes of imitation or homogeneization could very well allow them to spread.

In France, in the last 2 decades of the military draft, the combat companies of all-volunteer battalions earmarked for out-of-area operations were manned by sons of North African immigrants and natives of overseas dependencies in proportions known at times to exceed 20%. Muslim *hallal* food and religious holidays and services are now provided for, and limited instances of reverse discrimination in promotion criteria (a practice almost universally loathed) was observed in the French Army.

[32] This was also noted in the United States in the 1980s, despite the fact that it had an all-volunteer force. See Charles Moskos (1988).

[33] In Britain, this was in the air in the late 1980s: Christopher Dandeker, "Le cas britannique (II): La politique des personnels militaires et ses problèmes dans les années 90, à travers l'exemple du recrutement de l'armée de terre," in Boëne and Martin (Eds.) (1991), *op. cit.* It became policy with the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (see especially the chapter entitled "Policy for People").

In countries, generally to the North, where feminist movements are not antimilitary, women have pressed for complete equality in the services, including assignment to combat units—with mitigated success. But in many others, France among them, despite the absence of outside pressure from activists (but through prodding by Cabinet ministers, Parliament, or administrative courts), integration of female service members has proceeded apace in a nonadversarial climate.[34]

Following the same strategy, homosexuals in the same countries pursue public recognition and access to "first-class citizenship" through service under arms. The first homosexual *cause célèbre*, American-style, occurred in Britain recently: The case of soldiers dismissed from the Army on the traditional grounds that homosexuality is incompatible with military life was reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights; the ruling made it necessary to change the law in the direction of more tolerant policies. Such a ruling is certain to reverberate in countries such as France, Germany, or Italy, where to this day homosexuality, handled informally in rare incidents, is hardly a salient issue in the military.

It follows that the post-Cold War military, deprived of the massive threat of old (and less central in the new fight against international terror than other government agencies), has seen its other basis of legitimacy change substantially over a decade: It is no longer legitimized by the fact that it faithfully reflects a socially diverse but culturally homogeneous parent society. In a culturally diverse configuration, functional military values that diverge from the mainstream are no longer a problem. In societies where each and every group is left to pursue its inclinations and cultivate its lifestyle free of any constraint from a cultural mainstream, the armed forces will be legitimated as a tribe among tribes. The only condition imposed upon them is that they be sparing of human life in the application of force and tolerant of diversity. Given that classic social science literature on combat motivation underlined the value of cultural homogeneity as a source of primary group cohesion,[35] one of the main factors of collective morale and effectiveness, this development is bound to raise functional issues. They have gone unrecognized so far,[36] but when the question is eventually tackled, "unity in diversity" promises to be a hard nut for military sociologists to crack.

Accordingly, suspicion of military professionals' career motives and interests is fast disappearing. Not only are their new missions deemed worthy, but their demanding lifestyle has an air of authenticity about it that makes their profession attractive, even if few young men or women are prepared to make it their career. The respect that surrounds them contrasts

[34]See Bernard Boëne, "The Changing Place of Servicewomen under France's New All-Voluteer Force," in Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (Ed.) *Extended Roles for Military Women*, Hull/London, Centre for Research on Military Institutions (University of Hull) and U.S. Army Research Institute, European Branch, 2002.

[35]S. L. A. Marshall (1947), Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz (1948), Samuel A. Stouffer et al. (1949), Stephen D. Wesbrook (1980), and William Daryl Henderson (1985).

[36]For a statement of the issue that was meant to be provocative, see Bernard Boëne, "Diversity in the French Armed Forces: Trends and Prospects," in Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (Eds.) 1999, pp. 85–103. The problem was tackled by David Segal by questioning the value of writings considered to be classical (see note 35 above) rather than by probing its continued relevance empirically: [that literature] "must for methodological reasons be regarded as heuristic rather conclusive, and contemporary research, which is also not yet conclusive, seems to stand the argument on its head" (David R. Segal, "Presidential Notes," *IUS Newsletter*, Summer 2000). However, if (as can be presumed) the contemporary research alluded to applies to the field of work, it is moot whether conclusions derived from civilian settings can unproblematically be transferred to the context of military action.

sharply with the vocal disrespect of a quarter-century ago. Abundantly documented by survey data (cf. the high approval ratings mentioned earlier), it also comes out strongly in public debates and media attitudes. In Germany recently, a ruling by the constitutional court to the effect that antimilitary activists could not be forbidden to call soldiers "murderers" without violating the norm of free speech met with a resounding public outcry. In France, following the announcement of cutbacks, disbanded battalions, and closing armaments factories, the dominant reaction has been to treat service members as an endangered rare species.

Part of the story is that the military have become adept in public relations and institutional survival: A recent comparative study (Moskos, Williams, and Segal, eds., 2000) shows that in most countries, the "soldier-communicator" is one of the new roles to be found among officers, alongside those of "soldier-diplomat" and "soldier-scholar." These new roles, called for by the new context, have been made possible by unprecedented levels and types of officer education. It is no longer rare for military élites to hold graduate degrees, not just in engineering but in the social sciences. In future, these educational attainments will combine with the low numbers which result from much reduced force levels to enhance their prestige. In more than one country where senior civil servants are politicized and politicians have been discredited by scandals and suspicions, or what the public perceive as ineffective policies, lack of vision, or sterile rivalries, senior officers will appear as the only disinterested, nonpartisan élite, thereby enhancing their political influence. That this is already the case in America only adds weight and credibility to what is as of now a nascent trend.

Such newfound prestige and influence probably means that the decline of professionalism[37] observed in the military as in other sectors during the 1970s and 1980s will be reversed among officers: Prestige, generating self-esteem and a sense of moral worth, is the precondition for the personal sacrifice of power and profit in the discharge of one's duty and gives meaning to it. And if that is the case, professional ethics should take care of most civil–military problems likely to arise, thereby removing the possible sting and making the new situation democratically acceptable.

Finally, the cultural entropy to be expected at the international level has already started in the military field. This stems from increased cooperation and manifests itself in language and procedures. Though French, for instance, is supposed to be one of the two official languages within NATO (and the second main language of UN agencies), English is used in most cases, even when British or U.S. troops are not a party to the multinational operation. Whereas integration of multinational forces under the Cold War was of the horizontal type, with large, mostly self-contained national formations juxtaposed and contact with foreign service members limited to higher headquarters, it now often tends to be vertical: Due to the relatively low numbers involved, interaction of national contingents in the field is apt to take place at battalion level or sometimes even below. For simple pragmatic reasons, the more intricate division of labor among contingents imposes English as a single *working* (as distinct from official) language in common-denominator procedures. From that standpoint, the functioning of new (mostly European) multinational formations listed above confirms the observations made during the UN peace support missions of the early 1990s.

In summary, diversity within, entropy without are changing the face of armed forces, as predicted by the postmodernist interpretation of larger trends. They do so in both functional and sociopolitical respects.

[37] Christopher Dandeker, "Farewell to Arms?", in James Burk (Ed.) (1994).

Antihumanist Naturalism

The rise of volunteer manpower procurement betrays a growing acceptance of such natural mechanisms as market forces to substitute for the aggregation of citizens' values and interests into collective political purpose. The ideal of autonomous individuals, capable of free choice and self-regulation, participating in public affairs as they decide and take their share of collective burdens, gives way to a situation in which private preferences do not have to be ordered and consolidated into a unified individual will. In military procurement strategies, this leads, for instance, to recruiting slogans stressing job security, the economic value of training for subsequent careers, or adventure and downplaying the *raison d'être*, the risks and burdens of military service, thus favoring extrinsic motivation, and opening the hitherto unheard-of possibility of volunteers applying for CO status when the time comes to go to war (as happened during the Gulf War).

Another aspect of postmodern naturalistic antihumanism was the surge of antinuclear feeling observed in the period which followed the Cold War's demise. Nuclear weapons have never been popular. Yet despite powerful campaigns against them in the 1950s and 1980s, especially in northern Europe, they had come to be accepted reluctantly as a necessary evil so long as they promised to inhibit the great war everybody feared. When that danger disappeared, the influence of "deep ecology" themes making humans responsible for the destruction of natural systems redoubled, as was revealed when, in 1995, President Chirac decided to resume nuclear tests in the Pacific. The campaign of protests and boycotts of French goods which ensued was bitter in Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia, and it assumed surprising proportions in the whole of Europe. In France itself, where consensus on nuclear deterrence had until then seemed strongest, surveys showed that a majority disapproved of the President's decision.

Pastiche of older forms is also present.[38] If antimodernism has been taken above to mean postnational and antipolitical, it is possible to construe it as a resurgence of *traditional* sociability, stressing cohesion, authority, discipline, warrior myths, and the like. Indeed, at a time when self-selection becomes an important factor in recruiting soldiers, it is to be expected that the type of personality attracted to the military will differ at least in part from the cross section prevalent when the draft was in force. With lower numbers and less visibility, as well as more separation from family due high levels of overseas deployment, interaction with civilians on the outside will probably be less than it used to be. Exaltation of military values and more conservative attitudes (though not exclusive of some consumerism imported from civilian society) is in the cards. This was noted in Holland, where even before transition to the projected AVF was completed, a trend toward "remilitarization" was being observed,[39] while adherence to conservative values (functional as well as sociopolitical) by large portions of the military was among the more prominent findings of recent studies in Britain and the United States.[40] As noted previously, a legitimacy based on the right of

[38] The international antiglobalization movement which has emerged in the last few years is definitely not inspired by postmodernism as it reasserts the need for rational control of collective destiny—a distinctly modern concern. Yet, postmodern theory has no problem interpreting it precisely as a pastiche of older forms.

[39] Jan Van der Meulen, "Mission Bound: The Final Professionalization of the Dutch Military," in Moskos, Williams, and Segal (Eds.) (2000).

[40] Hew Strachan (Ed.) (2000), *Military Culture in the 21st Century*; Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn (Eds.) (2001). Israel, too, seems affected by that trend: see Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek (Eds.) (2001).

all groups to cultivate whatever identity they care to choose will make such trends much more acceptable than they were only a few years ago still, except where such hardening of orientations is accompanied by arrogance and triggers a civil–military crisis (as reported in America by authors of the first rank in the mid-1990s: see Kohn, 1993, Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, Feaver, 1996, Ricks, 1997).

This, however, is only part of the story. Holistic organization and warrior culture are functional in the combat outfits of land forces. In other parts of the military, especially in navies and air forces, the pressures of technical specialization point in the direction of continued civilianization. So do the strong aspirations of military families to lead "normal lives" and the little-noticed fact that under an all-volunteer format civilian employees form the largest component of defense ministries. In other words, the military will become more pluralist than it ever was. Given lower force levels, as already noted, the variety of missions to prepare for results in a larger measure of versatility. Use of force today ranges from warrior to peace soldier modes, whose norms—aggressiveness or restraint—are apt to differ. The difficulty of moving with ease from one to the other has been documented in the American case (D. Segal, 1996), and no doubt similar problems are bound to occur elsewhere. In Western European armies, Danish aggressiveness and "shoot or scoot" attitudes among French troops during the early years in Bosnia are cases in point. Conversely, Nordic battalions, well-versed in peacekeeping duties, were reported then to be less at ease when the time came to *enforce* the peace rather than keep it. Experience will likely iron out some of these difficulties (though changing the guard every 4 or 6 months, to minimize the stress of peace support operations, tends to cut the learning curve short). If human resource quality is high, training suitable, and doctrine flexible enough, it will make for adaptability; if not, military institutions will become blunt, unresponsive instruments, and something approaching schizophrenic soldiers the norm.[41]

One last aspect is the limitation of social horizons to the present. Mainly responsible for such lack of distance from up-to-the-minute events is the speed of telecommunications through satellites, which has made real-time media coverage possible. In the age of CNN, meditation and thinking have been turned into luxuries for those in authority; so has the writing of full reports for their subordinates. This has important consequences in the way military organizations function in action. One of them is that short-circuits tend to be more common between those in control at the top and those in the field. In the heat of the moment, the latter (generally junior officers) are the only ones to command the particulars of a problem situation calling, under the gaze of world TV cameras, for immediate treatment. As a result, much gets delegated to them, and their superiors in middle management, often being made idle in the process, then become sitting targets for those wielding the streamlining axe. The best documented case in that regard is that of Britain,[42] but (as informal briefings suggest) there is reason to believe that the same can be found in other militaries involved in "new missions." The honeycomb structure of communications systems, allowing everybody to

[41] The latter is especially the case in view of the possibility now offered by satellite technology to soldiers on overseas theaters of operations to communicate with their families back home. Interference between family and military groups with strong claims on the attention and loyalty of service members may disturb the classical sources of motivation and primary cohesion among soldiers. The subject had come to the attention of commanders during the Gulf War: It is raised in the memoirs of Gen. Schwartzkopf and of (French Army) Gen. Maurice Schmitt, former chief of the Defense staff. David Segal and his collaborators have documented and analyzed the effects of such communications among U.S. troops on a number of occasions since the mid-1980s.

[42] This is a recurrent theme in Christopher Dandeker's recent works.

confer with everybody else in action, has relativized the hierarchical dimension of military organization: orders tend to become general directives to be adapted to local circumstances at the discretion of field commanders. This is the price exacted by complexity if goals are to be reached in good time.

Simultaneously, however, the political repercussions of any incident are such that politicians are tempted to exercise detailed control in real time.[43] The consequence of the legitimacy constraints being felt at grassroots level is that young officers are now routinely burdened with political responsibilities for which they have to be trained. These are tomorrow's senior and general officers: Overlap of the political and military spheres is now at an all-time high and—all geopolitical things equal—promises to grow over time.

In brief, the devitalization of *homo politicus* and social bonds does indeed bring about circumstances in which human will and rationality cede pride of place to impersonal mechanisms, social or natural, a partial return of premodern sociability, and a primacy of the present over the future, as predicted again by postmodernist formulations. This is conducive to plural and unstable military organizations, shifting goals, fragmented selves, and officers who learn to heed public opinion and the media, but are more difficult to control.

CONCLUSIONS: GOOD REASONS TO PRAISE THE POSTMODERN THESIS—AND TO REJECT IT

The postmodern prediction of "networks of organized anarchies, flat hierarchies given to decentralized decision-making, units with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity and permeable boundaries" proves correct with regard to the manner in which present-day militaries function, just as it does with the type of firm competing on foreign markets with a measure of success. From a sociopolitical angle, integration of service members is no longer a problem, if only because their status as "a tribe among tribes" allows a much greater deal of divergence from increasingly uncertain cultural mainstreams; civilian control by political authorities is weakened, but as the military learns the art of institutional survival by swimming with public opinion currents, it is made effective by legitimacy constraints indirectly enforced through approval ratings and budgetary pressures. As noted on a number of occasions above, most of the trends brought to light, and insights as to what the future seems to hold in store, would apply equally well, despite differences, to North American and to Western European militaries. In other words, the postmodern interpretation of civilizational trends is verified in its essentials as well as in many of its details in the comparison of national military institutions of the West, just as it appears to be in many other facets of life in those countries.

If it turns out to be such a fine tool of analysis, why does it fail to carry conviction? To begin with, probably because its evolutionist view of the Last Man is too ontologically realist to be swallowed with ease by many social scientists. Those who beg to differ know that contexts are apt to change and lead to other modes of adaptation and in the end to new societal and institutional constellations. While they do not claim that "postmodern" analyses are invalid, they prefer to think in terms of a "late (radical, or reflexive) phase of

[43] This is what Giddens has called the "dialectic of control." Yet, it must be noted that repeated dysfunctions have eventually led to organizational improvements recently at the political–military interface in that context.

modernity," leaving open the metaphysically charged question of whether it is the last. The argument in favor of continuity is rather compelling. If it is true that the nation-state was the first embodiment of modernity, and that it is now on the decline, the individual as an ultimate value was there from the start: The nation-state was but a means to an end. So that the current situation can be seen as a natural development, one that is ridding humanity of the unintended, negative effects of exalted notions of the nation. The trends noted by postmodernists can be interpreted as a hypermodern critique of modernity, in sharp contrast to the reactionary postures which had prevailed previously and mostly failed to contain it. As Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992) and Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1989) have shown, such trends represent a *deepening* of modern principles rather than their negation.

But there is another reason, which is of particular interest for sociologists of the military: Postmodernists are generally far too optimistic when they postulate that societies are self-regulated through market forces and mutual tolerance of social groups living in separate symbolic and normative worlds. The potential for conflict and *unorganized* anarchy, indeed for a war of all against all, is much greater than they surmise. The fact that in the present circumstances it would not produce a great war of the type that ravaged the 20th century is poor solace: universal insecurity at home would in all likelihood be worse. It would, among other things, turn military institutions into roving bands of predator mercenaries, as in the Middle Ages or in futurist horror movies.

The best that can be said of the postmodern thesis is that it has great potential *pragmatic value* in providing insights or new angles of attack and in drawing attention to trends which the settled ways of the paradigm that has been dominant in the military field for nearly half a century would not spontaneously spot and mark as important. But that paradigm—the Janowitzian tradition, a fine blend of Weberian method and theory, functional analysis, and strategic realism tempered by democratic values and pragmatic philosophy—is perfectly capable of analyzing the developments and paradoxes the postmodernists point to in terms of context, meaning, function, and consequences, intended or unintended, of purposive action. Indeed, the followers of that research tradition have done and will continue to do so: all of the trends examined in this summary review of post-Cold War developments can be analyzed in such terms—without incurring the intellectual and social risks involved in postmodern conjectures.

In short, while most authors agree on the new realities and the factors underlying them, the use by some of the term "postmodern" has inadvertently introduced metatheoretical considerations that may not be entirely welcome. "Postmodern": useful, yes, but unnecessary.

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CHAPTER 11

Soldiers and Governments in Postpraetorian Africa

Cases in the Francophone Area

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FOREWORD

Since their access to independence, civil–military relations in African states have generally operated on the praetorian mode, that is, under the form of an hegemonic domination of the political and administrative system by elements of the armed forces and with the latter's support.[1] The subsequent politization of military institutions has, with other corporate and sometimes ethnic factors, provoked, through takeovers, plots, and so on, an "elite circulation" of various groups of the military hierarchy within the governmental-administrative structure. The order of their appearance, their sociological characteristics, and their ideological positions have contributed to give the praetorian cycle a ternary configuration, moderate at first, then radicalized, and finally "thermidorianized" (Martin 1989, 1995).

With the decline of authoritarianism and the political transition that followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such an extreme type of civil–military relations has become more exceptional, be it because of a conversion of the military to the principle of subordination to civilians, the demoralization of an institution worn out by internal crises and lack of results, or simply the systemic inadaptation of such a type of rule.[2] On other continents, in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, the political marginalization of the military has

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[1] It is of little import that this type of government includes civilians, which is inevitable. It is the most extreme version of civil-military relations, with regards indeed to the criteria working in most advanced countries, liberal or totalitarian, but also in modernizing nations where the military plays a more oblique political role.

[2] With their modernization, societies are less susceptible from a structural point of view to be easily dominated and efficiently governed by a praetorian elite, that is, a sociologically isolated and small-sized group.

generally operated according to the dominant Western managerial norm, which implies its neutralization and subordination, henceforth confined to its original institutional functions, that is, territorial defence; intervention in outside theaters; and, exceptionally, the keeping of internal order.

From this viewpoint, Africa, where democratization is "without end",[3] occurring with more difficulties than elsewhere, remains an exception. If they no longer assume the praetorian form, posttransitional civil–military interactions seem to operate according to four main patterns, with the Western managerial model still uncommon (I) and three others more frequent: military leaders stay or return to power and emphasize the civilian dimension of their responsibilities as heads of state according to a model that could be labeled "Kemalist" (II); the armed forces are either used as a recourse and intervene in cases where divisions are too pronounced or are rendered inefficient due to the demands of the new civilian political class (III); or, with in a context of civil war and breakdown of authority, the military disintegrates into rival groups fighting one another, sometimes in conjunction with opposed political factions competing for power (IV).

This typology is still tentative, based as it is on observations which need be taken further. It emphasizes a few distinctive shared features, leaving out national specificities, however relevant they may be otherwise, and ignoring other elements of overlap. Last, it focuses on North and Sub-Saharan Africa of French colonial succession, which, however, does not preclude an overall validity, since illustrations dealt with are numerous enough and comparatively representative of the situation on the whole continent. It ought to be noted that the presentation—from the conventional one to the most problematical—avoids suggesting any evolutionism, implying, in a teleological perspective, a progress, with the Western managerial model as the desirable outcome.

THE WESTERN MANAGERIAL MODEL

Also defined as democratic or liberal, this model has first appeared in Western Europe. It is characterized by the institutionalized subordination of a professionalized military rendered politically and ideologicaly neutral. In French-speaking Africa, four states correspond at present to this category, with some variations: Senegal, which, since its independence, has used a quasi-democratic system; Morocco, where the successive monarchs have been able to enjoy a legitimacy mixing religious considerations and a capacity to preserve national integrity; and Cameroon and Gabon, which have continuously functioned in a highly tutelary context.

It should be noted that the professionalization or the confinement of the military to its institutional functions has not prevented attempts at political interferences and organizational restlessness. Despite the prestige of President Léopold S. Senghor, Senegal experienced, in 1962, an attempted coup involving Premier Mamadou Dia and recently, in December 2001, a mutiny by soldiers having just returned from serving with UN troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Morocco, at least two attempts have been too serious to be hidden: in 1971, cadets of the Royal NCOs School attacked Skirat palace during a reception to kill

[3]To borrow Larry Diamond's, Antony H. M. Kirk-Greene's, and Oyeleye Oyediran's title (1997). Among recent books written on this question (the litterature is voluminous), see: Daloz and Quantin (1997), Joseph (1999), Bratton and Van de Walle (2000), and *Géopolitique africaine* (2001). For a review of pre-1995 works, see Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995).

Hassan II and, the following year, six combat aircraft tried to shoot down the king's plane; in both cases, the sovereign's capacity to react led to an increase in his prestige and legitimacy. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya used the rumor of a military plot to replace Prime Minister Maigari in 1983, while, a year later, a group of officers from the north, headed by Colonel Saleh Ibrahim, tried to topple the regime, leading to a harsh repression. In Gabon, an intervention by French troops was necessary to reinstate President Léon Mba, deposed by a military coup in February 1964; and Omar Bongo, who succeeded him in 1967, used the argument of a military plot to sentence Captain Ngokouta to death in 1985. Yet, and despite their seriousness, these attempts succeeded only in instituting tighter control of the armed forces.[4]

Several factors explain the civilian leaders' capacity to remain in power.[5] Some are general. The prestige, or in any case the statesmanship or the adroitness, of successive heads of state played an important part: Senghor then Abdou Diouf in Senegal, Mohammed V then Hassan II in Morocco, Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya in Cameroon, and M'Ba then Omar Bongo in Gabon were all capable of mobilizing all governmental resources to reinforce their power and consolidate their legitimacy. Moreover, France's influence was not without consequence, with, regarding Senegal, the intent to keep a rather unique political experiment its exemplary character, and, for Cameroon and Gabon, the consciousness that they are important economic stakes given their natural resources, especially oil.

Other variables also intervene. In these four cases, armed forces are generally well treated, spared notably all problems which have developed elsewhere, such as interruptions in the payment of salaries; a concern which in some cases could produce a certain amount of corruption. Civilians, moreover, make sure not to commit any violations of their professional status and not to meddle in their organizational functioning or interfere with affairs generally considered as military. Often, statutory codifications and regulations have been drafted, helping to harmonize transactions between both spheres.

It ought to be noted that this subordination to political power does not mean the complete marginalization of the military or any disinterest on its part for the polity's affairs without seeking to play any political role, it follows the evolutions engaged by civilian authorities, who in turn are careful not to leave the military ignorant of their plans and sometimes give it to them, at least in the perspective of keeping public order, for example, through administrative roles and functions.[6] It is indeed difficult to evaluate with precision the nature of the negotiations going on between the military and politicians because of the necessity of secrecy, but rumors are not without significance; in Senegal, for example, the military seems to have agreed to prevent any possible contesting of the 2000 presidential elections even if, as they eventually did, they were to be won by the candidate opposed to the Socialist party, in power for 40 years.[7] In Morocco, the tradition inaugurated by Mohammed V

[4] Nothing important has been written on Cameroon and Gabon's civil–military affairs; about recent changes, see Sindjoun (1999) and Rosatanga-Rigault (2000).

[5] Sam Decalo (1998) has lengthly discussed at length the case of these countries spared by military domination.

[6] A good counterexample is offered by the Ivorian military which, after enjoying the full attention of the regime (and, for that matter, it functioned on the Western managerial model of subordination) found itself, under Henri Konan Bédié's leadership, gradually marginalized, a situation which, with other factors, relates to General Robert Gueï's taking over in December 1999 (Kieffer, 2000).

[7] The supervision of the 2000 presidential elections was confided to a general, Lamine Cissé, by outgoing president Abdou Diouf, who told him to do everything to keep the elections free; when it was clear that Diouf was losing, Cissé advised him to be prepared to recognize Abdoulaye Wade's victory (Cissé, 2001).

to place the designated heir at the head of the armed forces is obviously aimed at insuring him a useful support once on the throne.

In general, in these countries the role of the military is unambiguously defined, feeding a sense of professional self-purpose among its members. There is always an adequation between troop and equipment levels and the missions to be fulfilled. In Senegal and Morocco, the armed forces have felt valorized by the assignments entrusted to them to intervene in regions placed in the sphere of influence if not the direct sovereignty of the country (e.g., Guinea-Bissau and Casamance for Senegal and Western Sahara for Morocco). Moreover, recurring tensions between Senegal and Mauritania, on the one hand, and Morocco and Algeria, on the other, add validity to the idea of a function to be fulfilled in the defence of the nation. Other forms of military legitimation and valorization also exist, as with the participation of African states in peacekeeping multilateral forces with Ecomog or post-Westphalian operations under the aegis of the international community, as during the Gulf War. Obviously, this periodical exposure to other military institutions, sometimes among the most modernized ones, helps to reinforce more professionally conformed behavior.[8] Last, the devastating effects of the excessive politicization of armed forces in neighboring countries has contributed to the neutralization of the military.

These four nations have therefore been able, not without success, to implement objective and subjective forms of political control of the military[9], putting at the same time emphasis on factors of a professional nature, while eschewing isolation of the military from the rest of the nation by associating them to sociopolitical evolutions. This being said, civilian rulers never neglect to take some precautions toward their armed forces, witnessing a residual distrust and the conviction of the potential danger they could constitute; hence, policies seeking to balance the military with a powerful gendarmerie capable of handling any disorder,[10] managing troop levels with parcimony, and even controlling access to armaments and their use.

THE "KEMALIST" MODEL

Though it might be questionable to compare two different countries in two different centuries, a number of rulers in uniform in a few states of Francophone Africa seem to have adopted a political posture much like the situation that Turkey had known after World War I: arriving in power with the unction, if not the backing of the military from the ranks of which he came, the leader reinforces his legitimacy through the "civilianization" of his rule and through a project of administrative, economic, and social reforms. The organization of relatively open elections allows him to test this legitimacy before the public and to erase the

[8] Though at the same time, it could induce feelings of relative deprivation about one's material standards and professional status, as well as arouse a less favorable opinion on the regime. Moreover the, use in multilateral operations could raise problems with the military as in Morocco during the Gulf War (Leveau, 1993; Daguzan, 1998).

[9] To use the classic distinction proposed by Samuel P. Huntington (1957), who is rather partisan of the former over the latter, which, though potentially risky, can nevertheless have beneficial effects, notably in a phase of democratic consolidation (Karsten, 1997); a view which converges with Morris Janowitz's (1960).

[10] A brigade of the Senegalese *Légion de gendarmerie d'intervention* was mobilized to intervene against mutinuous elements of the army in December 2001.

Caesarist genesis of his political trajectory.[11] Though restricted to its technical functions, the military is always susceptible to be instrumentalized by the leader of the country if need be.

Today, six coutries belong to this catagory and, to this effect, could be presented in pairs. First, Tunisia and Mauritania: In 1987, Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali deposed Tunisia's historic leader, Habib Bourguiba, whose Premier he had just been nominated. Though a general, the military was only remotely associated with his accession to power, though quite satisfied with it. His career as head of state was legitimated by civilians and subsequently reinforced by his successes in the presidential elections of 1989, 1994, and 1999. The few officers originally involved in the coup, such as the chief of staff and the commander of the presidential guard, were removed and the armed forces served as any other group—as a political counterweight (Ware, 1985). Mauritania is indeed poorly comparable, given differences in development and political tradition: Tunisia is more democratic and liberal, while Mauritania is praetorian, with four military coups in 20 years. However, they have important aspects in common: the weight of Islamic fundamentalism, which the military opposes (in the Kemalist tradition) and having an officer in power during a period of democratic transition. In Mauritania, it is Colonel Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, in place since 1984, who sought to draw legitimacy by running for president in the elections of 1992 and 1997, during which the opposition was allowed to compete, better the first than the second time (Ould Hamed Salem, 1999). Finally, in a country where half the population lives under the level of poverty and where the application of Islamic law has been engaged, the military appears as an element of stability, all the more so as it pays respect to a few democratic rituals and because tensions with neighboring Senegal justify its role, at least from the point of view of territorial defence.

In Burkina Faso and Togo, the Kemalist model of evolution is linked to the political careers of Presidents Blaise Compaoré and Gnassimbé Eyadéma. Both enjoy strong longevity as the heads of state: the first since 1987, after the assassination of his comrade-in-arms Thomas Sankara; the second owes his accession to the presidency to a coup led in January 1967. Both also have sought to revive their legitimacy and renewed their mandate through general elections, held in 1991 and 1998 for Compaoré in 1979, 1986, 1993, and 1998 for Eyadéma. However, though their discourse and public behavior seek to give proof of their democratic conversion, the reduced room for maneuvering they have left to the opposition compromises the credibility of even a postauthoritarianist stance.

Benin and Malagasy, to December 2001, are of a somewhat different nature. If in the four other countries, the presidency is held by officers concerned with giving the impression they have disassociated themselves from their praetorian past, Kérékou in Cotonou and Didier Ratsiraka in Tananarive, returned to power after having been obliged to step down and incurred the country's disfavor, which they ended by winning electorally. Thus, after having governed from 1972 to 1991, Kérékou had to organize a national conference (the first in Africa) to deal with democratic demands and then accept the results of the following elections, which gave a majority to a civilian, Nicéphore Soglo, in March 1991. Ratsiraka headed first the Supreme Council of the Revolution and then the Republic in 1975; relected in 1982 and 1989, he resigned with no opposition in 1991 and ceded power to Albert Zafy. He had to wait until the 1996 elections to win back his position (Zafy had been impeached a little earlier) and again become head of state.

[11] These are the most salient elements retained here; Kemalism is indeed a more complex configuration which has moreover evolved with time; the analogy was suggested by Janowitz (1964).

The legitimacy of these six leaders does not, however, proceed from the same logic. It ought be granted that elections in Tunisia, Burkina Faso, and Togo are not models of pluralistic procedures; the presidential candidates ran without real competition (Ben Brick, 2000; Otayek et al., 1996; Sassou Atisso, 2001). But the main problem for the elected military leader was less about keeping competitors at bay than circumventing constitutional clauses introduced to limit the number of successive candidates. Conversely, in Benin and the Malagasy Republic, there was a genuine alternation in power; the outgoing president stepped down after losing but subsequently won the following elections. If these results, alternatively favorable and unfavorable, can be interpreted, partly at least, as the sign of a certain disappointment among voters, it shows that these two countries offer an example of a comparatively successful democratic transition (Quantin, 2000).

The role of armed forces in such contexts is not always easy to grasp. Everyone, even high-ranking officers, is now convinced that it is in the interest of the country and the organization itself not to meddle in politics because it is counterproductive and that it is better to concentrate on defence functions, perhaps on missions in the area of public development, that are defined and supervised by the constituted powers. The military "ought be disconnected from political life," advised Blaise Comporé. It remains that, when necessary, especially in case of too-pronounced a disorder or in case of the confiscation of political power by too-unpopular a group, it could be activated to the service of the leader, but then it is rather in the capacity of a network intervening in a surreptitious fashion (which does not exclude the use of violence) than openly; in any case, abstaining from reentering the political arena to substitute itself to civilians. In Tunisia, the military became omnipresent (after a long period of remaining low-profile) when it appeared necessary to quell Islamic fundamentalism, yet it has remained politically reserved.

In this model, too, objective means of control, such as the setting of juridical restrictions, functional containment, and professionalization, are operating together with more subjective means to organize the attachment to the head of state according to methods based, if necessary, on patrimonialist devices, even appealing to ethnic solidarity. The Togolese case is exemplary in this regard, mixing nepotism and ethnic representation in the composition of the commanding officers corps or of the most valuable support units (Toulabor, 1999); a large proportion of officers is made up of men coming from the president's area. The tendency is often also to pamper the units closest to the leader, such as the paracommado of the Pô in Burkina Faso, the "Pigeons" battalion, the rapid intervention force in Togo (Thiriot, 1999), or the paramilitary and specific security forces.[12]

Simultaneously, the leadership seeks to protect iself from any attempt at autonomous action by armed forces or its members. In this regard, a systematic constitutional control of the military is often designed. Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo, for instance, have innovated in this area to the point of suggesting the idea of a "praetorian threat" which has to be handled with all possible means. The basic laws of these three countries are very different from those of the four nations presented above as proceeding from the Western managerial model. Beyond the idea that measures against praetorianism in countries where civilian governments have always prevailed are necessary, it remains that any alluding to such a danger would seem an admission of weakness, in any case of vulnerability. Conversely, the

[12]Though such groups tend to arouse the jealousy of the regular military, their intervention, notably in the area of domestic public order, saved the military from situations sometimes technically difficult to manage and from the alienation of the public opinion, as became the case in North Africa (Leveau, 1996; Daguzan, 1998; Souaidia, 2000).

political involvement of the military in Togo, Burkina Faso, and Benin has been in place too long for constitution-framers to judge it of little consequence.

Two types of precautions have been focused on (Cabanis and Martin 1998). They consist first in condemning in advance any military coup attempt and, above all, inviting the population to resist it. This is the case with Benin's constitutional preamble and chapter on executive power (Art. 66), which calls on the people to disobey and rebel in case of a coup, notably by the military. The text goes further and, banishing any hypocrisy, authorizes the head of state to oppose a *coup d'etat* by appealing to "foreign armed forces or polices" (Art. 37). In Burkina Faso, appeal to "civil desobedience" in case of a coup or putsch is also mentioned in the constitution, though the possibility of calling on foreign troops is not allowed (Art. 59). As for the Togolese text, it stipulates the *apolitism* of the military and its *total submission* to "the political constitutional authority regularly established" (Art. 147).

The basic laws also specify a number of measures aimed at hindering any military abuse of their functions and status during an electoral competititon. In Benin, any candidate of military origin running for the presidency or the national assembly must first resign from the ranks. This measure is all the more rigorous as it does not allow reinstatement in the ranks in case of defeat; it is hardly attenuated by the indication that "the party concerned could claim benefits of the rights acquired according to the status of his corps" (Art. 64 and 81). The Togolese constitution imposes resignation only on parliamentary candidates. As in Benin, and in identical terms, which perhaps suggests an influence, the basic law grants them to claim their benefits (Art. 52). These measures are further elaborated with electoral codes, parties' charters, and military regulations, though with more or less clarity. The rule that requires members of the armed forces who run for office to first abandon their responsibilies in the ranks is a salient element of the Kemalist practice, as it was conceived originally by the founding father of the Turkish Republic.

THE RECOURSE MODEL

Among the four models proposed here, this is probably the one that presents the least clearly distinctive characteristics; it is very tangential to the other types, yet often borrows from them. Its principle consists in a military intervention undertaken to arbitrate, and even to sanction, civilian actors for the misuse or violation of democratic rules, before a new throw-in. Such actions are not unlike those used in the prepraetorian past, when the military, often under public-opinon pressure, intervened—in the first days of independence—to replace incapable and corrupt civilian governments. Nowadays, military intervention follows (and seeks justification out of) explicit disappointments born from posttransitional malfunctionings. The military political interference appears therefore as a form of recourse, and all the more as its actions are expected, even partly welcome by the population, as was the case in 1996 in Niger and 1999 in the Ivory Coast.

At the same time, a number of elements from two preceeding models are not completely absent. The return of the military on the political scene occurs in a climate favoring the norms of liberal democracy, which they do not wish to differentiate themselves from, as attested by the rapid organization of new elections, more quickly than their predecessors had done at the end of the 1960s. The Kemalist model is also implicitly present in their asserted wish to return as quickly as possible to political normality, with regularly elected assemblies and a functioning civilian government.

Four countries follow this model: Mali, Niger, the Ivory Coast, and Algeria. In Mali, the incapability of president Moussa Traoré, in power since a coup in 1968, to deal with democratic demands presented by the various groups comprising the opposition (grouped in the Alliance for Democracy in Mali), was at the root of his eviction at the end of March 1991 by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. The new leader, following to the usual scheme, organized a national conference and prepared a new constitution; an original procedure, however, because he abstained from seeking an electoral mandate and let the candidate of the opposition, Alpha Oumar Konaré, be elected head of state (Clark, 1995). Interestingly, with the election of General Toumani Touré as the head of state in the following presidential round in April 2002, Mali takes on traits of the Kemalist model, similar to Benin and the Malagasy.

In Niger, after Colonel Seny Kountché's rule, who died in 1987, and that of Colonel Ali Saibou, who ran the democratic transition in 1991, the difficult cohabitation between President Mahamane Ousmane, democratically elected in 1993, and the new majority formed after the legislative elections of 1995, headed by Premier Hama Amadou, gave the impression of a paralysis in the political system, edging on conflict; the president refused to convene the Cabinet, attempted to impose the agenda, and threatened to use his special powers. For his part, the Premier decided to demote top civil servants and heads of public businesses and designate new ones without the president's agreement. After the latter's refusal to promulgate the budget for 1996, the situation was deadlocked which made an opening for Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara to step in.

Even more than in Mali, the intention of the military to solve the difficulties in the democratic process was not entirely clear. Baré sought to legitimate his presence at the head of the state by organizing presidential and legislative elections which mobilized only a small number of voters. Assassinated in 1999, he was replaced by the chief of the presidential guard, major Daouda Mallam Wanké, and then by Colonel Tandja Mamadou, who was elected in November 1999 in competitive consultations (Abdourhamane, 1999; Idrissa, 2001).

In the Ivory Coast, the long period of domination of president Houphouet-Boigny ended with his death in December 1993 and the accession to power of Henri Konan Bédié. Until then, the long tradition of civilian rule, the level of development and its low-profile and rather legalistic military institution, with a rather stable number of troops, would lead one to classify the country's civil–military relations as belonging to the Western managerial type. But the impossibility of organizing elections throughout the entire country, due to the opposition in the western regions; accusations of corruption against the head of state; and growing discontent in the armed forces owing to the latent marginalization of heretofore pampered officers and an open crisis among the rank and file (who had served in the Central African Republic under the UN auspices) with ethnic overtones led to a coup in December 1999 that put former Chief of Staff General Robert Gueï in power (Dozon, 2000; Ouegui Goba, 2000). After saying that he intended to stay in power only for a short time, he decided to run for the presidential elections and lost against Laurent Gbagbo, Alasane Ouattara's candidacy having been rejected. Nevertheless, had he been elected, it would have been difficult to consider the Ivory Coast as Kemalist.

Algeria also evinces the difficulty in opting between the Kemalist and recourse models. Given its will to preserve the benefits of the revolution, its secular tradition, and its concern for economic and social development, the military institution has long played a decisive role in terms of state building, to some extent in the Ataturk manner. Actually, it was only with Ahmed Ben Bella from 1963 to 1965, then with Mohammed Boudiaf in

1992, and finally with Abdelaziz Bouteflika since 1999 that civilians have ruled, barely a total of 6 years (with often the military in the background voicing its dissatisfaction) and nothing compared with the 8 years of leadership of Colonel Houari Boumediene, the 13 years of Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, and the 6 of General Liamine Zeroual. It is finally this alternation of short episodes of civilan government and periodical returns of military rule, with adjustments being made as necessary, which leads one to class Algeria with the recourse model. In light of the various dangers threatening the country—economic, with an unemployment rate that is destabilizing the whole social fabric; religious, with the installation of a fundamentalist Islam; and political, with the decline of the F.L.N. (National Liberation Front), which seems to have exhausted the levels of trust accumulated during and after the war for independence—the officer corps felt invested with the mission to preserve the vital interests of the nation, a role that is for the most accepted, according to public opinion.

As it is conceived here from empirically complex experiments, the recourse model implies from the armed forces a modicum of political neutrality and respect, if not full adhesion, to democratic values, something not always easy in an immediate postpraetorian period. Furthermore, the military is supposed to function in a juridically and budgetarily structured framework, according to the norms of a professionalized organization, and in a "corporately appeased" and cohesive climate, which supposed solved a number of issues.[13] It is the frailty of the democratic experiments, vulnerable either to political/social polarizations, or the no longer bearable impopularity of top political authorities which motivates a temporary military intervention, even if the feeling of being alone capable to mobilize national energies is shared by many in the ranks. The validity of the model, of course, is linked paradoxically to the rarity of its occurrence and the constitutional violations implied. Moreover, a too-visibly unstable armed forces, affected from within by corruption, unrest and discontent, from without by plots or mutinies, will contribute to undermine the credibility of any idea of arbitration or appeal supposed to characterize the action of the military, and to make it, on the contrary, appear as a threat for the political system. The Malian military began giving such an impression after various episodes of internal unrest in 1994 and 1996 particularly. The same could be said of the Algerian military, whose highly repressive tactics to quell Islamist forces began to trouble public opinion, while showing signs of internal division, notably among officers, and disorganization in the ranks (Addi, 1999; Martinez, 2000).

THE DISINTEGRATION MODEL

The term "*disintegration*" indeed lacks precision. It defines a situation of rupture in the civil–military relation, generally correlated with the decomposition of the armed forces; it happens in a context of state failure, civil war, and often antagonistic foreign interventions.[14]

[13]Such as for instance the reintegration of those excluded under the previous praetorian regime, the readjusment of promotions, the modulation of sanctions against former authorities, and so on. Mali, exemplary in this regard, has gone as far as to organize the amalgamation in the military of members of rebellious militians of the North (Thiriot, 1999).

[14]There is an important literature about this phenomenon (Zartman, 1995; Migdal, 1988; and regarding Africa, Forrest, 1998). For a few authors, such a phenomenon does necessarily call for a negative interpretation as it could hide a reconstruction in the forms power is exercised and economy handled; see for instance: Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (2000) or Achille Mbembe (2000).

Such a plight is especially characteristic of countries outside the Francophone area such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. Left to itself, the military ends up splitting into rival bands fighting for control of regional territories and plunder prevails over any other political considerations. These armed groups headed by power-hungry chieftains and self-promoted warlords, concerned only with to satisfying their appetite for riches, live in autonomy, procuring for themselves through any means, notably criminal, the necessary resources for the pursuit of their struggle (Gershonil, 1996; Reno, 1998).[15]

Until recently, French-speaking Africa had been spared such a kind of situation. For a long time indeed, the military institutions in the area, though politically active, had not reached any comparable stage of decomposition. The relative resilience of the state structures, partly thanks to France's influence and unwillingness to let things degenerate in what is considered her sphere of influence, was one reason among others explaining this exception. In the past few years, however, the region in its turn became affected by the powerlessness of the state and military fragmentation, as illustrated by Tchad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea (Conakry). Indeed the deterioration and corruption of the armed forces and, beyond that, the dislocation of civil–military relations, have not arrived to proportions observed, for example, in Liberia or Somalia. Yet this does not say much about whether it is only a moderate and temporary form of "gangsterization" or a step toward a deeper degradation in the way power is exercised.

A number of factors contributed to this evolution, some directly and others more obliquely: the weakening of administrative structures following policies of state disengagement; the private reappropriation, often on the delinquent mode, of the state means and functions; and the diminution of financial resources at the disposition of public services within policies of structural adjustment policies.[16] More specifically, there are also the consequences of France's changing relations with Africa, who now wants to avoid any "*ingérence abusive*" (Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 2001), being content with punctual and limited interventions, less to arbitrate between rival factions than to protect civilian populations and assist inter-African solutions (Ela Ela, 2000). There is, as well, the contagious effects induced by geographic contiguities with countries themselves affected by such a type of crisis, Guinea with Sierra Leone and Liberia, and Congo-Brazzaville with ex-Zaïre, as well as the consequences of arms availability and the emerging role of Africa in international illicit trafficking.

Chad appears to be the country that first entered into this pattern of armed confrontation between successful military leaders, alternatively supported by Libya and France, according to contradictory strategies. Ethnic and religious considerations complete this situation of endemic civil war. After the eviction of the leader of the independence movement, François Tombalbaye, following a military coup by General Félix Malloum in 1975, Chad lived through coexistence first, then alternation in power between Goukouni Oueddeï and Hissen Habré, and was then led by Idriss Déby, not counting other lesser and more ephemeral personalities at the head of other politicomilitary movements (Charlton and May, 1989;

[15]This phenomenon has appeared on other continents in the past, such as the *grandes compagnies* which blooded Europe after the One Hundred Years War, or the warlords in China by the end of the 19th century. In all these cases, it was a more or less long sidestep followed by the progressive takeover by a refounded state.

[16]For a summary of such evolutions and their impact, see Béatrice Hibou (1999) and Harvey Feigenbaum et al. (1999).

Cosna, 2001). The political fate of the Chadian people was thus dictated by leaders incapable of representing it as a whole; each of them sought the support of specific religious or ethnic groups, commanding a small quasi-personal force controlling a portion of the territory which is altemately a base for attack or for a comeback.

This situation indeed contrasts with what was stipulated in the constitution promulgated in 1996 at the time of the democratic transition, which, with some foresight, had multiplied the formulae in order to quell military activism. Article 190, for instance, indicates that armed forces are at the "service of the nation," "submitted to the republican legality," and "subordinated to civilian rule. As if it was not enough, the following article claims that the military is "apolitical" and that "no one is allowed to use [the military] for particular ends." Finally, there was a total of 15 articles devoted to the issue, trying to ensnare all security forces—the armed forces, the gendarmerie, the police, the national guard, and the nomadic guard—in a system of legal obstacles in order to forbid them to outpass their normal roles.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the destabilization of the system born from independence is linked to the intervention of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, then a captain, on the political scene in 1966. If he was no more repressive than his peers in power elsewhere at the time, his rule was characterized with such ostentatious and sultanistic demonstrations that he was quickly dismissed in international public opinion. With his departure and the ephemeral return to power in 1979 of David Dacko, who had been evicted 13 years earlier, CAR entered a period of instability, first dominated by the presidency of General André Kolingba from 1981 to 1993 and then that of Ange-Félix Patassé since then. If the military wanted to intervene in 1981 (politics and a return to the barracks prevailed after a pluralist electoral process, which Kolingba submitted to more or less gracefully) it was not without consequences, as the armed forces became increasingly weakened by internal divisions. The disintegration intensified with the country's budgetary and financial problems and subsequent delays in the payment of soldiers' salaries, rendering them vulnerable to appeal to revolts, as attested by episodic mutinies throughout 1996. Tensions between troops of Yakoma, origin, the ethnic group of Kolingba, who were faithful to him, on the one hand, and the presidential guard made up of Baya, the group of President Patassé, on the other hand, added to the polarity.[17]

The situation was complicated, as in other countries belonging to this model, by the presence of foreign armed forces. CAR was first faced with French troops, which led to clashes between April 1996 and January 1997. Then it was the arrival of the Inter-African mission for the the Bangui agreements watch (MISAB), in charge of the retum to peace and the disarmament of militias, but which led to violent demonstrations opposing Centrafricans first against Chadian soldiers of the MISAB in March 1997 and then against Senegalese and again Chadians the following June. The antagonisms between rival armed groups have their roots in an apparently less ancient past than in Chad. International interventions have seemed more efficient, even if, as in Chad, France was ready to disengage to permit inter-African solutions. The presence at the head of the state of a civilian leader would give its chance to the democratic process, though regional instability, notably in Congo, is not without impact on these evolutions.

In Guinea, and as in the Ivory Coast, political life was for a long time dominated by the personality of Sékou Touré, in power since winning independence until his death in 1984. As in the Ivory Coast, those who sought to succeed the historical leader were eliminated

[17] In May 2001, Kolingba attempted a coup which resulted in harsh repression by Patassé's presidential guard.

by a military coup which propelled Colonel Lansana Conté to the head of state. The armed forces, then, began to factionalize according to personal ambitions, complicated by ethnic rivalries. Diarra Traoré, coauthor of the 1984 operation with Conté, and having become prime minister, tried in 1985 to depose his comrade-in-arms and was finally executed. He was a Malinke, whereas Conté belonged to the Soussou group. The latter tried to stay in place by preserving some political pluralism which gave his successive reelections a democratic appearance, winning at the first round with 51.7% in 1993 and 56.1% in 1998.

Actually, political life was punctuated by several confrontations between Peuls and Soussous in March 1993 and by coup attempts by members of the military in February 1996. Moreover, the country has been unable to get rid of Sékou Touré's inheritance in its various forms, with a tradition of political violence, habits of repression against Peuls, and a serious economic underdevelopement. The destabilization of neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia aggravated the situation, with cross-border moves of uncontrolled elements.

Very soon after winning independence, Congo was dominated by a highly radicalized praetorian regime. The military took over in 1966 (after an earlier attempt against Fulbert Youlou) controlled by captain Ngouabi, who set up a Marxism-based government. After his assassination in 1977, he was briefly replaced with Colonel Joachim Yhombi Opango and more durably after 1979 by Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso, who maintained the monopartist system and the ideological frame of his predecessor. If the military sought to dominate the process of democratic transition which it had been obliged to accept, it ended up losing control of the situation and the national conference fell into the hands of the opposition. As soon as 1991, civilians came back to power, Sassou Nguesso remaining president until June 1992. Then elections were held and gave the victory to Pascal Lissouba; in 1997, in an atmosphere of continuous civil war, Sassou Nguesso took over by declaring himself president.

If the Congolese armed forces never constituted a very stable milieu, cohesion was maintained in the past thanks to procedures of subjective control based on the communist model.[18] The disintegration that it began experiencing in the 1980s was induced by civilians. These were highly divided, very frail political coalitions which allowed the military to become autonomous at first and then to play umpire. Attempts at its subordination, notably after the eviction of Chief of Staff, General Michel Mokoko, finally failed. With the incapacity of political parties and groups to overcome their disagreements, the military ended up disintegrating, all the more irremediably as confrontations between civilians operated on a high degree of violence and delinquency fed by a sharp "militian culture" (Dorrier-Apprill, 1997; Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999); cease-fires never lasted and from 1992, civil war went on. The lines of cleavages are complex, intergenerational, hierarchical, organizational, and between all branches of the armed forces, with a strong ethnic overtone, notably between the Mbochi and Kongo-Lari groups, exacerbated moreover by foreign influences, notably Angolan.

CONCLUSION

This study had no other ambition than to sketch out emerging forms of civil–military relations in the so-called posttransitional period of praetorian succession. If four models could be identified, it is obviously from an ideal-type perspective, for, in effect, these categories do not operate under such pure forms and rather constitute fluid situations. The Ivory Coast is a case in point: Gueï's intervention makes it belong to the recourse model

[18]On the communist model see Bradley R. Gitz (1992).

(yet had he been elected it would have then resembled the Kemalist's one) but discontent among officers marginalized by Konan Bédié and unrest among the rank and file, having served outside but excluded from special bonuses, led not only to a mutiny, but also to a beginning of disorganization, with the formation of delinquent bands, disobedient NCOs, interhierarchical feuds, and so on. The ethnic imbalance in military regional representation (Kieffer, 2000) is also a large factor and places the Ivory Coast more in alignment with the disintegration model.

Needless to say, the present configuration will modify with time. Not only will cases belonging to one category evolve toward another, but the whole typology is destined to become invalid. Now, because of the complexity of African sociopolitical processes, it would be futile to predict any direction in the evolution of civil–military relations. One or two observations, however, can be made, provided, of course, that the continuous relevance of state sovereignty (and the reversibility of its breakdown) and of "national" security forces. As elsewhere where armed forces have long been involved in politics, civil–military relations will remain complicated and the neutrality of the military will never be acquired once and for all.[19] Moreover, if it cannot be definitively discounted, the praetorian option, meaning a hegemonic control of the political system by the military, is, with the pursuit of modernization, more and more improbable, as it becomes highly difficult for a small isolated group to command alone the functioning of a complex society.

One possible emerging model will be situated between the Western managerial and the recourse options. The complete subordination and neutralization of the military do not seem indeed to be expected for a while. Even if the armed forces are confined to the defence domain and function on a highly professionalized register,[20] until internal security forces are fully dependable, they will remain the ultimate instrument of political/social order. So, for some time yet, the military institution will continue to see itself, consciously or not, as a possible recourse. In this hypothesis, however, it will probably act according to a more sophisticated version of the recourse model than the one observed until now, which implies a direct intervention on the political arena in violation of constitutional prescriptions. This new version could take the form of a "political ombudsman," reevaluating the country's political balance and managing possible dissensus between the political elite and the civil society in a more or less institutional framework, perhaps not far from what is today the Turkish national security council. For that matter, it seems the way the Algerian military orients its behavior today.

This pattern could even affect countries where the Western-managerial model seems in place; the military is increasingly influential in Morocco (Turquoi, 2001)[21] and it is not

[19] Prescriptions for harmonious civil–military relations in democratic situation have been numerous (recently: Huntington, 1996; Kohn, 1997), but rather theoretical, showing thus the limits of political engineering in this area (also: Luckham, 1996).

[20] An evolution which necessarily will take some time. Admittedly the participation to external missions helps these efforts, but until now they also create problems given their nature and the still limited efforts undertaken by African countries in this area (Olonisakin, 1997). This said, initiatives such as the RECAMP or ACRI programs, organized by France and the United States, should contribute to these evolutions. It remains, as noted above, that multilateral participation is always susceptible to induce feeling of relative deprivations due to "envious comparison," *a fortiori* create unrest, as was the case in the Ivory Coast in 1999 and Senegal in 2001 if the soldiers' bonuses are not paid on time or are simply retained; it implies therefore a sound treasury.

[21] It is also the argument of a Moroccan journalist, Abdel Hamid El Aouni in a recent (2001) unpublished document in Arabic (*Generals and Red Files*).

sure, for example, that the Senegalese military will remain passive, should a radicalization of Islam occur to form a strong opposition (Villalón and Kane, 1998).

Needless to say, such a process will take longer to develop and it will be more difficult in countries where the military has factionalized and become completely deprofessionalized, as its rehabilitation will first require a policy of national (re-)building, which is always complex and costly (Lewis, 1999; Herbst, 1996–1997; Picard 1999). More radical solutions, such as the abolition of the armed forces, with or without an "externalization" of national defence, such as their full privatization, raises other kinds of problems (Mills and Stremlau, 1999; Howe, 2001) and will situate civil–military relations on new grounds (Mandel, 2001).

CHAPTER 12

Military Families and the Armed Forces

A Two-Sided Affair?

RENÉ MOELKER AND IRENE VAN DER KLOET

This chapter focuses on theories concerning military families and family support arrangements. We will deal with the ways in which spouses cope with separation from their loved ones and with the organizational response to the needs of families. Coping and organizational response will be dealt with in more detail in sections on the genesis of family support groups, greedy institutions, family stress, social support networks, and marital reconciliation. The theories presented in the sections are illustrated with research findings and experiences of army wives.

INTRODUCTION

A Personal Experience

> The telephone rings. Will it be him? I almost do not dare pick it up. I watch the clock: it is almost one a clock in the morning (my friend has the habit to call late, . . . or is it something common to all soldiers?). "Hello, honey." Yet, it is him. With difficulty I manage to control my emotion. My "Hello" back comes out with a broken voice. "It's good to hear your voice and to talk to you". The connection is perfect. It's like he's just across the street with our neighbors. We talk about how things went and next we say "goodbye". I feel uncomfortable. I liked talking to him and hearing that all is well, but at the same time this short conversation brings emotions to the surface that are disagreeable. I miss him so very much. (Schipper, 2000, p. 33)

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The Problem: The Burden of Deployments

This personal experience Marrit Schipper shares with us serves as an introduction to an evaluation study on the family support system of the Royal Netherlands Army and the experiences of spouses during deployments. She herself was at the same time a researcher and spouse to an officer who was on a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. If anything, this personal account of emotions puts the finger right on the problem. Military families carry a heavy burden, especially when they endure a separation from the military spouse for 6 months.

In some countries it will perhaps take some time, but most armed forces and governments are aware of the problem and recognize it in their policies. In The Netherlands this recognition became official in 1993 when the army made "family support" an issue in their "mission statement." It literally says: "The Army guarantees fair and trustworthy care for it's personnel and pays special attention to the needs of those whose duties take them abroad, and their families." In the most important policy document on Armed Forces by the Ministry of Defense (Defensienota, 2000) good intentions were formalized and translated into budgets:

> Deployments . . . implicate a major responsibility for the Ministry of Defense. The MoD is obligated to provide support to soldiers and their family before, during and after the deployment . . . The MoD will take additional measures to lighten the care for the family by the spouses in the absence of the deployed soldier and will make financial reservations for the amelioration of family support.

The magnitude of the problem is easy to see. The rate of rotations is 1:2, meaning that units that have completed a deployment of 6 months have 1 year to recuperate. During this period of recuperation the units are not available for deployment. However, there are many exercises to keep up military skills. A lengthy "mission oriented training" precedes every new deployment. During exercises and training the soldiers are in "the field" or in a training facility and are not available for their families. This means that the period away from home exceeds the 6-month deployment by, perhaps, 4 months or more. The number of deployments is such that the organization has trouble staffing the battalions that are sent on missions. In 1999, of a total of 70,000 personnel (including civilians) for the Armed Forces, 36,650 service men have been deployed, and 6,525 of these 36,650 have been on deployments for several times (two times or more). In total the number of deployments equaled 47,100[1] (Tweede, 1999–2000). The bottom line is that every serviceman, unless for a very good reason, is or will be sent on a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing mission. They will be sent on mission not once, but continuously during their whole career.[2] Those who refuse to go are certain to lose their job.

These cold numbers are one of the causes of the emotional pressure that is experienced by the military and their families, a pressure that was so very well put into words by Marrit Schipper. This brings us to the problem dealt with in this chapter and to the title "a two-sided affair." **The general question that runs through all sections below is "How do military families, and spouses in particular, cope with the burden of deployments, with the burden of being separated from their husbands and coparents?"**

[1] This number includes soldiers who were deployed two, three, or even four times.

[2] Military who serve as instructors or are on staff at the Central Organization in The Hague operate under a slightly less severe regime, but they also can be sent on missions abroad. Mostly these are observer missions.

To spouses "the way things are" can never be anything else but a two-sided affair. Spouses are prepared to invest in their relation and family and to a degree they are willing to suffer some hardship on the part of the employer of their military loved ones. But the sacrifices made will have to be compensated in one way or another. The soldier will also have to invest in his spouse love, care, providing means of existence, the upbringing of children, and so on. He (or she) will have to do his or her share. The military organization as well, will have to support the spouses of military personnel. If the military organization would regard the contract with its personnel as a one-sided affair, only taking and giving the contractual obliged financial compensation, spouses will opt out, steer for a divorce, or force their partner to leave the Armed Forces. **This chapter deals not only with the way military families individually cope with deployments but also with the way the military organization reacts to the demands and needs of the home front.**

Research into Military Families as an Illustration

The chapter will deal with theory mainly, but it draws on all kinds of research to illustrate the theory and to prove the points made. References will be made to colleagues from all parts of the world entrained with the study of "military families and family support." Use will be made of interviews with policymakers, founders of the family support organization, and with spouses of deployed service men. But also we will illustrate theory with findings from our research in the year 2001 among spouses of army personnel who experienced a deployment 9 months preceding the research. This means that we will use data collected from spouses whose partners participated in KFOR1 (Kosovo: peace-enforcing mission), SFOR8 (Bosnia: peacekeeping mission), and UNFICYP (Cyprus: peacekeeping mission under British command). Of 2000 respondents 423 reacted positively to our request to fill in a questionnaire. People who did not want to participate indicated by use of a nonresponse survey that either they were single or that they were annoyed with the huge amount of surveys they were confronted with. However, analysis of both the survey and the nonresponse data proved that the sample is sufficiently representative for the population we intended to investigate.

The emphasis is on the Dutch (military) society because the authors are most familiar with it. The Dutch military society may diverge from other societies but the theories we are using are as applicable to Dutch military society as to other societies. Whenever possible, parallels are drawn with other countries.

Structure of the Chapter

Military organizations are slow to accept responsibility for military families and help families cope with separation. Maybe separation was more easily accepted in former times when military families were integrated in the larger military community. Or maybe in those times it was not necessary to tend to the needs of families for those needs were taken care of by other military wives. In modern times the demands from the home front cannot be ignored. Employers in general are expected to pay more attention to the needs of their employees. Family support organizations are established by pressure of the spouses themselves. The second section deals with the question of how family support organizations come into being by use of a strategy that is known in the sociology of organizations as cooptation.

Cooptation as a mechanism of including groups of people is closely connected to one of the characteristics of military organizations: it's greediness. This characteristic means that the organization is trying to commit people and to bind them. Greediness is an appeal to total devotion. The matters become complex when we consider that families share this characteristic of greediness with the military organization. Children need to be tended. A spouse demands quality time and wants the partner to participate in keeping house. The serviceman finds himself between two greedy institutions, resulting in a tense situation that could aggravate into a conflict situation.

While the greediness of the institutions is discussed in the third section, the fourth section elaborates on the results from these potentially conflicting situations. This section deals with family stress and ways to handle stress. Findings from research will provide additional information.

One of the ways people manage stress is to seek social support. This support can be found in the circle of friends and family, but the military organization can also facilitate social support networks. In the fifth section an analytical tool is presented for estimating the use of the different possible social support networks. This analytical tool is constructed on the basis of exchange theory but also finds support from our data.

In section six we venture into the topic of marital reconciliation. Leaving one's family behind is difficult, but so is getting together. The aftermath of deployments is essential for the process of marital reconciliation. Research findings are discussed that lead to a discussion on strategies to further the quality of the relation between the two spouses.

In the seventh section a conclusion is presented.

A HISTORY OF COOPTATION

Grassroots in the United States

Military organizations are slow in accepting responsibility for military families, in The Netherlands as well as in the United States. Wickenden (1987) described the situation of family support policy in the 1950s in the United States as a "rather shabby manner in which the military family members were treated because of a lack of basic social services." But in the 1980s attention to military families rose dramatically. According to Stanley, Segal, and Laughton (1990) "a major impetus to organizational developments responsive to military family issues has been organized political activism by family members." A volunteer grassroots movement organized three Family Symposia in the early 1980s, to which the military organization was responsive. Recommendations from the volunteers were implemented by the army resulting in a Family Action Plan, better housing, establishment of job centers, family support, child care, medical facilities, and much more. The Department of the Army noted that "if military family members perceive that they have some power... they will cope better with the unchangeables of military life."

The point is that the army was *forced* to listen to the grassroots movement. The demands of military families were a result from changes in the structure of the organization, the transformation to an all-volunteer force being the most important change. From a "bachelor" army the organization evolved into an army that—because of the many married professional soldiers—could no longer ignore the growing presence of military families. Military families became a political reality.

The Mechanism of Grassroots Cooptation

Whenever armed forces realize for themselves that outside groups are uncontrollable and unstoppable they will try to bind, commit, and even incorporate the outsiders. This strategy is called cooptation and can be defined as a process in which groups outside the original organization will get involved in the making and implementing of new policy. Outside groups obtain the chance to share in executive power and decision making. Thus family support is a result of political action.

A classical example in sociology is the study by Selznick (1966) called the "Tennesee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Grass Roots." In the 1930s organizations of farmers got involved into the decision making on controlling the wild waters of the Tennessee river. The TVA's effectiveness increased by coopting the organizations of the farmers. At the same time there was a downside: only the interests of big farmer organizations and White colleges were represented while those of small farmers, most of whom were Black, were excluded.

Selznick demonstrated that cooptation can create a win–win situation for both the organization and the excluded outsiders. Cooptation is an attractive strategy for the organization for it leads to gains in effectiveness. It is attractive to outside groups because they get to realize some of their goals (more power, better care facilities, acceptance, and recognition). The costs for the outside groups are giving in on autonomy and the risk that some groups will remain excluded despite the cooptation strategy.

Grassroots Cooptation in The Netherlands

In The Netherlands the problem of family support arises because of a recent phenomenon: deployments. The Netherlands started deploying military personnel in the early 1990s. It is during deployments that military families feel neglected and have a need for additional support systems. The similarity with the United States is that The Netherlands armed forces also had to be forced into providing family support by volunteer—grassroots—action. The political pressure developed from the bottom up.

The first forms of family support organizations originated in the Navy (Moelker, 2000).[3] In 1976 a submarine boat, the Tuna, departed from its harbor, leaving the crew's wives at the quay. They found some consolation in each other's grief, but soon grief became anger. The women were angry and annoyed by the fact that there were no arrangements at all for those who were left behind. They founded the very first "home front group"[4] and gathered regularly, exchanging experiences and giving each other the social support they needed. Some clergymen and union men were present and with their help the wives tried to expand the initiative to other ships' families.

Navy headquarters probably felt threatened by this spontaneous self-organization from the grassroots. The organization feared—among others—negative reports in the media. They ordered the social sciences department to study the magnitude of the problems and to come

[3]The "cooptation" study is based on interviews with military wives and with military officials working in the family support organization (Moelker, 2000).

[4]The term *"family support group"* would be better English, but "home front group" is a more close translation of "thuisfrontafdeling."

up with recommendations for new policies on family support (Van Breukelen, 1978). The rapport recommended that "home front groups" were to be founded for each ship. The Navy as an organization accepted responsibility for initiating new groups and facilitating them. The spontaneous initiative of Navy wives was taken over by the Navy itself using the mechanisms of cooptation.

The Marine Corps had no experience with family support prior to their deployment to the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992. Only with the help of clergymen that had naval experience was the Marine Corps able to copy and improve the family support system originally devised by the Navy. They introduced telephone circles, home front meetings, and a newsletter. These three new organizations were staffed and controlled by volunteers. The military organization merely initiated and facilitated these "home front groups." Only just in time did the Marine Corps prevent spontaneous self-organization by spouses.

The Army was not so lucky. The Army had no knowledge of the lessons learned by the Navy or the Marine Corps when they deployed over 2000 soldiers to Bosnia in 1992. Many spouses were disappointed in the Army. Some army wives knew that the Marine Corps had made better arrangements, were discontent with the efforts of the army and started a group of protesters. The volunteers gathered in April 1994 and wrote a "black book" that contained all complaints. They addressed the "black book" to the general in command of peacekeeping missions. There were complaints about missing letters, not receiving attention from the organization, badly organized farewells and return gatherings, and the lack of support. The Army was receptive to these complaints and began reorganizing the family support system. Nowadays the Army runs the most professional family support system of all armed forces.

The grassroot influence is institutionalized in a dual system; on the one hand there is a "home front committee" run by Army personnel that facilitates the volunteers and organizes whatever needs to be organized ("information days," midterm gathering, real-time video links between military families and deployed soldiers, and much more) and is responsible for coordination. On the other hand there are the "home front groups" that consist of autonomous volunteers who organize themselves around a particular mission. The main purpose of these groups is to provide social support to other spouses by informal gatherings. The autonomy of these volunteer groups is such that they can command an officer (the chair person in charge of the home front committee) to attend their interests at higher levels. Following the volunteers' demands it happens in some cases that this officer, a major, will have to go against the chain of command. He will act on behalf of the volunteers. In this manner volunteer influence will travel bottom-up. This system demonstrates that cooptation improves organizational effectiveness and covers the needs of military families. It is a win–win situation.

But even in win–win situations there is the risk, as Selznick pointed out, that some people will be excluded (Moelker & Verheijen, 1999). This is the experience of both the Army as well as the Air Force. It was difficult to render family support to spouses of personnel that went on observer missions of the Army or the individual missions of the Air Force. Mainly, the problem consisted of the identification of "isolated" families and linking them up with other families. Normally a detachment of the Air Force or a battalion of the Army will go on a mission together. Spouses will be part of the respective communities. Spouses of observers and Air Force personnel in individual missions are not a part of a particular community and will be more easily overlooked by the military organization. The situation

for spouses of personnel that is added to a deployed battalion is comparable. The spouses tend to be dissatisfied with the organization and are potential "protesters." Nowadays, the Army and Air Force have improved their family support systems to accommodate the needs of these families.

The military organization is forced to provide good care and good family support. It is the self-interest of the organization that is the main drive to adopt cooptation strategies. Without well-functioning family support systems The Netherlands' government (and especially the MoD) will have to face questions from democratically elected representatives in parliament and malcontented spouses. In addition to questions, the organization would have to deal with high retention rates. Both the United States and The Netherlands provide support for the hypothesis that family support is stimulated by political pressure from the grassroots organizations. The role of spouses seems crucial in the amelioration of support systems. Military organizations themselves are slow to initiate policies on family support and need to be aided by volunteer action.[5]

GREEDY INSTITUTIONS

The Military Family

According to Van den Engh (1983), a military family comprises "a married man and woman or a man and woman living together, with or without children, including any adoptive children, residing at the same location, of whom at least one of the partners has a military occupation." One can argue that this definition wrongly excludes the family with a son or daughter who has a military career. Nor are male–male or female–female relationships included in the definition.[6] For practical reasons, we confine ourselves to the group of people as described in this definition. The definition includes nonmarried couples who themselves claim to have a stable relationship. In modern Western societies this type of couple is best regarded as a "family." They have the same rights by law, they perhaps have bought a house together, and they share the responsibility for raising children.

What is the statistical profile of the Dutch military family? Of course, this question depends on the choices made in the sampling procedure in the 2001 survey. Sampling concentrated on families that had endured hardships that are logical in the course of the military profession, these hardships being separation for a period of 6 months. In the sample based on spouses of soldiers who have recently completed their duties in peacekeeping operations, the marital composition was 66% married and 34% unmarried. Only 3% of the spouses in the sample were male, indicating that soldiering—especially during deployments—is still a traditionally male-dominated affair. Of 423 women 186 indicated that they had no children. The average age of the respondents was 34 years old. She (or he) had a relation with the partner for (on average) 12.5 years. The ranks of the military personnel varied from

[5] Further international comparative research is necessary to prove whether this hypothesis holds true for other countries as well.

[6] In The Netherlands marriages between homosexuals are nowadays recognized officially. In line with The Netherlands constitution (article 1, the antidiscrimination article) homosexuals are fully integrated in the Armed Forces.

soldier to lieutenant colonel. Twenty-two percent of the husbands/friends of the spouses were soldiers or corporals. The same percentage (22%) was commissioned officers (COs). The majority of spouses (56%) were married to or living together with noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Between two Greedy Institutions

Military personnel have become increasingly trapped between two greedy institutions: the armed forces and the family. The traditional military family fits in with armed forces that have many *institutional* features. According to Moskos (1977) this means that the wife and the military family are part of the military community. Private life is not separate from military life. The serviceman, his partner, and the children are involved in all kinds of military activities. The situation is mostly the more traditional when military units and their families are placed at a foreign military base (for instance, Americans or Dutch who are stationed in Germany; see Van den Engh, 1983; Hawkins, 1994; Durand et al., 2001). The isolation, or inability to connect with a foreign culture, drives military families into a community that is pretty much closed. In Germany the privacy of family life is constantly under pressure. Social checks are paramount. Gossip is the instrument for exercising social control (Soeters, 1994).

The more the military profession becomes a job just like any other, the less will partners be integrated into the military community. The soldiers' job has become more *occupational* (Moskos, 1977). Service personnel's partners are much more likely to have a job and a circle of friends of their own. They are no longer morally obliged to participate in the military community.

The evolution of the traditional institution into the modern occupation is important for the claims that are made on service personnel by the military organization and the family. Mady Segal stated that the military family and the military community are both greedy institutions (1986). Lewis Coser (1974) defines a greedy institution as "a pattern of total devotion." One example is the vocation of a priest. The tie with the church comes about because the priest is bound to lead a celibate life. The church claims total devotion from its servants. Other examples where similar patterns of total can be found are the court Jew, the mistress at the court of the absolute kings of France, the housewife, and the member of a sect. Patterns of total devotion are functional because the persons involved devote themselves 100% to the greedy institution. These patterns have a darker side to them as greedy institutions have the tendency to consume or even devour their members. Examples are Jonestown and Waco, where sect leaders demanded a devotion that went as far as asking followers to kill themselves. A recent example would be the foreign Chechen warriors fighting to the last ditch for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The armed forces and the family both have a greedy character because of the claim on the devotion of the individual. In the past (in the institutional model) the armed forces was the most dominant and most greedy institution of the two: duty was meant to go before love. Officially service personnel had to be available 24 hours a day. The shift in the armed forces from the institutional model to the occupational model is the reason why the armed forces and the family both make strong claims on the devotion of the individual, who, in the one case is appealed to in his or her role as a member of the armed forces and in the other case in his or her role as partner, parent or member of the family. The individual is caught between two greedy institutions and has a dual loyalty problem. If one is chosen,

the other is given short measure. If the person in question opts for the armed forces ("it is his job after all") the military family is confronted with a specific problem, the problem of family stress.

Greediness, Family Conflict, and Commitment

De Soir (1996) pointed at a basic animosity between the armed forces and the demands of family life by quoting a military proverb: "If the army would have wanted you to have a wife . . . it would have issued you one." This assertion, steeped in cynicism, conceals a grain of truth. The armed forces of different countries vary in the degree of greediness and there are of course also variations in greediness over time. In times and places were tradition prevails greediness is higher. Very high scoring on traditionalism is India. A recent development demonstrates progress regarding to "greediness" for the Indian government financially compensates war widows for the loss of their husbands. Without this compensation the war widows would have been social outcasts (Parmar, 2001).

In a historical analysis of class-based role expectations Harrell (2001) developed the hypothesis that military wives, and especially officers' wives, are engaged into volunteer action to ensure the status position of their husbands. Particularly, this hypothesis holds true for the commissioned officers wives of West Point Military Academy who try to uphold upper class status by fulfilling role expectations such as mentoring younger wives, attending ceremonial gatherings, entertaining guests, and participating in family support. More researchers noted this aspect of greediness. Weinstein and White (1997) offer a feminist explanation for the same phenomenon, whereas Jessup (1996), from the United Kingdom, points to the fact that the armed forces benefit the most from the expectations toward military wives. Military wives, who participate in family support and other forms of assistance, are providing the armed forces with free services.

