THE NEW MIDDLE AGES



IN THE LIGHT *of* MEDIEVAL SPAIN

ISLAM, THE WEST, *and the* RELEVANCE *of* THE PAST

Edited by Simon R. Doubleday
and David Coleman
Foreword by Giles Tremlett

THE NEW MIDDLE AGES

BONNIE WHEELER, *Series Editor*

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

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CONTENTS

FIGURES

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FOREWORD: "WELCOME TO MOORISHLAND"

Giles Tremlett

It is September 2006 and my e-mail is filling up with the normal mixture of news bulletins, invitations, and unwanted junk. Amongst the invitations, are some of the latest, often heated, comments from online opinion columns in the debate over a new charter of self-government for Catalonia, approved three months earlier, its historical references going back to 1359. There is also an invitation to the presentation of a new book by New York University's H. Salvador Martínez on the co-existence of Muslims, Jews, and Christians in thirteenth-century Spain that has come to be known since the 1940s as *convivencia*. Finally, in the unwanted junk category, comes an e-mail from the town of Buitrago del Lozoya, fifty miles north of Madrid, which boasts a walled city first built by Muslims. It invites me to attend the town's medieval fair. This, bizarrely, is to be themed around J.R.R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* or, more accurately, the blockbuster films being made of the story; it is to be complemented by fictional elves, orcs, and hobbits visiting from the Middle Earth.

All three e-mails have something to say about Spain's relationship to its own medieval past. They do so in different and overlapping ways, but they give an idea of the multiple forms in which the medieval resurfaces in contemporary Spain. On the one hand, there is the "historical-political" form, of which the Catalan charter is a shining example. This is a country that differs viscerally over much of its own history. "Few Europeans have disagreed so much about their own country as Spaniards," warns Henry Kamen. "The difference of opinion, centering both on culture and on politics, dates back to at least the eighteenth century and is

still alive today. It affects the way Spaniards look at their past and write about themselves, their history and their literature."[1] Spanish politicians have proved themselves quite ready to seek ammunition for contemporary debates from real or imagined versions of the medieval period. Accompanying this conspicuously politicized element of the presence of the medieval, on the other hand, lies the "historical-cultural" dimension, including the academic and encompassing a genuine interest in the country's heritage. But let us turn first to the "theme park medieval," embodied in its Tolkienian version at Buitrago.

The theme park version of medieval Spain—based on commercially motivated and sometimes false, idealized, or dramatically skewed notions of history—is there to make euros out of the past. It ranges from some film and television depictions of that period to the hard-nosed schemes of tourism departments in countless Spanish cities, provinces, and regions for whom medieval Spain is, first and foremost, a marketing tool. If it is true that politicians and, to a certain extent, historians themselves can be accused of shaping the medieval past in response to their own interests, in theme-park-medieval Spain almost anything goes. From the "City of Three Cultures" in Toledo to the "Routes of al-Andalus" or the newly denominated "Route of El Cid," exploiting the past is seen as a key way of tapping into the tourist sector that accounts for 11 percent of the country's gross domestic product.

One of the main manifestations of this process is what I call Moorishland, the semifictional version of Spain's past where exotic offerings of orientalism-with-tapas are combined with "nostalgia" tourism for Sephardic (Spanish-rite) Jews, and where Charlton Heston's *El Cid* meets the sun-loungers of the Costa del Sol beaches. Spain's Moorish history is happily raided to provide a narrative that will attract visitors, above all foreigners. Granada provides one of the most conspicuous examples. For many years the Alhambra, and the narrow, winding streets of the Albaicín district were the sum of its Moorish offering to tourists. Now the streets of the Albaicín boast couscous restaurants and gift shops selling Moroccan knick-knacks, as if they had always been there. While the restaurants serve typically Moroccan food, the gift shops actually import much of their material directly from Morocco. On one recent visit, I found the shops of Granada stocked with exactly the same goods as those I had seen being sold in the square in Chefchaouen, at the start of the Rif Mountains in Morocco, just a few months earlier. I was delighted. The lamps I could not fit into my suitcase in Morocco were easily stowed in the back of my car.

Granada's transformation into Moorishland is relatively new. A decade ago, at least one of the same shops that was now selling Moroccan

knick-knacks had been devoted to selling Christian religious figures, crucifixes, and *estampas* of the Virgin Mary. One travel writer puts it like this:

> On some streets of the Albaicín you'd be forgiven for thinking that the Moors are still holding sway here. The Calderería Baja is lined with Moroccan-style tea shops offering mint tea and honey pastries. These establishments, along with book stores selling Arab texts and shops stocked with Moorish-style crafts, are a sign of the *Granadinos*' renewed interest in their Islamic past. There is even a *hammam*, an Arab public bath offering an atmosphere which recalls Moorish times, among trickling fountains and dazzling tile work.[2]

Recent reinventions of medieval Spain are not driven exclusively by financial factors. In the kitsch, colorful "Moors and Christians" festivals of Valencia and Alicante provinces, for instance, other elements are at play. Anthropologists would probably point to the ritualization of an ancient conflict or the playing with concepts of the Moorish "other." For the casual observer, it is also obvious that some very Spanish characteristics are at play—a love of ritual, the reaffirmation of community, and, simply, that very Spanish pastime of having fun in large groups. And the only medieval event that many *granadinos* themselves seem keen on celebrating is the *Toma de Granada*, the capture of Granada in 1492, a fiesta that takes place every January 2 in a revindication of the city's Christian status. Amongst those who turn up to the celebrations every year is a small group from the ultra-right Falange party. A group of intellectuals and artists, including Amin Maalouf, Yehudi Menuhin, and Ian Gibson, have tried to have the fiesta changed, but mayors of all political colors have refused to budge. "If they want to wear turbans, then they should come to the Three Kings parade," said one mayor, referring to the Epiphany celebrations when three people dressed up in Arab costume play the part of the magi and hurl handfuls of boiled sweets into the crowds. The fiesta illustrates a decidedly ambiguous relationship with the past. "Islam can be as profitable a thing as any other religious or political phenomenon. But it looks somewhat ridiculous when politicians try to exploit our history with the message 'visit Andalusia and Granada, a beautiful Moslem and Jewish land, but without any Jews or Moslems in it,'" Tomás Navarro, a journalist from Granada, observes in his *La Mezquita de Babel*.[3]

But the fact that this "beautiful Moslem and Jewish land" is often primarily a convenient source of profit is clearest at the headquarters of the Grupo Al-Andalus, a business set up to exploit Spain's Moslem past for tourism. The group has opened hammam-style baths in Granada,

Madrid, and Cordoba and is moving into tearooms, restaurants, and hotels. In Madrid's case there is evidence that the renovated baths being run by the company may actually be Roman in origin. That, I suspect, does not market quite as well. Tourists, and Spaniards themselves, think of Spain in terms of al-Andalus not—as they might in Britain—in terms of the Romans; far better, then, to make your baths Arabic. The narrative of convivencia in its most idealized form is especially valuable to the marketers. I once asked the tourism councilor at Segovia's city hall whether she believed in convivencia. "Not really," was her reply. "Except when it is useful." That same week Segovia was playing host to parties of tourists who had come for a special day of events to mark the city's Jewish past. As reflected by the Web site "reddejuderias.com" (which belongs to the Red de Juderías de España), the Sephardic legacy in fact provides especially rich pickings. In November 2006, the Web site featured a "three cultures" medieval fair in Cáceres, courses in Sephardic cooking for entrepreneurs and restaurateurs in Ávila, courses on Jewish history for people in the tourism business in Córdoba, and information on an exhibition dedicated to kosher wine and medieval Jewish Spain by a museum in La Rioja. Despite its rather obvious attempts to promote tourism, the Red de Juderías states that it is "a non-profit public association with the goal of protect the urban, architectonic, historical, artistic and cultural Sephardic Heritage of Spain."

This in turn brings us to the "historic-cultural relationship" of the Spanish with the surviving expressions of the medieval: in art, for instance, and especially in architecture. The architectural presence of the medieval—the proliferation of medieval cathedrals, convents, and monasteries and the few remaining synagogues and mosques—is pervasive. In 2005 workmen renovating a building in Porto, northern Portugal (medieval Portugal and Spain are often hard to differentiate) discovered a walled-up sixteenth-century synagogue, allegedly one of those built to cater for the tens of thousands of Jews who flooded across the Portuguese border after they were expelled from Castile. "The house of worship was hidden behind a false wall in a four-story house that Agostinho Jardim Moreira, a Roman Catholic priest, was converting into a home for old-age parishioners," the Associated Press news agency reported at the time:

> Father Moreira, a scholar of Porto's Jewish history, said that as soon as the workers told him of the wall, "I knew there had to be some kind of Jewish symbol behind it." His hunch was confirmed when the wall came down to reveal a carved granite repository, about five feet tall, arched at the top and facing east to Jerusalem. It was the ark where the medieval Jews

kept Torah scrolls. Decorative green tiles in the ark further confirmed the age of the ark when experts dated glazing to a method used in the 16th century.[4]

The cultural impact of medieval architecture is impossible to measure and difficult to overestimate. Antoni Gaudi (1852–1926), the modernist Catalan architect whose Sagrada Familia cathedral is still under construction in Barcelona, was deeply inspired in both an architectural and a religious sense by the Cistercian monasteries of the Catalan countryside. Equally, at the time of writing a novel based around the construction of Barcelona's Santa María del Mar church—*La Catedral del Mar*, by Ildefonso Falcones—is the country's bestselling novel. In this way, the past enters the realm of the familiar.

As the remarkable survival of a *marrano* community in the Portuguese hill-town of Belmonte indicates, the medieval past also continues in more human forms. This crypto-Jewish community survived right through to the 1980s, when they were "rediscovered" by mainstream Judaism. Subsequently, rabbis from elsewhere have tried to persuade them both to observe more orthodox forms of Judaism; in the 1980s, many of the adult men were circumcised. One of the most curious religious legacies of the medieval period is the survival of a Spanish Roman Catholic community that defines itself as *Mozárabe*. Based in the city of Toledo, and with a community of some 2,000 families spread around Spain and the world, the Mozarabs consider themselves the true heirs of the Christian tradition bequeathed by the Visigoths and surviving among the Arabized Christian communities under Moslem rule. They even have their own religious brotherhood (*cofradía*) in Toledo, established in 1966, the "*Ilustre y Antiquísima Hermandad de Caballeros Mozárabes de Ntra. Sra. de la Esperanza de San Lucas*." Isolated from Rome during the years of Moslem domination, Toledo's Mozarab community held on to liturgical elements that had developed separately in the Iberian peninsula in the fifth to eighth centuries. Under the Moslem rulers who took over the city in 711 they were allowed to continue worshipping, being divided into six parishes. When the city was conquered by Alfonso VI of Castile in 1085, they found that many of their practices had been banned by Rome more than two centuries earlier. Eventually a compromise was reached and the six Mozarabic parishes were permitted to hold on to their liturgy. The so-called *Rito mozárabe* was conserved in these parishes through to the beginning of the sixteenth century. By this time, however, the community and the liturgy appeared in danger of extinction. Cardinal Cisneros then appeared as savior, creating a committee that researched the manuscripts and produced both the

Missale Gothicum mixtum and the *Breviarium gothicum*. A Mozarabic chapel was also created at the cathedral. The six parishes still formally exist, though only four now have buildings and the Mozarab parish priests now have personal, rather than territorial, jurisdiction over their widely scattered parishioners. The community has held on to parish registers and *tazmías* with censuses of Mozarab families.[5] In 1992 a new Hispanic-Mozarab Missal was published, after nine years of investigation spent, especially, recovering lost material. Pope John Paul II celebrated a mass in the Vatican using the Missal. "We believe it was the first time that the Mozarab Mass had been celebrated by the Pope," the Archdiocese of Toledo proclaims.[6]

Yet this apparent medieval "survival" is surely not politically innocent. It seems probable that the Church's continued support of the Mozarab "community"—from the age of Cisneros, though the Franco era to that of John Paul II—reflect a sustained attempt by Christian Spain to stretch its narrative back through the period of Muslim domination to the Visigoths (just as the modern-day Muslim Spanish converts discussed in Lisa Abend's and David Coleman's essays later in this volume also seek to stress continuity). This reintroduces us to the hotly contested "historical-political" dimension of the medieval Spain in contemporary political discourse, exemplified by the new Catalan charter of self-government, the Estatut, approved by referendum in June 2006. The charter's Preamble begins by stating that Catalonia has been shaped over the course of time through the energy of many generations, traditions, and cultures that found in Catalonia a land of welcome. The Catalan people, it continues, have maintained a constant will to self-government over the course of the centuries, embodied in such institutions as the Generalitat, created in 1359 by the Catalan *Corts* (representative estate) held that year in Cervera. But political autonomy for Catalonia does not go down well everywhere, and once again, the arguments can turn on history. Catalan politicians were indignant when, in 2003, the head of Spain's Constitutional Court, Manuel Jiménez de Parga, claimed that in the year 1000 his native Andalusia had boasted fountains of colored or perfumed water while other self-proclaimed "historic communities" (by which he meant Catalonia and the Basque country) in Spain "did not even know what washing themselves at the weekend was."[7]