In our research we have named this hypothesis—stating a correlation between wives' status and volunteer participation in family support—the "mother superior syndrome hypothesis." Active engagement in volunteer action is the more likely when the rank of the wife's husband is higher. Commanders wives are presumably the most active and are a kind of "shadow commander" or "mother superior" in their relation to other military wives. However, statistical analysis of our 2001 data did not support the hypothesis of a linear correlation between rank and participation in "home front groups." Most active participants were wives of NCOs and subaltern COs. Wives of higher officers participated less. Maybe NCOs wives and subaltern COs wives can acquire more status gains by participation than higher officers' wives. Goffman[7] (1994) already observed that lower ranking individuals in particular are more often totally devoted to the greedy institution. Fanatic volunteers in family support groups are most likely to be found in the lower ranks.

Greediness of the institutions could easily lead to conflicts between the family and the military organization. Using items from Bourg and Segal (1999) in our 2001 survey we found that this family–military conflict was a reality for some families. Sixteen percent

[7] A remarkable regularity occurs with the phenomenon of "greedy institutions": the lower the social satus of the individual that renders services to the greedy institution, the more total the devotion. Madame de Pompadour was of lowly birth and was an important instrument of power in the hands of the king. The aristocratic De Lavalière scarcely had any political influence. It was too dangerous for the French king to give her political influence because De Lavalière had too many connections with other members of the nobility and was consequently not totally devoted to the king.

of the spouses was not able to attend family activities because of the obligations connected with the soldier's job. An other 16% agreed to the statement that there is a lack of leisure time to spend with the family. In their study using American data Bourg and Segal (1999) elaborated on the family–military conflict and its correlation with commitment. They found that the strongest effect on the soldiers' commitment to the armed forces is the commitment level of his spouse. An other important finding was that supportive policy by the armed forces and the support from the unit commander lessens the family–military conflict.

Interinstitutional Comparisons on the Greedy Character of Work and Family

Many organizations work on an international scale with employees all over the world. Maritime transport companies, oil companies, international trading companies, diplomatic service, and so on, depend on personnel abroad. All of these organizations are more demanding, more greedy, on their personnel and the personnel's families than regular domestic organizations.

The Dutch study by Jilda Mercx and Jan van der Meulen (2000) is one of those rare studies in which the armed forces family support system was compared to care systems of international civilian organizations (shipping industry, foreign affairs/diplomatic service, oil industry, and aviation). Basically they found that all those organizations are highly "greedy," but they also found that the civilian organizations were incomparable with the armed forces. The organizations varied strongly in the duration of the deployment (2 weeks on drilling rigs to 5 months in shipping industry), and in many organizations (oil and diplomatic services) the family was also stationed abroad and the support facilities varied immensely. But none of the support facilities of these organizations could match the standard put up by The Netherlands Armed forces. Armed forces support systems proved to have developed the most sophisticated and most extensive of all family support systems. This holds true for The Netherlands but even more so for the United States (Bell, Segal, and Schumm, 2000). Support systems in the United States somewhat have the appearance of a miniature welfare state.

As the deployment policy and the family support systems differ between organizations, so do the problems they come across. Military organizations mainly need to support spouses of deployed personnel, as spouses stay at home in the "safe harbor," whereas soldiers are deployed in an often violent and hostile area. Their main concern is to give information and to create opportunities for spouses to meet and exchange their experiences. Nonmilitary organizations who let spouses accompany their employees on deployments (multinationals, diplomatic service) have the problem that these spouses often have to give up their job in The Netherlands. They often cannot get a job abroad.

The next problem is reintegrating expatriates on repatriation. Usually the problem (for both partners) lies in finding a function that is equal or higher in rank and pay. In an international research (Schaffer and Harrison, 1998) into expatriates about 46% had to accept a position with less autonomy. Solomon (1995) found that 77% of American expatriates in the survey accepted a job that was lower in prestige than their expatriate job. Many families had problems adjusting to living in their country of origin.

FAMILY STRESS

The Double ABC-X Model

The prevailing model of stress among families, the so-called double ABC-X model (Hill, 1949; McCubbin and Patterson, 1982) is the fruit of military psychological research. Civilian family therapy and ideas on the operation of stress in civilian families are also based on this research. Surveys among the female population in general reveal that a period of separation comes in third place on the list of the most stressful events (Homes and Rahe, 1967). Only the death of a partner or divorce score higher. That means that every military family experiences a fairly high level of stress during the period that the serviceman is deployed abroad. Separation is stressful in itself. This becomes clear when the deployment is doubled in length (1 year instead of the normal length of half a year) as was the case with certain American missions. Spouses of soldiers that were deployed for a year reported that the length of deployment is stressor number one. Spouses of soldiers participating in deployments of normal length were more concerned about safety of their partner (Bartone and Bartone, 1997).

The ABC-X model for family stress, developed shortly after the Second World War by Hill (1949), is attractive because of its simplicity. In the model A stands for the stressful event and B stands for the resources people have for solving their problems (financial resources, the help of friends and family, help from the organization, etc.). As an event may be much more problematical for one person than it is for another, the model also includes subjective perception. The subjective definition of the stressor is indicated by the letter C; X stands for the crisis, the disorganization and chaos that is the result of the combination of A, B, and C.

McCubbin and Patterson's *double* ABC-X model (1982, p. 46) is an improvement of Hill's original model. This takes into account the pileup of problems as a dynamic process. It is the last straw that breaks the camel's back. In Figure 12.1 the doubling of the stressors



FIGURE 12.1. McCubbin and Patterson's double ABC-X model.

is indicated by the squares with the double letters A in them. Over the course of time, one problem has been piled up on top of the other. The doubling of stressors is often described in proverbs like "it never rains, but it pours." Often the pileup is attributed to "Murphy's law." A similar doubling may also occur with regard to the availability of resources. In addition to the existing resources new resources can be tapped to remediate the problems (double B's). Doubling also occurs regarding the perception of the problem (double C's). The first problem is as it were perceived to be more stressful because of the second problem. The fact that the doubling of stressors (pileup) may result in a greater crisis follows from the logic of the model (the last square in Figure 12.1). In other words it is double As, Bs, and Cs that ultimately affect the capacity to cope with the problems and the level of adaptation. When coping is not successful adaptation will go wrong and aggravate the crisis.

Intermezzo: Some Interviews Relating to Stress

In order to understand the situation of the home front better we started with qualitative depth interviews in the spring of 1996. IFOR1 had only just begun. In mid-June the servicemen of IFOR1 returned from their mission. In total we interviewed 38 spouses of servicemen (Moelker and Cloïn, 1996, 1997). From these interviews we learned much about the troubles of military families but also about the ways in which the families coped with the situation.

There was much variance in the way the women felt. When the women were asked "how happy they felt on a scale from one to ten," they gave themselves a happiness score varying from 8 to 3. Strikingly the wives determined their happiness score in relation to the normal situation before their partners were deployed abroad. Usually 3 or 4 points were deducted from the normal happiness score to indicate that the partner was missed. In one interview the partner gave herself a 5 because "I really miss him badly, more than I had expected, I admit it; I just miss my mate with whom I can talk and whom I can tell my problems to."

Most of the women were getting on well to reasonably well. But these women, too, said that they were less happy than they normally were. We will elaborate on one of the more positive experiences to give an example of successful coping behavior. Someone, who reported that everything really was going very well—she gave herself a score of 8 on the happiness scale—had benefited from the experience of an earlier separation. This was a middle-aged NCO's wife whose husband had been deployed to the Sinai earlier. The positive experience from the past made a major contribution to the degree of independence and self-confidence during the IFOR deployment. She coped then and is confident that she will cope now. Her children—now adolescents—accepted the fact that their father had his job to do and were helping in the household (cooking, getting groceries, etc.). When her husband would be obliged to go on a deployment a year after this IFOR deployment, the NCO wife would not be enthusiastic, "on the other side ... if it has to happen, then I'll get over it."

Four of the 38 wives were faring badly. Petra Jansen's[8] story is interesting because she can look at the problem from two sides: as a servicewoman and as a partner. Petra herself has been sent on a mission to former Yugoslavia. It is her experience that the sound functioning of the home front has an impact on one's own functioning. But she didn't

[8]Names have been changed for privacy reasons.

have much time for a peaceful life after her deployment because her partner, who is also a serviceman, was deployed to Bosnia. Petra finds it difficult and feels very unhappy. She gives herself a happiness rating between 3 and 4. A lot has happened recently in her life that contributes to her dissatisfaction with the situation.

First of all, she has only just moved because she went to work together with Hans in the same battalion. Since Petra had expected to be deployed as well, she and her partner had to fit out the new house while they were being trained to be able to participate in the mission. Petra has a health problem that is caused by a chronic slipped disk. For the time being she cannot get around to her foreign language study, so she's getting further behind. Petra has a new posting and this means she has to learn the ropes. The last straw was when she was told that she was not being deployed abroad with Hans's battalion. At a public meeting Petra was informed that personnel who had been appointed to the unit after May 1, 1995, could not be deployed abroad.

Since the problems were accumulating (pileup) it is difficult for Petra to develop a coping strategy. "I'm desperately unhappy that they're away and I'm here. Desperately unhappy, yes, it has cost me a great deal of effort. In the last few weeks I've just slammed the door shut on several occasions and sat crying like a child." Nevertheless she is taking steps toward effective coping behavior. She plans to play an active role in the "home front group." She can talk to friends about her problems. She is in touch with her family and a female friend in The Netherlands. She is not in close touch with the wives of the servicemen in Hans' platoon who have been left behind. Although she has had a talk with a psychologist, Petra has not resorted to official help. Despite all the setbacks, Petra remains optimistic. "We have grown closer together in this period. I see it in a positive light. It has drawn a line under a certain period for me." To the question whether this period is also the end of Petra's military career she replies that she is thinking about looking for a job in civilian society after her current posting. She would like children in a few years' time.[9]

The Emotional Stages before, during, and after Deployments

Stressors and stress reactions of spouses vary in time. What is perceived stressful before the deployment differs much from what is perceived stressful during or after the deployment. There are, according De Soir (2000), seven stages in the ways spouses experience stress over time. The stages wives go through are initial shock/protest, disengagement and alienation, emotional disorganization, recovery and stabilization, anticipation of homecoming, reunion, and reintegration/stabilization (De Soir, 2000). Coping strategies might very well vary during these seven stages, in fact, it seems advisable for spouses to adapt the coping strategy they practice to the stage they are in. In reconstructing these stages for the military families De Soir was inspired by Logan (1987).

Initial Shock/Protest. Literature on deployments (Peebles-Kleiger and Kleiger, 1994; De Soir, 1996) points to a 2-weeks period of tension, protest, and even anger after announcing the "bad tidings" of the coming deployment. Spouses know that deployments are part of their husbands job, but this kind of news is seldom welcomed. Most stressful were announcements of deployments that gave families shorter than a month of preparation. This

[9] Petra wants to leave the organization despite facilities like parental leave and child care.

happened on several occasions due to political developments on the Balkans. Deployments to Bosnia in 1995 after the Dayton agreements (IFOR) and later in 2000 in the Kosovo conflict left for the deployment areas on very short notice. But stress will also arise when spouses are informed too long before the deployment. When families know a year in advance that they will experience a time of separation, the spouses report that preparation time was too long. The ideal preparation time seemed to be between 3 and 5 months (Moelker & Verheijen, 1999b).

Disengagement and Alienation. The last days prior to departure the spouses enter the stage of disengagement and alienation (De Soir, 2000; Logan, 1987). In this stage the soldier and his spouse (but also, to a lesser degree, the children) experience distancing because of the uncertainties that surround the departure. During this stage some latent problems may surface as happened to a sergeant major whose wife confessed to have fallen in love with another woman (Roza, 2000). However, normally in this stage emotions are smothered and burst to the surface at the last moment: the moment of departure. This is very much a moment during which emotions (and tears) are set free.

Emotional Disorganization. Shortly after departure emotional disorganization may take place. Sadness and desperation may be prevalent emotions during this stage, accompanied by symptoms as depression, periods of crying, sleeping disorders, and problems with the rhythm of life (for example, eating problems). Normally this period is temporary and takes up to 6 weeks, but it could take longer when a deployment does not go well and bad news reaches the home front. To get over this period more quickly, communication (Ender, 1995a, 1995b; Ender & Segal, 1996) between soldiers and their spouses is essential. Spouses need to know as soon as possible whether their loved one has arrived well, is doing fine, and how to reach him in case of emergency. Sometimes wives were not informed of the whereabouts of the soldiers (due to lack of communication means) for over a month. This prolonged the stage of emotional disorganization.

Recovery and Stabilization. After 6 weeks most spouses and families are recovering and—more or less—getting used to the situation of separation from the deployed family member. Intense feelings of sadness, missing the loved one, and anger will slowly fade. Getting on with one's life and coping with the daily hassles will get the upper hand. But any crisis—at home or in the mission area—might anew bring the family into the stage of disorganization. In this stage routine (going to work, taking care of the children, and/or keeping house in the habitual way) is helpful, as is maintaining family and friendship ties, visiting neighbors, and participating in "home front groups" or other activities in the context of family support.

Anticipation of Homecoming. According to Logan (1987) anticipation starts approximately 6 weeks before the return of the soldiers. Soldiers and sailors may experience similar feelings when they suffer from "short timer's syndrome" or "channel fever." Feelings are a mix of hope, euphoria, and anxiety/fear. The feelings of anxiety are understandable, as one never knows how much the returning partner has changed. There is also the fear that he or she has fallen in love with someone else. The dominant question is "Will things be as before?" Though normally this stage is short, we once interviewed a spouse who was

in the anticipation stage for 6 months. Before going on the mission the partners agreed to get married on return. The preparations for the marriage were left to the spouse in The Netherlands. It proved to be a wonderful coping mechanism as this spouse was in happy anticipation of return for the whole period.

REUNION AND REINTEGRATION. Reunion may take up to approximately 6 weeks. In these weeks the family tries to reintegrate and pick up life where the family members had left it. In the first 2 weeks closeness is important to the partners. They need to reconnect and get used to each other again. Tenderness and intimacy are key words here. But the "foxhole-to-front-porch transition" is a delicate stage. Just when they think that it's all in the past, it is in this particular stage that many families experience problems. We will elaborate on the problems and solutions in this stage in the section on marital reconciliation.

STABILIZATION. After 6 to 12 weeks most families are reintegrated and have recovered the cohesion, warmth, and closeness they longed for during separation. Some norms and values of the family have been subject of negotiations for things will not always be the same as before. But in this stage negotiations will probably have led to stable arrangements.

Coping and Handling Stress

Handling stress is difficult and should be a topic in courses or in informative gatherings before sending soldiers on a mission. People can learn to cope with stress. Coping behavior is defined as "the management of a stressful event or situation by the family as a unit, with no detrimental effects on any individual in that family. Coping is the family's ability to manage, not eradicate or eliminate, the stressful event" (Gelles, 1995, p. 429). The ability or inability to apply coping mechanisms results in the ultimate adaptation to the crisis situation. Alongside all the numerous negative coping strategies which do not solve the problem (drinking, sleeping tablets, denial, or flight) there are seven positive coping strategies (McCubbin, 1979): (1) keeping the family ties intact; (2) developing self-confidence and self-esteem; (3) developing social support; (4) developing a positive attitude; (5) learning about a problem; (6) reducing tension by, for example, hobbies, talking, and crying; (8) introducing balance in the coping strategies.

Military wives cope better than civilian wives. An American research by Eastman, Archer, and Ball (1990) demonstrated that Navy families scored higher on cohesiveness, expressiveness, and the level in which a family is organized than civilian families on the shore. Families that can be characterized as low stress families are as a rule also more cohesive and better at expressing feelings. Also, there is less conflict in low-stress families. Despite the better coping skills of military wives, the fact remains that military wives are faced with more stressors (deployments and missions in peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations and war or warlike situations) than "average" civilian wives.

Findings on Stress

Stress is one of the most recurrent topics in military families' research. Most of the discussion is dominated by scholars from the United States (Adler, Bartone, and Vaitkus,

1995; Figley, 1993; Knapp and Neuman, 1993; Rosen, Teitelbaum, and Westhuis, 1993; McCubbin, Dahl, and Hunter, 1967; Durand et al., 2001). But there is also a growing amount of country studies in the literature on family stress. Reports have come in from Korea, Poland, Israel, Slovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands and France (Kim and Hong; 1994; Kolodziejczyk and Mikiciuk, 1994; Desivilya and Gal, 1996; Milgram and Bar, 1993; Polláková, 2000; Wauters, 1997; Moelker and Cloïn, 1997; Léon, 1995).[10]

The sheer amount of research on family stress underlines the importance of the topic. The discussion is complex for spouses may not only suffer from long-term stress because of separations themselves, but they can also experience secondary traumatization. Secondary traumatization arises when a spouse suffers from a posttraumatic stress disorder because of the traumatic experiences of the soldier.

Long-term stress and secondary traumatization occur more frequent when the soldiers' mission was dangerous and life threatening. In our survey from the year 2001 the soldiers had very different experiences; 39% were not confronted with risks at all, whereas 8% had to deal with extreme danger and life-threatening situations and 53% experienced risks once in a while but those were never really dangerous. These differences in experiences make sense for the missions were also very different; some were on peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (tranquil/no risks), some were stationed in Bosnia (stable, occasional risks), and others were engaged in the Kosovo I peace-enforcing operation (dangerous/sometimes life threatening).

All studies mention a correlation between the dangers in a deployment area and measures of stress and well-being. But findings are sometimes difficult to interpret. In fact, the actual percentage of people who experience long-term stress is low, and it is difficult to attribute this stress causally to the deployments. For instance Moelker and Cloïn (1997) found that 2–3% of their respondents suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, but they had to acknowledge that among the civilian population this percentage was higher. This could lead to the erroneous and misleading conclusion[11] that—despite being confronted with more stressors—military wives are faring better than civilian wives. In our research in the year 2001 the correlation between the danger the soldiers experienced and a scale measuring depression was small (.11) but significant. The survey was taken more than 9 months after the return date of the soldiers, implying that even after considerable time soldiers and spouses can be troubled by stress and secondary traumatization caused by deployments.

Depression was measured by summing up six items to form a scale. These were items like "I feel down," "During the last four weeks I was troubled by feelings of desperation," "... feelings of emptiness," and so on. Reliability analysis proved that these items formed a satisfactory scale (range 1–5; Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$). Two spouses had the score of 5, which means that on six questions they consistently chose the most extreme answer. Eight percent of the spouses scored 3 or higher; 18% scored 2 or higher.

These scores are difficult to interpret without knowledge of civilian reference norms, but correlations with other variables are interesting. Depression correlated .58 with physical complaints, .19 with sexual problems, and .31 with the item "our relationship is bad." Also important is the causal attribution to separation/deployment by the spouses themselves. Twelve percent of the spouses (46 of 379) attributed their psychic and physic complaints to

[10]The authors mentioned here are just a sample. We do not pretend to present a complete overview of literature.

[11]The conclusion is misleading for one should take into account the age of respondents, the educational level, the general health condition, and so on to make fair comparisons.

the deployment. The correlation between depression and the question whether complaints are related to deployment was .43.

SOCIAL SUPPORT, AN IDEAL TYPICAL APPROACH

Seeking social support is one of the ways people use to cope with stressful situations. Sometimes people have extensive social networks and do not need support from the organization. Sometimes the organization can stimulate and facilitate informal family support groups. The effectiveness of social support has been much discussed by many scholars (Bell, Segal, and Rice, 1995; Cohen and Wills, 1985; Rosen and Moghadam, 1990). Desylva and Gal (1996) already started exploring solutions in order to overcome the conflict between families and the military organization. They focussed mainly on family structures. We hope to bring the discussion a little bit further by focusing on structures of social support networks.

From our research concerning social support certain findings were replicated over and over again (Moelker and Cloïn, 1997). In the 2001 survey we again found that 64% agreed to the statement "the support from family, friends and neighbors is more useful to me than the family support rendered by the army." Thirty-nine percent think that family support group meetings are useful, but 63% never visited them. In general family support is very much appreciated, but people tend to think that it is more useful to others than to themselves. These findings raise the question how family support should be organized so that it is as efficient and effective as can be. Exchange theory can provide an answer to this question while taking into account that the needs of individuals will differ. What is effective and efficient support to one individual will not be same for someone else.

We can distinguish four support relations on the basis of the dependency axis and the individualized–communitarian continuum. Dependency and independence form the extremes on the dependency axis. This axis refers to the relationship with the providers of support. The second axis refers to two traditions in social exchange theory (Ekeh, 1974), one is individualist and the other is communitarian. The first is rooted in the work of George Homans, who departed from an almost economic individualist conceptual framework. Each gift or service has to be reciprocated by the recipient by a service in return, a gift or money. The communitarian tradition builds on the concepts of Durkheim, Mauss, and Lévi-Strauss. This tradition states, for instance, that even in economics there are communitarian issues—like trust—that are essential to exchange transactions. Exchange cannot solely be analyzed by using the calculative logic of contributions versus retributions.

The two structure variables "dependency" and "idividualism–communitarian" together form a taxonomy that defines four types of social support networks; professionalized social support relations, institutionalized social support networks, exchange relations, and social support networks on the basis of generalized reciprocity (see Figure 12.2).

In professionalized social support relations (Table 12.1) the individual spouse becomes dependent on support offered by professionals like psychologists, social workers, or members of the medical profession. Services by professional helpers are reciprocated by money or insurance or are paid for by the military organization. This dependency arises because spouses are isolated and do not connect to other army wives or to family or friends. When confronted with problems the spouse cannot cope with, there is no other resort than professional workers. Hence the size of the support network is small, there are not many people the spouse can turn to for help. The marital quality and the authority relation between family

	Relationship with provider of support	
	Dependent	Independent
Individualized	Professionalized	Exchange relations
Communautarian	Institutionalized	Generalized reciprocity

FIGURE 12.2. Structure variables determining social support network types.

TABLE 12.1. Ideal-Type Approach of Social Support Networks

Variables/social support network	Professionalized	Institutionalized	Exchange relations	Generalized reciprocity
Dependent–independent	Dependent of professional care	Dependent of military community	Independent: bargaining for own position	Independent: strength of weak ties
Individualized–communautarian	Individualized: individual versus bureaucracy	Communautarian: service to community	Individualized: *quid pro quo*	Communautarian: citizenship behavior
Network structure	Individualized/isolated	Military community serves as extended family	Dyad structure	Friendship circles
Network size	Small, isolated	Large	Small	Medium to large
Status spouse	Does not apply: the family is separated from military community	Depending on rank of the serviceman	Depending on the possibilities to reciprocate	Depending on own occupation, personality
Authority relation within the family	Varies for all families	Patriarchal/traditional	Depending on what the other can offer	Egalitarian
Commitment	To family only	To military community	To one self	To friends and loved ones
Greediness: conflict between family and military organization	Family is most greedy: sharp conflict when the organization demands deployment	Military organization is most greedy: sharp conflict when spouses do not accept traditionalism	Low conflict if balanced: Give and take kind of balance	Low conflict if balanced: balanced if there is mutual acceptance: "a two sided affair"
Effectivity and efficiency of the support network	Professional help is effective if spouse cannot cope, not efficient because of costs and capacity problems	Effective and efficient if "institution" character is accepted	Not effective and efficient: when families are in trouble they are not attractive exchange partners	Effective and efficient: on basis of friendship support is offered without expectation of immediate reciprocation

members may vary within each family but when there is need for professional support it is likely that there are problems regarding the family relations. Commitment is limited to the family only. One of the problems that might be heavier on these type of families is the conflict with the military family. While the family is inner directed and highly "greedy" the justified demands of the military organization regarding the duties of the serviceman may not be accepted by the spouse. Especially deployments will lead to a sharp conflict between family and military organization. Support from professionals is effective but costly. When emergency situations arise, professional support will probably encounter capacity problems.

The fundamentals of institutionalized social support networks were discussed in the section on greedy institutions (Segal, 1986). The networks are embedded in traditional military norms and values such as the value that is placed on community. This type of network is likely to occur in the "institution" model (Moskos, 1977), where communitarianism is strong and the individual is dependent on the military community for social support. Often the military community is—to a certain degree—isolated from civilian society (its a closed inner directed community). This community is characterized by strong social control, a high commitment to community from its members and hierarchic relationships. The military community serves as a surrogate family of the extended form. The family itself is also traditional and is characterized by patriarchal authority relations. Wives usually do not have jobs, but devote their time keeping house and raising the children. The status of the spouse is derived from the rank of their husband. The network size can be very large which contributes to effectiveness and efficiency of the support rendered, but this support is only effective and efficient when the spouse accepts the traditional "institution" character. When the "institution" character is not accepted, there will be a sharp conflict between family and military organization. In contrast to the type described above the military organization is highly greedy.

In direct exchange relationships individual spouses bargain for their own position in a way that is ruled by the *quid pro quo* principle. Calculations are made whether or not investments in relationships are profitable considering the costs. The support network—if it deserves that name—is very small and is structured in dyads. There can be several dyads, relations of support between provider and recipient, but the number of dyads will be limited due to the investments and costs needed to maintain the dyads. Status and authority relations with others depend on what the others can offer and the "market value" of the spouse. Commitment is primarily to one self. The attitude toward the military organization is not conflictuous provided that there is a balance between "give and take." The dyads are not very effective and efficient support systems. When someone experiences a problematic situation over a considerable period of time, her "market value" will diminish and she will lose attractiveness as exchange partner. In fact the dyad structure will dissolve and slide down into a professionalized support relationship, meaning that there will soon not be another alternative for support than to knock on the doors of professional workers.

Social support networks based on generalized reciprocity (Sahlins, 1978) combine a communitarian character with a great independence of participating individuals. In fact the strength of the support network is derived from what Granovetter (1973) called the strength of weak ties: There is a rather large community of friendship circles with members who support each other, but the ties between the members are not so strong that they would cause the support network to become greedy or threaten the independence of the individuals in the network. There are many weak ties between people to make the network strong. The exchange principle is not based on direct reciprocation, and sometimes helpers may never be reciprocated. "This is not to say that handing over things in such form,

even to 'loved ones' generates no counter-obligation. But the counter is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality: the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite" (Sahlins, 1978). This results into a behavior that can be described as citizenship behavior. People making contributions to society are not altruistic but they act from the well understood self interest that one day they might receive support from someone with whom they perhaps were not personally acquainted. The principle of generalized reciprocity enables networks to be of medium or large size. Relationships within the network but also within the family are egalitarian. Spouses derive their status from their own occupation or their personality. When the military organization and the family both believe the relation to be a two-sided affair the chance that the family–military relation is conflictuous is low. Support is offered on basis of friendship without the expectation of immediate reciprocation, which causes the support network to be stable. Prolonged support is enabled because support is offered without the expectation of immediate reciprocation. The friendship circles giving support in fact very much resemble the volunteer groups or "home front groups" in the armed forces. In short, social support networks based on generalized reciprocity are effective and efficient.

The 2001 survey makes specific the kind of support spouses want from the military organization. They have a need to be informed and communicate with their loved ones (see also Ender, 1995). But spouses are not much in need for financial or material support. Only 26% answered "I need mainly material support" (the answering categories "a little bit" and "a lot" were taken together). Only 26% needed professional support; 64% stated that they needed mainly emotional support by family or friends or both.

The survey also showed a remarkable preference for the more communitarian forms of support. The item "in our community we should help each other without wanting a favor in return" was agreed to by 68%. Only 15% agreed to the question "If I help someone, I expect him/her to help me too." "Help comes from unexpected persons" was agreed to by 75%. Only 24% agreed to the statement "Rendering support cannot be left to amateurs." Most popular was "People have to care about each other." The item was supported by 86%. These items proved all in favor of communitarian forms of support networks. Both the "institutionalized" and "generalized reciprocity" forms of networks were popular. Individualistic approaches—exchange and professional support—proved least popular.

When looking at actual emotional support it became clear that the social support networks in the civilian surroundings of the spouses are the best used support networks. The most popular conversational partners to whom one could open one's heart were parents (73% could have this kind of conversations with the parents) and parents in law (57%), friends (85%), colleagues (50%), and neighbors (42%). These kind of comforting conversations with colleagues of the deployed partner and with other military wives were much less likely (27 and 34%). These findings lead us to believe that social support networks based on generalized reciprocity are more important in The Netherlands than institutionalized social support networks.

MARITAL RECONCILIATION: BETTER LISTENERS GET MORE SEX

An important topic in international research is the time after the deployment (Wood, Scarville, and Gravino, 1995; Wauters, 1997; Moelker et al., 1999a) Successful reintegration of the soldier and his/her family is essential in developing a positive attitude toward future

deployment. Successful marital reconciliation is important for the motivation of many soldiers. Many studies report that wives have found new confidence in themselves and that the relation between the spouses has become more close. In a Belgian research 60% of the couples said that they stood the test and are "stronger and closer, because both partners have become more autonomous and mature" (Wauters, 1997, p. 23). In a Slovenian survey 55% of interviewed soldiers said that the separation made it apparent how much they loved each other (Pollákova, 2001).

These findings were replicated in our survey in the year 2001. Seventy-eight percent of the military, as reported by their spouses, were proud that the spouses did so well by themselves. Fifty-seven percent agreed to the statement that the relationship had even become stronger and closer because of the deployment. What is striking in the data is the resilience of the women. Most spouses were not particularly fond of the prospect that maybe their loved one would have to be deployed again in the near future—41% agreed to the statement "I never again want to experience a period of separation"—but they also agreed in majority (83%) to the statement "I will manage when my partner is on his next mission abroad."

One of the things that might endanger the reintegration and marital reconciliation is the way the servicemen react. Thirty-four percent of the returned servicemen expected that nothing had changed at home. When these men would react adversely to the inevitable changes (they had been away for half a year) they would put pressure on the marital relationship. On average, it turned out positively. Twenty-six percent of the spouses agreed to the question that after the deployment man and wife had to get used to each other. Some of them (5%) did not like being touched by their partners shortly after reunion. But most (88%) agreed to the statement that the relationship is back to were it used to be.

What helped these people in their process of marital reconciliation was the open attitude toward each other, during and after the deployment. Partners communicated much during the deployment. They used telephone connections, e-mail (see also Ender 1995a, 1995b), and letters to interact almost daily. Communication was necessary not to get alienated from each other. After the deployment the returned soldier was very much willing to talk about his experiences. Fifty percent of the spouses reported that their husbands were communicating openly on all topics. But also, and perhaps more surprising, the returned soldiers were also good listeners and had an open ear for the things that had happened at home (even though these things were not so spectacular as their own adventures). Seventy-seven percent of the returned soldiers listened to their spouses very well.

This open attitude contributed much to the process of marital reconciliation. The quality of the marital relationship had not suffered much and quickly recovered after the deployment. Intimacy and tenderness proved to be good medicine to overcome the pain of separation. Sixty percent of the spouses reported that in the first weeks after the return they "kissed and hugged" a lot with their partner, 9% reported problems concerning sex,[12] and only 3% agreed to the question "I wish that we were divorced."

We expected that there would be a statistical relationship between talking and listening and marital reconciliation and tried to test this idea by using regression analysis. In this

[12] One might object that there are methodological problems in research that deals with delicate matters such a sex. However, The Netherlands is a liberal country in which talking in all honesty about sexual matters is hardly a taboo. The low percentage of people reporting that they would rather be divorced is caused by the sampling method: only families that were still together after deployment could be traced. This is a methodological flaw caused by nonavailability of addresses of women who divorced shortly after deployment.

TABLE 12.2. Better Listeners, Less Sexual Problems, and More Kissing and Hugging

Independent variables	Dependent variables (β)			
	Kissing and hugging		Sexual problems	
My partner wanted to talk about his experiences	.07	.48**	−.01	−,05
My partner listened to my experiences	.20**	.46**	−.21**	−,22*
Interaction (Talking × Listening)	—	−.58**	—	,06
N	416	416	415	415
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04
F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01

*$p < 0.05$.
**$p < 0.01$.

study talking was measured by the item "my partner wanted to talk about his experiences" and listening was indicated by "my partner listened to my experiences." We expected that there would be an interaction effect and added a product term of "listening" times "talking." The dependent variables were "we did a lot of kissing and hugging" and "we had sexual problems." The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 12.2.

The conclusion is that there is indeed a significant statistical relationship between "talking" and "listening" and marital reconciliation. Consonant to our expectations the model is not very strong (a low explained variance) but we were not interested in the strength of the model as a whole but in the significance of the coefficients. More in particular, we were interested in relative magnitudes of the β's for "listening" and "talking." Interaction effects do not change the overall conclusion. The overall conclusion is that listening to one's spouse does contribute to marital reconciliation (more kissing and hugging and less sexual problems). Or, in more popular words, better listeners get more sex.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we aimed mainly at presenting sociological and psychological theories that might help understand how military families cope with separation and how the military organization reacts to the needs and problems of military families.

Deployments are a heavy burden for servicemen and their families for they endure a separation of 6 months. Some missions are dangerous and therefore more stress provoking than normal. The frequency of deployments is a problem as well. After a several-year period of recuperation the soldier and his family might be faced again with a 6-month deployment.

Now the military organization accepts it's responsibility to provide family support but it was slow to accept this responsibility. The organization had to be forced into taking responsibility by volunteer action from the grassroots organizations, meaning spontaneous self-organization by the military wives themselves. Military wives started "home front groups" and threatened control capacity of the military organization. The most adequate organizational response to this spontaneous self-organization was to deploy a strategy of cooptation. Wife-volunteers were offered the possibility to influence family support policy, to organize themselves into autonomous "home front groups," and to use the facilities and financial means of the organization. Effectivity and efficiency of the organizations family support system increased by coopting the "home front groups." Home front groups gained

power and influence but had to pay a price by accepting being channeled into "quiet waters" by the military organization.

At the same time this organizational reaction to the needs of soldiers and their families is an illustration of the conflict between two greedy institutions. The soldier is trapped between family and the military organization. Both institutions are demanding and claim the soldiers' devotion. The family–military conflict is probably greatest in isolated places, for instance, when soldiers and families are posted in foreign countries. From research we know that the conflict between the family, and the military is a reality but we also know that it can be alleviated by the organization's effort to provide family support and by supportive commanders. When compared to civilian organizations, the family support efforts of the armed forces stand out positively.

Notwithstanding all these efforts, the military family is confronted with more stressors than are civilian families. Separation is high on the list of most stressful life events. It comes in third place. Expanding the family's resources can ameliorate the perception of and the consequences of stress (family crisis). One of these resources is social support. Furthermore, families can improve their coping skills by learning about the different ways to handle stress. Positive coping strategies are keeping family ties intact, developing self-esteem, developing social support, developing a positive attitude, learning about a problem, reducing tension by hobbies, talking, and introducing a balance in the coping strategies. From interviews and surveys we know that the pile up effect of stressful events is devastating to a family's feeling of well-being. The perception of stress changes during the deployment and is characterized by seven stages as follows: initial shock/protest, disengagement and alienation, emotional disorganization, recovery and stabilization, anticipation of homecoming, reunion, and reintegration/stabilization. Research points at a correlation between "depression," on the one hand; and "dangers experienced by the soldier," "marital quality," and "attribution of psychic and physic problems to deployments."

Social support can help cope with stressful situations, but spouses do not prefer professional help much and tend to see professional help as a last resort or safety net. The same holds true for support from the official organization side. Most preferred is support from next of kin, friends, and neighbors. From a theoretical analytic model it seems likely that individualized social support arrangements—professionalized social support—can only be efficient and effective as safety net rendering support to individualized "heavy" cases; otherwise it will be costly and ineffective. Social support networks—that combine communitarian characteristics with independence of individuals—operate on basis of generalized reciprocity. This means that retribution must not be immediate. Friendship circles serve as an egalitarian self-help group. These kind of social networks are most effective and efficient and fit into the structure of modern societies.

After deployment the family's problems are not always over. Sometimes it is the return that may be the beginning of marital quarrels and discontent. Sometimes returned soldiers have a hard time readjusting to life "back home." Most servicemen, however, are proud of their wives. Many spouses claim that the experience has made the relation stronger. Good communication during the time of separation is essential for positive marital reconciliation. The first 2 or 3 weeks are important to get used to each other again. After this period the family mostly enters the reintegration stage. Partners that communicate much are clearly at an advantage in accomplishing marital reconciliation. Listening skills on the part of the returned soldier are most clearly correlated to "kissing and hugging" and to the absence of sexual problems. In short: better listeners have more sex.

CHAPTER 13

Implications for Military Families of Changes in the Armed Forces of the United States

MADY WECHSLER SEGAL AND DAVID R. SEGAL

INTRODUCTION

The defining characteristic of the American military establishment, from the end of the Second World War until 1989, was the position that America assumed in the Cold War in general, and its specific role in the bipolar politicomilitary confrontation in Europe between the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the signatories to the Warsaw Treaty. This characteristic contributed to other features of the armed forces. These included the continuation of military conscription until 1973, the maintenance of a large standing military force even when the United States was not actively engaged in overt military hostilities, the willingness of the nation to support a large military budget, a definition of military mission that focused on the European theater, and normative restrictions on the role that the United States was to play in peacekeeping operations. Indirectly, it also encouraged an emphasis on active duty forces and minimal use of reserve military forces. Conscription ended a quarter of a century ago, and all of the other features noted here have changed since the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in Europe (Segal, 1992). These changes have all had consequences for military families.

THE ADVENT OF THE COLD WAR VOLUNTEER MILITARY FORCE

In 1973, in part as a result of opposition to military conscription during the Vietnam War, the United States ended the military draft (Segal, 1989). This was not America's first voluntary

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military force. Historically, the American people have not embraced military conscription gladly. The draft has been used primarily as a tool of wartime military mobilization; after wars we have demobilized and returned to volunteer military forces. This was even true of the period between the two World Wars. Since the birth of the republic, America has had voluntary military forces for more years than it has had military conscription, and even during periods of conscription, more volunteers than involuntary draftees served in uniform. The Cold War volunteer force, however, represented a unique social experiment. It was the first time that America had attempted to maintain a large standing military force on a voluntary basis. The historical pattern would have predicted a post-World War II demobilization. That process was delayed for decades by the Cold War and by the hot wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The end of conscription, which had been male only, and the advent of an all-voluntary military force in 1973, had important implications for the family demography of the American military even as the Cold War continued. First, although a majority of personnel in the American armed forces before 1972 had been married (Segal et al., 1976), the continuation of military conscription had meant that a considerable proportion of the force would be composed of young unmarried men, turning over fairly frequently, and placing a ceiling on the proportion of the force that was likely to be married. Conversely, the end of conscription and the conversion to a more professional and career-oriented military service meant that personnel turnover would be reduced, personnel would remain in service longer, as they aged they would be more likely to marry and have children, and the proportion of the force that was married and with children would increase.

Today there are some 850,000 military families with more than 1.3 million children. The approximately 1.5 million active duty personnel have 2.28 million family members, including spouses, children, and adult dependents (Military Family Clearinghouse, 1995). Approximately 60% of service members are married, with the percentage varying by rank and service (Military Family Clearinghouse, 1995; Gaines et al., 2000). Only the lower four enlisted pay grades have a minority of married personnel (27% of E1–E3 and 46% of E4). Sixty-four percent of junior officers (O1–O3) are married, compared to 87% of more senior officers. Among midlevel and senior enlisted personnel, 72% of those in pay grades E5–E6 and 83% of those in pay grades E7–E9 are married. Overall, the Marine Corps has the smallest proportion of married personnel (48%). That is due to the concentration of Marines in the lower enlisted grades. More senior Marines have marriage rates similar to the other services. The Air Force is the most married service (64%).

Second, the end of conscription produced a change in the gender composition of the American armed forces. Under conscription, the Selective Service System was able to deliver the required number of young men to the military services. As a result, the number of women in the armed forces, and the roles in which they were allowed to serve, were minimized. At the dawning of the all-volunteer force, only 2% of uniformed personnel were women. However, placed in a competitive labor market, the armed forces were not able to recruit the required numbers of young men voluntarily. This personnel shortage was occurring at the same time as the larger society was moving toward greater gender equality, including the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by Congress in 1972 (and expectations that it would be ratified by the states). As a consequence of both these trends, the number of women brought into service, as well as the service roles they perform, expanded markedly. In general, when western nations terminate military conscription in favor of volunteer forces, the proportion of women in their armed forces increases (Haltiner, 1998).

Today, 14% of uniformed American military personnel are women (Manning and Wight, 2000). While military women are less likely to be married and to have children than their male peers, the presence of substantial numbers of women with families has the potential for great social change in the armed forces. Since the work place is a primary determinant of courtship and mate-selection patterns, there has been an increase in the number of dual-military marriages (11% of all military members have a spouse on active duty; 6% of male service members and 48% of female service members) (Gaines et al., 2000). Most dual military couples are in the same service, but interservice couples also occur (especially in the Marine Corps) (Defense Manpower Data Center, 1994b; Military Family Clearinghouse, 1995, using 1992 DMDC data). Recent efforts to mandate that fraternization regulations be uniform across the services have required changes in Army policies and have focussed attention on the approximately 500 married couples in which one spouse is an officer and the other an enlisted person. Such relationships will not occur in the future under fraternization guidelines issued to all of the services in August 1998. There are a growing number of military veterans among civilian wives of military men (approximately 5 to 8%) (Gaines et al., 2000), a phenomenon that has not been studied despite potential consequences for family adaptation and satisfaction.

However, civilian spouses of American military personnel today are not only wives, but also husbands. Fewer than half (48%) of married military women are in dual-military marriages (Gaines et al., 2000). This is down from 54% just a few years ago; even then, a minority of married military women in the Army and the Navy were in dual-military marriages (Defense Manpower Data Center, 1994a; Johnson, 1998). However, a majority of the civilian husbands of the remaining married military women are military veterans (Defense Manpower Data Center, 1994a; Johnson, 1998). Civilian husbands, especially those who have never served in the armed forces, are likely to experience special social and interpersonal difficulties resulting from their treatment by other members of the military community (Bourg, 1995; Johnson, 1998). Military culture has traditionally assumed that military personnel are men, and military family policies and programs tend to be oriented toward traditional gender roles and traditional family structures. While there has been some change in this in recent years, civilian husbands of military wives are still treated as oddities.

A third trend is that the conversion to an all-volunteer force led to the overrepresentation of some racial and ethnic groups in the military, especially African Americans. Of personnel on active duty in 2000, approximately 18% of men and 32% of women were Black (Manning and Wight, 2000). While much public attention and research has analyzed the causes and consequences of this trend, little attention has been paid to racial and ethnic diversity in military families. Some studies of family housing have found that military communities are unlike civilian neighborhoods in that they are (and have been for some time) racially integrated, with many cross-racial friendships among neighbors (Segal, 1986a).

Fourth, and perhaps most important, as the armed forces have learned to compete in the labor market for quality personnel, they have found that such competition involves not only the initial recruitment of personnel, but also their long-term retention. One important factor in the retention of personnel is family satisfaction. Service members whose family members are not happy with military life are likely to seek alternative employment in the civilian sector. This results in putting the services to the expense of recruiting, training, and retaining replacements. There are, therefore, clear economic payoffs to military family satisfaction.

Military wives, like other American women, derive their personal identities less from their husbands than in the past and they have increased their participation in the labor

force. Spouse employment satisfaction has been shown to be a major determinant of family satisfaction with military life (e.g., Orthner, 1990). What affects spouse support for retention is not whether or not the spouse is employed, but rather whether the spouse's employment outcomes (whether employed, type of work, pay, etc.) meet his/her expectations (Scarville, 1990).

Military policies, programs, and practices have significant effects on family adaptation to the "greedy" demands of the military lifestyle, on family satisfaction, and on service members' commitment to the service (Segal, 1986b). For example, perceptions by Army soldiers and their spouses that their unit leaders care about their families have direct positive effects on soldiers' (and their spouses') affective commitment to the Army (Bourg and Segal, 1999). Implementing policy and practice recommendations derived from research can increase family adaptation as well as service members' readiness and retention (Segal and Harris, 1993).

As a result of all of these changes, attention to families by the armed forces has increased dramatically over the past 20 years (Segal, 1986b; Stanley, Segal, and Laughton, 1990). During the Cold War and the first 2 decades of the all-volunteer force, many programs have been developed to help families adjust to the military lifestyle. These include financial services, child care, spouse employment programs, relocation assistance, and support services during deployments. Current changes in the international scene and the armed forces pose new challenges for military families and for the armed forces in their attempts to provide for military personnel and their families.

NEW TIMES FOR THE MILITARY: DOWNSIZING AND NEW MISSIONS

While the Cold War in Europe is over, and the military is downsizing, American military personnel are participating increasingly in nontraditional operations that pose new challenges in political, social, and military dimensions. During the Cold War, the bipolar antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States limited both the ability of the United Nations to mount multinational peacekeeping operations, and the military involvement of these superpowers in the missions that were initiated. Traditional peacekeeping involved a norm of impartiality and it was assumed that the United States and the Soviet Union were unlikely to be impartial disinterested parties in an international dispute. Since the end of the European Cold War, the United Nations has become a more active sponsor of multinational peacekeeping operations (Segal, 1995), and the United States has become a more frequent participant. United States operations also include strategic peacekeeping missions that go beyond traditional interposition between conflicting parties with the consent of these parties (Dandeker and Gow, 1997), and missions conducted under auspices other than those of the United Nations.

In 1993, for the first time, U.S. Army doctrine began to reflect the changing nature of military missions. *Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations*, the Army's basic field manual for doctrine, explicitly included a section on "Operations Other Than War" which includes peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Department of the Army, 1993). The other services have similarly modernized their doctrine.

Doctrinal modification reflects the fact that the American military has become busier with these missions than it was during the height of the Cold War. Although American military force structure has been reduced by about one-third, from about 2.1 million to

about 1.4 million uniformed active-duty personnel, and defense spending has been reduced by almost 40%, the overseas use of American military forces has increased by almost 300%. In the early 1990s, American military personnel were involved in more than 45 operations (Doyle, Lewis, and Williams, 1996), which took them to places like Panama, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

These missions are all stressful for the families of the personnel involved. The stress of peacekeeping operations for the families of peacekeepers has long been recognized (Segal and Segal, 1993). What has been less clear is the cumulative effect on families of repeated peacekeeping missions and other separations from family.

Service members spend time away from home for many reasons, including peacekeeping duty. In 1999, 73% of service members (81% in the Army) surveyed indicated that they had been away from their permanent duty station at least one night because of military duties during the previous 12 months; this included 39% who had been away at least five separate times and 35% who had been away for at least 3 months. Asked if they spent time away from their permanent duty station for peacekeeping or other contingency operations, 19% responded that they had. What these figures do not tell us is the uneven distribution of the particular troops who participate in such operations.

Although peacekeeping doctrine does not specify light infantry units as the most appropriate U.S. forces for peacekeeping, during the period of traditional peacekeeping interposition, such units—the 82nd and 101st Airborne, and the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions—bore most of the burden of peacekeeping because of their rapid deployability (Segal, 1996). In a study of soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division, which in three successive years had been deployed to Florida for Hurricane Andrew relief (1992), to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope (1992–1993), and to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy (1994), a clear majority said that peacekeeping operations are hardest on soldiers with families. About a third were not sure (primarily unmarried soldiers and soldiers who had not deployed on such operations). Very few disagreed (Reed and Segal, 2000). More dramatically, although most soldier attitudes were found not to vary as a function of number of deployments, the percent feeling that peacekeeping is hardest on soldiers with families increased from 51% of those who had been on no missions or only one mission, to more than 70% among those who had been on three or more missions.

Units other than light infantry, such as military police, logistical support, civil affairs, special operations, and heavy combat units have increasingly been deployed to perform peace operations. This has occurred as the United States has become involved in increasing numbers of these operations, as they have grown to include more troops, and as they have increasingly involved strategic peacekeeping rather than traditional interposition missions. As is the case with light infantry, these deployments have implications for military families.

For example, in March 1994, President Clinton announced that a PATRIOT missile battalion would be deployed to South Korea in response to North Korea's refusal to comply with nuclear site inspections. The decision to send PATRIOTs to Korea impacted significantly on the families of PATRIOT soldiers, as well as reflecting the fact that the Cold War is not yet over in Asia.

There are only nine PATRIOT battalions in the U.S. Army. In the 1980s, they were stationed either in the United States or in Germany. In either case, married soldiers were stationed with their families. In 1990, although the PATRIOT had been developed as an antiaircraft rather than an antimissile system, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, American PATRIOT units were deployed to the Arabian Peninsula to help protect allied nations and coalition forces from Iraqi SCUD missiles. After the war, the

PATRIOT missile system never left Southwest Asia (SWA). Units from Germany and the United States have been rotated to staff the PATRIOT systems in SWA. One year, two of the three units in Germany divide the assignment for 6 months' temporary duty each. The next year, two of the units from the continental United States divide the mission for 6 months each. Thus, prior to the deployment of PATRIOTs to Korea, in any 2-year period, four of our nine PATRIOT battalions each experienced a 6-month period of family separation (Jones, 1995).

One of the units that had served in SWA was the 2nd Battalion (PATRIOT) 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (2-7 ADA). This unit had served in the Gulf War and had rotated back to SWA from April to September 1993. It was then scheduled to be stabilized at Fort Bliss, Texas, for 2 years. However, in April 1994, with little advance preparation, 2-7 ADA deployed for an unaccompanied 6-month tour in Korea in April 1994. After 6 months, it was replaced by 1-43 ADA, which was to be forward stationed in Korea, with soldiers serving in it for 1-year unaccompanied tours. This latter unit had more time to prepare its soldiers and their families for this deployment.

Research carried out on these first two PATRIOT units to be deployed to Korea showed some significant differences between them with regard to family issues (Segal et al., 1999). Almost two-thirds of the soldiers in 1-43 ADA reported strong family support for their Army careers compared to less than half in 2-7 ADA. More than half of the soldiers in 1-43 ADA reported good family adjustment to the Army compared with about a third in 2-7 ADA. Almost 40% of the soldiers in 2-7 ADA reported a decrease in spouse support for reenlistment as a result of the Korea deployment as compared with about 15% in 1-43 ADA. Perhaps most dramatically, over half the soldiers in 2-7 ADA reported that if future assignments required long separations, they would leave the military, compared to about a quarter of the soldiers in 1-43 ADA. Family adjustment to the Army was strongly related to soldier morale, and both satisfaction with resources to communicate home and perceptions that leaders were supportive of soldiers and their families were important determinants of family adjustment (Rohall, Segal, and Segal, 1999).

FAMILIES OF DEPLOYED PEACEKEEPERS: THE RESERVES

It has long been recognized that peacekeeping deployments have been hard on soldiers' families. With the military assuming increased numbers of peacekeeping missions, involving larger numbers of soldiers, attempts have been made recently to lift the family separation burden placed on active component personnel by using reservists for peacekeeping. For example, in 1995, the United States fulfilled its obligation to provide an infantry battalion task force to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai in support of the Camp David Accords by sending an experimental unit 80% of which was drawn from the reserve components—primarily the National Guard. Sending reservists rather than active duty personnel on peacekeeping missions raises interesting family issues.

Reservists' families are less accustomed to the military way of life and less familiar with how to access military benefits to which they are entitled. They are less likely to be integrated into a military social support network. They are also a difficult population for the services to reach, especially when they are dispersed throughout the United States rather than concentrated in one geographical area (Caliber Associates, 1993). Reservists' families are less likely than active duty families to use installation-based social services. This is at least

partly due to the distance from their homes to the nearest installation (Rosenberg, 1994; Bell, Stevens, and Segal, 1996). Also, reservists called up for missions (rather than volunteering) can experience a drop in income, especially if they are in high paying civilian jobs (Caliber Associates, 1993). For both reservists and active-duty personnel on deployments, access to fast, inexpensive, and effective communication with families is of the utmost importance. An advantage for reservists' families over active duty families is that they are less likely to be geographically separated from extended family and long-term friends and are more likely to be integrated into civilian social support networks (Bell et al., 1996).

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and subsequent bioterrorism have profoundly changed the American people's sense of security, the relationship between the military and the civilian society, and military families in many ways. We are witnessing increased public attention to military operations and greater visibility of military personnel (such as National Guard soldiers on security duty at airports). There is greater support for military funding. There is even some renewed public debate on a return to conscription.

Many military personnel are being sent abroad for various missions. Military family separations are increasing. Furthermore, they are now accompanied not only by concern for service members' safety, but also service members have greater concern than usual about the safety of their families.

Reservist and National Guard members called to active duty must leave their civilian jobs, which often means decreased income. At the same time, there is a general decline in the economy, with rising unemployment, especially in areas most directly affected by the terrorist attacks. For families living in these areas—as well as those around military bases with large numbers of deployed troops—spouse unemployment problems may be exacerbated.

It is too soon to tell whether military families will fare worse during these deployments and reserve call-ups than they have in the past. They may actually fare better in terms of social support from civilians because of the widespread expressions of patriotism in the nation. One thing is certain: Americans now speak of life before and after September 11th, and the ramifications of this watershed event will be felt for many years to come.

FAMILY COMMUNICATION IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE

Communication between forward deployed soldiers and their families back home has always been a challenge and a morale issue. The postcard was invented during the Franco-Prussian War. The mail continued to be the major vehicle of direct contact, although by the Korean War, telegraph, telephone, and the Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) were playing a role. Electronic media—particularly the telephone—became increasingly important, and large telephone bills became a major problem even as the telephone helped bridge the distance between soldiers and their loved ones at home (Applewhite and Segal, 1990). This problem has continued for some deployments, including the Sinai MFO. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in the early 1990s saw the first forward deployed e-mail distribution system, with 10,000 e-mail messages traveling between Somalia and the United States (Ender and Segal, 1995). More recently, interactive video, and even cellular telephones have helped to link forward deployed soldiers and the home front. During Operation Uphold Democracy, in Haiti in 1994, about 12% of soldiers reported using e-mail at least once a month, and

about 14% reported using TV teleconferencing at that level. In the same range, about 18% of soldiers' spouses used e-mail and about 14% used TV teleconferencing at least once a month. These figures reflected increased use from the earlier Somalia deployment (Ender and Segal, 1998).

Being able to communicate with family has continued to be a major morale issue while service members are away from home. Asked in 1999 what has been a concern for them while away during the past year, 44% of all service members (married and single) cite their ability to communicate with family—second only to managing expenses and bills (Gaines et al., 2000).

Issues of communication between deployed service members and their families are likely to arise in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. For example, security concerns may hinder communication with families. Further, it is likely that special operations personnel will continue to be involved in the war on terrorism and they will be out of communication with their families. This lack of communication presents a source of added stress for military families.

CONCLUSION

The trends discussed above are likely to continue. The American active-duty armed forces are unlikely to grow larger and are probably going to get smaller. They are likely to be more professionalized and career oriented and hence older and with higher numbers of married personnel. There will be continued pressures on the defense budget, and budget allocations are likely to go to hardware acquisition and to deferred maintenance rather than to personnel (including family) programs. Noncash benefits to families are declining as is retired pay. The job security that used to be a strong incentive for career personnel is threatened. The smaller force is likely to continue to be called upon to perform a large number of out-of-area missions, including peacekeeping and fighting terrorism, contributing to frequent family separation as a characteristic of military service. Where possible, reserve forces will increasingly be used to supplement the active forces on these missions, thus making separation a more common characteristic of service in the reserve components as well. At the same time, the armed forces, which have in past years assumed more responsibility for the well-being of the families of their personnel than have most employers, are increasingly likely to regard military families as apart from, rather than a part of, the military community, as increasing numbers of military spouses pursue their own careers and increasing numbers of military families live off-post and receive their basic services, from education and health to recreation and entertainment, from outside the military.

With fewer troops forward stationed in Europe and bases in the United States being closed, many remaining U.S. bases are growing. It may be that military families will move less often and thus have more chance to put down roots, become integrated in the civilian community, develop social support networks, and have more stable spouse employment opportunities. However, there is new evidence to suggest that a major military presence in local labor markets depresses civilian wages, particularly for women, and increases women's unemployment (Booth et al., 2000).

There is an inherent tension between these trends and the needs of the nation for an effective military force. The ways in which this tension is resolved will affect the effectiveness of the American military in the future. In a democratic society, it is important for the military not to become isolated from, or too distinct from, civilian society and culture. The

trends in military families that we have discussed have their origins in changes in military missions and changes in the wider social structure and culture. Military readiness is best served when military policies, programs, and practices adapt to these trends at the same time that military families adapt to military requirements.

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PART IV

INSIDE THE MILITARY

CHAPTER 14

Military Culture

JOSEPH L. SOETERS, DONNA J. WINSLOW
AND ALISE WEIBULL

Whenever some group of people have a bit of common life with a modicum of isolation from other people, a common corner in society, common problems and perhaps a couple of common enemies, there culture grows.

—Hughes

Military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to preparing military organizations for the next war.

—Murray

INTRODUCTION

Military organizations represent a specific occupational culture which is relatively isolated from society. Military people not only work in separated barracks and bases, but they also live there frequently (and sometimes their wives and children as well). Cadets and recruits get their training in specific schools and academies, where a sense of uniqueness is emphasized; and military personnel wear uniforms which makes them, in a highly visible way, distinct from most other workers. Military organizations are "greedy institutions" because they require a lot from their personnel: during active duty personnel are on a permanent, 24-hour call with rather ideosyncratic working shifts; their leave is subject to cancellation (Druckman et al., 1997); and they can be ordered to far-off places on short notice. The jobs in the military may be dangerous and potentially life threatening. For this reason servicemen and servicewomen are usually armed or at least equipped with protective instruments and materials. If necessary, the military can make use of legitimized violence.

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Military organizations, furthermore, require their employees to perform their duties without making any non-work-related distinction between (groups of) people. Hence, military personnel have to be fundamentally nondiscriminatory in their organizational behavior. Finally, the military is state funded, i.e., noncommercial, because they fulfil the state's core tasks, whose risks are not likely to be insured by or delegated to private companies. Although private armies in fact do exist, in modern societies the military virtually always are government agencies (Wilson, 1989).

In this chapter we deal with military culture. In doing so, we pay attention to a specific occupational culture, which is a cultural level between the organizational and national culture (Hofstede, 1991, p. 182). But there is no such thing as one single occupational culture of military organizations. It will be shown that the culture of military organizations varies between countries; hence, both the level of the occupational and the national culture are dealt with in this chapter. Besides, multiple cultures occur in the various types of military organizations such as the army, the air force, the navy, and the military police. This variation will also be acknowledged in this chapter. Despite all this variation there seem to be general developments, making the world of military organizations somewhat less complex than it may seem at first.

Not to complicate matters, but to enhance our understanding of military organizations, we subsequently will make a distinction between two sides of these organizations. As such, these organizations are Janusian (from the two faces of the Roman god Janus; Hunt and Phillips, 1991). This is the distinction between the *soldier on the battlefield* and the one in *garrison*, between *the military working at the MoD* and the *commanders in the field*, and between the "*corporate*" and the "*muddy boots*" army, so to speak (McCormick, 1998). Military organizations, like other uniformed organizations such as the police or fire squads (Soeters, 2000), are really two sided: one side for prevention, facilitation, and preparation and one side for the real action. Subsequently, we will extensively deal with the question how to become a "military" person. This chapter ends with a sketch of avenues for further research. But first we will start with some notions on what culture basically is.

WHAT IS CULTURE?

Despite its complexity, most people will have a notion of what culture is. Culture refers to common ways of seeing the environment; it relates to values and priorities in life, as well as to subconscious convictions, ideas, interpretations, and norms that are taken for granted. Culture is shared by collectivities of people: nations, regions, organizations, schools, churches, and families. Culture is a group phenomenon, hence leaving the impact of personality structures outside. Two definitions will contribute to a better understanding of the concept. "We use the concept of culture to characterize a set of meanings, ideas and symbols that are shared by the members of a collective and that have evolved over time" (Alvesson and Billing, 1997, p. 103). Hofstede's metaphorical definition (1991, p. 5) is as short as it is clear: "culture is the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another." Naturally, people have the disposition of "hardware," which is their biological makeup, but the way the "hardware" functions depends on the "cultural software." Culture is learned, not inherited. It derives from one's social environment, not from one's genes.

What culture basically is can be seen using the metaphor of music (see Becker, 1982). Music is usually performed by a group of people. The process of music making by a group of people may differ substantially. The performance of the national anthem in a football

stadium is based on everyone singing the same words and the same tune in harmony with each other. The tune like the words are shared by all, and the total sounds fine, without any real conducting. In a symphony orchestra everyone is playing different pieces of music, which comprise a totality. However, every section of the orchestra (e.g., violins and trumpets) plays a different part. The trumpet players master their own piece of music and they may or may not be aware of the violinists' exact music. Nonetheless, the total sounds beautifully, thanks to the specific instructions and the skills of each section and thanks the performance of the conductor. Jazz improvisation is something else again. The individual musicians master their instrument and have basic shared understandings of the principles of the music. However, what emerges is fairly unpredictable and is created by the social interaction of the musicians in the performance. Although the musicians use basic themes as frames of reference, the actual play is thus irregular and can never be repeated. It is needless to say that direct leadership in this type of musical performance is low-key or absent.

These three examples of musical performances correspond to three perspectives, three ways of looking at culture (Martin, 1992; Winslow, 2000). In the *Integration* perspective, culture is seen as a pattern of thoughts and priorities gluing all members of the group together in a consistent and clear manner. In this perspective cultural homogeneity whithin the whole group reigns. As a result the group (or organization if one focuses on organizational culture) is seen as a "little society" on its own, where organizationwide consensus is reached.

In the *Differentation* Perspective, the emphasis is on the subcultures within the group or organization. In this perspective the culture of the whole group or organization is seen as a mosaic consisting of subcultures, that are hard edged and largely homogeneous in their internal characteristics (Hannerz, 1992, p. 73). In the armed forces these subcultures refer specifically to differences between the army, the navy and the air force, or to different categories such as men and women, or noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. Within these subcultures clarity and consensus exist, but the subcultures are only pieces of a whole. The idea of the "navy as an insulated occupation" (Davis, 1948) fully conforms to this Differentiation perspective. This cultural perspective thus emphasizes the homogeneity within the subcultures but the heterogeneity of the group's or organizational culture.

Ambiguity itself is stressed in the *Fragmentation* perspective. This perspective accepts the existence of general frames of reference within the group or organization. However, at the same time the Fragmentation perspective stresses the multiplicity of views within the group or organization. Hannerz (1992) uses a special term in this perspective: microcultures. While subcultures can involve thousands or even millions of people, who can rely on relatively generalized shared understandings, microcultures may seldom reach beyond a few dozen people or a hundred (Hannerz, 1992, p. 77). Given the complexity resulting from these microcultures, chaos and political change, and even anarchy and junglelike behavior, in the group or organization may result. Whereas culture in the integrative perspective sees culture as a binding and overarching phenomenon, cultural elements in the fragmentation perspective are only loosely connected.

The three perspectives not only stress different aspects of a group's culture, they also differ in the level of analysis: from macro to micro. The macro Integrated approach leads to large brushstrokes and the analysis of major themes and developments, seen from the top of the hill. The micro Fragmentation perspective shows how individual factions within the organization grasp different and sometimes contradictory ambiguous fragments of culture; it is looking at culture from the bottom of the hill. In between, the Differentiation approach depicts subcultures and larger informal cultures within the organization.

The vast majority of the literature on military culture (Winslow, 2000) is based on the Integration perspective. This may come as no surprise, since this perspective provides

information that can be handled in a comprehensible way. It appeals to military commanders because of its "promise" that cultures may be changed by initiatives and impulses of (top-) leadership. It furthermore can easily be connected to the dream of a "strong" culture, where "all noses point in the same direction" and internal debates and struggle are absent.

However, empirical arguments lead us to believe that differentiation or heterogeneity within an organizational culture is more the rule than exception. But also on the basis of more pragmatic arguments the Differentiation perspective seems more attractive: a certain kind of heterogeneity precludes "organizational myopia." If everyone in the organization agrees on what to do and what to think, it is no longer possible to discern whether clinging to the shared "reality" still matches changing circumstances. In business history, quite a number of companies did not manage to survive because they held on too long to their own "truths" shared by everyone in the organization (Soeters, 1986, pp. 307–308). So called "strong cultures" thus may become weak in their consequences. Apparently, organizations need to have some internal dialog—not endless discussions—in order to cope with the changing realities in their environment. As most armed forces nowadays really do have to face up changing and turbulent environments, this is an important issue.

In the following sections we will try to paint a picture of military culture starting with the large brushstrokes of the Integration perspective. But soon it will become clear that differences between the various branches of the military, as well as developments occurring throughout the military of various countries, are too important to be neglected. The Differentiation perspective is more akin to the large brushstrokes and creates a more varying and colorful picture of military culture. The Fragmentation perspective, using the idea of microcultures, will come to the fore in the section thereafter; there we will be dealing with the military in action, both in officelike surroundings and in crisis or battle.

CULTURE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The military organization, being one of the oldest and traditionally most prominent examples of formal organization, has attracted considerable attention from social scientists. In an extensive review Lang (1965) points to various specific aspects of military organizations. First, there is the "*communal*" **character of life in uniform.** This specific character seems to be one of the clearest differences between uniformed and ordinary organizational life. It relates to the degree to which the control of the organization extends to various aspects and stages of personal life, much more than in ordinary organizations. Second, there is a heavy emphasis in military and other uniformed organizations on **hierarchy** which may even lead to a certain authoritarian ideology. And third, but closely corresponding to the second point, there is a chain of command postulating a downward flow of directives. This chain of command simply aims at the execution of orders, hence **introducing discipline and control.**

In the following we successively deal with these three features, distinguishing the military from other organizations. We respectively account for national variations and differences between the various types of military organizations.

"Communal Life"

In connection to Lang's first observation as to the "communal character of military life," the so-called I/O (Institutional/Occupational) distinction has become an important model in

military sociology (Moskos, 1973; Moskos and Wood, 1988). This model discerns between two extremes with regard to the normative orientation of employees working in the military. At one side, the employees are fully oriented toward the military institution (i.e., military organization). If this institutional orientation dominates, such matters as leisure time, family matters, living conditions, (high) salary, and career prospects on the external labor market are relatively insignificant. The only thing that matters in life is the military and the values the military stands for: the nation or constitution, the president, king, or queen. In this situation, military and personal life tend to overlap, transforming the job into a part of communal life. If the occupational orientation prevails, however, neither military personnel nor their families will focus all their attention solely on military life and the military labor market. On the contrary, they will aim to live outside of the direct military environment, they will strive for market wages, and they will prefer to acquire educational qualifications that can also be utilized outside the internal military labor market. In this case working in the military is "just another job" (Moskos and Wood, 1988).

In a comparative study among military academies in 18 (mostly Western) countries it was found that military cultures differ substantially in this respect (Soeters, 1997; Soeters and Recht, 1998). The cultures in the armed forces in countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Germany, but to a lesser degree also in The Netherlands, France, and Spain, appeared to be rather institution oriented, which implies that the cadet-officers are less inclined toward private life and material gains. Military officers in these countries normally stay within the military during their whole working life, a period of up to 35 or 40 years. This is what the student-officers have in mind when starting their career at the age of 20 or younger. Obviously, military existence in these armed forces (at least for the officers) is something more than "just another job"; it certainly tends to be something like a communal life.

However, in countries like Denmark, Norway, the United States, and Canada, officers are more inclined to value leisure time, an attractive living environment, high salaries, and promotion opportunities. In their view, military life certainly is not something that stands out above everything else in importance. In the United States and Canada, this may be related to the fact that student-officers in these countries generally embark on a career of 20 years or less (Druckman et al., 1997). This situation provides the opportunity (and sometimes makes it necessary) to be and remain oriented towards a career in the civilian sector. Hence, the differences between the two groups of countries.

In general though—and this may be an even more important result—military cultures were found to be far more institutional as compared to business organizations' cultures (Soeters, 1997). In this respect, there appears to be something like an overarching international and homogeneous military culture. Business organizations' cultures tend to emphasize leisure time, private life, and performance-based material gains. Military cultures, on the contrary, are indeed more "greedy" and institutional, requiring a commitment from their personnel 24 hours long and offering a fixed pay structure only. Given these differences, it may come as no surprise that organizational conflict in the peacekeeping force sent to Cyprus was between military personnel and civilians and not between the different national military contingents (Moskos, 1976).

Hierarchy

Lang's second observation, dealing with hierarchy, can be related to the bureaucratic character of military life. As James Wilson (1989, pp. 163–164) pointed out, military organizations—at least during peacetime conditions—are bureaucracies or procedural

organizations *par excellence*. This characteristic refers to the importance of the hierarchy and of rules and regulations in the organization. However, there may be variations in this regard.

Mintzberg (1989), as known, has distinguished between machine and professional bureaucracies. Machine bureaucracies (e.g., McDonalds-like service organizations, social security agencies, and Ford-like production plants) have steep hierarchies as well as elaborated sets of rules and regulations formulated by specialists and imposed on the rest of the organization by the managing élite. Professional bureaucracies such as hospitals and schools, on the other hand, rely more on the specialized knowledge of the operating core; this specialized operating core consists of educated professionals, whose activities are embedded in a more general bureaucratic framework and are steered by a small hierarchy of (professional) leaders only.

In a more or less similar vein Adler and Borys (1996) made an interesting distinction between so-called coercive and enabling bureaucracies. Whereas the coercive logic leads to the machine form of bureaucracies, the enabling logic provides employees with frames of reference, i.e., contextual information designed to help employees to do their jobs more effectively and reinforce their commitment. In the enabling bureaucracy, procedures are designed to afford employees an understanding of where their own tasks fit into the whole. In both types of bureaucracies hierarchies and rules exist. But in the coercive form "bad," noncontributing rules dominate, whereas in the enabling bureaucracy "good" rules are predominant, i.e., rules which are taken for granted and are rarely noticed (Perrow, 1986). Coercive logic is often considered to be an inevitable, even necessary, evil. This is especially advocated in organizations, where (1) a high degree of asymmetry of power between managers and employees exists and (2) where on an everyday basis no or only few "reality checks" are provided by external influences (Adler and Borys, 1986, pp. 82–83).

Knowing this, it may come as no surprise that military cultures as compared to the cultures of business organizations are more coercive. This was shown in the comparative study among military academies (Soeters, 1997; Soeters and Recht, 1998). The level of power distance, i.e., hierarchy, in military academies is much larger than in the business sector. The same applies, although somewhat less clearly, to the degree of rule orientation in the military. This result is hardly surprising since military organizations traditionally know a strong social order ("grid") based on vertical, power-related classifications and regulations (Douglas, 1973), and, besides, military organizations do not face reality checks very frequently, which would urge them to adapt their organization continuously.

As to differences between countries, the coercive orientation is fairly strong in the academies of Latin-based countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Brazil. This comes as no surprise, since in other sectors such as ICT and the hotel industry similar results have been found (Hofstede, 1991; Klidas, 2001). The exact opposite of this Latin cluster is found in two countries where the level of power distance and the degree of rule orientation are relatively small. These countries are Norway and Canada. The military cultures in these countries are clearly more "enabling." In these countries people are enabled by the organization's rules and hierarchy to do their job properly.

Discipline

Lang's third and final observation concerns discipline, which is the extent of compliance with rules, the acceptance of orders and authority, and the way the organization deals with disobedience through overt punishment (Arvey and Jones, 1985; Shalit, 1988). Obviously,

this relates to the previous characteristic and may as a matter of fact even be considered as an extension of it. Discipline in organizations has several potential functions in organizational settings. It operates as a direct behavioral control mechanism, which provides indirect cues concerning what is acceptable and important in the organization; it establishes the organizational boundary system, maintaining in-group and out-group relations with the supervisors and in general increasing organizational identification (Arvey and Jones, 1985, pp. 370–371).

Organizations may differ as to the amount and character of discipline they impose on employees. These differences can be related to formal or ceremonial discipline (e.g., salutes, outward appearance and uniform) and to functional discipline (for example, acting in accordance with the rules and the commander's intentions). Functional discipline is intended as a specific means of enabling employees to perform better in certain, specific circumstances. Formal discipline can be looked upon as an aim in itself, a generalized behavioral pattern that can be considered appropriate to a wide range of situations (Shalit, 1988, pp. 122–126).

In the previously discussed survey among military academies (Soeters and Recht, 1998) it became clear that student-officers in Western European countries such as Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway attach below average importance to most aspects of military discipline. In only a few, exceptional cases did the student-officers in these countries ascribe a great deal of importance to a certain aspect of discipline. These virtually never concern formal or ceremonial discipline. Dutch cadets, for instance, consider the uniform, salutes, polished shoes, and so forth less important than virtually all other foreign cadets.

The Latin cluster, with the exception of Belgium, yielded scores that could indeed be expected from relatively (machine) bureaucratic and institutional academy or military cultures. In the academies of France, Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Brazil the importance attached to the various aspects of discipline is generally considered of above-average importance. Interestingly enough, the British student-officers consider virtually all aspects of military discipline of above-average importance. This must be related to the extremely high level of power distance in the British academy, which was also found in the survey. Military life in the United Kingdom apparently is steeped in military discipline.

Another important finding relates to the importance attached to acting according to informal group norms. In those countries where importance is attached to the various aspects of military discipline and, specifically, those concerning ceremonial discipline, informal group norms are not deemed very important. Conversely, where virtually no aspect of military discipline is relatively highly valued, this single one aspect is considered to be of significant importance. It may be assumed on the basis of these findings that self-steering by way of informal group norms is an alternative to imposing general military discipline.

Developments

It is tempting—although methodologically precarious—to put the various characteristics of culture in uniformed organizations in a time perspective. In this way it may be possible to see more general lines of development. It could be hypothesized that there is a traditional uniformed culture which is institutional, hierarchical, and discipline oriented. This traditional type of uniformed culture still occurs abundantly in the military of various countries and will especially occur in the less Western parts of the world.

However, there seem to be developments in North America and Western Europe which point toward the emergence of a more "businesslike" attitude among military personnel, which will impact (1) their orientation toward the military and (2) the way of organizing work activities. We have seen earlier that the cadet-officers in many European countries are still rather institution oriented, more so than their U.S. and Canadian colleagues. But this may change rapidly with the introduction of all-volunteer forces (AVFs) in countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium, and France, and more specifically with the introduction of short-term contracts. These types of flexible contracts will undoubtedly enhance the occupational orientation among military personnel, like in the United States and Canada. The idea that one is part of the military for the rest of one's life, and hence the idea that it is worth sacrificing "everything" in order to be a military person, will soon disappear in those counties where AVFs are established. In countries, where lifetime employment for professional soldiers (together with the draft system) will continue to exist, the institutional attitude will survive, at least for some time.

As to organizing work activities, there are indications that uniformed organizations for reasons of efficiency, uniformity, and standardization will be bureaucratic forever (see Wilson, 1989). However, the character of that bureaucracy is likely to change gradually from coercive toward more enabling: In the latter case, the organization's rules and standard operating procedures provide frames of reference which are designed to enable employees to do their work properly. Within the framework of "good" bureaucratic rules that are hardly noticed, people can behave fairly autonomously and in a self-steering (and if one wishes, empowered) way, however, always in accordance with the group's informal norms. Coercive rules and commands, in contrast, are becoming more and more obsolete. As far as leadership is concerned, one can clearly observe that acting according to the "commander's intent" (mission oriented command)—implying some freedom of action among the rank and file and mutual trust between leader and followers—is replacing traditional, coercive styles of leadership (Vogelaar and Kramer, 1997). The introduction of team-based organizing will be inevitable to keep up with the increasing complexity of the work, although the pace and extent of application will vary according to national cultural characteristics (Kirkman and Shapiro, 1997). One could assume that on the long run this development will bridge the gap between uniformed and business organizations in many ways.

This presumed development is most likely related to several general developments: the continuous Westernization and individualization of national cultures; the expansion of information and communication technologies; the improving educational qualifications of the work population ("smarter soldiers"); and, finally, comparable tendencies in the business sector (Adler and Borys, 1996). For the military specifically, the end of conscription in increasingly more Western countries will contribute to this development as well. This development is depicted in Figure 14.1.

Coercive Bureaucratic/ Institutional/ Traditional discipline	-->	Coercive Bureaucratic/ Occupational	-->	Enabling Bureaucratic/ Occupational/ Discipline based on self-Steering, empowerment

FIGURE 14.1. The presumed process of development of uniformed organizations' cultures.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE MILITARY

However, there is something to add to this general development. Although the large brush-strokes of macro comparisons and developments have their own value, one should never forget that *within* (national) military organizations considerable cultural differences in fact do exist. The continuum from Institutional to Occupational and from coercive to enabling bureaucracies may be somewhat misleading in this connection. Here the Differentiation perspective, with its emphasis on subcultures, may prove its value.

Above all one should realize that within the military, more institutional versus more occupational segments or branches do exist simultaneously (Moskos, 1973). More traditional, institutional cultural features in the military are most pronounced in labor-intensive support units, combat forces, and presumably at senior command levels. On the other hand, occupational cultural features will accelerate where functions deal with education, clerical administration, logistics, medical care, transportation, construction, and other technical tasks such as Information and Communication Technology. The institutional subculture will "stress customary modes of military organization," while at the same time "there will be a convergent (occupational) sector which operates on principles common to civil administration and corporate structures" (Moskos, 1973, p. 277). The same applies to the coexistence of more coercive versus more enabling bureaucratic segments within one national military organization.

Swedish studies (Jansson, 1996; Weibull and Björkman, 1997) have clearly demonstrated this differentiation within one national military organization. These studies showed that the Swedish air force developed its own culture once it became an independent branch in the Swedish armed forces. Before that, it had been part of the Swedish army for a long period of time. When a genuine air force corps was established, it broke largely with army thinking, practices, and traditions. The social network that developed in and around air force activities differed radically from its army regimental counterparts. Belief in authority and hierarchy were broken down and replaced by more personal, informal relations, better adjusted to the air force need for openness and confidence, and giving more status to professional knowledge. The aircraft became somewhat of a "social free zone," and many officers did and do not consider themselves "genuine military men," but simply pilots and maintenance personnel. This even goes this far that in the subculture of the air force—in contrast to the army subculture—professionalism has priority over rank. This means that the young lieutenant in the squadron can just as well be the one who helps the air chief marshal, when he comes to fly the small number of flying hours still left for him, and all this is seen as "natural" from both sides. A better description of a more occupational and enabling bureaucratic culture could hardly be given. It shows that within the military considerable cultural differences in fact do occur.

A Janusian Culture

As mentioned above, military organizations in fact know two sides: (1) an organization which tries to prevent the occurrence of problems and provides the preconditions for the core task, which is performed by the organization (2) during a crisis and on the battlefield. Military organizations apparently have two faces, like Janus the Roman god (Hunt and Philips, 1991). In fact, however, this seemingly simple Janusian peculiarity is a bit more complicated.

Specifying the distinction between the two "faces", one can see various dimensions of organizational activities to be relevant here: the risk for personal life, the turbulence

of critical events and the time dimension. Using these dimensions, one can distinguish four exemplary general situations in military organizations: (1) HQ's or staff departments; (2) the garrison in the army, the navy vessel on a peacetime sailing mission and routine peacekeeping operations; (3) the operations on an aircraft carrier; and (4) the military organization in full battle, crisis, or disaster. From (1) to (4) the risks for personal life and the turbulence of critical events increase, whereas the time span of activities becomes increasingly shorter. For the sake of simplicity, the first two and the last two situations may be taken together; they respectively may be called the "cold" and the "hot" side of the uniformed organization. Obviously, this is derived from the world of the fire fighters, where personnel always speaks in terms of this two-sided concept (Soeters, 2000). Each side or face has its own (sub-)cultural content and dynamics. We will deal with these two sides or faces of the military in the next two sections.

The "Cold" organization

The managing organization in HQ's or the staff of the military organization closely resembles an ordinary office organization. In this organization one could say the white-collar work (although in uniform!) is being done. It is a real bureaucracy with hierarchies, specialization, rational decision making, (strategic) planning, paperwork as well as quality and cost control. This is the world of the "corporate" army (McCormick, 1998), where highly qualified officers and civilians do their work. Despite its rationality, the "cold" organization knows all aspects of bureaupolitics as well: emotional meetings, power struggles, negotiations on targets, battles over budgets, as well as contacts with the media and other external, mostly political pressures. These processes do not always develop in a structured rational manner. At least one can say that in the MoD the subcultures of the various branches (army, navy, and air force) impact on and sometimes really clash with each other. This means that the differentiation but sometimes also the fragmentation perspectives demonstrate their value in the analysis of the cold organization's subcultures.

Sometimes—but not always (!)—these processes even display the features of an "organized anarchy" (Sabrosky, Thompson, and McPherson, 1982). In these cases "information still becomes lost in the system, directed to the wrong people, or both. Similarly, during a crisis, the wrong people may try to solve a problem because of their prowess at bureaucratic gamesmanship, or the right people (because of mismanagement of oversight) may be overlooked or sent elsewhere" (Sabrosky et al., 1982, p. 142). Sabrosky et al. ironically note that this may not always be such a bad thing:

> The existence of bureaucratic inertia, fragmentation of authority, and relatively lack of efficiency may be a collective blessing in disguise in certain circumstances. Elected and appointed officials are not always paragons of intelligence and wisdom, and the inability of the military bureaucracy to execute rapidly some radical (or reactionary) executive proposal could have some inadvertent utility. (Sabrosky et al., 1982, p. 149)

In line with these comments a number of observations are not very flattering to the military culture. These comments point to the inclination of the military to "penalize the most gifted and creative persons" (Goldman, 1973) and the tendency among the military to avoid responsibility and cling to the "philosophy of doing the least" (Davis, 1948). In the latter observation one recognizes the famous "signature culture" in departments and large-sized offices. Note, however, that all these comments and observations are not very

recent and probably stem from the era where the coercive type of bureaucracy was more common in the West and is currently more commonplace elsewhere.

But not only in the MoDs and HQs does the "cold" organization exist. The military organization may be rather "cold" in many circumstances. These are the times where there is no need for real action. The "only" thing one has to do in garrison, in the barracks, and on routine sailing and flying missions is to make preparations for the worse-case scenario. This entails training, exercising, maintenance, and simply "being there." Leadership in these circumstances usually is traditional and disciplinary, rational and linear, and based on cognitive and analytic skills (Hunt and Phillips, 1991, p. 423). In these "cold" operational circumstances differentiation may also come to the fore. In the Swedish air force there are huge differences between the squadrons, the maintenance companies and the Air Defence Operation Centres. Especially the latter are interesting, because they are located outside the wings and spread all over the country. This makes them feel very much sidelined in many ways, or as the commander of these centers said: "It is doubtful whether these units actually live in the Air Force" (Weibul, 1988).

Not only in garrison but also in low-intensity operations such as on Cyprus and in the Sinai, military operations may be predominantly "cold." In these situations the main task is observation and presence. The subculture or organizational climate, consequently, is dominated by boredom, perceptions of underutilization, stimulus deprivation, and concern for privacy. If boredom in such a situation is a recurrent theme, many negative experiences are expressed and internal conflicts are likely to occur (Harris and Segal, 1985). Commanders in these situations should therefore make every effort to strengthen the unit's cohesion. This is important because cohesion is a prerequisite for the performance of military organizations, not only under "cold" but certainly also under "hot" conditions. The dynamics of working in military organizations make temperature shifts quite common.

The "Hot" Organization

Some segments of the military organization face "hot" conditions quasi-permanently; these are the "front-line" parts of the military. Most parts of the military, however, face "hot" conditions only incidentally: when they are on the battlefield, in crisis or in disaster, in sum when they are in conditions which are turbulent and potentially life threatening. "Hot" conditions occur when the heat is on, when one has to perform in critical, difficult, dangerous, violent, ambiguous, and hence stressful circumstances (Vogelaar and Kramer, 1997).

Whereas the "cold" organization is a real, classical organization of the bureaucracy-type, the "hot" organization structures it self around flexible groups having all the characteristics of either the ("one leader") simple organization or—when explicitly based on self-managing—the adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979; Druckman et al., 1997). Leadership in the "hot" organization definitely requires more than conventional linear and cognitive behavior. It should contain emotional aspects, such as courage, fear control, and compassion as well (Hunt and Phillips, 1991). In "hot" circumstances the military organization is rather frequently dominated by a "can do" mentality and its culture is generally perceived to be virile and competitive. In "hot" conditions the military culture, besides, is often full of "us-and-them" classifications: "them" being the enemy, the criminals, the general public, the media but also the managers in the "cold" organization as well as the politicians. Personnel in the "hot" organization generally are critical toward outsiders. The culture of the military-in-action displays the features of what Jane Jacobs (1992) has called the "guardian moral

TABLE 14.1. Elements of the Flight Deck Code[a]

If it is not written down, you can do it
Look for clouds in every silver lining
Most positions on this deck were bought in blood
Never get into something you can't get out of

[a]Derived from Weick and Roberts (1993).

syndrome": a public organization's way of thinking which wants one to be courageous, obedient, loyal, and traditional, but also to be exclusive, vengeful, and ostentatious. These ingredients of the "guardian moral syndrome" of the military-in-action can be observed in many ways.

Weick and Roberts (1993) have produced an in-depth study on group performance on flight decks of aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. Operating on such a carrier, even under peacetime conditions, may resemble crisis and wartime operations to a large extent. Work is dangerous and can be life threatening and it necessitates quick, immediate responses to changing conditions. Weick and Roberts have made it perfectly clear that in such circumstances there is a strong need for a so-called collective mind. Every individual plays his or her own role, but in doing so each person (in the tower, on the deck, the pilot) has to interrelate heedfully with the others. For instance, a pilot does not land his aircraft, he is "recovered" by the people on board. On a flight deck there are no solitary acts. Hence, solitarily acting "strong" individuals or commanders are not welcome there.

On the flight deck there are common action patterns and shared meanings as well as there is a common language or cultural code. Elements of this code are to be found in Table 14.1. The enemy being at a safe distance, the culture codes stress safety aspects of the work on the deck.

If in such circumstances the collective mind deteriorates and people's actions become less interconnected, there is less comprehension of the implications of unfolding events, slower correction of errors, and more opportunities for small errors to combine and amplify. If heedful interrelating fails, there is a greater chance of small lapses leading to failure or, even, to fatal disasters.

What becomes perfectly clear from this study is that in crises or crisislike situations organizational members need to form a strong, cohesive group with a collective mind—a "mechanical solidarity" so to speak (Winslow, 1998)—which as an organizational form and cultural entity differs greatly from the "cold" uniformed organization. As compared to the latter, the organization-in-action is more organic, flexible, and independent of other organizational units but it knows a high level of interdependency within in its own boundaries. Although there is less emphasis on rules and regulations, rules and conventions are certainly not absent; they have been internalized into the minds of people and are less the product of paperwork. In general, the organization-in-action is characterized by "swift trust," which is a manifestation of bonding among team members. "Swift trust" is more likely to occur when uncertainty is high and the situation is unfamiliar and dangerous (Meyerson et al., 1995).

This bonding may even lead to the development of subcultural patterns with rules and codes which are not considered legitimate or appropriate in the "official" world. These subcultural patterns may pertain to stealing, lying, and the expression of politically incorrect opinions or even the display of unacceptable behavior concerning sex and violence against outsiders. Often these subjects are considered taboo: these are subjects people are forbidden

to discuss (Heffron, 1989). Only if outsiders (e.g., the media) or critical insiders remark on this inappropriate behavior, the taboo may dissolve. Among undercover or special forces units this danger is even more prevalent, since in the "guardian morale syndrome" one is allowed "to deceive for the sake of the task" (Jacobs, 1992, p. 215). In the military, excessive violence is a continuing point of attention, in real war as much as in peace-enforcing missions (e.g., Van Doorn and Hendrix, 1970; Winslow, 1998). If such things occur, the group generally closes the ranks, codes of silence are invoked, and whistle-blowers are ostracized (e.g., Watson, 1997). In these circumstances, groups can generate their own values, beliefs, and ideologies that may have little or nothing to do with the formal military culture. For the "cold" organization the only way to control these manifestations of deviant behavior is to issue more specific rules, such as Rules of Engagement, and disciplinary correction measures.

As mentioned above, not all manifestations of the "hot" uniformed organization occur regularly. For the larger parts of uniformed organizations "hot" conditions occur only incidentally. But even then there may be variations: "hot" conditions may be well known to such an extent that everybody is fully prepared to do his or her task. If parts of the military organization, however, enter battle, crisis, or disaster conditions they have never experienced before, the culture or collective mind of the group is likely to disintegrate. Here fragmentation really proves to be dangerous. As Weick (1993) has shown in his analysis of "smokejumpers" fighting a forest fire, general patterns of action and shared codes of understanding may fall apart if one is confronted with life-threatening events which have always been considered as improbable. In such a case people are likely to stop thinking and panic. They no longer listen to the order of their superiors, mutual ties cease to exist, and fear is set free (Weick, 1993, p. 637). Due to the panic there are more casualties than would have been inevitable in the given situation. Only by means of stressing the importance of improvisation, simulation, wisdom, and respectful ("heedful") interrelating in a unit's way of behaving can these "unnecessary" casualties be prevented (see also Hutchins, 1991). By means of the uniformed organization's culture, personnel should be prepared for the unthinkable. Obviously, this should be done in the stages of socialization, training, and preparation of becoming a military person.

HOW TO BECOME A MILITARY PERSON

The integration of individual employees in an existing organizational culture obviously is a key issue when dealing with cultural management. In Figure 14.2 four general ways are represented. They vary to the extent that the employees are attracted to or, in contrast, distanced from the organizational culture. If individual and organizational values fully overlap, organizational values will be dominant. In this situation the individual employees show a *natural identification* with the existing culture.

This type of cultural integration frequently occurs in organizations with a strong mission, like churches, political parties, business organizations with an outspoken history such as Shell or IBM and, of course, in the military. In military organizations, "endo-recruitment" [recruiting new employees from families where one of the parents or relatives is a military (wo-)man] is a fairly common, although declining, phenomenon. Through this mechanism, new recruits, as children have learned to value the importance of working in the military. This so called "anticipatory socialization," in which children start to identify with specific occupations, applies to all uniformed organizations, including the police and fire departments



FIGURE 14.2. Ways of integrating personnel into the organizational culture (based on Heinen, 1987).

(Heffron, 1989). Through this way of self-selection new recruits easily become the persons the organization wants them to be.

However, natural identification, or anticipatory or presocialization, does not suffice fully and certainly not in all cases. For that reason, new recruits need to be *socialized* in training and educational institutes. One of the arguments for military organizations to have their own academies and training institutes is that the new recruits are interned, which makes them available to the organization on a 24-hour basis. This is the situation of Goffman's (1961) "total institution." Basic military training in such a situation facilitates the transition of persons into new social roles and statuses. A special element in this training is a process which in West Point is called the plebe system and which is known as the "degreening" program in European (military) academies. Shortly after having entered the training institutes, the new recruits go through a process of degradation or "mortification," i.e., a process of deconstruction of their civilian status. Subsequently, having become receptive to new values, the cadet-officers are "rebuilt," i.e., given a new identity. This means that they are exposed intensively to the norms, authority relations, and disciplinary codes of the organization, which are expressed to them by senior cadets.

Although criticized by some and perhaps old fashioned to most observers, this practice is still vivid in most military training institutes. This is understandable because "formal training settings (such as academies) concentrate more upon attitude than act" (Van Maanen, 1975, p. 225; Druckman et al., 1997). The various attempts to do away with this Plebe system in West Point and other academies have failed. Many vestiges of the plebe system have remained as strong as ever before (Druckman et al., 1997). This harsh system survives because its cruelty and humiliation imply a reward: "if full membership were too easily attained it would not be worth having" (Heffron, 1989, p. 217).

These "initiation rites" are scattered all over the military, but are particularly strong in elite units such as special forces, air mobile and airborne units, and the Marine Corps (e.g., Winslow, 1999). The entrance barriers to these units are high, which makes it worth it to suffer and sacrifice oneself in order to prove readiness to participate in the group and hence become a member of these elite troops (Winslow, 1999). The result of these socialization processes is that the recruits display commitment to the new organization. Commitment implies that the socialized persons engage in "consistent" and predictable behavior because they have learned that inconsistent behavior produces too many costs in terms of damage to reputation, penalties, or lack of promotions or other benefits. Commitment relies on generalized cultural expectations, providing penalties for those who violate them (Becker, 1960).

Ricks (1997) has described how the U.S. Marine Corps socializes its new recruits. This process takes 11 weeks, and it contains intensive group formation, harsh training, severe physical exercises, without alcohol, tobacco, TV, video games, let alone drugs or sex (Ricks, 1997, p. 43). The program culminates in a so called "warrior week," when the recruits are put to the most severe tests. These 11 weeks imply losing weight, undergoing constant drills, and a total cutoff from previous life, without friends or relatives. The process aims at a total value system transfusion, as the new recruits must learn the Marine Corps way of walking, talking, and thinking. Included in this process is the rejection of homosexuality (Ricks, 1997, p. 151). Especially important to the performance of military tasks is that new recruits learn to overcome, channel, and above all control their emotions (see also Ben-Ari, 1998, p. 44). At the end of the program "graduation day" opens the doors to get into the "promised land" of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Socialization in training and educational institutes, however, is only the first stage in the total socialization process. When confronted with real circumstances, additional events follow to complete, or as some would say, to redirect the socialization process. Outside the academy or the training institute the new recruits move from idealizations to the practicalities of real life. In this follow-up process the new recruits must learn to adapt to everyday military life and—perhaps most of all—to stay out of trouble (Hockey, 1986). Here, disappointment and various sorts of problems will crop up.

This may be the result of a certain disenchantment originating from the confrontation with the "real thing" (Van Maanen, 1975). The military, especially the members of the elite units such as the Marine Corps, expect their job to be exciting, glamorous, and full of adventure. These expectations are usually not fulfilled; often boredom, anger, anxiety, and dislike are experienced instead of the anticipated excitement, enjoyment, and pleasure (Heffron, 1989; Ricks, 1997, p. 239). Besides, there may be a certain degree of routinization, which inevitably leads to more realistic and henceforth more sober attitudes toward the organization. And third, new recruits of elite units may get frustrated after having finished their training because ordinary military life is not that correct, perfect, and disciplined as was promised during their training program. New recruits from the U.S. Marine Corps were highly disappointed to experience that drinking, lying, cheating, stealing, and whoring around can be seen all the time in the Marine Corps (Ricks, 1997, p. 240). This highly contrasted to what they heard during the first 11 training weeks about the behavior of U.S. Marines. It is no wild guess to think that job motivation and commitment decline swiftly after recruits face real-life situations, as has also been demonstrated in the world of the police (Van Maanen, 1975).

In ordinary military units, the unofficial way of coping with army life implies evading work, never volunteering, not reporting for more work when a job is finished, making it appear that there is more work than there actually is, and sometimes inducing symptoms of illness (Hockey, 1986). Thus, unofficial patters of behavior conflicting with official organizational demands seem to coexist with the official patterns. This obviously is an indicator of fragmentation of the military culture, which may lead to problems on the subject of military performance and the retention of personnel.

For that reason it may be clear that selective and especially calculative identification—the latter two integrating mechanisms mentioned in Figure 14.2—are becoming more important ways of integrating employees in military cultures. These mechanisms of identification have traditionally not been the most self-evident ways of transforming people into military persons. Traditionally, the military have displayed a greater tendency toward natural identification and (learned) institutionalism than employees in other organizations.

But this is changing, as we noted above. Especially now occupationalism tends to grow in the military (see Figure 14.1) and a certain convergence between military and business cultures seems to develop, and this too will be an aspect for people to consider before becoming motivated to join and stay in the armed forces. The military therefore will increasingly have to compete on the labor market on the basis of material conditions (salaries, work hours, and promotion opportunities). Obviously, this change will have a strong impact on military cultures.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In summary, one can say that military cultures traditionally are fairly ideosyncratic, with an emphasis on institutionalism and parochialism (which is a form of insulation) and on rules, hierarchy and disciplinary control. However, various developments point at the emergence of a more contemporary civilian or businesslike culture in the military. This new culture will most probably consist of a general tendency toward occupationalism and team-based, self-steering practices relying on general, "enabling" frameworks of rules and operating procedures. Obviously, there are national culture-related variations on this axis, and not every branch or unit within the military—not even within one nation—will be the same in this respect. Differentiation pervades the military; that is for sure. In these macro developments the Janusian character of the military plays a role as well. In the current era of "New Wars" it looks like the organization-in-action—the "hot" organization—becomes more dominant in the design and command philosophies of military organizations, at least compared to earlier Cold War times when the "cold" military organization provided the model for organizing activities (Vogelaar and Kramer, 1997). These general developments will induce changes in the military organizations' cultures which merit further research.

First, with respect to the Janusian character of the military there is and will be a certain amount of tension between the two faces of respectively the "cold" and the "hot" organization or—if one wishes—between the hierarchy and the team in the organization. The military will have to prepare their personnel for both sides of the working environment. More specifically, they have to prepare them to get along with (sudden) temperature shifts from "cold" to "hot" and then back to "cold" again. It remains to be seen how successful the military will be in dealing with this. To mention just one particular issue: which people will be promoted to top positions: those who have best performed in the "hot" or those who have best performed in the "cold" organization?

Second, if more new recruits enter the uniformed organization with no prior developed identification with the organization and if more recruits enter the organization without aiming to stay for a lifelong career, occupationalism undoubtedly will grow. This is an obvious and overriding tendency. The question, however, is how this will affect the uniformed organizations' performance and readiness. Will military performance worsen or, on the contrary, will it improve? One hypothesis could be that employees with a more occupational attitude (i.e., people who are more independent of the organization and hence more "internally controlled") will enter the organization. Those are people who attribute the results of their work to their own ability and efforts and not to matters outside their own sphere of influence: the system, the procedures, the mandate, bad luck, or mere coincidence (Rotter et al., 1962). A further hypothesis would be that "internally controlled" personnel will do a better job, since they have no excuses like waiting for orders from above, hiding within the group, blaming

rules and regulations, and so on. There is some evidence that cultures in which "internally controlled" people have more room perform better in terms of the prevention of military aircraft accidents (Soeters and Boer, 2000). A further question would be how the traditional core of the uniformed culture will react to this development: will a conservative backlash emerge among core personnel within the military or will they gradually accept the changes?

Third, military culture traditionally is male dominated; it is a masculine, warriorlike culture (Dunivin, 1994; Ricks, 1997). There are at least two developments that may impact on this phenomenon. The performance of military organizations is increasingly becoming less oriented toward violence at a close distance and aggressive behavior. This is true even after the war in Afghanistan. The military tends to become more and more involved with humanitarian action, civil military collaboration, and distant violence based on "smart" technology. The traditional aggressive, warriorlike culture will gradually have to be balanced with these new developments in task requirements. Furthermore, new categories of personnel will enter the world of the military. Women and cultural minorities will enter the uniformed organization as much as they have in all other organizations. The management of demographic diversities (Cox, 1993) will therefore become a priority on the agenda of uniformed organizations. Especially, since the very entrance of women and ethnic minorities may influence the way the military perceives and performs its work, as some research during the Somalia operations in 1993 has indicated (Moskos and Miller, 1995).

Fourth, it has been shown that national variation exists between the military. Italian armed forces bear specific national characteristics that make them unique and distinguishable from for instance the German or British military. In times of increasing internationalization those national forces have to work together in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations as well as in humanitarian actions. Commanders of such international operations should be aware of the intercultural variation that exists within their (temporary) organization. It remains to be seen how these international organizations will succeed in overcoming these intercultural difficulties.

Finally, the behavior of military organizations toward their stakeholders requires attention. Mintzberg (1996) showed that government organizations have to deal with at least four types of stakeholders among the general public: subjects, citizens, clients, and customers. Traditionally, the military are used to emphasizing the subject-role of the public. But increased attention for human rights stresses the need to be aware of citizenship aspects (van Rheenen, 1997), whereas an orientation toward clients (taxpayers!) is increasingly valued as well, at least in the Western countries. Finally, a point of attention regards the way the military deal with another important stakeholder: their superiors, the politicians. As known, this relation is always somewhat precarious. But especially in emerging democratic countries, as for instance in some parts of the former communist realm and in African countries, this relation may be put under strain.

Due to all these shifts in emphasis it is only logical that the military, in Western as well as in non-Western countries, are in a situation of permanent reorganization and are searching for new directions. In these processes the military will have to introduce new ways of structuring work activities, of giving birth to new working methods and instruments, of developing new HRM policies, of preparing for new forms of leadership, and of creating a greater transparency (media!) and awareness of accountability and quality.

This permanent search for new directions may be at odds with the structural and cultural inertia that characterizes organizations in general and public organizations in particular (Hannah and Freeman, 1984). Public and uniformed organizations value stability (Heffron, 1989), and for good reasons: in times of trouble the general public must be able

to rely on these organizations. Not surprisingly, the well-known "liability of reorganization" poses serious threats to military organizations. There are various recent examples that show that the military-in-action were not able to cope with a situation in a way the general public would expect them to. One simply has to cite names like Somalia and Srebenica in this respect (Klep and Winslow, 2000). Consequently, the military have to balance their attempts to introduce new ways of working and hence new cultures with the necessity of preserving the traditional basics. Changing military cultures, therefore, requires patience and wisdom.

CHAPTER 15

Military Officer Education

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

FOREWORD

The officer corps has always been a vital component of armed forces: it is their leadership, it possesses and imparts professional expertise, it determines the military mind set, and it upholds and revises the military ethic. Its importance is witnessed by the host of studies that have examined it from a sociological standpoint[1] as well as those of other disciplines. Naturally, even though it has sought a degree of social separateness in certain historical periods, or been so driven, the officer corps also interacts with all the other social actors present on the national stage and, in part, also on the international one. Sociology thus undertakes the study of officership according to the same schemes it applies in investigating any group or social aggregate: It studies the process of newcomer socialization and its internal dynamics, the individual's relations with the group, and the relations of the officer corps with other social groups and with society as a whole.

In this chapter we look at the socialization process of those who enter the corps, by which term we mean the process by which an individual learns and absorbs the complex of rules, values, behaviors, and cultural models that a given social group has laid down for its members. For what regards a profession[2], this process is normally considered to be divided

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[1] See, for example, in the chapter "Some Historical Outlines" the descriptions of the thought of Comte, de Tocqueville, Weber, Mosca, Huntington, Janowitz, and Wright Mills.

[2] That the officer's job is a profession is supported by numerous studies. See in this regard Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Prandstraller (1985). Basically, as we have written before (Caforio, 1998a, pp. 7–8):

> The very concept of profession sanctions the status of an activity by establishing the following characteristics of the activity: a. existence of sound theoretical knowledge (the "doctrine"); b. existence of an ethic (values and norms) regulating individual behaviour to role expectations; c. existence of a sense of belonging, an "esprit de corps", peculiar to professional group members who recognise one another as bearers of competences and attitudes typical of that peer group.

into two phases: primary socialization (for the profession, anticipatory) and secondary or professional socialization (Merton, Reader, and Kendal, 1957). Primary socialization means the process the individual undergoes to become a member of society at large (family, school, sports, and friends); it is considered anticipatory when it predisposes the subject to adhere to the set of values proper to the profession that one is concerned with. Secondary (or, in our case, professional) socialization is the socialization to which the individual is subjected when he wishes to enter a narrower, more specialized social group: in our case a profession. It generally takes place in educational institutions (universities and academies) and is often completed through a practical training period in the chosen professional milieu.

In examining the officer's profession, we see that anticipatory socialization takes on particular value in the selection process for admission to the military academies. This selection, usually made on large numbers of applicants, has the specific aim of choosing the individuals best suited to the next process—professional socialization—not only from the intellectual standpoint but especially for adherence to certain social values, character traits, role commitment, and an aptitude for identifying with a highly particular professional reference group. From this point of view it differs substantially from the selection procedures normally adopted by the other professions. For the military, those who enter the academy become part of the institution itself, they immediately become members; their expulsion is therefore in some way a pathological event.[3] The first part of this chapter is devoted to the methods and modes of this selection.

The officer's professional socialization instead occurs during an actual educational process: it takes place in special training institutes which until very recently (the last decade of the 20th century) were strongly separated from the national education systems in the various countries but are substantially now in a process of drawing closer to them. These training institutes, mostly called "military academies," basically have two objectives: one is to endow the individual with the necessary expertise to function in the profession, the other is to transform the anticipatory socialization into a true and complete professional socialization. Professional socialization tends more to strengthen and better define values acquired in anticipatory socialization that are consonant with the military institution than to inculcate them in the individual *ex novo* (Hammill, 1995). For this purpose, special procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, such as community life, discipline, emphasized hierarchical authority, rules for public and private behavior, and a system of sanctions. The educational offerings of the military academies, as well as the general characteristics of their internal life, are dealt with in the first part of this chapter as well.

But what is the effect of this secondary socialization on the individual? How and to what extent does it achieve results that are functional to the officer profession? The answers to these questions are of great interest to sociological investigation because they are the fruit of field research and provide concrete and often new data on those who participate in the officer socialization process. The second part of the chapter is devoted to these aspects.

[3]One concrete datum in this regard can be seen in the differing selection rates during the educational process. Following admission to the academy and possibly a short training period, cadets leave their studies in much lower numbers than their generational peers enrolled in universities. In Italy, for example, fewer than 10% of cadets abandon their studies or are expelled from the military academies, whereas some 70% of 1st-year university students fail to graduate (data up to 1999).

SELECTION AND EDUCATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER

Selection

The selection procedure generally[4] used for young men and women who aspire to become officers in the armed forces is that of a public competition based on educational qualifications and test performance. The educational qualification is normally a secondary school diploma and the examinations are composed of a battery of cultural, aptitude, and physical tests. The requested educational qualification is the one normally required to gain access to a country's university system since the officer training program, whether it leads to a degree or not, is always a college-level program. As mentioned above, the testing can be divided into actual examinations aimed at ascertaining a homogeneous cultural preparation and a given level of knowledge among young people coming from different schools and regions within a country and selection tests aimed at ascertaining the applicant's suitability in terms of character and physical aptitude for the officer profession.

This second part, which has no parallel in the selection made for the other professions or for access to other university-level programs, is particularly important for evaluating applicants' anticipatory socialization[5]. It includes a medical checkup; physical screening tests; aptitude selection tests; and, frequently, an interview. The medical examination and the physical selection are obviously aimed at assessing whether the young person has the psychophysical characteristics needed to cope in a profession that, more than many others, subjects the individual to intense, prolonged physical and psychological stresses. The aptitude tests evaluate character and personality, while the interview is aimed at assessing the compatibility of the applicant's motivations, values, and convictions with the value set proper to the military.

In various countries[6], the verification of satisfactory anticipatory socialization continues through an initial period (generally a few months) of actual military life, either a training period at the military educational institutions or a period of actual military service

[4] The reference here is to the so-called developed countries: Europe, North America, Australia, South Africa, and similar. However, it must be said that most of the so-called Third World countries have borrowed the officer education structures and procedures of the developed countries. In particular, the specific data that will be cited here from time to time refer to a survey conducted by my research group on the following countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

[5] But this verification also takes place through other mechanisms, which differ from country to country according to culture and tradition. By way of example I can cite analysis of the value concepts expressed by the applicant in the general culture questions which are almost always part of the examinations; the privileged access to the academies for graduates of military prep schools; facilitations for the offspring of military families; and an assessment, in some countries, of the applicant's personal and family background. In the United States, admission to the entrance examination for West Point requires an individual nomination by a member of Congress or another important public figure.

[6] Of the countries examined in the research cited in footnote 4, this occurs in Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. In reality, however, the first months of service are a trial period at other academies as well. At West Point, for example, during the summer military training, extensive demands are made on new cadets as a test of their emotional stability, perseverance, and ability to organize and perform under stress.

Table 15.1. Selection of Applicants of the 176th Course (1994) for the Italian Army Academy

	Places 303	
	Discharged	**Remaining**
Applicants		6307
Rejected applications	242 (most for being more than 22 years old)	
Present at preselection		4593
Failed	2412	
Present at physical selection		2181
Failed	252	
Present at medical selection		1683
Failed	398	
Present at psychological selection		1272
Failed	251	
Present at written exam		923
Failed	267	
Present at oral exam		510
Failed	184	
Suitable registered applicants		326
Admitted to probationary period		320
Discharged	26	
Enrolled		**294**

Note: Between selection tests, the total number of applicants also decreases due to some applicants dropping out.

in the rank and file of a military unit[7]. But since sociology is a very concrete science and we have instead so far talked at a very general, theoretical level, it seems appropriate to give a few examples of how this selection procedure is carried out for a cadet program and how selective it is. The example given in Table 15.1 refers to Italy and is taken from my previously published research (Caforio, 2000b, p. 106).

Going back to the general discussion, all the selection tests mentioned above produce scores that, added up and considered in various manners for each country, result in an overall score for each applicant. The scores are used to rank the applicants, from the highest to the lowest, and applicants are admitted on this basis until the established number of places are filled. A quantitative understanding of how the selection process works can be gleaned from the example given below for two other countries, Greece and Portugal. As can be easily calculated, the average figure here is between 12 and 13 applicants per opening (Table 15.2).

In many countries the aptitude selection tests are carried out at specialized centers—for example, the Applicant Testing Centre for Commissioned Service in Cologne, Germany—and include a series of tests such as [the following example is taken from Sweden: (see A. Weibull in Caforio, 2000b, pp. 189–190)]: (1) ability tests: the Bongard test-pattern

[7] As occurs in Germany, for example, and also in the United Kingdom, where the officer education process is completely different from the other countries. University culture is not included in the officer's professional education in a strict sense because around 80% of the officer candidates already have their degrees and for the remaining ones, support and time is provided for attending university courses separately from the specific military training. The training provided by the military academies, in particular that of the army (Sandhurst), is short (around 1 year), intense, and strictly military.

TABLE 15.2. Rate of Selection for Military Academies in Greece and Portugal

Country	Year	1996	1997	1998
Greece	Applicants	6796	7135	6709
	Admitted	261	272	277
Portugal	Applicants	1083	700	1314
	Admitted	85	83	65

Source: The European Officer (Caforio, 2000b, pp. 92 and 166).

recognition, spatial reasoning, and number series; (2) personality tests: cognitive style (examples of scales used are sensation orientation, intuitive decision making, concrete thinking, working group empathy, ethnocentrism, and impulsiveness); and (3) interview: psychologists interview each applicant for 90 min and rate them on the following variables: social ability, professional motivation, stability, intellectual ability, energy, and maturity. In other cases the interview by the psychologist is replaced by or supplemented with an interview conducted by the military members of the competition board. As a Polish colleague reports (see Jarmoszko in Caforio, 2000b, p. 142), "The talk allows the board to get additional (besides the documentation provided and examination and test results) information on the applicant's motivations, interests, life plans, etc. It evaluates: service as a means (logical thinking, ability to present arguments rationally, language sufficiency), understanding of the officer's social and professional role, self-control, and general bearing."

In the United States, for example, the applicants are evaluated and rated in the following areas:

DEGREE:	TOP	SECOND	MIDDLE	FOURTH	BOTTOM	NOT OBSERVED
	1	2	3	4	5	N/O

__a. Motivation and seriousness of purpose
__b. Responsibility and dependability
__c. Moral and ethical values—integrity and honesty
__d. Industry and application—thoroughness and perseverance
__e. Cooperation—teamwork, spirit of service, interest in others
__f. Emotional stability and self-control
__g. Common sense judgement—ability to think practically
__h. Bearing and appearance—carriage, smartness, poise, neatness
__i. Physical condition—agility, smoothness of action
__j. Personal magnetism—ability to get along with others—influence on peers
__k. Ability to speak and write clearly
__l. Ability to command respect of peers
__m. Maturity
__n. Demonstrated leadership potential to new situations

These brief national examples can, I feel, give an idea of the importance and thoroughness of this process of ascertaining an appropriate anticipatory socialization, a process which, as said, has no parallel in the admissions processes for other professions or university programs.

Education

Generally we can say that the education programs of the military academies are a mix of strictly military subjects and others more specific to university studies. The former usually include strategy, tactics, logistics, weapons and firing, military history, leadership,

communication systems, NBC defence, combat training, and military exercises. These days the university subjects are largely those studied in political science programs[8]. They generally include international relations, political economy, contemporary history, computer science, sociology, geography, public law, governmental accounting, and foreign languages.

One important exception to this orientation are the education programs followed by American officers, where, also for army cadets, the core education is chiefly constituted by mathematics and engineering, although a sizeable number of disciplines taken from the social sciences have been added in recent years (Franke, 2001). The philosophy behind this different approach is that "because the Army works with both people and machines and because it serves in the United States and abroad, it needs officers whose education has provided a solid foundation in both the arts and the sciences" (United States Military Academy online prospectus, 2001).

In the year 2000, however, the nature of the education programs still displays strong national characteristics in the European countries as well. These characteristics allow us to distinguish the two main orientations existing today: one that privileges a typical military education, with less space for general university culture, and a second orientation that tends to bring officer education closer to the national university systems, including the awarding of a true university degree with value on the civilian market at the end of the program. In this second orientation the civilian university-type subjects (as said, generally political science courses) have prevalence over the more strictly military ones, the advanced study of which is often postponed to later educational stages (such as the various war colleges).

The motivations of the countries that have opted for this second choice are, generally, the following: giving the officer a type of basic education that better integrates him or her into the context of the surrounding society and facilitates his or her collaboration with officials and agents of other institutional sectors; providing him or her with cultural knowledge that makes him or her better prepared for operating in nontraditional military missions, such as MOOTW[9]; giving the officer better opportunities for a second career in the event that he or she leaves the military[10]; and enhancing the prestige and attractiveness of the profession by giving the officer a more widely recognized degree in the national environment.

But to get to concrete situations, let us see how we can sum up the positions of the countries on which we have data available. For this purpose I use data from some

[8] The reference here is to the normal courses that regard most of the future officers. When one examines the officer courses of particular technical services, the set of university subjects obviously changes and, according to the case, takes a direction in engineering, computer science, electronics, and so on. An example of the percentage distribution of cadets by major is supplied by Lindy Heinecken (Franke, 2001, p. 571) for the South African academy, "With roughly 55 percent of students enrolled in the human sciences, 12 percent in the natural sciences and 25 percent in management programs."

[9] "Military Operations Other Than War" (acronym MOOTW) include peace keeping, peace enforcing, peacemaking, internal territorial control, control of mass immigration, the fight against illegal arms and drug trafficking, intervention in public disasters, and so on. In short, all operations carried out by military units that are not actual war operations.

[10] The problem of the early departure of officers arose especially in the 1990s, when the generalized downsizing of national militaries following the end of the Cold War made it necessary to streamline the officer corps as well. This problem is still (2001) particularly acute for the Eastern European countries, which had oversized armies. To give a concrete idea of the problem, I report what a Bulgarian researcher wrote about his country (S. E. Nikolov, in Caforio, 2000b, p. 15), where officers' lack of a valid educational qualification in the civilian sector "left most of them unable to find appropriate job in the civilian labour market. For example, many colonels and even generals were forced to work as door-keepers, janitors, wardens, etc., in order to add something to their low pensions."

TABLE 15.3. Officers' Basic Education in 2000[a]

Position	Divergent	In between	Convergent
COUNTRY	Bg, Pl, Gr, UK, P, R, Hu	S, US, F, I, Cz, N	SA, CH, G
		14	10

[a]The American military academies were not examined in the research I referred to (Caforio, 2000b). The United States was therefore inserted in the table a posteriori by applying to the six parameters used to define the level of convergence/divergence the same scoring criteria used for the academies of the countries included in the research.

Abbreviations:

Bg = Bulgaria;	Cz = Czech Republic;	F = France;	G = Germany;
Gr = Greece;	Hu = Hungary;	I = Italy;	N = Netherlands;
Pl = Poland;	P = Portugal;	R = Russia;	SA = South Africa;
S = Sweden;	CH = Switzerland;	UK = United Kingdom;	US = United States.

cross-national researches that have already been conducted[11], which will also give the reader greater insight into the methods and tools that the sociology of the military brings to bear in cross-national research.

To evaluate the positions of the various countries' officer training schools in relation to the national education systems, we used the well-known *divergent/convergent* dichotomous model[12], but where the divergence of the education process refers not to the parent society in general but to its sector devoted to advanced professional studies, i.e., the university. The question posed by the application of such a model is therefore "How close is a country's basic education system for officers to that for the other professions?"

On the basis of the experience gained in the research cited in footnote 12, and for the sake of simplicity, we reduced the four original positions of the cited dichotomous model to the following three: *divergent*, *in between*, and *convergent* (in respect to the civilian education system). The criteria for belonging to one position or another were determined by analyzing six significant, comparable aspects of the educational process. These are the selection procedures, the teaching staff (mostly officers or civilian professors), the curriculum (military/civilian subjects), separation or contemporaneousness of military training and academic studies, civilian value of the diploma, and type of socialization inside military academies. This analysis made it possible to construct the scale shown in Table 5.3.

As can be seen from this scale, there is still a sizeable group of countries where the educational process is clearly typically military (albeit with different nuances from country to country, nuances rendered graphically here by different positions along the scale); others that are located in an intermediate, transitional position; and others that seem to have reached a more university-like type of system. I am not using the expression "transitional position" by chance: the reports of colleagues from the countries located in this position agree in stressing that these situations are not definitive. The impression of finding ourselves faced with a sort of "caravan" moving toward positions closer to the individual national education systems is given by a comparison (for the countries for which it was possible to make one) with the positions that, in the same application model, the officer education systems in these countries occupied in the preceding decade. These positions, represented graphically in Table 15.4 below, clearly show the type of movement from one position to another that

[11] Published in the already cited *The European Officer* (Caforio, 2000b) and in *The Flexible Officer* (Caforio, 2001).

[12] For a theoretical presentation of the convergent/divergent model, see G. Caforio and M. Nuciari (1994b).

Table 15.4. Officers' Basic Education in the 1980s

Position	Divergent	In between	Convergent
COUNTRY	Bg, Pl, Cz, Gr, UK, P, I, S	F, N, CH	G
		14	10

Abbreviations:
Bg = Bulgaria; Cz = Czech Republic; F = France; G = Germany;
Gr = Greece; I = Italy; Pl = Poland; P = Portugal;
S = Sweden; CH = Switzerland; UK = United Kingdom.

took place during the decade: It is sufficient for this purpose to make a comparison between the two tables.

One particular aspect of the education system that has significant influence on the secondary socialization process (which we talk about in the next section) is the internal environment of the military academies. Traditionally and on principle it is quite different from the environment in which cadets' generational peers in other professional categories pursue their studies, that is, civilian universities. Therefore, even though the convergence process mentioned above tends to reduce this diversity, it is good to have a general idea of this environment.

As is widely known, cadets normally live a shared, collegial-type life in the institutes where they pursue both their academic studies and, usually, their military training. Their status is military and from the start of the education process they are subject to the rules and customs of military discipline, and are often part of actual military units.[13] The theoretical definition of this type of environment has been given on a more general level—and not only for military institutes—by Ervin Goffman in a study that had considerable echo among social scientists (Goffman, 1961; see also the chapter of this volume "Some Historical Notes"), and certainly the military academies, to different degrees from one country to the next, reflect some features of what Goffman called the "total institution." To give, as always, a concrete idea of what this means, I report below what a Dutch sociologist writes on the internal environment of the military academy of his country (R. Molker, in Caforio, 2000b, p. 123): the academy's motto "Honi soit qui mal y pense," he reports,

> is characteristic of the military education/socialisation system as 'total institution'. In principle, a total institution is 'inner directed' and does not easily accept criticism. According to Goffman, other characteristics of total institutions are:
>
> —rational orientation towards a goal, or in other words: the total institution is a rational means to an end that otherwise would be realised with difficulty (or not at all);
> —the presence of (physical and psychological) barriers between the 'inmates' (the residents) of the institution and the world outside;
> —work and private life are integrated;
> —all things, activities, et cetera are scheduled;
> —inmates and staff are segregated;
> —life under one authority.
>
> All these characteristics apply to the military education/socialisation system at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy.

[13] For example, for West Point, the online admissions prospectus for 2001 (http://www.usma.army.mil/admissions/prosp_military.asp) reads: "The Corps of Cadets is organized as a brigade under the command of a Commandant of Cadets. The commandant is a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. There is both an officer and a cadet "chain of command," providing many opportunities to practice and develop personal leadership skills."

What Volker Franke writes referring to the American situation (Franke, 2000, p. 177) goes in the same direction:

> Military socialization exemplifies the identification process. Basic training, for instance, typically disconnects recruits from past social network and established identities and develops new identities. Although recruits begin basic training as complete strangers, the isolation from civilian society, an almost complete lack of privacy, and shared socialization experiences create a strong normative group bond among new soldiers. By depriving recruits of any alternative sources of meaning, basic training almost invariably induces individuals to adopt the "soldier" frame of reference.

As said above, the situation differs from country to country, and the convergence between military studies and university studies also involves the internal environment of the military academies. The reader will recall that the six parameters that we considered to define the positions of the different countries' military educational institutions along the divergent/convergent continuum included the type of socialization inside military academies, which depends precisely on the internal environment. There is a clash here between what are considered two opposing requirements of officer education: the substantial freedom of academic studies and the necessity for a particular professional socialization for officers (Lovell, 1979; Priest, 1998; Franke, 2001). The current problem of the military leadership of the different countries—and also a subject of study of the sociology of the military—is how to strike the best balance between these two needs.

PROFESSIONAL SOCIALIZATION IN MILITARY ACADEMIES

The professional socialization of officers mainly takes place in military academies, even if, as for other professions, it also continues during their careers. Obviously, for a suitable anticipatory socialization to a military career to be fruitful, an adequate professional socialization must be grafted onto it. And it is precisely a graft in a botanical sense, where the stock is the primary formation of personality and character and the scion is the complex of values, mentality, and knowledge that make up the professional socialization. If stock and scion are healthy and compatible, the tree will bear good fruit during its maturity.

From these premises the necessity of varied and numerous studies on the socialization in military academies is evident. Among other things, the different case studies make it possible to assess not only the efficacy of the professional socialization produced by the individual academy, but also to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of the initial selection of the applicants, a selection, as already said, chiefly aimed at determining how suitable their anticipatory socialization is. In addition, according to some authors,[14] today's military academies are fully successful only in the officer socialization process; from the standpoint of professional studies the results are less satisfactory. Here I refer mainly to a general cross-national study on socialization in European military academies and to some sectoral studies (which I cite as they arise) on the comparable individual aspects of the American academies or other situations in the developed countries. As stated above, these situations are the most significant ones and also those for which there are valid studies and researches to take as reference.

[14] According to R. Molker (cited study, p. 135), in the Dutch military academy "motivation to study is low and academic objectives are not met; the military objectives are probably only partly met; it seems that the objective of group development is met. During their time as cadets, officers create an 'old boys' network that is of great use during the career."

Methodologies of Empirical Research

The above-cited study was carried out by my research group on the professional socialization process of cadets in the academies of 10 different European countries (see Caforio, 1998a). Before discussing the results, however, some basic information should be provided on how the study was conducted; this information will also constitute a useful example or paradigm for readers wishing to undertake a cross-national research of some type on themes of the sociology of the military.

The survey on the training institutes for European officers was aimed at assessing both cadets' values and attitudes and the changes produced by the education period as well as on the cadets' professional conceptions. At the same time we wanted to see what was shared by the cadets of the different countries and what was peculiar to those belonging to one specific country. Despite the fact that these kinds of studies should require a diachronic procedure—to analyze the same cohort of cadets over time—the findings of our research study regarded different samples taken from different contemporary classes present in the academies. However, we assumed that this type of analysis could give us results that would not be too distant from a cohort analysis. This assumption stemmed from the fact that at the Italian Army Academy we had done both transversal and longitudinal surveys on this subject. In comparing the results we found that the data and trends of the two surveys were very similar.

Ten countries participated in the research: the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. A structured questionnaire of 37 questions was submitted to 2850 cadets of the countries listed above. The questionnaire had been previously tested on a sample of Italian Army cadets. National samples were selected by class year and were stratified proportionally according to the chosen curriculum. Sample extraction was performed using the random function of the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet program.[15] The processing of the research data was then carried out within a theoretical framework previously discussed and agreed on among the researchers. Sociological literature on the military has a number of interpretive models, some of which were considered in the research. Two dichotomic models, the bureaucratic/professional and the professional/occupational, were judged to be particularly well suited. These models had been constructed and already used to analyze the officer profession (Larson, 1974; Feld, 1977; Prandstraller, 1985; Nuciari, 1985; Segal, 1986; Caforio, 1988; Caforio and Nuciari, 1994b).

As known, the officer's profession takes place in the framework of a complex organization; it is thus characterized by both professional and bureaucratic aspects. This observation led to the construction by various authors (see above) of an interpretive model—the bureaucratic/professional model—that takes account of this bipolarization and is a suitable tool for identifying the position that a single officer (but also, if one wishes, a national officer corps) occupies along the continuum between the bureaucratic pole and the professional pole.[16]

The professional/occupational dichotomy originates from American sociological literature,[17] which considers two different and somewhat opposing attitudes on the part of the

[15] For the whole sample the standard error of the mean ranges from 0.09 to 0.89. Standard error indicates how greatly the mean score of the sample is likely to differ from the mean score of the investigated population.

[16] For a complete description of the model see Caforio and Nuciari (1994b, pp. 33–56). For the application of the "Burpro" variable to the research in question, see Caforio (1998a, p. 14). On the same page see the application of the "Profes" variable relative to the professional/occupational dichotomy.

[17] Larson (1974), Feld (1977), Segal (1986), Moskos (1988).

officer: the first, the professional one, emphasizes professional values and the traditional features of the military profession; the second, termed occupational, is more centerd on market values and tends to consider the military profession *just like another job* (Moskos, 1988). An empirical research on European officers carried out by our working group in 1992–93 (Caforio and Nuciari, 1994b) led us to define a typology more pertinent to the results of the empirical research, a typology constituted by the following four positions: *radical professional, pragmatic professional, indifferent*, and *occupational*. This modified professional/occupational model was later used in processing the results of the research on professional socialization in European military academies.

Motivations of Professional Choice

Having completed our methodological premise, we can now summarise[18] the salient data that emerged from the study.

First, features common to the different countries definitely exist that allow us to sketch a kind of ideal type of the European military cadet, as it emerges from the survey. The cadet in the studied European countries comes prevalently from the middle class, with more lower-class origins in the ex-communist countries and a more upper-class recruitment for the remaining countries. However, there appears to be a gradual converging trend for these situations: recruitment in the ex-communist countries is becoming more elitist, while in Western Europe it increasingly draws on the lower class. Another common trend is the decline in endo-recruitment in recent years, a phenomenon that might contribute to greater convergence (in the Janowitzian sense; Janowitz, 1960) of military professionals with the parent society.

Researches conducted on U.S. Army cadets (Hammill, 1995) show that also for the United States the social origin of cadets is predominantly middle class, with a strong component of endo-recruitment. Hammill and Segal write (*op. cit.*, p. 104): "The Corps of Cadets overrepresents students from military families, relative to most educational institutions, and underrepresents women" and, further on (*op. cit.*, p. 105): "West Point cadets are drawn largely from America's middle class. In 1988, almost two thirds of the entering class of male cadets reported annual family incomes of $40,000 or more, and the fathers of more than 60 percent of the cadets had college or graduate degrees." Albeit in a certain homogeneity of the prevalent social origin, some differences nevertheless emerge in comparing the two surveys: the West Point cadets constitute a population that has attained a high standard of academic achievement in secondary school, while the average student admitted to the European military academies does not seem to have achieved the same level of excellence.

The motivations that drive European youths to take up the officer profession are still mostly reasons of the traditional type, such as *interest in the military, wanted to play my part in serving my nation*, and *looking for adventure*, but here, too, with a difference between cadets in the ex-communist countries and cadets in the other countries. The former display higher percentages than the latter with respect to motivations defined here as *posttraditional*, such as *opportunities for education and further training, wanting to be independent, wanting to act as a teacher*, and *interested in technology and engineering*.

Before going into the data analysis in greater detail it must be pointed out that the reasons for choosing the military profession normally stem from a particular anticipatory

[18] Anyone wishing to read the entire research report will find it in Caforio (1998).

socialization. This is especially true today, when the values which modern society tends to emphasize—individualism, creativity, self-actualisation, personal independence—often appear to diverge from, and at times to clash with, values like solidarity, cooperation, altruism, tradition, and discipline, which are proper to the military institution. Thus, to evaluate the impact that professional socialization has on cadets during their time at the academy, it seems particularly important to determine the prevalent initial motivations for their choice, that is, the extent to which they have been influenced by anticipatory socialization. Considering the survey sample in its entirety, these reasons can be ranked as follows: *interest in the military, serving one's nation, looking for adventure, interest in sports and physical activities, opportunities for education and further training, interest in leading men, because of military ethics, working in a disciplined organization, wanting to go to sea/to fly/to parachute, wanting to be independent,* and *wanting to act as a teacher.* These 11 motivations of choice of the total 19 allowed cover 71.3% of the responses; the remaining ones are not listed because they all have very modest percentage shares, also considering the "don't knows" and omitted responses.

It is interesting to note, first of all, how the order of preference of the reasons for the cadets' professional choice is very similar to the one expressed by already commissioned officers in a European cross-national survey carried out by the same working group in the period 1991–1992 (Caforio, 1994a). This seems to indicate that the effect that anticipatory socialization has on the motivations underlying this choice retains its efficacy over time and throughout the subsequent period of professional socialization.

Next, it should be pointed out that a subdivision according to the interpretive models adopted here show that, in the bureaucratic/professional dichotomy, cadets with a bureaucratic orientation register a lower percentage of adherence to the more "traditional" reasons of choice than the "professional" cadets. In the occupational/professional dichotomy, those who fall into the "occupational" position display higher percentages of agreement with motivations like the desire for economic independence, an interest in getting a good education, job security (also in relation to unemployment situations), the salary: An X-ray of a subject with an occupational attitude could not produce a better fit. For the "professional" cadets the prevalent reasons of choice are *wanted to play my part in serving my country, I was interested in leading men, I was looking for adventure,* and *because of military ethics.* In substance, the application of the two interpretative models shows, on the one hand, their intrinsic coherence, but on the other it seems to warn those in authority that the motivations of choice are later influential in determining the professional typology that is selected and produced: Prevalently "bureaucratic" and/or "occupational" motivations will produce an officer who is less bound to the military tradition and more inclined to consider the military a profession like any other. This can have, for example, considerable importance for the advertising approach adopted in officer recruitment campaigns.

An interesting non-European comparison can be made with Australian cadets on the basis of a motivational research conducted in 1992 and published in 1995 (McAllister, 1995). Although the motivational choice items are not identical, they are similar enough to compare the data from this study with the European ones. Using the same item names as for the European research, we can say that the Australian cadets' reasons for their professional choice are, in order: *opportunities for education and further training, interest in the military, looking for adventure, serving one's nation, to get a steady job and pay,* and *career opportunities.* As can be seen in comparing the two surveys, there is a hard core of motivations that seem to constitute the main reasons for choice in both samples. These are *interest in the military, looking for adventure, serving one's nation,* and *opportunities for*

education. However, the Australian cadets display a greater occupational interest (*to get a steady job and pay*: a motivation that also exists for the European cadets, but which ranks toward the bottom for percentage of choices).

Some motivations of choice that ranked among the first 11 in the European research (*interest in sports and physical activities*, *working in a disciplined organization*, *wanting to go to sea/to fly/to parachute*, *wanting to be independent*, and *wanting to act as a teacher*) were not included in the Australian questionnaire and therefore cannot be compared. An additional motivation (*career opportunities*) appears in both questionnaires and ranks 6th in the Australian sample and only 14th in the European one. This result, too, can probably be interpreted as indicating a more occupational mentality among the Australian cadets (it is not possible here to apply the professional/occupational model due to the difference in the items proposed); however, more investigation would be needed for confirmation.

An American study, albeit limited to the Air Force Academy (McCloy, 1988), largely confirms the hard core mentioned above (motivations that can be summarized as *interest in the military*, *opportunities for education*, and *looking for adventure*), and adds a prevalent motivation typical of all air force cadets everywhere (*the desire to fly* and *to be pilots*).

Cultural Model and Social Image

The cultural model of the officer that the European cadet has in mind appears to be characterized mainly by the social aspects of the profession: characteristics like leadership, responsibility, and cooperativeness are the ones he chooses most often. The second set of characteristics in terms of preference are classified here as *individual* and include qualities like expertise, education, and self-control. The more traditional military characteristics, such as patriotism, bravery, and discipline, tend to receive less consideration. Despite this common European picture, national differences can be discerned. Adherence to the social aspects of the profession gradually declines as one moves from Northwest Europe to the South and East. This decline is countered by a higher percentage of responses for the individual characteristics in France, Italy, and the Czech Republic, and for the traditional military ones in Poland and Italy. The socializing effect of the military academies—measured according to the concentration of the choices—appears more significant in the academies of the Western European countries (with Swedish cadets at the top) than in those of Eastern Europe.

A study that presents comparable data taken from a research conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (G. Stevens, 1994) provides results not unlike the European ones. Also in this research, the cadet's cultural model proves to be centred mainly on the social aspects of the profession (called "interpersonal values" in the study), immediately followed by the individual ones (called "personal values"); the traditional military aspects are not contemplated by the study. Comparison between freshmen and seniors seems to show growing importance of interpersonal values during the socialization process, particularly with regard to some of them, such as "leadership" and "independence."

On the whole, the European cadet's perception of the social image of his chosen profession is good in all the examined countries, with the partial exception of cadets in the Czech Republic, who show less confidence in public esteem. The national situation is rendered in Table 15.5. Application of the interpretive models to the responses on social image shows that the occupational/professional dichotomy is significant here: the "occupational" cadets are less convinced of the profession's prestige than their "professional" colleagues, an attitude that appears to be consistent with the motivations underlying the choices of this group.

TABLE 15.5. Perceived Social Image of the Military Officer by Country (Data in %)

Score	Czech.	Denm.	France	Italy	Lithuan.	Nether.	Poland	Sweden	Switz.
Positive	5	62	65	50	39	66	60	50	41
Neutral	70	38	34	41	57	33	37	49	56
Negative	25	—	1	6	4	1	3	1	3

Evaluation of Professional Choice

But where the effect of socialization at military academies appears to be most significant is in the comparison between the cadets' expectations from military life and the concrete reality of this life as it is lived in these institutions.

Whatever its weight in determining the behavior and value orientations of young people who choose a career as an officer, anticipatory socialization creates expectations with regard to military life. Such expectations must eventually come to terms with reality, and a first and fundamental moment of this process occurs at the military academy. It thus seems important to evaluate how certain preconceptions fare in comparison with the reality of military life, both upon admission to the academy and in the later years of study. The general situation from this standpoint is that over half the cadets interviewed find life at the academies conforms to their expectations: However, the percentage of cadets who feel disappointed with respect to these expectations is significant, a good 30% of the sample. The evaluation expressed as "it is worse that I expected" is considered here in greater depth since it is the most interesting one for possible initiatives by those in authority, and Table 15.6 is dedicated to these negative assessments. The table shows the percentage data for respondents who judged the reality to be worse than they expected for the single aspects considered. The overall average is presented first, followed by the data recorded for the cadets of each country. The disappointment of European cadets mostly focuses on four aspects of life at the academy, aspects that for this reason are considered "critical" here. From the most critical to the least, they are efficiency of organization, behavior of superiors, impartiality of treatment, and internal dissemination of information. As can be seen from Table 15.6, there are countries where the idea cadets formed of their future life and activity at the military academy appears to match quite closely the perception they have of the reality at the academy and other countries where the gap is significant. Since the size of this gap is undoubtedly an interesting indicator, an overall average was made of the positive assessments, the "neutral" assessments ("it is like I expected"), and the negative assessments for the respondents of each country. This gap appears rather modest in Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and The Netherlands; it then widens for the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Italy, France, and finally Poland, where it reaches truly significant values. Moreover, the data show widespread and increasing disappointment of expectations during the socialization process, chiefly for those aspects where disappointment showed itself to be most marked. The spread is not uniform, however: While it regards all the countries in relation to the example set by superiors, it regards only three (France, Italy, and Lithuania) in relation to the education received. For the problem of equality of treatment, which already appeared significant from general examination of the data, it shows a clear growth trend between 1st- and 2nd-year cadets in five of eight countries (France, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, and Poland): This is tantamount to saying that life at the academies confirms the opinion of the cadets of these countries that their superiors' behavior toward them is not impartial.

TABLE 15.6. Disappointment of Expectations among European Cadets (%)

Aspect	General data	Czech Republic	Denmark	France	Italy	Lithuania	The Netherlands	Poland	Sweden	Switzerland
Impartiality	**45.3**	36.2	11.8	**59.9**	**65.1**	**45.7**	19.7	**67**	13.1	25.9
Efficiency	**54.5**	**56**	**81**	52	46.1	40.2	**68**	**71.9**	42.1	53.1
Values	28.9	**43.3**	14.3	**36.1**	27.7	**36.6**	8.6	**48.7**	6.1	13.8
Sports	22.5	**26.2**	4.8	**25.1**	19.7	16.2	**30.4**	19.8	20	**57.5**
Comradeship	21.3	12.1	4.8	**28**	**32.6**	**30**	12.4	**28.9**	3.2	17.5
Education	27.7	11.4	16.7	**57.2**	18.7	21.5	25.9	22.3	26.2	22.2
Superiors	**47.6**	44	35.7	**58.7**	46.9	44.3	27.1	**68.6**	29.8	38.3
News	**45.1**	44.3	26.2	**55**	**49.1**	30.4	**58**	**50.5**	30.4	**48.1**
Discipline	22.9	**30.2**	**26.2**	22.4	10.1	22.7	**23.9**	**28.1**	**23.8**	**27.2**
Acceptance	23.6	**57.4**	14.3	9.9	**45.6**	**28.9**	**23.9**	**23.8**	9.3	5
Personality	28.5	12.8	7.1	21.7	**29.1**	**43.9**	19.1	**54.4**	11.5	3.7
Qualities	30.7	30	—	**31.9**	**40.5**	**38.2**	21.3	**38.9**	15.8	16.5
Relations	22.6	**26.2**	7.1	20.4	**24.5**	**35.2**	18.3	**37.3**	3.6	13.6
Severity	18.2	10.6	9.8	**30.2**	15.7	**24.4**	**23.5**	**20**	5.2	18.5

Note: The data in bold for the individual countries are those that exceed the averages of the overall sample.

In applying these interpretive models to the dissatisfaction about the aspects in question, one sees first of all that the cadets' judgments are influenced quite clearly by their bureaucratic or professional attitude. The cadet with a professional attitude is quite disappointed in life at the academy: the percentage of "professional" cadets who express a negative judgement is higher than the sample average in 10 aspects of 14, often with quite large differences (10–11%). The cadet with a bureaucratic attitude is in a diametrically opposed position, of course: perhaps precisely because of his or her bureaucratic orientation, he or she displays less "pretentious" cultural models from the start or adapts more easily to less "professional" situations.

In a less distinct way, breakdown according to the professional/occupational model also produces a figure that stands out, by and large, for dissatisfaction expressed with regard to the various aspects in question: This is the cadet with an occupational attitude. Data show that the "occupational" cadet displays greater-than-average dissatisfaction in 9 aspects of 14, even though this time the differences are smaller (maximum 7–8%). Here it can be hypothesized that embracing the officer's career while considering it a job like any other makes it harder for this type of cadet to deal with the sacrifices that military life demands from the start, sacrifices greater than those required by comparable professional socializations in just about all countries. It may be that—as for the "bureaucratic" cadets, although in a quite different way—anticipatory socialization has worked for these cadets in a manner that is not entirely functional to the chosen profession.

The confirmation or disappointment of expectations finds correlation with the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction regarding the choice made. Generally speaking, most European military cadets display satisfaction about the time spent in the academy; however, some dissatisfaction can be observed among the respondents from the Czech Republic, Poland, France, and Lithuania, all ranging between 31 and 32%. Conversely, the percentage of dissatisfieds remains particularly low (below 18%) for Denmark, The Netherlands, and Italy.

Among the factors influencing cadets' evaluation of their time spent at the academy is of course their assessment of the usefulness of their studies for their future professional work. In general, the data show that the cadets judge the adequacy of their curriculum at the academy rather harshly: less than 50% of respondents consider their studies to be highly useful, and over 20% consider them to be of little use.

Last, a few remarks can be made in regard to anticipatory socialization. As we have seen, a presumable lack of anticipatory socialization causes significant departures from the average values of satisfaction/dissatisfaction compared to the expectations for some categories of interviewees ("bureaucratic" and "occupational"). One might hypothesize here that a relative lack of anticipatory socialization makes some types of cadet more fragile in coping with the undoubted hardships and sacrifices of military training. Analysis of the group of cadets who seem to display insufficient anticipatory socialization lends support to this hypothesis, at least for those countries where this group is fairly large. Of course, the issue of disappointed expectations—like that of confirmed expectations—cannot be reduced to a purely statistical matter. Local, environmental, and cultural factors, such as the real living and learning conditions at the academies and the social acceptance of officers in the country in question, certainly come into play as well.

The World of Values

The survey also revealed a number of value-related and social aspects that are of undoubted significance for defining the ideal-type of the European cadet. The analysis on the value

orientations of cadets was conducted according to two lines of research. The first was aimed at examining cadets' attitudes—and the change in them during the socialisation process—toward the significant social institutions common to the different countries; the second sought to define their attitudes toward sets of behaviors taken as indicators of corresponding values. The confidence expressed by cadets in the various social institutions was considered by grouping these institutions into the following sectors, which appeared to be significant: (1) public institutions (civil servants, teachers, magistrates, and government) (2) law and order institutions (police and military) (3) ideological institutions (politicians, clergy, and journalists) and (4) work/business (entrepreneurs, banks, and trade unions).

Globally, the cadets' confidence in social institutions appears to be high in all the countries and toward all the institutions, with the partial exception of journalists, politicians, and trade unions, for which lower percentages of confidence are registered. As could be expected, an analysis according to the above groupings shows the highest levels of confidence for law and order institutions. Confidence in public institutions generally appears to be high among the cadets of all the examined countries, although less high in the Eastern European countries. Within the "public institutions" group, the levels of confidence expressed toward national governments are particularly interesting: confidence in government is especially high for Switzerland (73%) and France (72%) and quite low in Eastern Europe, where lack of confidence reaches significant levels (34% in Lithuania, 32% in Poland, and 22% in the Czech Republic). The world of work and business receives rather high levels of confidence. If it ranks below the levels received by public institutions, this is mainly due to the strong and nearly generalized lack of confidence that cadets display for trade unions: 70% among the French respondents, but around 50% for the Italian, Polish, and Swiss respondents. The level of confidence drops considerably when respondents' attitudes toward the "ideological institutions" are examined: a good 40% of the sample shows open distrust toward the institutions of this group. Among them, as mentioned, it is politicians and journalists[19] who inspire the least confidence, but there is also a diversification of positions between East and West: The cadets of the ex-communist countries seem to be particularly critical toward their political class, while the cadets of the Western European academies are especially critical of the press.

A breakdown of the responses to the different items of the four institutional sets according to the two interpretive models generally used in this research yields the following data: cadets with bureaucratic attitudes tend to show lower percentages of confidence in all the groups examined except for work/business, but this is due to only one item, confidence in trade unions, where the "bureaucratic" cadets show a positive gap of 12 percentage points over their "professional" counterparts. In the professional/occupational dichotomy, it is still the "professionals" who show the highest average levels of confidence in the institutions, with a gradient of 20 percentage points for the "law and order" set and 10 for "public institutions." In conclusion, in both models the cadets with professional attitudes show a higher level of professional socialization—probably anticipatory—than the cadets with bureaucratic or occupational attitudes, an expected result if one considers that a high level of confidence in social institutions is one of the aims of military socialisation.

Making, then, a comparison with their generational peers in the universities, we can say in general terms that European cadets have a degree of confidence in social institutions

[19] Diffidence toward the mass media is not proper only to cadets, but appears to be confirmed at all levels of the profession by various researches: for all, see the one conducted on European officers by our working group (Caforio, 1994a).

that can be considered higher than for their civilian counterparts. This is not true of all social institutions, however: The cadets display less confidence in the mass media, the political class, and trade unions, and in so doing fall in line with the dominant behavior of already-commissioned officers (Caforio, 1994a).

Correlated with the analysis on confidence in social institutions is cadets' level of involvement in social contexts, a topic that was examined by a question aimed at determining the degree of involvement of the cadet toward different values of aggregation, from the large (the world) to the small (oneself). Also in this case, the aggregates were united two by two as follows to characterize the four different social contexts: (1) global (the world and Europe), (2) national (country and native city), (3) academy (academy class and platoon), and (4) private (family and yourself). The general datum common to the whole sample is a strong feeling of involvement for the private sphere and little identification with values like Europe and the world, which are evidently perceived as abstract and distant. Nearly equivalent are the levels of involvement toward the national and academy aggregates, which are at median values compared to the global and private ones. Breakdown by country shows that the cadets who feel least involved by the global values are the Lithuanians and the Swedes, while the most involved are the Italians, Swiss, and Poles, where, however, the involvement is mainly for the value of Europe. Applying the general interpretive models, we see that cadets with a bureaucratic attitude are less involved than their "professional" counterparts toward the set of global values, especially Europe. In the professional/occupational dichotomy, the cadet with an occupational attitude appears less involved in everything except the private sphere. Significant within the "national" set is the greater involvement of the "professional" cadet for his country (a gap of 24 percentage points), while the "occupational" cadet appears to be somewhat more tied to his native city.

The professional socialization process displays some effects on the degree of social involvement, but aside from a quite natural and obvious one—a greater feeling of involvement in the academy context with the passing of time—the most significant effect is the opposite of what might have been expected: involvement for the European context decreases along the socialization process. In times of the globalization of armed forces and the increasingly frequent recourse to multinational expeditionary forces, one would have expected that the socialization process acted in the sense of producing a growth in involvement toward global social contexts (Europe and the world).

An American study conducted at the United States Military Academy (USMA) (V. C. Franke, 2000) provides interesting data comparable with the European ones. Franke's research contemplates the following five groups: family, religious, social, military, and national. As can be seen, with the exception of the religious group and, in part, the social group, the others appear to be easily comparable with some groups of the previous European research, as follows: family ⇒ private, military ⇒ academy, national ⇒ national. Also the situation found at the USMA shows that it is the family that is the most important reference group, followed at considerable distance by the military and national contexts. It should be pointed out in this regard that also in the European research it was the family rather than the "yourself" item that attracted the most consensus in the "private" category. For the sake of completeness it should also be said that the second point of reference chosen by the American cadet is religion, unfortunately not comparable with the European data.

The trend of change during the socialization process—comparison between cadets during their 4 years at USMA—is an increase in family and military references and a significant falloff in identification with religious groups. In particular, on the growth trend of this reference, Franke writes:

> Overall, military socialization at West Point appeared to affect cadets' identification with military and national groups differently. While their USMA experience did not enhance the potency of their national identity images, military reference groups became significantly more potent with length of exposure to military socialization. However, identification with the military did not render other reference groups less central to cadets' self-conceptions

(the reference here is chiefly to the family group). The European data also show increasing identification with the military context during the socialization process.

The survey aimed at defining the attitudes of European cadets toward behavior sets indicative of value choices was later taken further by applying analysis tools already used to conduct similar surveys in the military academies of the United States.[20] Cadets were asked to indicate approval or disapproval for a set of 15 behaviors taken as indicators of corresponding values. The level of approval/disapproval was measured through three response choices: "I always agree with it," "I never agree with it," and "I agree or disagree according to the situation." Total agreement and total disagreement were considered to be traits of *absolutism* in that individuals did not consider the possibility of adapting their behavior to the situation. As a first step, an absolutism index was created. In a second step, 12 of the 15 indicators were taken from the "Scott Values Scales" (indicated in parentheses with the original item names in the list below: see Scott, 1965); they therefore provide data comparable with the studies carried out in the United States (see footnote 20). The selected values were put into three groups, as follows: (1) a community-oriented group, including "be loyal," "be honest" (honesty), "be concerned with others" (kindness), and "be able to get along with every kind of people" (social skills); (2) an individual-oriented group, including "be a leader" (status), "be creative," "be self-controlled" (self-control), and "be independent" (independence); and (3) a practical-oriented group, including "study hard" (academic achievement), "enjoy physical activity" (physical development), "learn many things" (intellectualism), and "gain recognition." The data resulting from applying the absolutism index indicate that the level of absolutism is high for the whole sample (always over 75%) and that the most radical cadets in their absolutism are the Swiss, French, and Lithuanians; the Czechs and Danes appear most relativistic.

For what regards the responses pertaining to the three groups as determined above, the national differences are sizeable, appearing more significant than the datum common to the whole sample. Looking at the first set of "community-oriented" values one sees a particularly wide range of agreement according to the country the cadets belong to. The Dutch and French cadets display a very positive attitude with respect to this set of values (over 50% always agree), while the cadets of four countries (Denmark, Switzerland, Poland, and Lithuania) show decidedly low levels of agreement, below 30%; the rest of the respondents are at intermediate values. The set of "individual-oriented" values garners a high percentage of agreement everywhere, always over 50%, with peaks among Lithuanian, French, and Swedish cadets all above 70%. Among the values of this set, the most universally accepted one is *to be a leader*, something that confirms the widespread choice of leadership as one of the characteristics proper to the cultural model of the officer. The level of agreement on the third, "practical-oriented" set of values is also differentiated, where the cadets of only three countries (France, Italy, and Lithuania) *always agree* with percentages higher than 50%. For all the other countries the levels of agreement are much lower, particularly for Sweden and The Netherlands. Aggregating the above data by geopolitical areas, we can say that the most significant division is according to the prevalence of the country's religious faith.