Elsewhere, too, the debate over Spain's regional tensions frequently provokes recourse to the medieval. In my book *Ghosts of Spain*, I told the story of Iñaki, a history teacher in the Basque country, who found a pupil handing in an illustration of the battle of Roncesvalles complete with Basque soldiers carrying the *Ikurriña*, the Basque flag inspired by the Union Jack in the late nineteenth century.[8] The cultural subtext

is an unconscious, but telling, misuse of history and symbols: "The men who invented the *Ikurriña* (Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque Nationalist Party) were right in their insistence that a Basque nation/people existed in the Middle Ages. Here they were, centuries earlier, carrying their flag as they saw off yet another invader." A radical Basque separatist rereading of the battle of Roncesvalles can also be found in the pages of *Por qué luchamos los vascos*, written by a prisoner from the armed separatist group ETA—Fernando Alonso Abad. The same desire we see today to deny the existence of a Basque people was already patent in those years, Alonso writes in relation to the account of the battle of Roncesvalles given in the *Chanson de Roland*, which claims it was Muslims, not Basques, who carried out the attack. The book devotes several pages to the attempt to prove that the medieval Kingdom of Navarre was, in reality, a Basque state. This kingdom is seen by Alonso, and presumably by others prepared to use violence in order to fight for a separate Basque nation, as "the moment of greatest expansion of the Basque state." The death of Sancho III, king of Pamplona, is presented as "the origin, along with other factors, of the state of partition and national domination that the Basque country is living through, eight centuries later."[9]

It is, though, the memory of medieval al-Andalus that continues to be most politically contentious, especially in a context shaped by the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, and by those of "11-M," the commuter train bombings that killed 191 people in Madrid on March 11, 2004. "If you take the trouble to focus on what Bin Laden has written and stated in recent years," former prime minister José María Aznar of the conservative Partido Popular (PP) declared in his inaugural lecture at Georgetown University, "you will realize that the problem Spain has with Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the Iraq Crisis":

> You must go back no less than 1,300 years, to the early eighth century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity. This *Reconquista* process was very long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully. There are many radical Muslims who continue to recall that defeat, many more than any rational Western mind might suspect. Osama Bin Laden is one of them.[10]

Two years later, at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, Aznar would denounce as a "stupidity" the Alliance of Civilizations between the West and the Islamic world being promoted by the socialist government of José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero. Wading into the polemic surrounding references to Islam made by Pope Benedict XVI

at Regensburg, Aznar maintained that double standards were being applied when judging Islam and the West. "Many people in the Muslim world are demanding an apology from the Pope for his speech. I have never heard a single Muslim ask me for forgiveness for having conquered Spain and maintained their presence in Spain for more eight centuries," *El País* newspaper reported him as saying.[11] Mr. Aznar's views were diametrically opposed to those, including the Moslem converts discussed in Lisa Abend's essay in this volume, who take a strongly inclusive view of Spain's Muslim past. As in the case of his Georgetown lecture, Aznar's remarks at the Hudson Institute provoked angry debate, in which his ideological opponents also invoked the experiences of medieval Spain. "Aznar says that no-one has asked his forgiveness for the invasion of 711, but I say that he, Aznar, who appears to be a direct descendent of sons of Witiza, who betrayed the legitimate power of Don Rodrigo by handing people over to the Saracens, has never asked me for forgiveness," a professor of history and geography at the University of Valladolid, Marcelino Flórez, wrote in reference to the Visigoth leaders who lost control of Iberia to the Moslems.[12] On the same opinion page in *El País*, Manuel Ángel García Parody, a high-school teacher from Cordoba, invited Aznar to attend "my modest little class at a high school in Cordoba, if he does not mind the school name of 'Alhaken II.' This 'Moslem occupier' owned a library of 400,000 volumes at a time when Christian Europe was hardly a shining example of culture and knowledge. . . . Al-Andalus is an essential part of this previous plurality that is my country, of this country about which he talks so much but appears to know so little."[13] The novelist Juan Goytisolo was moved to irony, asking who Aznar thought should be asking forgiveness given that neither Tarik nor Musa, nor any of the Umayyads, were still around. Perhaps it should be Morocco, or the Arab League and the Islamic Conference, he mused.[14]

Amidst such highly publicized polemic, the academics who study the cultural dimensions of Spain's medieval past can hardly hope to escape the shadow of contemporary politics. Faced with this fact, what is the proper role of the intellectual engaged in research on medieval Spain? Is a traditional commitment to scholarly "detachment" appropriate in times of high tension, or rather, as Simon Doubleday will suggest in his "Introduction" to this volume below, do such claims to objective "neutrality" themselves raise difficult ethical questions? Scholars of medieval Spain are indeed confronted with a political minefield. Yet—perhaps uniquely in Europe outside the Balkans—they also find themselves in the privileged position of working in an area that actually has some real impact on political debate.[15] And that is so whether they like it or not.

Notes

1. Henry Kamen, *Golden Age Spain*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 2.
2. Mark Little: "Granada at a Glance": http://www.spainview.com/tickets.
3. Tomás Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel: El nazismo sufista desde el Reino Unido a la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía* (Granada: Ediciones Virtual, 1998), p. 21. Navarro's book deals with the controversial construction of Granada's new mosque, which is discussed in greater detail in David Coleman's esay in this volume.
4. "Builders Reveal Hidden Synagogue and Dark Era of Portugal's Past," *The New York Times* (26 December 2005). For a readily accessible web version, see: http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/19827.html.
5. www.architoledo.org/informacion/mozarabe.htm; www.geocities.com/mozarabestoledo/index1.htm; www.architoledo.org/informacion/mozarabes_en_toledo.htm.
6. www.architoledo.org/informacion/mozarabe.htm.
7. "En el año 1000, cuando los andaluces teníamos varias docenas de surtidores de agua de sabores distintos y olores diversos, en algunas zonas de las llamadas comunidades históricas ni siquiera sabían lo que era asearse los fines de semana" María Peral, "Jiménez de Parga cree un error hablar de 'nacionalidades históricas," *El Mundo* (22 enero 2003): http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2003/01/22/espana/1318131.html.
8. Giles Tremlett, *Ghosts of Spain: Travels Through Spain and its Secret Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), p. 21.
9. Fernando Alonso Abad, *Por qué luchamos los vascos* (Txalaparta: Bilbao, 2005), p. 31.
10. http://www3.georgetown.edu/president/aznar/inauguraladdress.html.
11. "El PSOE critica la actitud "irresponsable" de Aznar con sus declaraciones cobre el Islam," *El País*, 23 September 2006: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/PSOE/critica/actitud/irresponsable/Aznar/declaraciones/islam/elpepuesp/20060923elpepunac_1/Tes.
12. "Dice Aznar que no le han pedido perdón por la invasión de 711, pues yo digo que él, Aznar, heredero directo, al parecer, de uno de los hijos de Witiza, que traicionaron al poder legítimo de Don Rodrigo, entregando a la gente normal en poder de los sarracenos, no me ha pedido perdón a mí." Marcelino Flórez, "Opinión," *El País* (26 September 2006): http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/senor/Aznar/historia/Espana/elpepiopi/20060926elpepiopi_7/Tes.
13. "Le invito a que venga a mis modestas clases en un instituto de Córdoba, si es que no le molesta su nombre: Alhakén II. Sí. El "ocupante musulmán" poseedor de una biblioteca de 400.000 volúmenes cuando en la Europa cristiana no brillaban precisamente las luces de la cultura y el saber. Allí podrá aprender, junto a los alumnos de la ESO, que no existió tal "ocupación", sino un extraordinario fenómeno de síntesis de religiones y culturas que se llamó Al Andalus. Que ese Al Andalus fue un ejemplo de concordia y de tolerancia, es decir, de esa "estúpida alianza

de civilizaciones" de la que se mofa cada vez que puede. Y que ese Al Andalus es parte esencial de esa hermosa pluralidad que es mi patria, de esa patria que tanto pone en su boca pero de la que sabe bastante poco." Manuel Ángel García Parody, "Opinión," *El País* (26 September 2006): http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/senor/Aznar/historia/Espana/elpepiopi/20060926elpepiopi_7/Tes.

14. Juan Goytisolo, "¡Felicitaciones, señor Aznar!," *El País* (27 September 2006): http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Felicitaciones/senor/Aznar/elpepiopi/20060927elpepiopi_5/Tes.
15. On the Balkans, see Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: Picador, 2005).

INTRODUCTION

"CRIMINAL NON-INTERVENTION": HISPANISM, MEDIEVALISM, AND THE PURSUIT OF NEUTRALITY

Simon R. Doubleday

> *"Theory must always return to the earth to get recharged with new energy. For the word that breathes life is still needed to challenge the one that carries death and devastation."*
>
> Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "For Peace, Justice, and Culture: The Intellectual in the Twenty-First Century."[1]

I

Casting new light on the relationship between history and its observers, the critical theorist Eelco Runia has arrestingly claimed that the past "may have a presence that is so powerful that it can use *us*, humans, as its *material*." The starting point for Runia's theory is the report compiled by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation on the massacre, in July 1995, of thousands of Muslim men and children near Srebrenica (Bosnia).[2] Like Spain between 1937 and 1939, Bosnia had been placed under an arms embargo by the liberal Western democracies, and the Dutch UN peacekeepers stationed at Srebrenica had maintained a strict and—it has been widely alleged—ethically culpable neutrality. Refusing to take sides, the authors of the report reproduced this deliberate and repressive impartiality; they disarmed the past, Runia argues, just as the peacekeepers had disarmed the Muslims in the enclave. Their 7,000-page report effectively neutralized the horror of the massacre, subconsciously working to reinforce the myth of the Dutch as a sensible and decent nation. "They may have been under the impression that *they* were mastering the past,"

he writes, "but, strangely and inexplicably, the past turned the tables and mastered these historians."[3] Glossing Runia's "presence" theory, Frank Ankersmit points out that the Dutch politicians responsible for the report "behaved as if the Srebrenica drama had taken place in a wholly different galaxy without any ties to their own cozy little world; they behaved as persons regressing to the innocence of childhood in reaction to the irruption [*sic*] of an overwhelming reality. Mechanisms of repression and dissociation worked at top speed." Ankersmit underscores Runia's philosophical debt to Sigmund Freud, who theorized that what is not adequately remembered may be repeated through subconscious reenactment: "The picture one gets," he states, "is that of a false coin that can unproblematically be passed on from one person to another as long as nobody scrutinizes it." Like this false coin, the unseen myth is repeated, revealing the "stubborn persistence of the past."[4]

Although Runia's immediate concerns lie in contemporary history, he raises a number of issues relating to objectivity and neutrality in historical writing, and to the presence of history, that are equally pertinent to the study of the distant past. These theoretical issues are essential to address before grounding the discussion more concretely in the relevance of a pluricultural society—medieval Spain—that to some observers bore more than a passing similarity to modern Bosnia and that retains an even broader range of ethical and political significance in the contemporary world. The "false coin" at stake, the pretense to detachment, neutrality, and to the potentially allied ideal of objectivity, has, after all, had a much broader, and longer, circulation, in the study of history. Ankersmit's reference to the "stubborn persistence of the past"—and more fundamentally the Freudian underpinnings of "presence" theory—echo a passage in Beverley Southgate's study *What Is History For?*:

> Whatever attempts are made, "the past" persists—eluding containment, seeping through boundaries and barriers into present consciousness once more, resurfacing against the odds, and finally resisting abolition.[5]

Ideological and cultural transactions in the present, it might be said, inescapably negotiate with the currency of the past: a historical economy in which we must necessarily deal. The attempts to which Southgate refers respond to the aspiration to a strict, impartial, detachment that has been fundamental to the discipline since the rise of positivism in the late nineteenth century. "Like medieval knights," he writes, "historians have pursued their subject (and their objective)—the discovery of what 'really happened' in the past—with religious fervour and intensity, one of the last relics of an earlier age of faith."[6] The accusation may be overgeneralized.