[20]For all, see Priest (1982) and also Priest (1998).

Table 15.7. Value Changes during the Socialization Process*

Scott values scales	First year United States (1992)	First year Europe (1995–1996)	Fourth year United States	Fourth year Europe	Difference United States	Difference Europe
Social skills	0.83	0.59	0.72	0.66	**–.11**	.07
Physical development	0.80	0.70	0.78	0.58	–.02	–.12
Academic achievement	0.84	0.59	0.58	0.44	–.26	–.15
Intellectualism	0.72	0.55	0.71	0.34	–.01	**–.21**
Kindness	0.84	0.40	0.74	0.35	–.10	–.05
Honesty	0.65	0.59	0.57	0.44	–.08	–.15
Status	0.77	0.73	0.61	0.71	**–.16**	–.02
Religiousness	0.61	0.16	0.50	0.08	–.11	–.08
Self-control	0.38	0.81	0.28	0.75	–.10	–.06
Independence	0.26	0.52	0.27	0.63	.01	.11

Note: U.S. data from Priest (1998, p. 90); EU data from Caforio (1998, free elaboration).
*Data in bold indicate the meaningful effects of the socialization process.

In the countries of the Lutheran area, stronger adherence to community values is found, while in those of the Catholic area, especially France, Italy, and Lithuania, the cadets are more drawn to a set of practical duties. On the level of values, it is likely that religion still constitutes a stronger differentiating element than geopolitical position.

The best comparison with the value orientations identified among American cadets can be made with the research that R. Priest and J. Bach conducted in the 1990s on four classes of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (Priest, 1998). Applying the subdivision into sets of behaviors used in the European study reported above to the data collected by these authors, we see that the American cadets display stronger adherence to community-oriented values than their European counterparts, who appear much more individual-oriented. The same Priest research provides an element of cultural explanation for this phenomenon, however, as this research also tested the value choices of a group of students of University of Colorado. From this it appears that identification with community-oriented values is also higher among American university students in percentage terms than among the European cadets. In short, it can be reasonably deduced from this comparison that greater adherence to community values may be a cultural characteristic of American society. However, Priest and Bach's research also lends itself to a comparison of the effects on cadets of the socialization process in military academies on both sides of the Atlantic. Table 15.7 is devoted to this comparison. From this table, beyond the basic differences already pointed out—probably due to cultural factors—a few interesting observations can be made. First of all, for both the European cadets and the American ones, the socialization process acts in the sense of a general decline in adherence to nearly all the examined value sets: the only one that registers an increase—significant for Europe and almost symbolic for the United States—is the desire to be "independent, outspoken, free-thinking, and unhampered by the bonds of tradition or social restraint," to use Priest's and Bach's words (Priest, 1998, p. 84). A second observation is the differing degree of importance that the socialization process takes on in the two continents for some value sets (the related differential numbers are highlighted in bold in the table). What occurs for the inclination to socialize with others (social skills

set) is especially interesting: for the American cadets it is very high when they enter the academy but then drops significantly during their studies, while the opposite is seen for the European cadets. Something similar and in the opposing direction is also seen for leadership qualities, the desire to stand out, and to assert oneself (status set), which records a still more significant drop in adhesions for the U.S. cadets during the socialization process while remaining nearly unvaried for the European ones. A different phenomenon takes place for the desire to learn (intellectualism set), which remains more or less unvaried at West Point but drops sharply in the European academies.

What are the possible explanations for these changes? The general decline in adherence to the different value sets has already been explained by Priest and Bach, who wrote (Priest, 1998, p. 93): "Students progressively develop an ability to reason critically. Characteristic of this increased cognitive capacity is less reliance on authority and dualistic thinking. Thus, one is less likely to indicate 'always' admiring or 'always' disliking any particular behavior." It is thus a decline of that "absolutist" position that we identified in the "absolutism index." Applying this index to the data of the two samples, we find that the absolutism in the choices decreases with the socialization process both in Europe and in America. Still unanswered are the questions regarding the differences in the two samples in the trend of this index for some value sets such as social skills, status, and intellectualism. Further investigation would be needed to explain this phenomenon.

Also connected with the world of values is the cadets' political orientation, which was investigated in Europe through two questions contained in the questionnaire. The general attitude of the cadets in the sample is to stay informed about politics but without the direct involvement declared by minorities of respondents; only among the French cadets is there a high percentage of respondents (47%) who declare themselves to be politically committed. Conversely, very few cadets say they are disgusted by politics, the only exception being Poland, where disgust with politics reaches the significant level of 16%. It bears repeating, however, that the great majority of the cadets (over 60% in nearly all of the countries) declare that they keep themselves abreast of the political events of their country without letting themselves become directly involved. The political orientation of the cadets was investigated along very general lines by questioning them as to their position on a scale ranging from the far left to the far right. From this standpoint the cadets seem on average to place themselves in conservative positions in accordance with the constant predictions of the literature in this regard (for all: Huntington, 1957). An analogous position is seen in the studies on American cadets, where a progressive growth of political conservatism during the military socialization process is observed (G. Stevens, 1994, p. 475; Franke, 2001, p. 587).

Last, leisure and free time were investigated as well. To describe how the cadets spend their time free from studies, work, social life, and family obligations, we analyzed their leisure preferences, their sociability, and their modes of self-realization and self-expression, as well as their characteristics as a social group. The analysis of leisure activity also made it possible to evaluate other dimensions of cadets' daily life. The interpretive framework used here was divided into four sets of leisure activity: (1) culture consumption set (classic concert, playing instruments, museum, theatre, listening to music, and reading); (2) sport-oriented set (sport and sports events), (3) social life set (dancing, pop concert and strolling with friends), and (4) private life set (visiting family, girlfriend, and stay alone). The distribution of the preferences of the whole sample shows a clear prevalence of the private life set, which with 69% of responses clearly outdistances the culture consumption set (37%), the sport-oriented set (29%), and the social life set (26%).

So, how does the European cadet spend his time when he is free from the activities of the academy? A good part of it is spent on activities of a private nature (family, girlfriend, time dedicated to himself); the rest is divided in a fairly balanced way between cultural, sporting, and social activities. How does the process of military socialization in the academies act on preferences? Breaking down the data by class year, withdrawal into the private sphere appears evident during the academy years, as does, although to a lesser extent, an average increase in cultural interests (if we draw the regression line it displays an increasing trend for this set as well). Cultural activities appear to be favoured by cadets with more modest sociocultural backgrounds, while the trend of the preferences seems to oscillate for the other two groups of activity. This link with private life had already emerged in the survey in relation to the principal groups of reference.

CONCLUSION

It may be useful at this point to sketch the ideal-type of the cadet as it emerges from the empirical researches cited above in order to give the reader a broad general idea of the situation. It should be said at the outset, however, that this operation entails ample approximations which do not always take significant regional and national differences into account.

With this premise, we can say that the ideal-type of the military cadet in the developed countries displays a few significant common characteristics, a kind of solid core that can be considered typical of the officer profession. First, it is found that the middle class dominates as the prevalent class of origin of the cadets, with obvious national differences. These differences regard both the percentage of this prevalence, which differs from country to country, and the notion of middle class itself. For example, the middle class identified by the American researchers, with its minimum income of $40,000 a year, is certainly not the middle class of many European countries examined in our researches. A second common characteristic is that a career as officer is often a tool for upward social mobility for the young person; naturally, this tool is more significant in the more rigid societies, where other means of social mobility still appear limited. The cadet often comes from a military family: endo-recruitment appears significant in all the countries examined, obviously with different percentages of incidence and also with different social origins: in some European countries, the percentage of noncommissioned officers' sons is greater than that of officers' sons. In these cases, endo-recruitment acts as a means of social mobility as well. A common set of motivations characterize the typical cadet's choice of profession. They are (1) interest in the military, understood as a generic, generalized inclination toward the military world, its values, traditions, and way of life (this interest often takes shape as a specific interest within the military world: the desire to fly, take to the sea, be a parachutist, a member of the mountain troops, etc.); (2) a desire for adventure, an active life, to put oneself to the test; (3) the wish to serve one's country, to put oneself at the service of the community in the particular sector of defence; and (4) the opportunities for university-level education and training at low or no cost.

On the continuum between the two poles of the well-known professional/occupational dichotomy (for all, see Caforio, 1994), the cadets of the examined countries place themselves mostly in intermediate positions (here called pragmatic professional), with some greater professional radicalisation for the cadets of a few European countries (France and Italy, for example) and the United States. Defining the individual cadet's motivations for his career

choice according to this dichotomy also reveals a significant impact on the type of officer later produced by the academies: depending on the motivations that underlie the professional choice, we shall have, on one hand, an officer who considers his work almost like a calling and on the other an officer who considers it a job like any other.

The young person who embraces the military profession has generally received an anticipatory socialization that has prepared and predisposed him for this choice, so it is interesting to evaluate to what extent cadets feel that the expectations generated by this socialization are borne out by daily life at the academy. The typical cadet is divided here: while nearly two-thirds of the interviewees declare that their expectations are confirmed, one of three affirms the opposite. This is a sizeable percentage and deserves careful examination. In the countries where this examination has been made, the areas of disappointed expectations appear to be mainly the following: efficiency of the organization, behavior of superiors, impartiality of treatment, and internal dissemination of information. The professional socialization process during their studies causes the percentage of disappointed cadets to increase, particularly in regard to these four aspects of academy life. The cultural model that the typical cadet identifies with is chiefly characterized by interpersonal values such as leadership, responsibility, and cooperativeness; however, values of an individual nature, such as expertise, education, and self-control, are important as well.

This very widespread adherence to the sets of community and individual values together shows how cadets everywhere recognize and support a model of the officer who is first and foremost a leader, patient, controlled, creative in thought, and independent in judgment. Breakdown by social origin seems to show that adherence to this model is more widespread among cadets from military families and seems to indicate that a traditional nucleus of defining characteristics and values proper to the military profession exists and is perpetuated. The social identification of the typical cadet is chiefly toward his family, which appears to be the most significant reference group right from the start of the professional socialization process and increases during that process. Secondarily the cadet appears to identify with his country and the military institution, but while the socialization process does not seem to increase the national identification, the tendency to see the military as a reference group significantly increases during the cadet's stay at the academy.

The cadet's world of values appears to be less homogeneous than other characteristics of the ideal-type sketched here, when one compares the data relative to European and American cadets. Indeed, by applying the same investigation tool (Scott Values Scales: Scott, 1965), one sees that the U.S. cadet displays greater adherence than the European cadet to community values like loyalty, honesty, caring about others, empathy, and so on. The European cadet appears to be more individualistic and more interested in being leaders, creative, independent. The professional socialization process acts in the same way on the world of values for cadets on either continent, however: For both the American and European cadets, it produces a decline in absolutist value choices in favor of relativistic ones, that is, correlated to a situation, an environment, a circumstance. Whatever the chosen value (to be honest, to be a leader, etc.), for cadets in their final year at the academy the choice is much more likely to be "according to the situation," that is, in relation to the concrete circumstances in which it must be made.

Another characteristic of the ideal-type is the more politically conservative nature of the military world with respect to civil society, confirmed for the cadets of all the countries examined. It is also significant that this characteristic appears to be only partly dependent on the cadets' social origins. But also the more or less professional typology that can be applied

to each cadet according to the interpretive models used here provides indications on the assimilating value of the profession: It is the "professional" cadets, not the "occupational" ones, who tend to be most conservative.

For the countries for which it is possible (Caforio, 1994), comparison with the political positions of commissioned officers shows that the 4th-year cadets (generally the last year) display political attitudes that are quite close to those of serving officers. This complex of data underscores the unifying value of professional military socialization.

CHAPTER 16

Women in the Military

Sociological Arguments for Integration

MARINA NUCIARI

PREMISE

The role of women in the military has a long history. Leaving aside the long and never-ending discussion about the question in the past, we can conveniently approach the topic by means of scientific tools, offered by empirical sociological research. Research on the subject is so far rather abundant, and it is feasible here to organize the discussion about the long road toward integration of women within armed forces in a certain number of themes, articulated under the form of answers to specific questions:

1. What are the reasons pushing armed forces to open their doors to women?
2. In which ways do women enter and remain in the military professional career?
3. Which gender specific problems do women find in the military organisation?
4. Which problems does women's presence pose to the functioning of military organisation?
5. Which orientations do women show toward military profession and military organisation as well?
6. And, to conclude, which limits must be overcome yet by women within armed forces, and which opportunities are coming for them from the very nature of Peace Support and Humanitarian Missions?

Sociologists are normally bound to consider factual data and to avoid forecasting: I shall try here to give an answer to each of the above questions by means of the many empirical researches on women situation in the military in those countries where such a situation does exist and it has also a certain historical depth.

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WHAT ARE THE PUSHING REASONS INDUCING ARMED FORCES TO OPEN THEIR DOORS TO WOMEN?

Different ideas have been expressed on this subject, according to which there are particular time periods where military institution (traditionally considered as a true all-male society), on the one side, and society, on the other side, consider women's possibility to join the armed forces with favor. Under a historical point of view these periods are frequent and rather obviously coincident with war times, when a society is directly involved in its own defence: to remain confined to the contemporary period, World War One and World War Two are occasions where at least one definite role is assigned to women in military activities, that is, that of nurses. The process through which the practice, before, and the profession, then, of nursing has been created is actually linked to the needs for assistance and caring of wounded soldiers in field hospitals, and it is already well known. What it is important to be reminded here is the fact that this is the first role to be institutionalized and internalized by Western military institutions to be played specifically by women. There is in fact a difference with respect to other activities, mainly bureaucratic services, assigned also to women as part of the civilian personnel working in the administrative sectors of defence departments. The role of military nurse is considered as a true female activity within military activities, not directly involved in the battlefield but often severely touched by combat risk.

Thus, a first opinion, aiming to explain the quest for female participation to military operations at various extents, relies on the fact that this participation becomes a necessity when a society is in war, particularly in the case of total wars like the two world conflicts, when civilian population is inevitably involved and modern military institution manifests its greater structural complexity: the practical reason is a question of optimization of scarce resources for combat. Women are then a substitutive human resource for all those support and service tasks which, being not directly linked to combat functions, "can be performed also by women," thus saving men for combat.

Sharing an idea with Bengt Abrahamsson (Abrahamsson, 1972), modern military organization could be considered as a good replication of civilian society in the sense that division of labor, roles, and functions coming from the ongoing differentiation and specialization of modern society are replicated within armed forces aside and around their core function (combat). Only reproductive function is not replicated within armed forces: Abrahamsson says that military organizations tend to produce inside all what is needed for their functioning, with the only exception of human beings which are "produced" outside by civil society.

Taking this comparison for granted and considering that military institution is an all-male society, we could say then that such a replication means also that many roles are assigned to males even though the same roles in the society are traditionally played by women. And this it happens also for those roles that modern society begins to assign also, and to a certain extent mainly, to women: from the traditional service and care roles within the family to the occupational roles linked to public and bureaucratic service, such as nurses, teachers, clerks, and office assistants; the process continues with the enlargement of occupational skills at professional and technical levels, where formal education and specific expertise become the formal requisite without any sort of gender ascription.

Generally speaking, as far as women in modern society arrive at playing more and more public roles under an achieved perspective, military institutions continue for a long time to

assign their roles under an ascribed perspective, that is according to (male) gender. Only emergency situations (such as, but not only, a war), while making male manpower a scarce resource, call for a rationalization that progressively leads to an enlargement to female personnel of military noncombat roles; such possibility begins with activities considered to be more adequate to female "nature," and it goes on with those roles which in the civil society are step by step occupied also, and sometimes mainly, by women. Since modern society considers combat role as an exception rather than "a job like another," and since combat is considered by definition a typically male activity, it appears to a certain extent "natural" and unquestionable that soldier roles remain the last to be assigned under an ascriptive orientation (denied to women because they are women and imposed to men because they are men).

But scarcity and emergency are not the only causes able to move military organizations to accept ever-growing gender integration. Nor are simply the changes within role assignment in modern societies. An attempt to define a more systematic theory bound to explain the ongoing and widespread change in female roles related to military activities has been undertaken by various sociologists dealing both with the military and gender studies. The aim of a theory as such should be to predict, and not only to explain, the trend moving armed forces to integrate women for a large variety of countries, where the process of integration is highly different in the various national military organizations.

The best attempt of this kind is given by Mady Wechsler Segal (1995) in an essay where a general theory of factors affecting women's participation in the military is proposed. According to Mady Segal, the main factors affecting women's role change in the armed forces can be grouped into three sets of variables, each of them defining a specific dimension: a military dimension, a sociostructural dimension, and a cultural dimension (see Figure 16.1).



FIGURE 16.1. Theory of factors affecting women's' military participation. Figure from M. W. Segal (1995, p. 759).

Military variables are considered in a wide sense and include the national security situation, type and level of military technology, the combat to support function ratio, the structure of forces, and the policies driving accession to the military. *Social structure variables* include country's demographic pattern, characteristics of the labor force (women's participation to the labor force and occupational gender segregation), the state of civilian economy (expansion or depression), and the structure of the family (average age of marriage and maternity and role responsibilities sharing). *Cultural variables* include the social construction of the notions of gender and family, social values underlining the above definitions, public discourse about gender and gender equality, and values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity.

From the combination of these variables' modalities a number of assertions is derived according to which women's participation in the armed forces changes: as far as the military variables are concerned, the level of *perceived military threat* has a curvilinear effect in that:

> At the high end of threat to the society, women's military roles seem to increase (...) In societies with low threats to national security, but with cultural values supporting gender equality, women's military participation also increases (...) the extent of women's participation in combat jobs will be minimised when there is a medium threat... defined as the situation in which the society is not threatened with imminent extinction or invasion by superior military forces, but there is a moderate to high probability of military action on its soil in the near future ... The greater the relative importance of actual warfighting (especially ground combat), the less the participation of women. (M. Segal, 1995, pp. 761–762)

This last assertion seems to be of particular importance in current times, since the increased presence of military operations other than war is likely to increase women's participation in the armed forces.

As far as *military technology* is concerned, "Some technological developments have led to the substitution of brainpower for brawn in the warrior role" (M. Segal, 1995, p. 762). These changes, the related specialization of military roles with increased emphasis on technical skill, and their assimilation to civilian occupations all have a positive impact on the possibility of women to fit with military roles.

Another factor is given by the *relative relevance of combat roles over support roles*; as Segal says, "Women's involvement in military operations is negatively affected by the proportion of combat jobs" (M. Segal, 1995, p. 764). Because of the rise of support jobs over time, this has given women more possibilities to have a job in the military. This goes also together with the variable concerning the *force structure*, since a force relying more on reserves for support tasks gives rise to an increased number of women in the reserve.

And finally, *military accession policies* have an impact as far as armed forces are becoming more and more an all-volunteer force (AVF): "... Women's military participation tends to increase under voluntary accession systems" (M. Segal, p. 765).

Considering now the set of variables defining the social structure dimension, *demographic patterns* affect women's participation ratio as far as "the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labour" (M. Segal, 1995, p. 766), and this becomes dramatically true for volunteer forces. Furthermore, *characteristics of the labor force* in the sense of relative gender segregation impacts over women's participation in that a gender segregated labor structure is associated with limited roles for women in the military, while the contrary happens when the occupational structure of the labor market is more gender integrated. Economic factors affect women's participation in the sense that a *high unemployment rate*

increases the availability of men for armed forces and it prevents access to women; *family structure* and its role burden for women can also prevent them from military jobs, but when this burden is shared or postponed in the future, then women's representation in the armed forces tends to increase.

At an attentive analysis of Segal's discussion, the *cultural dimension* appears to be crucial, since it appears always at the background and beside every change in the other two dimensions. The *social construction of gender*, both feminine and masculine, is culturally determined and it changes within the same culture according to time and according to different cultures. As Segal says, "Cultures can stress gender equality or differences between the genders, which has strong effects on women's military roles. The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender (and thereby the less the emphasis on individual differences), the more limited women's military role" (M. Segal, 1995, p. 768).

The change in cultural values about women's social roles is linked also to changes in the *definition of family roles*, so that the movement away from traditional conceptions of family and family duties, and the growing supportive policies outside the family, permit a greater participation of women to military activities.

It has to be underlined furthermore, in my opinion, that changes in values defining gender and family structures have an explicative value independently from the type of force in a given society, be it an AVF or a conscription based military and also from the economic situation which can enlarge or reduce male labor force availability. An all-volunteer force is more vulnerable to demographic restrictions, and more dependent on the labor market contingencies: it is not by chance that the percentage of women in military roles reaches its highest figures in volunteer type militaries (United States, 14%; Canada, 11%; United Kingdom, 7%). But since even demographic restrictions can be influenced by changes in the conception of genders and consequential opening of labor market to women, this last set of cultural variables seems to have a major causation capacity.

To this respect, it is my opinion that value change—including also the prevailing of universalistic and achieving orientations as well as of equity-based reasoning as far as citizenship rights and duties entitlement according to gender are concerned—provides a better explanation to the widening of gender integration in the armed forces (that is, the progressive accessibility for women to every military role, direct support to combat and true combat roles included), than to the opening to women of military role per se. For this last event, a different cause seems to me otherwise to have a more general value: this cause also is linked to social change in Western societies since 1945, but it impacts specifically over military organizations.

I am speaking here of the well-known process of civilianization, defined and described by Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960) in the early 1960s, which has become a common salient trait in every contemporary Western (and not only Western) armed forces. With civilianization, many technical roles are assimilated to roles in big civilian corporations, there is an increase of highly bureaucratic roles and of scientific-technological and managerial content roles as well; the organizational structure becomes similar to that of a civilian administration, and the professional practice, expected to remain essentially peaceful, removes the perception of activities in the military as intrinsically combat activities. It is a process as such, to my opinion, that reduces progressively military role impermeability with respect to women: Women, in fact, are already accepted in parallel roles within civilian society. The process of civilianization goes along with women's emancipation and progressive integration in every occupation and profession within Western societies, and it makes possible the opening to

women of professional roles in the armed forces even in the absence of national emergencies or demographic shortages.

A confirmation of these assertions can be found in the fact that usually the highest proportion of female personnel is found in the air forces, just where technical roles outnumber combat roles and where gender integration, as a consequence and not considering combat pilot positions, begins earlier and continues faster. It should be added also the fact in the air forces, because of the same reasons of technological specialization, voluntary recruitment is already present in substantial numbers without touching the obligation only for male to serve under a compulsory system.

To conclude this point, we can affirm that the entry of women in Western and Western-like armed forces is a consequence of the process of civilianization on the one side and of the parallel and progressive change in value sets defining gender ascriptive characteristics; this last process leads to women integration in jobs and in the society at large. Furthermore, women's entry in the armed forces widens with the decline of the draft system and the prevailing tendency to rely on voluntary-based armed forces.

IN WHICH WAYS DO WOMEN ENTER AND REMAIN IN THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL CAREER?

A first answer to this question is very sharp: women enter in the armed forces on a voluntary basis. We can make use here of data reflecting the situation of servicewomen in NATO countries, what it could be considered, and actually it is, a nonuniversalistic situation. But to use data coming from the Office for Women in the NATO Forces in Brussels means to deal with a good comparative information for a large number of contemporary military organizations. It is true, nevertheless, that information could profit, for this as well as for other points raised in this chapter, from the availability of data concerning also non-Western armed forces.

In every NATO country where women are so far present, they are recruited on a voluntary basis, whatever role and task they are assigned to. Of course, women soldiers' percentages vary from country to country, also because of the different military format (Table 16.1): In all-volunteer forces there are comparatively more women than in conscription-based militaries, and they are allowed to serve in more specialities, when not in every specialities, in AVFs than in those armed forces based on the draft system.

But another factor impacts over women's presence, that is the great variation among NATO countries of the time period since when women's recruitment was allowed. Late comers, such as Italy (where women recruitment has been permitted by law only in the year 2000) see much lower percentages than countries where women soldiers are present since many decades. These two factors together give rise to a very different situation from country to country.

Under a general perspective, and leaving aside the role of military nurse, which is considered the typical military female role and it is everywhere the first way to access armed forces for women, military roles where women are normally employed have two main characteristics:

1. First roles opened to women in the armed forces are in the administrative sectors, where tasks are mainly bureaucratic; then women are allowed to serve in technical

roles in logistic services, and subsequently in combat-support technical roles. If we put all military roles along a continuum from the farthest to the nearest the true combat role in terms of task content and relative risk, we can see that women enter the armed forces from those roles which are more detached from the combat situation, and they approach progressively the combat sector until arriving to the current situation where even this last restriction is totally removed or is going to be removed.

2. For reasons linked also to the nature of the above-mentioned roles, entry at first is allowed for medium and medium-high levels of military hierarchy, that is as officers and non-commissioned officers, and only as a second step female personnel is recruited also as private soldiers.

Both processes are linked to the reasons why military organizations become accessible for women: the most civilianlike roles (that is, the least true military roles) are an offspring of the process of civilianization, and they can be easily filled with women because of the growing availability of women with medium and high educational standards in the civil society. Furthermore, technical and administrative roles have intrinsically a lower combat content, are normally performed in areas not directly touched by real war fighting (even though this situation presents many exceptions and it is not always clearly defined to this respect), and requested expertise are usually achieved and not easily ascribable to gender.

As far as combat roles are concerned, when a more or less direct contact with an enemy against whom to use weapons and the risk of being killed, wounded, or capture are present,

TABLE 16.1. Presence of Women in 18 NATO Countries: Situation in 2000[a]

Country	Number	Over total force (%)
USA	198.452	14.0
Canada	6.558	11.4
France	27.516	8.5
United Kingdom	16.623	8.1
Czech Republic	1.991	3.7
Netherlands	4.170	8.0
Belgium	3.202	7.6
Portugal	2.875	6.6
Luxembourg	47	0.6
Denmark	863	5.0
Hungary	3.017	9.6
Norway	1.152	3.2
Greece	6.155	3.8
Spain	6.462	5.8
Germany[b]	5.263	2.8
Poland	277	0.1
Turkey	917	0.1
Italy	438	0.1

[a] Source of data: Annual Report of the Committee of Women in the NATO FORCES, *NATO Review*, Brussels, summer 2001, p. 34. IISS, *The Military Balance, 2001*, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2001.

[b] In Germany women are serving in medical and band roles only. In January 2001 first 244 women recruited for combat roles.

two further considerations can be pointed out:

1. As far as subordinate levels (soldiers) are concerned, the ultimate reason to keep women away from combat roles are ascriptive gender differences linked to physical strength and aggressiveness, raised in order to explain women inadequacies to attain performance minimum standards; a second reason is the maintaining of unit cohesion among buddies, which would risk to be undermined by the presence of female soldiers in a male bonding system such as "buddyship." Different countries consider both reasons valid or invalid in different periods. Even though women integration in every posts at a legal level has gone further in some armed forces during the past decade, in practice combat roles remain in most cases unattained by women. On the second reasons in particular some research details will be given here at Paragraph 4.
2. As far as officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are concerned (that is, for leading roles at various levels), operative roles and assignments are obviously much desired and much rewarded by the organization: it is a well-known organizational process, then, that the most prestigious roles be retained by an elite, who tries to keep their access limited and controlled in quantity and quality. The resort to ascriptive criteria, and among them especially to gender, is one among many attempts to create and maintain role exclusivity.

As far as career and length of stay in the armed forces are concerned, reality differs greatly in the various countries. Being women soldiers relatively young in their career in the majority of NATO countries for which data are available, it is rather difficult to generalize about their career length and advancement. It seems that female careers in the armed forces are shorter with respect to men, but cross-national researches, which permit evaluation of such a difference not only among different armed forces but also with respect to other occupational sectors, are lacking.

Some information can be drawn, on the one side, from figures of women in higher ranks, in the various NATO countries, and, on the other side, from what has been written by Charles Moskos on this subject for U.S. female officers. For the first datum, the situation varies greatly from country to country since it depends very much on the year from which women's admittance in the armed forces has begun (see Table 16.2), but it is recurrent the underlining of the fact that only in the last years some women in uniform have reached highest rank positions, and this obviously in those countries whose armed forces accepted women since 20 years and more (such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom).

Apart from possible gender discrimination in the promotion and advancement policy, especially as far as highest positions are concerned—what it can be hardly demonstrated with available data—the true turning point for a military woman's career is marriage and childbirth.

This is the case not only because marriage and maternity means in the majority of cases a choice between career's demands and family endeavors, but also because it seems to exist a negative relation between marriage and rank. This has been noticed in particular by Moskos for the American armed forces, when he wrote that "...the more the senior the female, the less likely she is to be married. The opposite pattern prevails for males. Reconciliation of a military career and family life impacts much more on women than it does on men" (Moskos, 1999, p. 25). Looking at compared percentages of married women and men in the U.S. total force, in 1997, the M/F ratio for married people ranged from negative ratios in the lower ranks (that is, more married women than men among privates) to

TABLE 16.2. Women's Admittance in the NATO Countries' Armed Forces and Subsequent Changes: Situation in 2000[a]

Country	Year of legal admittance[b]	Some posts[c]	All posts[d]
United States	1948	1973	1993
Canada	1951	1968	1989
France	1972	1973	1985
United Kingdom	1949	1991	1992
Czech Republic	Early 1980s	idem	1984
The Netherlands	1979	1979	1981
Belgium	1975	1977	1981
Portugal	1992	—	—
Luxembourg	1980	1987	1997
Denmark	1962	1971–1974	1988
Hungary	1996	1996	1996
Norway	1977	—	1985
Greece	1979	1979	—
Spain	1988	1988	1998
Germany	1975	1975	—
Poland	1988	—	—
Turkey	1955	1957	—
Italy	1999	2000	—

[a]Data source: Office on Women in the NATO FORCES, *Women in the Armed Forces. Year-in Review 1999–2000*, (2000).
[b]Date of the law indicated as the one opening officially services to women.
[c]Actual first entry of women in the armed forces with restrictions.
[d]Date of the most recent reduction or elimination of assignment restrictions.

a rapid increase of positive ratios as long as rank increases (that, is, more married men than women for sergeants up to sergeant major, and for all officers' ranks), as Table 16.3 clearly shows.

In another essay, Moskos notes that different attitudes toward professional life are present for women in uniform according to their rank position (Moskos, 1990b): for women commissioned officers, a military career is a lifetime choice as well as for their male colleagues, and this explains the fact that difficulties in career advancement are complained, especially in higher ranks where operative performance (that is, combat role) evaluation is crucial for promotion and selection; for women noncommissioned officers and even more for enlisted women, career is considered as a temporary choice since the beginning, and this reduces the perception of frustration coming from a difficult or even blocked advancement.

TABLE 16.3. Percentage Married by Ranks and Gender, DOD Total, 1997

Grade	Males	Females	M/F difference
O6 and above	96	58	+38
O4–O5	91	66	+25
O1–O3	65	50	+15
E7–E9	89	65	+24
E5–E6	80	62	+18
E4	50	52	–2
E1–E3	20	25	–5

Source: C. C. Moskos (1999).

The higher presence of married men than women among officers and NCOs has been also commented by Moskos introducing a generation criterion. In both American and British armies it seems that the deadly choice between military career and family (many times defined also by referring to the common "greedy" nature of both institutions) be governed by a generation factor: Women senior officers (more aged women) seem more inclined to prefer career to family life, while on the contrary within women junior officers (younger women) the idea seems to prevail about the possible reconciliation of the two careers, finding a specific momentum, in the first employment's decade, when professional career is less demanding and it permits to build up a family, having children, and then coming back to career's requests after a few years.

WHICH GENDER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS DO WOMEN FIND IN THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION?

This topic, together with the following one, is crucial from a realistic point of view, since it has direct implication with daily life; it is in this domain that usually justifications for women's exclusion or impossible total integration within military life can be found.

Problems, real or supposed, that women can meet within the armed forces can be distinguished into two groups: (1) Difficulties of adaptation to an often harsh environment, where living conditions are far from the normal life in an advanced society (living at camps, during training or missions, combat and noncombat, where environmental conditions are highly uncomfortable and various levels of promiscuity are rather obliged); such concerns are emblematically indicated as "feminine hygiene" and "bodily privacy." (2) Difficulties in sustaining and giving efficient performance in combat environment, or simply with severe work rhythms and workload, where conditions are worsened by the fact to be a small gender minority in strict contact with a male majority.

As far as point 1) is concerned, in her anthropological study on "GI Jo," M. C. Devilbiss (1985) affirms that the first order of concerns is rather easily overcome, and normally women do not suffer facilities restrictions more than men do, nor do they show necessarily a higher, gender-related, sensitivity; what it comes to the fore, anyway, it is what Devilbiss called a "gender-consciousness," forced to some extent by the fact to be among a majority of men who "... make you think about it—it is emphasized that you are different (and) you stick it out.... You have to constantly and actively seek to do things so as not to be treated differently" (Devilbiss, 1985, p. 531). Very often the specific question of personal hygiene is more a problem of the individual independently from gender, and it could rather easily be solved at the organizational level by means of choices which keep a gender etherogeneous environment into consideration, as well as the fact that privacy needs are differently felt by different individuals.

As far as point 2) is concerned, in the same research the question is observed of women's ability to cope, both physically and psychologically, with activities performed, during missions or training, in hostile and difficult environments, near combat areas. The case under observation concerned a radar squadron of the U.S. Air National Guard, deployed for training with approximately 200 squadron personnel from the East Coast to the training site on the West Coast. Operations were conducted in isolated conditions and in climatic and orographic environment defined "difficult and hostile." Female personnel counted for 10% (of the 200 individuals), active in various kinds of technical specialities linked to

squadron activities. Also in this case, it did not seem that difficult environmental conditions and heavy round-the-clock work activities would be performed with less efficiency or create more problems when actors are women.

What is important to stress, on the contrary, is the above-mentioned "gender-consciousness," which is perceived by women who do not have such perception in "normal" conditions. This feeling transforms current activities and difficulties to sustain into ever-lasting challenges to a woman's ability to manage with tasks "notwithstanding her gender"; or into reasons for being offered non requested help; or, on the contrary, for being refused an help which could have been normally and spontaneously given to a male colleague.

According to Devilbiss, three factors could explain the fact that problems not related to gender per se could be perceived by women as caused by their being women. Factors are the following:

1. *High women visibility*, physical and social as well, given to the fact that "...in combat situation exercise (as in other similar situations), women—for a variety of reasons—are often a small numerical minority, and, therefore, they are often highly visible" (Devilbiss, 1985, p. 532). Such a visibility, and the consequential perception of one's female identity as a "diversity," is part of a theory elaborated by Rosabeth Kanter in her studies on civilian corporations where men and women work together at various hierarchical levels (Kanter, 1977). According to Kanter, the presence of a minority gender group within a majority is differently perceived on the basis of the group size. Very small groups, few people of a different gender, are paradoxically much more visible than relatively larger minorities, whose ubiquitous presence may be differently considered.
2. The *social impact* of such visibility, that is to say the fact that women in traditionally male environments and performing male tasks are *social exceptions*, who go against common standards and expectations, thus emphasizing rightly their being women.
3. The *social definition* of women in the armed forces, according to which they are normally exempted from direct combat, which means to be exempted from the highest professional risk. This means to make servicewomen a kind of special group, gender-stigmatized as not fully useful for the organization, and for this same reason protected and made different from any other male soldier who can be sent to combat at needs without any other consideration. Such a law-based diversity, far from being understood as aiming at the protection of the weaker part, is going to be considered rather iniquitous: Women can be members of the armed forces and perform traditionally male jobs, but they continue to be safe from most severe risks, to which men are subject notwithstanding their professional task.

WHICH PROBLEMS DOES WOMEN'S PRESENCE POSE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF MILITARY ORGANISATION?

Many of the problematic issues raised by the entry of women in the armed forces have found adequate solution **at a practical level** in the military organizations where gender integration has been adopted with various levels of completeness. These solutions include destination and readjustment of infrastructural facilities (so that privacy could be assured), legal norms extensions from the civilian to the military sector as far as servicewomen as

employed women are concerned (such as maternity leaves and medical facilities according to current civil legislation in each country), social services and children care facilities for military families where the soldier is the mother or both parents, special norms or adaptation to military environment of norms aiming at contrasting and punishing sexual harrassment in its various kind of manifestation, retirement and dismissal policies and the like. To a certain extent, this level of adaptation, while introducing unavoidable change within military organization, has been far less difficult to be adopted, since it was led by general legal norms already at work in civilian sectors.

More difficult has been the adaptation as far as specific military functions and roles are concerned, and **at the normative social level** as well. Formal and unformal social relationships cannot be totally ruled by means of legal norms and interpersonal relationships, being as they are culturally determined and shaped, cannot be changed by law.

Performance evaluation is, among others, a crucial issue under many respects: on the one side, an incorrect use of standards could cause in fact discriminative choices; to avoid this problem, unit segregation or segregated training has sometimes been chosen or different standards for men and women were adopted. With time and experience, gender-free standards for recruits' selection, training, and performance have been adopted in some countries in order to enhance women possibilities to be selected and promoted for ever more kinds of posts.

Under another point of view, performance is also affected by social relationships coming from common training and shared experiences. Being armed forces a place where performance is generally calculated at a collective level, the crucial question is not simply to assure an adequate individual performance, but an adequate group performance, assuming that group performance is not the flat sum of many separated individual performances. Within armed organizations this issue is addressed as "unit cohesion question," and more or less total gender integration has been considered in the light of its consequencies on effective behavior and combat readiness, considered to be strongly affected by the special male solidarity called buddyship, which arises in risky and stressing situations shared by unit members (see, on this subject, Chapter 4).

Unit cohesion and male bonding are recurrent topics in sociopsychological research on combat readiness and behaviors, and a great bulk of empirical research on the military has been and continues to deal with this subject. Factors of cohesion have been repeatedely inquired and tested, so that it should not be surprising that creation and maintenance of that special set of relationships called as buddy relationships, stemming from that solidarity peculiar to an all-male living condition, could be considered at risk as a consequence of the "turbolence effect" of the entry of women, the "unknown other," into the military in-group.

Empirical research on this specific subject, unit cohesion in gender-integrated units, has been repeatedly conducted, in operative and nonoperative units, aiming at reaching a definite and scientifically satisfying answer to the *vexata questio*: do women endanger military unit effectiveness with respect to group cohesive behavior? As it often happens with sociological enquiries on human affairs, a straightforward answer is not available, but some knowledge can anyway be usefully taken from a number of studies conducted on U.S. units since the early 1990s.

In the above-mentioned research by Devilbiss in 1985 the question of unit cohesion has been raised, and her observations of soldiers' behaviors in gender-integrated groups allowed her to affirm that mixed groups can develop the same cohesion level as one-gender groups and provided that such cohesion be positive as far as organizational goals are concerned, mixed groups are able to perform with the same efficiency as do one-gender (usually, all-male) groups.

That special kind of male brotherhood found in military units is linked, in fact, to the special living conditions that in military jobs can be particulary harsh and stressing; it is also sustained by relationships' duration, and it does not seem to be affected by gender: *Buddyship* arises within buddies, and when prerequisites are present, all buddies are *buddies* no matters what gender they belong to. Buddyship is eminently important in combat situations, that is to say in those situations where life is at risk and stress reaches its extreme peak; in situations as such, Charles Moskos, analyzing enlisted soldiers' reactions in the Vietnam war, pointed out how solidarity among buddies looked more as a social contract of mutual help in case of danger than as an affective bonding between two or more people (Moskos, 1971): when individual survival is the main goal, and its attainment is guaranteed by group or buddy solidarity, then gender does not seem to have an appreciable impact over in-group relationships.

But the topic remains of crucial relevance, and social enquiry continues to work on it especially as long as women's participation to military roles more and more approaches the ground combat role. Among the last pieces of research on the theme, an essay published in 1999 by Rosen, Bliese, Wright, and Gifford tries to compare five studies on the subject of group cohesion in gender-integrated American military units in order to gain some definite and noncontradictory results. As authors wrote in their discussion:

> The relationship of gender composition to unit cohesion was addressed in two recent studies conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. The first of these studies (Rosen, Durand, Bliese, Halverson, Rothberg and Harrison, 1996) based on data collected in 1988 found a significant negative correlation between percentages of women in the work group and horizontal cohesion among male junior enlisted soldiers. The finding did not support Kanter's tokenism hypothesis, which posits that the increased presence of women would have positive organisational outcomes for women. However, it supported a competing hypothesis developed by Blalock... which posits that the increased presence of a minority will lead to increased discrimination because of the perceived threat of competition. In the second study conducted in 1995 (Rosen & Martin, 1997), we found no significant relationship between the percentage of women in the work group and unit cohesion. (Rosen, Bliese, Wright, and Gifford 1999, pp. 366–367)

The 7-year time span separating the two studies seems to indicate that some change has occurred in the consideration of women in uniform, so that a certain ability to consider "women as soldiers without a gender tag" could be taken for achieved within military units. However, authors argue that "...in the minds of many, the gender tag is still very prominent," and their purpose is to compare results along these and three other studies on the same subject in order to ascertain the extent to which "these two studies represent real before and after changes, rather than two chance findings that have little potential generalizability." And their conclusion is not so much encouraging, in that

> this meta-analysis on the relationship between gender composition and unit cohesion found that while the negative effects of increased female presence on group cohesion have occurred in a variety of settings, both deployed and non-deployed, the findings are by no means universal or even consistently strong. No specific factor has hitherto been found that could account for all the differences, but some that should be examined in future research include size of the unit, soldiers' support for the mission, level of violence in theater, and the effects of leadership policies regarding the treatment of the genders. (p. 382)

Great variety of possible related factors has been thus the result of this effort to find out a general explanation of the ambiguous effect of gender integration on military unit cohesion. And noncontradictory findings arise from a further study on gender-integrated group cohesion, readiness, and morale conducted by Laura Miller and Margareth Haller for the RAND's National Defense Research Institute and published in 1997. Aim of this

study was "a short-term analytical effort to evaluate the progress of gender integration in the services and the effects of this integration on selected units" (Haller and Miller, 1997, p. 5). The research followed and was consequence of the legislative and policy changes occurred in the 1992–1994 period in the United States, which opened to women more posts in the military so that they became eligible for assignment to all positions for which they are qualified, except their exclusion from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.

Based on a combined quantitative (a sample of 934 individuals surveyed by means of a structured questionnaire) and qualitative (focus groups) methodology, this research has been conducted within five army units, seven navy units and two marine corps units; units included combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units. Among the many interesting results of this survey, a major finding is that "gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion and morale" (Haller and Miller, 1997, p. 99). Researchers affirm to this respect that this does not mean that gender has no impact at all, but that other factors are more influent, such as leadership and training, on cohesion and readiness. A link between cohesion and gender was found in the sense that "gender appeared as an issue only in units with conflicting groups" and "any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion."

Thus it seems plausible to conclude that gender integration alone does not have enough causal strength and that possible conflicting situations can be avoided by adequate leadership. To a certain extent, this topic could be another example of the overrepeated affirmation according to which "If men (and women?) define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

WHICH ORIENTATIONS DO WOMEN SHOW TOWARD MILITARY PROFESSION AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION AS WELL?

We have so far considered only those problems that the military organization has to face once it has opened its doors to women. But what attitudes do women share with regard to this organization? What about their professional orientation, their job satisfaction in a context anyway considered *sui generis* like the military?

In the above-cited study by Devilbiss the subject was posed concerning a gender-specific perception felt by women employed in male-dominated environments or engaged in activities traditionally considered as male jobs. The relevance of the numeric proportion between men and women for the determination of attitudes and behaviors in both genders has been raised.

Based on a theory proposed and developed by Rosabeth Kanter in her famous *Men and Women of the Corporation* (1977), a study conducted by Karen Dunivin (1988) aimed to determine if men and women of the U.S. Air Force (in this case) perceive differently their work environment and if this possible difference could be ascribed to gender or, better, to numerical proportion between genders.

According to Kanter, tokenism is the condition in which women working in a male-dominated environment find themselves when their relative number is very small. In a case as such, they are a token group and experience a negative situation formed by four components: (1) *pressures toward performance* (they must demonstrate to be able to do what they are asked to do), (2) *social isolation* (they have difficulties to be accepted as members of unformal groups mainly formed by men), (3) *role entrapment* (they are always and anyway

considered first as women rather than colleagues or workers), and (4) *boundary heightening* (exaggeration of tokens' differences from dominant members in order to exclude tokens from the dominant group), as it is the case for women in managerial positions who are not accepted as "colleagues" by male managers. Such a situation is considered by Kanter to be dependent on gender ratio in the teamwork, and it can be distinguished into four cases, that is into four group types or work environments (Kanter, 1977, pp. 129–208 and 245–249):

- **Uniform group:** homogeneous group, only one type of person, only one social type. Ratio of 100:0; that is, all-male group or all-female group.
- **Skewed group:** dominant versus token culture. The token group is pushed to adapt to dominant culture. Ratio of 85:15.
- **Tilted group:** majority versus minority culture. Minorities are strong enough to affect majority culture. Ratio of 65:35.
- **Balanced group:** Cultural balance. Ratio of 60:40 or 50:50.

The research conducted by Karen Dunivin aimed at testing the validity of tokenism explanation within the contest of the U.S. Air Force, by means of a large survey on 21631 officers, of which 2711 women officers (sample women proportion, 12.5%, was very near the 11.3% of real women officers serving in the U.S. Air Force at the time of the research in mid-1980s). To the total sample five additional subsamples were added, with different gender ratios and gender-traditional work ratios. The aim was in fact to explore different **work attitudes and perceptions** of female personnel **with regard to career opportunities, power structure** at individual's disposal, and **gender ratio** in work environment. In a few words, since in the Air Force the group's gender ratio is covered in large majority by types 2 and 3 of the above typology, a demonstration is searched of the fact that servicewomen in skewed and tilted groups perceive the negative situation described above in its four components.

In the case under examination, the rather uniform group is formed by combat pilots with 1% women, the skewed group was formed by two real groups (air traffic controllers and personnel officers with 15 and 17% women respectively), and the tilted group type was formed by two other real groups (administrators and nurses, with 30 and 77% women respectively); no balanced group type can be found currently in the armed forces. As far as type of work is concerned, military activities in the enquired groups range from the most nontraditional female role (combat pilot) to air traffic controller, personnel responsible, administration and nursing, with these last two being considered the most traditional female roles in the armed forces as well as in the society.

Dunivin's results are not totally coherent with Kanter's hypothesis about tokenism: even though at a general sample level the perception of less career opportunities and of a weak position in the power structure are perceived more by women in a token environment than by men, other attitudes toward work and organization do appear differently shaped than expected and probably are explained by some other variable. Dunivin argues that the token group situation does not explain *every* work attitude and that the intrinsic nature of the work itself can have an explanatory capacity. Thus the author proposes two causal variables, the combination of which gives rise to four theoretical types of work situation. The two variables are defined as **numeric domination** (group gender ratio, many women/few women in the group) and as **work type** (traditional/nontraditional for women); the four cells in Figure 16.2 are the following: (1) few women and traditional work; (2) few women and nontraditional work; (3) many women and traditional work; (4) many women and nontraditional work, which cannot contain cases since it is intrinsically contradictory

Numeric Domination	Work Type: Traditional	Work Type: Nontraditional
Few Women	**Personnel and Controllers Administration** Less positive attitudes than men for -relative numbers -opportunity structure -power structure 1	**Pilots and Air Traffic** Similar attitudes as men for - relative numbers - opportunity structure - power structure 2
Many Women	3 **Nurses** More positive attitudes than men for - opportunity structure but similar attitude for - power structure - relative numbers	4 **Contradictory cell: many women in nontraditional women jobs** cannot co-exist

FIGURE 16.2. Career typology based on numeric domination and work type (from K. Dunivin, 1988, p. 83).

(if many women would perform nontraditional jobs, these jobs should no longer be nontraditional).

Thus, three cells are consistent with data and theory, and in each of them women officers manifest different attitudes toward work environment and organization.

- In cell 1, officers in administration and personnel management are present, among which women are a minority and perceive themeselves as tokens, with low career opportunities and low power, and performing a traditional job rather underestimated by the military organization.
- In cell 2, combat pilots and air traffic controllers are mainly men, but the nontraditional job performed by the female minority causes a similar satisfaction for the two genders in all the three components; because of the high evaluation given to this job by the organization, women in these posts consider themselves according to their occupational status and not according their gender, thus perceiving even their token situation as rather unimportant.
- In cell 3, where there is a female majority (nurses), servicewomen show more positive attitudes than men as far as career opportunities are concerned, but they feel anyway to have low power and autonomy, even less than their male colleagues. Even in this case full explanation is given by the very nature of the role performed, coherent with female identity under certain respects (nursing is a traditional job for women in the armed forces) and not subject to a token effect, but anyway perceived as a low prestige role within the organization.

As Dunivin stresses:

> Numeric domination influences tokens' attitudes since women feel less attachment in a male-dominated culture where they are viewed as 'outsiders'. As a result, women will be less positive than

> men in their attitudes about their work environment. Work type also influences women's attitudes since women evaluate their career fields to assess their potential for organisational opportunity and power. Each element has associated status: numeric domination typifies women's ascribed (gender) status, while work type exemplifies women's achieved (occupational) status. (Dunivin, 1988, p. 82)

Since the two statuses can have contradictory consequences within the military environment (stressing the gender status prevents from prestigeous professional roles), then it is plausible that women evaluate separately their two statuses, giving a higher importance to the status more rewarded by the military, that is, the occupational status, and downplaying their ascribed gender status: "In short, this model suggests that occupational status predicts military women's attitudes better than does gender status (specified by numeric tokenism)... Again, the interaction of the structures likely occurs: women who perform nontraditional but valued work may perceive more opportunity and power and therefore may not perceive their token status" (Dunivin, 1988).

But the numeric question remains important because it has consequences for a different type of problems, already faced here when speaking about cohesion in integrated units. In the already above-mentioned study by Rosen, Durand, Bliese, Halverson, Rothberg, and Harrison (1996), the number of servicewomen was negatively correlated with cohesion of the integrated unit in the sense that tokenism's negative effects (role entrapment, boundary heightening, and social isolation) affected cohesion, but the possible solution to tokenism was only apparent: increasing the number of women in units had unintended effects of enhancing negative attitudes toward women, since their growing minority was perceived as a threat to the declining majority. Here Blalock's theory on minority group relations is recalled by considering the feeling of increased internal competition perceived by a once strongly majoritarian group when it sees its numerical superiority threatened by the growing minority.

Some distinctions proposed by Janice Yoder (1991) permit to better place the role of tokenism: according to her findings, negative effects of tokenism are perceived only by individuals playing low-prestige roles with respect to the majority and in this case to increase the minority size in these roles should not have "Blalock-like effects." For high and medium-high prestige roles, on the contrary, internal competition between the male majority and the female minority (as it is the case in the armed forces) would generate negative attitudes toward women, conversely related to the growth in numbers of the female minority.

CONCLUSION: WHICH LIMITATIONS REMAIN TO WOMEN'S INTEGRATION WITHIN ARMED FORCES, AND WHICH OPPORTUNITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO WOMEN IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR?

This last point does not intend to analyze in detail limitations posed anyway to a full integration of servicewomen in the military organization, since situations greatly vary from country to country and the integration process is subject to progressive changes. The general trend seems in fact to be that of a progression toward an ever-more enlarged involvement, especially for those countries where women's entry in the military is a rather recent event or a true novelty (as in Italy).

Women's entry in the armed forces goes along the transition from conscripts-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically advanced all-volunteer force. This process goes also along two other dynamic phenomena of high relevance: force downsizing, at least in the armed forces of Western societies; and frequent deployment in nonconventional missions. In the MOOTWs the use of force is reduced, and soldier's orientation is undergoing a change, becoming less centerd on the "warrior" ideal-type and more on a protective disposition which has been called, among many other definitions the "miles protector" model.

Each one of these processes can have specific influences on women's future within the armed forces. The transition to a professional and voluntary military makes the entry easier to women because their exclusion from a public sector employment is no more acceptable and also because of the necessity to heighten and enlarge the recruitment basis (both in quality and in quantity). On the other side, downsizing can have an opposite effect, as noted above by Mady Segal, and reduce posts for women. But the process deserving more attention is the increased frequency of nonconventional deployment. Here the military role of women can receive its appropriate evaluation and prominence.

It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to rediscuss the wide range of analysis provided by social scientists in general about nature, impact, and evaluation of the once-called "new missions" for armed forces, which are now generally addressed as Military Operations Other Than War or Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Definitions as such indicate the many-sided nature of these operations, their intrinsic ambiguity and imperfect predictability. One among the many subjects dealing with PSOs is also the need for specific education and training on the side of military personnel, for officers and NCOs but also for privates.

New educational profiles should be bound to give to the peace soldier a wider orientation than that conventionally described as the "warrior," including attitudes, values, and specific knowledge and expertise so that he/she could be able to act in a large variety of situations, from true war fighting to ever-decreasing violence levels to true peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions. This new soldier, by no means destinated to lose his/her character of one's own society defender (we could say "egoist defender"), should anyway learn to be also the altruistic protector of "others," in many cases formed by weak and oppressed people, mainly civilian populations of women, children, aged people, refugees and the like. This soldier is also asked to be cold and enduring against possible offences coming from the conflictual situation in which he/she has to operate: the use of the organized force, its degree, and also the choice and the extent to which to use it, this is his/her peculiarity, the true "soldier's job."

But the use of force must be legitimated, as it happens in any case for conventional armed forces in conventional warfare. In military operations other than war, legitimacy comes from many sources (Dandeker and Gow, 1997), but one of the most important is the defence of the reasons of the "other," the reasons of the weak, and this has to be done "according to the interest of the weak." It is not only an altruistic help given to someone in difficulty, it is the application, possible or real, of a legitimated violence for "other's" interests and goals.

For this peculiar attitude requested to the peace soldier, the word "*flexibility*," often abused, has been proposed as the new quality of the nonconventional soldier; flexible, then, and not *tough*, should the new soldier be for the military missions of today. This flexibility does not contradict the eventual aggressive attitude and toughness requested in case of true warfare, since it means rightly the soldier's ability to cope with all the spectrum of situations where his/her performance is asked.

In a picture as such, many have expressed opinions such as women soldiers could find an easier adjustment in a field condition where aggressive attitudes do not function or are even disruptive and where on the contrary a large part of the task is made of care and service to people in many different states of deprivation. More adequate cognitive dispositions have been actually found in nonhomogeneous (that is, gender mixed) units in one of the first studies conducted on soldiers deployed in operations other than war, the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and coauthorized by Laura Miller and Charles Moskos (Miller and Moskos, 1997).

In their study, Miller and Moskos found a distinction among U.S. soldiers deployed in Somalia, so that two ascribed conditions, race and gender, seemed to cooperate in the definition of two different and somewhat contrasting orientations toward the situation. These two orientations were able to define two different strategies of adjustment to the continuous ambiguity and precariousness present in the situation. Thus, a *warrior's strategy* and a *humanitarian strategy* have been defined.

The first is adopted by soldiers who define the (Somali) population as anyway "hostile and unfriendly," ununderstandable in its behavior or superficially classified on the basis of cultural stereotypes and ethnocentric principles, and it is typically adopted by soldiers in combat units, exclusively formed by males, and White males in large majority.

The humanitarian strategy is, on the contrary, typical of Black soldiers and of Black as well as White women soldiers; it refuses negative stereotypes about Somali people, showing an empathetic orientation bound to understand the situation, the culture *and the reasons of Somalian people* (italics mine), and it refuses also the resort to force even though it would be a justified reaction to violence and damages committed by the "protected": Miller and Moskos, in their comments of American military performance in Somalia, arrive to say that "American troops exerted far less excessive force during Operation Restore Hope than did other national contingents," and in their opinion all that was to be imputed to the mixed composition of military units by race and by gender, in that servicewomen and Black soldiers were able to act as bad behavior controllers more than other soldiers in one-race and one-gender units.

This empathetic orientation has been explained by means of a better ability of people in condition of minority to consider differences between self and others in a more positive as well as respectful way. Women as minorities and Black (men and women) as minorities in gender- and racially mixed groups were thus able to reduce the resort to the more aggressive and harsh culture of all-male (and White) soldiers' units.

Variety, then, and diversity within military units allows acceptance and adjustments to diversity in situations such as those frequently found in Peace Support Operations. This could be another aspect under which to consider the quest for flexibility needed by peace soldiers, adding one more reason, if necessary, to the many already recalled here above, to promote and reward women's presence in the armed forces.

CHAPTER 17

Diversity in the Armed Forces

DONNA J. WINSLOW, LINDY HEINECKEN AND JOSEPH L. SOETERS

INTRODUCTION

For armed forces, the pace of change since the end of the Cold War in 1989 has been extraordinary. Even though a major world war no longer seems to pose a serious threat to international peace and stability, militaries find themselves operating in more diverse environments than ever before. In the past, military astuteness and a clear picture of the enemy were sufficient. Today members of the military must—in diffuse political constellations—negotiate with belligerents from all sides of a conflict and remain neutral, at the same time remaining able to defend themselves against aggression. They also have to deal with a host of international actors in the theater of operations, including representatives of multilateral organizations, the media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). And they must do this in a foreign cultural environment, in a country devastated by war, far removed from family and friends. Such conditions demand a high level of intercultural competence.

Intercultural competence is also necessary in the daily operating of many military organizations since they are becoming more internally diverse in terms of ethnicity, gender, and religion. This is a result of several factors. One of them is the change from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force.[1] Not only do militaries have to tap into new groups of ethnic minorities and women if they are to solve their recruitment and retention problems, they must also provide a tolerant work environment in order to keep them. Many societies are also more ethnically heterogeneous than 20 years ago, raising issues of equal opportunities for

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[1] Although many militaries (e.g., the United States) moved to an all-volunteer force decades ago this is a new phenomenon in other countries such as Belgium and France, which recently decided to move to an all-volunteer force. Countries such as Austria, Denmark, and Germany still have a national/conscript force.

all employing organizations and the need to ensure that militaries are broadly representative of the societies they are supposed to defend.

This chapter deals with diversity issues in non-U.S. military forces. It is not possible to cover the entire range of military organizations around the world; however, we have attempted to illustrate some of the challenges facing non-American armed forces. We begin with a discussion of internal organizational issues concerning diversity. Our examples are from Canada, Western Europe, and South Africa, where diversity has also become a critical domestic issue. We then go on to discuss the special challenges that peace operations pose for military organizations and conclude with a discussion of various issues concerning the implementation of diversity awareness and training programs.

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ARMED FORCES

As militaries around the world downsize and streamline their operations, several have decided to move from a conscript-based military to full professionalism. This move reinforces the need to meet equal-opportunity objectives. There are several reasons for this. First of all, it can improve access to a wider recruitment pool as the armed services compete with civilian companies for scarce labor both in terms of quantity and quality. In the United Kingdom, for example, one can point to the fact that ethnic minorities, although comprising about 6% of the national population, constitute over 19% of the 16–24 age group in the military recruitment pool (Crawford, 1995). In Canada, almost 80% of people entering the workforce in the year 2000 were from designated minority groups (women, visible minorities, and Aboriginals) yet these groups represent less than 17% of the Canadian Forces (Canadian Department of National Defense, 1999, p. 8). In other countries, for instance, Australia (Silk et al., 2000), similar developments can be observed.

In addition, many Western countries are facing the crisis of an aging population. For example, in Canada, although currently there are twice as many Canadians under 15 as there are over 65, by 2030 the dependent elderly (over 65) will outnumber dependent children. This trend, combined with declining fertility rates, means that immigration is the only way to maintain or increase the population (Verdon, Okros, and Wait, 1999, pp. 11–12). Immigrants may come to outnumber those born in Western countries and might constitute the major source of recruits in the future—a very different picture from the predominantly European origin White forces of today. Demographic changes such as these will put particular pressure on militaries such as the German Armed Forces (Budeswehr) since the constitution makes it difficult to become a German citizen for ethnic immigrants and their offspring. Without formal citizenship, they cannot enter the Budeswehr. This excludes a range of ethnic minorities, particularly people of Turkish descent. If naturalization procedures are changed then a substantial number of minority conscripts could be called up, many of them Muslim. Paul Klein (1999) argues that this kind of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity will require specific policies, actions, and programs to deal with the changes.

Another argument supporting the inclusion of minorities is that the armed services would benefit from the diversity of skills and backgrounds that a broader based entry would produce. While the services have much to gain from recruiting a greater proportion of the ethnic minority communities than they currently do, those communities themselves would also derive some benefit. If the American experience is anything to go by, military service can provide ethnic minority communities with a sense that they are valuable elements of

the social and political system (see Moskos and Butler, 1996). That is to say, people from these backgrounds are and feel included not excluded: They develop skills that enhance their socioeconomic mobility as well as acquire a range of leadership skills that can be transferred back to local communities. Thus, inclusion of minorities in armed services could be seen as part of a process of citizenship building.

With the need for more intelligent and flexible service personnel likely to increase rather than decrease, such diversity is likely to prove an advantage in future years. Moreover, a military freed from racial discrimination and focused instead on diversity, tolerance, and decency would be more operationally effective than one in which racial harassment is permitted.[2] The services could benefit from being seen to live up to the ideal of an equal-opportunities employer in order to sustain their legitimacy and the good will of the general public. In a healthy democracy it is vital that the armed forces do not remain too far apart from the society they are charged to defend. After all, it is society that funds them and bestows on them their legitimacy, and it is society from which they recruit their personnel and to which they return them to continue their working lives as civilians (Dandeker and Winslow, 1999).

Internal diversity is also a result of laws that force change on military organizations. For example, European Union courts have ruled that homosexuals should not be prohibited from participation in the United Kingdom's military. Previously the British Crown together with the Ministry of Defence and Services were exempt from legislation. This is now no longer the case. Similarly, the German Bundeswehr was asked by the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg (Tanja Kreil case C-285/98)[3] to provide access for women to all military posts. Prior to that, German legislation allowed women to be recruited only as volunteers in the medical and military music services (see Klein, 1999, for details). However, the European Court of Justice judged this as contrary to the European Directive of equal treatment for men and women. Germany countered that European Community law does not in principle apply to matters of defence, which remain within the Member States' sphere of sovereignty. The European Court rejected this argument and ruled that European social law applies to the public service that includes military service men and women.[4] If other European countries follow this pattern then more often than not diversity issues will have to be addressed in a legal context. A series of rulings and directives will continue to flow not so much from the national legislatures but from such bodies as the EU Commission and European Court, especially in the field of employment law (Dandeker and Winslow, 1999).

While the enforcement of legislation to permit women and homosexuals are based on equity and fairness issues, legislation can also force militaries to accept minorities to improve the legitimacy of the armed forces. In South Africa, for example, legislation has compelled the previously White-dominated South African Defence Force (SADF) to become more representative of broader society. For many, this is seen as a trade-off between legitimacy

[2]Speech by General (ret.) Colin Powell and subsequent discussion at the "Equal Opportunities Conference," Great Britain, Royal Society of Arts, November 10, 1998.

[3]Tanya Kreil was trained in electronics and applied for service in 1996 in the weapons electronics maintenance service of the Bundeswehr. Her application was rejected on the ground that German law prohibits women from occupying military posts involving the use of arms.

[4]It is interesting to note that over a decade ago the Canadian forces were unable to successfully prove that gender integration was detrimental to operational efficiency and thus in 1989 the Human Rights Tribunal found that the military's exemption from the Canadian Human Rights Act based on the occupational requirement could not be supported by the evidence (Winslow, 1999). Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that Canadian forces' policy, which designated specific units and occupations as male only, was an unjustified discriminatory practice.

and competency. In future, exemptions are only likely to be supported if and when it can be demonstrated that the imposition of law would be incompatible with essential training and operations of the military. In a climate that is less deferential, it is now up to the military to prove that conforming to the changing norms and values of wider society would be likely to damage operational efficiency rather than the burden of proof falling on the proponents of change (Dandeker and Winslow, 1999).

THE CASE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

Internal diversity can also be the result of major social changes such as those that have occurred in post-apartheid South Africa. Following the first multiparty democratic elections in 1994, the government passed legislation to redress previous inequalities and imbalances though a program of affirmative action defined in the constitution as "positive discrimination." The newly formed all-volunteer South African National Defence Force (SANDF), being part of the public service, was subject to the legislation that led to dramatic changes in the racial profile of the military.

For the SANDF the changes were probably even larger than for other South African institutions, since it had to integrate into one new organization seven different armed forces from vastly different military, political, and ethnic backgrounds (Heinecken, 1999, pp. 188 and 193). Two of the seven armed forces were revolutionary armies, the others more conventional professional forces, but all to a greater or lesser extent with their own ethnic identity and different level of identification with the new SANDF. Thus, in the SANDF there were not only cultural issues at stake, there was also tension over the value system underpinning what was perceived to be the "dominant" military culture still based on the former White-dominated SADF.

In the initial stages of integration, the focus was on the need to uphold standards and the belief that once the members of the former revolutionary forces had passed their bridging training they could be relatively easily integrated into new SANDF. While this process in itself was fraught with difficulties, what was severely underestimated was the impact differences in culture and identity were to have. The initial program referred to as the Psychological Integration Programme (PIP) was introduced to defuse underlying feelings of mistrust, insecurity, and racial tension associated with integrating former enemies and it was the first taste of what was to come.

Briefly, PIP was a 5-day program, commencing with a session on emotional debriefing, which was intended to facilitate discussion of the feelings of guilt, bitterness, fear, and anger associated with apartheid. PIP emphasized that acceptance of others must take place on the cognitive, emotional, and personal levels. However, the examples used as part of this program (such as scenes from the apartheid era) evoked such extreme resistance that the facilitators were unable to defuse the emotions that surfaced during the sessions, creating not only renewed anger and resistance, but exacerbating tensions rather than diffusing them (Heinecken, 1999, p. 201). The lesson learned from this experience was that a culture of tolerance could not be imposed on people. First parties have to learn to accept and respect the differences that exist, and acknowledge what the underlying divisive factors are before they can hope to create acceptance.

To some extent the follow-up Civic Education Cultural Diversity program, which was introduced in the curriculum of the various military courses, offered a more viable alternative

to coming to grips with the challenges the SANDF faced. The key to this programme was to create awareness of the differences between the cultures and to create openness about culture and what culture means to the individual. In this course the negative consequences of stereotypes are debated and legal aspects of discrimination on grounds of race, gender, language, and religion are discussed, as well as the need for affirmative action (Heinecken, 1999, p. 202).

The approach on how these concepts were introduced differs in some units. For example, SAS Saldanha a Naval Training Base used Robert Ellis' rational-emotive therapy and the "ABC theory" of personality to convey respect for diversity. Here the emphasis was not on managing diversity out there, but about managing the conversations one has with one self about diversity and the value judgments placed on other cultures. Important in this theory is the notion that events (A) do not simply cause emotions (C) to occur. Between the event and the emotion is the person's belief (B) about A, which actually causes the emotion. The program is based on the ideas that by showing people how to change their belief system, they can truly bring about a change in their behavior and attitudes. Using cuts from the film the "Lion King" this type of reasoning has been presented to all new recruits (see Heinecken, 1999, pp. 203–204 for details). The course, which is interwoven with the military basic training program, appears to be successful in fostering a certain level of tolerance for diversity.

Most of the trainers presenting the management of diversity programs within the SANDF have attended courses given by the Defense Equal Opportunities Management Institute (DEOMI) in the United States and "DEOMI thinking"[5] is clearly prevalent in the programs presented in the SANDF.[6] These programs have most certainly contributed to a better understanding of the need to cultivate respect for cultural diversity, as well as the need for equal opportunities and affirmative action (Heinecken, 1999:203). However, one of the major problems with all the courses presented is that they have largely ignored the immense impact other crosscutting variables such as language, education, social origin, and regional and political differences have. Although the SANDF has largely succeeded in creating cultural tolerance, serious cultural collisions have arisen because the impact of the differences in power relations were underestimated and because a universally accepted value system was not in place.

Within the SANDF tensions continue to exist, especially among White males, who resent the fact that Blacks and women are given preferential treatment in promotions. On the other hand, Blacks still feels discriminated against where power still remains in the hands of Whites in environments where transformation has been slower, such as in the officer ranks and in some specialized units. As is known from organization theory, the perception of such imbalances is likely to create conflict and indirectly hinders organizational effectiveness (Cox, 1993). It is these tensions that have led to real dramas, such as the race-related shootings in September 1999 in Tempe, in which eight officers were killed, followed by two similar incidences in 2000 in Palaborwa and Simonstown. In all these incidences, it was White officers or personnel enforcing regulations that were perceived to be unjust and unfair and, therefore, discriminatory.

Had the SANDF instilled a common value system acceptable to all serving members, capturing the core values and ethical behavior required by the organization, this may not

[5] For a description of "DEOMI thinking" see Dansby, Steart, and Webb (2001).

[6] Specific information on intercultural training in the U.S. military can be found in Dansby and Landis, 2001.

have occurred. This recognition has led to the adoption of a code of conduct to which all military and civilian personnel are expected to subscribe and which underlines the core values of the SANDF as a professional force. The hope is that this common value system will foster an organizational culture that will supersede cultural differences and ultimately create the cohesion thus far lacking.

What the SANDF experience shows is that the management of diversity is not purely about race, ethnicity, gender, or identity linked to other factors such as religion, language, tribe, or social origin. It is intermingled with power-related issues and past legacies. In this regard, the South African experience serves as a useful case study in the challenges armed forces may face in coming to grips with the management of diversity in the post-Cold War era.

DIVERSITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF NEW SECURITY OPERATIONS

The Cold War was in fact a time of relative stability for the armed forces. Now the rather straightforward bipolar conflict has given way to a much messier world. Conflicts are a result of internal state disintegration or civil war rather than interstate confrontations. Moreover, peace operations take place all over the world in relatively rapid succession. For example, Belgian troops are presently deployed in Bosnia as part of Stabilization Force (SFOR) and in Kosovo as part of Kosovo Force (KFOR). But as Manigart (2000, p. 17) points out, the same troops or other units were part of multinational task forces sent to Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Haiti, Cambodia, and Turkey. The requirements of multinational peace operations means that armed forces must be able to deal with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity among many different local populations. In addition, armed forces have to deal with the cultures of the other international actors in the theatre of operations. This includes not only the culture of other armed forces but also those of international organizations, NGOs, and so on (Winslow and Everts, 2001).

Relations with the Local Population

According to Battistelli, Ammendola, and Galantino (2000) one of the major challenges for military personnel is the change from a war environment, dominated by the binary logic of friendly/hostile, to a peacemaking environment, based on the multivalent, blurred, "fuzzy" logic of friend/foe/non-foe. The soldier's function then changes from interested party to disinterested party, from antagonist to by stander, from player to referee. Troops poorly prepared with regard to intercultural issues can lead to disaster. This is a lesson the United States understood already some 50 years ago. During the Second World War the American MoD asked famous anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict, to draft papers on the local cultures in the countries where the U.S. troops were planned to arrive during the liberation campaigns. Benedict's famous study on Japan (officially published in 1946), and also her interesting notes on the Dutch culture (Benedict, 1944, 1997) have been the result of those efforts.

This lesson from the Second World War has not yet reached all present-day armed forces. For example, both the Canadians and the Belgians got into trouble in Somalia because they were not well prepared for what they found in the country. In Somalia, the Canadian Airborne Battle Group arrived in a physically challenging and highly charged,

fluctuating political environment. Soldiers were not prepared for this culture shock and according to Winslow (1997) many felt they were not adequately equipped, briefed, or trained.

A cursory look at most of the leaflets or handbooks that were handed out to troops confirms the fact that there simply was not enough to help them understand the situation that they were about to enter in Somalia. In the *Somalia Handbook* (Canadian Department of National Defense, 1992: 21/21) which was distributed to the Battle Group before its deployment, the section "Dealing with the Locals" was three parts that consisted of perhaps six sentences in total. The *Handbook* told soldiers: "Some have proven to be very unpredictable even day to day; any locals with weapons must be considered as dangerous and potentially hostile on every encounter." The *Handbook* does not mention that, in fact, almost all Somali nomads carry weapons to protect their herds. The Somalia *Handbook* also projected an idea of the Somali as a potential threat, danger, and enemy: "Yesterday's allies can turn on non-vigilant groups if it is in their interest and if they can get away with it. This is an unfortunate aspect of trust building in Somalia." This simple statement in the *Handbook* does hint at the unpredictability of a peacekeeping environment but fails to capture the complexity of the situation. Once they arrived in Somalia, soldiers began to feel almost as if they were on another planet, thus producing high levels of stress. According to Schein (1985, pp. 24–25) "a new language, strange customs, unfamiliar sights, sounds and smells and unpredictable behavioral responses from locals make it hard to relax." It seemed to many Canadians as though they had been ripped out of one world, in which the familiar order of cause–effect, means–end, premises–conclusions operated, and had been transported to another.[7] A group, in this unique intercultural situation, "attaches its own meanings to events, and develops assumptions about itself and its environment that begin to operate as silent filters on perceptions" (Schein, 1985, p. 41). This is where better intercultural training could have helped the Canadians, preparing them for these intercultural difficulties so that the unfortunate violent consequences of xenophobia and racism might have been prevented.

Belgium also had its share of excessive violence committed against Somalis. A number of Belgian soldiers were accused of committing acts of violence and racism during the operation in Africa. The official investigation reported in April 1998 that the Belgian armed forces tend to suppress differences, beginning with gender differences. Therefore, one of the recommendations was that diversity training within the armed forces was definitively necessary (Manigart, 1999). This was especially important, since in the beginning of the 1990s the draft system had been abolished, hence introducing the all-volunteer force with a considerable increase of diversity within the organization (women and cultural minorities).[8] The recommendations of the report were integrated into a General Order, drafted by the Joint Staff and signed by the Minister of Defence in February 1999. This General Order stated that members of the Department of Defence should abstain from any form of racism and xenophobia. Furthermore, it said that racist attitudes are fully incompatible with military ethics and are detrimental to good working as well as the reputation of the armed forces and that, therefore, such behaviors cannot be tolerated (Manigart, 1999, p. 117).

[7] For example, Canadian soldiers also had some trouble with the gender behavior of Somali men. They were shocked by men holding hands and squatting to urinate like women (even though this is more discreet when one is wearing a sarong). The Canadian soldiers were particularly disturbed by the cultural practice of female circumcision and by the way Somali men treated Somali women.