Although some historians may have responded to a climate of uncertainty by reverting to an outmoded positivism,[7] the belief, articulated by Geoffrey Elton in *The Practice of History* (1967), that historiographical research and writing can attain the absolute and objective truth about the past is far from universal. The ideal of scientific objectivity to which the disciples of Leopold von Ranke adhered was challenged in the wake of a wide variety of social and intellectual changes: the traumas, loss of certainty, and anti-German sentiments unleashed by the First World War; the more recent rise of feminist, postcolonial and postmodern theory; and, not least, the emergence of new understandings of science itself. Thomas Kuhn's post-empiricist book *The Structure of Scientific Thought* (1962), widely read by historians, suggested that even science was bounded by consensus paradigms.[8] "Traditional" historians have been more sensitive to the problems addressed by postmodern theorists than their opponents sometimes imply, accepting to varying degrees the subjective "positionality" of the historian, aware of the multiple meanings of texts and their autonomy from the intentions of the author, and indeed the impossibility of absolute knowledge of the past given the fragmentary nature of the historical record. Yet the strategies pursued by Ranke—the attempt to transcend the morally didactic function of historiography, to understand the past "on its own terms," to approximate the past through primary sources, subjected to modern philological methodological inquiry, and above all, the pursuit of objectivity—still remain central to the historical profession.[9]

If, as Bernard Williams has suggested, the error of the positivist school was to imagine that anything beyond historical minimalism ("telling us how things went") involves fiction and falsehood, the pursuit of some degree of "objectivity" in historical writing is equally not to be scorned.[10] We might understand the term as indicating an allegiance to *some* idea of (historiographical) truth, that is, the belief that certain statements correspond to external (historical) realities. It is ultimately such an idea that gives history a public authority distinct from that of literature or fable, in Western culture as in other parts of the world.[11] As Richard J. Evans has written, historical writing "can provide convincing support for social and political empowerment in the present only if it can convincingly claim to be true, and this in turn demands a rigorous and self-critical approach to the evidence."[12] Intellectual honesty, rigor, and self-criticism, are of course essential in generating a useable past. (The point at which they are infringed is the point at which political or ethical commitment becomes problematic, although unacknowledged, unconscious tropes and patterning may be just as formative in the interpretative reshaping of the past.) Historical debate and inquiry serve the vital function of revealing falsehood and

distortion. While rejecting the notion of a single truth about the past, and underscoring the wide arena for legitimate differences of interpretation, Williams rightly defends the notion of (multiple) historical truths and in this sense the validity of the word objectivity. A liberal society, despite its manifold faults, allows space for various accounts and various needs for explanation to encounter one another. It has, he remarks, "considerable resources to promote historical truth if it wants to, and it uniquely discourages some famous enemies of it, such as a state or religious monopoly—discouraging these things is, after all, its speciality, part of its legacy of Enlightenment."[13] The value of open historical inquiry as a counterbalance to deliberate ideological manipulation is clearly considerable: one thinks of the determination of postwar German, and post-Francoist Spanish, historians to distance themselves from the distortions of extreme right-wing historiography. The aspiration to objectivity, then, is not the same as neutrality (or impartiality); and just as one might theoretically envisage a subjective advocacy of neutrality, *histoire engagée* has often been written under the banner of objectivity. Some objectivist historical narratives have been devoted to providing historical justification or inspiration for political and social movements (such as Marxism) in the present. Conversely, postmodern relativism can lead as easily to political inaction as to more radical agendas. While also overgeneralized, Richard Evans' claim that "the postmodernist concentration on words diverts attention away from real suffering and oppression and toward the kinds of secondary intellectual issues that matter in the physically comfortable world of academia" is echoed in some contemporary European leftist circles.[14]

However, at the empirical heart of the historical profession, the pursuit of objectivity has in practice widely implied a rejection of moral engagement and the denial of the inescapably political function of history.[15] Evans, whose *Defense of History* was widely critiqued both by postmodern progressives and by intellectual traditionalists, may perhaps be allowed here to speak for the center. While recognizing that *all* history has a present-day purpose and inspiration, whether it is moral, political, or ideological (even the work of Geoffrey Elton, whose conservative political beliefs were reflected in his defence of authoritarian government in the sixteenth century), Evans writes that "if political or moral aims become paramount in the writing of history, then scholarship suffers." But the tension between the admission that *all* history has a subjective political/ethical purpose, on the one hand, and the claim that this purpose should not be "paramount," on the other, raises some serious difficulties. The logically necessary strategy, and one that intrinsically can never be completely successful (let alone desirable),

becomes one of repression—repression of the very purpose of the study and of two elements, the political and the ethical, which are inherent to historical narrative. Indeed, the repression of the subject—and in this sense, agency, as well as compassion—is the very essence of objectivity. Implicit in this strategy is the attempted enclosure of the past from both present and future, "a chronological *cordon sanitaire*" whereby historians feign an "innocent eye" untainted by considerations of the present.[16] These various forms of repression carry at least two associated dangers. First, they disguise the processes of historiographical production and the political or social interests which inevitably remain at work in the narrative: those processes that culminate, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot suggests in his study of the historiography of Haiti, to the silencing of the past.[17] These silences serve clandestine colonial, racist, or other *socially* repressive purposes, safely obscured by a veil of objectivity.[18] Hence, he suggests, historical representations—books, commercial exhibits, or public commemorations—cannot be conceived as passive vehicles for the transmission of knowledge; moral and intellectual integrity requires that they make explicit their authentic relation to that knowledge. We must recognize our role, in other words, in relation to power and domination.[19]

Simultaneously, the historiographical repression of that relationship, and of self-positioning, often reinforces political and moral immobility. It was precisely against an indigestible flood of knowledge accompanying the rise of "scientific" history, and a corresponding weakening of the will to political action, that Friedrich Nietzsche railed in his meditation "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (1874). "We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves life," he pronounced, invoking a new generation of youthful fighters and dragon-slayers to dispatch a deadly and moribund "culture": "and the sign that guarantees the superior robustness of its own health shall be that this youth can itself discover no concept or slogan in the contemporary currency of words and concepts to describe its own nature, but is only aware within it of an active power that fights."[20] To cure their habit, the new generation would "have to educate themselves, and in opposition to themselves moreover...so that they could say to themselves in old Spanish: *Defienda me Dios de my*, God guard me from myself."[21] Nietzsche identified a specific political collusion between "objective" history and liberal political hegemony: "Historical education and the identical bourgeois coat rule at the same time. While the 'free personality' has never been commended so volubly, there are no personalities to be seen, let alone free personalities—nothing but anxiously muffled up identical people."[22] Such a collusion has been

more recently underlined by Constantin Fasolt. By proclaiming that the past is absolutely dead, no longer a threat, a shackle, or a help, Fasolt suggests, the discipline of history provides a misleading sense of our own freedom; it "assures us that we are free and independent agents," capable of exerting choice and in command of our own selves.[23] Simultaneously, the liberal historiographical regime continues to deny the obligation of ethical commitment. I have argued elsewhere that the violent traumas of the historical past are repressed by the structure of "objective" historiographical space, and consequently *possess* the historian. The discipline of history, as it has been institutionally regulated, has left a troubling debt unpaid: the ethical imperative in the study of the past is cordoned off in ways that give themselves to Derrida's theory of hauntology.[24] The spectral image was anticipated a century earlier by Nietzsche ("a moment, now here and then gone, nonetheless returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment"),[25] and flits across Fasolt's work, too, as he borrows from the German legend of the sleeping emperor. The emperor, forced to retreat into the mountain, "an impotent and insubstantial figure," reemerges "not as his former self, but as a new state of mind, the shadow cast by modernity, the insubstantial alter ego of individual autonomy."

> Under this shadow, the subjects of modernity went on to conquer empires of unprecedented magnitude, perhaps in fits of absentmindedness but not without the guilty conscience that was the price for claiming moral and scientific objectivity, and ultimately at the cost of unspeakable human sacrifice to history and nature. The shadow of the emperor brought civil war into the modern world.[26]

The coin of objectivity, then, has often purchased our unwitting complicity in repression: repression of the moral conscience in historical writing, of empathy for past sufferings, repression by extension of our capacity *as intellectuals* for ethical and political commitment in the present. Scholars might instead embrace that spirit of radical commitment to which (in the course of a discussion of Jacques Derrida) Keith Jenkins exhorts us in his attempt to "open up" historiography:

> Derrida's invocation of the absolute enormity of global subjugation and pain in his *Specters of Marx* is not about another "globe" or another time but about this globe and this time. *Historians should have something to say about this*, but all-too-often their putative values of objectivity, neutrality, detachment, non-worldly "academic" scholarship and specialised erudition about some aspect not of the now but of the past, become alibis for silence.[27]

Nowhere, for reasons that go beyond the intrinsic construction of the "medieval" as modernity's radical other, has this been more pervasive than in the study of the Middle Ages. Kathleen Biddick has identified a "shocking history of silencing" among medievalists, responding to the unacknowledged trauma of that late Victorian violence that forcibly segregated past and present, history and theory (professional) medieval studies from (lay) medievalism. This trauma, and its repression, she suggests, is intimately entwined with the reality of imperial violence, and with a professional economy in which political silence came to pay. One victim of this emerging economy was Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, forced to resign in 1866 as a result of his protest at the violent suppression of an uprising of former black slaves in Jamaica the previous year, and rapidly replaced with a more discreet—and conservative—candidate.[28] William Stubbs resolutely refrained thereafter from intervening in contemporary political debate, refusing to teach constitutional history beyond the early seventeenth century as it was too "presentist," and was rewarded with nominations to the sees of Chester and Oxford. (New men of learning, railed Nietzsche, "demand honors and advantages of themselves, as though the state and public opinion were duty bound to accept the new coins as being of equal to the old."[29]) Remarking that "at the center of an incipient medieval studies, we thus hear the monastic-like silence of Bishop Stubbs," Biddick concludes that the silence continues to linger.[30]

Most medievalists, over the course of the past century, have effectively quarantined the past from the concerns of the present, aiming to understand the past "on its own terms" or "for its own sake." Henry Charles Lea's exhortation in his 1903 AHA Presidential address that the profession's essential mission was to "set forth the truth" has on some levels remained conventional wisdom.[31] It is true that a Whiggish view of history gave some purchase to the present-day value of the Middle Ages. The first generations of medieval scholars in the United States, constructing the profession in opposition to popular "medievalism," would, in Gabrielle Spiegel's words, "insist in a highly overdetermined fashion, on its relevance as the origin of the modern, hence American, world."[32] In the 1920s, the politically progressive Charles Homer Haskins aimed to trace the development of individualism, centralized institutions, and constitutional government from the twelfth century onward; his pupil Joseph Strayer would later argue for the medieval origins of the "modern state."[33] Some medievalists found new forms of urgency in their field as, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, total war enveloped the globe. In 1943, Charles Rufus Morey, chair of Princeton's Department of Art and

Archaeology, joined other scholars of the humanities in a symposium entitled "Approaches to World Peace." The following year, amidst "the horrors of the present war," Morey wrote that "medieval culture will play its part in the formation of a new humanism, as custodian of values whose worth becomes more clear as the disaster of modern materialism develops the fullness of its catastrophe."[34] And in 1966, delivering the Diamond Jubilee Conference address to the Historical Association in London, Geoffrey Barraclough, the British historian of medieval Germany, urged his listeners to respond to the rapidly changing times, to illuminate the present and shape the future through the study of the past. He cautioned that "we must not make the mistake of thinking that relevance is the same as nearness in time. . ."[35] But overwhelmingly, the relationship between the Middle Ages and contemporary global affairs was ignored; and with few exceptions, it has continued to be so.[36]

This book therefore takes, as one point of inspiration, an article by E.N. Johnson, "American Medievalists and Today," published in *Speculum* in 1953. Against the tide, Johnson aimed to find relevance in the study of the Middle Ages for the contemporary crises of his own day: the development of nuclear weapons, McCarthyism, and the underlying tension between the West and the Soviet Union. Medievalists might help to solve this set of problems, he argued, by reemphasizing the violent horror of medieval warfare; by tracing attempts by the Church to establish a transnational peace; by determining the extent to which there was a truly international culture; and by seeking the roots of the conflict between East and West. In regard to these historical roots, he commented that "the contemporary distrust of the Middle East for the West" was "in part the result of its medieval experience." Looking over back issues of the journal of medieval studies in which his article was published, he remarked caustically that "I began to suspect that *Speculum* was unstained by the sin of contemporaneity"; we should not, he added, continue "attending to our own comfortable, irrelevant, esoteric, and academic busy work while the world goes to ruin and we together with it." One cannot help but think, in reflecting on these anxieties, of Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's invocation of the specter of nuclear annihilation; he reminds us that the world remains under the shadow of sudden death. In the academy there has been "a tendency to shy away from engagement with words like *freedom*, *liberation*, *social justice*, *peace*, and *nuclear disarmament* and to retreat into a modern scholasticism where splitting hairs about form takes precedence over content."[37] This tendency, he writes, flies in the face of John Donne's awareness that " 'No man is an island, entire of itself' ": an awareness that gave itself to Hemingway, of course, as a symbol of political commitment in the Spanish Civil War, when the bell tolled for the United States and

other liberal democracies. The role of the intellectual should, instead, be that of "raising a hue and cry against the 'destroyers' of the world."[38]

II

This book, in its immediate origins, is a response to trauma: to the literal shock waves that passed from downtown Manhattan, through the bedrock of the city, to the apartment building across the river in Brooklyn Heights where, on September 11, 2001, I watched an apocalypse unfolding. The events of that day, it is true, do not stand outside ordinary history. As journalist Robert Fisk has argued, the credo that this day "changed the world forever" was mendacious; while it may have transformed public consciousness in the United States, atrocities against civilian populations had repeatedly been committed over the previous generation by Western democracies themselves, encouraging increasingly radical forms of Islamist militancy. Neoconservative narratives of "mindless" and radical disruption therefore disguise the causal continuities.[39] Eviatar Zerubavel has described the U.S. government's attempt to change the cartography of collective memory as an instance of the *revanche* trope, and invokes a provocative medieval parallel:

> It was the official portrayal of the 2001 military strikes in Afghanistan as "retaliation" for the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that...led U.S. television networks to report on them under the on-screen headline "America Strikes Back," and the collective memory of a pre-Muslim, essentially Christian early medieval Spain that leads Spaniards to regard the late-medieval Christian victories over the Moors as a "re-conquest" (*reconquista*).[40]

Yet to remember the moment when the towers fell is to remember a very short period of time—no more than a few hours—when conventional narrative failed, before the nation's newspapers were mobilized for war, a moment when radio presenters cried on air, when TV coverage was not glossy, and the president ran for cover. A space had been violently opened, and for a few hours, no familiar story could be told. It is difficult, now, to read about the loss of Constantinople in 1453, about Juan de Segovia's compulsive interrogation of how Christian Europe should respond to this infinitely greater military threat, and his particular interest in the avoidance of crusade (chapter 1), without being drawn back into that space, and to inhabit that space forces history—including the history of the distant past—to be revisited and rewritten. Within Spain, the combined effects of 9/11, the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the "war on terror," and North African immigration, have led

to new exchanges on the "Oriental question"—Spain's relationship with the Islamic world (and by extension, with Europe)—not least because anxieties in relation to the return of the Muslim "colonizer" coincide with the concern to present Spain as a fully European nation.[41] In Bernard Williams' words, it is particularly at moments of crisis "when the smooth order of things is disturbed by violence" that historically oriented questions ("Why?," "Why us?," "Where from?") are asked.[42] The shadow of religious terror, and of the need to rethink the relationship between the West and the Islamic world, crosses his own pages as he explores the idea that for the historian to "make sense" of the past it is necessary to account for the agent's intentions within the framework of his historical outlook and preconceptions. It may well be, Williams writes, that "to neither of us would it make sense to kill ourselves and immolate thousands of other people for political objectives identified with a certain religion: neither of us would do it or conceivably have reason to do it. Perhaps it makes sense to each of us that it could make sense to someone else with a very different formation; indeed, this had better make sense to us, if we are to sustain the hope, however desperately, of making sense of the world we live in."

I have come to envision this book partly as a reflection of that moment of trauma, and partly as a form of collective rethinking, even as therapy: a process in which the individual is required "to harmonize *present* concerns and *future* projects with a psychological inheritance from *the past*."[43] Beverley Southgate, envisioning the future of history, draws a parallel between historical rewriting and personal rethinking: "we constantly modify our perceptions and interpretations of our own past experiences—from a virtually infinite totality, recalling some 'lost' memories, reconstituting or obliterating others, and periodically seeing events and other people and ourselves in '*a new light*' [my italics]."[44] He reminds us that historical writing can serve a therapeutic role by disturbing us from our moral lethargy, unshackling us our assumptions as to what is inevitable and self-evident. Thereby it opens up new possibilities for change.[45] It was in this spirit that, in June 2003, a small group of scholars specializing in the history of Spain and Portugal drafted a letter to the media addressing the war in Iraq; the letter indicated that many of the signatories were about to attend the annual conference of the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies (SSPHS) in Madrid.[46] Some of us were convinced that Spanish history might teach us something about the international crises in which we had become engulfed, and in particular the war—still overwhelmingly supported in the United States, in the early summer of 2003. In our view, the past was urgently relevant, sometimes in terms of analogies, sometimes in terms of long-term historical continuities, and sometimes

because exposure to Spanish history might sensitize us to the horrors of repression, imperialism, and intolerance, no matter their cultural origin. The text of the letter read partly as follows:

> The invasion of Iraq was, we believe, launched under false premises, and the effects continue to be devastating. We call for an immediate end to the occupation and for visible signs of constructive goodwill towards the Islamic world.... As scholars specializing in Spain and Portugal we are painfully conscious of the irreparable cultural damage that accompanies imperial aggression, and the obliteration of the cultures of colonized peoples.... Let us not forget the lessons of Iberian history.

The president of the society, objecting to the mention of its name in the letter, explained that it was "a scholarly organization whose members do not necessarily share a common political perspective and that it is therefore inappropriate for a fraction of the membership—even by implication—to speak for the whole."[47] A corresponding petition, presented to the annual business meeting of the society, met a similar official response; by way of concession, it was suggested that a panel be organized on the subject for the following year's conference. In the end, three roundtables were held at the 2004 conference in Los Angeles, respectively addressing the relevance of the medieval, the early modern, and the Spanish Civil War periods.[48] *What is the use of history*? I asked in my brief introductory comments, just a few weeks after the Madrid train bombings.

> How can it help us, as the West faces a renewed crisis of confidence?...How can it help us make sense of an apparently senseless world in which commuter trains explode in a European capital, some of the immigrant victims achieving a public recognition in death which, without papers, they had not enjoyed in life?

How, then, to allow the past to speak to our present circumstances without forcing it to mouth platitudes; how to trace analogies, causal connections, and other forms of "relevance" while avoiding a reductive vision of medieval Spain? How, and not whether, to intervene politically as intellectuals; a policy of principled nonintervention is both intrinsically hollow and ethically problematic—in scholarship as in international affairs. "Must we always non-intervene?" asked Afsaneh Najmabadi on the eve of the current war in Iraq. In the case of the Gulf War and the campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban, Najmabadi argued, the principal dissident position in the United States—opposing military intervention—clashed with the interests of many of those people who had suffered under the regimes. Such people—one thinks also of the

Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s—"welcomed (and at times begged for) outside, including American and including military interventions":

> The American dissident position, therefore, was received by these forces (and is currently received by the Iraqi opposition) as worse than irrelevance: it is tantamount to *criminal non-intervention* [my italics]. What here may seem the honorable position of opposing the war machine and military adventurism of one's own government, in this configuration, came at the price of other people continuing to suffer with no end in sight.[49]

The point is certainly not, of course, to vindicate the military actions of the United States, Britain, or—for that matter—Spain. Instead, Najmabadi asks us to consider the *kind* of intervention that is required, and adds: "Historically, non-intervention has not always been the stand of dissidence. One can mention the Spanish Civil War. . . ." On this note, it is worth comparing the resistance to intellectual politicization, which I have described, to the position articulated in the journal of the American Association for Teachers of Spanish, *Hispania*, five months into the Civil War (in December 1936), in which the editor made the following announcement:

> Letters and proffered articles have come to the Editor which it seems best to answer publicly in this fashion. The writers are vehement partisans of the one side or the other in the Spanish civil war. An individual has a right to his or her own opinion but it would be the height of folly for this Association or any of its chapters to take sides. The American Association of Teachers of Spanish stands for but one object, to wit, to advance the study of the Spanish language in the United States. It will not promote that end to project the Spanish civil war into our midst. *Hispania*, as the official organ of the Association, will not print articles that can be considered as biased.[50]

Despite differences—there was some willingness, in the context of early twenty-first century Hispanism, to allow debate on matters of contemporary political importance, and no principled objection to individual publications or papers with overt ideological positioning—the discomfort that greeted the antiwar letter (paralleled, to some degree, across the profession) does appear to reflect the way in which Hispanists have long been reluctant to engage with the discourse of "relevance." As Sebastiaan Faber shows in a forthcoming study of Hispanism in the Anglo-American world, professional historians and literary scholars of Spain maintained a virtuously neutral position, mirroring that of the liberal democracies, during the Spanish Civil War. "[T]he most senseless, the most stupid, the

most criminal way to waste. . .time and energy," Henry Grattan Doyle asserted in 1939, on the eve of U.S. entry into a cataclysmic global conflict, "is to get involved—we, Americans and teachers of Americans!—in quarrels among ourselves over foreign politics or the rights and wrongs of internecine or international conflicts in foreign countries."[51] The emergence of U.S. Hispanism, as a scholarly field, had been associated, to the extent that it was politicized at all, with a largely moderate, patriotic pan-Americanism, sufficiently part of the national "consensus" that it was barely perceived as a political position. In the three years between the 1936 coup d'état and Franco's final defeat of the Republic, says Faber, "the almost complete absence of American Hispanists in the widespread public-sphere struggle over Spain is striking"; the major professional journals largely abstained from mentioning the war. Detachment and neutrality transitioned easily into accommodation, and those articles in *Hispania*, for instance, that did address the contemporary situation in Spain "seem to indicate a practically unquestioned acceptance of the Franco regime as a new state of normality." In the decades after the war, this ostensibly depoliticized, effectively conservative, strategy of scholars in the field of Hispanism would be perpetuated; the influx of liberal but anti-Marxist Republican exiles such as Américo Castro blended easily into the mix.[52] For many U.S. historians and literary scholars of Spain, skepticism toward any attempt to trace lines of "relevance" between past and present was later accentuated by a reaction to the highly polemical nature of medieval historiography during the Franco dictatorship, for which history was central to the ideological struggle.[53]

If the historical profession as a whole has often repressed the "relevance" of the past, and if most Hispanists—both historians and literary scholars—have traditionally adopted a position of conservative objectivity, the problem is compounded by a long-standing cultural sense that Spain is irrelevant to modernity. The deeply rooted Anglo-American perception that Spain, from the sixteenth century onward, represented the antithesis of Protestant traditions of democracy and tolerance, has been recently conjoined to neoconservative and Huntingtonian backlashes against Hispanic presences in the United States and the corresponding celebration of white, "Anglo-Saxon" and Protestant historical legacies.[54]

One fundamental premise of this book, however, is that medieval Spanish history is made thoroughly—though *by no means* uniquely, considered within the broader history of the Islamic world—relevant to global (post)modernity by virtue of its pluricultural, and indeed plurilingual dimensions. For the sake of coherence, and in response to the most pressing international tensions, the essays in the volume focus on the

long, complex relationship between "Christian" and "Muslim" cultures. The following section of this introduction will explore the use (and abuse) of three approaches to the relevance question: analogy; continuity; and the study of the past as a catalyst for rethinking religious and cultural difference.