[8] Soon after the introduction of the zero-draft, recruiting and staffing problems arose, making it inevitable that more women and people from minority groups would enter the Belgian armed forces.

Other aspects of this order were related to preventive policies, aimed at fighting racism and xenophobia by means of recruitment advertising, culture-free selection policies, and training and education of personnel. Finally, a complaint procedure, including punitive measures, was instituted. Despite all good intentions, it has been difficult to implement the recommendations since training courses and services dealing with diversity issues are voluntary.[9] Special "Advisors in Mental Readiness," one allocated to every brigade, can be attentive to problems of racism and xenophobia occurring in their units, and can strongly recommend that specific officers and NCOs should follow these modules. But these advisors have only limited power to order reluctant people to do so. Although diversity training in the Belgian armed forces does exist, its impact on the organization may be rated as still fairly modest.

Relations with Other (Military) Organizations in Peace Operations

Another problem that militaries encounter in peace operations is the cultural differences of other militaries in the theatre of operations. While there appears to be a common military culture that promotes effective coordination among NATO countries, there may be misunderstandings and differing operational styles in concrete situations, even between traditional NATO partners such as the Danish and the Americans or the British and the Dutch (Soeters and Bos-Bakx, 2002). Differing cultural backgrounds in operations specifically come to the fore in (the application of) rules, regulations, and laws. For instance not every nation, not even within NATO, uses the same violence instructions and certainly not the same penalties with regard to misbehavior of soldiers. Not surprisingly, even more significant differences have arisen when NATO militaries work with non-NATO countries (Winslow and Everts, 2001).

An Ethics Survey conducted with Canadian Forces members reveals that cultural tensions are prevalent in multinational deployments. These included differences between Canadian and other military forces on substantive ethical issues, such as participating in the black market (Maillet, 1998, pp. 33–34). Other problems arise from different value systems among the contingents. As one Canadian remarked, "I have observed that the different cultural values, not only within different groups in the host country, but also among the components of a multi-national deployment, appear the most prevalent in causing stress" (cited in Maillet, 1998, pp. 20 and 34). Another noted difficulties due to "Differences between ethical standards of host nations and especially between other contingents who may have different value systems (especially with respect to harassment, gender integration, etc.)" (cited in Maillet, 1998, pp. 10 and 34).

Other difficulties arise in working with other organizations in theatre such as international relief agencies (IOs) and NGOs. There are now larger numbers of civilian relief workers in peace operations performing a wide variety of tasks such as food delivery, monitoring elections and human rights, managing refugee camps, distributing medical supplies and services, and so on. They can belong to any number of organizations with varying budgets,

[9] Belgian officers and NCOs can ask to follow a 2-day course on intercultural communication and a 3-day course on negotiation techniques. This is a first step, but only a small one. It is easy to assume that this voluntary procedure leads to self-selection of those who are already display some affinity with the problem.

tasks, goals, competence, types of personnel, and so on which can make cooperation between them and the military at times difficult.[10] According to Williams, (1998, p. 37). NGOs' and IOs' perceived lack of structure and tendency to delegate decision making to people of a much younger age than those in the military can be a source of frustration for military personnel. In addition, UN agencies such as the UNHCR recruit women on a positive-discrimination basis, which means that half of the staff of UN agencies and NGOs operating in places such as Bosnia are female (Williams, 1998, p. 34). Female UNHCR officials and staff can present problems for some officers who are accustomed to dealing with men.

Traditionally, interactions between the military and humanitarian workers have been characterized by avoidance or antagonism. The military is a conservative organization as compared to NGOs, which tend to attract young socially conscious individuals. Many NGOs regard the military as out of touch with the values and members of society they seek to protect. Each group sometimes continues to hold stereotypes of the other. According to some analysts military personnel are described by some NGOs as "boys with toys," "rigid," "authoritarian," "conservative," "impatient," "arrogant," "civilian phobic," "homophobic," "excessively security conscious," and so on. In contrast battalion commanders have referred to NGOs as "nonguided organizations" and other authors note the following comments: "children of the sixties," "flaky do-gooders," "permissive," "unpunctual," "obstructionist," "anarchic," "undisciplined," "self-righteous," "antimilitary," and so on (see Winslow, 2000, and Bollen, 2002, for details). It is important to overcome barriers of age, gender, race, and organizational culture, which can exacerbate the gap between NGOs and the military.

DIVERSITY AND INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT

Diversity and intercultural management in the military is not a luxury nowadays and one should hasten to say it probably never was. Diversity and intercultural management is needed in present-day armed forces in order to develop smooth cooperation with cultural minorities within own troops, with other nations' armed forces, with other organizations in general, as well with local populations. Therefore, the non-American armed forces should be prepared for diversity and intercultural management, as the American military has clearly understood for quite some time already (Dansby et al., 2001).

However, cultures in general, and probably military cultures in particular, are fairly stubborn. This implies that diversity-related change runs the risk of becoming powerless. Therefore, some aspects in the implementation of diversity management need to be stressed. These aspects relate to the *direction* and *strength* of the implementation, its *continuation* during a longer period, and *leadership* issues, including the application of the training programs to everyday working life.

[10] In peace operations, one can now find the large International Organizations (IOs) such as the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). In Bosnia, there are the well known international NGOs such as CARE, OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and the ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross). There is also a larger number of smaller NGOs in areas of conflict in the post-Cold War period. These NGOs may be religious or secular, may include personnel from one nation or several, may be truly non governmental or may in fact receive large sums from government grants.

Direction and Strength

First of all it is important to realize that diversity management and intercultural training should be connected with everyday-life working procedures and regulations. Management predominantly refers to the "rules of the game," and training aims at creating awareness and affinity with the issues at stake. When the "rules of the game" are inconsistent with what is been taught during training, the training is doomed to fail (e.g., Schneider and Barsoux, 1997, pp. 137–139). For example, if a diversity training program in a Western army stresses that the integration of Muslims is to be valued, and at the same time the organization is reluctant to acknowledge specific Muslim eating habits or holidays, the training is useless at best. It may even have a negative impact.

In addition to the content of the training program, which should be consistent with management policies (Cox, 1993), it is important to introduce diversity training with strong intent. Here, the South African Defence forces provide an excellent example: Everybody in the armed forces had to follow the training programs. There was no escape possible. But in many countries, such as in Belgium, participation is voluntary. This is equal to sending the message that diversity training is not important.

Although top-down management is not considered very fashionable in many Western countries nowadays, this is often the way diversity-training programs are introduced. If this management approach provokes resistance among the workers, then it is important for the strategic apex of the organization to clarify the reasons behind the diversity policy. The role of top leadership can hardly be overemphasized in this respect (Dansby and Landis, 2001, p. 23). In general, organizational change needs to be realized by "management with power" (Pfeffer, 1992); at the same time, the change should be speedy instead of based on slow incremental policies to no clear benefit (Dansby and Landis, 2001: 23).

Continuation

Changing people's beliefs is not easy to achieve. It needs time, especially if valuing other, "strange" people is the goal. As we know from social psychology, the so-called contact hypothesis is important here (see, e.g., Dansby and Landis, 2001). This hypothesis says that over time people tend to like each other, even if at the beginning of their contact negative stereotyping, dislike, and hostility are predominant. In general, however, many intercultural encounters do not start with negative, but rather with positive intergroup feelings. This may be called the stage of euphoria, which is the phase of excitement of being confronted with something new. However, very quickly thereafter a kind of culture shock sets in. People discover peculiarities of the other group, and they consider many of these discoveries not very pleasant. But people tend to get used to the new situation, they tend to integrate with the others and slowly they start to value or at least accept the practices of the other group. This is called the stage of acculturation (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 425–426). In this phase one should try to improve the mutual perceptions and valuations in the best possible way.

This is not mere theory. In numerous studies, and in one particular study on the military (Moelker and Soeters, 2001), this process has been clearly demonstrated. In 1995, the binational German/Dutch Corps was founded. This was a remarkable military merger since, due to their history, the people in both countries were not very sympathetic toward each other. Nevertheless, due to political pressure and the thrill of something new the Corps proved to be a success in the beginning. However, after the promising first 2 years, the two

contributing national "parties" in the Corps developed fairly low opinions about one another. This situation deteriorated so gravely that it seemed to endanger the operationability of the Corps. However, as a result of excellent collaboration during the Kosovo crisis as well as ambitious work in the binational HQ, the militaries of both nations started to appreciate each other again. Apparently, time and the "contact hypothesis" did their work here. But there is more to the success of intercultural encounters than the impact of time.

Leadership

When intercultural encounters and diversity issues are at stake, leadership is extremely important. A new learning subject such as intercultural training is often interpreted in an organization as being in competition with other existing training options. As such, implementing curricula can become part of a political game concerning the amount of hours allocated to further education. In a strictly hierarchical organization the support of the top management is essential to kick-start the notion of "intercultural competence." There is a very real need that official statements about the importance of intercultural competence are followed through with its actual implementation. Otherwise the intervention will be only symbolic thus endangering the credibility of intercultural training itself.

Commanders should also develop intercultural awareness among their soldiers and officers. This is their job too, not just the trainers' responsibility. Commanders should create awareness of the benefits of diversity through deeds and words (e.g., Soeters and Bos-Bakx, 2002). In order to create some affinity with diversity among their men and women, they first should stress the common character of the organization or the mission. The common character of the mission should be seen as the superordinate goal for all people involved. In this vein, it is important to emphasize the equal status of all people involved in the organization or operation. If the status of some "parties" (e.g., the homeland armies in the SANDF or Muslim soldiers in the German/Dutch Corps) is relatively low, and if the dominant group's "virtues" come to be seen as the other group's "vices," it is the commander's responsibility to boost the status of the low-status group. The commander should make his or her decisions in such a way that representatives of every group can maintain his or her dignity, without "loss of face." Furthermore, measures should be taken in order to facilitate intercultural encounters, both within the work itself, but also in informal social or sports events.

We wish to emphasize that diversity training and training for intercultural encounters should *not* be introduced and implemented in an isolated manner. This type of training should consistently be integrated within broader diversity and intercultural policies (affirmative action, concrete collaboration between diverse groups, in the general structuring of work, and the preparation before deployment). Furthermore, it should be implemented with some strength, and its lessons should be translated into everyday practices. In much the same manner, the preparation for intercultural encounters should be integrated within the whole training period before deployment. For all this, commanders carry the prime responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

We do not want to end this chapter with an elaborate model of possible relations between variables that should be studied in the near future. This has been done excellently elsewhere (Landis, 2001). Instead, we wish to point to some issues which arise from the previous

observations and analyses. These questions deal with the preparation for intercultural encounters as much as with diversity management and training.

It makes sense to study concrete experiences armed forces have with intercultural encounters as well as with diversity management and training. Focused case studies help to understand the dynamics and effectiveness of these fields of organizational policies and practices. If these case studies are be done in the armed forces of a number of countries, the benefits of comparison can arise (see, e.g., Soeters and van der Meulen, 1999). It is important to study these experiences in-depth, which is to say that the influence of the organizational culture and the impact of the commanding style on these experiences should also be detailed.

Second, we point toward the influence of the time factor. Studies on the formation of the German/Dutch Corps indicate that this is an important variable. One may expect that time also plays a role in the integration process of the South African Defence Forces. Whereas the first years after the Apartheid Regime still showed fairly problematic situations in the armed forces of this country (such as the race-related shooting we referred to earlier), it may very well be that these tensions may disappear in due time. Carefully designed longitudinal studies could demonstrate this. As to the European Rapid Reaction Forces, which will come about in early 2003, the same type of longitudinal study may prove to be valuable to commanders as much as to scholars.

Third, concerning the training programs themselves, it seems wise to study the effects of those programs on the participants, shortly after the program, as well as some time later when the participants have taken up their work again in the organization or at the mission. The content of those programs may be subject of further investigation as well (Landis, 2001). In addition, it seems important to make use of the "discoveries" and experiences of the participants themselves. This could be done by means of problem-based learning or self-reporting of "critical incidents" (David and Lloyd, 2001). A further expansion could be to introduce some kind of military simulation, in which "diverse" parties and, hence, uncertainty and friction are the main elements of the game. In combination with elements of conflict management training and with an emphasis on cooperative groups tasks, this type of simulated cross-cultural and diversity training may really enhance the affinities and capabilities among the participants to learn how to cope with intercultural encounters (Soeters and Recht, 2001, p. 437). Designing these modules and studying their impact should provide a serious contribution to the integration of diverse groups within the military and to the facilitation of their encounters with other cultures. One can only hope that the people who, in the future, are to work with and to be protected by the military may profit from these efforts.

CHAPTER 18

Unionization of the Military

Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

The growing trend towards partial or total abandonment of conscription for more or less broad forms of professional volunteerism in armed forces (see the chapter on the "Decline of the Mass Armies" by Karl Haltiner in this regard) is giving renewed importance and topicality to the study of union representation of the interests of military personnel. The subject attracted widespread interest among military sociologists in the 1970s before being substantially abandoned. It thus seems opportune to give some space in this handbook to the social and political issues that the unionization of professional military personnel can involve and to report the most significant studies published on the subject.

Originating in the Scandinavian countries in the early years of the 20th century, union representation of military personnel was initially considered a private matter, tolerated by the state, despite some initial conflict, in the general framework of the broad liberties ensured by those advanced democracies. Only later did military union organizations begin to be recognized by the state and regulated by it, in a way not dissimilar from the other occupational unions.[1] This process in the Scandinavian countries was gradual and can be considered to have more or less reached completion by the time of the Second World War. But in the same historical period, the fall of the totalitarian regimes and the wider democratization of Western Europe, the disappearance of the guarantee function that some forms of government (monarchy) or regime (nazism) had for professionals in uniform, and the general demilitarization of the individual national societies extended the issue of

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[1] In the Scandinavian countries, because that is where forms of industrial democracy first developed in the civilian sector. Laurie A. Broedling writes in this regard:

> The Scandinavian countries were in the front line of the industrial democracy movement and their industries were the first to be actively involved in experiments with increasing worker participation.... Their labour confederations were greatly influential in controlling what legislation was passed to benefit those they represented. (Broedling, 1977, p. 21)

union representation of military personnel to just about all continental European countries where free expression of citizens' needs and desires was possible. In this situation—the expression, according to some, of a "secularization of soldiering" (Manigart, 1984, p. 4)—a clear line was drawn between conservative tendencies, which considered any form of unionization incompatible with the military institution, and innovative tendencies, which, with the disappearance of the royal army or the caste army, deemed an alignment of the military profession with the other professions and occupations both possible and necessary.

REASONS FOR THE DIVISION

At this point two questions arise spontaneously: why was there this generalized push, or at least interest (more or less all Western countries, the United States included, had to face the issue, in the aftermath of the Second World War), in autonomous forms of defence of the interests of military personnel? Why was union representation of military personnel seen as a problem and resisted so vehemently?

THE PUSH FOR UNIONIZATION

We said how, historically, the disappearance of some forms of government (or regime) that performed a guarantee function for the professional members of the armed forces was one of the causes that extended the push toward unionization beyond the countries of the Scandinavian area. This affirmation must now be better specified: in reality, what influenced this trend most directly seems to have chiefly been the new situation in which professional military personnel found themselves in their home societies. In other words, it was the change that took place in their societies, or, at least, the change in the relative positions of the different components within each single society, that produced the phenomenon.

For what interests us here, the essential aspect of this change was the loss of prestige and social appreciation of the military social group and a resulting sense of frustration of the personnel. "The mood to unionize," writes Harries Jenkins (Harries Jenkins, 1977, p. 63), "in the armed forces as in other organizations, arises when the general feeling of individual deprivation is converted into the rare sense of collective deprivation". The thinking of other authors, such as Philippe Manigart and Lucien Mandeville, runs along the same lines. The latter writes (Mandeville, 1976): "The continuing decline of the standard of living in the military, combined with the general trend towards relations of a new type between a superior and his subordinates, is beginning to produce new expectations among military personnel." Manigart further states that "the process of unionisation of the armed forces is part of the general evolution of labour relations in Western societies. This evolution is characterised by greater participation by citizens, by their propensity to defend their interests, and by a supplanting of individual labour relations with collective labour relations..." (Manigart, 1984, p. 4).

As a consequence of social change, the internal connotations of soldiering have changed as well. David R. Segal points to the transformation of "the calling of military service into a secular occupation" due to three changes: "the changing technology of warfare that, making civilian population as vulnerable to attack as are frontline troops, has socialized the danger of war" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977b, p. 31); the changed nature of the individual soldier's work, which has become significantly more like working in an enterprise; and last,

the progressive acceptance of this assimilation by those responsible for managing military personnel. And, according to Harries Jenkins, another important change took place as well, namely "a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment by virtue of a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 56). A further aspect of social change was identified by William Taylor (Taylor et al., 1977b), who observed how the changed social extraction of officers meant that they were coming in ever greater numbers from those classes or social sectors where unionization had long been entrenched.

That the push for unionization began, in a direct manner, from a change in social standing is made particularly evident by the examples, opposite in their results, of two countries where institutional changes were not made, Belgium and Great Britain.

"Before the First World War," writes Victor Werner (Werner, 1976, *passim.*), "the status that the military professional enjoyed in Belgium was quite enviable. At each level of the social hierarchy, the armed forces occupied a privileged position." The officers formed a caste, but the other ranks of career personnel were satisfied with their status as well: "At each level of the hierarchy, the career personnel were aware of belonging to one of the most important organisations of the state, an organisation that enjoyed the highest public regard." But also on a concrete level, military personnel "enjoyed certain privileges that, at that time, were not granted to workers, such as stability of employment, free medical care, the provision of food and clothing, paid holidays and a pension." According to the same author, the situation after the Second World War appears profoundly altered: soldiering undergoes a sharp drop in social prestige and military personnel "are no longer the object of the attentions and preoccupations of the state." On the concrete level, "At the same time the country enjoys a situation of full employment, and the social conquests in the industrial labour sector are spectacular. From this standpoint the material position of career military personnel becomes relatively less advantageous." There is thus a social change that is independent of institutional changes (although in the countries where these occurred they were certainly not without influence); it alters the preexisting balances and does away with the old systems of protection, thereby producing new demands in the military environment as well. Indeed, in Belgium (still according to Werner), the drive toward unionization stems from the fact that "in this changing society, career military personnel, who also work to earn a living, are swept along by an irresistible tide."

A contrary example is provided by the English situation, where a persistence of form of government and regime was accompanied by a substantial maintenance of the positions and, especially, of the forms of protection previously in vigor for career military personnel, despite social change in general. Indeed, regarding the union issue in Great Britain, G. Harries Jenkins writes that in his country, the armed forces have "a special relationship with the civil power whereby the rights and privileges of the dominant social group are automatically guaranteed to members of the military; in this relationship there is no need to seek unionisation to provide the political, social and economic rights of members of the organisation for these will be always protected by the power elite with which the military is closely associated" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 68). But when he talks about the European situation in general, this author, too, points out that the push toward unionization in the military "arises from the feeling that the armed forces, in comparison with other institutions in society, have lost their previously held status and have suffered an undue amount of deprivation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 61).

A further reason for the trend to unionize the armed forces is identified by David Cortright (Cortright, 1977b), with reference to the American reality, in the notable growth

of unionization in the public employment sector starting in the 1960s, growth that could hardly fail to have an entraining effect in regard to military personnel as well. Cortright further observes, however, that it must not be forgotten that the push toward unionization in the armed forces is not created by the unions; it is not unions that create discontent and frustrations: these factors are inherent in daily working conditions and depend on the possibility or capability that the chain of command has to come to terms with the problems of the various categories of personnel. Although opposing an introduction of unionization in the armed forces, this affirmation is confirmed by U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond when he notes that the problem arises due to the frustrations and disappointments of military personnel, created in part by the feeling of having been abandoned by the national government. Thurmond reports (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977a) in this regard a report drawn up by the United States Defense Manpower Commission (1976), which states that many members of the Armed Forces feel shocked and disappointed because they feel they have been ignored and neglected by a government that does not keep its word; it also seems there is a significant lack of communication between politicians and the troops in the operational units.

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel?

The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal:

> Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28).

Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession.

SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE

Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel.

Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones:

1. The creation of a dual authority structure:

   > Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70)

2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers.
3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 71).

Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69).

According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs.

Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither

prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels.

Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden.

ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS AUTHORS

The case of Austria presents two interesting peculiarities: the first is that it constitutes the first example of unionization in an army recruited totally voluntarily. The second is that, if I am not mistaken, it represents the only case of a unionized army that has faced conflict situations. There were two such situations: a conflict, albeit limited, with Hungary for the border territory called Burgenland (1921–1922), which despite its limitedness nonetheless involved over a third of the Austrian army. The second situation was a massive intervention to maintain public order, in 1924, against Social Democratic demonstrators who had taken possession of the city of Vienna, erecting barricades in the streets: the army intervened with a force of 9600 men and lost; 31 were killed and 170 were wounded.

The significant aspects of these interventions are, according to Raymond Bell (Bell, 1977): (1) despite the ideological divisions then existing in the country (reflected also, within the army, by two opposing unions), there is no evidence pointing to decreased efficiency of the military: on the contrary, in both types of intervention the Austrian army seems to have conducted itself quite well; and (2) in the cited operational phases, the unions never interfered in the chain of command.

Hence, according to the author, the Austrian experience demonstrates that a clear line can be drawn between exercising union prerogatives and the execution by commanders of lawful and necessary commands.

These assessments are shared by David Cortright in his analysis of the experience, now historical, of the military unions in Sweden and the German Federal Republic. Responding to the fears of a diminished efficiency of the military, Cortright states: "It should be obvious from our discussion of the professional unions of West Germany and Sweden, however, that no such negative effect exists" (Cortright, 1977a, p. 49). Fritz Oliver and Ger Teitler (Oliver and Teitler, 1982) also make an evaluation of the union experience, arguing that union activity in favor of military personnel cannot be seen as an erosion of subordination or of the apolitical nature of the Dutch armed forces, although certainly there is a change in military style and a growing awareness that today, career military personnel cannot ignore the tactics of pressure groups, with whom they compete for the allocation of tax moneys. However, this change of style does not mean a slide from a professional position to an occupational one, Oliver and Teitler insist. On the contrary, the actions taken to protect the interests of military personnel testify to a sense of professional responsibility, which adapts to the changed social context of the country. The necessity of a change in the style of command, a change which is already in progress due to the natural evolution of national societies, is, according to Manigart (Manigart, 1984), closely tied to the introduction in the armed forces of a system for representing the personnel's interests. Also according to this author, the change is from an authoritative system to a participatory one. "The available evidence suggests," writes Harries Jenkins, "that two distinct cultural models can be envisaged. In the first of these, the continental model, the ongoing relationship between military institutions and citizenship creates a very specific political culture in which military service in the mass army is defined as an integral part of citizenship. This recognizes that the institutionalization of citizen conscription was an essential component in the emergence of Western parliamentary institutions" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 67). Owing to this relationship, the protection of citizens' rights in their working activity could not fail to extend from the civilian sector to the military one. The continental model of the citizen-soldier thus leads to extend to the soldier the systems of protection proper of the citizen.

Of the same opinion is Ger Teitler (Teitler, 1976), who, pointing to the origin of mass armies and obligatory conscription in the French Revolution, writes that, with the Revolution, the whole people was mobilized in the name of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, thus enabling the state to call (to arms) all the citizens to defend and spread the Revolution. But in the English model, notes Harries Jenkins, "military service has never emerged as a hallmark of citizenship. Instead, in Great Britain, for example, it can be argued that an inalienable right of the individual has been that of not serving in armed forces" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 68). In the Anglo-Saxon model (or "insular" model, as Harries Jenkins calls it), the protection of the rights of military personnel is automatically ensured by the officer cadres' belonging to the elite who head the country.

William Taylor (Taylor et al., 1977b) makes another interesting observation: the European countries that have military unions are generally governed, in the 1970s, by Social Democratic or Labour parties; unionization thus derives from the close connection that these parties normally have with trade unions in general. Taylor further observes that concrete experience has shown that it is not useful to prohibit military unions by law: the problem would only be shifted in its times and modes. If one wishes to oppose the penetration of unionism among military personnel, it is necessary to act on the causes upstream, both on the material dissatisfactions of the personnel and their motivations. With regard to the latter and, in particular, the American situation, Taylor argues that it would be necessary to return to a conscript army, motivated not by economic incentives but by a feeling of service to one's country.

According to Philippe Manigart, however (Manigart, 1984), the line of demarcation between countries that have forms of free and elected representation of military personnel and countries that refuse it only partly, and incidentally, coincides with the division between conscripted armies and volunteer armies. Premising that effective representation of soldiers' interests has always had to be imposed on a military leadership reluctant to cede power, either from within (pressure from the membership) or without (pressure from political parties), Manigart argues that where the military establishment still enjoys broad autonomy and effective power (in the United States, Great Britain, and France, for instance), the brass has so far been able to oppose any form of unionization of the armed forces, while the opposite has occurred in the countries where this was not the case.

A recurrent opinion is that career soldiers and conscripts (in countries that have conscription) must necessarily have distinct bodies for union representation. Gerard Perselay writes, for example, that "the European experience is that conscripts or draftees generally have their own labor organization to represent them. Part of this separation is based on a lack of a community of interest with career military. This can be interpreted to mean that the conscripts have different interests and purposes, many of them not lying wholly within their relatively short term of service in the military" (Perselay, 1977, p. 175). And David Cortright writes, "The military unions of Europe show two basic patterns: the development of separate associations for each class of military employee and a division between professional unionism and conscript unionism" (Cortright, 1977a, p. 223). This difference of issues is also pointed out by Roger J. Arango (Arango, 1977), as well as by Philippe Manigart (Manigart, 1984), who describes the diversity of the two phenomena.

One quite constant datum found where military personnel are completely free to organize is that they tend to choose associations of origins and types typically internal to the institution over sections or groups of general unions devoted to military personnel (significant data in this direction have been found chiefly in Belgium and Germany, but the tendency is also noticeable in The Netherlands and in the Scandinavian countries). At least for now, therefore, a corporative-professional type appears to be winning, likely due to awareness on the part of professional personnel of a real specificity of the military. This phenomenon is also felt by the civilian unions, which can therefore put themselves in a position of contrast with the representative associations of the type cited. Manigart (Manigart, 1984), for example, points out in this regard that the chief motivation of the civilian unions in Belgium in requesting the right to organize in the armed forces was not to increase their membership as much as to put an end to a monopoly by organizations of a corporative nature, as the professional associations of military personnel were considered to be.

Among the significant historical experiences it is interesting to cite one of the few opinion surveys conducted in armed forces undergoing a process of unionization. The survey was performed by the AOSA (Association des Officiers en Service Actif) of the Belgian armed forces in 1980 (2 years after definitive regulation of the representative function) and is reported by Manigart in an appendix to the essay cited several times above. The survey universe was composed of all officers on active duty; the response rate was 35%, but the breakdown by rank, origin, age group, and so on makes the author consider the sample sufficiently representative. The most interesting data are as follows:

1. The distribution of the respondents by union membership: 48% belonged to the AOSA (a corporative-type representative association, as stated above), 3% to intercategory civilian unions, and 4.5% were not enrolled in any union.

2. The respondents' opinions on the unionization of military personnel: 82% considered this process positive with regard to the category associations of a corporative type, while only 25.5% express the same judgement on the possibility of joining the intercategory civilian unions.
3. The classification of the objectives of union representation, by order of importance:
   - defend moral and professional interests
   - defend material interests
   - enhance the profession in the eyes of public opinion
   - inform commanders on the problems of the personnel
   - collaborate with commanders to solve such problems
   - inform public opinion on national defence
   - inform the officers themselves
   - defend the interests of retired personnel
   - mediate between commanders and other union organisations
   - participate in bodies for social and cultural promotion
4. The tools of action of union representation: chiefly action toward the military authority, participation on the committees provided for by regulations, action toward the press, interventions vis-à-vis the political power, and studies, seminars and public conferences on topics of interest.

Roger Manley et al. conclude the already cited study on military unionization stating, "It may well be that some form of unionization or, at the minimum, some form of effective representation of the interests of military personnel is inevitable. . . ." Just as it occurred in civilian industry, "so might we now be witnessing an inexorable trend toward representation of the military which will continue even though the courts hold that there is a clear and present danger associated with organization of the military." (Manley and McNichols, 1977, p. 114). Also for Manigart (Manigart, 1984), it is false to say that unionism is, by definition, incompatible with the mission of armed forces; on the other hand, "since the Western armed forces are there to defend democracy, it seems logical that they should apply democratic principles to themselves," also to avoid the danger that failure to participate in social change might lead to an isolation of the military establishment from the society to which it belongs.

PART V

TRENDS IN THE MILITARY: CONVERSION AND RESTRUCTURING

CHAPTER 19

Restructuring of the Armed Forces

PHILIPPE MANIGART

INTRODUCTION

Because military organizations are open-ended systems (i.e., they are in constant interdependence and exchanges with their environment), it follows that different types of military organizations correspond to different types of societies (Feld, 1977).

In advanced industrial societies, the end of the Cold War, technological change, and social–cultural evolution have brought about the end of the mass army. With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself, the Western armies' missions have also changed. They are no longer to deter a known adversary, but to intervene, with other actors, in the new kinds of conflicts, i.e., maintaining or enforcing peace in regions where our interests are in jeopardy, fighting international terrorism and other threats, and/or carrying out humanitarian missions. In the context of these new engagement scenarios, political and military logic calls for quick reaction capability of what Janowitz (1971) called "constabulary forces." These kinds of forces are smaller and more professional. This conglomerate of structural factors pushes the decline of the mass army to its critical point.

The aim of this chapter is to describe this restructuring process from a comparative perspective, using examples when appropriate, and to show how these recent developments in the environment of military organizations of advanced industrial societies influence, and will continue to influence, their organizational structure. If they want to survive and remain efficient, military organizations, like their civilian counterparts, will have to develop new, more decentralized structural forms, with more open boundaries and flatter hierarchies. The old centrally coordinated and routinized bureaucratic structures, well adapted to their stable milieu, will have to be replaced by flexible organizations, better adapted to the new, uncertain, and fluid environment of the 21st century.

But before analyzing the various general dimensions of the restructuring process of Western military forces, let us briefly[1] look at its macrosocial causes.

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[1] Other chapters in this book indeed analyze these variables in more detail.

CAUSES OF THE RESTRUCTURING OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES ARMED FORCES

Among the variables that influence military organizational structure, five are especially important. Four are exogenous variables (the level of economic development, the existing technology, the social–cultural environment, and the geopolitical environment in which the organization functions) and one is an intermediary variable (the mission of the organization). These five variables taken together determine the form that a military organization will take; in other words its organizational structure, as shown in the following flow chart (Figure 19.1).

The Environment

The restructuring of military organizations that began after World War II has been characterized by a decline of the mass army model (Harries-Jenkins, 1973; Janowitz, 1971; Van Doorn, 1975). In fact, with the decline of the mass armed force, one sees to a transformation similar to the one that has affected complex civilian organizations in the industrialized world, i.e., the transition from labor- to capital-intensive organizations. A model based on universal conscription in peacetime and national mobilization in wartime has been progressively displaced by a new form of organization, the postmodern military organization.

The Economic Environment. Western economies are experiencing what some (Dicken, 1986; Giddens, 1992; Kennedy, 1993) call the third industrial revolution (information technology). The rhythm of technological innovations is ever more rapid and product life cycles are ever shorter. At the same time, the economy is becoming global. The old



Figure 19.1. Main determinants of military organizational structure.

national markets are disappearing and are being replaced by a global market dominated by transnational organizations.

According to Schuler and Jackson (1996, p. 63), a transnational organization is structured in such a way that national boundaries disappear. The transnational organization operates in several countries and does not recruit its personnel using national criteria. It functions in a global manner and production is entirely integrated at the global level. The difference between a transnational and a multinational organization comes from the fact that a multinational firm is an organization that has operations in more than one country and whose major business decisions are made at the headquarters, while a transnational structure refers to an organization that also has operations in more than one country but whose major business decisions are made throughout the world. This structure often results from the growth of companies and the nature of the business. So IBM, Ford, and so on were multinational corporations (MNC) in the 1960s–1970s. Now they are true transnational organizations.

The military field is also becoming more global. Indeed, not only are defence industries, as other industries, in the midst of a radical restructuring process to become transnational corporations (Serfati, 2000a, 2000b) but Western military organizations are also operating all over the world, in culturally, ethnically, and linguistically very diverse regions. Furthermore, these operations are conducted most of the time in a multinational framework. The accent is indeed put on cooperation much more than before. In the future, as will be explained under "Integration of European Armed Forces," one can even envisage the possibility of truly transnational organizations under the control of some regional or international organization, such as the European Union or (although more far-fetched) the UN. In other words, it is likely that one will see the same evolution as in the private sector, i.e., the proliferation of joint ventures, strategic alliances, and so on.

The Technological Environment. Modern armies are organizations using very complex technologies (weapons systems, etc.). In fact, at the close of the 20th century, the sheer critical mass of technological novelties, as part of the "third industrial wave" based on the generation, gathering, processing, and dissemination of information, had allowed some observers (Snow, 1991; Toffler and Toffler, 1993) to speak of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Though designed to be user friendly and easy to operate by nonspecialists, these new high-tech weapons also generate new layers of complexity for those in charge of logistics, doctrine, coordination, command, and control. They entail higher development, production and maintenance costs, as well as a greater need for educational sophistication and training among (at least) commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

This has two consequences: On the one hand, one needs more and more highly trained personnel, with a higher educational level. The least specialized functions tend to disappear (they are either automated or outsourced). On the other hand, the training of these specialists is long and costly. In order to make this training cost effective, personnel must remain in place for a minimum period of time. From this follows the fact that, in all Western military organizations, the role of draftees has been progressively marginalized to the point that in some countries, the draft has been ended or suspended.

The new information technologies also redefine traditional authority structures. Because information is now directly accessible, those at the top can short-circuit the intermediary levels of the hierarchy and have direct access to leaders in the field. The consequence is *delayering*, as one does not need as many hierarchical levels as before to control people (see "Downsizings"). The result is thus flatter hierarchical structures and more use of teamwork.

One example of this redesigning because of increased access to information is the U.S. armed forces. To cite Wheatley (1999, pp. 107–108):

> Both the Army and the Marines now have the technology to provide every individual soldier with information about what's occurring on the battlefield, information that formerly was known only by the commanders. Through extensive field tests, the Army has discovered that when individuals have such information and know how to interpret it because they know the "commander's intent," they can make decisions that lead to greater success in battle. They respond quickly and intelligently, and assume responsibility for their decisions. Although it has been difficult for some older commanders to turn over so much control, the evidence is very clear that a network form of organization, where people are linked together by technology and shared meaning, makes soldiers more effective. Because of this demonstrated effectiveness, the Army and Marines have announced that they are moving into a networked form of command quite different from their historical traditions.

These new technological developments lead also to intriguing paradoxes (Boëne, 1997, p. 4). The first of these paradoxes, apparent for about a decade, is known as "structural disarmament." As budgets (downsized or not) cannot possibly catch up with spiralling investment costs, with each new generation of weapons, the numbers bought to equip the services are lower. There is more, however: Military managers are often reluctant to use, and risk the loss of, these scarcer, more expensive weapons systems when the gain at stake is much lower than the possible loss (as was the case with punitive air strikes in Bosnia recently), thus to some extent inhibiting the use of armed force. But this paradoxical mechanism also affects highly trained human resources. For example, Boëne (1997, p. 4) cites the case of some French battalion commanders who, when the call came for junior officers to reinforce Army units' cadre assets in the Saudi desert, as part of the French contribution to the Gulf War, were reported to have spontaneously refrained from designating their Saint Cyr graduates (supposedly the best the officer corps has to offer) on the grounds that their very expensive training made them too precious to be wasted in a sideshow.

The second paradox is that, if these costly weapons and human assets may be very good at deterring, punishing, and compelling, they may not lend themselves to effective employment in the new asymmetrical conflicts, such as the fight against international terrorist networks (as the Al Qaeda network of Osama Bin Laden) and most peacetime engagements and stability operations, the so-called Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or Low-Intensity Conflicts (LIC), that are the more probable sorts in which they would be used or involved.

The Social–Cultural Environment. At the social–cultural level, individualism and hedonism become the central values. The nature of work is changing too: the notion of a job for life disappears. Postmaterialist values are growing (Inglehart, 1990). There is also a greater cultural diversity, the essence of postmodernism (Inglehart, 1997; Lyons, 1999; Mafesoli, 1995). One of the consequences of this cultural shift is that the search for one's personal interests comes before everything else and that the feeling of belonging to a larger community tends to fade away, to disappear. Indicators of this trend are, among others: (1) individual rights are stressed and duties toward others and the nation are downplayed; (2) traditional values tend to disappear (work ethic, religious values, etc.) (Stoetzel, 1983); (3) civic consciousness also tends to disappear; (4) as a consequence of the rise of postmaterialist values, people's expectations of work have changed. Soldiers are no longer motivated by patriotism. They are much more interested in their working conditions than before (Moskos, 1977; Moskos and Wood, 1988); and (5) there is a decline of trust in institutions in general and in military institutions in particular (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995), although concerning these last institutions the situation is

TABLE 19.1. Confidence in the Military in EU Countries (1981–2000)

Country	1981	1990	1997	2000
Belgium	43	33	33	67
Denmark	40	46	74	82
Germany	53	40	60	66
Greece	—	—	85	87
Spain	63	42	56	65
France	55	56	54	68
Ireland	76	61	83	85
Italy	56	48	55	67
Luxembourg	—	—	61	74
The Netherlands	43	32	53	74
Austria	—	—	59	49
Portugal	—	47	58	78
Finland	71	—	88	91
Sweden	61	49	64	72
United Kingdom	82	81	74	83
European Union	—	—	61	71

Note: Germany: 1981 and 1990 = West Germany; 1997 and 2000 = new and old *Länder;* 1981 and 1990: percentage indicating "a great deal" and "quite a lot"; 1997 and 2000: percentage indicating "rather confident."
Sources: 1981 and 1990: European Values Survey 1981 and 1990 in Listhaug and Wiberg (1995, pp. 304–305); 1997 and 2000: Eurobarometer 48 and 54.1.

more complex. In the last few years indeed, there has been a trend reversal in the public confidence towards the military, at least as far as the European Union is concerned.

Some authors (Boëne and Dandeker, 2000; Manigart and Marlier, 1996; Van der Meulen, 2000) explain this trend reversal by the reorientation of postmodern armies' missions toward peacekeeping and humanitarian aid: peacekeeping operations, most often implemented to guarantee stability and help populations in distress, are regarded by public opinion as noble causes, even though over the long term, this type of operation may become more difficult to justify, particularly if it involves casualties and/or has a less than clearly defined mandate.

Table 19.1 illustrates quite well this trend reversal. It presents the evolution of the confidence in the military in the 15 European Union countries between 1981 and 1990. If it is indeed true that confidence in the military in the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e., during the late Cold War, was rather low in every country, except in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland, in the late 1990s it bounced back almost everywhere.

THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. The new geostrategic environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War can be characterized, on the one hand, as one of greater complexity and uncertainty compared to the certainties of the bipolar world of the previous decades (Freedman, 1991). There are no longer any clearly identifiable threats, but rather a multitude of risks and dangers.[2] This leads some authors to refer our postmodern

[2] A distinction should be made among risks, threats, and dangers. Dandeker (2000, p. 108) defines risk as "capacities that have the potential to cause harm to one's security. Threats arise when such capacities become conjoined with an intention to cause harm." By dangers, he refers to "those capacities that have a high probability of causing harm but without anyone's hostile intentions through, either, the negligence of identifiable actors, or the unintended consequences of social action."

Table 19.2. Fears of Europeans for a Certain Number of Threats (Percentage Who Indicated "Fear")[a]

Threats	EU15
A world war	45
A nuclear conflict in Europe	44
A conventional war in Europe	45
The accidental launch of a nuclear missile	55
An accident in a nuclear power station	75
Spread of nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical weapons	62
Ethnic conflicts in Europe	65
Terrorism	74
Organized crime	77
Epidemics	57

Note: DK/NA included.
Source: Eurobarometer 54.1. See Manigart (2001, pp. 4–8).
[a]The question was: "Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?"

societies as "risk societies" (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; Shaw, 2000) and to say that we live in an era of "risk complexity" (Dandeker, 1999).

But perhaps more important than the changing objective risk and threat situation is the subjective dimension: The perception of these risks and threats by Western publics has quite radically evolved since the end of the Cold War. As an illustration, Table 19.2 shows the kinds of risks Europeans feared the most in fall 2000, i.e., before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As for the 2000 results reported in Table 19.1, the data come from a special Eurobarometer survey[3] carried in fall 2000 among representative samples of the population ages 15 and over in each country of the European Union,[4] at the request of the Belgian Defence Minister, André Flahaut, as a way to prepare the Belgian EU Presidency.

As one can see, in 2000, the three things Europeans feared the most, at the time, were nonmilitary risks, specifically organized crime (77%); an accident at a nuclear plant (75%); and terrorism (74%). At the other end of the scale, the three risks cited least often (but nonetheless by more than 4 respondents of 10) were a nuclear conflict in Europe (44%), a conventional war in Europe (45%), and a world war (45%). We should note that these are the three types of military conflicts directly (explicitly or implicitly) involving European nations on their own territory and that were characteristic of the preceding era, i.e., the Cold War. In between these two groups of risks, one finds very diverse risks such as ethnic conflicts in Europe, nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation, epidemics, and accidental launch of a nuclear missile.

The other dimension of the changing geopolitical landscape is that the disappearance of the Soviet threat has caused an acceleration of the trend toward *downsizing*[5] and what Morris Janowitz (1960) called a *force-in-being*, i.e., smaller, more professional forces. It

[3]Eurobarometer surveys are conducted at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Public Opinion sector.

[4]A total of 15,900 people were questioned, or about 1,000 people per country, except in Luxembourg (600), Germany (2,000 total: 1,000 in the Western part and 1,000 in the Eastern part), and the United Kingdom (1,300 total: 1,000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern Ireland).

[5]Downsizing is naturally not a specific military process. It also impacts on the whole civilian sector and is a consequence of a global economy.

has also, and perhaps above all, caused a modification of the role of these forces (from deterrence toward constabulary).

Missions

The mass armed forces' mission was to prepare and to conduct total wars[6] for their respective nation-states. The military was therefore an instrument for state nationalism. The expected threat was an enemy land invasion, such as Belgium's invasion by German troops in 1914 and 1940. With the advent of the Cold War and nuclear weapons, the concept of deterrence replaced that of total war. The goal was to deter a nuclear war between the two superpowers. In the new international environment that is taking shape, the missions have become much more diverse. Certainly, a conventional war has not become totally impossible or unimaginable; territorial defence remains the ultimate justification of national armed forces. But, in the short and middle terms, it is not the most likely war scenario. For one thing, according to Van Creveld (1991), traditional interstate wars are supplanted by intrastate wars that cut across state boundaries. Ethnic conflicts (such as in former Yugoslavia), terrorist threats (such as the one posed by Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network or terror organizations and states in the Middle East) but also those posed by the new mafias (such in the Balkans or Russia), will probably become the typical examples of postmodern conflicts, conflicts for which traditional military organizations are not always the most appropriate and certainly not the only actor.[7] For another, the defense of basic democratic values and human rights is increasingly an aspect of "security" as we conceive of it. In short, the main mission (in term of frequency at least) of postmodern military organizations will rather be to counter this type of new subnational threats and to maintain and restore order in regions where our interests are in jeopardy and/of for humanitarian reasons. Concretely, these new, constabulary missions range from conventional warfighting to maintaining or enforcing peace in unstable regions of the world to fighting international terrorism and other threats to carrying out humanitarian missions.

Given the increased diversity of potential missions which can be carried out by postmodern armed forces, an interesting question, for legitimacy reasons, then becomes to know which are the ones judged to be the most important by public opinion. Such a question was asked in the Fall 2000 Eurobarometer Special Defence Survey to representative samples of the 15 EU countries.[8] Table 19.3 presents the results.

As one can see, defence of the country remained the mission most frequently cited by respondents (94%). However, immediately following, cited by 91% of respondents, came a nonmilitary role, specifically help to the country in case of disaster (natural, ecological, or nuclear). Aid to other countries (e.g., in case of natural, ecological, or nuclear disaster or famine or to remove land mines), was mentioned by more than 8 respondents of 10 (84%). The mission that in recent years has incontestably become the most significant in quantitative terms and which is also typical of postmodern armies, that is, peacekeeping or

[6] By total the mobilization of the whole nation, of all its activity sectors (military, but also and mainly industrial) for the war efforts (Janowitz, 1971, p. xi) is meant.

[7] Kaldor (1999, pp. 1–9) calls these new types of conflicts the "new wars" as distinguished from the "old wars" (between states).

[8] The question was: "For each of the following, please tell me if you think it is one of the roles of the army, or not?

TABLE 19.3. Opinions of Europeans about the Roles of the Military (Percentage Who Answered "Yes")

Threats	EU15
Defending the country/the territory	94
Helping our country in case of a disaster	91
Helping other countries in case of a disaster	84
Keeping or reestablishing peace in the world	80
Preparing for wars and fighting	76
Defending values, such as freedom and democracy	70
Guaranteeing/symbolizing national unity	59
Passing on to young people values such as discipline, respect for their superiors	54
Helping young people to integrate into society, e.g., by teaching them a trade	54
The army is of no use (SPONTANEOUS)	6

Note: DK/NA included.
Source: Eurobarometer 54.1. See Manigart (2001, pp. 8–11).

restoring peace, was meanwhile cited by 8 Europeans of 10. Seven of 10 Europeans felt that the defence of values like freedom and democracy was also a role for the military. We note that more traditional, albeit nonmilitary, roles for the armed forces, such as guaranteeing/symbolizing national unity, instilling certain values in young people, or helping them integrate into society (the army as the school of the nation) were cited much less frequently (although the percentages remained above 50%).

On a comparative basis, it is interesting to mention that, except in Spain and Luxembourg, defence of the country led the list of roles mentioned, with percentages above 90. It was followed by help to the nation in case of disaster. The United Kingdom was the only country of the 15 where the traditional function of the military, specifically preparing for and waging war, came in second with 93%. It was moreover the only country, along with Greece, where the percentage was over 90. Preparing for and waging war was cited particularly infrequently in Sweden (38%), Luxembourg (41%), and Austria (52%), where this role came in last. We would note that two of these countries (Sweden and Austria) had a policy of neutrality during the Cold War (in fact, as concerns Sweden, for much longer, nearly 200 years, that is, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars) and that the size of Luxembourg's Army prevents it from envisioning this type of role.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS

In this central section, we analyze the main dimensions, at least in the author's judgement, of the restructuring process affecting, to a greater or lesser extent, all the military organizations of advanced industrial societies. Five of the six dimensions reviewed here are common to all these military organizations, i.e., downsizing; professionalization; the increased use of reservists, civilians, and outsourcing; interservice integration; and the multinationalization of formerly national military structures. The last one is more specific to armed forces of the European Union and is, in fact, a special case of this multinationalization process, i.e., the increased integration of these forces, what one could call their "Europeanization."

Downsizing

The end of the Cold War has brought a significant reduction of military expenditures, arsenals, production of armaments, and armed forces personnel. But apart from this specific military cause, the downsizing of armed forces is also the consequence of the same process as the downsizing of business firms, namely technological evolution. Because they have become very capital-intensive organizations, armed forces from advanced industrial societies need less personnel and are therefore much smaller than the labor-intensive mass armies of the past.

Another reason for the downsizing of armed forces is the need to make them more flexible and able to react swiftly to changes in their environment.[9] Mass armies, like large mass production firms in the 1950s–1970s, were bureaucratic organizations. As organizations grow, structural differentiation becomes greater and the number of hierarchical layers tend to proliferate (Perrow, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965), making them too rigid. So one crucial aspect of the restructuring of armed forces, as the restructuring of large civilian organizations (Robay and Sales, 1994, pp. 457–458), is their downsizing and delayering to make them leaner and meaner. To use the terminology developed by Ashkenas et al. (1995), the goal is to minimize vertical boundaries, i.e., boundaries between levels and ranks of people. According to them, speed has replaced size as a critical factor of organizational success. As was the case for large firms for much of the 20th century when the larger the company became, the more it was able to attain production efficiencies, size was also a crucial factor of victory for mass armies. This is no longer the case. Ashkenas et al. (1995, p. 8) make the following comparison: "large organizations are like tankers. Compared to smaller firms, they need more space and time in which to change direction because they have a greater mass to be mobilized, informed, convinced and channeled. The challenge for them is to act like a small company while retaining access to the large company's broader resources." Therefore the trend in all Western armed forces is to reduce the number of personnel and the size of centralized staffs. Probably we will also see in the near future a reduction in the number of ranks so as to have flatter hierarchical structures, like those in the postbureaucratic organizations.

As one can see from Table 19.4, with the exception of those of Luxembourg and Turkey (which is not an advanced industrial country), all NATO armed forces were seriously downsized between 1980 and 2000. The forces reduction percentages go from a minimum of 12% in Greece (the least advanced industrial country) to a maximum of 55% in Belgium and The Netherlands, the two countries that suspended the draft in the 1990s (see following section).

In most Western countries, downsizing should mainly affect the corporate (support) activities of military organizations through rationalization, elimination of redundancies, and outsourcing. Saving achieved through personnel cuts can then be channeled into procurement by rationalizing and restructuring the various staffs and support branches (administrative and logistics services, schools) and reducing the number of people working there. In several Central and Eastern European countries, this downsizing will necessitate more radical conversion policies (Jelusic and Selby, 1999).

That is, for instance, what is being done in Belgium (Manigart, 2001). The Strategic Modernisation Plan 2000–2015 (Flahaut, 2000) calls for personnel strength to be further

[9]See Chapter 23.

TABLE 19.4. Force Reduction among NATO Countries (1980–2000)

Country	1980	2000	Percentage reduction
Belgium	87,900	39,250	55
Canada	78,646	59,100	25
Denmark	35,050	21,810	38
France	494,730	294,430	40
Germany	495,000	321,000	35
Greece	181,500	159,170	12
Italy	366,000	250,600	32
Luxembourg	660	899	+ 36
The Netherlands	114,980	51,940	55
Norway	37,000	26,700	28
Portugal	59,540	44,650	25
Spain*	342,000	166,050	51
Turkey	567,000	609,700	+ 8
United Kingdom	329,204	212,450	35
United States	2,050,000	1,365,800	33

Note: In 1980, Spain was not yet a member of NATO.
Source: The Military Balance 1980–1981 and 2000–2001.

reduced from 44,500 now to 39,500 in 2015, allowing personnel expenditures to be cut from 1.38 billion Euro to 1.10 billion Euro by 2015. The new downsizing will be linear and without forced layoffs. During the transition period, the gradual manpower reduction will be realized through a series of accompanying outplacement measures (within the DoD or outside) and a limitation on new recruitments to around 2,000 per year. New recruits will be assigned in priority to operational units and older personnel will be transferred to support services. In 2015, the proportion of military personnel working in support ("tail") functions should be brought back to 46% (versus 54% in 2001), while the proportion in the "teeth" arms should go from 46 to 54%.

Professionalization

Perhaps the most discussed aspect of the restructuring of armed forces from advanced industrial societies is their professionalization, i.e., the end of the draft. Although Canada, Great Britain, and the United States had long ago abandoned the conscription system, most of the continental European countries had maintained it during the Cold War. As Shaw (2000, p. 23) points out, it was because of the greater threat of land invasion; long-established national traditions of military service (e.g., France); national beliefs concerning the democratic significance of conscription (Germany); local conflicts (Greece); and/or, more importantly, the high budgetary costs of a professional military.

The collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself changed all that. Such large armies were no longer necessary. To this extent, an all-volunteer force (AVF) became feasible—economically affordable—for most Western European states. But more importantly, the mission of these armies, as already pointed out, has changed. In the new kinds of conflicts, draftees no longer have their place. Finally, due to social–cultural changes at work in postindustrial societies (see section 2.1.3), in most European countries, the draft had become quite unpopular among young people.

TABLE 19.5. Opinions on Compulsory Military Service in the 15 EU Countries

Country	Percentage in favor
Greece	79
Finland	52
Sweden	40
Denmark	39
Portugal	35
Germany	34
Austria	30
United Kingdom	18
France	17
Italy	17
Belgium	15
Spain	13
Ireland	12
Luxembourg	10
The Netherlands	9
EU 15	**23**

Note: DK/NA included.
Source: Eurobarometer 47.2.

A question asked to a representative sample of young Europeans between ages 15 and 24 in a special Eurobarometer survey, carried out in spring 1997, provides an indirect indicator of this unpopularity.[10] The question dealt with compulsory military service. Did they think that young people their age would be rather for or rather against this institution? Table 19.5 presents the results for the 15 EU countries.[11]

On a comparative level, it is in these countries where compulsory military service no longer exists and where the issue is debated (see below) that the percentages of respondents who thought that young people their age would be in favor of this institution were the lowest. Among the 15 EU countries, it was in The Netherlands that military service was the least appealing (9%). There was also very strong opposition in Luxembourg (10% in favor), Ireland (12%), Spain (13%), Belgium (15%) France (17%), Italy (17%), and Great Britain (18%). On the opposite, it was in Greece and, to a lesser extent, in Finland, two countries which have (or had) difficulties with their neighbors, that military service seemed the most accepted among young people: 79 and 52% of respondents respectively thought that young people their age were in favor of compulsory military service.

As a consequence of all these factors, almost everywhere in continental Europe, during the first half of the 1990s, the debate on the end of the draft was reopened, and some countries have now reached their conclusions. Belgium and The Netherlands were the first countries on the European continent to abolish—or, to be exact, to suspend—conscription. France, the country that, with the United States, invented the *levée en masse*, is also abandoning the traditional draft system. On February 22, 1996, Jacques Chirac, the French President, announced his decision to replace the conscription system by a professional army and in

[10]It is interesting to know that in a 2001 replication of this survey, this item was no longer included, meaning that this issue had completely lost its salience and relevance in most EU member states.
[11]Sample size was 7059 for the 15 EU countries. This survey was carried out for the Directorate General Education and Culture of the European Commission.

TABLE 19.6. Percentage of Conscripts in NATO Armed Forces (1980–2000)

Country	1980	2000
Belgium	26	0
Canada	0	0
Denmark	34	23
France	53	20
Germany	45	40
Greece	72	62
Italy	63	45
Luxembourg	0	0
The Netherlands	43	0
Norway	72	57
Portugal	60	13
Spain	67	31
Turkey	66	87
United Kingdom	0	0
United States	0	0

Note: In 1980, Spain was not yet a member of NATO.
Source: The Military Balance 1980–1981 and 2000–2001.

2001, the transition to an AVF will be completed. In still other countries, as in Italy and Spain, discussions about the desirability and feasibility of ending the draft are underway, and in Germany, the topic is no longer taboo. Other countries will, no doubt, soon follow, not only in the former Western countries, but also in Central Europe.

Even in countries that have not yet ended the draft, the trend toward increased professionalization of armed forces is well underway: for instance, in all NATO countries except Turkey, the proportion of non professionals, i.e., conscripts, has significantly decreased since the early 1980s, as Table 19.6 clearly shows.

Because the military organizations of advanced industrial countries are high-tech organizations, the role of draftees in these organizations had progressively become marginalized. As early as the Cold War, the trend was to use them either in nonspecialized tasks, such as infanteers, or in nonmilitary functions. The latter were either nonspecialized service functions (cooks, drivers, etc.) or highly specialized ones not requiring on-the-job training, such as computer specialists, engineers, and so on. In some countries, such as Belgium, the unpopularity of the draft further initiated a vicious circle that led to the 1992 decision to suspend it: the more unpopular the draft was, the shorter the length of service and therefore the less there were functions open to draftees; draftees were thus more and more confined to boring roles which, in turn, led to low job satisfaction and to an even greater unpopularity of the draft and of the military; the government then responded by shortening the service length even more.

As already said, one of main reasons explaining why the draft was kept for so long in continental Europe, and continues to be kept in some countries, is that it was a relatively cheap method of manning relatively large armies (on paper at least) and that the East–West confrontation justified maintaining relatively large armies (despite a reduction caused by technological change). In other words, until 1989, i.e., as long as there was an East–West conflict, an all-volunteer force was, especially for small countries, from a budgetary perspective, too expensive. As a result, most European countries maintained mixed systems,

i.e., systems where draftees and volunteers worked alongside each others, although in different roles. The advantage of these "mixed" systems was that it allowed the professional military to receive more sophisticated weapons while, at the same time, allowing a military of a sufficient size to exist. Again, as already said, the end of the Cold War changed all that.

Professionalizing Western armed forces, however, is not an easy process. Most countries which have ended the draft, or are ending it, are indeed experiencing problems at the human resource management level. Indeed, ending the draft means that the military must recruit all its personnel. In other words, if they want to survive, armed forces must become competitive on the labor market, which is quite new for them, especially culturally, after having relied for so long on some form of forced labor; they must offer potential recruits career or training perspectives attractive enough to lure them. Otherwise, they will either not be able to recruit enough personnel or are going to attract individuals who are poorly motivated or skilled.

In the transition phase, as the examples of Belgium and the Netherlands show (Van der Meulen and Manigart, 1997), the absence of draftees is likely to be particularly felt in the technical, service, and staff branches, branches that sometimes employ highly skilled draftees in civilian functions, such as computer specialists, engineers, doctors, and language teachers. It is in these specialized civilian functions that draftees are the most difficult to replace by volunteers, due to pay differentials. Such specialists are indeed in short supply on the labor market and are thus very well paid in the private sector. Consequently, armed forces, with their rigid pay structures (mainly linked to rank), and, more generally, the public sector, have a lot of difficulties attracting and, even more so, retaining these people. But in most countries, as already said, conscripts also fill a large number of nonspecialized nonmilitary slots, such as cleaning, maintenance, or catering, which are costly to entrust to short-term volunteers. In AVFs, such nonspecialized nonmilitary functions tend to be outsourced to private firms (see next section).

The consequence of this is that with the end of the draft, a more flexible, diversified, employee-friendly human resource management is needed if armed forces are to attract qualified personnel on the labor market. Although pay increases are not unimportant in this respect, they are not sufficient; more structural and cultural measures are needed. Among the measures going in this direction, one can cite the introduction of new working conditions, such as part time and flex time, and a more efficient outplacement policy for noncareer volunteers. For example, the Dutch armed forces are offering their short-term volunteers in nontransferable combat jobs, the opportunity to receive a civilian vocational training, so that they do not leave the military empty handed.[12]

Other measures aimed at optimizing recruitment is to tap recruitment pools hitherto neglected, i.e., women, ethnic minorities, and so on (Boëne, 1997, p. 12), or even, as the Belgian Defence Minister proposed in 2000, substituting nonnational citizens for nationals.[13] Another possibility is to take into account new demographic realities, namely the ageing of the population, and therefore allowing the possibility of recruiting age groups older than the 18–25 years old, which is the classical age segment in most current armed forces.

[12]Source: *De Volkskrant*, July 31, 1999.

[13]The Belgian Defence Minister made this proposal in an interview to *La Dernière Heure* of October 30, 2000. In that interview, the Minister aired the idea, in the future, of recruiting EU and even non-EU citizens living in Belgium in the Belgian armed forces. According to him, the recruitment of EU citizens would prefigure a future European army while recruiting non-EU citizens living in Belgium would be a way to integrate them in the society.

Reserve Forces, Civilianization, and Outsourcing

Another aspect of the restructuring of armed forces is that the reserve is playing a greater role than in the late Cold War military organizations, at least in some domains and functions such as support functions and critical and/or scarce skills (such as linguists, intelligence, civil–military cooperation, public relations, and medical, air movements support). This role, however, is fundamentally different from the reserve's role in mass armies. The U.S. concept of total force, i.e., a mix of specialized and deployable active and reserve units, is an example of this new role.

Because of budgetary constraints, the diminution of the immediate threat and the extreme diversity of possible missions, it has become impossible to recruit, train, and retain enough specialists for all possible scenarios. One therefore either uses, and deploys, reservists for a certain number of tasks and/or contracts out some activities (*outsourcing*). In other words, as with the private sector, armed forces increasingly concentrate on their *core competencies*,[14] or primary mission, i.e., the management and prevention of organized violence, and contract out the remaining functions and/or use reservists as a temporary workforce.

In fact, as Dandeker (1994) notes, the armed forces of the future are becoming more like a flexible firm with a core of full-time specialists and a highly trained immediately available reserve, particularly in the areas of logistics and other supporting technical arms (doctors, information specialists, engineers, but also pilots, civil–military cooperation personnel, etc.). In the same vein, during peacetime, these organizations are beginning to outsource a growing number of peripheral tasks, such as maintenance, transport, and catering. They also use more civilians for administrative and management tasks, for instance, because the latter are cheaper to employ than highly and expensively trained military specialists, stay longer in their functions than military personnel (officers rotate every 3–4 years), therefore providing continuity and expertise and because, in so doing, one releases hard-to-recruit military personnel for operational tasks.

In other words, the challenge for human resources military managers is to identify what are the core functions that must be assigned to military personnel and what are the other tasks that can be assigned either to reservists or to civilian personnel or to be outsourced to specialized civilian firms. One of the decision rule could be the following (Dandeker, 1999, p. 40): if a function is necessary both in time of peace and operations (the core functions of military organizations, i.e., combat related functions), then active-duty military personnel is indicated; if one needs it only during operations (for instance, linguists, interpreters, medical personnel, transport aircrews, air movements support staff, and civil–military cooperation), then one can use reservists; and finally, if it is only needed in peacetime (administrative tasks, catering, routine maintenance, etc.), then it can be outsourced or civilianized. Among other decision criteria, one can cite the necessity for one's own personnel to acquire and maintain a certain level of know-how, of expertise, in order to be able to use it in specific circumstances, such as long-term operations abroad; or the fact that, in the organization, for some tasks, one can use, in peacetime, military personnel who are assigned to operational functions in time of war or of long-term operations abroad. In that case, these people will, in peacetime, perform a function similar to this operational wartime

[14] Prahalad and Hamel (1999) define core competencies as activities that are central to the organization's customers and mission, in which it has unique capabilities and can meet world-class performance standards.

function, even though, in peacetime, it could perfectly be possible to outsource this task. Instances of such functions are cooks and mechanics.

Beyond the increasing use of reservists, civilians, and contractors, however, there is also the possibility of outsourcing some functions to other armed forces. One enters here the domain of international cooperation and integration (see "Integration of European Armed Forces").

There is, however, a pitfall of contracting out too many functions (and notably civilian administrative tasks); that is, by so doing one risks eliminating possible second-career slots for combat soldiers who, after some years in very demanding and physically heavy functions (long-term operations abroad, etc.), aspire to more sedentary functions, such as administrative ones. One would thus further decrease, unwillingly, the attractiveness of a military career and would create a new problem, this time at the recruitment level.

All these developments make the borders of restructured military organizations more flexible and permeable and further blur the differences between military and civilian organizations, but also between service branches.

Interservice Integration

For technological and budgetary reasons, in the new restructured armed forces, there is also greater interservice integration, what Dandeker calls the "purple trend." Interservice integration results also from what the British call "force packaging," i.e., modular structures. Dandeker (1999, p. 30) defines such structures as "a series of coherent, self-contained, mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from the various organic commands for a given mission. Such modules can be assembled at short notice to form a mix of force appropriate for the specific demands of unforeseen crisis demanding the use of armed forces" (see "Virtual Organizations and Multinationalization of Armed Forces").

As Dandeker (1999, p. 30) also aptly points out, interservice integration has serious implications as far as expertise and education of military personnel of all ranks are concerned. It also requires the development, among personnel working in these integrated staffs, of some sort of "cultural interoperability," i.e., the development of an joint organizational culture encouraging the effective cooperation among different service cultures.

An example of interservice integration is provided by Belgium. The new Strategic Modernisation Plan 2000–2015, adopted by the Belgian government in May 2000, proposes indeed a sweeping reorganization of the Belgian armed forces intended, through a smaller but better equipped and more efficient force, to enhance Belgium's ability to project forces capable of operating across the full spectrum of military operations in concert with NATO and EU allies. Among others, the plan calls for the adoption of a more modular, flexible structure (force packages) for the various force components capable of putting rapidly into place elements that can then be integrated in a multinational force. The plan is structured around the following three basic principles (Flahaut, 2000, pp. 33–37): *joint* (interforces) is the rule, nonjoint the exception (one joint staff, one HRM management); *combined* (multinational) where it is possible (thus need for integration and interoperability); and *CIMIC* (civil–military cooperation) is imperative (with other national departments, with NGOs, etc.). The government has opted for a joint structure with as few layers as possible (delayering) and maximum interservice integration in order to be 100% operational with less personnel. The intention is to have a clear distinction between "core" activities and support or "corporate" functions, where core functions are clients of corporate services. The

core activities will be coordinated by a joint staff in coordination with European partners (combined). The corporate activities will be structured along functional domains so as to eliminate redundancies between services (joint). Furthermore, cooperation will be sought with allied armed forces and with the civilian sector (combined). The joint structure which is to be implemented in January 2001, means that the four independent Forces and Services (army, air force, navy, and medical service) disappear and are replaced by ground, air, sea, and medical components and that, in the place of independent staffs come one integrated, interservice joint staff.

Virtual Organizations and Multinationalization of Armed Forces

By far the majority of military operations are now carried out by multinational intervention forces (such as KFOR) or permanent multinational forces (such as NATO or the Eurocorps). In other words, one sees again the same evolution as in the private sector, i.e., the proliferation of joint ventures, strategic alliances, and virtual organizations. According to Schuler, and Jackson (1996, p. 44), a virtual organization is a temporary network of companies with diverse core competencies who quickly form a collaboration to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Having exploited these opportunities, the "corporation" may disband as swiftly as it formed. The temporary firm has no hierarchy, no central office, and no organizational chart. Among the examples of virtual organizations in the military domain, one can cite SFOR in Bosnia or KFOR in Kosovo, but also the new NATO strategic concept of *Combined Joint Task Forces* (CJTF) and the notions of modular forces and force packages (see preceding section).

Package structures are so-called matrix organizations. A matrix organization has a dual reporting and control mechanism, a vertical one (functional hierarchy) and a horizontal one (product or service). In a matrix structure, employees report to more than one boss, with each boss responsible for a different aspect of the organization. Once the project is completed, the employee returns to his or her department or is directed toward a new project. The structure is therefore temporary (Norgan, 1994, p. 29). On the one hand, such a structure is more flexible and avoids duplicate functions (one shares skills according to the project). It encourages cooperation, conflict resolution, and coordination. It is, however, important that individual team members have considerable tolerance for confusion and ambiguity since a lot of employees from different levels within the organization are grouped together in an informal environment where lines of communications are loose and unorganized. On the other hand, the disadvantages are that it is difficult to put into place in a traditional (functional) organization, that there is a risk of power conflicts, and that it requires flexibility, cooperation, and highly developed interpersonal skills at all levels.

Actually, Western military organizations have had some of the characteristics of matrix organizations for a long time. But before (e.g., NATO), the horizontal dimension was permanent. With the new force packages (CJTF, SFOR, KFOR), the horizontal dimension changes with the mission. All these changes, however, require a fundamental change in organizational culture (more emphasis on values such as initiative, cooperation, and trust) (Kipnis, 1996; Mishra, 1996; Reimer, 1996).

As an example of the multinationalization of armed forces, let us take the peacekeeping mission to Kosovo, or Kosovo Force (KFOR).[15] NATO forms the core of this international

[15]Source: NATO's and KFOR websites (www.nato.int and www.kforonline.com).

peacekeeping mission, called Operation Joint Guardian, in which some 50,000 military personnel from over 30 countries[16] have been deployed in this region since June 11, 1999. The mission is seeking to build a secure environment within the Serbian province in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, can live in peace and, with international aid, democracy can begin to grow. KFOR's mandate comes from a Military Technical Agreement signed by NATO and Yugoslav commanders on June 9, 1999 and from UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 12, 1999, which followed a 78-day air campaign. KFOR contingents are grouped into five multinational brigades (MNB).[17] Although brigades are responsible for a specific area of operations, they all fall under a single chain of command under the authority of Commander KFOR.

Integration of European Armed Forces

One specific feature the restructuring of European armed forces is taking is a slow, difficult, but nonetheless probably inexorable organizational integration at the European Union level. The 1992 creation of the Eurocorps and the 1999 decision to set up a EU rapid reaction force of 50,000–60,000 men by 2003 are steps in this direction.

The Eurocorps, which succeeded the Franco-German Brigade created in 1989, comprises military contributions from its five member states: France and Germany, the two founder countries; Belgium (which joined in June 1993); Spain (July 1994); and Luxembourg (1996).[18] The headquarters is located in Strasbourg, France. The HQ Eurocorps took part in SFOR and KFOR missions. The HQ Eurocorps is to be restructured into the EU Rapid Reaction Corps HQ. The Eurocorps is a multinational (and not yet a truly transnational) military organization to the extent that, except for the French–German Brigade and the Staff of the Multinational Command Support Brigade (MNCS Bde) that are permanently under operational command of HQ Eurocorps, the national contributions remain under national command in peacetime. They become fully subordinated after Transfer of Authority has been decided by member states.

But, aside from the creation of the Eurocorps, in the long process of development of a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), one major turning point, without doubt, has been the joint declaration on European defence during the British–French summit of December 1, 1998 in Saint-Malo. Until then, the United Kingdom had indeed been the country most opposed to the inclusion of defence among the Union's competencies.[19] This summit and, later, the Kosovo conflict opened the way to the decision of the Cologne European Council of June 3–4, 1999 to develop the "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."[20] In order to realize this objective, the Helsinki European Council of December 10–11, 1999 decided on

[16]NATO participating countries are Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Non-NATO nations are Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, Lithuania, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Arab Emirates.

[17]MNB Centre, MNB North, MNB South, MNB East, and MNB West.

[18]Source: www.eurocorps.org.

[19]See Heisbourg (2000).

[20]Cited in Rutten (2001, p. 41).

TABLE 19.7. Opinions of Europeans on the Creation of an RRF (Percentage by Country)[a]

Country	Very or rather good thing	Very or rather bad thing	DK
Belgium	82	8	10
Denmark	78	17	5
Germany	70	13	17
Greece	77	11	12
Spain	69	8	24
France	81	7	12
Ireland	55	12	34
Italy	81	7	12
Luxembourg	79	5	16
The Netherlands	77	10	13
Austria	63	16	21
Portugal	73	7	21
Finland	73	15	12
Sweden	74	16	10
United Kingdom	60	21	19
European Union	73	11	16

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1 Special Defence (Manigart, 2001).
[a]The question was: "Recently, the EU has decided to set up a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men. Personally, do you believe it is a very good thing, a rather good thing, a rather bad thing, or a very bad thing?"

the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 50,000–60,000 men by 2003 capable of being deployed within 60 days for a period of at least a year for so-called Petersberg missions, i.e., humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping, and restoring peace missions.

As Table 19.7 shows, this decision by EU leaders has the full backing of their public opinion: in fall 2000, over 7 Europeans of 10 (73%) believed that the establishment of a rapid reaction force (RRF) of 60,000 men was a very good (23%) or rather good (50%) thing. Some 16% expressed no opinion. In other words, only a very small minority of respondents (14%) disagreed with that initiative. In all the Union's countries, over half the respondents believed that the establishment of that rapid reaction force was a very good or rather good thing. In three countries, founder members of Six—namely Belgium, Italy, and France—the percentages approving even exceeded 80%. In two of the other Six founder countries—Luxembourg and The Netherlands—the percentages of respondents deeming this initiative a very or rather good thing were 79 and 77%, respectively. Among the Six, it was only in Germany that the approval rate (70%) was below the European average (73%). The three countries which were, relatively speaking, the least enthusiastic about this initiative were Ireland (55%), the United Kingdom (60%), and Austria (63%).

As the Eurocorps, the future EU Rapid Reaction Force will, however, remain a multinational organization. So, does the European public support further steps in the integration process of European armed forces, for example, the creation of a true transnational European Army? This question was also asked in the fall 2000 Eurobarometer Special Defence Survey. Europeans were asked what type of European army it would be desirable to have. Response categories constituted a sort of Likert scale going from a maximalist federal option ("one single European army that would replace national armies") to the pure national option ("no European army, but only national armies"). Table 19.8 shows the results by country.

The solution preferred by Europeans was that of a permanent European RRF in addition to national armies (37%). The proposal corresponding most closely to the solution accepted at the Helsinki European Council—namely "a European rapid reaction force, that

TABLE 19.8. Preferences of Europeans about the Type of European army (Percentage by Country)

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I
One single European army that would replace national armies	25	10	21	16	20	21	11	25
A permanent European RRF in addition to national armies	40	35	37	48	30	44	27	41
A European RRF that would be put together only when needed	16	32	16	13	21	15	17	15
No European army, but only national armies	7	17	12	14	6	12	23	7
Other (SPONTANEOUS)	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	1
DK	10	5	14	8	21	7	23	12
	L	**NL**	**A**	**P**	**FIN**	**S**	**UK**	**EU15**
One single European army that would replace national armies	11	24	19	13	6	7	8	18
A permanent European RRF in addition to national armies	50	29	33	35	31	39	31	37
A European RRF that would be put together only when needed	19	28	17	21	28	27	22	18
No European army, but only national armies	9	9	14	6	26	16	25	13
Other (SPONTANEOUS)	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
DK	9	10	16	25	9	12	15	13

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1 Special Defence (Manigart, 2001).
B = Belgium, **DK** = Denmark, **D** = Germany, **GR** = Greece, **E** = Spain, **F** = France, **IRL** = Ireland, **I** = Italy, **L** = Luxembourg, **NL** = Netherlands, **A** = Austria, **P** = Portugal, **FIN** = Finland, **S** = Sweden, **UK** = United Kingdom, **EU** = European Union.

would be put together only when needed"—was chosen by 18% of the respondents. Nearly 2 respondents of 10 (19%) were in favor of the establishment of a thoroughly integrated European army that would replace the national armies. At the other end of the scale, only 12% of Europeans wanted no European army at all, in whatever form. In other words, more than 7 Europeans of 10 (73%) are aware that the time of purely national armies in Europe is over and that such a solution no longer meets the challenges with which the EU is and will be increasingly faced in the future. Hence they want to set up, in one form or another, a supranational European force.