III

It has become something of a commonplace to decry "facile analogy": to the point, indeed, that the complaint itself threatens to become facile.[55] Empiricist historical narrative represses the kind of moral and political repulsion that, in the vortex of the Bosnian bloodbath, drew the novelist and journalist Juan Goytisolo to make explicit a devastatingly clear analogy with al-Andalus. Entering the ruins of the celebrated library in Sarajevo, shelled into oblivion by Serbian artillery, the phantoms of the fifteenth century were, for Goytisolo, ubiquitous. Five centuries after the destruction of Arabic manuscripts in Granada by Cardinal Cisneros, Goytisolo observed, the violence of medieval Spanish ethnic cleansing repeats itself.[56] He writes of *memoricide*, of the destruction of the cosmopolitan memory of the Bosnian people. The Sephardic Jewish population of Sarajevo, descended from the exiles of 1492 and present in the city under Ottoman rule after 1551, is abandoned by a Spanish government that celebrates its European credentials while distancing itself from the Islamic world; the *convivencia* of Muslims, Jews, and Christians that characterized prewar Sarajevo has been pulverized.[57]

There is no doubt that, whether in an academic context or in international affairs, analogies can be deeply misleading.[58] This is surely the case with Hugh Thomas' passing reference to the twelfth-century Almohads as "the Al Qaeda of the Middle Ages," an analogy that breaks down at any number of levels (theological, organizational, geopolitical). The power relationship, for example, between the Almohads and the medieval Iberian Christian kingdoms was not remotely comparable to the current relationship between Al Qaeda and the United States.[59] Christopher Tyerman rightly critiques the deployment of analogies in the major conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean since the First World War, including Saddam's self-presentation as the new Saladin and such unlikely associations as the siege of Beirut in 1982 with the siege of Acre in 1189–1191.[60] Not without reason did Nietzsche decry the danger of that "monumental history" which necessarily deals "in approximations and generalities, in making what is dissimilar look similar": "Monumental history deceives by analogies: with seductive similarities it inspires the courageous to foolhardiness and the inspired to fanaticism."[61]

Yet as Peter Euben has suggested, this intellectual strategy can prove extremely productive, introducing a "generative voice" stimulating new ideas and invigorating scholarly debate.[62] As he points out, if, on the one hand, the modern world—such as ancient Athens—is increasingly subject to processes of globalization, challenging existing theoretical categories, cultural difference can be as illuminating as similarity. Political comparison "raises the question of whether America is, in Greek terms, more of an oligarchy or plutocracy than a democracy."[63] In another historical theater, sixteenth-century France, Liam Brockey—responding to the way in which public figures including Salman Rushdie and Tariq Ramadan have asked whether Islam needs a Reformation akin to the great changes in sixteenth-century Europe—has asked, "What Iraqis Could Learn from France's Wars of Religion." Although acknowledging that to draw historical analogies is a tricky business ("Rarely do events from the past fit into present molds, and their lessons rarely offer real solutions to current problems"), Brockey's article revolves around just such an analogy, emphasizing the presence of militant sectarianism in sixteenth-century France and the twenty-first century Islamic world.[64] Half a century ago, Hugh Trevor-Roper famously declared that "History that is not useful. . .is mere antiquarianism."[65] In a consummately elegant essay written in the mid-1950s, Trevor-Roper evoked the irruption of "a power of huge military strength which, exploiting every social discontent, had advanced into the heart of Europe, imposed a new social system, and protected it behind an iron curtain": not the Soviet Union, as his readers would initially have assumed, but the Ottoman Empire. The pragmatic relations between East and West in the sixteenth century, he suggested, gave the lie to claims that a clash between the "free world" and its enemies was inevitable. "All historical parallels," he wrote, "are imperfect and therefore dangerous; but those who use them would do well to remember one which, being inconvenient, they too often neglect: the parallel of coexistence, of Europe and the Turk."[66] Historical analogy—applied in a spirit of intellectual rigor and honesty—surely presents many of the same opportunities, and the same challenges, as comparative history. This approach has rich possibilities for medieval Spain: possibilities which Maria Menocal exploits characteristically in *Shards of Love: Exile and the Origins of the Lyric*. Here, she suggests that thirteenth-century Spain and the postmodern United States share a kaleidoscopic variety and a capacity for subversion; modern Americans, multifarious, broken, and yearning, have far more in common with the Middle Ages than with the aggressively unifying ideologies of the Renaissance.[67] What further analogies suggest themselves, then?[68] First, the apparent appeal of Arabic culture in medieval Iberia, in which Menocal invests so much poetic capital in

The Ornament of the World, might be understood in the same context as the contemporary appeal of U.S. culture: social, economic, and political hegemony. Equally, resistance to that culture—as manifested by the ninth-century Christian martyrs of Córdoba, for instance—should be understood in analogous ways: as a response, in part, to social and economic inequality and injustice. Second, the complacent lack of interest in the Islamic world on the part of the United States, before 9/11, and a certain self-satisfaction in the "inevitable" triumph of universal Western civilization might be juxtaposed with the lack of interest in Christendom on the part of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Iberian Muslims.[69] Conversely, the great intellectual institutions that accompanied nineteenth-century British and French empire-building, and the corresponding emergence of Orientalism, bears comparison with the pragmatic pursuit of knowledge by Alfonso X of Castile-León (1252–1284), whose fragile authority in Andalusia might usefully be understood as a weak imperial regime. The Alphonsine cultural project should not, perhaps, be understood as an abstract reflection of enlightened toleration; rather, the king's interest in translation was as much an instrument of proto-absolutist, colonial control as the Cantigas de Santa María.[70]

Another approach to the relevance question—and one whose dangers must be acknowledged—relates to the issues of historical continuity and causality. Claims of historical links between medieval and modern Spain are self-evidently politicized in public affairs. This is reflected, for instance, in Giles Tremlett's discussion (foreword) of the apparent "survival" of the Mozarabic mass in Toledo, a process whose dynamics reveal a conservative Catholic agenda dating from the Franco era and ultimately back through the age of Cardinal Cisneros. No less political were Claudio Sánchez Albornoz's contention that a continuous line might be drawn between the Visigothic-Catholic heritage and modernity or Américo Castro's argument that coexistence shaped new cultural forms defining the permanent essence of Spanishness.[71] One could certainly argue that causal relationships between distant past and the complex present are the hardest to trace and easiest to misrepresent. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot recognizes:

> Even when the historical continuities are unquestionable, in no way can we assume a simple correlation between the magnitude of events as they happened and their relevance for the generations that inherit them through history. . .[What] we often call the "legacy of the past" may not be anything bequeathed by the past itself.[72]

A considerable quantity of ink has been shed on illuminating the modern Arab reinvention of the memory of Crusades, for instance.[73]

Christopher Tyerman has shown that the imagery of "crusade" became so divorced from its origins that in Britain and France the Crimean War (1854–1856) could be described as a crusade despite the fact that they were both fighting in alliance with a Muslim power, Turkey, against a Christian one, Russia. He adds that members of *both* sides in the Spanish Civil War adopted the term: J. Gurney, in his memoirs *Crusade in Spain* (1974) argued that "the crusade was against the fascists who were the Saracens of our generation."[74] As Eviatar Zerubavel suggests, the degree of actual continuity can be exaggerated by the nostalgia that accompanies an acceleration of social and economic change or a political, cultural or economic downturn in a group's fortune. By way of example (citing Bernard Lewis), he underscores "the sentimental longings of nineteenth-century Arab historians witnessing the beginnings of Europe's colonial expansion and the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the past glories of medieval, Muslim Spain."[75] Geopolitical relations between the West and the Islamic world have transformed so profoundly and so often since the medieval period that to envision the relationship as one of continuous western crusading would be a simplistic error; and the role of Spain, specifically, within the geopolitical "imaginary" has shifted significantly over time.[76] Religious extremists, in the Islamic as well as in Jewish or Christian contexts, often have an interest in erasing divisions between past and present realities. In using the language of crusade, prominent after 9/11 in the rhetoric of the Bush administration and the supporters of Osama Bin Laden, all sides—as Marcus Bull puts it—are "guilty of forcing historical continuity out of discontinuity."[77] In this volume, Mary Elizabeth Perry (chapter 3) argues that historical memory is particularly susceptible to distortion in modernity, and that memories of violence have always been manipulated for political reasons: this was the case as much for the emerging early modern Spanish state as it was for the *Moriscos*. While she adds that violence represents a persistent "wound of memory," calling out for vengeance—in large part because the injustice remained unacknowledged by the perpetrators[78]—there are, by implication, good reasons to question the form of historical consciousness to which Ayman al-Zawahiri infamously appealed on October 7, 2001, declaring that the jihadists would not allow a repetition of the "tragedy of al-Andalus."[79] Focusing on the historical roots of a modern phenomenon such as Islamist "terrorism" can distort our understanding of the ways in which it is tied to contemporary circumstance. There are many far more proximate causes for contemporary problems in the Middle East, among them U.S. support for Israel and for Islamic militants during the struggle against Soviet Forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

Nonetheless, an *over*insistence on proximate causes runs the risk of by-passing the question of the *longue durée*—as if the Annales School had never existed. If political interest can "invent" memory, it can also eclipse long-term continuities in *mentalité*: continuity, for example, in our leaders' faith in violence as "the perfectly appropriate, even chivalrous, first response to what is wrong in the world," regardless of the chosen target for that chivalry, and continuity in Europe's self-definition against Islam, which "remains embedded in the West's self-understanding today."[80] It appears hasty to suggest that "seemingly self-evident constancy is only a figment of our minds," transforming noncontiguous points into seemingly unbroken historical continua.[81] In the contemporary Spanish context, it is surely a matter of political pragmatism, of collective will and strategic amnesia (the *pacto de olvido*) to imagine that the ideological and cultural divisions that erupted in the Spanish Civil War and that were perpetuated by the dictatorship have died in two generations. As Antonio Feros argued in the context of the bitter national election that followed the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, deeply engrained collective memories of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime continue to shape political rhetoric and political loyalties.[82] Equally, it has been suggested that a long history of unpopular colonial interventions, encompassing Cuba in the late nineteenth century and Morocco in the early twentieth, helped to shape the overwhelming Spanish opposition to war in Iraq and the defeat of the Partido Popular (PP) in the 2004 elections.[83] Looking back even further, one might argue (along with Joseba Gabilondo) that the demonization of all forms of resistance as "terrorism" reflects the re-formation of (Spanish) imperialism,[84] or point to the durability of attempts to expurgate the "Moorish" Other within Spanish culture. If these historical ghosts resurfaced during the Spanish Civil War, when Moorish otherness became a vital representation of the 'inner adversary" aspect of the discourse of Francoism, the rhetoric of crusade, violence tempered by religion, and images of Christological suffering, had symbolic mileage precisely by resonating with a "pre-existing ideological-mythical sense."[85] Equally, the incorporation of the Cross of Santiago *Matamoros* into an army badge specially designed for Spanish troops serving in Iraq would have had little significance outside a social context in which an aggressive contempt for other cultural and religious systems continues to be latent and pervasive.[86] This racist mark on Spanish culture, as Daniela Flesler indicates (chapter 5), jars with the self-celebrating maturation of the country as an enlightened and liberal European nation and correspondingly haunts the national imaginary: a "presence" deep in the Spanish psyche, or a "public secret," to use another phrase of Eelco Runia. In his article "Spots of Time," Runia suggests that

historical "presence" travels like a stowaway in the form of public secrets that are not named or labeled. Presence coincides with, and in some sense *is*, our culture—our private collection of public secrets. It does not connect to a conscious story; we do not know that it is there, and because it cannot be remembered, it cannot be forgotten: no *pacto de olvido* can be mobilized against it. Instead, it makes us feel, think, and do things in a way that jars with our conscious sense of identity.[87]

Let us turn, lastly, to the value of studying the past as a catalyst for rethinking religious and cultural difference. A number of scholars have identified the conventional disciplinary virtue of facilitating a sympathetic understanding of others: it is, Bernard Williams suggests, partly by being told their historical story that we acquire such an understanding.[88] Marcus Bull has recently argued that the relevance of medieval history lies in its capacity to promote awareness of alternative values, other worldviews, and *mentalités*: "the liberating richness of human diversity, across time as well as space."[89] Historical study, by extension, expands the boundaries of possibility, heightening awareness of the potential of human thought and action.[90] Peter Euben, citing Hannah Arendt, has suggested that we might press "the past into the service of establishing the strangeness of the present," making the everyday seem anomalous and opening up the present for fresh political thinking.[91] In medieval Iberian studies, María Rosa Menocal's book *The Ornament of the World*, a work—embedded, to its benefit, in the cultural moment—offers a fine instance of this rethinking, through its proactive humanization of the Other, its rehabilitation of the term "medieval" (a term deployed as a negative marker of the Taliban and other strategically targeted groups to signify backwardness), and its poetic evocation of the full possibilities of cultural symbiosis.[92] Anne Marie Wolf's essay in this volume (chapter 1) also implies a variety of forms of "relevance" in this sense. In addition to the importance of appreciating the complexity of interethnic relations, she points to the richness lost when dissident voices are suppressed and the need to be alert to the manipulation of biblical language to legitimize violence.