It is remarkable to note that, in the EU's 15 countries, admittedly by a narrow margin in some cases, the option of a permanent European rapid reaction force, in addition to the national armies—which is also the next stage for which several governments are hoping for instituting a credible common security and defence policy—was the option which won the greatest approval. In Luxembourg, it was even by one in two. In Greece (48%), France (44%), Italy (41%), and Belgium (40%), the percentages reached or exceeded 40%. Among those most favorable to the establishment of a European army, in one form or another, we again find five of the Union's six founder countries. In fact, more than 8 Belgians, Italians, and Dutch of 10 (81% in the three cases) and 80% of French, as well as 79% of Luxembourgers, would prefer to see such a solution effected.

Concretely, the next step in the integration of European armed forces will have to be some kind of tasks specialization, or division of labor. In fact, such a division of labor already exists today, be it in an informal, nonnegotiated way. French and British forces are

TABLE 19.9. Preferences for the Education of Officers (Percentages by Country)[a]

	Belgium	The Netherlands	Italy	Slovenia
Entirely on a supranational basis in a military institution of the EU	10	7	9	9
Partly on a supranational basis in a military institution of the EU	70	78	85	83
Purely on a national basis	20	15	7	8

Source: Manigart and Jelusic (2001, p. 22).
[a]The question was: "Within the framework of a greater European integration, should it be desirable that the education of officers be organised..?"

indeed, de facto, the only two real war-fighting military organizations within the European Union: Not only do they have the military capabilities to conduct robust peace-enforcing or peace-making operations, but they have also the political will and, as discussed under "Professionalization," the public support to do so (Boëne, 2001; Webber, 2001). Other EU armed forces are, again de facto, more or less confined to and/or specialized in less robust military operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Some armed forces, such as the Belgian ones, have even gone a step further: the new Strategic Plan 2000–2015 (Flahaut, 2000) indeed clearly puts the emphasis on the new multinational peace-support operations and explicitly pleads for some degree of concerted specialization between EU member states.

If the European Union ever wants to move toward a really integrated common European defence (for the moment, it remains at the intergovernmental level) and a truly transnational armed force, then more radical forces and units specialization will be needed, as well as rationalizations (for example, at the level of training). Not only equipment and procedures will have to be standardized across the various countries (interoperability in NATO terminology),[21] but also the education of soldiers, especially officers, will have to be integrated in order to enhance, this time, cultural interoperability and to replace the old national organizational cultures by a new European one. Some military academies, such as Saint Cyr in France and the Royal Military Academy in Belgium, are already cautiously moving in this direction by sending, or planning to send, their cadets to military academies of other countries for a more or less extended stay (a few weeks to 6 months), following in this the example of civilian universities participating in the Erasmus and other exchange programs funded by the European Union and which are aimed at increasing mobility within the European Union.

To illustrate this trend, let us look at Table 19.9. It shows the answers of military cadets from four European countries to a question on the desirability of a greater European integration of the officers' education.[22]

As Table 19.9 clearly shows, the preference of large majorities of respondents in the four countries went to a mixture of national and European education, i.e., the format more

[21]Within NATO, there exist already some standardization agreements between some or all member countries, the so-called STANAG (Standard Nato Agreement).

[22]The survey was carried out in 1999 and 2000 in four European countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, and Slovenia) among civilian and military samples within the framework of the COST A10 program of the European Commission. The aim of the research project was to measure how the recent developments in the environment of military organizations were perceived both by members of armed forces and the public (professionalization, downsizing, new missions) and at assessing how these same actors view the future of armed forces (threat perception, mission, budget, international cooperation, alliances, common European defence policy, etc.). See Manigart and Jelusic (2001).

TABLE 19.10. Opinions on the Nature of Armed Forces in 20 Years' Time (Percentage by Country)

	Belgium	The Netherlands	Italy	Slovenia
Only national armies	7	7	13	19
A common European army	67	51	62	35
A permanent UN army	22	26	20	35
No more army	0	1	1	0
DK/NA	4	15	5	12

Source: Manigart and Jelusic (2001, p. 21).

and more found in civilian universities in the EU. The least in favor of such a solution (but still with a percentage of 70%) and also the most "local," i.e., favorable to a status quo, were Belgian cadets (20% were for an education purely on a national basis). The most pro-European and least nationally oriented were the Italians and Slovenians.

Finally, as a sort of conclusion to this section, how do the same military cadets view the nature of armed forces in 20 years' time?[23] Table 19.10 presents the results.

Except in Slovenia, where undergraduates were divided between the prospect of a European or a UN army, in the other three countries, a clear majority of respondents thought that, in 20 years' time, there will be a common European army. It was among Belgian cadets that the percentage was highest (67%). If almost nobody believed that in 20 years' time there will no more army at all, one must note that the percentage of those thinking that there will still be only national armies was also rather small (7% in Belgium and The Netherlands and 13% in Italy and 19% in Slovenia).

CONCLUSION

It is likely that, at the end of their restructuring process, the postmodern military organizations of the future will resemble what in the HRM literature are known as networks of organized anarchies, i.e., organizations with permeable boundaries and flat hierarchies given to decentralized decision making (hence a reduction of the size of headquarters) and with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity. Finally, as far as European armed forces are concerned, the restructuring process must go hand in hand, if these organizations want to be more efficient, with a greater integration and cooperation of armed forces at the European level. Only greater integration and cooperation will make possible a greater degree of task specialization among European armed forces and therefore allow to solve the present ajustment problems given the present and future budgetary constraints facing all European governments.

[23]The question was: "And now, try to imagine the world in 20 years time. Do you think that, in this world, there will be...."

CHAPTER 20

Conversion of the Military

Resource-Reuse Perspective after the End of the Cold War

Ljubica Jelušič

INTRODUCTION: ARE MILITARY AND CONVERSION THE ADVERSARIES?

Defense conversion has attracted scientists from several different backgrounds, including many macroeconomists; sociologists of industrial organization; defense analysts; peace researchers; and, since the early 1980s, sociologists of the military. Most studies on defense conversion emerged after the large-scale downsizing of military and defense sectors seen in the late 1980s following the end of the Cold War. However, conversion is not a new phenomenon. It has been presented throughout history as part of postwar reconstruction and, in this respect, it has generally been successful. Conversion became a concept worthy of analytical and scientific studies in times of peace in the 1960s when it accompanied the general downsizing of defense sectors and the disarmament of different countries around the world. The first downsizing issue concerned the number of military personnel following the end of WW2. The second driving force underlying modern conversion has been seen in disarmament negotiations, which have encouraged economic analyses of the possible benefits of the military industry.

The early studies on defense conversion focused on certain specific characteristics of the process, sometimes involving only very limited aspects of conversion (for example, economic conversion). The narrow sense of conversion, i.e., "direct conversion from research establishments and defense factories to research and manufacturing enterprises of civilian products in order to eliminate a loss of employment or firm closures" (Struys, 2000, p. 34) was one of the main specifics of the first scientific approaches to conversion. Another feature of the early studies was their strong connection with peace activism and disarmament, which made such studies very popular among the general public, especially

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among peace activists but, on the other hand, also very doubtful in some other scientific fields. The sociology of the military was among those sciences that were very suspicious of the substance of defense conversion, mainly because of its possible foundation in peace studies.[1]

The economic school on defense conversion is the oldest scientific approach to the field (Benoit and Boulding, 1963). The sociology of organizations owes its analysis of defense conversion to one famous expert, American professor of industrial engineering Seymour Melman (1970, 1974, 1983), whose works are still studied as the founding sources on conversion. There were many attempts to verify the issues closely related to conversion, although their authors did not use the terminology of conversion. There was also no common concept of conversion to establish an analytical framework for the transformation of armed forces and the related industries.

The sociology of the military is interested in defense conversion as a process and is closely connected with the concepts of disarmament, demilitarization, and demobilization. Melman launched the thesis on the demilitarized society in 1988, when he related disarmament processes with economic conversion. Three years earlier, in Europe, Haltiner (1985) empirically tested demilitarization as a value change process. Shaw (1990) discovered the connection between militarism and demilitarization. Van Doorn (1975) was among the first military sociologists to have elaborated a thesis on the decline of the mass army, empirically tested later by Haltiner (1998; also see this volume). These authors and their theories have paved the roads for entrenching the sociology of the military as one of the sciences most interested in the processes of qualitative military conversion, whereas the quantitative concept of defense conversion has remained in the main interest domain of the economic sciences.

Within a decade of waiting on the "dividends" of post-Cold War reconstruction, the concept of conversion was broadened in meaning to include the phenomena of military postconflict and peace demobilization, along with the reuse of military infrastructure.[2] Nevertheless, the criticism that conversion and the "peace dividend" in general have failed has gained some public and expert support (Voronkov, 1996, p. 134).[3] The empirical verification of different aspects of conversion's outputs took place in some European states in the 1996–2001[4] period under the title "Defense Restructuring and Conversion." The study

[1] Doubts of the sociology of the military toward peace studies in general and defense conversion as a subject were indirectly expressed at the very beginning of the sociology of the military, when its scope of interest was defined. Kurt Lang, author of the annotated bibliography of the sociology of the military in *Current Sociology* (16(3) 1968, published in 1970), decided to include bibliographical items according to the sociological approach regardless of the scientific affiliation of the author, yet he disqualified the works stemming from peace studies.

[2] The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) began to publish the yearly Conversion Survey series in 1996. The publication provides recent data on global disarmament, demilitarization, and demobilization. The data are measured by the BIC3D index (the BICC Conversion, Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization).

[3] Voronkov argued that during the Cold War many myths had been created about the peace dividend as a magic tool for the resolution of all kinds of problems.

[4] The European Commission has launched the project within the framework of COST (Cooperation in Science and Technology Program) "Defence Restructuring and Conversion," which followed key goals like increasing the interaction and cooperation among researchers already active in the field of defense conversion; establishing contacts with practitioners to support and stimulate conversion management; and empirical testing of different concepts of conversion and of the economic, social, cultural, and political outputs of conversion in 14 participating European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

revealed the dilemma in the relationship between the processes of defense sector restructuring and defense conversion, asking whether they are complementary or competing processes in the global community. The notion of conversion has gradually lost its antimilitary and antiwar theoretical meanings and has evolved into a concept helping the military establish the mechanisms for successfully reusing freed-up military resources.

If at the beginning it was mostly the scientific interest of the economic sciences to discover the benefits of conversion and the public slogans of peace activists, it is very clear that after 3 decades of the concept's development it calls for an interdisciplinary approach at the scientific level and for financial and business support at the practical level. Antimilitary oriented in its first attempts, the concept and practice of conversion have developed into a phenomenon acting in the interest of the military, in the interest of the services that support the military (defense industry), and in the interests of civil society. If at the outset conversion seemed a controversial issue between the military and civil society, it has gradually been developed into a concept which brings the two poles together.

CONVERSION: TRANSFORMING DEFENSE HARDWARE AND A CHANGE IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

In the past 3 decades conversion has developed to become an empirical phenomenon as well as an analytical concept with various understandings. The *Dictionary of Alternative Defense* states that the term "*conversion*" signifies a shift of productive resources from military to civil production or, put in a broader sense, a shift from the military to civil use of resources. In an even wider sense, conversion means the shift of society from wartime to peacetime (Møller, 1995, pp. 91–92). Brzoska (1999, pp. 132–133) distinguished three groups of analytical uses of conversion. The first group of concepts is limited to the transformation of defense plants from producing military to civil goods (developed in the 1970s and early 1980s). The second group of concepts focuses on the transformation of all resource types found in military sectors. The third group of concepts demotes the economic focus and is used to encompass all kinds of economic, psychological, cultural, and political changes happening in societies where military efforts are reduced. According to Brzoska, the first use of the conversion concept is too narrow because it focuses on only one of the changes in reducing military sectors, requiring a total changeover from military to civil production. The third use overburdens conversion as an analytical concept because it includes phenomena not necessarily related to the downsizing of military sectors. The second use of the concept is the most useful for analytical and practical purposes due to its resource reuse perspective (Brzoska, 1999, p. 133).

The resource-reuse approach was conceptualized at the Bonn International Conversion Center and served as the basis for empirical measurements of conversion in six issue areas, published in the annual periodical Conversion Survey (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). The conversion issue areas are as follows: reallocation of financial resources, reorientation of research and development, restructuring of the military, demobilization and reintegration, base closure and redevelopment, and the disposal of surplus weapons. These are issue areas where the quantitative measures of the economic sciences can be used; explaining to what extent the quantitative transformation of defense hardware is achieved. The European Commission project "Defense Restructuring and Conversion" took place within the framework of the social sciences and set out three dimensions of conversion: conversion of the arms

industry (Serfati, 1996; Serfati et al., 2001), the regional dimension of base closures and the closing of arms industry facilities (Jauhiainen et al., 1999; Brzoska, Markusen, 2000), and the sociocultural aspects of conversion (Jelušič, Selby, 2000; Manigart, Jelušič, 2001). All three dimensions encompass the relation between post-Cold War defense restructuring and conversion.

The sociology of the military is interested in the qualitative aspects of conversion; this means it explores the sociocultural aspects of all six conversion issue areas, although the main focus remains on the demobilization and reintegration of military and defense personnel. Qualitative conversion is discussed not only as the by-product of force restructuring, but also as an achievement of the relation between military organizations and the civil environment, in which new social prospects should be developed for those who stay in the military or in services connected with the military (bases, arms industry), for those who have left it, and for the society which accepts the surpluses created by the freeing up of military capabilities. Recent history has shown that in many cases force reduction was not followed by a qualitative conversion of the resources then made available, which supports the statement on conversion being a luxury for the richest countries.

CONVERSION AND RELATED CONCEPTS (DISARMAMENT, DIVERSIFICATION, AND DEFENSE RESTRUCTURING)

Conversion and disarmament are parallel processes that accelerated along with the waning of the Cold War. Both processes occurred on a large scale in countries that belonged to the former Cold War alliances, i.e., to the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and also in countries that had proclaimed their foreign policies as neutral or nonaligned with regard to the two main adversaries of the Cold War. Disarmament was partly a guided process; meaning that it took place as a result of agreements made among former adversaries or interested countries. In some cases, disarmament was also a spontaneous process whereby greater numbers of military personnel were leaving military organizations in the search for jobs with better prospects in the civil labor market. That was the result of the rapid drop in the living standards of military personnel which emerged in most postsocialist countries. At the same time as military personnel were seeking new jobs, the large surpluses of weapons began to be spread around the world, mainly in the new conflict areas of the 1990s. Europe was a theater for these two processes as well as an additional one. In the Balkans, the large number of "freed" soldiers from other countries appeared as volunteers in armed conflicts, fighting for different conflicting parties. Therefore, freed up military personnel have sought jobs in the civil market but they have also pursued jobs in the military market, outside of their home countries.[5]

Brzoska (2000a, pp. 15–16) established the relationship between disarmament and conversion in the sense of disarmament being merely the point of departure for an investigation of conversion. Disarmament is a multifaceted and contradictory issue. It results

[5]The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deployed Russian volunteers who had fought on the Serbian side in the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed conflict (1992–1995) as a mobilization source also in time of the NATO air strikes in 1999. The Russian volunteers attended the big antiwar demonstrations in Belgrade and in other cities in order to show the preparedness of Russia to help Serbia under NATO attack. Soldiers were accepted with ovations but Russia was not eager to repeat the beginning of the First World War just because of its Slavic ties with the Serbs.

in a reduction in the number of arms, but it is not necessarily always followed by reduced military capabilities. A reduction in certain specific types of arms might lead to an increased number of other (more sophisticated or better) arms, resulting in an increased level of military capability. Reductions in military expenditures should result in structural adjustments within the military sector, ending with greater rationalization and increased military capability. The threshold of the 1990s generally pushed militaries into the situation in which they obtained less men (or personnel), less relevance, and less priority, yet greater defense commitments and military deployments. The "less of everything" paradigm (Boëne et al., 2000, p. 43) reveals the contradiction arising from the reduction of military expenditure after the Cold War ended and the political and public expectations for the military to be more effective and capable of meeting the challenges of new threats and risks.

Therefore, disarmament has quantitative dimensions, which may result in lower or increased military capabilities. Further, reduced military expenditures might not result in the scaled-down importance of the military in civil societies. The authors of the study entitled "The Swedish Military in International Perspective" (Boëne et al., 2000, pp. 44–45) concluded that military defense is perceived as a policy goal of low priority because education, health care, fighting crime, creating jobs, environmental care, and other things involving everyday needs come first. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s confidence in the military as an institution has either been stable at a high level or has risen from a downward trend in the 1980s.

The mentioned contradictions of disarmament show that positing disarmament as a quantitative reduction in all aspects of military sectors and, at the same time, a qualitative reduction in military capabilities and a reduction of the importance of the military in society is no real solution. Brzoska (2000a, p. 29) suggested differentiating the concepts into concepts of quantitative disarmament, resulting in resource-reuse economic conversion; qualitative disarmament, resulting in force restructuring or military–political conversion; and demilitarization, resulting in cultural and psychological reorientation or societal conversion. Looking from the perspective of these concepts, the sociology of the military mostly studies military–political conversion and societal conversion.

As the peace dividend showed no results in the short term following the end of the Cold War, some experts and public opinion complained that conversion was the wrong concept. This understanding was the product of naïve expectations and a very narrow definition of conversion, both expecting the full engagement of freed-up military resources in the civil environment. The resulting disappointment had some influence on public opinion and in political circles and the academic sphere. Certain actors and analysts are hesitant to put their work within the framework of conversion (Brzoska, 1999, p. 131). The result was seen in implementation of a new concept which describes the policy of using military technology in the civil domain and which was called "defense diversification." It is very popular in the United Kingdom, where the Labor government has supported the process and helped establish a diversification agency to overview and concentrate the efforts for defense industry conversion. In general, diversification is a situation in which a firm (or technology) becomes involved in a completely different economic domain of activity without abandoning its former activity, either by modification of its internal structures or through the purchase of social shares (Struys, 2000, p. 34).

Another process running parallel to defense conversion is defense restructuring. The dilemma between conversion and defense restructuring can be explained in the following findings (Jelušič, 2000, pp. 311–312). First, defense restructuring is a process that affects all national and transnational defense organizations and institutions. The end of the Cold

War influenced the nature of contemporary conflicts; it created possibilities for reductions in military expenditure and the size of armed forces. Many new perspectives for attaining international security have since been offered, especially to countries of the former socialist world. All countries, regardless of their political system, size, and role in the international community have thus been forced (whether they desired it or not) to restructure their defense capabilities.

Second, conversion is a process consequent upon the reduced use of military and defense resources which needs plans, programs, and conscious action. It involves the organized shifting of people, skills, technologies, equipment, and financial and economic resources from defense or military-related activities to civilian purposes. Conversion is neither a cheap nor spontaneous process. It needs the investment of skills, money, ideas, and time.

Third, defense restructuring is usually a state-governed process (defense is the responsibility of the state), although it might also be supervised by international organizations, which in some cases leads to disarmament, demilitarization, or even conversion, but often only to restructuring within the defense sector. In some situations, conversion might not only be state-governed but it may also be a regional, local, or even privately supervised process. Governments are not always interested in making investments in conversion.

Fourth, defense restructuring and conversion should be examined together in cases where there is a social need to reallocate defense resources to other social sectors with the potential for development and growth. Where there are reallocations within the defense sector in order to establish more effective defense, or to achieve the better use of scarce resources, it is better to refer to this process as defense restructuring.

Fifth, there are some new developments in the defense sector which could be seen as defense restructuring aimed at both improved defense effectiveness and the development of civil society. One example is information technology. The history of information technology shows that the first form of networked electronic communication was developed inside the U.S. military—the Arpanet, the predecessor of the Internet. Today, the Internet allows the quickest transmission of enormous amounts of information for civil purposes. Unfortunately, it is also an appropriate media for waging "*cyberwar*" or "*war on the Internet*," as some events concerning the Kosovo crisis in 1999 were termed (Caforio, 2000). It is the military that is now trying to adapt to the order (or disorder) of the (civilian) Internet. Paradoxically, it is more convenient and cheaper for military organizations and the defense sector to adapt to "nonmilitary" technologies and strategies in order to improve defense capabilities rather than to stay with the traditional concept of a closed and heavily armed military.

CONVERSION AND THE POST-COLD WAR DIVIDEND

At the end of the Cold War, the ensuing economic conversion became the hit of economic analysis, political language, and even public opinion. It was translated into notion of "the peace dividend" (Gleditsch et al., 1996). The "peace dividend" is a concept used to refer to the benefits derived from reduced defense spending and the conversion of military production to civil production (Intrilingator, 1996, p. 1). Converting from military to civil production is not simply a matter of shifting funds from one category of social spending to another. It entails a fundamental transformation of resources in the economy, including the retraining of soldiers and defense workers, retooling of capital, and developing the capability to produce nondefense goods and services. There are some potential gains from

reducing defense spending. In the short term, defense cuts lead to the unemployment or underemployment of labor, capital, and other resources, interpreted as costs. In the long term, the investment process as a result of lowered defense budgets produces benefits, as the unemployed resources are reemployed to produce civil goods and services (Intrilingator, 1996, p. 3).

There was also a great deal of public optimism (not simply experts' fascination) about defense conversion at the beginning of the 1990s. It derived from the perception that postwar conversions have been generally successful (Gansler, 1995, pp. 7–9). Unfortunately, what happened after the Cold War was incomparable to other postwar periods. The post-war periods that followed conventional wars have created many victims from military personnel and civilians and the great destruction of mainly civil facilities. The post-Cold War period has not been characterized by physical destruction, yet it still forced the defense sector to undergo a huge downsizing. It had the specifics, i.e., the absence of "reconversion," defined as the postconflict return of certain firms to civil activities (Struys, 2000, p. 34). Defense industrialists of the 1990s had to convert resources originally developed for defense purposes into production for civil markets. In the post-Cold War period, the drastic reduction in demand for military goods has coincided with economic and industrial recession (especially in Central and Eastern European countries). The military resources thus freed up have found themselves unemployed together with civil resources then made available in the civil labor, financial, and technological markets. In the past, industry compensated for (or reconverted) the lost military demand from wartime by increasing civilian production in peacetime. Therefore, reconversion according to Struys (2000, p. 34) is the return of certain firms to civil activities after having been engaged for a given period of time in military tasks. In the case of a defense enterprise, this means the redeployment of its activity base by allocating military and nonmilitary tasks to its nonconverted economic capacity. The contradiction between short-term costs and long-term benefits stemming from reduced defense spending has generally intensified the disappointment with the "post-Cold War Peace Dividend."

The reality of the post-Cold War transformation can be described in terms of defense cuts, the disappearance of traditional military enemies, the challenge of new (nonmilitary) threats and risks, active regional and local armed conflicts, and regional arms races. There have been different reactions to this reality, many falling more into the scope of restructuring inside the area, with the production of side effects for the civil environment that is already under pressure of its own transformation and in many cases incapable of accepting the dropouts emerging from the defense sector. It is possible to sum up the following processes.

First, planned defense restructuring is a process in which the defense sector adjusts to reduced defense spending; reallocation is undertaken mainly within the defense sector, with surplus labor still on the payroll or having taken early retirement. The result of the process is effective defense at a lower cost, as seen in the richer countries of Western Europe and in the United States. Second, unplanned, ad hoc defense restructuring is a process mostly resulting in plant and base closures with the ensuing unemployment of soldiers, officers, and civil workers in the defense sector. The common result is less effective defense and the reduction of output and income. This is reflected in most Central and Eastern European countries. Third, defense conversion is the reallocation of economic, technological, labor, and other resources transferred from the armed forces and defense-related industry to civil activities. It involves long-term potential gains from defense cuts, although often there is short-term unemployment or underemployment of labor, capital, bases, plants, and

other resources (swords to ploughshares). It is a common European ideal, yet it is only seen in the richest countries in a very limited number of cases. Fourth, defense diversification is a process where civilian enterprises are capable of converting their production, originally developed for the civil market, to military wartime capacities (ploughshares to swords).

The restructuring and diversification processes need public support and/or promilitary ideology in order to legitimize changes in the defense sector. However, conversion is more successful when there is an antimilitary ideology and public skepticism of the military. As conversion needs time to bear fruit, it is most effective in the context of positive attitudes from the public; the political elite; and workers in the defense industry, military professionals and managers.

CONVERSION AND DEMILITARIZATION (SOCIETAL CONVERSION)

Demilitarization is a multifaceted concept. Its narrowest understanding belongs to international law, where demilitarization concerns the prohibition on the establishment of any military facilities or the stationing of armed forces under contract in a specified territory. The demilitarization of a certain territory usually follows peace accords in order to reduce armed tensions and the possibility of outbursts of conflict. Total demilitarization aims at the destruction of military sites, a prohibition on building up new military infrastructure, a prohibition on all types of armed forces except for law-and-order forces, and a prohibition on military recruitment and training. According to international law, demilitarization also describes the return of armed forces to their barracks after a *coup d'état*.

The more complex understanding of demilitarization is linked with value changes in modern society and the changed place of armed forces in society. This concept of demilitarization is also linked to the economic conversion and an improvement of the quality of life, mostly as factors that unleash the individual style of living in a modern society. This so-called postmodern project became a very popular concept of describing the changes seen in societies at the beginning of the new millennium, albeit it was presented to a lesser extent through the concepts of a "demilitarized society" (Melman) or "silent revolution" (Inglehart) long before the turmoil of the 1990s.

Melman (1988, p. ix) thought that a demilitarizing society institutionalizes democratic decision making and decentralization, reinforces productive life-serving values, and frees up the resources needed for every sort of improvement in the quality of life. Besides, the conversion from the military to the civil economy provides an economic alternative to the arms race. Melman showed how the three processes (conversion, demilitarization, and disarmament) are interlinked and interdependent. Nevertheless, his work on demilitarized society was accepted with doubt and criticism, mainly concerning the utopian character of his idea that war-making institutions and superpowers should embark on the simultaneous course of disarmament and economic conversion.

Demilitarization may also be understood in terms of value changes and attitudes to the central role of the military in the national security system. Haltiner explained the process of establishing the new social values whereby the military is no longer seen as the central national or state institution and termed the process as "secularization of the military" (Haltiner, 1985, p. 39). This means that the military is tolerated in society as one of the institutions providing national security, but it is no longer the central or only one. Social

attitudes to the military are not as oriented against it as antimilitary attitudes, or antimilitary ideology, when measured in pro and con terms. They are connected with the dimension of relevance from important to not important. The level of ignorance is increasing. Moskos touched on the same problem when speaking about the armed forces and public attitude to them in different eras. In modern pre-Cold War society, the public was supportive of the military; in the late modern (Cold War) era the public attitude was ambivalent. In the postmodern (post-Cold War) era, the public mood regarding the armed forces is becoming one more of indifference (Moskos, 2000, pp. 15 and 20). The explanation lies in the end of conscription, which makes military service more salient for the general population and produces a growing gap between the military and society. The end of the conscription era is the result of the long-term process of a reduction in armed forces sizes observed since the end of WW2 (van Doorn, 1975; Burk, 1992; Haltiner, 1998).

CONVERSION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

The Social Consequences of Cutting Defense Spending

A particular focus of the sociology of the military after the Cold War is on the demobilization of soldiers, which has happened as a result of the termination of wars, or a peaceful reduction in defense spending. The concept of post-Cold War demobilization in some respects covers issues similar to the "decline of the mass army theory" (Haltiner, 1998, p. 7), mostly in that part concerning erosion of the concept of mass armies on the basis of conscription. However, it also addresses much broader issues of the demobilization of professional military personnel (personnel on a military payroll) who, due to defense cuts, have lost their job in the military or who seek new, more prestigious, better paid, and more stable jobs in the civil labor market. It is also tied up with the issue of reintegration into civil life, as the expected dividend of demobilization, and which is not a necessary consequence of the "decline of the mass army" concept. As the latter will be elaborated in another chapter of this volume, the problems accompanying the demobilization of professional military personnel will be analyzed in detail here.

The quantitative measures of military downsizing in the past decade show that the total number of world military personnel fell from 28.8.million in 1987 to 22.0 million in 1997. The number of soldiers per citizen is dropping even more rapidly. In 1987, there were 5.7 soldiers worldwide per one thousand people. In 1997, this figure was down to 3.7 per thousand. In terms of continents, Europe has displayed the most drastic cuts in force levels over the past decade, namely to 62% of the level in 1987 (Conversion Survey, 1999, p. 76).

Demobilization is a reduction in the number of personnel and includes a reduction of the size of regular military, paramilitary forces, and civilian personnel employed by the armed forces. The Conversion Survey (1999, p. 76) does not include within the term "demobilization" the general turnover of personnel which occurs in every army. From the perspective of the sociology of the military, the general turnover of personnel is also an issue worthy of surveying with regard to demobilization because the size of turnover in general and the speed with which functions' are rotated are indicators of a potentially high innovation rate within the military and the potentially "occupational" versus "institutional" (Moskos and Wood, 1988) character of the personnel. Turnover shows to what extent soldiers were professionally socialized as a convergent or divergent social occupation with regard to other civil occupations (Caforio, 2000). Those soldiers who have undergone convergent

professional socialization are better prepared to leave the armed forces than those educated in a divergent system of military education and are also better prepared to reintegrate into civil life and the production of goods.

The turnover of personnel is usually highest in countries with large amounts of conscripts who remain in the armed forces for a certain period and, after finishing their compulsory military duty, move to the reserve service (some also become active soldiers under contract). Voluntary privates sign up for a certain number of years, with a possibility of prolongation. Some continue their military careers by entering the ranks of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Noncommissioned officers usually volunteer for a number of years; in some militaries they could stay through to the end of their military careers. The officer corps consists of professionals for contracted periods with the possibility to stay on until the end of their career if they are able to pass the requirements of different ranks. Such a system of turnover, where many of those who join up know they will stay only for a fixed period but also know that they can be promoted if they display certain abilities, brings many different people into the armed forces and permits the development of a pyramid ranking structure.

Voluntary departures from the military do not always take place at the levels expected in military personnel planning. There are many privates, NCOs, and officers who would like to remain in the military.[6] The new military missions (military operations other than war) require many young soldiers, which means it is essential for militaries with an all-volunteer force to compete in labor markets and to continue recruiting young personnel "whilst at the same time providing retraining to older personnel and assistance in finding new jobs" (Manigart, 2000, p. 61).

Demobilization is only the first part of the "human conversion" process (Kingma and Pauwels, 2000, p. 16). The second part of the process, namely "reintegration," is *de facto* conversion. It means that demobilization may end in the dismissal of soldiers[7] in some cases, increasing the unemployment level in society or even posing the threat of jobless veterans searching for an income to survive. The turn of demobilization into the conversion process demands additional sources for the reintegration of soldiers. Reintegration is needed to secure a productive role in civil life for the demobilized soldiers. Kingma and Pauwels (2000, p. 16) differentiated between various aspects of reintegration: social, political, economic, and psychological. The social, political, and economic aspects of reintegration correlate with the ability of a community to accept the former soldiers and their dependents. Psychological adjustment depends on a soldier's personal adjustment to the new civil situation. It is a process of cultural change in the soldier's "military mind" and/or (especially in cases of former combatants) the process of treating psychological stress disorders.

Reemployment is one of the first steps in the reintegration of people who have become accustomed to a certain way of life and have attained specific knowledge and skills. Some skills, for example, combat skills from teeth army units, are nonconvertible for civilian life.

[6]Some countries with an all-volunteer force, like Belgium, are facing the "aging" of the military as the natural result of the combined suspension of the draft and substantial downsizing of the organization (Manigart, 2000, p. 55).

[7]Demobilization sometimes works out well for the armed forces, ensuring reductions and the reintegration of soldiers but, from the point of view of many individual soldiers, the consequences are not so positive. The case of the dissolution of the former East German armed forces went smoothly, but many professionals were not incorporated into the military of the unified Germany. They did not meet the conditions to be accepted and were left on their own (Kingma and Pauwels, 2000, p. 18).

The armed forces have a hard time attracting suitable soldiers if they do not simultaneously provide adequate compensation, benefits, and prospects of finding a job afterward. During a period of high unemployment, the military is a way of acquiring a stable job and a permanent income.[8] In times of relatively low unemployment, the armed forces have to open the prospect of a subsequent civilian career in order to attract workers (even under short-term contracts).

According to Brzoska (2000b, p. 31), there are different types of incentives allowing the armed forces to help in bridging the two civil periods of life: in-service training for civil jobs, benefits, and early retirement subsidies. The most prominent one is training. First of all, some military tasks also have civilian applications (truck drivers). Second, the armed forces can provide additional formal education, either at military or civil institutions, which is recognized by the civil education system. The formal education for conversion may take place during a military career or at the end of it. Third, soldiers are educated in a two-sided occupation. In some militaries, soldiers are supposed to have a civil degree before starting their military career (dual-use soldiers).[9]

The search for a civil job, irrespective of additional training in the armed forces; appropriate counseling both before and after discharge; and reintegration support require a willingness to adjust to a different environment. Those who have been part of a military organization from an early age would have to undergo a fundamental transition (Brzoska, 2000b, p. 38). This cultural change requires the so-called "conversion of a military mind."

Conversion of a Military Mind

Those individuals forced to leave the armed forces due to reductions or in their search for a better job must adapt to the new professional culture of the civil enterprise. They have been trained in a top-down leadership style and possess knowledge and skills of limited application. They are forced to leave their established social networks and may even face social alienation. The main problem lies in the (in)-congruity of values that result from the specific military culture. There are also some strengths of the military culture, which can be regarded as positive and stimulating within a military organization yet are negative and repulsive outside of the military. A combat image and a masculine warrior image are two

[8] In postsocialist countries at least two different types of relations toward military jobs emerged. Due to drastic reductions of professional officers and NCOs in some countries (like Hungary and the Czech Republic), not only the older, less-qualified persons left the service but also the young, well-educated, energetic officers, who were frustrated because they could earn relatively little and felt that their opportunities for upward mobility were poor. Besides their workload increased significantly due to the shortage of staff and they were forced to work overtime without adequate remuneration (Kiss, 2000, pp. 224–225). A different attitude toward a military job was developed in Slovenia after the gaining of independence. The civil labor market was overloaded with unemployed people from the collapsed industry; the threat of bankruptcy was hanging over many enterprises. Therefore, many middle and top managers from nonprospective civilian enterprises, having the rank of reserve officer from the former military, decided to leave their civil jobs and sought military employment. They brought a lot of managerial knowledge and skills to the military and retained their "occupational" expectations regarding the military profession.

[9] In the Slovenian Armed Forces the precondition for entering the professional ranks of the army is a suitable civil degree: a vocational diploma for privates, a high school qualification for NCOs, and a college or university degree for officers.

elements of military culture not generally accepted in the civil environment (Garb, 2000a, p. 278). Further, both are becoming increasingly unacceptable in the nonmilitary world of liberal values.

This value gap is a significant obstacle to the conversion of soldiers because they have been trained under a conservative military ethos that is necessary for discipline, morale, and obedience. As the military must reflect the values and norms of society in order to maintain popular support, the military ethos might come into a contradiction with public expectations. In order to achieve efficiency, the military has to create a common professional military culture and a common mind.

The military mind is tied to the distinct goal, mission, and methods of executing a particular mission. It is the product of intraoccupational socialization, which provides a homogenization of values or occupational minds. Abrahamsson (1972, p. 78) listed five components of the military mind: nationalism, pessimism, alarmism, conservatism, and authoritarianism. These components derive from specific military goals and military education, yet they might also be the product of strengthening certain values, attitudes, and interests of people (cadets) who decide to become officers. Military values may reflect the anticipatory socialization, military socialization stage, or life cycle of a soldier. Therefore, in order to transform the military mind into a civilian's professional mind (and culture), military professionals should be exposed to resocialization and reeducation, which is in fact the start of converting the military mind.

There are two predominant theses on the role of military socialization and its impact on the development of a military mind. The first one belongs to the theory of total institutions like prisons, concentration camps, orphanages, or military garrisons, where the institution governs the life of its residents according to a fixed schedule, at a common place, and divided off from global society. Socialization in a total institution is mortification (Goffman, 1964), which fully changes the socialization framework of the individuals involved. A military mind produced in this kind of military socialization would require a broader range of resocialization approaches, mainly focused on the "demilitarization" of values.

The second thesis of military socialization argues that a military organization mainly strengthens the attitudes and values, developed in primary and/or anticipatory socialization, of self-selected military personnel. An international study of students from 10 European military academies led by Giuseppe Caforio tried to "determine the extent to which value orientations and ethical conceptions typical of professional officers are due to the educational process undergone by individuals before entering the academies (as a process of primary socialization or as a kind of anticipatory socialization), and the extent to which, on the contrary, military educational institutions have an impact as secondary socialization agencies" (Caforio and Nuciari, 1998, p. 7).

The self-selection involved in military jobs raises questions of the motives for entering a military organization and, consequently, the question of conversion's success at a time of reductions or given the expected turnover of professionals. Sarvas and Hodny (1998, p. 20) differentiated between divergent (traditional) motives for joining the military (for example, serving one's nation; an interest in the military or admiration of a certain military personality; a family tradition; and an interest in being a leader and in disciplined organization, in sport, or in physical activities) and convergent (posttraditional) motives (for example, for an income, job security, further education and training, or social promotion).

The motives for joining the military are important in explaining the success of the reintegration or conversion of military professionals. The group of professionals that share convergent motives for entering the military convert to civil life more successfully than the

group that has divergent motives. The expectations of the "convergent" group regarding working conditions in the military derive from factors that could be provided by many civil institutions. The "divergent" group searches for those characteristics of the military that make out of it a so-called *sui generis* organization. Their personal motivation to leave the military and adapt to general civil values and attitudes would be far more difficult.

Postconflict Demobilization and Conversion

Postwar or postconflict demobilization encompasses the complex of military, social, economic, and psychological measures which occur after the termination of a violent conflict and sometimes also while it is still underway. Some militaries mobilize soldiers for the whole duration of a conflict (like guerrilla combatants in Second World War partisan units in Yugoslavia or combatants of the Governmental Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–1995), while others mobilize combatants for a certain period, for offensive operations, and then demobilize them and call them up again before the next offensive (for example, the Croatian Army in the 1991–1995 war). Demobilization involves many actors with different roles and interests. It follows the peace accords, capitulations, and victories, with or without the help of the international community. When it comes after a victory, it usually affects the traditionally nonmilitary groups of soldiers and those with a more soldierlike image form the new postconflict military. Women combatants[10] and marginal ethnic groups are among the first to be dismissed. Female ex-combatants produce new social tensions because during fighting they have acquired a new war identity and have become aware of the equality of opportunities in civil society, too. When released, they are expected to return to their traditional roles. Here lies the first analytical interest of the sociology of the military, i.e., identifying those groups that are the first to leave the military.

Postwar demobilization could be a planned process that follows a preexisting military plan. In addition, the procedures are well known in those cases where international organizations provide help to demobilize combatants: combatants are brought to assembly areas, where they are registered, disarmed, and issued with identification cards; sometimes they receive health care, reorientation assistance, and financial or material support to start their new activities. In other cases, soldiers are demobilized directly out of their barracks (Kingma, 2000, p. 222). The period following the act of demobilization is of greater interest for the sociology of the military. Reintegration to civil life is a very slow and not always successful process. Former fighters have to find employment, which in postconflict destroyed areas can be very difficult. Their military experience, skills, and norms may cause social conflicts. They are very dangerous in situations where demythologization of the war in which they fought emerges. If they are converted into new professional roles (for example, the Kosovo Liberation Army's combatants were disarmed as soldiers and rearmed as members of the Kosovo Police Service), they might continue behaving as if in a military organization. In some cases, veterans undergo psychological rehabilitation. In many postwar countries there is no psychological help and those veterans suffering war trauma and various syndromes

[10] There were many women combatants in the Croatian Army in the 1991–1995 war. They were allowed to serve in all services and branches without restrictions and, in general, their male comrades made no exceptions when letting them fight in dangerous situations. Immediately after the war, during demobilization processes and soon after, women were restricted from some jobs and their military knowledge and expertise was put in question. This means that their expertise was good enough for waging war, but not for use in peacetime.

(the most well-known being the Vietnam syndrome) might well pose a threat to themselves or to the broader community (e.g., murders and suicides).[11]

There is sometimes also a possibility of moving into another military or into banditry. People with military skills are easy to mobilize if they do not have suitable living conditions. They can become mercenaries or look for employment in other conflict areas.

Child Soldiers

A special problem of demobilization involves child soldiers. According to Vandergrift (2000, p. 347), child soldiers are defined as people less than 18 years of age who form part of regular or irregular armed forces. Pursuant to certain legal documents, the term "*child soldier*" means young people under the age of 18 (Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989) who are militarily trained, accompany armed family members and military units as candidates for combatants, or who are used as the slaves of military commanders during civil wars. Some cultures do not care about such global-level documents, but regard military involvement as part of personal maturity or as one of the phases of initiation. This comes about when soldiers are needed, regardless of their age. The children who take part in hostilities become legitimate military targets, individuals whose death or disablement results in the weakening of the armed forces of the enemy, which is the only legitimate aim in war (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1997, p. 70). Children are recruited (forced) into the army or they volunteer.

The low cost of lightweight guns makes the use of child soldiers very attractive for militaries. The advanced army technology is also very simple to use. Besides, child soldiers are easily manipulated to go into dangerous situations and may be prepared to carry out the toughest jobs to satisfy their commanders. Some children act as spies. Other young people perceive their own personal security as greater within an armed movement than outside, alongside fellow orphans, street children, refugees, and displaced civilians. Demobilizing child soldiers is complicated due to their experiences in war; detention; being captured; committing harsh crimes; and their desire to seek revenge, having witnessed violent acts and the killing of family members. Even if they regret their decision to volunteer they often find it impossible to leave the armed group safely. It is the case that the converting child soldiers is far more difficult than for older combatants. They have lost school time, suffered physical injuries, and become delinquents. For those who spent their school-age years as fighters, it is unlikely they will return to education programs because they are more concerned about getting a job. Without any civil skills and training they are hardly likely to find a place to work.

Child soldiers are a very serious consequence of armed conflicts and are seen more in internal or guerrilla-style warfare than in international disputes. In addition to the problems they pose after the end of a conflict due to difficulties in adapting to civil life (without schooling or family support and burdened by war traumas), they are also very dangerous adversaries during conflicts. Their behavior on the battlefield is unpredictable. Soldiers from peacekeeping units are frequently shocked when they are meant to act against child soldiers.

[11] The war in Croatia (1991–1995) produced large a veteran population because some 350,000 men and women had circulated through the Croatian Army during the war. More than 900 war veterans committed suicide after the war. Incidents involving weapons (hand grenades, rifles, and pistols) are still very common. Experts estimate that almost 20% of all Croatian war veterans need psychiatric help (Zunec, Tatalovic, and Kulenovic, 2000, p. 300).

For many reasons, special attention needs to be given to former child soldiers during their demobilization and beyond. If their reintegration fails they could contribute to further violence and armed conflict.

CONCLUSION

Defense conversion was from the military point of view perceived for a long time as a slogan of peace activists. During the Cold War it was seen as a strange and threatening idea to the military and as a desirable goal for those movements, which stressed human needs other than military security. Many myths were created about it and many people naively expected a direct shift from military expenditure to other categories of social spending at the end of the Cold War. There were some positive results in quantitative measures of conversion in the first decade following the Cold War, but not as many as expected. A range of other goals, not only quantitative economic ones, but also qualitative political, cultural, personnel goals of conversion was achieved. As they are not quantitatively designed, it is impossible to count them in a short period of time.

The reality of the post-Cold War period is bringing about the rapid decline of the armed forces of the whole world and especially of Europe. It points to the urgent need to reorient research and development for military purposes into another activities. Many military facilities such as bases, barracks, and training fields are closed and the search for new functions for closed military infrastructure involves a common military and social effort (Prebilic, 2001). Demilitarization of the armed forces, known as civilianization, and demilitarization of social values (Haltiner, 1985) are together pushing the contemporary military towards a postmodern military (Moskos et al., 2000). Nearly eight million soldiers were dismissed between 1987 and 1997 as the result of peacetime demobilization.

Hence, there is a huge post-Cold War dividend appearing in the world of modern militaries, but it brings with it many calls for additional financial help to convert the thus freed resources from military to civil use. The conversion of military surpluses is becoming the desired goal for the freed up and dismissed human military surpluses and it is today no longer the peace activists' weapon against the military.

The military identity is under many types of pressure: the impetus to change its exclusiveness into a more civilianized outlook comes from civil society, political decision-makers, and the international community. The military has lost some of its classic military functions regarding the national security of the country, which is longer under military threat, and gained some new military functions reflecting operations other than war. Armed forces that were once reduced to the main social border-control mechanism within states are now at the forefront of establishing flexible borders. Contemporary armed forces in Europe, including in transition countries, encourage cross-border cooperation through bilateral and multilateral military agreements. Soldiers from different countries, serving together under UN command in peacekeeping operations, are developing a new sense of multicultural military identity. This means the overwhelming conversion of a nation-based military mind into an international military identity.

The post-Cold War period has witnessed the public's greater skepticism and lack of interest in defense matters and the social context of change is very much in favor of conversion. The defense sector as a whole and especially the military have to accept the challenge of transforming the warfare identity into a welfare identity.

CHAPTER 21

The Decline of the European Mass Armies

KARL W. HALTINER

On August 23, 1793, the new revolutionary regime in France decreed the *levée-en-masse*, the duty of all citizens to do military service, a step that was gradually taken by other nations as well (Posen, 1993; Mc Neill, 1982; Kestnbaum, 2000). The mass army based on universal conscription thus became the characteristic mode of military organizations in the economically fast-developing societies of Europe and North America in the 19th and 20th centuries. On May 28, 1996, roughly 200 years after its creation, the French president Chirac announced its abolition in the country of origin, France, for the year 1997. Belgium and The Netherlands have preceded, and Spain, Portugal, and Italy have joined the decision to end conscription gradually. In some countries, such as Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Slovenia, conscription is the topic of a continued public debate, and its abolition can be expected in the near future. In the course of the diminution of armed forces and the intensification of international military cooperation a number of other nations are enlarging the share of voluntary military personnel while reducing the number of conscripts. In these military organizations citizen-soldiers often constitute but a small minority.

Does this mean the definite end of the classic mass armies based on universal conscription in Europe as has been predicted for a long time (Janowitz, 1972; van Doorn, 1975; Harries-Jenkins, 1973; Martin, 1977; Kelleher, 1978; Boëne and Martin, 1991; Segal, 1993; Boëne et al., 2000)? By means of some selected empirical indicators referring to the period 1970–2000, this study tries to answer the question of how far the erosion of Western Europe's mass armies has progressed in the recent years and mainly after the end of the Cold War. Second, it proposes some hypotheses about the driving forces of this development and tests them empirically. Third, it tries to investigate the probability of the existence of mass armies of the old type—based mainly on conscripts—in the near future.[1]

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[1] This article is an enlarged, partly changed, and updated version of Karl W. Haltiner, The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe? in *Armed Forces & Society*, 25(1), 1998, pp. 7–36.

THE CLASSIC THEORY OF THE DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY

Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War gave a fresh impetus to the question of whether "universal conscription" was still the appropriate basis for the organization of modern armed forces. However, the erosion of the fundamentals of mass armies based on conscription started much earlier. For about 40 years the "decline of the mass army theory" has been a permanent constituent of military sociology (van der Meulen, 1994, p. 3). Essentially, the thesis reads as follows: The enormous economic productivity and the high living standard in modern industrialized societies are based on a continuously increasing degree of functional division of labor and professional specialization. The driving forces of these processes are the technological progress and the market penetration into all spheres of life and society. This development implies an increasing degree of individualization and normative pluralization as well as a decreasing importance of traditional values and an erosion of the norm of compulsory military service (Burk, 1992, p. 47). In the course of globalization, the nation has lost its importance as reference point for a collective identity. The development of military systems technically, economically, and sociopolitically follows the logic of development based on differentiation and economization. The greater the internal military division of labor, the higher the tendency to rely on highly trained professional soldiers (Burk, 1992, p. 45). This means that the armed forces of modern societies become leaner in personnel size. They rely on high technology and are highly differentiated and complex as far as their organization and function are concerned. Before long, they will be partly and eventually fully professionalized. The mass army, indebted to a national ideology; organizationally homogeneous, but functionally little differentiated based on physical mobilization of human masses in order to be efficient. But economically it is inefficient as far as the ratio between personnel, capital, and technology is concerned. It has lost its technical; economical; sociopolitical; and, after the end of Cold War, even its geostrategic legitimization. As a result of the changed threat situation, the territorial defense necessitating numerically large armed forces became a secondary task on European territory. The multipolar and global conflict scenario compels modern armed forces of the 21st century to comply with multiple tasks that are independent of a given threat scenario. Smaller, faster, more mobile, and functionally and technologically more flexible military organizations, which may be integrated into multinational armed forces as well, meet these requirements much better than armies of the type *levée-en-masse*.

According to the Dutch military sociologist van Doorn, particularly the "large and rich countries" can afford to maintain forces-in-being on the basis of volunteers (1975, p. 53). One of the central hypotheses of the "decline-of the mass army theory" may thus be that the probability of the mass army format of armed forces decreases in societies with economic growth and increasing living standard while the probability of the volunteer format of the military personnel increases. In other words, there is a negative correlation between the socioeconomic degree of modernization and the extent of compulsion as far as recruiting personnel for the armed forces is concerned.

Many studies have been written on the thesis of the decline of the mass armies. Van der Meulen states: "Although this theory in its major outlines has quite some plausibility, it must be looked upon as a rough analysis, which either hasn't been tested or has been falsified." (1994, p. 3). Very few studies tried to argue on the basis of empirical data. Among those few, Kelleher's stands out (1978). After an investigation in the year 1978 titled "Mass Armies

in the 1970s—The Debate in Western Europe," concentrating on six Western European states,[2] it concluded that the decline of mass armies, forecasted particularly by van Doorn and Janowitz, proved true for the indicators investigated. It established that, given technical trends and the ongoing citizenship revolution, mass armies were declining. Assuming no major East–West conflict, no rapid progress toward European integration and no extended period of economic warfare, it furthermore projected for the period 1990–2000 that Western European armies would (1) be shaped smaller in size (perhaps by as much as 30%), (2) involve far fewer conscripts (if any, no more than 25–30%) in primary military positions, and (3) involve far more specialists and technicians in more highly differentiated role structures. On the whole, as can be shown today, Kelleher's prognosis of 1978 proved to be correct.

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION AND NEW MISSIONS

The outlined theories see socioeconomic modernization and technological development as the dominant driving forces in the decline of the mass armies. This would suggest a strong relationship between the economic transformation of Western European states—indicated for instance by the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP)—and the degree of the professionalization of the armed forces. However, some indicators point at the possibility that other than socioeconomic and technological factors may contribute at least as much to the decline of the mass army than only the socioeconomic and technological differentiation process in modern societies. These driving factors are to be sought primarily in the changes of the geostrategic environment since the end of the bipolar global structure on the one hand and in the altered range of new missions for armed forces on the other.

It may be assumed that the erosion of the classic mass army in Europe will likely be accelerated through the increasing density of the security institution network in Europe. By way of the European Union (EU) the continent, and especially Western Europe, is tightening its security policy network beyond NATO. The European Defense Initiative, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the many different multinational military corps that have sprung up since the early 1990s are examples of that process. Therefore, a Western European state not facing any territorial threat and being member of different security policy alliances, such as NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the former Western European Union (WEU), and/or a political federation such as the EU should be tempted sooner rather than later to downsize its costly national military organization. It is thereby profiting from the security-inducing effect of alliances and the diminished military threat. This option is encouraged especially when states are confronted with a high national debt. To suspend conscription may be welcomed by democratic parties and governments as a kind of peace dividend and/or a popular decision to gain or maintain power. Due to their trust in the collective security network, it can expected that those who are members of several alliances will minimize national defense efforts, in extreme cases even to a level below the one accepted by the alliances they belong to. This "alliance effect," as it could be called, is enhancing the accelerated diminution of the traditional mass forces. One could therefore phrase the following hypothesis: The more a European nation is involved in supra- and international

[2] Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden.

ties, the greater the probability of an abolition of conscription with a simultaneous reduction of its own defensive power.

Since the end of the Cold War the military organizations of Western Europe have been engaged more often than ever before in Military Operations other than War (MOOTW). The Peace Support Operations in the Balkans and in Africa made military missions outside of national territory necessary for the first time since colonial times. The long-lasting deployments of large contingencies of armed forces outside of national territory pose new problems for the recruitment and training of military personnel as well as for logistics. The citizen-soldiers that make up the bulk of the traditional mass armies may be apt for the homeland defense. For other kinds of operations taking place outside of a state's own territory they are only apt under certain conditions or not at all. In many states the military service for conscripts is constitutionally restricted to the aim of national defense. Other missions for conscripts are politically not legitimized and cannot be effected. Therefore, all Western European armed forces deploy only volunteers to out-of-area missions. Conscripts who are willing to take part in such missions do so on a voluntary, noncoercive basis. Due to the significantly greater need for volunteers for missions abroad even those states that are still to a large degree dependent on conscripts (e.g., Switzerland!) have been increasingly forced to recruit personnel from the labor market.

The more military organizations are engaged outside of their national territory and in the domains of their alliances (e.g., NATO) the more are they inclined to reduce the percentage of conscript-personnel in their organization and to enlarge the share of volunteers. In other words, we may assume that the increasing use of the armed forces for international stabilization and peacekeeping purposes contributes to the rapid decline of the mass army in Europe.

DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this study we define mass armies as armed forces that meet at least the following six criteria: (1) The recruiting system for the armed forces is based on universal or selective conscription laid down in the constitution or by law. (2) A relatively large population mass may be mobilized for military purposes. That is, the actual number of regulars and reserves in the armed forces comprises a relatively high share of the national population. (3) Specific age cohorts of the male population are liable for military service, and the majority of these military age cohorts are also drafted. (4) Those liable for military service define the character of the armed forces. That is, the conscripts make up more than 50% of the total strength of the national armed forces. Accordingly, the share of volunteers, especially women, is relatively low. (5) The level of military technology is relatively low. The armed services Air Force and Navy mostly rely on conscripts serving for short time periods. There are reasons to believe that the high complexity of modern military technology requires a greater share of voluntary long-term personnel at the expense of the conscript ratio. (6) The armed forces are army dominated. That is, the share of navy and air force is relatively small compared to the terrestrial forces.

In order to be operational for the empirical analysis, this working definition is limited to structural variables of the military. It sticks to the criteria "size," "social mobilization," and "homogeneity" that van Doorn termed as characteristics of mass armies (1975, pp. 53–56). "Size" refers to the actual number of the military forces and "social mobilization" to the possibility that large numbers of the population may be mobilized for political and military

purposes. The concept "nation-in-arms" places this phenomenon in a nutshell. "Homogeneity" labels the mass army in as far as the degree of functional differentiation, specialization, and especially technology are concerned. The combat–support ratio is relatively low. The working definition does not explicitly consider important sociopolitical attributes of mass armies, especially those that correlate with the feature of social mobilization, such as the position of the military as national emergency forces; as citizen training; and, more generally, as a symbol of the state and of national integration.

DATABASE

We focus our analysis on Western Europe, the continent where conscription has been the traditional basis for the organization of the armed forces for around 200 years. More precisely, we limit ourselves to the *Western European Non-NATO-States* and to all *NATO States* (before the recent NATO enlargement) recognizing universal conscription or to those that did so until 1991, respectively. These are the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. For structural comparisons we refer partially to countries with all-volunteer-forces because we need a larger number for statistical reasons. These countries are the following: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.

Not included in this study are countries of the former Warsaw Pact and ex-Yugoslavia. Especially the NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are not yet part of the analyzed sample. These nations maintained mass armies of constantly high actual strength until 1990. Since 1991, the armed forces of most Eastern Central European states have been declining in numbers (Military Balance 1991–2001). There are indications that in some of these nations conscription might soon be suspended (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia). However, the short time span to the changeover in 1990–1991 as well as the emergence of new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans do not yet permit a well-founded prognosis of long-term trends. Nevertheless, it is obvious that similar developments as they were found in Western Europe may be observed especially in Central Eastern European countries. This can be assumed mainly for the new members of NATO who have to adapt their forces to the standards of the alliance and will profit of the "alliance effect."

As a basis for the military structure we use data from the Military Balance of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) for those periods when data were collected by the institute, i.e., usually from 1970 onward. A trend analysis for the period of about 30 years is thus possible.[3]

[3] About the quality of the data, the authors state themselves:

> The Military Balance provides the actual numbers of nuclear and conventional forces and weapons based on the most accurate data available, or, failing that, on the best estimate that can be made with a reasonable degree of confidence.... Information may differ from previous for a variety of reasons, generally as a result of substantive changes in national forces, but in some cases as a result of IISS reassessment of the evidence supporting past entries.

In some cases time series may therefore contain errors. *The Military Balance 1994–1995 of the International Institute for Strategic Studies* Brassey's, London, 1994, pp. 10–11.

METHODS

From the data of the IISS Military Balance Series the following variables will be examined or calculated, respectively, as indicators for the six criteria of mass armies as they were defined above:

1. As an indicator of the definition criterion 2, the size of the armed forces, and the mobilization of the population for military purposes, we use the **Military Participation Ratio (MPR)** (Andreski, 1968, p. 33). It is defined as the share of a country's population registered in the military (actives and reserves).[4] This number permits more accurate statements about the size of a country's armed forces than does the absolute number of its size without any demographic relations. In addition, the extent of militarization or mobilization of the population for military purposes in the sense of criterion 2 of our definition of mass armies will become evident using this indicator. The MPR may be shown for the period 1970–2000.
2. As an indicator of criterion 3 of our working definition we use the **Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts (MPRMAC)**, which is defined as the percentage of drafted individuals of a particular group of age cohorts. Usually, the data of the Military Balance refer to the age group of 18 to 32 years or of 22 to 32 years, respectively, and include conscripts with regular and reserve status. As a rule, the MPRMAC has been shown in the IISS publications only since 1987. It indicates the degree of equal military burden sharing. It may be assumed that with a decreasing MPRMAC, i.e., with a decreasing equality of military burden sharing, the political pressure for abolition of universal conscription increases.
3. As an indicator of criteria 4 and 5 we use the **Conscript Ratio (CR)**, defined as the percentage of conscripts compared to the total of a country's regulars (not counting reserves), as well as with the individual subtotals of the regular armed services Army (**CRA**), Air Force (**CRAF**), and Navy (**CRN**) (not counting the respective reserves). The CR informs about the degree according to which the armed forces recruit their conscripts or volunteers respectively. It is thus a variable of central importance for the characterization of the organizational structure of the military organizations analyzed.
4. As an indicator of the share of volunteers and functional differentiation we make use of the **Women Ratio (WR)**, defined as the percentage of women compared to the total of a country's armed forces. By pointing to the degree of women's social emancipation, the extent of voluntarism of the force personnel, and the combat–support ratio in the armed services, the WR may be considered as an indicator of the degree of differentiation and specialization in the military role structure.
5. The percentage of the army compared to the total strength of a country's military forces serves us as an indicator of the amount of army dominance in the analyzed mass armies.

In order to test the hypothesis that the mass army format decreases with a country's growing affluence, the respective gross domestic product per capita per annum (real GDP in 2000) is calculated from the data of the Military Balance and will be correlated to the CR of

[4] The term "actives" comprises all servicemen and women on full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assignees from the reserves). The term "reserves" includes all reservists committed to rejoining the armed forces in an emergency, except when national reserve service obligations following conscription last almost a lifetime, as is the case in Switzerland.

the 15 Western European conscript countries and the 7 all-volunteer-force states. In order to test the "alliance effect," i.e. the degree of integration into cooperative networks, we will correlate the amount of memberships of a nation with regard to NATO, EU, and WEU and its CR. The correlation between the CR and the share of the armed forces deployed out-of-area will be used to test the hypothesis that the decrease in importance of national defense paralleled by the increase of new missions enhances the suspension of conscription.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Universal Conscription as Recruiting Base

In the period 1970–2000 there was universal conscription in all 15 analyzed Western European nations. After 1991 the situation changed insofar as Belgium first (1992) and then The Netherlands (1993) decided to abolish conscription. In January 1996, president Chirac announced plans to abolish conscription in France. Spain followed in doing so in autumn 1997. Portugal, too, decided to end citizen-soldiering. Italy is ending conscription gradually, according to a parliamentary decision of September 3, 1999, and will have abolished it by 2005.

Military Participation Ratio

The average MPR related to the active armed forces and the reserves in all 15 countries was around 5% in the period 1970–2000 (Figure 21.1). Since 1990 the average degree of militarization of the population has dwindled more or less steadily, reflecting an almost continuously ongoing downsizing of the Western European armed forces since the early 1990s. In 2000, the MPR amounted to around 3%, which is 60% of the Cold War-period average. This decrease reflects the ongoing process of downsizing national militaries all over Europe and the diminished importance of national militaries as social institutions.

Conscript Ratio

Whereas the MPR reports the connection between the size of a society and its military, the CR provides information on the internal structure of military organizations. The CR is therefore one of the most significant indicators for the organizational format of a nation's armed forces: The larger the CR, the likelier a force may be labelled as mass army from a structural perspective. The lower the CR, the more is a force based on voluntary personnel, and the more can it be called an all-volunteer army.

In the Cold War-period 1970–1989, the CR reached an average level of more than 50% in the 15 Western European countries (Figure 21.2). Of 15 nations, 11 based their forces predominantly, i.e., by more than 50%, on conscripts. Since 1989, these numbers have been dropping. By the year 2000, the CR had dropped to an average value of less than 50% (Figure 21.2). Of the seven military organizations (Switzerland, Turkey, Finland, Greece, Sweden, Spain, and Norway), which had an average conscript ratio of at least 66% during the period 1970–1989, only three still have a CR of two-thirds and above for their armed forces at the end of the millennium: Switzerland, Turkey, and Finland.



Figure 21.1. Population Military Participation Ratio (1970–2000). (Total average of 15 Western European conscript armed forces.)



FIGURE 21.2. Comparison of the Conscript Ratio [average during Cold War period (1970–1989) and the year 2000].



FIGURE 21.3. Typology of force structure and expected changes.

Sweden's and Greece's CR had dropped to slightly above 60% and Norway's to 57% by 2000. Of the four countries which had an average force CR between 50 and 66% during the period 1970–1989 (Italy, Austria, Portugal, and France), none had an average CR above 50% by the year 2000 (Figure 21.2). Even Denmark, which manned a third of its forces during the Cold War period with conscripts, cut its share to less than a quarter. The data prove an extensive decline of the conscription format and an increase of the degree of voluntarism in the military forces in most of the 15 states observed. This becomes most obvious when the Western European average CR during the Cold War period (1970–1989) is compared to the CR of 2000 (Figure 21.2). In all of the 15 countries except for Turkey the effectives of conscripts were cut down after 1989.

Comparing the long-term Cold War average trends (1970–1989) of the national Conscript Ratios to their level in the year 2000 (Figure 21.2), we can distinguish three different developing types of conscript forces (Figure 21.3).

TYPE I. Some military organizations showing a mass army character on the whole have a Conscript Ratio below 50%. The majority of their force members are volunteers although these forces could legally rely on universal conscription for the recruitment of their military personnel or could at least do so until recently (Belgium until 1993 and The Netherlands and France until 1996). These forces have—not *de iure* but *de facto*—more the character of all-volunteer militaries than that of conscript armies. We may call them **Pseudo Conscript Forces** because as early as the Cold War period their conscripts accounted only for a minority of the forces. The armed forces of Belgium (until 1992), Denmark, Germany, France, and The Netherlands (until 1996) have the characteristics of Pseudo Conscript Forces. Of these five states, Belgium and Denmark had a very low CR as early as the period of the Cold War, whereas the other three distinctly lowered their CR only after the end of the East–West conflict. On the average, the countries of type I reacted to the end of the Cold War with a downsizing of their armed forces that simultaneously contained a further decline of the CR.

Type II. We call military organizations of a mass army type and with a Conscript Ratio between 50 and 67% during the Cold War period and a sharp decline of the CR after the end of the Cold War **Soft Core Conscript Forces**. The armed forces of Austria, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal qualify as Soft Core Conscript Forces. In some of these states an almost dramatic shrinking process from a high to a low CR took place within a few years (see Figure 21.2). This applies particularly to Sweden and Portugal and, since 1994, Italy. All of them have decided to suspend gradually conscription by no longer drafting and calling up certain male age cohorts.

Type III. Armed forces whose CR during the Cold War period was above the threshold of two-thirds (67%) and who have maintained a high Conscript Ratio until 2000 can be called **Hard Core Conscript Forces** (see Figure 21.2). Forces with an absolute and high dominance of conscripts we find in Switzerland, Turkey, and Finland. Greece cut its CR only recently to a level below 65% (1998); its further downsizing of the CR seems yet uncertain. The almost 100% CR of Switzerland can be explained by the fact that in the Swiss militia system officers are conscripts, too. Although all these states with the exception of Finland reacted to the end of the East–West bipolarity with a cutdown of their armed forces, there was less retrenchment in type III than in types I and II (Figure 21.2).

If these three conscript types are compared to the zero-draft countries (type 0) and their all-volunteer systems (the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan), it becomes very obvious that it makes little sense to dichotomize conscript systems and all-volunteer systems as it is often done in military sociology. The transition between the different types of force format is rather gradual. The mass army characteristics of the armed forces become continuously more apparent in the transition from type 0 (All-Volunteer systems) to type III (Hard Core Conscript systems).

Moreover we find a clear transformation trend in Western Europe not before the period after the end of the Cold War (1990–1995, Figure 21.3). A majority of the Pseudo Conscript type forces have already suspended conscription (Belgium and The Netherlands) or decided to do so gradually in the near future (France). Obviously, there is an inclination for armed forces of type I to change into a 0–type force format. The same holds more or less true for the Soft Core type, which shows a tendency to transform itself into a Pseudo Conscript type or directly to an all-volunteer format. The former refers to Austria and Sweden and the latter to Italy, Spain, and Portugal, whose governments have declared their will to end conscription. Figure 21.3 gives a typological overview of the ongoing format transformation process in Western Europe. As can be assumed, there is a growing parallelism between the MPR and CR.

Equal Burden Sharing: Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts 18–32 (MPRMAC)

The sharp drop of the CR lets us assume that the degree of exploitation of the Military Age Cohorts in Western European societies is in decline. The IISS studies only give us data about Military Age Cohorts since 1987 so that the assumption can only be tested in the medium term.

In the period 1987–1991, the average MPRMAC of all 15 states was around 45% (Figure 21.4). This means that about every second Western European citizen of the age



FIGURE 21.4. Military Participation Ratio of military-age cohorts (18–32) (MPRMAC) (Total average of conscript armies types I–III.)

between 18 and 32 years had to reckon with being drafted for military service in this time period. After 1990 the average MPRMAC started to decline sharply. In 2000, it was slightly above 30% and dropped below this limit after 1999 (Figure 21.4).

But the Western European average value according to Figure 21.4 hides a considerable variability between the different countries that fits well into the distinction of the three types of Conscript Ratios: Naturally, the MPRMAC of the zero-draft states is lower than the one of the conscript-nations altogether (Figure 21.5). The countries of type I (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and The Netherlands) bear a strong resemblance to the type of zero-draft. In 2000, their MPRMAC does not even reach 20% anymore. This makes it obvious that these countries are no longer true conscript but only Pseudo Conscript systems. They draft their potential conscripts only to a very low extent as the example of Denmark shows. They obviously use the draft as a personnel reservoir to supplement their military organizations already consisting mostly of volunteers. The draft did and does not serve the Pseudo Conscript forces universally, but selectively, to recruit their personnel. That it was relatively easy for countries like Belgium, France, and The Netherlands to suspend conscription completely under these circumstances can be understood considering this fact.

The most extensive change in the development of the MPRMAC becomes obvious for the mass army type II, the one that we call Soft Core Conscript Force regarding their military systems (Austria, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; Figure 21.5). Whereas in 1990 about half of their nations' age cohorts between 18 and 32 had to reckon with being drafted for military service, less than one-third of them were still drafted in 2000! In their MPRMAC, the nations of type II resemble those of type I more and more. They too practice conscription to an increasing extent only selectively and no longer universally. These armed forces seem to have lost their mass army format in a very short time period. The probability that universal conscription will become a political issue under the aspect of equal military burden sharing in the near future has considerably risen in these countries as the case of Sweden shows.

Also, in countries of type III (Finland, Turkey, Switzerland, and Greece until 1997) the degree of militarization of Military Age Cohorts tends to sink markedly, especially after 1994. However, compared to states of type II their reduction in exploiting conscription is rather minimal. Still slightly more than half of these countries' Military Age Cohorts have to reckon with being drafted. The still-dominant conscription format of their military organizations is therefore confirmed.

The Level of Technology Indicated by the Air Forces Conscript Ratio (CRAF)

A hint to the level of technology of the armed forces investigated may be provided by the extent of the CR in the technically highly developed armed services of the air force and navy. We can expect the Conscript Ratio to decrease and the professionalization to rise with the increasing degree of technical complexity of appliances and arms systems because conscripts serving on a short-term basis no longer meet the requirements regarding permanence in training and readiness for duty.

Compared to the average values for all conscript forces investigated, the known phenomenon of military sociology proves true on the basis of the IISS data: In the period 1970–2000, the CR in the armies was distinctly higher than that in the air forces and navies. It may be expected now that the CR in the air force and navy will be highest in the armed



FIGURE 21.5. Military Participation Ratio (active and reserve) of military-age cohorts (18–32 years old). (averages of Types 0–III).

forces of type III and lowest in those of type I. According to the available data this proves to be very true. In the air forces of the Hard Core Conscript nations the forces call upon conscripts still for around 60% on average, but the Pseudo Conscript forces only for roughly 14%. The sharp decline of the CRAF in type I reflects the rapid professionalization in those countries who have already suspended conscription or are on their way to doing so. The CRAF of the Soft Core Conscript forces rose in the 1980s and has been dropping unsteadily under the threshold of 50% since 1990 (Figure 21.6). The same pattern holds true for the CRN where the differences between type I and the other types are particularly marked (Not shown in a graph).

According to the indicators CRAF and CRN the level of technology of the forces of type III is therefore distinctly higher than the one of the forces of types I and II. Whereas in type III *all* services of the armed forces still have the format of a mass army, those of type I and II use significantly more volunteers than conscripts for their air force and navy. The partial all-volunteer format of these types is thus particularly manifest in the armed services' air force and navy. The transformation of mass armies into all-volunteer forces obviously does not take place evenly. Air force and navy play a rather preeminent role as forerunners in the trend toward professionalization of military organizations.

Army Dominance

There is a correlation between the Conscript Ratio of a force and the criterion "army dominance" (not shown in a graph). The more distinct a force's mass army format is, measured by its CR, the higher is in general the share of terrestrial forces compared to the total strength of the armed forces. The distinction of three types of forces developed on the basis of the CR proves true insofar as the Hard Core Conscript forces live up to the expectations and show the highest degree of army dominance on average. The zero-draft countries and type III, on the other hand, show the lowest ratio. The percentage of terrestrial forces of the former was at more than 80% in the period 1970–1994 and has been dropping slowly since. The Pseudo Type (III) shows a steady decrease from 70% in 1975 down to 60% in 2000. The Soft Core forces are in between.[5]

Women's Participation (WR)

The WR indicates different aspects in the development of armed forces. Women are voluntary members of the armed forces in all countries investigated by us. That is why the Women Participation Ratio (WR), among others, is first of all an indicator of the volunteer format of armed forces. Second, volunteers are mainly assigned to tasks, for which conscripts serving on a short-term basis may no longer be used, namely for technologically complex tasks. The WR points therefore to the technological standard of a particular force.

[5] There are only very few deviations from the average tendency. Austria's force is army dominated to a high extent although this country, measured by the change of its CR after 1989, now passes for a Soft Core Conscript state. There is a large variety within the zero-draft states: Ireland's and Japan's forces-in-being are army dominated to an extent—more than 75%—as is usually the case with conscript armies. It is obvious that not only technology, but also other conditions (such as domestic prerequisites, historical facts, and namely the location close to the sea and the geopolitical position of a country) determine the structure of its armed forces.



FIGURE 21.6. Total Air Force Conscript Ratios (CRAF) (averages of Types I–III).

Historical experience shows that women may be found above average in the differentiated armed services such as air force and navy. In a general sense, the WR can therefore be seen as an indicator of the structure differentiation of modern military organizations. This means that the higher the WR, the lower the mass army format of a force and the higher the degree of organizational role differentiation and specialization.

In our investigation the value of WR is lowered by the fact that some nations, for historical reasons, do not permit or sharply restrict women from doing service that involves carrying weapons. Some changed their policy only recently (Germany and Italy). On the other hand, the IISS studies give incomplete information regarding the WR of certain countries, although it is well known that they let women join their armed forces (e.g., Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden). According to the IISS studies, women participate in the conscript forces of Belgium, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, Greece, and Spain.

There is clearly a negative correlation between the degree of women's military participation and the mass army format of the armed forces (Figure 21.7). In general the typology according to the Conscript Ratio proves true also for the WR: The zero-draft nations and the Pseudo Conscript Forces show not only the highest share of female personnel in their armed forces but also a steady increase since 1990. In the Soft Core as well as Hard Core Conscript nations (types II and III) the military assignment of female personnel is increasing but still low. It seems that only the abolition of universal conscription and the subsequent difficulties in finding personnel on the labor market causes the armed forces really to open themselves up to women.

Gross Domestic Product per Capita and Force Format

If the average Conscript Ratio (CR) of 1970–2000 is taken as the central variable for the force format and correlated to the real GDP per capita of the year 2000 as the classic indicator of the level of socioeconomic modernization, we find only a very faint relationship ($R^2 = 0.01$). This might be due to the fact that the country with the highest CR is also the nation which has the highest GDP per capita: Switzerland. If Switzerland as a special case with regard to its unique force system is eliminated from the investigation series, the correlation factor rises significantly but still remains on a comparatively low level (see Figure 21.8: $R^2 = 0.17$, $r = 0.41$). It still does not explain more than about 17% of the variance. The above-mentioned thesis that the mass army format of forces in societies with economic growth and increased living standard decreases is supported by our data, but not very strongly.

Degree of Transnational Security Cooperation and National Army Format

If we correlate the 15 nations' Conscript Ratios (CR) of 1999 with the amount of inter- and supranational organizations a country is a member of we find a strong association of $R^2 = 0.61$ ($r = 0.78$) (Figure 21.9). The range of possible memberships includes NATO, the WEU (still in vigor in 1999), and the EU. Obviously the assumption that a country being a member of all the three security institutions is more likely to cut down its forces by reducing its CR than a country abstaining from defense cooperation is very relevant. The "alliance effect" rates very high, explaining 60% of the observed variance. However, this correlation can only be taken as a rough indicator since it is based on small absolute numbers only.



FIGURE 21.7. Women Military Participation Ratio (WR).