Closely related to the appreciation of alterity is the intellectual value of ambivalence. In an era of righteous binary thinking and bipolarity, many place a high premium on *aporia* (an impasse in meaning), on ambiguity, irony, and paradox.[93] In this volume, Leyla Rouhi (chapter 2) suggests that the deepest value of *Don Quijote* lies in its capacity to instill a sense of heterogeneity, conducive to irony, reminding us of the inevitable multiplicity and uncertainty with which literature, history, and life must be read. One finds a related approach in Menocal's *The Ornament of the World*, and its veneration of the "first-rate" features of al-Andalus, in the sense suggested by F. Scott Fitzgerald: "the test of first-rate intelligence is the

ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time."[94] I must admit, nonetheless, to some doubts that also surface, troubling the author, in Ariel Dorfman's delightful piece "The Lost Speech," a text originally read—to some confusion—at the 2005 conference of the Modern Language Association (MLA).[95] Dorfman dramatizes the cultural and intellectual tensions faced in the contemporary United States through a fictitious interrogation by two agents from the Department of Homeland Security, following the supposed impounding of his MLA conference speech in Miami airport, en route from the worst possible ideological location in Latin America: Caracas. At a crucial juncture in the interrogation, he explains to the agents the need for uncertainty, ambiguity, and philosophical insubordination, "crucial," he says, "at a time when we are being fed black and white, either/or, dead or alive, 'bring the evildoers on' alternatives."[96] Ascribing to his persona a "typical petit bourgeois angst," a vacillation between the desire to be dangerous and the desire to be aloof and alone, he has the "brainier" of the two agents cut to the chase:

> "We're at war," he said. "You know what wars are like. According to this speech of yours you were once in a life-and-death struggle to get rid of a dictator, and when you were in the midst of that, I don't think you were so enthusiastic about ambiguity and tentativeness and nuance."[97]

"He had a point," "Dorfman" responds, recalling the Chilean struggle of the Allende and Pinochet years. "I have to admit this Homeland Security agent had a point." He asks for a few minutes to reflect on the objection, and as he continues to voice conventional intellectual wisdom, he hears his words sounding hollow. . .He reflects on the parallels between Chile and the United States after 9/11: "How sadly familiar the current state of affairs was to me, the renditions, the torture, the eavesdropping, even disappearances—*desaparecidos*, here in the United States!" Once again, we must think ourselves out of catastrophe, he reflects. But the agent is unsatisfied: "You didn't answer my question. About being ambiguous and tentative while you're trying to serve a cause, fight a war." "Dorfman" is forced to respond: "'Right,' I said. 'That's the foremost source of tension. Not only for the intellectual but for every citizen: to battle for what you believe in and yet be critical, be suspicious of your own motives, your own positions, be relentlessly complex.'" And yet: this is surely *not* ambiguity, not nuance, and not tentativeness: simply intelligent self-reflection. The cultivation of ambivalence, ambiguity, irony, and paradox are therefore problematic from the perspective of those who pursue radical forms of commitment or resistance. In the

words of Domna Stanton, intellectuals today should assume the role of "agents of social change that is both local and has broader, more global material and ethical consequences." To achieve this, she adds, "[w]e need to fashion a more collaborative vision of intellectuals working together across divides."[98] This book is intended as just such a vision, underlain by Bernard Williams' faith in the virtues of (multiple) truths. "The hope is that they will keep going in something like the more courageous, intransigent, and socially effective forms that they have acquired over their history."[99]

One final form of rethinking is "myth-breaking." Marcus Bull, invoking Patrick Geary's claim in *The Myth of Nations* (2002) that it is the duty of modern academic historians to protest at the abuse of the past by ideologues and rogues, explicitly points to Franco's use of the terminology of crusade. The Middle Ages, he speculates in a chapter devoted to the question "Is Medieval History Relevant?," provide particularly fertile territory for this kind of abuse because the period is sufficiently distant in time to give modern claims the authority and prestige of antiquity, but not so distant as to appear too remote from contemporary interests.[100] A number of the essays in this volume express a concern with the need to puncture politicized myths. Anne Marie Wolf (chapter 1) suggests that historians are right to be reticent about mining the past for lessons not only because it often leads to distortion of the past, but because the perpetuation of historical myths distorts our vision of the present. Denise Filios (chapter 4) takes aim at idealizations of al-Andalus, asking crucial questions about forms of social and economic privilege that shaped these myths. And David Coleman (chapter 7) indicates the dangers of "the very sorts of imagined connections to romanticized or mythologized pasts that most of us take as one of our principal missions to debunk." Nevertheless, the debunking strategy is not without its own difficulties. The first is that the objectivity problem makes the distinction between myth and reality more elusive than might be expected; subjectivity is more easily disguised if it happens to resonate with dominant ideological positions. The syndrome is easily diagnosed in the case of the dominant tradition of current Anglo-American historiography of Spain, its unspoken predilection for cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and European unity coexisting with a reputation for pure objectivity.[101] Among Hispanists within, as well as outside, the country, Spain's entry into the European Union (EU) in 1986 catalyzed an obsessive concern with "Europeanizing" the nation, and demonstrating that—while historically entitled to serve as a bridge between Europe and the Arab world—it was *not* different from its northern neighbors. This, of course, entailed a self-distancing from Morocco and other parts

of the Maghreb.[102] And yet one should not necessarily draw from this the conclusion that the transnational inclinations of those historians writing in a recent age of political Europeanization represent a target to be hunted down and destroyed. As Southgate has observed—and this is the second objection—the constructive participation of intellectuals in desirable social goals (and the transcendence of nationalism may well be one) is something to be applauded. "The proper function of historians today," he writes, "whether working still to a hidden agenda or (surely preferably) an agenda that's made quite explicit, is not, to revert to Ranke, to 'benefit the *nation* to which we belong,' but rather that *international* community to which now we all belong."[103] In this context, myth—understood as an inspiring construction of meaning—may, in fact, have a place. While, once again, guarding against the abuse of history—whether in our own hands, or in others'—through methodological rigor and intellectual honesty, intellectuals must also aspire to a role beyond nuance, beyond the "delicate net of judiciousness" that, Nietzsche suggested, entraps and impedes the will to action.[104] We must offer new narratives that help to reinvigorate and relocate our culture: specifically, though not exclusively, in relation to the Islamic world. The historical vision of Spanish converts to Islam, self-consciously designed to reshape the present and future and providing hope in a moment of intercultural crisis, resonates with Anidjar's reading—in the final essay in this book—of Mahmoud Darwish's poem On the Last Evening on this Earth "constituting a future, articulating as well the opening of futures that is also a reading of the past." The horizon of what is thinkable needs to be extended, encouraged by a future-oriented and ethically involved history, such that history "stands in the service, not of pure knowledge, but of life."[105]

Notes

My introduction has been recharged by exchanges with Hisham Aidi, David Coleman, James D'Emilio, Sebastiaan Faber, Denise Filios, Joseba Gabilondo, Barry Mark, David Rojinsky, and Benita Sampedro. Each of them has provided a wealth of ideas, which here I can only begin to pursue.

1. "Presidential Forum: The Role of Intellectuals in the Twenty-First Century," *Profession* (2006): 39 (33–39).
2. *Srebrenica, A "Safe" Area,* http://193.173.80.81/srebrenica. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
3. Eelco Runia, "'Forget About It': 'Parallel Processing' in the Srebrenica Report," *History and Theory* 43.3 (2004): 308 (295–320).

4. F.K. Ankersmit, "'Presence' and Myth," *History and Theory* 45.3 (2006): 330, 335 (328–336).
5. Beverley Southgate, *What Is History For?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 113. The quotation will resurface in this volume in the essay by David Coleman (chapter 7).
6. Southgate, *What Is History For?* p. 14.
7. Carlos Barros, "The Return of History," in *History Under Debate. International Reflection on the Discipline*, ed. Carlos Barros and Lawrence J. McCrank (New York: Haworth Press, 2004), p. 9 (3–41).
8. Cf. Stephen Jay Gould: "The idea that observation can be pure and unsullied (and therefore beyond dispute)—and that great scientists are, by implication, people who can free their minds from the constraints of surrounding culture and reach conclusions strictly by untrammeled experiment and observation, joined with clear and universal logical reasoning—has often harmed science by turning the empiricist method into a shibboleth. . .Thus, if only to honor the truism that liberty requires eternal vigilance, we must also act as watchdogs to debunk the authoritarian form of the empiricist myth—and to reassert the quintessentially human theme that scientists can work only within their social and psychological contexts" ("The Sharp-Eyed Lynx, Outfoxed by Nature," *Natural History* (May 1998): 19 [16–21], cited by Michael B. Shermer, "The View Science: Stephen Jay Gould as Historian of Science and Scientific Historian," *Social Studies of Science* 32 (2002): 516 [489–524]). I am grateful to David Coleman for this reference.
9. The limitations of Ranke's own objectivity are well known. Paid by the Prussian state precisely in order to commemorate the achievements of that state, von Ranke was demonstrably prone to manipulating his evidence to fit an ideologically predetermined story about events. As Anthony Grafton has argued, "He composed his text as a whole. Only then did he search his books and notes, extracts and summaries for the evidence to support it." (Cited by Oliver Daddow, "Still No Philosophy, Please, We're Historians," *Rethinking History* 9.4 [2005]: 491–495).
10. Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 246.
11. Barros, "The Return of History," p. 22, although in my view Barros overstates the "scientific" nature of the discipline. Cf. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past. Power and the Production of History* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995), p. 11: "for reasons that are themselves historical, most often spurred by controversy, collectivities experience the need to impose a test of credibility on certain events and narratives because it matters to them whether these events are true or false."
12. Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 188, 191.
13. Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, pp. 253, 265.
14. Evans, *In Defense of History*, p. 159.

15. Cf. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p. 151: "The traditions of the guild, reinforced by a positivist philosophy, forbid academic historians to position themselves regarding the present. A fetishism of the facts, premised on an antiquated model of the natural sciences, still dominates history and the other social sciences. It reinforces the view that any conscious positioning should be rejected as ideological."
16. Beverley Southgate, *History: What and Why? Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Perspectives*, 2nd edn. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 119. No clearer example presents itself than the cultures of al-Andalus, which Western scholarship—as Gil Anidjar indicates (chapter 8)—has obsessively sealed as "past," as obsolete, behind the high walls of catastrophe. What, he asks, if the so-called past had not ended? How would we reconceive both present and future of the West and the Islamic world?
17. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, especially Chapters 2 ("The Three Faces of Sans Souci. Glory and Silences in the Haitian Revolution," pp. 31–69) and 3 ("An Unthinkable History. The Haitian Revolution as a Non-Event," pp. 70–107).
18. Cf. Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 14: "In the early decades of the twentieth century the most professionally accomplished work on Reconstruction—work hailed by the profession as the most objective, the most balanced the most fair—was viciously racist."
19. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, p. 149.
20. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale and trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 121 (59–123).
21. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 119.
22. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," pp. 59, 84.
23. Constantin Fasolt, "The Limits of History in Brief," *Historically Speaking* 6.5 (2005): 5–10.
24. Simon Doubleday, "The Re-experience of Medieval Power: Tormented Voices in the Haunted House of Empiricism," in *The Experience of Power in Medieval Europe, 950–1350*, ed. Robert F. Berkhofer, Alan Cooper, and Adam J. Kosto (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 271–285.
25. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 61.
26. Constantin Fasolt, *The Limits of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 28.
27. Keith Jenkins, *Refiguring History* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 16.
28. The irony was highlighted by a later Regius Professor, Hugh Trevor-Roper: the "regius" chairs at both Oxford and Cambridge had been created in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, precisely to bypass the universities' Tory elite and to buttress the direct power of the Whig Crown. They were therefore "part of a large design, a design to make the study of history, as it ought always to be, both useful and controversial": *History,*

Professional and Lay. An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 12 November 1957 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 5.

29. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 99.
30. Kathleen Biddick, *The Shock of Medievalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 1–9.
31. Beverley Southgate, "A Pair of White Gloves," *Rethinking History* 10.1 (March 2005): 49–61; also Southgate, *What Is History For?* pp. 18–21; Jenkins, *Refiguring History*, pp. 33–58.
32. Gabrielle Spiegel, *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 59.
33. Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005 [1927]); Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins on the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). More recently Henry Mayr-Harting has invoked the importance of the twelfth century as a nursery of systematic logic (by dubious implication, a hallmark of modernity), promoted by the new medieval universities: "The Relevance of Medieval History," *Oxford Historian*, newsletter, 2 (2004) (http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/alumni/oxhistorian/issue_2/index.htm).
34. Charles Rufus Morey, "Medieval Art and America," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 7 (1944): 6 (1–6), cited by Celia Chazelle and Felice Lifshitz in their introduction, "Early Medieval Studies in Twenty-First Century America," in *Paradigms and Methods in Early Medieval Studies* (New York: Palgrave, forthcoming).
35. Geoffrey Barraclough, *"History and the Common Man," Presidential Address, The Historical Association, Diamond Jubilee Conference [1906–1966]* (London: Historical Association, 1966), p. 10.
36. The traditionalism of elite U.S. universities before the 1970s, and especially before the 1950s, is emphasized by William Palmer, "On or about 1950 or 1955 History Departments Changed: A Step in the Creation of the Modern History Department," *The Journal of the Historical Society* 7.3 (2007): 385–405. One recent and exciting portent of a radical change of priorities was a series of three panels on "Medieval Studies, Social Justice, and Human Rights" at the 42nd International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo (Michigan), in May 2007, organized by Celia Chazelle and Amy Remensnyder.
37. Wa Thiong'o, "For Peace, Justice, and Culture," pp. 38–39.
38. Wa Thiong'o, "For Peace, Justice, and Culture," p. 36.
39. Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation. The Conquest of the Middle East* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), pp. 840–841. "America's failure to act with honour in the Middle East, its promiscuous sale of missiles to those who use them against civilians, its blithe disregard for the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqi children under sanctions of which Washington was the principal supporter—all these were intimately related to the society that produced the Arabs who plunged New York

into an apocalypse of fire.... Now at last, the suicide bomber had made his way west" (pp. 841–842).

40. Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps. Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 12.
41. If the past can be marketed as a source of literal financial advantage, as is conspicuously the case in Andalusia, the value of the medieval is equivalently clear in political terms. Exchanges on the Oriental question have focused particularly on the era of al-Andalus, in which both leading Spanish political parties have found leverage: Hishaam Aidi. "The Interference of al-Andalus," *Social Text* 24.2 (2006): 68 (67–88), draws attention to the diametrically opposed visions of al-Andalus—as models of terrorism and dialogue respectively—articulated in two different U.S. cities on the same day in September 2004 by José María Aznar (the former leader of the conservative Partido Popular) and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (president and leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español). For the marketing of medieval Granada, see Giles Tremlett's foreword to this volume as well as the essay by David Coleman (chapter 7).
42. Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, pp. 262–263.
43. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 71–72, 180 (Cited by Southgate, *What Is History For?* p. 9).
44. Southgate, *History: What and Why?* p. 146.
45. Southgate, *What Is History For?* pp. 176–177.
46. Tensions relating to the relationship between Islam and the West are not purely focused on the Middle East, of course, or on Bosnia: they are also raised by the potential expansion of the European Union (EU) to include Turkey, a state with a Muslim majority and by questions regarding the large Muslim immigrant communities in European societies. But it is in the arena of Middle Eastern conflict that the issues are most explosive, and the dominant subtexts of scholarly discussions of the subject over the past five years have surely been 9/11 and the essentially unrelated U.S. military assault on Iraq.
47. E-mail to "Espora" discussion group, June 22, 2003. The response bears close comparison to an op-ed piece published in the *New York Times* by Stanley Fish, "Why We Built the Ivory Tower" (May 21, 2004, p. A23), in which he argues the position that any collective stance would necessarily suppress a dissenting minority. But more than concern for minority interests underpins the point; it rests upon an ostensibly depoliticized vision of the role of the university. Fish goes on to state that "teachers should teach their subjects. They should not teach peace or war or freedom or obedience or diversity or uniformity or nationalism or antinationalism or any other agenda that might properly be taught by a political leader." I am grateful to Sebastiaan Faber for this reference.
48. Simon Doubleday, "The Relevance of Spanish History: A Report on Three Roundtables at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Spanish

and Portuguese Historical Studies (SSPHS), University of California, Los Angeles (1–4 April 2004)," *Social History* 29.3 (2004: "Spain—A Special Issue"): 384–392, and *Bulletin for the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies* 29.1 (2004): 12–20.

49. Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Must We Always Non-intervene?": www.barnard.edu/bcrw/respondingtoviolence/najmabad.htm. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
50. Cited in Sebastiaan Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists and the Spanish Civil War: Hispanophilia, Commitment, Discipline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), Chapter 3.
51. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, Chapter 3.
52. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, Chapter 4. If this capacity for political accommodationism is a hallmark of modernist scholarship, it might be noted, Castro himself did at least provide a paradigmatic example of rewriting history in a way that unsettles, and opens up a sense of alternative possibilities, in both past and future. (Cf. Southgate, *What Is History For?* pp. 115–128).
53. The Francoist application of the rhetoric of Crusade and Reconquest, and the iconography of the medieval, part of the so-called conscription of the past against Leftist ideologies and peninsular nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country, was accompanied during these years by the exploitation of the Moorish past to justify various foreign policy motives: Aidi, "The Interference of al-Andalus," p. 73; Michael Richards, "Doctrine and Politics in Nationalist Spain," in *Teaching Representations of the Spanish Civil War*, ed. Noel Valis (New York: Modern Language Association, 2007); I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Richards for generously allowing me to read his chapter in advance of publication. The conservative invocation of the medieval did not end with the dictatorship—see e.g., César Vidal, *España frente al Islam* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2004).
54. Former House speaker Newt Gingrich tapped into this deep cultural vein in April 2007: "The American people believe English should be the official language of the government. [. . .] We should replace bilingual education with immersion in English so people learn the common language of the country and they learn the language of prosperity, not the language of living in a ghetto" (Kasie Hunt, "Gingrich: Bilingual Classes Teach 'Ghetto' Language" [Associated Press], *The Washington Post*, April 1, 2007, p. A5).
55. Note Geoffrey Barraclough's (*History and the Common Man,* p. 10) denunciation, in 1966, of "a dogmatic obsession on the particular and individualistic aspects of history rather than on trying to discover such common features (such patterns, if you like) as can be discerned in past events."
56. He had clearly been reading Tariq Ali's *Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree* (London: Verso, 1993).
57. Juan Goytisolo, *Landscapes of War: From Sarajevo to Chechnya* (San Francisco, CA: City Lights, 2000), pp. 41–47.

58. On analogies in political discourse, see the brief discussion in Zerubavel, *Time Maps*, pp. 48–52.
59. Hugh Thomas, *Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire from Columbus to Magellan* (New York: Random House, 2003).
60. Christopher Tyerman, *Fighting for Christendom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 208.
61. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 71.
62. Peter Euben, "The Uses of Classical History for Contemporary Themes," Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society 6.3 (2005): 15–19. One other participant in the forum "The Uses of Classical History for Contemporary Themes," Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society 6.3 (2005): 15–36, Richard Ned Lebow ("Ethics and Foreign Policy," Historically Speaking 6.3 (2005): 20–23), argues that the United States, such as ancient Athens, has experienced a shift in values away from community and toward the individual pursuit of wealth, accompanied by the increasing reliance on force. Hypocritical discourse is generalized in political life, in both cases; "the loftiest and most compelling statements about justice and its practical benefits are made by the worst transgressors."
63. Euben, "Uses of Classical History."
64. The brutality of the French Wars of Religion, and the constructive solutions offered by the pragmatic *politiques*, may offer "a historical lesson of immediate importance for the current chaos in the Middle East," Brockey (History News Network, March 3, 2007: http://hnn.us/articles/35579.html) suggests: "namely in the political and legal compromises that eventually brought peace between warring Christian factions.... Will the sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'ites last as long? Or will the lesson of moderation that came from the Reformation only be learned after these wars of religion end?"
65. Trevor-Roper, *History: Professional and Lay*, p. 5. The statement echoes Nietzche's denunciation of the capacity of antiquarian history to degenerate into "the repulsive spectacle of a blind rage for collecting, a restless raking together of everything that has ever existed" ("Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 75).
66. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "A Case of Co-existence: Christendom and the Turks," in *Men and Events: Historical Essays* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 175, 178 (173–178).
67. "In his role as arbiter of high cultural standards, Petrarch—who, alone in his own room in the dead of night is very much the lover of vulgarity and scatteredness—and the tradition that follows him all the way into our classrooms is horrified by all the same things that horrify others today: the reveling in pluralities; the refusals to cultivate the great tradition; the writing of literature in the crass dialects instead of the great literary language;...and ethnic and religious variety that would be unequaled in Europe thereafter; the secret and unholy alliances with the heterodox cults, and so forth." María Rosa Menocal,

Shards of Love: Exile and the Origins of the Lyric (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), p. 37.

68. Many of the suggestions in the following paragraph were the fruit of an informal dialogue with James D'Emilio, Barry Mark, and Mary Elizabeth Perry, that preceded the "medieval" roundtable at the annual meeting of SSPHS in 2004. I thank them warmly for their thoughtful contributions and intellectual energy.
69. Richard Fletcher, *The Cross and the Crescent: Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation* (New York: Viking, 2004), p. 160.
70. Cf. Simon Doubleday, "*O que foi passar a serra*: Frontier-crossing and the thirteenth-century Castilian nobility in the *cantigas de escarnio e de maldizer,*" *Le médiéviste et la monographie familiale: sources, méthodes et problematiques*, ed. Martin Aurell (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 189–200.
71. Adapted versions of Américo Castro's "multicultural" vision of Spanish identity—serving ideological purposes simultaneously shaped by exile, migration, and the rejection of Marxist perspectives on social class—continues to have considerable purchase in left-of-center circles in Spain and in the "liberal" academic culture of the United States.
72. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, pp. 16–17.
73. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003).
74. Tyerman, *Fighting for Christendom*, pp. 197–199.
75. Zerubavel, *Time Maps*, p. 39.
76. The orientalization of Spain by foreign observers in the eighteenth to mid-twentieth centuries (involving Islamic and African referents for Spain's supposed essential *ser*) has now been replaced by Spain's role in the Western-northern orientalizing power bloc. (Richards, "Doctrine and Politics.")
77. Marcus Bull, *Thinking Medieval*, 120–127.
78. Aidi. "Interference of al-Andalus," pp. 76–77, discusses the resentment of Moroccan intellectuals at the failure of King Juan Carlos to offer an apology to the descendants of Moriscos that might parallel the apology granted to Sephardic Jews in 1492. He cites the historian Muhammad Azzuz Hakim: "We want moral reparations for the wounds we suffered. Mentally, we feel linked to the same customs and history."
79. The jihadist claim on al-Andalus appears, in fact, to have begun only in the late 1980s (Aidi, "Interference of al-Andalus," 84).
80. James Carroll, *Crusade: Chronicles of an Unjust War* (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2004), pp. 5, 25.
81. Zerubavel, *Time Maps*, p. 40. The Spanish example that follows this claim is purely speculative. It was a desire to construct continuity, Zerubavel suggests, that led Ferdinand III of Castile to decide, in 1236, not to destroy the "gorgeous" mosque in Córdoba; the very real continuity of Muslim culture would be illustrated within a generation by the *Mudéjar* revolts.

82. Antonio Feros, "Civil War Still Haunts Spanish Politics," *The New York Times*, March 20, 2004. Feros, however, is conventionally hostile to "the trend toward using history as a weapon in political debates."
83. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, in Doubleday, "The Relevance of Spanish History."
84. Joseba Gabilondo, in Doubleday, "The Relevance of Spanish History."
85. Richards, "Doctrine and Politics."
86. http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2003/07/24/espana/1445256.html.
87. Eelco Runia, "Spots of Time," *History and Theory* 45.3 (2006): 305–316.
88. Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, p. 260.
89. Marcus Bull, *Thinking Medieval. An Introduction to the Study of the Middle Ages* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 136. Cf. Mayr-Harting, "Relevance of Medieval History": "The more we understand the human experience of past and present societies and individuals, the more sensitive and 'compatible' our reactions to other human beings and other societies is likely to be."
90. Southgate, *What Is History For?* pp. 30–40.
91. Euben, "Uses of Classical History."
92. María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (New York: Little, Brown, 2002). Menocal shares with Américo Castro the double role of having set the agenda for contemporary discussions of "relevance" and being significantly misrepresented by most parties to the debate. The intended lesson of her book is not, however, as many have maintained, that al-Andalus be taken as a paradigm of multiculturalism: her tribute to a "culture of tolerance" is also "an account of the forces of intolerance that were always present and that ultimately triumphed" (p. 282). Just as Castro's *España en su historia: Cristianos, moros y judíos* (1948) articulates a more nuanced argument than most commentators have implied, avoiding the naïve belief in utopian coexistence and associating the fact of convivencia with an underlying neurosis in the Spanish "being" (*ser*), so Menocal's study is by no means an instance of idealism. Her book is primarily concerned with cultural hybridity and with a repetitive internal struggle (in both the Islamic and the Christian camps) against intolerance.
93. Beverley Southgate ("Postmodernism and Historical Inquiry: Spoilt for Choice?" *Historically Speaking* 6.3 [2005]: 9–11), for instance, reflects that "blurred edges might better suit our times than those Manichean-style distinctions—true or false, fact or fiction, good or evil, friend or foe, with us or against—which currently divide the world into dogma-touting partisans. It's their certainty—the fanatical conviction (on both sides) of their own rightness—to which history might properly provide some antidote."
94. Menocal, *Ornament of the World*, pp. 10–11.
95. Ariel Dorfman, "The Lost Speech," "Presidential Forum: The Role of Intellectuals in the Twenty-First Century," *Profession* (2006): 40–47.
96. Dorfman, "The Lost Speech," 42.