GNP and CR
Average 1970-2000

Turkey	1'697.32	81.33%
Portugal	4'669.78	49.77%
Greece	8'201.51	72.03%
Spain	8'318.03	63.50%
Italy	11'495.60	61.04%
Netherlands	13'987.84	36.86%
Belgium	14'603.28	25.11%
Austria	15'065.83	51.91%
France	15'183.78	47.45%
Finland	15'239.82	74.17%
Germany	16'155.02	44.81%
Sweden	17'536.36	69.55%
Denmark	19'035.07	30.49%
Norway	19'313.00	64.44%
Switzerland	23'745.18	99.92%

FIGURE 21.8. Correlation between Average Conscript Ratio and Average GNP per Capita (1970–2000) (Types I–III without Switzerland).

CR and Co-Operation 1999

Austria	40.99%	1
Belgium	0.00%	3
Denmark	32.43%	2
Finland	72.87%	1
France	32.62%	3
Germany	42.67%	3
Greece	63.87%	3
Italy	47.50%	3
Netherlands	0.00%	3
Norway	53.23%	1
Portugal	13.02%	3
Spain	55.07%	3
Sweden	67.04%	1
Switzerland	99.10%	0
Turkey	82.63%	1



Figure 21.9. Correlation between the Conscript Ratio and Co-Operation (Types I–III) (Nato, WEU, EU, Year 1999).

Peace-Support Operations (PSO) and National Army Format

In order to test if the increase of foreign engagements tends to have a negative impact on maintaining conscription we associate the peace-support engagement of the nations observed with their CR. It can be assumed that the more troops a country deploys abroad the more it will be inclined to base its forces on voluntary personnel. The percentage of a national force being in PSOs abroad serves as an indicator of foreign engagements. Figure 21.10 shows a close correlation ($R^2 = 0.43, r = 0.66$). Countries such as France, Belgium, and The Netherlands, who in the meantime have all set up all-volunteer forces, deploy more than 8% of their forces abroad.[6]

With regard to the associations shown in Figures 21.8–21.10 and our initially formulated hypothesis we would conclude that the "alliance effect" and the enlargement of the operational territory beyond the nations' borders connected with the spread of missions are far more important for the noted accelerated disappearance of the mass armies in Europe than the economic growth of the Western societies. This does not exclude a higher predisposition of countries with a high standard of modernization to abolish conscription more quickly than countries with a low standard—if the strategic situation of a country allows to do so. What enhances the end of mass armies more than anything else, however, are the geostrategic changes, such as the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of global conflicts and security structures.

CONCLUSIONS

The era of mass armies is about to end in Western Europe even though not all of its nations will suspend conscription in the near future. Most national defense systems in Western Europe as well as in Central Eastern Europe are under reform or facing a next reform. In the light of the data shown, James Burk's assumption, that "ending conscription is not a necessary outcome of the decline of mass armed forces" is confirmed (1992, p. 56). This is one of the conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis of structural indicators of a 30-year period for 15 Western European nations. The general tendencies are the following:

1. The European Military Participation Ratio has been in a rapid decline since 1990. This is true especially for the drafting ratio (Military Age Cohorts Participation) in all Western European nations. The general degree of militarization in Europe's populations has thus been reduced and is still in a trend of further diminishment.
2. The Western European military organizations base their recruitment to an increasing extent on voluntary personnel, regardless of whether conscription still exists in their countries. As a general tendency, the degree of compulsion for recruiting military personnel has decreased remarkably. This process did not only start with the ending of the Cold War but was accelerated through it. The multipolar, global conflict scenario, with its many smaller points of conflict and its need for local conflict stabilization, asks for a new, clearly broader profile of competencies for today's armed forces. Smaller, swifter, more mobile armed forces with a high degree of functional and technological differentiation can meet the standards of new risk scenarios better than armies of the *levée-en-masse* type.

[6]Source for PSO engagements: *SIPRI Yearbook 1999*, Oxford. (See also: www.sipri.se; the figures can be collected in http://first.sipri.org/index.php.)



FIGURE 21.10. Correlation between Conscript Ratio 1999 and Peace Support Operation Strength Ratio (Types I–III).

3. The forces' volunteer format is especially underlined by the fact that, when cutbacks of military strength occur, not the ones who serve voluntarily on a midterm contract basis or professionals are reduced, but conscripts. To the extent in which conscription is only practiced more and more selectively and not universally, a burden-sharing debate tends to start which gives rise to a political pressure for the abolition of conscription.
4. The degree of women participation in the Western European armed forces will only increase substantially if conscription is abolished and personnel will have to be recruited entirely on the labor market. It seems that the further existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the largest obstacle to an increase of the Women Military Participation Ratio. The Women Military Participation Ratio (WR) is thus an excellent indicator of the army format.

The assumption that the socioeconomic modernization would favor the trend to volunteer systems is only faintly supported by our data. Strategic and military goal-bound factors such as the end of the Cold War and new missions for the armed forces (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) seem to be of more importance for the recent changes of force structures in Western Europe. It is well known that no European country compels conscripts to participate in missions abroad. Furthermore, the fact that all of those countries who have abolished conscription recently or intend to abolish it soon are NATO members or NATO candidates. On the other hand we find among the Hard Core forces those who are not integrated in an alliance (Finland and Switzerland) or such militaries who are still directly involved in national territorial conflicts (Greece and Turkey). It may therefore be concluded that the combination of being a member in defense and political alliances *and* of being far from a direct national military threat *and* of participating frequently in international missions facilitates the abolishment of conscription and the change of army format into a force with no or with merely a low degree of nonvoluntary military personnel.

But these general tendencies hide a large variety of unique developments and national special cases. Particularly, the dichotomy used in politics and sociology between conscript forces on the one hand and volunteer systems on the other, between mass armies to be mobilized for temporary purposes and forces in being, may *not* be maintained. It does not do justice to reality at all. The transitions are gradual. The structural dimension mass army versus non-mass army is not identical with the dimension volunteer- versus conscript system. The fact that a nation legally recognizes universal conscription does not necessarily mean that it actually makes full use of the potential personnel provided by conscription. It is rather obvious that many Western European military forces use conscription to an increasing degree only as a pool for supplementing their organizations, by now consisting mostly of volunteers. In other words: Even if universal conscription is laid down, as it is in most cases, in the constitution, this does not rule out that a country's armed forces are recruited mostly from volunteers, conscripts thus making up for only a minority of the military personnel. As the empirical analysis shows, Pseudo Conscript militaries generally bear more resemblance to all-volunteer forces of the Anglo-Saxon type as far as their structure is concerned than to those states which dominantly, i.e., for more than two-thirds, provide compulsory personnel for their forces. If these Pseudo Conscript systems abolished conscription altogether, the sociopsychological, political and legal impact would probably be much greater than the military-structural one. In our opinion, it might be easier for the Pseudo Conscript systems than for the other types of armed forces to abolish conscription altogether, i.e., not only *de facto* but also *de jure*. That is what happened so far in Belgium,

The Netherlands and France. Although Germany and Denmark do not intend to abolish conscription, their military structure rather resembles the all-volunteer type encountered in the Anglo-Saxon states than that of classic mass armies like those of Switzerland and Finland. Selectively practiced conscription in the framework of a more comprehensive context makes it possible for these two *de facto* volunteer systems to further call upon compulsory personnel for part of their needs. A peculiarity of these two states compared to other nations of type I is that they have extended conscription to a large degree to civil services. We may therefore assume the following: If in Denmark and in Germany conscripts had not to a growing extent been used for civil but only for military needs and if all conscripts of an age cohort were to be assigned to the military exclusively, the probability of an abolition of conscription would in both countries be as high as in other Pseudo Conscript systems. The extension of conscription to civil services obviously makes its abolition more difficult.[7]

There are also exceptions to the general trend of a rapid cutback on the mass army, namely those European states that, despite structural reforms and some substantial reductions of their strength since 1990, still maintain forces with the features of a mass army. We have called them Hard Core Conscript systems because their military personnel is still almost entirely recruited by compulsion. These nations had become a small minority by the year 2000. Two of them are involved in border conflicts: Greece and Turkey. Another is the neighbor of the largest land power in Europe and does not rely on a military alliance: Finland. Since the territorial defense component is still of great importance here, a deviation from the general pattern of the trend can be explained to a certain extent. Something similar holds true for Switzerland: Here the militia tradition—closely related to the political system and to neutrality—is a kind of ideology. But there are reasons to doubt if these countries will escape the general trend in the long run.

Those Western European armed forces are of particular interest who, in the framework of reductions of their troops and of structural reforms after 1990, have done away with conscription and the mass army format *de facto* but not yet *de jure*. These are Austria, Norway, and Sweden. Like Italy, Spain, and Portugal they are serious candidates for turning away from conscription in the years to come. It is in those countries, most of all, that the reduction of personnel for military service has led to the fact that today, unlike a few years ago, fewer than half of the military age cohorts are drafted. It is obvious that in these nations the political pressure to abolish conscription will increase in the near future, since already now it is only being practiced selectively and not universally.

[7] On the other hand, despite intentions to do so it was not possible on a political level to replace conscription after its abolition with compulsory civil service (Belgium and France).

CHAPTER 22

Technology, Organization, and Power

RENÉ MOELKER

> During World War II in Britain when armaments were becoming scarce and use of manpower critical, time and motion studies were made of gun crews in the artillery. It was hoped that the speed of operation of each gun could be increased. In one such study of a gun crew numbering five men, a peculiar act was noted. At a certain point, just before the firing of the gun, two of the men simply stood at attention for three seconds, then resumed the work necessary to the next firing. This was puzzling. The men themselves could not explain it; it was a part of the technique they had learned in gunnery school. Neither the officers nor the instructors at gunnery school could explain it either. All anyone knew was that the three-second standing at attention was a "necessary" part of the process of firing the highly mechanized piece of artillery. One day an old, long-retired artillery colonel was shown the time and motion pictures. He too was puzzled at first. He asked to see the pictures again. Then his face cleared. "Ah," he said when the performance was over. "I have it. The two men are holding the horses." (Nisbet, 1970, p. 318).

INTRODUCTION: ON TECHNOLOGY

Technology is a buzzword as well as a container concept. The word technology is much used and probably also much misused. On the one hand technology is embraced and surrounded with optimism. In the near future each infantryman will be connected to battlefield management systems by use of a portable computer. He will be able to communicate with other soldiers and superiors and get information on locations and weapon systems of friend and foe. On the other hand there is the resistance against the introduction of new technologies. During informal gatherings one can hear servicemen muttering about the modernization of military training: man-to-man fighting skills, or the skills to wield the bayonet, are lost. Culture, tradition, and vested interest are mostly the reasons for the resistance against emerging technologies. The example used as the opening to this chapter is typical for the durability of traditional arrangements. In this chapter the attitudes toward technology are examined from the perspective of power relationships in the military organization. We discuss how

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TABLE 22.1. Patterns of Dispersion of Armies in the Past[a,b]

	Napoleonic wars	American Civil War	WW I	WW II	Yom Kippur War (1973)
Frontline (km)	8.05	8.58	14	48	57
Depth (km)	2.50	3.0	17	57	70
Area (m^2/soldier)	200	275.5	2,475	27,500	40,000

[a] Army or corps of 100,000 soldiers.
[b] Source: Dupuy: (1980, p. 312).

technology can be used to disguise the underlying power relationships and constellations of interests in organizations. We also discuss—by using historical military examples—how technology can be used in a way that is more transparent. These examples demonstrate how military commanders have successfully dealt with power relations that are connected with the introduction of technology in military organizations.

It cannot be denied that technology is one of the major factors influencing the changes in the military profession. Some of the changes in war are directly connected with the rise of new technologies. Wars are no longer restricted to certain seasons but can go on during summer or winter and day or night. Technological improvements in means of communication, logistics, precision, and firing range of weapons made it possible to change the length of the frontline and the depth of the battlefield. Frontlines became longer and the depth of battlefield became shorter. Dupey (1980) calculated that the average depth of the battlefield was only 17 km in WWI (Table 22.1). In certain places soldiers of the rivaling parties were so close to each other that they could hear the other side. During WWII the depth of the battlefield was 57 km. During the Yom Kippur War (1973) the depth was 70 km. Over time the length of the frontline became longer: 14 km in WWI, 48 km in WWII, and 57 km in the Yom Kippur War. This development automatically meant that the battlefield became emptier. Soldiers were dispersed over the battlefield. The amount of square meters per soldier increased over time. During WWI each soldier had 2,475 m^2 of the battlefield to himself. During the Yom Kippur War the dispersion of the soldiers was such that each soldier had 40,000 m^2 at his disposal. These changes also changed the way of fighting from static attrition, like warfare, to swift-maneuver warfare. In modern warfare the emphasis is not on direct confrontation with the enemy but on smart, swift, and small operations that avoid direct enemy contact (Moelker en Born, 1997).

Technology raises the expectation that the future will be sunny and that technology will solve our present problems. Armed forces can do more with less (personnel and economic resources). But optimism is not always justified: whereas in centuries before the 19th more soldiers than civilians were killed in war, in the 19th and 20th centuries more civilians than soldiers were killed because of high-tech war actions. The percentage of noncombatant victims is growing larger each and every war. More critical remarks should be made regarding technology. Technology promises effectivity and efficiency, but—as demonstrated in the citation that opened the chapter—often ineffectivity is introduced together with new technology. Technology also promises better labor conditions, but the discussion on the effects of technology points to certain ambivalent results. On the one hand there are scholars who predict an upgrading of labor (Kerr, 1983; Bell, 1976) and on the other hand there are authors who predict technology-induced downgrading of labor and loss of skills (Braverman, 1974). Another concern is bureaucratic and political game playing. The introduction of new technology is never simply a question of the best technology being the victor over inferior

products, but is always complicated by economic, political, and organizational interests. All these remarks are connected to the topic of power in organizations. In this chapter we elaborate on the relation between technology, power, and organization by using historical examples, but first we need to define technology in order to proceed.

As mentioned above, technology is often used as a container concept. The meaning of the concept has broadened. According to Berting (1992, p. 19) technology has a threefold meaning as follows:

1. Technology can refer to various human-made *artifacts*. Technological objects are things, utensils, and apparatuses. The computer is an example of an apparatus useful for calculations, designing, writing, and so on.
2. Technology also refers to human activities and to human labor connected with the use of technical artifacts. The artifacts are useless without the knowledge on the manufacture, maintenance, and use of them. When we return to our example of the computer; it is impossible to operate the apparatus without the knowledge of the human–machine interface as—for instance—described in manuals. The manuals are a description of the *action system* necessary to operate the machines or artifacts. To be able to write this chapter, the author first had to acquire knowledge by reading manuals and consulting his kind and more informed colleagues on the use of word processors.
3. The third meaning of technology is as broad as can be and refers to a higher level of knowledge. In this meaning technology is the totality of knowledge necessary to generate new solutions. It refers to a scientific *system of knowledge* in its most abstract forms. One of the sciences governing the operation of the software in our computers is mathematics. Without it, programmers could never have made the programs we work with.

The different definitions of technology are relevant to this chapter for they point at different aspects of the problem. In the artillery example it can be demonstrated that when the different aspects of technology are not harmonized mismatches will occur. When there is a mismatch between the artifact the cannon (definition 1) and the knowledge to operate the cannon (definition 2) firepower will be threatened. Part of the drill to fire the cannon was deemed unnecessary and hindered the speed of operation. Traditions and exercises that had lost their use caused the loss of speed of operation—in words close to intention of definition 3—the knowledge system was no longer in accordance with the action system.

As said before this chapter is on the relationship between technology, power, and organization. The paradigm of control is discussed under "Technological Determinism and the Paradigm of Control." This paradigm is based on the assumption of technological determinism. Under "Debunking Technological Determinism" the discussion is on the debunking of the myth of the technological determinism. This section ventures into topics such as the myth of the automatic introduction of technology, economic factors, and political factors. The introduction of machine guns and tanks will illustrate the point to be made regarding the automatic introduction of technology. The "third wave" theory of Alvin and Heidy Toffler provides examples of economic factors in the introduction of new technology. Political factors—e.g., rivaling organizations were so eager to reach own goals that they willfully ignored the overall goals of U.S. armed forces—proved to be important in introducing the M-16 in Vietnam. Three examples on positive ways to deal with power, organizational principles and technology are given under "Overcoming the Concealment of

Power Relationships by Myth of Technology." The classic work of Max Weber on military technology demonstrates that technology was consciously rejected in the ancient Israeli society in favor of a certain antimonarchal political arrangement. The chapter takes a turn in favor of the sociology of organization with the Dutch Prince Maurice, who used the principles of scientific management to improve his military organization by making intelligent use of the interface between technology and personnel. The French Lieutenant-General De Gribeauval is a military example of a change master, someone who found ways to conquer resistance to technological and organizational change. In these three examples—ancient Jewish society, Maurice, and De Gribeauval—positive and sensible use of power led to improvements in military organizations and the use of military technology.

TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND THE PARADIGM OF CONTROL

The basic idea of the paradigm of control is that reality can be controlled by the use of technology. The roots of this way of thinking originate from the era of enlightenment. Before the enlightenment the social arrangements were legitimated by the traditional order installed by God. People acquiesce in this situation for there is no way that they can protest against this divine order. The enlightenment changed this traditional worldview. The enlightenment brought the technological paradigm of control containing the following elements: (1) the optimistic belief that the world can be created by humans; (2) the appliance of scientific models to all areas of life (rationalization and secularization); (3) belief in progress in technological, economic, and social areas; and (4) belief in the technological factor as the "prime mover" (Moelker, 1992).

The appliance of calculation (Weber, 1992, p. 17) leads to a disenchantment ("die Entzauberung der Welt") completing the rupture between the premodern and magical way of thinking that is characteristic of the times preceding the enlightenment. A disenchanted world is a world dominated by science, technology, and bureaucracy (as a rational instrument of control). The model of Clark Kerr (1973)—in which the concept of the "iron hand of technology" is put forward—is renowned and is an example of the disenchantment of the world caused by science and technology (Figure 22.1). In this model scientific knowledge is imperative to the appliance of technology. Rational processes of decision making, aimed at obtaining the most optimal position in competitive economic systems, lead *automatically* to the choice of the best technology. The next step in the model is that the form and structure of an organization is determined by the best technology. Industrial relations, the way labor processes are organized, quality of work, and all other societal institutions are derived



FIGURE 22.1. Technological determinism in the model of Clark Kerr.

from the preceding causal factors in the model. The last (and least important) part of the model is culture. Culture—in this model—is no more than a remainder. It is not capable of autonomous influence. Educational systems and the labor market are important institutions in Kerr's model for their role is to make the system function smoothly. People have to adapt to the (educational and labor market) system so that they can fit into the form of the organization and the technological demands. Interesting in this model are the political implications. As technology is the most important factor causing change political systems will converge. The differences in political systems—capitalism and socialism—will finally disappear. Technology causes societies to become similar. Especially the percentage of "white collar" workers will grow in both type of societies.

The technological paradigm of control can be seen in the literature in different forms, but the fundamental idea remains the same. For example, Bell (1976) states that our society has evolved into an open society that is no longer industrial but *postindustrial*. According to Bell postindustrial society is based on the application of theoretical knowledge. An optimistic belief in progress in inherent in the views of authors like Bell and Kerr.

Military intellectuals, strategists, and commanders usually think along the lines of the technological paradigm of control. In order to obtain pragmatic solutions they turn to new or emerging technologies more advanced then the technologies of their adversaries. The optimism that problems are controllable thanks to modern technology is not the only thing that appeals to the military elite. Technology and especially information technology promises control of matter over personnel. Technological tools raise the expectancy that when the machinery of violence is released, the military elite can keep control.

DEBUNKING TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

The importance of technology as a causal factor in modernization processes is not to be ignored or downplayed. But on the other side a simple monofactor theory of change is always one-sided and likely to be flawed. Deterministic approaches do not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon of "technology." The work of Bruno Latour does (1997). In fact, in the work of Latour technological artifacts obtain human characteristics and humans are depicted as machines, robots, or computers. In one of his ground-breaking articles on technology—titled "Mixing Humans and Nonhuman Together, the Sociology of a Door-Closer"—the author himself becomes a machine. This is achieved by writing under the pen name of Jim Johnson (1988). Jim Johnson is the computerized author Latour and—to use a concept of Latour that is closely connected to the military—is his own lieutenant. Latour means literally *lieu tenant*, locum tenens. Machines, computers, and other technological gadgets (and Jim Johnson!) are replacements, place holders. In this way machines become human, and humans become machines.

It is this kind of lateral thinking that is needed to debunk the technological determinism and to shred off the implicit simplicity of deterministic models. The determinism can be debunked by pointing at the mythical aspect that surround the introduction of new technology and by demonstrating that technology is not the only factor influencing change. Economic and political factors sometimes are more important in the introduction of new innovations than their level of technological perfection. Military technology serves well the purpose of illustrating these points.

The Myth of Automatic Introduction: Machine Guns and Tanks

World War I was crucial to the development of modern industrial warfare. In only 4 years military technology (Griffith, 1994) and its battlefield applications advanced tremendously. The static trench warfare stimulated innovations whose purpose was to regain mobility. From the perspective of the paradigm of control one would expect that every innovation would be applauded. In accordance with the model of Clark Kerr new technology should lead to adaptations in organization. Rogers (1983) explains this optimistic view from the *pro innovation bias*: the expectancy that all progress comes from new technological innovations. From this positive attitude toward new technology one would expect that innovations are not hindered during the implementation phase.

Contrary to expectations new weapons, the machine gun and the tank, were not incorporated into the traditional structures of the English armed forces. The weapons were incorporated independently through the Machine Gun Corps (established 1915) and the Tank Corps (established 1917). But implementation of these weapons met much resistance.

Introduction of the Machine Gun. Based on American inventions by Gatling (1862), Hiram S. Maxim (1894), and John M. Browning (see Ellis, 1986) a gun with high firing speed was constructed. Civilians made these inventions, not army technicians. The military in general was not supportive of this kind of modernization and technology. The second half of the 19th century was an era of invention, mass production, and technological progress, but in the military the idea lingered that wars were decided by courageous individuals who were motivated by patriotism, honor, and heroism. Most prestigious were bayonet fighting and the cavalry charge as signs of human strength of will and courage. This dominant way of thinking also was a protest against the modernization of society. Especially officers stuck to a worldview that was predominantly preindustrial.

Was the machine gun not used at all? No, limited amounts of guns were bought for use in the colonies. In colonial wars, where European powers were outnumbered by their adversaries—mostly the original inhabitants—the machine gun proved to be effective. It was a weapon appropriate for the use against African people. It was not considered honorable to use machine guns against civilized Europeans. Black opponents were not regarded as equals, which made it easy to disregard the concept of "fair play."

Neither colonial experiences nor the use of the machine gun in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) changed the mind-set of the military. The simple idea that increased firepower could be decisive in modern warfare fell on barren grounds. Cultural preoccupations and this mind-set caused much discussion on the question of where to fit the machine gun into the organization. Officers with experience in colonial wars favored the idea that the infantry should use the weapon. Most infantry officers were against the heavy and not easily transportable gun and preferred to regard it as a part of artillery. Artillery officers were not keen on incorporating the machine gun either. In 1914, the beginning of WWI, non of the three traditional army branches were willing to adopt the machine gun.

The most important advocate of the machine gun was Captain George M. Lindsay. The infantry officer had learned to appreciate the machine gun based on experiences in the Boer War. He realized that firepower was crucial in combat. He pleaded his case ceaselessly before the top decision-makers in the British military. Idealistically an elite unit of specialists should use the weapon in order to gain as much profit as possible without hindering infantry and artillery. Lindsay claimed that technology would replace traditional fighting with more

effective ways of taking action. Lindsay wanted an independent, mobile, motorized machine gun force to break trough the trenches. He got his machine gun force, but it never gained the independent status that Lindsay wanted.

Trench warfare in winter of 1914–1915 and the failure to bring maneuver warfare tactics into the battle changed things for the machine gun. The onslaught that resulted from attempts to break trough enemy lines became characteristic for the Western front. The Germans, having the availability to more machine guns and using them in a more dispersed way, caused heavy losses to the British. Though the British were tempted to ascribe these losses to their own lack of "offensive spirit" the real cause of the losses was a change in the nature of battle. *Battle had become dominated by mere firepower, putting aside old military values as bravery and sacrifice.* Given effectivity of the machine gun (the firepower of one machine gun equals that of 80 infantrymen), civilian politicians pointed to the fact that the use of the machine gun would save lives. Technological development and modernization were inevitable. Old values had to disappear. But Lindsays wish that the Machine Gun Corps should be an independent unit did not come true. The corps was obliged to work closely with infantry and artillery. From 1915 the machine gun had developed to the nucleus of both firepower and maneuver tactics in infantry. In 1918 the first regulations were written down underlining the importance of firepower. But the Machine Gun Corps soon was threatened by emerging technologies itself, the invention of the tank (Liddell Hart, 1959). Financial cuts after WWI resulted in the end of the Machine Gun Corps.

Introduction of the Tank. Just like the introduction of the machine gun, the tank also met resistance from traditional branches of the army. Again, the most fervent advocates of the innovation were to be found in strange places, more specifically in a coalition of engineers and the navy. Stimulating were Winston Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton, a military engineer. As early as 1914 Churchill propagated armored cars. Though rejected by the army, this idea survived in navy circles and led to the establishment of the *Land ship Committee.* Swinton was inspired by the caterpillar tracks used on American agricultural machinery and hoped to overcome the difficulties of trench warfare by using tanks. The new machines should be able to destroy machine guns and to cross obstacles and trenches in the terrain.

The army was skeptical about the new innovations—minister of war Field Marshall Horatio Kitchener called them "pretty mechanical toys"—but when technical achievements improved Swinton got his chance. In 1916 the first constructions (in separate parts) were transported to France. Not to lose the element of surprise people were made to believe that the parts were water tanks for Russia and the Middle East. This also explains the origin of the name "tank." An independent Tank Corps was established. Lieutenant-Colonel John Fuller made plans for the future use of the tank and got to put his ideas into practice during the battle for Cambrai in November 1917. Hundreds of tanks were able to make a breach of 10 km depth into the German front line. But the Germans—after the first surprise—were able to regain the terrain. The British military top was not convinced of the tanks' usefulness. Field Marshall Douglas Haig still believed in the decisive role of cavalry. The battle of Amiens in August 1918, where 350 tanks again broke through the front lines, did not take away the resistance against the tank. After the war Fuller kept on promoting the use of the tank. In 1923 the Armoured Car Companies were renamed the Royal Tank Corps and the soldiers were allowed to wear the black beret (an idea which was originated by the French).

Causes of Resistance. But even then the Royal Tank Corps was not integrated into the organization and tactical procedures of the traditional army branches. Among the cavalry the ideal of officers as *gentlemen and sportsmen* remained one of the central values. Resistance was not uncommon, even in the United States, where the tank had been a part of the infantry since 1920. Cultural barriers delayed the implementation of new technology. Politics are maybe as important as culture. Vested interests are decisive for the openness of mind of the established military elite. The use of machine guns and tanks could mean the end of traditional branches such as infantry and cavalry. At the least these braches would have to be reformed and reorganized. Returning to the model of Clark Kerr: technology did—because of cultural and political factors—not automatically lead to changes in organization. In fact, in many instances culture and vested interests caused technology to be used in a wrong manner. The necessary changes in the organization could only be brought about by political labor of advocates of the new technology. Advocates who did not regard technological artifacts as isolated "gadgets" but who were willing to think in an holistic way about the best way to couple new technology to organizational requirements and to introduce the new technology in a convincing manner, and this tactic helped to slowly overcome resistance.

Economic Factors: Alvin and Heidi Toffler

Technological determinism masks the role of economic factors in the introduction of new technologies. Economic factors are inherent in the idea of military competition. If it is the best technology that survives, rivalry between societies will lead to arms races. Arms races are in fact not only races in search of scientific excellence, but they are economic forms of warfare and were characteristic of the Cold War era. The basic idea is to economically exhaust the opponent. The Cold War is an example of this principle: the Soviet Union was economically exhausted by the arms race.

Many authors on economy are in fact technological determinists. Marxist or neomarxist theorists and some "capitalist" theorists often share the same deterministic approach. Blauner's neoliberal (1964) book on alienation and freedom distinguishes three technological stages—roughly artisans/crafts, mechanization, and automation—that are causing economic development and alienation. Braverman's (1974) neomarxist approach also is an example of technological determinism; technology leads to changes in the economy, which leads to alienation. Other authors implicitly or explicitly deal with the economic factors as the cause of changes in technology. Sometimes these authors fall in the pitfall of economic determinism but in the more successful analyses there is a balance between voluntaristic aspects of human action and multifactor causation.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1994), who claim that changes in technology and economic structure are reflected in warfare, provide a good example of a successful analysis. In their vision technology is considered to be a "prime mover" but the model of explanation is economic at its heart. All military developments are fit into a three-stage economic model or, in the terminology of the Tofflers, "three waves" (Table 22.2). The three waves are the agricultural revolution, the industrial revolution, and the information revolution. Factors of production in these waves are "earth/soil," "capital," and "knowledge." Warfare in the first wave is characterized by seasonal labor performed by mercenaries. In the second wave mass armies enter the scene. In the third wave small volunteer armies replace mass armies. Warfare is a land–air war with surgical interventions and growing importance of information

TABLE 22.2. Relationship between Economy and Warfare

Wave	Characteristics economy	Characteristics warfare
Agricultural revolution (first wave)	Agriculture, mercenary system	Seasonal labor, soldiers living from the countryside and from what they can seize
Industrial revolution (second wave)	Mass production, mass consumption	Mass armies, mass destruction
Information revolution (third wave)	Information as factor of production, continuous innovations	Precision weapons, smart weapons, Information as weapon and target, improvisations at every level, growing importance of non lethal weapons

specialists. In information wars personnel behind computer screens many thousands of miles away from the theater of war may be decisive in the outcomes of the battle.

The Tofflers's analysis is richly documented and the hypotheses for the future are challenging, but some remarks should be made. The economically based theory has the appearance of inevitability. It seems almost logical that countries who have reached the second wave stage will be the underdog when confronted with military conflict with countries in the third wave. This hypothesis is too much derived from Gulf War experiences and neglects historical situations in which high-tech superpowers had to give in to lesser developed countries. The Tofflers contribute to the debunking of the technological determinism by pointing at the relevance of economic factors. Their theory is a counterweight to one-sided technological determinism. Their theory is at the same time overly optimistic in viewing technology as a solution for problems that might be better solved by political debate or diplomatic conflict resolution. It is neither the economy nor technology that provides answers to political questions. Both economic and technological determinists are likely to forget that freedom of choice serves as the point of departure for political decision making.

Political Factors: The M-16

Tradition, culture, and vested interests are important factors in the introduction of new technology. Demonstrating the role of these factors unmasks the myth of technological determinism. But what really needs to be unmasked are the underlying power structures. It is only occasionally that the power relationships become visible and in those scarce instances the naked truth can be shocking. Conspiracy, intrigue, power plays, self-enrichment, and even criminal negligence come to the surface when critical researchers unveil the sinister webs that are woven by powerful stakeholders. In general theories of conspiracy, like the theory on the Military Industrial Complex, lack plausibility, but sometimes there is a grain of truth to them.

James Fallows (1985) is one of the few researchers—a journalist—who succeeded at debunking myths of technological superiority as a conspiracy—a real bureaucratic horror story. The story is on the introduction of the famous M-16 rifle in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. The M-16, produced by the Armalite Corporation, was a competitor of the M-14 that was produced in a joint venture between civilian industry and the army's

own arsenal system and Ordnance Corps (a part of the U.S. Army responsible—among others—for the testing of rifles). The Ordnance Corps' M-14 used a large .30-caliber round that was uncontrollable in automatic firing. The explosive charge needed to propel the heavy bullets was so great that the kick was ferocious. This even caused nosebleeds. The M-16 proved to be the superior rifle—at the time it was the most reliable, most lethal infantry gun ever invented—therefore it was decided that after 1965 it should be handed out to soldiers in Vietnam. It was technically superior, used a smaller caliber round (.22), and was easier to operate. The technicians of the Ordnance Corps ridiculed the caliber size. In their opinion the gun using this caliber was only fit to shoot at squirrels. But the smaller caliber resulted in greater stability of the gun. The greater stability made it more controllable during automatic firing. Upon entry into the human body the smaller caliber started to rotate, causing more damage than a larger caliber would. The M-16 was not as heavy as the M-14, therefore the soldiers could carry more ammunition.

As the M-16 was made by another enterprise, the Amalite Corporation, the Ordnance Corps probably felt put aside. The Ordnance Corps lost its monopoly. This probably is the reason why the Ordnance Corps made some "improvements." Adaptations to the barrel made the bullet rotate more during flight and follow a straighter path. But this improvement also caused the bullet to be less lethal at the moment that it penetrated the human body. The most important change was the appliance of a different powder: "ball powder." A higher firing speed was made possible because of the use of this powder: 1000 bullets a minute could be fired in stead of 750.

According to Fallows the results were disastrous. The bullets jammed on many occasions because of "fouling": a powder residue on the inside of the gas tube and chamber. The higher firing rate also caused the weapon to jam. Testing proved that with normal powder there were 3.2 malfunctions per 1000 rounds. Using the ball powder the failure rate was six times higher per 1000 rounds. The weapon, in normal conditions very reliable, chronically refused to function in battle conditions due to the use of ball powder. Soldiers in action in Vietnam were desperate. They were equipped with a gun that stopped functioning during life-threatening moments. They started to write letters to their girlfriends, parents, to the weapons industry, and to their congressmen. Parents in Idaho received this letter from their son, a Marine:

> Our M-16s aren't worth much. If there's dust in them, they will jam. Half of us don't have cleaning rods to unjam them. Out of 40 rounds I've fired my rifle jammed about 10 times. I pack as many grenades as I can plus bayonet and K bar (jungle knife) so I'll have something to fight with. If you can, please send me a bore rod and a 1¼ inch or so paint brush. I need it for my rifle. These rifles are getting a lot of guys killed because they jam so easy.

One man wrote to a member of the Armed Services Committee Staff, recounting what his brother told him: "... in battles there in Vietnam the only things that were left by the enemy after they had stripped the dead of our side were the rifles, which they considered worthless. That when battles were over the dead would have the rifles beside them, torn down to attempt a repair because of some malfunction when the enemy attacked ..." Another letter states: "The weapon has failed us at crucial moments when we needed fire power most. In each case, it left Marines naked against their enemy." Another private wrote:

> Dear Sir: ... our company ... ran into a reinforced platoon of hard core Viet Cong. They were well dug in and boy! Was it hell getting them out. During this fight and previous ones, I lost some of my best buddies. I personally checked their weapons. Close to 70 percent had a round stuck in the chamber, and take my word it was not their fault.

And, according to Fallows (1985, p. 251).

> "When investigators ... went to Vietnam, they confirmed another report: that one Marine had been killed as he ran up and down the line in his squad, unjamming rifles, because he had the only cleaning rod in the squad."

In 1967 a congressional investigating committee conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the origins of the M-16 problem. This committee concluded that "the failure on the part of officials with authority in the Army to cause action to be taken to correct the deficiencies... borders on criminal negligence." The bottom line is that the M-16 was sabotaged. Bureaucratic rivalry, a battle in which technological and scientific arguments served as weapons between several powerful organizations within the armed forces could probably have cost the lives of several hundreds and maybe even thousands of young soldiers. Fallows states: "The hearing record, nearly 600 pages long, is a forgotten document, which received modest press attention at the time and calls up only dim recollections now. Yet it is the purest portrayal of the banality of evil in the records of modern American defense."

Fallows's story on the M-16 rifle is a bureaucratic horror story that proves that politics are an essential factor in the introduction of new technology. Power relationships and vested interests can sometimes be more important than the quality of the new innovation when it comes to the introduction phase of this new technology. If quality had been decisive the M-16 would have been introduced with no difficulties.

OVERCOMING THE CONCEALMENT OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS BY MYTH OF TECHNOLOGY

In the examples above the point to be made was about unveiling the simplicity of the notion of technology as the single cause for changes in society and warfare. The hypothesis is that this kind of one-factor theory masks the underlying power relations. Power relations need not always be masked. Military decision-makers can sometimes better deal with technology when they acknowledge the consequences in terms of power relations. Military decision-makers can make use of the power structures by making them more transparent in order to change them and to overcome resistance to change. The military elite can gain much by openness, a scientific exploring attitude, and the skills of a change master. Happily, there are many examples where power relationships are laid open by military decision-makers. These examples are illustrations of creative ways of dealing with technology. For the first example we go as far back in time as the ancient Jews. The second example was found in the early 17th century in The Netherlands when Prince Maurice reorganized his army and defeated the Spanish. The last example comes from France, where in the last half of the 18th century Lieutenant General De Gribeauval reformed the artillery to overcome resistance from the cavalry and infantry.

Ancient Jews Rejecting Technology: The Military Sociology of Max Weber

The dominant military technology in the Middle East in the 1st and 2nd millennia before Christ consisted of horses and chariots. Because of its speed and maneuverability this was the ultimate weapon. Real cavalry, men on horseback, became popular in later times with the Assyrians. Horses and chariots were expensive. The horses had to be fed and housed in

stables. The men working with them had to be trained. A new type of professional soldier would be required. All this meant that the expenditures for horses and chariots would be so high that no normal man—not even a very wealthy man—could afford a military force equipped with these new weapons. Only a king with central powers could equip such an army (Hancar, 1956, pp. 399–635). This simple fact forms the essence of the argument of the classic sociologist Max Weber (1963) in the third part of his "Gesammelte Afsätze zur Religionssoziologie," where it deals with ancient Judaism. According to Weber the political power structure in the 13th to the 9th centuries before Christ depended on the principle of self-equipment. As long as the Jewish nomad-warriors could use their own weaponry they could exert enough political power to guard against centralist tendencies that would eventually substitute their tribal society with a kingdom. Modern technology—chariots and horses—would be so costly that it would mean the end of the army as it existed when Israel was a federation of tribes.

But the balance of power between the city and the country shifted. The city patricians gained economic influence and indebted the farmers and shepherds in the countryside. The accumulation of capital led to military influence. The capital enabled the patricians to buy more sophisticated armories and weapons. The patricians were:

> ...Trägerin der damals höchstentwickelten militärischen Technik (...) Den der stadtsässige Patriziat war in Palestina Träger des von der mitte des 2. Jahrtausends an sich über die ganze Erde, von China bis Irland, verbreitenden riterlichen Wagenkampfs, dessen Kosten, bei Selbsequirpierung, nur die vermögendstend Sippen, aus eigenen Mittel ökonomisch gewachsen waren.

> Translation RM:...bearers of the highest military technology of that time.... In Palestine in the middle of the second millenium the city-dwelling patricians were bearers off the chivalrous tournaments with chariots that were becoming popular in the world from China to Ireland. Under the principle of self-equipment only the wealthiest tribes could finance these tournaments.

At the moment that the group of people able to self-equip and became smaller, opportunities for centralization grew. Before the institutionalization of the monarchy modern military technology was rejected on purpose. A few times horses and chariots were part of the loot gotten from vanquished tribes. Even though the weapons were for free, they were rejected. Only tribes that had tried to conquer Judean tribes had used horses. Jewish warriors used donkeys for transport and production of milk. They did not take military advantage of horses or chariots that were won from other tribes or kings as is demonstrated by the following quote from Joshua 11:

> ...Yahweh said to Joshua, Don't be afraid because of them; for tomorrow at this time will I deliver them up all slain before Israel: you shall hamstring their horses, and burn their chariots with fire. [11:7] So Joshua came, and all the people of war with him, against them by the waters of Merom suddenly, and fell on them. [11:8] Yahweh delivered them into the hand of Israel, and they struck them, and chased them to great Sidon, and to Misrephoth Maim, and to the valley of Mizpeh eastward; and they struck them, until they left them none remaining. [11:9] Joshua did to them as Yahweh bade him: he hamstrung their horses, and burnt their chariots with fire.

The Jews were heavily outnumbered, but were victorious in the end. Joshua does not take the horses to be part of his army but cuts their hamstrings and burns the chariots. Of course the Jews were proud that they could defeat the technologically superior armies of the Canaanite city-states with only foot soldiers.

In *The Tribes of Yahweh* Gottwald, a scholar of the Old Testament, elaborates on the work of Weber (1979). Horses were probably not used in the time cited in Judges. In Israel during that time a war hero—appointed by Yahweh—not only administered justice but also served as war commander leading the joint tribes. In Webers' terminology these

commanders are *charismatische Kriegshelden*, "charismatic war heros." When confronted with a military state of emergency one of the leaders of the tribes acquires charismatic authority over all tribes. When the state of emergency has passed the *primus inter parus* retreats from his leading position before it coagulates into a proto form of monarchy. The idea of hereditary monarchy seems repelling to the Jews during the time cited in Judges. Gideon openly rejects the offer to become king in Judges 8:23: "Then the men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule you over us, both you, and your son, and your son's son also; for you have saved us out of the hand of Midian. [8:23] Gideon said to them, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you: Yahweh shall rule over you."

Military leadership in this period is always temporary and military leaders do not try to establish a reign of kings. They must have realized that stables, horses, chariots, and charioteers, as a part of Israeli defense, would irreversibly have led to central authority and to a hereditary king. By rejecting military technology (cutting the hamstrings) they proved their loyalty to the traditional tribal society and to the traditional balances of power.

The situation changed when the threat of war became permanent. The long wars against the Philistines caused the rise of permanent kingship. The war efforts required a standing army and permanent military leadership, which caused the form of authority (again using Weber's terminology) to shift from "charismatic" to "hereditary charisma." Monarchy became institutionalized. Using the modern definition of a state, it is clear that Israel became a state. This development starts with Saul and is completed under Salomo. Saul originally was a farmer riding a donkey. David had followers among his family, people who otherwise would perhaps have become enslaved, and soldiers recruited from different peoples (see Samuel 22:1 and 22:2 and Samuel 8:18; 15:8; and 23:24–39). These followers formed the basis of his power, a basis independent of the existing tribal society. Finally it was Salomo who definitively vested established Weber's *ërbcharismatische stadtsässige Monarchie* ("hereditary charisma and city-centered monarchy"). He builds a modern and costly army that is equipped with horses and chariots.

The decisive change is from David to Salomo. David orders the majority of the captured horsemen to be killed (2 Samuel 10:18): "The Syrians fled before Israel; and David killed of the Syrians the men of seven hundred chariots, and forty thousand horsemen, and struck Shobach the captain of their army, so that he died there." Salomo equipped his army with 40,000 stalls of horses for his chariots and 12,000 horsemen. To finance this army the people were taxed. The tribal structure was reorganized by dividing the country into 12 districts. The districts were ruled by officers who supplied the king and his house with food (1 Kings 4:28). A centralist state was formed. The elite in the city definitively got the upperhand. The old farmers armies lost their significance and the shepherds were demilitarized.

This development greatly influenced Judaism. In this religion resistance against central monarchy is traditional. The resistance often takes on the form of protest against kings who take advantage of their position. Weber elaborates on this topic but we do not. In the context of this chapter we are mainly interested in the introduction of new technology. Among the ancient Jews technology is consciously rejected. The Jews realized themselves that technology and the resulting monarchy would destabilize traditional balances of power between the tribes.

Organizing Firepower: the Prince Maurice

Rejecting technology for good reasons is one way of consciously choosing certain power constellations. Changing power constellations in order to make better use of technology and

to gain firepower is another way. In the example discussed below technology and organization principles get so much intertwined that it is impossible to decide where technology stops and where organizing begins. Of course organizing is nothing else but technology. This may sound like a platitude from the days of Henry Ford, but few will realize that organizational theory is rooted in the Renaissance. It took one Dutch sociologist to point out that Ford had an important military predecessor, the prince Maurice of The Netherlands. The sociologist was the esteemed Dutch intellectual and renowned military sociologist Jacques van Doorn (1971, 1974). His thesis was that the principles of scientific management were already applied by Prince Maurice at the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century. Maurice understood that he had to reorganize his army in order to take full advantage of the new technology of his day: muskets. If he had not reorganized his army, the new technology would have been just as misplaced as was the machine gun at the beginning of WWI.

Maurice of Nassau (1567–1625), Prince of Orange, was a son of William the Silent. He became stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland after the assassination of his father in 1584. He was later appointed captain general and admiral of the United Netherlands in 1588 and became stadtholder of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel in 1589. Throughout his career The Netherlands continued to struggle for independence from Spain (biographical data from *Columbia Encyclopedia*, 2001; for excellent Dutch biographies see Wijn, 1934; Van Deursen, 2000).

The most dangerous weapon in battle was the cavalry. The new technologies that emerged at the end of the 16th century consisted of a combination of soldiers wielding pikes together with musketeers providing firepower. Pikes and muskets were arranged in squares with pikes in the center and musketeers on the side. Pikes normally had a length of 8 m. Musketeers could fire at the charging cavalry and when cavalry came up close they ran into a wall of pikes. This technology changed the balance between infantry and cavalry, making infantry relatively more important. But pikes and muskets were not easy to operate. Muskets were dangerous. Before inserting a bullet a charge of gunpowder had to be added. Because of the weight a fork had to be used in order to aim the musket. The musket was fired by use of a fuse that set fire to a pan with gunpowder. First the pan had to be filled with powder. Then, while holding the musket, the burning fuse had to be fastened to a sort of festoon that was connected to a trigger mechanism. After aiming the musket was ready to be fired. All in all it took a skilled musketeer at least 3 minutes to fire and to reload his musket.

The usefulness of the new technology would have been limited without organizational reform. The secret lied in infantry drills. The Spanish had developed drills but Maurice soon came to understand that the weaknesses of the Spanish drills were discipline, mobility, and maneuverability. The squares formed by the Spanish were large and consisted of company-size units (300 soldiers per square). Maurice turned to classic Roman literature and made a scientific analysis using a table with tin soldiers. He (together with his nephew) kept on experimenting until they arrived at a solution. Many changes were necessary. He divided the normal amount of soldiers per square by three creating squares of 100 soldiers, thus increasing maneuverability. He tripled the amount of officers, putting more emphasis on instruction, discipline, and leadership. Maurice did away with the principle of self-equipment—he did not allow soldiers to bring their own muskets—and standardized the musket. Drills were part of the organizational technology. As the time to recharge a musket amounted to 3 minutes Maurice introduced the back march. After firing the musket the musketeer had to march to the back of the square. At the back the recharging started. Maurice was able to bring out fire constantly because of this drill.

On top of all these changes the what we would nowadays call "human resources philosophy" was adopted. Recruiting officers could no longer keep the money for recruitment in their own pockets, leaving the company half-empty (sometimes companies' coffers were filled only on paper). Education and training of soldiers was improved by scientific analyses. First, Maurice ordered the artist Jacob de Gheyn to break down all the movements needed to fire muskets or to handle pikes. Every movement was translated into a drawing. Thirty-four drawings were needed for instruction purposes on the firing of a musket. When one would make a slide show of these drawings an animated movie would have been the result. The same was done for the handling of pikes (18 drawings) and other weapons. Instruction needed to be visualized for the soldiers because mercenaries, from all over Europe, were not able to communicate in Dutch. Translations of the book were made resulting in one standardized command language. The drawings made by Jacob de Gheyn were no less than a classic time–motion study that was used in scientific management 3 centuries later.

Van Doorn rightly pointed at the similarities between the organization of Maurice's army and the principles of scientific management. Scientific analysis and time–motion studies were the cornerstones of his system. Maurice demonstrates that technological innovation can never stand alone. Only together with organizational change does it become possible to bring out the best of the new technology. The way the organization is transformed makes part of the new technology. Without integral organizational reform new technologies would not perform as well as they could. Maurice warns us against piecemeal changes that are directed at only substituting one old artifact with something newer. In managing change a holistic point of view is necessary. In changing the structure of vested interests and changing power relationships military managers should follow this holistic course.

Overcoming Resistance to Change: De Gribeauval

From Lieutenant-General De Gribeauval we learn an additional lesson. Again scientific analysis, experimentation, and integral organizational design are the cornerstones of the system. But De Gribeauval also knew to overcome resistance to change from the traditional branches of the army. In the 18th century he knew how to implement his artillery reforms by convincing the strongly opposing infantry and cavalry.

Technological developments in artillery were manifold. In the early 18th century each gun had to be cast in a unique and individual mold. Due to this technique it was impossible to accurately match the core of the mold to the exterior (McNeil, 1985). There were many irregularities on the inside. As a result cannons had to be heavy to attain a certain level of firepower. Cannons could be used most effectively on shipboard and in fortresses. They were to heavy to serve on the battlefield and when they were used on the battlefield (or when they were used to put fortresses under siege) civilian transporters carried out the transportation. They had the means to carry heavy loads. From a military point of view this was disadvantageous for the civilian transporters were not subject to military discipline and were not willing to endanger their own lives. This limited the use of cannons.

Swiss engineers Jean Maritz and his son improved the technology of forging guns considerably by developing a boring machine. This machine was capable of producing a perfectly centered and smooth bore. In the period 1755 to 1774 this technique eventually was applied all over Europe, from Russia to England. The advantages of the new technology were greater safety and equal strength and thickness on every side of the explosion. The bored-out barrel allowed a closer fit between cannonball and gun tube. Smaller charges were

needed. The walls of the cannon could be thinner, which allowed the weight of the gun to be reduced considerably. Reduction of the weight of cannons enabled artillery to follow the troops and to join in at the battlefield. Transportation was no longer an insurmountable barrier. What is more, thanks to the technological developments the personnel responsible for transportation could be militarized.

Lieutenant General De Gribeauval was the key player who, in the second half of the 18th century, translated technological developments into workable organizational formats by using rational methods, science, and experimentation. In this he differed little from Prince Maurice. De Gribeauval introduced many technological improvements, for example, a screw device for elevation and a combination of shot and powder into a single package. But the organizational side of the reforms was just as important. As the transport of the new field artillery became the responsibility of the soldiers who fired the guns, there arose a need for drills and education. The soldiers had to learn how to maneuver with the equipment and how to attain the highest firing speed possible. De Gribeauval set up schools for artillery officers. Not only theoretical aspects were taught but also tactics of joint operation together with infantry and cavalry.

De Gribeauval did not stand alone. He formed a group of reform-minded officers who understood that the French army was badly managed and that changes were necessary. The reform party understood the importance of mathematics and science. Social origin may also have played a role. To obtain a commission in infantry or cavalry, people were obliged to be in part of noble descent. People in artillery could obtain a commission on the basis of their civilian skills, be it technical of mathematical skills. The reformers were very much more in favor of modern methods of warfare. As was to be expected resistance came from infantry and cavalry. These traditional army branches valued "courage" and "physical power" for these qualities were essential to man-to-man fighting. The new weapons introduced by De Gribeauval were welcomed with dissaproval:

> a weapon that could be used to kill soldiers impersonally and at a distance of more than half a mile offended deep-seated notions of how a fighting man ought to behave. Gunners attacking infantry at long range were safe from directs retaliations: risk ceased to be symmetrical in such a situation and that seemed unjust. Skill of an obscure, mathematical, and technological kind threatened to make old-fashioned courage and muscular prowess useless. (McNeill, 1985, p. 236)

Disapproval was even greater in Prussia. Whereas De Gribeauval had convinced the other French army branches of the usefulness of his system—the many victories of the French army were partly based on the use of field artillery—Prussia under Frederic the Great and his successor clung to the old military values. Frederick downplayed the artillery in favor of "discipline" and "honor." In 1806 the Prussians paid the toll for their backwardness when they lost the battle of Jena. "Discipline" and "honor" were no match for the sheer firepower of the French field artillery.

De Gribeauval knew to persuade and convince the military elite and especially the infantry and cavalry generals for several reasons. Early in his career he learned about Prussian artillery methods and became experienced with foreign artillery when he was transferred to the Austrian service. He made note of the improvements the Austrians had already made. Presumably De Gribeauval and his party had a clear image of the future direction of artillery operations. What De Gribeauval was implementing was a form of "planned invention" that nowadays is a common part of research and development departments. The way he convinced the other branches was by experimentation, by demonstrations in the field, and by piecemeal improvements. The firepower demonstrated on the battlefield was the ultimate argument.

But this argument would not have mattered much if the timing had not been right. Among the Frenchmen there was a widespread feeling that the army was badly managed and that things would have to change. These common beliefs were needed to topple the vested interests of the traditional branches that felt threatened by the rise of "civilians" (not noblemen) into the ranks of the army.

CONCLUSION

After giving definitions of "technology" and explaining the concept of technological determinism this chapter proceeded with debunking some myths about technology, the myth of automatic introduction, and the myth of causality—that of technology being the only factor explaining change. Economic and political factors proved to be factors of influence. Power, vested interests, and organizational structures always are connected to the introduction of new technology. When power structures are clouding decision-making processes, it is mostly the simple soldier who pays the toll. He might end up being equipped with inadequate technology. But power can be put to use in a positive way, in a way that furthers transparency and honest decision making. "Overcoming the Concealment of Power Relationships by Myth of Technology" provided several examples of awareness of the power structures underlying the introduction of new technology and ways of dealing with the new technology. Of course, new technology can be rejected or it can be accepted (in due time). Acceptance of technology does not come around by itself. It is the result of integral management adapting the organization and the people in it (their methods of working) in order to arrive at a symbiosis of new technology and organizational structure. In order to achieve this goal the military elite will need to be "change masters," men or women who know how to overcome resistance to change.

Travers (1990, p. 76) points to the similarity in the stages of development regarding the introduction of the machine gun and the tank: (1) Invention and introduction of the new technology meets resistance of the established order. (2) Acceptance at the lower levels: At the shop floor level the usefulness of the new technology is acknowledged. (3) No development in doctrine or tactics which could lead to implementation of the new technology. The establishment tries to marginalize the new technology. The political will power to integrate new technology into existing branches of the army or to create a new branch is lacking. The weapons are seen as an extra but the existing technical imperfections are an argument for the opponents. (4) Opponents and proponents speak out more clearly; weapons are improved. (5) The tactical role of the weapon is elaborated on leading to integration in the existing order.

These stages apply well to the introduction of machine guns and tanks but not to the introduction of muskets (Maurice) and field artillery (De Gribeauval). The introduction of machine guns and tanks clearly was a bottom-up development. The introduction of muskets and field artillery was a top-down development. Both paths of development have led to the implementation of new technologies. The bottom-up path is the trial-and-error path. The army wrongly implements technology causing failure and loss of human life. Later the errors have to be corrected. The top-down path implies a choice in favor of science and management studies. Prince Maurice did not sacrifice his men but experimented, analyzed, instructed, and reorganized. De Gribeauval managed to convince the other army branches by his scientific labor but also by political labor (winning votes, making coalitions, and citing shared interests and win–win solutions).

There are many lessons to be learned from the history of the introduction of new technology, both positive and negative lessons; lessons that could save the lives of soldiers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This chapter is based on joint research with Wim Klinkert, whom I thank for stimulating my thoughts on technology. The text on machine guns and tanks is based on his work. However, the roots for this chapter go back to the times when I was writing my thesis and owes much to Jan Berting and the members of the Center for Societal Transformation and Technology (Centrum voor Maatschappelijke Transformatie en Technologie).

PART VI

NEW MISSIONS

CHAPTER 23

Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century

Key Challenges for the Contemporary Armed Services

CHRISTOPHER DANDEKER

> For the future, what we need are flexible forces configured to be able to deal with many different scenarios... [I]n future, we may be engaged across a different, and potentially wider, canvas than we perhaps envisaged at the time of the Strategic Defence Review... [O]ur objective is to have forces available with the agility and adaptability to deal with a range of scenarios, not focussed simply on a few specific possibilities. Otherwise, we risk inflexibility and planning for the wrong outcomes.
>
> —The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Hoon, UK Secretary of State of Defence[1]

INTRODUCTION

After over a decade of coming to terms with the post-Cold War security landscape and, in so doing, redesigning armed services that are felt to be appropriate for that context rather than for the Cold War era, one of the central themes of most Western states' experience of this process has been the need to build a flexible military.

By the term "*flexible forces*" it has been normal to refer to armed services as follows: such forces are equipped with the appropriate hardware, force structures, and people policies that will enable states to respond swiftly, in collaboration with allies and/or friends bonded in "coalitions of the willing," to a wide variety of crises whose precise nature it is quite difficult to predict in advance. Consequently, the military response to such crises will increasingly

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[1]See the speech by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Hoon QC, "11 September—A New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review," Text can be downloaded from the Ministry of Defence, available at http://moddev.dera.gov.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id = 1247 (accessed January 4, 2002).

have to be configured in packets of force, drawing on a range of military elements to meet the particular needs of a specific crisis in ways that echo the long-standing distinction made in the world of business between mass and customized production.[2] Indeed, a key theme in organization theory since the influential study by Tom Burns and Graham Stalker (1994) has been the functional linkage between uncertainty in the business environment and the payoff attending the adoption of flexible organization structures capable of being agile and responsive to unforeseen shifts in market conditions.[3]

These are some of the military consequences of living in a more uncertain world, at least when compared with what may now be regarded as the relative certainties—indeed even relative security—of the bipolar Cold War era. It is, in my opinion, too early to draw definitive conclusions from the terrorist outrages of September 11th in the United States, which threaten states and values far beyond the boundaries of the state in which they were committed.[4] Yet it does seem to be the case that these events have added further impetus to the perceived necessity of advancing the organizational trend of flexibility in the armed services.

This development is apparent at least in the case of the United Kingdom, where, having conducted a far-reaching Strategic Defence Review, which concluded in 1998, the British government has recently released details of a proposed additional chapter of that Review. This includes some consideration of those terrible events and their implications for the security policy and force planning of the UK and its future collaboration with allies and friends.[5] One theme in what are still, wisely, ongoing discussions, is the continuing need for the UK to provide rapid, flexible, and appropriate military responses to crises, whatever form these might take in terms of an admixture of humanitarian disasters, state collapse, and conventional state or nonstate sponsored terrorist threats.

In this chapter, I explore the idea of "flexible forces" in more detail, considering the implications for the contemporary armed services and include some tentative suggestions on the likely effects of September 11th. Underpinning this analysis is the claim that, at least for states other than the United States, there are some serious tensions between two different kinds or levels of flexibility: first the ability to maintain the full range of military capabilities that might be required to meet any conceivable crisis and, second, a more specific capability to provide rapid and appropriate military responses to far-away crises; crises that can, however, quite quickly have repercussions nearer to home within the very state that is involved in generating such responses. Such tensions between these two ideas of flexibility can only be resolved by thinking through what a state can afford to do alone and what it must depend on the collective efforts of allies and friends to supply.

[2]See C. Dandeker (1996, 1999); B. Boene, C. Dandeker, J. Kuhlmann, and J. Van Der Meulen (2000); D. R. Segal (1993). For the broader context see the recent essays in C. Moskos, J. Williams, and D. R. Segal (2000); J. Kuhlmann and J. Callaghan (2000); and B. Boene and C. Dandeker *Les armees en Europe*, Editions La Decourverte, Paris (1998).

[3]See T. Burns, and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation*, new edition, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press (1994), first published Tavistock, London (1961). It is also interesting to note that in recent discussions with UK government research agencies there is an increasing interest in the lessons that might be learned from studying the parallels between the ways in which business enterprises and the military adapt to uncertain environments.

[4]That said interesting studies are appearing on this theme. See in particular the thoughtful essays in the issue of *Survival* devoted to "After 11 September," *Survival*, 43(4), Winter (2001).

[5]See *11 September—A New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review*; text can be downloaded from the Ministry of Defence, available at http://moddev.dera.gov.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1247 (accessed January 4, 2002).

In addition, there is a need to consider the imperatives of role specialization, which in turn raise large questions for European cooperation and the security and military relationships between the United States and European states, whether or not these are members of NATO.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT—HARD AND SOFT SECURITY

The contemporary international environment offers a variety of risks, threats, and dangers depending on where a state is in the interstate system. The terms "*risk*," "*threat*," and "*danger*" need to be clarified. By risk, I refer to capacities that have the potential to cause harm to one's security. Threats arise when such capacities become conjoined with an intention to cause harm. By dangers I refer to those capacities that have a high probability of causing harm without anyone's hostile intention but through either the negligence of identifiable actors or the unintended consequences of social action. Radiation leaks in poorly maintained facilities can be examples of dangers rooted in negligence. Population movements caused by humanitarian disasters can be considered as dangers rooted in either negligence or the unintended consequences of social conflict. However, they can also be considered as threats, especially when such movements are politically inspired by deliberate policies such as "ethnic cleansing." Such policies not only deliberately harm the population being cleansed but also the security of adjacent countries. Any concrete case might involve one or more of these elements of risk, threat, and danger.

We live increasingly in an era of "risk complexity" in that it is now difficult for any of the advanced societies to establish the circumstances in which a bewildering array of risks (defined as capabilities not matched to intent) might become identifiable threats. For example, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction increases the risk of their use, but specific identifiable threats cannot be charted without an analysis of the intentions of the users of those weapons (as well as the readiness of the means of producing, sustaining, and delivering such weapons to their targets). Thus, a risk can become an immediate danger through accidents and human negligence rather than through deliberate and hostile intent.

Global security looks and feels different depending upon the regional context. Thus, for most western European countries, the events of 1989–1990 saw the end of the bipolar confrontation that had split the continent of Europe and placed a nuclear-tipped Sword of Damocles above its inhabitants. It also saw the end of a long era during which states had to confront the potential of a threat to national territorial sovereignty from their neighbors. However, it has become evident that what we are witnessing is not a "warless society" or a return to the warring nation-states in the cockpit of Europe with which we have had to deal since 1648.[6] Rather, in general terms, we live in an era of a "violent peace" in which the relatively peaceful and increasingly socially and economically integrated West faces a troubled hinterland of instabilities. These are not only relatively distant but on its "doorstep," so to speak, as in the Balkans and, perhaps as some pessimists have argued, due to move into

[6]See C. Moskos, "Armed Forces in a Warless Society," in L. Freedman (Ed.), *The War Reader*, Oxford University Press, New York and London (1994), pp. 134–139; C. Dandeker, Sociological Perspectives: "War and the Nation-state, Retrospect and Prospect," in M. Clarke (Ed.), *New Perspectives on Security*, Brassey's, London and New York for the Centre of Defence Studies (1993), pp. 80–91.

the core of western Europe. Even so-called far-away problems, as in South Asia just now, have the capacity to affect other regions. One of the consequences of September 11th is that such interregional effects are likely to be magnified as, for example, groups or activist cells inside them within European societies become disaffected because of the perceived wrongs being committed to people in regions far away to whom they nonetheless feel committed.[7] Governments in the West feel drawn to these problems, whether on the doorstep or far away, and, out of conscience and material interest, a need to "do something."[8] Of course, not all states take the same view: much rests on their power position in international politics and their strategic culture.[9]

For states wishing to respond to contemporary crises, and to contribute to international peace and stability, they must ask their armed forces to perform a far wider variety of activities than was the case during the Cold War era, especially complex forms of peace support missions. One view, dominant in defence circles in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the more "warrior like" elements of the military profession in other parts of Europe, for example, Sweden, is that states in the West have to prepare for war and base their organizations on that prime purpose, even if, paradoxically, major interstate wars are the *least likely* scenarios that they will face in future. This is because, first, it is prudent to prepare for the unlikely as it cannot be discounted entirely; furthermore, the capacity to respond to the need for a war-fighting machine cannot be prepared overnight. Second, a war-fighting capacity is required to buttress the conduct of more "muscular" peace support operations in which peacekeepers face a potentially much more violent tempo of life than classic peacekeepers would encounter. As the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has put it recently, "Planning capabilities based on warfighting will give us the ability to contribute to other types of operation but the reverse is not true. Optimising the force structure for either a warfighting or non-warfighting role is not the way forward. Building a force by planning for both will produce a more robust force structure with wider utility."[10]

Even if one accepts this argument (as I do) that warfighting underpins the whole spectrum of likely military activities, warriors in what, with a colleague, I have called

[7]There is a good deal of debate now, and not just in the UK, about multiculturalism and social cohesion in Western nation-states. For a thoughtful journalist's comment see, Melanie Phillips, "They CAN be both Moslem and British," *The Daily Mail*, London, p. 10, Monday, December 10.

[8]Thus EU states have not only humanitarian concerns about such cries as the violent breakup of SFRY, but also a strategic concern about the economic and other costs of the human spillover from this region into their own countries. The UK is not alone in developing the idea that security policy should be based in part on the idea that one should prepare to go to and ameliorate the crisis before the crisis come to you. This approach requires the use of both armed forces and other instruments of policy.

[9]In other work I and other colleagues have found the following formulation useful. The evolution of armed forces and society and the impact of government decisions on this process are situated in three interconnected settings: the international context (in particular, the new security landscape that emerged after the end of the Cold War in Europe); the domestic societal context comprising social, economic, technological, political, and cultural factors; and the "weight of history"—the inheritance from the past in terms of the experience of war—for example, whether a society has an imperial history or one of neutrality; a history of invasion or fear of invasion or one of relative security; whether the military has a long-standing position of power and prestige in state and society; whether a society has a long tradition of conscription and so on. In each of these three settings, decision-makers responsible for the armed forces and their relations with their parent societies face not only constraints but also opportunities. See C. Dandeker, *Facing Uncertainty, Vol. 1* and B. Boene et al., *Facing Uncertainty Vol. 2.*

[10]The Future Strategic Context for Defence, available at http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page = 2449 (August 2001). Italics added by the author.

strategic peacekeeping operations need to be aware that certain aspects of their culture have to be adapted to the new situation.[11] For example, their mission is less the use of force in order to achieve a victory and more in order to edge the conflicting parties to make an agreement of their own making. Classic peacekeepers are drawn into conflict resolution where the strategic initiative and the resolution of the dispute lies in the conflicting parties hands. In peace enforcement both the strategic initiative and the solution to the conflict are determined by external powers. Increasingly, in strategic peacekeeping operations midway between peace enforcement and classic peacekeeping the strategic initiative lies with the external, intervening powers but the resolution of the conflict lies with the political will of the conflicting parties.

Meanwhile, at least until recently, when considering the defence of national, sovereign territory in a globalized world with a decline in the perceived immediate military threat, many Western industrial states (who were at peace with each other and could look with some optimism at a continuation of this condition for the foreseeable future) felt able to rely more on reserve forces or even police agencies to deal with what were perceived as remote "hard security" risks to their territory. In the UK context, this was one effect of conceiving the primary role of armed forces as "going to the crisis before the crisis came to you"—which has become a key theme in the current Labour government's defence policy.[12] At the same time, the major, softer security challenges to the sovereign state such as migration, and the drugs trade and related forms of international criminality, provided the basis for a blurring of the boundaries and the need for cooperation between policing, intelligence, and military agencies. Thus armed forces' involvement in the defence of national sovereignty against traditional state-centric threats could become a rather secondary consideration so far as strictly military functions were concerned. Meanwhile, where the armed forces did become key players in the softer security areas their distinctive role and identity would become somewhat blurred through their collaboration with other nonmilitary organs.

Yet some modification of this kind of thinking is in order in the light of the events of September 11th. Indeed, even before these events, some commentators felt that if a state sent its forces abroad to prevent a crisis, those hostile to the action might mount some kind of terrorist action within that state's homeland.[13] September 11th has brought this scenario into stark relief. Consequently, defence planners now have to think even harder about "securing the home base" while projecting power abroad or threatening to do so to deal with crises.[14] This will involve ensuring that regular and reserve forces are distributed

[11] See Christopher Dandeker and James Gow (1997).

[12] The Secretary of State for Defence in the UK in 1998, George Robertson, now Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, remarked, "In the Post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the crisis rather than have the crisis come to us." Quoted in *The Strategic Defence Review: How Strategic? How Much of a Review?* London Defence Studies, No. 46, published for Centre for Defence Studies, Brassey's (July 1998), p. 34. "As a result of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) the UK is now committed to a generally internationalist policy. This confirms a trend away from a concern with large-scale European contingencies to more limited affairs—in which international values are believed to be under threat as much as are national interests (narrowly conceived). Force structure is already becoming more geared to expeditionary operations of a multi-national character." Coalitions and the Future of UK Security Policy, Whitehall Paper Series No 50, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) (2000), p. 1.

[13] *Ibid.*, 34.

[14] Hoon, September 11th, p. 14.

appropriately to meet both power projection and homeland defence. Meanwhile, the need for even closer cooperation between military, police, and other security agencies has only been reinforced as states recognize that the boundaries between internal and external security have become more blurred.

In all of this, one must not forget, as I indicated above, that not all states think about security in the same way. Thus it is important to note that, for some countries in Europe, there is a perception of a persistent, present military danger (or conventional state-centric hard security risk) to national territorial sovereignty. This (so it is judged) will require continued reliance on larger scale or mass armed forces based on conscription—the case of relations between Greece and Turkey comes to mind. Other cases would be members of the ex-Warsaw pact, some of whom continue to look with, to say the least, suspicion on Russia's role in Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, from their point of view, they have serious *military* as well as the obvious nonmilitary reasons to develop closer links with the security systems of Western Europe based on NATO and the European Union (EU). In doing so they will participate in the trends toward more flexible forces over the first two decades of the 21st century.[15]

THE DECLINE OF MASS ARMED FORCES AND THE TREND TOWARD FLEXIBILITY

Notwithstanding the exceptional patterns noted immediately above, the general picture in the international scene (as far as Europe and most of the advanced industrial countries elsewhere are concerned) continues to favor a shift to smaller, more flexible forces. If the internationalist-based projection of power evident in the United Kingdom's thinking is any guide, these will have to be organized on an all-volunteer basis. (Or, if not, the all-volunteer elements will be the ones that are most useable and relevant to today's conditions, leaving states with conscript forces more reliant on others for this capability, which in turn raises issues of role specialization and alliance politics to which I shall return.) These volunteer forces are of the kind that one can observe in the United Kingdom and United States (although as a superpower its armed forces are exceptional) and the European countries that have already or are in the process of divesting themselves of the national conscription systems that formed the backbone of the 19th-century nation-state. Examples include Belgium, The Netherlands, and most recently France, which has redesigned its armed forces drawing in part on the British model. This model is not uninfluential in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is a well-established finding in military sociology that the long-term shift away from conscription and mass armed force model dating from the 1789–1945 era is caused by a combination of societal and international factors.[16] From a societal point of view, the growth of affluence, individualism, and differing conceptions of citizenship have all undermined the idea that the primary basis of citizenship is military service. In addition, modern technology as well as nuclear deterrence placed a premium on a capital intensive "force-in-being" rather than the mass armed force. This momentum in the strategic and

[15]See J. Kuhlmann and J. Callaghan (2000).

[16]The literature on this subject is immense. See K. Haltiner (1998); his chapter together with that by James Burk in this volume.

international context has been reinforced by changes since the end of the Cold War. These have promoted the longer term move away from "war winning" to a more pragmatic pursuit of viable international relations through what Janowitz called a "constabulary force"—a shift from a concern for victory to that of success.[17]

In recent years, the shift in priorities to missions that make a contribution to international peace and stability (as distinct from defence of narrower national interests or national sovereignty and that of one's allies) as the most likely basis for the deployment of force has added pressure to shift away from the mass armed force. Under modern technical conditions, even when acting in defence of allies or in contributing to international peace and stability as varying levels of intensity of violence, states are increasingly dependent on rapid-reaction, high-technology forces. This was revealed, for example, in the French experience of the Gulf War, a key event in precipitating the abandonment of conscription. With a much larger (formally speaking) military establishment France could put in the field far fewer personnel—about a third of the forces deployed by the smaller all-volunteer force of the UK.[18]

Recent evidence indicates that although societal trends are significant drivers of force structure, strategic and international considerations are more important. A recent survey by Karl Haltiner (1998) shows this quite clearly. Haltiner argues that the shift away from the mass armed force is most likely under three conditions: when a country can enjoy the security benefits to be had from membership of a defensive alliance (such as NATO); when the country concerned is relatively distant from a clear and present military danger to its national sovereign territory (e.g., from a threatening contiguous state); and, third, when that country embarks upon (or is intent upon) frequent participation in international peace support operations. When these conditions do not apply then countries are likely to retain conscription as in the cases of Finland and Switzerland (which are nonaligned) or the cases of Greece and Turkey (which are involved in a dispute that buttresses their present military manpower systems). Haltiner's research (an update of which, extending the focus to Central and Eastern Europe, appears in this volume: see Chapter 21) indicates that, notwithstanding the importance of societal trends, factors in the international and strategic context are the more important drivers of shifts in the organizational format of the armed forces; or, rather, that societal changes might undermine the mass armed force concept but that political elites will not judge it right to break with the weight of history unless strategic circumstances indicate that it would be prudent to do so. Indeed, should such prudential circumstances arise then, as was the case in France in 1997 and perhaps will be in Germany as it thinks through how best it can play a role with its allies after September 11, 2001, and the intervention in Afghanistan, such a decision could be relatively easy to take and follow through. This suggests that the "weight of history" may be less significant than what appears

[17]See Morris Janowitz (1973, pp. 418–419). It is important to qualify this point by noting that the pursuit of success rather than victory can be associated with (a) the use of immense force to achieve limited goals, as in the application of airpower by the United States in Afghanistan and (b) the *de facto* pursuit of limited goals can be couched in absolutist terms such as "war" and "victory" when, either this is not meant or, worse, what is meant is not achievable, as in the current "war on terrorism." On these matters see M. Howard's address on the events of September 11th at RUSI on October 30, 2001, which will appear in the *RUSI Journal* during 2002. Janowitz's prescient commentary on the struggle between absolutists and pragmatists in U.S. military doctrine will continue to be relevant to observers of debates in U.S. defence circles for the foreseeable future.

[18]On these issues see F. Valentin, "Armee de conscription our armee professionelle," Defense Nationale (June, 1993), pp. 9–15.

at first sight to be the case: that only the shell of the legitimacy of an inherited structure may be intact rather than the substance.[19]

THE DESIGN OF FLEXIBLE FORCES: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Let us now turn to the question of the appropriate organization for armed forces in the post-Cold War context, whether or not a state decides to retain elements of a conscription system in some form. When considering recent developments in military organization, it is interesting to note the striking parallels between the drivers of change facing armed forces and those encountered by private-sector organizations discussed above. Six dimensions are noteworthy: first the end of immediate direct threat to national territorial sovereignty is paralleled by the lack of a stable market for business. Second, military establishments such as those in the United Kingdom are at their lowest level since the Second World War, paralleling the course of company downsizing since the 1980s. Third, the military has to addresses a range of missions involving operations other than major war, namely interventions abroad in multinational contributions to international peace and stability. This focus on projection of force to dispersed points on the globe from a home base parallels the ways in which companies have to respond to increasingly global markets. Fourth, the military are having to think through the possibilities offered by the application of business models to the military, such as contracting out of functions, restructuring of hierarchies, and so on—processes that echo civilian developments in the empowerment and restructuring of companies. Fifth, both military and civilian organizations have to respond to the social and cultural challenges of a changing society: this society is more individualistic (in which, for example, people wish to be actively involved in how their working lives are organized and expect organizations to respect their private and family commitments). I shall not deal in any depth with these personnel and social issues here. Sixth, both sets of organizations are seeking to make best use of the new information technologies in enabling them to achieve flexibility and a competitive edge over their rivals. This is evident in all aspects of organizations, from the personnel functions (such as the administration of pay, personnel records, and so on) to operational areas—not least in the offensive and defensive aspects of "information warfare."

As a result of downward pressures on defence budgets and the need to be able to respond flexibly to the international environment, armed forces have to develop appropriate organizational structures. As I indicated above, in the United Kingdom, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review pointed the way to more flexible, smaller forces serving a more internationalist foreign policy. The key focus now is rather less on downsizing—a process that has preoccupied planners since 1989—and more on restructuring in order to maximize the capacity to flexibly respond to the uncertainties in the international system. This focus has only been sharpened by the events of September 11th. As the Secretary of State for Defence pointed out in December 2001:

> For the future what we need are flexible forces configured to be able to deal with many different scenarios.... Our objective is to have forces available with the agility and adaptability to deal with a range of scenarios, not focussed simply on a few specific possibilities. Otherwise, we risk inflexibility and planning for the wrong outcomes.[20]

[19] On France see B. Boene and D. Danet, "France: Farewell to the Draft and All That," in J. Kuhlmann and J. Callaghan (2000, pp. 227–258).
[20] Hoon, September 11th, pp. 5 and 9.

In all of this it is important to distinguish two meanings of flexibility. The first connotes an attempt to provide the fullest range of military capabilities—this is a natural response to an uncertain world. However, with downward pressures on defence budgets (or even with a very modest increase as we have seen in the UK recently) it is difficult to provide this flexibility with each capability at a reasonable level of sustainability. Consequently, there is a risk of becoming a "jack of all trades and master of none."

The second sense of flexibility is to make a strategic judgment about the kind of crises to which one should be prepared to make a military response and then organize a flexible response against this framework or standard. One key problem is the possibility of failing to exercise choice in terms of these two senses of flexibility. As I pointed out in 1994:

> ... [F]lexibility in the first sense—in what might be termed the spectrum of capability—can, under conditions of resource constraint, lead to inflexibility in another, i.e., in the specific capability of smaller, flexible forces. And the reverse applies: the latter capability requires a loss of flexibility in terms of having a full range of capabilities across the spectrum. Any failure to make choices here is likely to lead to an unsuccessful compromise in which one will reap all the disadvantages of each and none of the advantages. The effect of seeking to achieve flexibility in both senses simultaneously, under severe resource constraints, will lead to excessive multi-roling of equipment and personnel that might stretch them to the limit.[21]

Let us illustrate these somewhat abstract considerations. For example, a state like the United Kingdom might opt for preparing for more Bosnias and Kosovos, and indeed Afghanistans, rather than Desert Storms. This would require the creation of lighter, mobile forces, configured in such a way as to facilitate their being arranged into convenient packets of force customized to meet the needs of particular situations—what is known as "force packaging," on which more is presented below. In addition, it might be thought prudent, in regard to some of the provisional lessons of September 11th, for there to be more investment in special forces and in light troops trained at a level midway between special forces and line infantry—a development mooted in both the United Kingdom and the United States in recent months.[22] In addition, there would need to be more investment in the means of force projection and sophisticated command control, communications, and intelligence.

Such developments would be at the expense of the "heavy army" (suited for the "more Desert Storms" scenario), which would be reduced and/or placed in reserve to be reconstituted should a reemergence of a major threat, say from Russia, reemerge in Europe. (That this would involve serious power struggles within the bureaucratic structures of defence goes without saying.) These considerations were at the heart of some of the thinking in the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review. As one commentator reported then, "The army is to become a fighting force on permanent alert, capable of rapidly taking up peacekeeping duties in foreign conflicts of fighting anywhere in the world."[23] Furthermore, such choices would have to take into account a continued dependence on the United States for airpower, intelligence, and sophisticated command control communications technologies. Alternatively, or as a complementary approach, the United Kingdom would have to depend more

[21] C. Dandeker, *Flexible Forces*, p. 30.

[22] For a discussion of the question of whether the United States should concentrate on preparing for major interstate conflicts; more Gulf Wars; more diffuse, complex counterinsurgency campaigns; or on the former and provide logistics and command control communications and intelligence support for friends and allies disposed to become involved in the latter, see L. Freedman, "The Third World War," *Survival*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. (4) (2001) pp. 61–88, 74–76.

[23] See the report by H. McManners, March 22, 1998, Sunday Times, p. 5.

on the European NATO members or an emerging European security and defence focus for the development of these capabilities.

At the same time, there might well need to be some role specialization within the European context with, for example, the projection of light forces being spearheaded by those European powers, such as France and the United Kingdom, who are more suited by history and policy preference for such a role. As a recent concept paper in the UK MoD suggested recently, "... Europe needs to improve its collective defence capability both to improve its contribution to NATO and to give the EU the capacity to act where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. Resource constraints are likely to place growing emphasis on effective multinational approaches and consideration of limited role specialisation."[24] This pithy statement encapsulates the crucial decisions that need to be made about major issues: upgrading the European defence effort by investing more, and more wisely, as, for example, in cutting out unnecessary duplication in development and procurement and ensuring that the forces that exist are useable. This point has a bearing on the future of conscription in Germany, for example. The United States is unlikely to diminish its pressure on Europe to do "more" in the area of defence. In designing flexible forces, states with new or with long-established all-volunteer forces need to think through the implications of two significant developments. The first involves a combination of a greater focus on the ability to deploy some of the armed services very quickly indeed and force packaging; the second concerns the integration of the individual services into a more joint or "purple" mode of operation and culture.

An increased focus on ready forces, with other elements requiring more time to be made ready for deployment, is connected with the idea of force packaging of military structures: all of this allows for the regeneration of military capacity of a customized, or "mix-and-match" kind, suited to the specifics of particular contingencies.[25] Uncertainty as to the environment, objectives, and conditions of missions to come has led the United States (through "building blocks"), the United Kingdom (through "force packages"), and France (Bernard Boene has referred to the emergence of "a modular configuration of forces"[26]) to the idea of organizing military assets in advance into a series of coherent, self-contained, mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from the various organic commands for a given mission. Such modules can be assembled at short notice to form a mix of force appropriate for the specific demands of an unforeseen crisis demanding the use of armed forces. Such modular structures can be geared to both warfighting as well as other, and more controversial, roles such as aid to the civil authority on matters of internal security, such as assisting the police and customs in antiterrorism and drugs law enforcement activities.

Force packaging involves the participation of elements from all three services. It is in this context that one can refer to the increasing importance of "jointery."[27] The increased focus on interservice integration—what can be called the "purple trend"—has implications for the expertise and education required for personnel at different points in the military

[24] *The Future Strategic Context for Defence*, last page.

[25] However, unless there is a major increase in the defence budget, maintaining some of the armed forces at a higher state of readiness is likely to require some compromise on the range of capabilities that will be maintained. Such an outcome would reflect a shift toward the second sense of flexibility identified above.

[26] Professor Bernard Boene, Academic Dean at Saint Cyr Military Academy, France, coined this phrase. See his discussion of modular military structures in B. Boene and D. Danet, "France: Farewell to the Draft and All That," in J. Kuhlmann and J. Callaghan (2000, pp. 227–258 and 239).

[27] Although "jointery" is driven by the nature of military conflict, governments, including the United Kingdom's expect significant savings to arise from such a development. See A. Alexandrou, R. Bartle, and R. Holmes, "New People Strategies," 11, and *Modernising Defence Training*, MOD, London, April, 2001.

hierarchy. In addition, interservice integration involves units drawn from the armed forces of different countries, posing additional issues of "cultural interoperability"[28]: how to ensure effective cooperation among different national traditions.

Increasingly, in modern armed forces, senior commands will not be available for officers above lieutenant-colonel rank unless they have served on a "purple staff." Preparing military professionals for these complex roles, which Moskos has termed soldier-statesman and soldier-scholar roles, requires innovation in education and organization. This can be seen, for example, in arrangements for the efficient management of complex joint operations involving components not only from all three services but also from other countries as well.[29] To take a more specific example, the Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) structure and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJQ) set up in 1996 and the establishment of Joint Services Command and Staff College are designed to develop the joint ethos required of future operations. This is linked with the possible development of a more robust central defence staff manned by officers with ethos to put defence above individual service interests. There may even be a career structure for this defence staff although with officers moving back to their own service regularly, e.g., for command appointments so that they would keep in touch with the military basis of their role. It is worth noting that these educational developments will increase the transferability of skills of officers who have experience of such staffs once they return to civilian society.[30] Building such purple forces is not a task that can be achieved overnight and it is important to recognize that defence planners and the services themselves are sensitive to the need to steer between the Scylla of the Canadian failure to eliminate individual services and the Charybdis of permitting continued individual service ways of doing business that undermine the delivery of an effective joint contribution to multinational defence efforts in an EU and or NATO context.[31]

Let me allude finally to the parallels I drew above between the problems faced by contemporary business organizations and the armed forces and the solutions that each are trying to find to those problems. In addition to the organizational developments I have just discussed, the military will seek to make greater use of the less hierarchical and lengthy chains of command characteristic of the leading businesses. But this will be limited by the peculiar needs of a coercive disciplined structure necessary in a war-fighting organization. Thus it is worth noting that in the PJQ of the JRDF discussed earlier; project teams are a significant feature of the working pattern. This is necessary because of the rapidly evolving complex emergencies with which these organizations are concerned.

Some years ago David Segal explored the wider application of matrix and related ideas to military organizations; his analysis is even more relevant to today's conditions (1993b). In many companies one can observe a shift from multilayered hierarchy to team or "matrix" structures. Of course, specialization of functions is still retained but less so than before and focused on projects working across functions. The matrix format provides the basis for

[28] Personal conversation with Professor Boene, Saint Cyr Military Academy, France, who has coined the phrase "cultural interoperability."

[29] C. Moskos and J. Burk, "The Postmodern Military," in J. Burk (Ed.) (1994, pp. 154–155). See also C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and D. R. Segal (2000, pp. 268–269).

[30] B. Robertson, "Joint Needs in 2010," in G. A. S. C. Wilson (Ed.), "*British Security 2010*, Proceedings of a conference held at Church House, Westminster 1995 (pp. 284–285).

[31] On this see the discussion in the UK MOD's document known as "AFOPS," *The Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy*, MOD, London, February 2000. It is interesting to note that one of the major themes in the UK government's recent Defence Training Review is the recommendation that there be a "progressive increase in opportunities for multinational training." See A. Alexandrou, R. Bartle, and R. Holmes, "New People Strategies," 11, and *Modernising Defence Training*, MOD, London, April 2001.

more flexible organization structures. One effect of a delayered, matrix organization is the need to ensure that the work force has the skills to be empowered effectively and to produce a quality output. We may thus conclude that throughout the new flexible forces, and at each of their rank levels, the need for intelligent soldiers is likely to increase rather than diminish.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War security landscape has led to a search for more flexible armed forces among Western industrial states, a trend that the events of September 11th can surely only accentuate. In building flexible forces, states need to be careful in thinking through the two meanings of flexibility that have underpinned the above discussion if they are to avoid the paradoxical outcome of an inflexible defence organization produced through a concern to be prepared for very scenario thrown up by an uncertain world. To avoid this paradox, national states will be constrained to work more and more cooperatively with one another: multinationality is as important as jointery as future organizational and cultural trends for the armed services. In developing multinational approaches to flexible forces delicate issues of role specialization will need to be addressed. This process will allow national and historical differences as to where comparative advantage lies among national members of the NATO Alliance, the EU, and "coalitions of the willing" to come into play.

Finally, in building agile and responsive forces, the demand for intelligent military personnel is likely to increase. In building such forces the armed services should, therefore, be able to look with some profit (but not in any slavish way) at the organizational lessons to be learned from the more agile companies in the private sector. One example is how to structure command and control. An important feature of flexible forces, capable of being agile and responsive in a variety of military operations is the suppleness of their command and control systems. In particular, they need to finesse effectively the tensions that arise between, on the one hand, political imperatives (for example, the perceived need to manage the effects of military operations on the media and public opinion), which can lead to high-level micromanagement, and, on the other, the military imperative of complex operations that reinforces the long-term trend toward the dispersion of control to lower command levels.[32] In addition, it will be important for the armed services to compare their own people policies with those of competitors in the private sector in terms of what will be required to recruit and retain the best and the brightest among the youth population; for it is these young people who will be needed to make sure that such flexible forces will produce successful results in future military operations.[33]

[32]On this theme see Bernard Boëne and C. Dandeker, "Post-Cold War Challenges and Leadership Strategies in West European Military Institutions," in *Leadership for Change 1999*, N 68171 98 M5540, edited by G. Harries-Jenkins, Centre for Research on Military Institutions (CRMI) for the European Research Office of the U.S. Army Research Institute (1999).

[33]For a recent survey of the relevant issues see A. Alexandrou, R. Bartle, and R. Holmes (Eds.), *New People Strategies for the British Armed Forces*, London/Portland, or, Frank Cass (2002).

CHAPTER 24

A Soldier Is a Soldier Is a Soldier!?

The Military and Its Soldiers in an Era of Globalization

GERHARD KÜMMEL

INTRODUCTION

According to the legend of the Phoenician prince Kadmos, looking for his sister Europe, who had been kidnapped by Zeus, the soldier is an offspring of a dragon. More precisely, the soldiers emerged from the teeth of the dragon killed by Kadmos, who had sowed the teeth into the earth. In his *Metamorphoses*, Ovid tells the story of how the soldiers, emanating from the dragon's teeth, out of the earth, fiercely fight each other in what has since been the central notion of the soldierly activities or profession, i.e., the element of combat, sometimes conceived of in terms of a duel. They kill each other until only five of them are left. These remaining five soldiers then assist Kadmos in founding the city of Thebes and become the founding fathers of the Theban aristocracy. This, then, leaves the reader with the impression that soldiers, at least most of them, are something evil and despicable. Yet, Ovid's saga is not that unidimensional and unilinear, but presents an ambivalent assessment of the soldier, precisely because some of the soldiers survive the fight and do something noble and respectable. And this might be an appropriate notion running through the lines of what follows.

This chapter, then, is an attempt to look at the soldier and the military from a trans- or interdisciplinary perspective. Such a perspective is deemed to be crucial to military sociology as a discipline in its endeavor to grasp the multitude of facets coming into play with regard to the military and its soldiers as a social phenomenon (see Kümmel/Prüfert, 2000). In this way, especially political science, sociology, history, and even psychology are called upon. The reason for trans-/interdisciplinarity lies in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon in itself and one that cuts through various levels and touches several different contexts and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpenetration.

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For heuristic purposes, basically three levels of analysis have to be distinguished when analyzing things military and this, in addition, has to be done with the time factor in mind. The first level of analysis is the military world itself. This can be broken down into (1) the individual level of the single soldier and his (or her) interactions within the military; (2) the unit level of the various military units ranging from the platoon, the squad, the company, the battalion, the regiment, the brigade, the division, and the corps to the military services (army, navy, and air force) and their relations to one another; and (3) the level of the military at large, i.e., the armed forces as an organizational, bureaucratic, and industrial-technological system. In this regard, the units may be viewed as the intermediary relay station between the individual behavior of the soldier and the macro level of the military organization at large.

The investigation of the military and its soldiers, however, cannot stop here, but has to be extended to two further levels of analysis because there are interactions between the military world and the world beyond the military. With regard to this latter world, it is appropriate to distinguish between the national context and the international context. The military establishment is a subsystem of society, i.e., of a given social system (Janowitz/Little, 1974: Chap. 1). As such, in general, the armed forces and its members are influenced by societal processes, be they socioeconomic, sociocultural, political, politicocultural, or even technological in character. To add on this and to be more precise, some would say, they, fortunately, have to be sensitive to most of these processes (Janowitz, 1971), while others would argue that they, regrettably, are even vulnerable to most of them (Huntington, 1957). At the same time, because influence is by no means a one-way street, the military has repercussions and implications for the society, i.e., it is not only shaped by developments within society, but is also shaping its relations to society, thus impacting on society. Further, the military as a societal subsystem is part of an even larger picture, the international context, since any country and, therefore, any country's armed forces are exposed to an international environment that is as contingent as the national context. The geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic, and geocultural processes, tensions, and conflicts within the international context define the pattern of the global and/or regional conflict formations a given state and its military are located in, and they determine the actors, both state actors and nonstate actors, one is confronted with. Again, impact is going both ways, meaning that a given state and its military are both objects and subjects of the international context. In this sense, they are coproducing and coshaping the world that structures them. Last, these three levels of analysis present themselves quite differently at different times. The actors, the structures, and the interactions on each of these three analytical levels are not the same throughout history. Rather, in the course of time, they are changing, sometimes modestly, sometimes fundamentally. Equally, what the military is, what it means to be a soldier and what warfare looks like is very much dependent on the specific political, economic, social, cultural, and technological conditions given at a specific point in time. As a consequence, the time factor, the dimension of time has to be incorporated into the investigation.

With this general model of scrutinizing the military, this chapter attempts to illustrate and substantiate two hypotheses:

(1) a soldier is not a soldier, as the title of this contribution is already indicative of (i.e., the soldier does not remain the same for good and for eternity, but the soldier of the ancient world is different from the one of the middle ages and is different from the one of modern times, the present, and the future); and

(2) the definitional criteria, so to speak the character of the soldier, are currently undergoing change again; what we are witnessing in these days is a new shift in the meaning

of what a soldier, the soldierly profession, is and is not. Both hypotheses, thus the thrust of the argument, relate to the term *"adaptive military"* used by James Burk (1998) implying that the military and thus its soldiers, out of genuine self-interests in terms of survival, have to respond to challenges posed to them by the national context and the international environment both experiencing change. As a result, we will see both continuity and change in the definitions of the soldier and the armed forces and we will also see a good deal of the ambivalence that Ovid ascribed to the soldier.

After this display of the analytical framework, this contribution proceeds with outlining the origins of warfare and violence and developing a definition of war as well as a typology of war. This is followed by presenting those types of soldiers that are known from the past. It then goes on to circumscribe the more recent changes within the international environment and within the national context. It will be inferred from this that these changes also suggest transformations within the military requiring a new definition of the soldierly profession and of soldierly roles. The argument advanced is that the soldierly role set will (and has to) be extended to include what will be termed *"nontraditional roles"* in addition to the traditional roles. The ideal-type soldier of the present and the future will have to be a soldier capable of integrating what will, to summarize, be termed *"cosmopolitan behavioral orientations"* into the soldierly role set.

ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE AND WARFARE: DEFINING WAR AND TYPES OF WAR

The title of this subsection contains the hypothesis that any attempt to approach the complex social phenomenon of war needs to look at the phenomenon of violence (Trotha, 1999, p. 81) because the problems of war, the military, and the various types of soldiers raises the question of where the armed forces; its members (soldiers); and, indeed, war, warfare, and, last, interpersonal violence come from and when they first came into being. These are issues that obviously cannot be solved very easily. Not surprisingly, then, there is a major and controversial discussion around this topic and quite a few different disciplines take part in this debate with anthropology, biology, ethology, philosophy, psychology, sociobiology, sociology, and political science among them. Its essence seems to be the clash of definitions of what a human being is and thus of differing, even contradictory, images of the human being leading to opposite views about the future fate of war. Whereas one side contends that wars are somehow natural or quasi-natural events and that, therefore, the phenomenon of war will persist, the other side provides room and hope for a potential future abolition of war.[1]

Anthropological, biological, ethological, psychological, and sociobiological studies argue that aggression, an aggression instinct, and violence are somehow biologically or even genetically entrenched or encoded in humankind and are essentially necessary in order to survive in an adversary, life-threatening, and hostile environment. In such a vein, authors like Konrad Lorenz (1963), Robert Ardrey (1967), and Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1973) have to be named. However, war is not equivalent to aggression; it also is not individual violence. Rather, it is organized and collective violence and as such a basically social phenomenon

[1] Given the restraints on space, an in-depth analysis of this debate is precluded. Yet, my own proposition is that war and violent conflict will persist for quite some time because the human being is a social and a political animal. For different perspectives see, *inter alia*, Vogt (1986) and Galtung (1998).

(Stephan, 1996, p. 65). This, then, raises the question when organized, collective violence or war came about.

Here, one line of argument put forward cites climatological changes in the history of anthropogenesis leading to a substantial narrowing of the hitherto traditional, "vegetarian" food supply and implying the need, in order to survive, to find other sources of food (livestock) that also had to be protected against wild creatures. This meant the invention of and the transition to hunting taking place at the end of the Miozaen and the beginning of the Pleistozaen, i.e., between 5 and 2.5 million years BC. However, there seems to be an essential difference between hunting and warfare because hunting refers to a violent undertaking aimed at a different species, whereas warfare is intraspecies violence. By contrast, according to others, warfare was invented much later, in the Neolithicum (ca. 5000–1800 BC). Following this rather widespread assumption warfare occurred at the time when agriculture and farming were on the rise. According to this last view, war began to be waged once there was territory and property. A third line of argument doubts both these interpretations. In this third perspective, Barbara Ehrenreich (1997, pp. 142–151) cites palaeontological and archaeological studies to counter both of the arguments put forward so far. In her view, warfare was invented later than the Pleistozaen, but earlier than the Neolithicum. Instead, she points to evidence of warfare stemming from the Mesolithicum (ca. 9000–4000 BC) and argues that the "Fall of the Human Being," so to speak, seems to have taken place in these times. Life-threatening intraspecies violence and war, then, became popular when the stocks of animals declined dramatically due to human hunting.

Be it as it may, according to my view, the above discussion of the origins of war already contains the basic elements of a definition of war. First of all, war is a collective endeavor, i.e., there must be a society of some sort, at least some sociality. Second, this social group, either in its totality or some segments of it, needs to be willingly and actively ready or, at least, to agree to be forced to kill other human beings as well as to bear the burden and the risk of being killed oneself. Next, war requires some sense of planning and organization and some means, weapons, to kill. These criteria resonate with Trutz von Trotha's (1999, p. 71, my translation) definition of war as "the *collective* and *organised* use of material damage . . . , killing, and a technology of destruction, in particular weaponry." Further, they are entailing the "readiness, to suffer and to die and also to kill" cited by Martin van Creveld (1998, p. 237, my translation) as a crucial element of war.[2]

Yet, contra Martin van Creveld, who argues that war is basically an end in itself, my understanding of war is that though war, like violence (see Sofsky, 1996), does contain—to varying degrees—some traces of being an end in itself, a definition of war requires the element of purpose or objective. The conduct of war, warfare, is in need of some sort of legitimation, i.e., war has to be fought for some reason or cause. Human beings fight each other for reasons of survival, food supply, and territory as mentioned above, leaving reasons of some biological or genetic coding aside since, to me, they are quite unconvincing (see also Holloway, 1971), there are other causes cited in the literature, and here, the academic disciplines of philosophy, history, political science, and sociology come into play. People did and do not fight for reasons of survival, food, and territory alone; rather, in the history of the human race, war was and is also waged because of economic, social, political, religious,

[2]This definition purposely disregards (1) the formal feature of a declaration of war and (2) quantitative criteria like the duration of war and/or minimum numbers of troops and/or soldiers killed in action (see Eberwein, 1981; Small and Singer, 1982).

and ideological reasons like wealth, natural and human resources, power, prestige, and status; war is conducted to honor some god and in the name of an idea (see Howard, 1983; Keegan, 1995; Creveld, 1998).

My proposition is that all this belongs to the dimension of the political and that, hence, it is still appropriate to adhere to the famous expression of Carl von Clausewitz (1989), who viewed war as the continuation of politics with different means (see also the meticulous and differentiating analysis of von Clausewitz's work by Herberg-Rothe, 2001). This view is by no means uncontested,[3] and Martin van Creveld (1998), who has already been referred to, has powerfully argued against it. Admittedly, van Creveld is right in pointing to the need of putting von Clausewitz in his specific historical context. He is also right in arguing that von Clausewitz' trinitarian perception of war containing the people, the state and the armed forces, is a specific understanding of war which was valid for quite some time, but which is not suited to represent war in general; rather, there are other forms of war that can be identified. But this does not necessarily imply that von Clausewitz has become completely obsolete.

Without going into greater detail, the crucial point in the discussion seems to be that the authors who analyze the works of von Clausewitz operate with different conceptions of the political. In addition and to complicate things further, the political is understood by von Clausewitz in a particular way also. My understanding of the political is one that is influenced by Harold Lasswell and Carl Schmitt. From Lasswell I borrow the assumption that the political is about questions of distribution of goods. In his classic formula, politics is about who gets what when, how, and where. This process of distribution implies dispute and social conflict. This, then, is when Carl Schmitt enters the scene because within this process people may decide to become adversaries or, in the rather dramatic expression of Schmitt, enemies. With this conception of the political just sketched in mind, I argue that war still is the continuation of politics with different means—with the implication of the expression "different means" that the primacy of politics vis-à-vis war is not automatically given, but has to be actively asserted over and over again because war tends to develop its own momentum (Herberg-Rothe, 2001, p. 245).

Such a conception of the political also implies that war is not inherently and of necessity tied to the state and to statehood as it is often done when defining war (see, e.g., Gantzel, 1991, 327f). Further on, it entails that, echoing von Clausewitz' proposition of war being a true chameleon, war presents itself differently at different times, meaning that there are different types of wars with different forms, different meanings, and different objectives to be distinguished. The concept of war can therefore be applied to tribal, kinship, feudal, and nation-state industrialized modern societies (Trotha, 1999, p. 73). And it—and the military—will stay with the human race for the foreseeable future (Münkler, 2001). When it comes to the various types of war, I resort to and combine the approaches of Martin van Creveld (1998) and Trutz von Trotha (1999). According to this, basically, four types of wars can be observed: (1) the total war, (2) the war of pacification or colonial war, (3) the trinitarian war, and (4) the neo-Hobbesian war or low-intensity warfare.

Total war is not a phenomenon of the industrial age or of the 20th century as one may initially think. Rather, total war is as old as the history of the human race itself and

[3]Clauswitz is also contested because of his proposition that war is an act of violence and that there is no limit in the use of war. This was interpreted as taking war to extremes. Also, he was charged with being the ideological catalyst of the First World War (See Bassford, 1994).

has been fought by various socialities and societies. Trutz von Trotha cites its essential characteristics like this: "[Total] war tends to include all the members of the warring society. Complementary to this, total war is indiscriminately directed to all the members of the 'enemy' society. Within this tendency of totalisation both within and beyond the warring society, there lies the genocidal element of total war" (Trotha, 1999, p. 75, my translation). This means that there is an impulse to dehumanize the enemy; to draw sharp dividing lines between "us" and "them"; to not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants; to perceive war in terms of a holy war; and to use violence without constraints and excessively, eventually turning into genocide (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). In the context of the modern state and of industrialized society, the totalizing, delimiting impulse of total war is of particular importance. Here, we find a strong capability of a given government to mobilize people in huge numbers and to dispose of advanced weapons' technology with high levels of lethality and destructiveness. Nuclear war, then, is the absolute lethal and destructive embodiment of total war.

A *war of pacification* is a war that is waged to conquer colonies and to establish colonial rule in these territories. It is a war of conquest in the context of the global expansion of the occidental state aiming at establishing state rule in a given territory. Since what is perceived by the colonizers as pacification is viewed by those to be colonised as pure conquest and imposition, resistance to this move may be provoked among the local population. This might lead to organized and armed counterviolence. Again, as von Trotha contends, there is an element of totalization in this type of war.

The concept of the *trinitarian war* has been put forward by Martin van Creveld (1998, pp. 64–74). According to him, the trinitarian war is the war that von Clausewitz had in its mind when writing his seminal *On War*. As the term *"trinity"* already indicates, trinitarian war has three elements: First, it requires the existence of states; next, it requires that these states or their respective governments maintain, organize and finance armed forces; and, last, it requires the societies of these states to participate in warfare as soldiers and as conscripts and to back the war emotionally, i.e., by patriotic sentiment. Hence, the trinitarian war is a war between states that—usually—neatly distinguishes combatants and noncombatants.

Finally, the *low-intensity war* (Creveld) and the *neo-Hobbesian* war (Trotha) respectively are basically intrastate wars in which only one side officially represents a state or a government while the other warring side consists of "irregular" troops. The names given to these wars are numerous: They are called "small wars," "partisan wars," "guerilla wars," "civil wars," "insurgency wars," "wars of liberation," and so on. In these wars, the distinctions between front and rear and between soldiers and civilians become blurred. The partisan (see Münkler, 1990) is a soldier in disguise and seems to be a civilian which means that, what in the eyes of a "regular" soldier may initially look like a civilian may indeed be a partisan. This, again, is a source of the totalization of war.

TYPES OF SOLDIERS

The history of the human race is a highly complex matter; it is marked by continuities and discontinuities; and it is equally characterized by the fact that people have been; are now; and, most likely, will be living in different social times. Societal development is uneven. This comes to mind when looking at the multitude of socialities and societies around the world.

Although the world is basically a state world due to the globalization of the occidental state, below this state level there are tribal or kinship societies to be found. More than that, in some parts of the globe characterized by failing state structures, there seems to be a certain renaissance of tribal and kinship relations.

This very fact of uneven societal development implies that not only wars and warfare, but also the rules of warfare, the military organization, the means of warfare, and the types of soldiers using these means change. For most parts of its history, and covering immense geographical space, warfare was based on muscle strength (Ehrenreich 1997, p. 176f), paralleled by a permanent effort to increase one's own combat power by the invention of weapons made up of different material (stone, wood, iron, metal, etc.). Nevertheless, the dominant types of soldiers varied.

Warfare may be one of the undisputed central tasks of a member of a given society. In total wars of whatever sociality or society, this is obvious. The period of Classical Greece, for instance, may be regarded as some ancient form of van Creveld's trinitarian war. And here, some form of general conscription or, rather, militia system was already known to the Spartans, who were soldiers between the ages of 7 and 60.[4] In fact, the Hoplites in Classical Greece between 650 and 338 BC have even been interpreted as the "prototype of the citizen soldier who completely identified oneself with his community" (Stephan, 1996, p. 73; for an in-depth analysis see especially Hanson, 1990). The predominant type of soldier at that time, then, was some sort of forerunner to the modern citizen soldier.

Warfare may also be delegated to some segments of a given society or even to nonmembers of this society who are mostly paid, but at times also forced to perform this task. One such institution was the standing army of the Roman Empire. Knighthood was another and it developed in Franconia in the 8th century AD.[5] In the Middle Ages in Europe, the knights represented the dominant type of soldier rewarded for his services with a fief. They operated on a specific elite code of honor and with a self-image of a civilized warrior fighting in close combat. Often, therefore, they were shocked when during the Christian crusades they were confronted—in what could be termed some form of asymmetrical war—with what they perceived as barbarian nomad warriors riding horses and shooting arrows from afar thus avoiding real combat (Ehrenreich, 1997, p. 176ff).

Eventually, in the 15th century, their services were shifted to the paid landsquenet, who more and more replaced the knight because he successively lost in military effectiveness. This development was triggered by four processes: First, the use of arrows and bows and crossbows implied that fighting could be done from a distance. Second, the development of the gun and the rifle (gaining momentum in the 14th and 15th centuries AD), the emergence of firearms, also promoted distant fighting and gave the ground combat soldiers a military advantage vis-à-vis the knights on their horses. Next, the economic and political ascendance of the city changed the battlefield as well since it meant that the cities turned into fortresses that could not easily be captured with the means of the cavalry thus requiring the use of the artillery that began to rise in the 13th and 14th centuries AD. Last, the mercenary, the soldier of fortune, acted as a soldier as long as he was paid. With

[4] Even prior to this, the Assyrians of the Second Millenium BC had operated with some form of conscription as well.

[5] It is interesting to note that a similar type of soldier, the samurai, is to be found in a different part of the world.

the job done, he could easily be dismissed. The mercenary became the predominant type of soldier and armies of mercenaries had their high time between the 15th and the 18th century AD.[6]

Between 1500 and 1800, then, warfare in Europe changed dramatically due to advances, if not even revolutions in military technology just mentioned (see also Parker, 1996). Recruitment and supply structures also changed substantially as well as the military organizational structure—where a process of bureaucratization could be observed—and military training. Long-time drilling and practicing became an essential part of the military and its objective was to turn the individual soldier into a well-working part of the huge military machine or combat system (Ehrenreich, 1997, p. 19). European countries, then, witnessed the rise of the drilled ground combat soldier as part of a coherent military formation, the bureaucratized standing army, requiring more complex administrative and command structures, including disciplinary means and greater numbers of soldiers due to high casualty rates. The armed forces began to extract greater amounts of a state's resource, even large majorities of state expenditures which persuaded the historian Michael Howard to coin the expression that Prussia was not a state that had an army at its disposal rather than an army that had a state at its disposal. The expanding military pushed the scope of a state's administration thus creating the civil servants whose task it was to extract taxes from the population.

Beginning with the political emancipation of society as in the American and French Revolutions in the last 2 decades of the 18th century, the ground combat soldier in the military formation gained, yet slowly, in military importance as well as in social prestige. In the course of the nationalist movement and the emergence of nation-states, military service became a (male) citizen's obligation, the armed forces turned into mass armies based on general conscription. From then on, the ideal-type soldier was the citizen-soldier.

Simultaneously, the industrial revolution of the 19th century substantially advanced the technologization of the battlefield, leading to an "industrialised battlefield" (Warburg, 1999, p. 97, my translation).[7] It created new weapons like, e.g., the machine gun, and made weapons affordable and easily available; it also furthered and, in fact, accelerated the process of increasing the destructiveness and lethality of weapons leading to the use of airplanes, submarines, tanks, and gas in the First World War. The First World War became the synonym for trench warfare and high casualty rates;[8] mass armies fought a mass war with mass losses. This last proposition was equally true for the Second World War, which was even more damaging. Here, von Trotha's notion of the totalizing tendency of war could be applied (see also Warburg, 1999, p. 116). Whereas in the First World War, about 15% of the death toll were noncombatants, the percentage of civilian war victims increased to roughly 65% in the Second World War (Ehrenreich, 1997, p. 276).

In the course of the Second World War, new armaments were invented and existing ones modernized. Of special impact here was the invention of the nuclear bomb. These technological advances could not leave the soldier and the military organization unaffected.

[6]The highest reputation and esteem was given to the members of the Swiss Guard. Even today, they are serving the pope in Rome. Yet, there were mercenaries who acted less nobly. The most well-known examples of them were the *Condottieri* of the 14th and 15th centuries in Italy as well as the looting bands of soldiers of the Thirty Years' War 1618–1648.

[7]On this process of technologisation in the more recent past, in the present and in the future in terms of catchwords like roboterisation, digitalisation, revolution in military affairs, information warfare and cyber war see, e.g., Denning, 1999; Matthews/Treddenick, 2001.

[8]With regard to high casualty rates, the American Civil War is to be named, too.

Equally, military politics, military doctrine, and strategic thinking faced the challenge of adapting to this new technology. The atomic bomb, the "Absolute Weapon" (Brodie, 1946) that had so devastatingly and horrifyingly been used against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki toward the end of the Second World War in the Asian theater, tremendously altered the images of war and the thinking about warfare. From then on the spectre of a global nuclear holocaust held the societies of the world in its firm grip. As Bernard Brodie elegantly put it as early as 1945, the onset of the nuclear age meant a shift within the profile of military action from the purpose of winning wars to the objective of averting wars (Brodie, 1946, p. 76). Nuclear deterrence, massive retaliation, mutually assured destruction, and the "balance of terror," an apt phrase coined by Winston Churchill, became the hallmark of the military.

Initially, resources were shifted into this new technological field to the detriment of the conventional forces in order to secure the "second-strike capability."[9] With nuclear devices becoming smaller and smaller and thus useful for operations on a tactical level in some sort of limited war (Kissinger, 1957), the strategic doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" adhered to by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was successively called into question. Next, threat perceptions changed somewhat because increased attention was paid to a scenario in which the adversary of the bipolar world order, the Soviet Union, would launch a nonnuclear attack on Western Europe. In addition, there were serious considerations of surviving and winning a nuclear war (see Kahn, 1960). As a result, there was a strategic shift to "Flexible Response" and a renewed interest in the build-up of conventional capabilities. To be sure, this move was heavily criticized by advocates of the balance of terror like Bernard Brodie. According to him, there was

> ample reason to feel now that nuclear weapons do act critically to deter wars between the major powers, and not nuclear wars alone but any wars. . . . It is the curious paradox of our time that one of the foremost factors making deterrence really work and work well is the lurking fear that in some massive confrontation crisis it might fail" (Brodie, 1974, p. 430f).

For the people within the military, for the soldiers, privates, and noncommissioned and commissioned officers, the shift to deterrence was not easily accomplished given the soldiers' "extreme dedication to the idea of *winning*, to the notion of victory for its own sake" (Brodie, 1974, p. 490). In this regard, Brodie discusses the contents and the importance of military training by pointing out "that the whole training of the military is toward a set of values that finds in battle and in victory a vindication. The skills developed in the soldier are those of the fighter, and not of the reflecter on ultimate purposes" (Brodie, 1974, p. 492). The shift in the military profession was notable and implied that "the profession serves society by maintaining its strength, expertise and effectiveness at such a standard as to deter permanently, potential enemies from contemplating embarking upon war, either conventional or nuclear" (Downes, 1985, p. 156).[10] This, in turn, effected the emergence of another predominant type of soldier. In an apt phrase of Michel Martin (1981), the soldiers turned from "warriors to managers" and technicians.

This transformation was a major ingredient of the Institution–Occupation debate within military sociology (Moskos, 1977, 1986; Janowitz, 1977; Segal 1986) resonating with and

[9]What the nuclearisation of armed forces means in terms of intraorganizational problems, struggles, shifts, and effects has intriguingly been investigated by Michel Martin (1981) for the French case.

[10]On military professionalism see also Caforio (1988) and Harries-Jenkins (1990).

being the continuation of the classic debate between Huntington and Janowitz on the pattern and structure of civil–military relations. In addition, it gave new momentum to the questions whether the armed forces are a *sui generis* phenomenon; whether and, if so, how much the functions of the military require "that it be separated and segregated" from society (Finer, 1975, p. 10); and whether the alignment of the military with civilian professions and with the civilian workplace in the nuclear age may, in fact, signal the decline of the military profession and lead to a "social devaluation" and a "spiralling deprofessionalisation" of the military (Downes, 1985, pp. 164 and 167). And it is these themes that are discussed in the present debate on the military and on the profession of arms as well.

TYPES OF SOLDIERS: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE[11]

The Paradox: The Synchronicity of the Decline and Rise of the Armed Forces

As we have seen, in modern times armed forces may be conceived as an agency of the political system of a given society and as an organization that, in a specific way, i.e., by the use of organized violence, contributes to the realization of political objectives. In the course of time, the format of the military, its character, and the way the military and its soldiers perceive themselves are subject to change much like societies and the world is changing in the historical process. This implies that armed forces are by no means static, but dynamic and fluid organizations.

The change that the military is undergoing and that we are witnessing at present may initially be described on a phenomenological level. Following Carl von Clausewitz (1989), the armed forces may be defined as an instrument of the modern state that is been established, financed, and utilized in the name of the security of a given state. This utilization meant—foremost, but not exclusively—the security of the state in relation to the outside world and implied the capabilities of deterrence and self-defence to reduce the security risks and threats posed by other states. This defensive role set is complemented by another, an offensive role set. This last role definition, however, has successively lost its legitimacy in the course of the 20th century because it means being capable to launch an attack on another state and being prepared for aggression in order to pursue ones own national interests or hegemonic ambitions.

It is evident that these two role sets have lost some political relevance toward the end of the 20th century. At least, this seems to be valid for some regions of the world, especially the West.[12] In view of this, it is hardly surprising to observe the public discourse in quite a few European states in the 1990s shifting toward an orientation that decreasingly perceives the military as a central organization of the state. Without being exposed to large-scale direct threats and without intending to use military means to threaten another state, both governments and public opinion have been engaging in inititatives to restructure and to reduce the armed forces (see the information in IISS, 2001 and SIPRI, 2001). Some countries like Sweden have even gone so far as to aim at dividing in half their armed forces.

[11]This section is a synthesis of Bredow and Kümmel (1999) and Kümmel (2000).

[12]The well-known proposition of the former German Secretary of Defence Volker Rühe that Germany nowadays is "encircled with friends" sufficiently illustrates this impression.

The call for armaments' control, disarmament, scaling down the armed forces and reducing military expenditures is popular and the peace dividend is tempting. Dark clouds, then, on the horizon of the development of the military?

These initial appearances are deceptive, if they remain as the overall impression, since in recent years we have been witnessing a development toward an increasing utilization of armed forces of many different countries in military operations other than war. This term refers to different military operations like peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace support, and humanitarian intervention. All of them, however, usually require the combination of military and civilian elements to a much larger extent than is the case with war in its traditional sense (see Palin, 1995, pp. 34–50; Ahlquist, 1996, pp. 42–56). Their success or failure is increasingly dependent on an adequate cooperation of the military with civilian agencies and organizations of civil society [nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)]. Leaving aside, for the moment, the renewed focus on traditional military roles due to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (Jäger and Kümmel, 2001), this seems to open a new, or different, field of activity for the armed forces that runs contrary to the perception of the military in decline just sketched; indeed, these new spheres of activity in military operations other than war seem to open the prospect of a military rising in importance. No wonder, then, that military operations other than war are perceived by critics of the military as an auxiliary argument, a last resort in order to legitimize not only the upkeep of armed forces, but also their potential build-up. In such a vein, the reference to military operations other than war is interpreted as being unfair, dishonest, and even malicious because it deals a heavy blow to, if not undermines, the objectives of demilitarizing and civilianizing society.

The question the social sciences is confronted with, then, is which perception, which judgement comes closer to the truth? Are we witnessing the decline of the armed forces? Or are we observing a rise of the military? Or, the third alternative, is the empirical reality more complex and ambivalent than this dichotomy of decline and rise suggests and do both perspectives reflect parts of reality? And, further on, what does this imply regarding the functions and the role sets of the military and its soldiers?

Without a doubt, not in dispute is the proposition that armed forces are currently undergoing change, the sources of which, in general, may lie in two spheres: for one, it is the respective society the military is embedded in (i.e., the social, economic, technological, cultural, political, administrative, and governmental structures of this society); and second, it is the international system, its structures, its processes, and its actors. Developments and changes in both spheres, depending on their intensity and importance, may trigger modifications, transformations, and even a metamorphosis of the military.

The Hypothesis of the Military in Decline Revisited

The assumption of the declining armed forces is nourished by several arguments. Among the first ones usually cited is the reference to the change of the macro constellation of the international system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Up to this date, the basic grammatical structure of the international system was defined by the East–West conflict. Indeed, this conflict, often, though somewhat imprecisely, referred to as the Cold War, was the structural conflict of international relations that shaped and overshadowed most of the other conflict lines and conflict formations in the world. Due to the implosion of the Socialist bloc of states and due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the East–West conflict evaporated and

both the potential and actual conflict bipolarity and antagonoism between the two blocs vanished (Bredow, 1994).

At that time, the world seemed relieved of the horrors of a nuclear inferno on a global stage. The United Nations were trusted with high expectations regarding their future functions as the main world ordering instrument. The idea of democracy seemed to take root in more and more parts of the world and to become an international standard of civilization resembling nothing less than the global triumph of democracy. Equally, the references to human rights became much more numerous and human rights were also seen as a global standard of civilization. In the economic sphere, the liberal market economy promised to extend its cornucopia to those parts of the world that hitherto had seemed to be at a disadvantage, neglected and deprived. The utopias of the "One World" and of the Kantian "Perpetual Peace" no longer seemed to be utopian, but able to be put into reality. As a consequence, and with the utopia becoming the real world, there was no longer room for the armed forces (see Kümmel, 1994).

Since democratization and economic relations are seen as forceful peace strategies (Czempiel, 1986), in some segments of the Western modern societies there was the expectation that humankind was about to enter the era of the democratic peace in which there would take place the "retreat from doomsday" (Mueller, 1989). The social scientific literature on the topic of the democratic peace contends that once more and more political systems turn to democracy, the democratic intrastate principles of peaceful and nonmilitary means of conflict resolution would be transferred and extended to the relations between societies and between states. As a result, international relations would increasingly be governed by democratic principles (see Russett 1993). This met with economic constraints that raised doubts concerning the financeability of a keeping up and, even more so, of a build-up of the armed forces.

In addition to these considerations, modifications in the evaluation of organized violence as a currency of power in international relations were cited to support the notion of the military in decline. Here, in terms of the usefulness, the efficiency, and the effectiveness of power currencies, a shift from hard to soft power resources was noted. According to this view, factors like technology, education, and economy have increasingly been raising their value, their exchange rate so to speak, as power currencies to the detriment of the military as well as to other, classical power resources as geography, population, and natural resources (Nye, 1990). And in line with this shift in functionality, soft power resources have been gaining in importance and they have also successively been becoming more relevant for political action. During the 1990s, both these developments resulted—with notable regional and country differences—in a worldwide reduction of military expenditures and both in a restructuring as well as in a diminuition of the armed forces (see Haltiner, 1998; IISS, 2001; SIPRI, 2001).

Next, these arguments were complemented by factors that can be mainly located in the internal development of the individual societies. Here, in the most advanced and modern societies, a demilitarization was underway and gaining strength. This refers to a process that conceptually, materially, and organizationally curtailed the armed forces and led to the emergence of a "warless society" (Moskos, 1990) and even of a "post-military society" (Shaw, 1991). Uneven, hesitant, but at the same time dynamic in its course, this process is traced back to social-structural and cultural shifts within societies. In this regard, several subprocesses have to be cited: improving standards of living; increasing social, economic, and spatial mobility; advancing urbanization; mounting average levels of education; differentiation and specialization within the working world; accelerating technologization; individualization;

and, last, but not least, the emergence and the strengthening of world-societal and cosmopolitan values and orientations. This reflects shifts in the normative system, the value order, of societies in such a way that the individual commitment to community-determined and community-oriented lifestyles and traditions is decreasing, whereas the adherence to ideas and conceptions of self-realization and to postmaterialist values, as Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) would put it, is increasing. As a result, the cultural gap between civilian values and military values becomes bigger (Wiesendahl, 1990; Holsti, 1998–1999; Feaver and Kohn, 2001).

This, in turn, has meanwhile lead to the affective-emotional desymbolization and societal devaluation of conscription and, therefore, to a farewell: (1) to a type of the soldier that emerged due to and in line with the political assertion of the bourgeois society in the second half of the 18th century and that has been termed the citizen soldier; and (2) to its corresponding format of the military with general conscription as the defining element. Accordingly, from an international comparison of armed forces and their development, there emerges the finding of a general and broad trend at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century toward much smaller and highly professionalized armed forces in the format of the professional and the all-volunteer force (Haltiner, 1998). The majority of NATO countries, to take an example, have meanwhile turned their back against general conscription and those of them that still operate with conscription find it increasingly difficult to legitimize them from a strictly political-security point of view.

The developments and processes just sketched do not necessarily substantiate the hypothesis of a decline of the military. Soon after the end of the East–West conflict, cracks within the world order optimism in the sense of the concrete utopia of the "Democratic Peace" in the "One World" occurred (see, e.g., Mearsheimer, 1990). Obviously, international relations have meanwhile become even more complex and turbulent than they had already been before, and the cleaveages and conflict lines cannot be deciphered as easily as in the past (Rosenau, 1990; Bredow, 1994). To evidence this: the number of armed and violent conflicts in the world at large and at the periphery of Europe in particular have by no means abruptly become less. The number of wars between states did decline, but not the number of substate and civil warlike conflicts. Indeed, their number has risen quite dramatically (Krumwiede and Waldmann, 1998).

At this point, the basic grammar, the macroconstellation of international relations has to be taken into the analysis because the international system of the more recent past is different from the one of the more remote past. The international system of the present is characterized by a substantial increase of interactions and interconnections between both state and nonstate actors—an increase that has gained considerable momentum in the recent decades due to a number of processes that are commonly referred to as globalization. A mounting interaction density produces a thickening net of interdependencies between societies, their governments, and both their collective and individual members. Yet, it has to be noted that this phenomenon, which is aptly coined in the expression "complex interdependence" (Keohane and Nye, 1977), bears an asymmetrical character. This implies that different actors are dependent on these interconnections to different degrees and that the cost–benefit analyses of complex interdependence differ markedly from actor to actor. Nevertheless, mutual interdependence of high intensity is to found and it is especially to be found within the so-called OECD world, the transatlantic relationship, and the macro region of Europe.

To be sure, and this has been indicated already by pointing to the asymmetry associated therewith, globalization and complex interdependence are by no means thoroughly and

completely positive phenomena. Apart from their bright side, e.g., in terms of the stimuli they provide regarding societal development, they also have a dark side. Complex interdependence is susceptible and vulnerable toward both intended and unintended interferences and violations and, in an era of globalization, the consequences of these interferences and violations may be felt in any part of the world. This means, that, even remote as they may be, both conflicts below the threshold of violence and conflicts that have already moved to the stage where the conflicting parties resort to violent means do have a spillover potential that is capable of affecting the islands of peace and prosperity in the world. Effective barriers between the regions of conflict and the rest of the world can hardly be erected (Bredow, Jäger, and Kümmel, 1997, 2000). This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the individual actors in international relations and, in particular, the state actors—and among them especially the more powerful ones—do have a responsibility for the course the world takes. They are encouraged, not necessarily in a moral or altruistic vein, but in their genuine self-interest, to take on world order functions. This entails, *inter alia*, the option to resort to armed forces and thus to violent means of conflict resolution should this be necessary (Jäger and Kümmel, 1995). From such a point of view, the swansong on the military is premature, to say the least, if not per se untenable.

The Hypothesis of the Rise of the Military Revisited

Since the end of the East–West conflict the number of military operations other than war has increased substantially. These peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations and humanitarian interventions as well as the attempts to gain some leverage on the destabilizing, conflict-prone processes going on in failing states, as was the case with Somalia, are multilateral military missions and represent the "internationalisation of military life" (Klein and Kümmel, 2000). Usually quite a few states are members to these operations which means that the construction and the management of military multinationality are of prime importance. Within these missions, the needs of the victims of violent local or regional conflicts are put to center stage. Further on, the respective national power-political interests of a given member state to such a mission are often secondary and recede vis-à-vis their normative interests, however inconsistent they may be. The role of "host" to humanitarian disasters is uncomfortable and inconvenient for governments as it carries with it the prospect of political costs, i.e., the loss of public support and legitimacy—particularly if their societies, in considerable segments, increasingly cultivate world society and cosmopolitan attitudes. Interventions of this kind, then, follow, at least to some extent and partially, the intention of civilianization which makes them agreeable for formerly pacifist and military-critical segments of society. (See also Kümmel, 2001)

In general, peace missions have not been as successful as one may have thought initially (see Geldenhuys, 1998; Jett, 2001). The widespread expectation within society regarding instant positive results following the interventions has often been disappointed as the intervening armed forces often enough turned out to be incapable of restoring peace. Consequently, within the societies sending the armed forces, complaints were lodged about ambigous morals, selective humanism, and double standards. The peace missions have also produced additional problems that, in some cases, have turned into huge political scandals. In this regard, Canada (1993) and The Netherlands (1995) have to be mentioned (Winslow, 1997; Soeters and Rovers, 1997). As a result, the enthusiasm to participate in these peace missions has somewhat cooled off meanwhile. This has met with voices within the

military (but also within civilian society) that doubt these nontraditional military missions to be a valuable instrument at all. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they have become completely useless.

However, the realistic, if not sobering, insight of the chances and the limits of peace missions as an instrument has to take into account the presently emerging dominant type of war with whom we are increasingly confronted with. The image of war that is and will be mostly shaping violent conflicts is different from the traditional interstate war—though this does not imply that wars between states will no longer occur. It is the type of small war on a substate level, usually fought between relatively weak governments and relatively strong antigovernmental forces. This war often is an asymmetrical war and it is more or less locally confined and conducted with dirty means. It is characterized by some kind of semiprofessionalism, as the combatants are civilians rather than soldiers, and by a rather primitive, yet cruel, even atrocious, warfare that combines the use of both high-tech equipment and modern methods of propaganda with the terrorization and physical liquidation of human beings well beyond the point where this turns into genocide.[13] The rules of warfare and of the international law of war are more often than not thoroughly ignored in these conflicts (Beaumont, 1995; Creveld, 1998: pp. 94–101; Trotha, 1999).

Such conflicts conducted with violent means also carry with them the potential of escalation, both for the region itself and beyond. As a result of a regionalization or internationalization of the conflict, the conflict itself may be exported or transferred into the urban centers of the West. Also, the conflict may trigger migration movements across borders. Because of these potential and actual spillover effects, the instrument of intervention and military operations other than war will remain within the arsenal of action of interested actors. Simultaneously, this will lead to an intensification of efforts to give the intervening soldiers more and more sophisticated high-tech weapons and equipment at hand, thus creating human-machine systems, in order to reduce the risk to the individual soldier's life to a minimum (see Landa, 1991).

THE NEW MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE SOLDIERLY ROLE SETS THEY REQUIRE

The shift in the military role sets outlined in the previous sections do not represent something completely new in the history of war and of warfare. Yet, they are quite different from the functions of the military and the roles to be performed by the individual soldier we are commonly thinking of. In view of this, it does not seem appropriate to place the label "postmodern" on them. Here, the more modest expression of *nontraditional roles* is suggested to grasp the functions required in humanitarian military operations (see also Däniker, 1992).

Since this nontraditional role set has taken on more relevance in the more recent past at the same time as the traditional military objective of defence has experienced substantial incursions regarding its former status of preeminent priority, military operations other than war and humanitarian interventions do pose questions of identity both to the military as

[13] In the low-intensity conflicts of the outgoing 20th century something like 90% of the dead are noncombatants (Ehrenreich, 1997, p. 276).

an organization at large and to the individual soldier in particular. The finding, then, is as follows: In the wake of globalization the armed forces are not only confronted with the simultaneity of different types of warfare, but also they are finding themselves in a balancing act between traditional and nontraditional role sets. It is this balancing act that will determine and define the role set of the military in the early 21st century, and this role set is characterized by a diversification of military missions. The traditional role set, the capability of self-defence, deterrence, and aggression, is complemented by the nontraditional role set, the capability to conduct military missions other than war (Bredow and Kümmel, 1999; for empirical analyses see Franke, 1998; Franke and Heinecken, 2001). One way to deal with the questions of identity resulting from this balancing act is to call the adoption of nontraditional roles into question on principle and deny that these functions be attributed to the military. According to this view, nontraditional roles are not genuinely military roles. However, this raises the question of whether such a line of reasoning according to status quo orientations following the classical notion of the military seriously doubts the proposition that armed forces have to adapt to changing conditions. Yet even more important is the question of whether such an approach is adequate to cope with the problems and vagaries of life in the international relations of the 21st century and whether it resonates with the respective national interests of the individual countries.

Given the argument put forward above, at least for some states, the great and the major powers, the answers to these questions are sound "No's" because these countries belong to the rather small category of actors that do dispose of, in a positive meaning, creative power and of steering capabilities in international politics. As mentioned before, these actors are not primarily called for altruistic or moral reasons, but it is their genuine self-interest, namely economic relations, prosperity, stability, security, and peace, that dictate their involvement in the positive management of complex interdependence and globalization. And in this foreign and security political endeavor, the military factor, consisting of an integration of traditional and nontraditional roles entailing a combination of civilian and military elements, principally remains a politically useful factor. In an important segment of the development of armed forces there is a renunciation of a thinking in the classic military categories of victory and defeat accompanied by the ascent of the principle of the appropriateness of means as long known from the work of the police.

To put this into a plithy formula: the nontraditional soldier is an armed global street worker and constable or policeman. This nontraditional element of the military, however, does not replace its traditional tasks of deterrence and self-defence as can be notably inferred from September 11, 2001, but is complementary to them. In military operations other than war, in particular, traditional and nontraditional roles cannot be neatly separated. Soldiers, then, will be required to know how to fight, how to establish local security, how to deal with the local adversaries, and how to cooperate with local partners and civilian international relief organizations. As experts in violence who the soldiers will still have to be, they also will have to be politically educated and to dispose of cultural empathy and diplomatic skills. The soldier will have to develop, as part of his professional self-perception as a soldier, some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism that exists besides feelings of patriotism and of national commitment, i.e., that does not contradict national interests, but extends them. Globalization and the both fictitious and real emergence of complex interdependence and of communication in the world village requires nothing less than a new self-perception of the military profession, at least its substantial extension. The new functions and the nontraditional roles of the soldier as streetworker, policeman, and diplomat complement the

TABLE 24.1. Three Eras in the Development of Armed Forces[a]

	1900–1945	1945–1990	Since 1990
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force structure	Mass army, conscription	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major mission definition	Defense of homeland	Support of alliance	Military operations other than war
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesman/diplomat; soldier-scholar; soldier-policeman; soldier-streetworker
Public attitude toward military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Indifferent

[a] Adapted from Moskos (2000, p. 15).

traditional roles of the soldier as warrior, defender, and attacker. This is the profile the armed forces and their soldiers are called to adapt to and that is needed to deal with the challenges of globalization in a productive way. And this requires the adaptation and modification of procedures of selection, socialization, and education of military personnel (see Linnenkamp, 1997; and the European case studies in Caforio, 1998; 2000). To summarize, these changes in the military sphere in the 20th and in the early 21st centuries are synthesized in one of the well-known tables of Charles Moskos (above).

PART VII

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 25

Conclusion

Themes and Issues of the Sociology of the Military

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

PREMISE

This handbook, compiled with the collaboration of many of the leading scholars of the sociology of the military from different countries and continents and representative of different currents of thought, ends up being a picture of the state of the art of the discipline at the start of the new millennium. Beyond being a manual for consultation and study for those who pursue this discipline—or are setting out on that road—the book constitutes a kind of *summa* of sociological thought on the military as it presents itself in the year 2002. But not only of sociological thought because the approach to our field of investigation is often interdisciplinary, as is evident from the essays presented in this volume. Indeed, the reader will have noted that the slant of some of them owes more to political science than to sociology, and others present approaches and aspects of social psychology, cultural anthropology, or strategic thought in general. As Gerhard Kuemmel observes in his essay in this volume, the reasons for this interdisciplinarity lie "in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon in itself and one that cuts through various levels, touches several different contexts and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpenetration."

Armed forces find their justification in the existence of inter-state violence, in large part still anomic, dominated by a sort of international anarchy, to overcome which different systems and projects have long been studied. It is the task of political science to study such systems and to propose projects in relation to them, just as it is the role of strategy to study the structure and tasks of the militaries that must confront and, if possible, dominate and control this inter-state violence; but it is the task of the sociology of the military to study the impact and the consequences that the forms of violence that take place between states and the structural and operational modifications made on the military have on its components, its internal dynamics, and its relations with the other social actors.

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This *summa* offered by the volume—interdisciplinary, as we have said—not only presents a series of theoretical and empirical results, but also poses a number of questions, new queries to which our discipline will be called to provide answers in the short and medium term. It is on these aspects that I would like to dwell, synthesizing them in these concluding remarks, as it makes no sense to recapitulate here the data and results acquired by the many studies presented in the volume.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CONTROL

The challenges put to our discipline today, which I shall attempt to list below without any claim to exhaustiveness, arise first and foremost from the rapid process of change taking place in society at large, but more in particular from the change in international relations and the resulting security policies of the different countries. Known to all, and repeatedly evoked in the chapters of this book, are the alterations in the international arena, which have produced a flood of changes in the area of national security in the various countries. The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the "focal enemy," the emergence of the "new wars," the transformation of the regimes in the Eastern European countries, and the revival of ethnic and religious differences: These are the chief factors of change that we have seen since the early 1990s.

One of the consequences of the changing face of international violence has been the progressive abandonment of mass armies and the transition to smaller, entirely professional ones. This fact presents a sizeable set of new problems and aspects that the sociology of the military is studying and must continue to study. One first important aspect is a different composition of military personnel than in the past, a transformation fraught with consequences on the level of human relations inside and outside the military, that also poses two questions of a general nature: (1) Will the abandonment of conscription lead to a weakening of the democratic spirit of the armed forces, even in the consolidated democracies? and (2) Can citizens' lack of personal experience of national military service alienate public opinion from external security issues and a country's own armed forces?

The possible weakening of the democratic spirit within the military is closely related to another important aspect studied by the sociology of the military, that of political control over armed forces. The problem of the military affecting the government is a concern in any democratic society. Hence, if the citizen-soldier disappears along with conscription as armies become increasingly professionalized, the risk of praetorianism may increase as well. According to Hans Born, for example (see his essay in this volume):

> The post-Cold War era requires a new look at the democratic control of the armed forces. The post-Cold War brought about more attention to peace missions, enormous reforms of the military in nearly every country and, as previously described, military activity increasingly is taking place at an international level. Regarding these developments, accelerated by the end of the Cold War, I would like to propose five fields of attention for future research on democratic control of the armed forces.

Among the *fields of attention* proposed by this author, two seem to me to be especially important: the changing perceptions of security, where Hans Born asks himself, "How do the civilian authorities and the military perceive security and the role of the guardians of

the state within the post-Cold War security context?" and the internationalization of democratic control, where the question is "What is the influence of the internationalisation of the militaries for the civilian oversight of the military?" And further: if political control over the armed forces during this process of change is a problem in the advanced democracies, what are we to say, and how can it be resolved, for regions of the globe such as Africa, where, as Michel Martin reports in his essay, democratization is a process "without end"?

RESTRUCTURING AND DOWNSIZING

The changing international context has also brought other consequences, among them a deep restructuring of the militaries of many countries. Armed forces, however, like every bureaucratic and, what is more, state-run, organization, always display considerable inertia to change. Political decisions in this regard must therefore first of all provide an answer to the question: What are the main obstacles to reforming the armed forces? A second question regards the type of military institution we are to have at the end of the restructuring process. Can we consider the hypothesis that Philippe Manigart advances in his essay in this volume to be valid, that "it is likely that, at the end of their restructuring process, the post-modern military organisations of the future will resemble what in the HRM literature are known as networks of organised anarchies, i.e., organizations with permeable boundaries, with flat hierarchies, given to decentralized decision making (hence a reduction of the size of headquarters), and with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity" ?

The restructuring Manigart talks about involves a generalized downsizing of armed forces, resulting in a significant reduction in military expenditures, weapons production, and the numbers of active servicemen. These are all aspects that deserve special investigation, even in their constant interrelationship. And as Ljubica Jelusic writes, in her essay in this volume:

> The sociology of the military is interested in the qualitative aspects of conversion; this means it explores the sociocultural aspects of all conversion issue areas. It entails a fundamental transformation of resources in the economy, including the retraining of soldiers and defense workers, retooling of capital, and developing the capability to produce nondefense goods and services. A particular focus of the sociology of the military after the Cold War is all kinds of economic, psychological, cultural, and political changes happening in societies where military efforts are reduced.

In particular, in advanced industrial societies, the end of the Cold War, technological change and sociocultural evolution have brought about the downsizing of the armed forces. This substantial reduction of personnel, which has been most significant in the Eastern European countries, has generated a number of problems, in part still unresolved, regarding the demobilization of personnel. One of the most important is the problem of reintegrating demobilized personnel into civilian life, a problem that is not only economic and organizational, but is also centerd on the fact that those individuals forced to leave the armed forces, due to reductions or in their search for a better job, must adapt to the new professional culture of the civil enterprise. From the perspective of the sociology of the military, the general turnover of personnel is also an issue worthy of surveying with regard to demobilization because the size of turnover in general and the speed with which functions are rotated are indicators of a potentially high innovation rate within the military and the potentially "occupational" versus "institutional" character of the personnel.

PROFESSIONALIZATION

The most discussed aspect of the downsizing and restructuring of armed forces in the advanced industrial societies is their professionalization, i.e. the end of the draft. The growing trend toward partial or total abandonment of conscription for more or less broad forms of professional volunteerism in armed forces (see the chapter "Decline of the Mass Armies" by Karl Haltiner in this regard) is giving renewed importance and topicality to the study of union representation of the interests of military personnel. These studies, developed particularly in the 1970s, revealed strong opposition at the time from the political-military establishments of many countries toward military unions.

But, if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces, why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which was summarized thusly by David R. Segal: "Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer." Now, in a changed social context, and especially faced with a different composition of military personnel, the responses given then must likely be revised. The sociology of the military will have to examine the new pushes toward unionization that arise from increasingly professional personnel and evaluate whether such pushes can be channelled without impacting the efficiency and cohesiveness of the units and how to achieve this.

FORCES' COMPOSITION

The composition of military personnel is also being strongly impacted by the growing presence of social minorities, especially women. As Marina Nuciari reports in her chapter "Women in the Military":

> Women's entry in the armed forces goes along the transition from conscript-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically advanced all-volunteer force. This process goes also along two other dynamic phenomena of high relevance: force downsizing, at least in the armed forces of Western societies, and frequent deployment in nonconventional missions. In the MOOTWs the use of force is reduced, and soldiers' orientation is undergoing a change, becoming less centred on the "warrior" ideal type, and more on a protective disposition which has been called, among many other definition, the "miles protector" model.

As a result, a number of issues and interrogatives are brought up for attention by military sociologists, such as (1) What are the reasons pushing armed forces to open their doors to women? (2) What are the reasons pushing women to apply for the military? (3) In what ways do women enter and remain in the military professional career? (4) What gender-specific problems do women find in the military organisation? (5) What problems does women's presence pose to the functioning of military organisations? (6) What roles can be covered by women within armed forces, and what opportunities do MOOTW present for them?

The social minorities are not only women, however, but include the ethnic minorities that are ever more present in the armed forces, as demonstrated by the statistical

data in this regard. It therefore makes sense to study the concrete experiences that armed forces have with intercultural encounters, as well as with diversity management and training.

NEW MISSIONS

However, the restructuring of national armed forces has not had only aspects that we might call "passive"—downsizing, budget cuts, a lower incidence on the active population (end of conscription)—but also "active" ones, that is, aimed at creating instruments functional to the new military requirements. As Christopher Dandeker observes in the chapter "Flexible Armed Forces":

> After over a decade of coming to terms with the post-Cold War security landscape and, in so doing, redesigning armed services that are felt to be appropriate for that context rather than for the Cold War era, one of the central themes of most Western states' experience of this process has been the need to build a flexible military. By the term *"flexible forces"* it has been normal to refer to armed services as follows: Such forces are equipped with the appropriate hardware, force structures and people policies that will enable states to respond swiftly, in collaboration with allies and/or friends bonded in "coalitions of the willing," to a wide variety of crises whose precise nature it is quite difficult to predict in advance.

Flexible forces, variety and indeterminateness of missions, and internationalization of the operational context are all aspects that complicate the management of military missions much more than in the past. Today's officer is entrusted with extramilitary tasks of a political nature and finds himself covering a number of new roles, as "soldier-communicator," "soldier-diplomat," and "soldier-scholar." This derives from the fact that commanders at various levels must interact with the population and local authorities, as well as with international authorities and the contingents of other countries.

This complex of roles and activities involves an unprecedented level of preparation on the part of the new officers. And the effect is that all the formative processes of officers in the different countries are subject to a deep process of transformation that began in the 1990s and is still ongoing, a process I outlined in the chapter entitled "Military Officer Education." The biggest problem of this process is striking the right balance between studies of the political-social type and traditional military studies, a problem reflected in the high percentage of officers with experience in MOOTW who feel their preparation is inadequate for the new missions, as seen in field surveys. Further investigations on the topic thus seem necessary. These new missions, particularly peace support operations, involve long stays by military personnel far from their home bases and, therefore, from their families. For most countries, this is a problem that had not presented itself since the Second World War.

As René Moelker and Irene van der Kloet write in their chapter in this book, "Deployments are a heavy burden for servicemen and their families for they endure a separation of 6 months. Some missions are dangerous and therefore more stress-provoking than normal. The frequency of deployments is a problem as well. After a year's period of recuperation the soldier and his family might be faced again with a 6-month deployment."

Matters become complex when we consider that families share the characteristic of greediness with the military organization. Hence, to avoid a conflict between two greedy institutions, the military has had to move to create social support systems, both for spouses

back home and for the psychological and social reintegration of soldiers into their families upon their return from missions. As David and Mady Segal observe in their chapter in this volume:

> In a democratic society, it is important for the military not to become isolated from, or too distinct from, civilian society and culture. The trends in military families that we have discussed have their origins in changes in military missions and changes in the wider social structure and culture. Military readiness is best served when military policies, programs, and practices adapt to these trends at the same time that military families adapt to military requirements.

As a result of all of these changes, attention to families by the armed forces has increased dramatically over the past 20 years. Field research has already demonstrated (see Moelker and van der Kloet) that positive coping strategies include keeping family ties intact, developing self-esteem, developing social support, developing a positive attitude, learning about a problem, reducing tension by hobbies, and talking. The way to implement these strategies in the different contexts (national, armed force, etc.) is one of the challenges of the social sciences today and for a foreseeable future in which missions abroad, often in distant lands, do not seem destined to diminish in frequency or duration.

MILITARY CULTURE

Today's military culture also appears subject to change, with a progressive loosening of many traditional rules, discipline, hierarchy, in a constant convergence with civil society and its values and a resulting abandonment of the traditional isolationism of the armed forces. This already occurs to a great extent in the area of the professional training of military cadres, where, as I pointed out in my chapter on officer education, a process of convergence of military education toward civilian university education appears to be in progress. But it also takes place on a more general level, in the armed forces as a whole, where occupationalism undoubtedly will grow: This is an obvious and overriding tendency.

The question, however, is how this will affect the military organization's performance and readiness? Will military performance worsen or improve? According to Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull (see their chapter "Military Culture" in this volume), the entry into the armed forces of employees with a more occupational attitude—i.e., people who are more independent of the organization and hence more "internally controlled"—poses the problem of how "the traditional core of the uniformed culture will react to this development: will a conservative backlash emerge among core personnel within the military or will they gradually accept the changes?" Further, military culture traditionally is male-dominated and knows a masculine, warrior-like culture, but, as the cited authors observe, "there are at least two developments that may impact on this phenomenon. The performance of military organizations is increasingly becoming less oriented towards violence at a close distance and aggressive behavior and the very entrance of women and ethnic minorities may influence the way the military perceives and performs its work."

These are deep cultural changes which require sociological investigation to examine a series of key dimensions, which the cited authors summarize as "changing roles, self-conceptions and bases of legitimacy, erosion of long-standing organizational formats, adjustment to tight budgets, mission complexity and unpredictability, real-time media

coverage, the rise of multiculturalism, the new standing of military élites and soldier–statesman relations."

SOCIAL RESEARCH AND THE MILITARY

But how does social research on the military tackle the complex of issues that I have listed above? The survey on the conditions in which research is carried out in the various countries (see the chapter "Social Research and the Military") shows us that the typical researcher is prevalently male, fairly evenly distributed in the different age groups, and for the most part engaged in military sociology in a prevalent but usually not exclusive way. The military sociologist's education is quite diversified, where the most numerous group is the Ph.D.'s, closely followed by university professors. Officers are quite numerous and are equally divided between active and retired.

The commissioners of research are chiefly national governments and this entails a number of limitations, particularly in some countries, limitations that must be faced and resolved in the interest of the research itself. Such limitations regard the aspects listed below.

1. Choice of research topic: Obviously, it is natural for the state, or its organs (the military), to promote researches on topics of interest to it, but what is lacking in many countries is the possibility of an autonomous choice of research topics, made by universities or other institutions, "research for the sake of research."
2. Choice of researcher or research group: Findings showed that in different countries and situations this choice is often determined by friendships, political reasons, membership in the military, and so on.
3. Limitations often set by the commissioner on the conduction of the research which appear to be absent (or present more rarely) in other contexts of social research: limitations on specific subjects of the research, on the military units where the research can be conducted, prior approval of questionnaires or other survey tools, and so on.
4. Dissemination of research results. This is one of the severest limitations and it is present quite frequently. It ranges from the simple need for an authorization to an actual bond of confidentiality and strictly internal dissemination of the data.
5. Finally, the research carried out on behalf of the institutions is often merely something to show off but not use concretely. In such cases feedback is lacking on the results and indications that often emerge from empirical investigation.

One of the issues that the sociology of the military is called to deal with in the near future is therefore that of more complete freedom of research, freedom that is in the very interest of the potential commissioner, as only in this way can data of sure reliability be provided. As I mentioned, however, the limitations often differ from country to country, and this leads us to another issue for the development of the sociology of the military: the big regional differences that characterize its development. There is an area in which the discipline is strongly developed that includes North America, Europe and Australia, with offshoots like South Africa and Israel; a second area of the world in which the discipline is cultivated but still shows modest development and breadth, constituted by India, Latin America, a few Pacific Rim countries such as South Korea and the Philippines, and a smattering of African

nations; and a third area where it appears to be totally absent that includes China and Japan, all the Islamic world of Asia Minor and North Africa, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the sociology of the military has a concrete problem of linkage with the cultural elites of the countries of these areas and of promotion of internal development. These are countries where, among other things, the local situations of the military organization and its relations with the national society are often singular and more than elsewhere deserving of focused investigation.

It remains to be said that, as the reader may have noted while leafing through the chapters presented in this volume, sociological research on the military is very often cross-national, comparative on an international scale. This is due to various factors. Primarily, the military is an institution so particular and so special that it is difficult to compare it with other institutions within the same nation: useful comparison can therefore only be made with the same institution in other countries. Second, the superseding of the nation-state and the ongoing political trend toward continental or subcontinental aggregations appears to be felt particularly strongly in the area of military security. NATO and the European Union are certainly leading examples in this direction. And last, the problems posed to states by peace support operations and, more in general, MOOTW, carried out by international coalitions, has made comparison and harmonization among the different national militaries increasingly necessary. In the 1990s the sociology of the military therefore gave particular attention to the development of methodologies of cross-national empirical research. These already make up a valid store of knowledge of the discipline but need to be further pursued and developed. Together with them, and precisely because of the need for inter-state research, attempts have been made at low-cost, high-yield empirical investigation, such as surveys via the Internet, of which an example is given in the chapter "Social Research and the Military." Further exploration and development of this survey methodology seems useful.

Many themes have been treated here and some of them might seem to lie outside the field of research of the sociology of the military. However, this special sociology deals with a social aggregate that today is called to perform tasks so diverse as to inspire this fitting description: It is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it (Moskos, 1976, p. 139).

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