97. Dorfman, "The Lost Speech," 43.
98. Domna Stanton, "Introduction" to "Presidential Forum: The Role of Intellectuals in the Twenty-First Century," *Profession* (2006): 8–9 [7–12].
99. Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, p. 269.
100. Bull, *Thinking Medieval*, pp. 99–101.
101. Simon Doubleday, "English Hispanists and the Discourse of Empiricism," *The Journal of the Historical Society* 3.2 (2003): 205–220.
102. Aidi, "Interference of al-Andalus," 74–75.
103. Southgate, *What Is History For?* p. 74.
104. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 63. "Or is a race of eunuchs needed to watch over the great historical world-harem? Pure objectivity would certainly characterize such a race. For it almost seems that the task is to stand guard over history to see that nothing comes out of it except more history, and certainly no real events!": Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 84. Richard Hofstadter, in the 1950s, expressed concern that a commitment to the rediscovery of the complexity of social interests may lead to political immobility (see Evans, *Defense of History*, p. 127).
105. Nietzsche, "Uses and Disadvantages of History," p. 63; cf. Southgate, "A Pair of White Gloves," 49–61.

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CHAPTER 1

JUAN DE SEGOVIA AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Anne Marie Wolf

Juan Alfonso de Segovia (d. 1458), commonly known as Juan de Segovia, was a Spanish theologian who was one of Europe's leading intellectuals of his time. Though his is not a household name, he is known to medievalists whose research concerns either Christian-Muslim dialogue and encounter or the Council of Basel (1431–1449). Segovia was a student and then a professor at the university in Salamanca in the early fifteenth century before he left in late 1431 or early 1432 to travel to Rome on university business. From Rome, he headed directly to Basel, and he never returned to Castile. Unlike many of his colleagues, who fought at Basel to restrain the power of the papacy but transferred their loyalties to the pope after it became apparent that the reformers' aims were not going to prevail, he remained loyal to the council to the end. He spent the last few years of his life in a small Benedictine priory in Aiton, in the alpine duchy of Savoy.

The reason that Juan de Segovia has attracted the interest of those who study Christian intellectuals' interest in Islam is that this was a topic to which he devoted considerable thought and writing. One of his first works, a university address delivered in 1427, was an exploration of whether it was necessary for everyone to accept Christianity in order to be saved. He concluded that it was, and he urged his listeners to take more seriously their duty to make the Gospel believable to non-Christians. Although most of his address has little to do directly with Muslims, it does contain some reflections on their beliefs and status, enough to show that he was interested even then in this religion and the eternal well being of its adherents.[1]

A few years later, in 1431, he was actively seeking a well-informed Muslim who could engage in a discussion about this faith. The first attempt was in July, when he approached the future king of Granada, Yūsuf, who was in Córdoba at the time, to ask him to send a member of his guard to him so that Segovia could have a discussion with a learned Muslim about his beliefs. The prince responded that no Muslim dared to engage in such a discussion in Christian lands, prompting Segovia to offer to hold the meeting secretly in one of their respective lodgings or out in the countryside where no one could hear them. Over two decades later, Juan related this incident in a letter to Burgundian theologian Jean Germain (ca. 1400–1461). He remembered that the future king was startled by this counterproposal and admitted to him that his entourage included cantors, but no one qualified to discuss their religious laws.[2]

Segovia was more successful in his second attempt to have such a conversation, which occurred in October of the same year. While traveling to Medina del Campo with a family member, he made the acquaintance of a well-educated man who was there on business with the royal court. The man was from Granada, which was still under Muslim rule. Ostensibly, Segovia sought this meeting in order to inquire about the fate of some friends from Córdoba who had been taken captive in the palace compound in Granada. After assurances that his friends were well, Segovia shifted the conversation to ask about the ambassador's practices and beliefs. Juan reported that after their initial conversation, the man returned several times, and that the two discussed such topics as the belief that Christians ate their God and worshiped three Gods, and Juan struggled to explain the Incarnation and the Trinity. According to Segovia, the man exclaimed that he was the only Christian who knew how to explain these things. Once the man from Granada even brought along a Spanish legal scholar (*faqīh*) who happened to be at the Castilian court.[3]

Shortly after these conversations, Juan de Segovia left Castile for Rome, and from there he went to Basel, where he became one of the most dedicated and articulate conciliarists.[4] Although he was busy with the various issues before the Council of Basel, such as reunion with the Greeks and church governance, we know that his interest in Islam continued. He later wrote that he saw a translation of the Quran in Germany in 1437, and that he ordered a copy made but was later dismayed at the inaccuracies in that translation.[5] Also, one of the factors driving the efforts to reunite with the Greeks was the sense of the growing threat posed by the Ottoman Empire's expansion. Segovia must have heard the concern expressed by delegates from Eastern Europe and council members returning from embassies in the region. These worries must have claimed some of his attention as he continued to think about Islam during his years at Basel.[6]

In 1453, Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, fell to the Turks. When this news reached Juan de Segovia in the French Alps, he was so concerned that he dropped other writing projects and spent the rest of his life, five years, writing exclusively on how Christian Europe should respond. He was not the only intellectual to take up the pen in response to this event. Nancy Bisaha has shown how significant the fall of Constantinople was in the development of European thinking about Islam and other topics.[7] However, his approach to this question differed significantly from those offered by most, and perhaps all, of his era's intellectuals. As he wrote to Nicholas of Cusa, his colleague and friend from Basel, the "beginning, middle, and end" of his letter was that the "way of peace" be preferred to the way of war.[8] In lengthy treatises written as letters to Cusa, Jean Germain, and Cardinal Juan de Cervantes (archbishop of Seville, Spain), he elaborated an urgent plea that Europe not respond to this threat with a crusade. He also articulated these thoughts in much shorter letters to an unknown friend and to Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who would become Pope Pius II, just months after Segovia's letter to him.

Instead, he called for leaders to embrace peaceful dialogue in an effort to convert Muslims. He proposed that a high-level delegation be sent to Muslim leaders in order to "invite them to peace." Darío Rodríguez Cabanelas, whose 1952 *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico* was the first to explore the Castilian theologian's thought on such matters, discussed Juan's plans for this embassy as if there were definite steps to their mission.[9] This is not exactly accurate. Nowhere did Segovia present any step-by-step blueprint for how these overtures were to proceed, and his thoughts on the delegation must be pieced together from his several works from this period.[10] But it is clear that he believed that Christians could successfully convert Muslims through these discussions, and that once converted, the new Christians would stop attacking Europe. Segovia was convinced that they only waged wars against Europe because "their law" or "their book," the Quran, urged them to. If they only knew that this book was not credible, was not revelation from God, the aggressions would cease.[11] But Juan argued intensely that Christians should avoid a crusade at all costs, for a variety of reasons. He even pondered the psychology of this dynamic, asking how Muslims could possibly come to love and welcome Christ if Christians had been killing them in his name.[12]

One of Segovia's most pioneering works, unfortunately now missing, was a trilingual edition (Arabic, Latin, Castilian) of the Quran. He was dissatisfied with existing translations, and he persuaded a leading Islamic scholar, Iça Gidelli (sometimes rendered as Gebir, from sixteenth-century Spanish records), to travel from Castile to his alpine monastery to help

him understand the Arabic. Gidelli spent four months in the Alps, where Segovia reported he worked twelve hours a day, except for the birthday of the Prophet. He drank no wine. After learning that a puree of peas he had eaten contained some, he limited himself to a diet of bread the next evening as a penance.[13] Gidelli translated the Arabic into Castilian, and Segovia later added a Latin version. Although this work is now lost, Segovia's prologue to it survives and provides a fascinating glimpse into this Western scholar's encounter with Arabic and with the Quran. He was clearly curious and interested in Arabic grammar and syntax and in how Muslims read their sacred book.[14]

When I tell people that I work on Juan de Segovia and his views about Muslims, they often comment that he was a thinker "ahead of his time," as if the impulse to seek peace was something only the modern world could inspire, if indeed it can. Perhaps especially in this post–September 11 era, people think wistfully about the prospect of peace with the Muslim world, and they resonate with this medieval thinker who longed for this as well. More than one grant application I have submitted has probably benefited from the belief that my work has "relevance." Cabanelas, a Franciscan priest, celebrated Juan de Segovia as an ardent pacifist and a lone defender of dialogue in the midst of chorus of voices calling for crusade.[15] He too wrote that Segovia was a thinker ahead of his time, who therefore has not lost his relevance for modern times.[16] Friends treated to a description of my dissertation research sometimes remarked that it was a shame that Segovia's approach to the Muslim world was not adopted and implemented by those in power.

As a medieval historian in a society that seems to value the humanities less and less, I am always delighted when others consider my work to have such value. But I confess to some discomfort about the precise nature of that all-important relevance that people seem to think Juan de Segovia has for our times. In Juan's case, the interest in him often seems to be a by-product of the modern fascination with Spain as a land of three cultures and the dream of a peaceful medieval *convivencia*, or at least of a hybrid culture, met with approval by modern sensibilities. Unlike most Western Europeans writing about Islam, after all, Juan de Segovia had met real Muslims, and this might explain his less bellicose inclinations toward them. According to this perspective, Segovia is a sort of poster child for the benefits of intercultural contact. I suspect that the lesson some want to draw from his work is that routine interaction between people from different cultures yields understanding and empathy, and that medieval Spain provided ideal conditions for this interaction to occur. Or, more specifically, that if only Muslims and westerners could get to know each other better, hostilities would dissipate.

I argue here that Segovia's case does not support such simple conclusions, but that there are, nevertheless, other, more complex lessons that emerge from a consideration of his life and ideas. Four are presented below. These lessons are not directly about relations between Christians and Muslims, but rather observations about the intellectual inclinations we bring to questions of religious and cultural differences. They offer reminders and cautions rather than prescriptions or promises. The first is a caution to about how much power we ought to ascribe either to a discourse or to life experience in forming someone's view of the world. The second is a reminder about the richness that is lost when those challenging the status quo are silenced or stifled, whether by ecclesiastical authorities or by trends in scholarship. The third is a challenge to those who use biblical language to legitimize violence. The fourth lesson from Segovia's case is that relations between people of different cultures are bound to be complex, and we should not expect them to be unproblematic. People living in the Middle Ages knew this.

One reason that Juan de Segovia should not be seen as a model for interreligious understanding, despite his advocacy of dialogue, is that he repeated so much of the Western tradition's stock condemnations of Islam. For example, he repeatedly remarked to his readers that Islam was a religion that encouraged sexual license, one of the most common charges made by medieval Christian polemicists.[17] Traditionally, this denunciation took two forms. One was a commentary about Muhammad's sex life, with his multiple wives, which served to prove to medieval readers that he was not a real Prophet of God. The other was an indignation at the Quran's promise of sexual rewards in paradise for the faithful. Segovia repeated such stock themes of the Western tradition when he warned his audience in a 1427 address that Islam "loosens the brakes on carnal concupiscence to many vices and after death places its happiness in carnal and fetid delights."[18] He was convinced that this promise of everlasting sexual gratification was a significant factor in the spread of this religion. To Nicholas of Cusa, he wrote in December 1454 that if this promise were put before the uneducated Arabic public, and presented eloquently, they would naturally desire this goal for themselves.[19]

Sexual excesses were paired with inordinate violence as a two-part explanation Segovia gave for the rapid spread of Islamic rule over such a large territory. He explained to Cusa that the Saracens had been able to reoccupy lands that Christians had gained because their law encouraged them to fight and because many women had been sent to them so their numbers would increase.[20] He even named violence and seduction (*violencia et seductione*) as the two means by which Islam grew in strength and number.[21]

As for the Quran, which so intrigued him during his work with Içа Gidelli, he called it a "most cursed law" (*maledictissima lex*)[22] and a "most damned law lacking all reason" (*illius dampnatissime legis omni profecto carentis racione*).[23] He told Cusa, "It seems from the law that Beelzebub, prince of demons, father of lies, was the giver of the law itself."[24] He was not the first to draw such a conclusion, of course. Pedro Pascual (d. 1300) and Roger Bacon (d. ca. 1294) were among those who described the Prophet as possessed by a demon. In a long treatise intended for Juan de Cervantes, then archbishop of Seville, Segovia related that the Saracens worshipped the "prince of this world," a term used by Jesus to refer to the devil, whose Prophet was Muhammad.[25]

Because of these ringing denunciations of Islam, the Quran, and Muhammad, Segovia is difficult to cast in the role of an apostle of tolerance or mutual understanding. The solutions he offered for the problems that an Islamic empire posed for Christianity might have been less militaristic than others' proposals, but if he were to share the kinds of views described here with any Muslim interlocutors, we can only suppose they would have been deeply offended. If a modern public figure involved in interfaith dialogue were to voice the opinion that the Quran was a cursed law and Muhammad was the prophet of the devil, the ensuing fury would surpass even the outrage over Benedict XVI's speech at Regensburg in September 2006.[26]

Nevertheless, the fact that one who harbored such views could also argue for dialogue and against war, and even carry on conversations with Muslim that Muslims themselves sought to prolong rather than escape, suggests one lesson that his story offers for the modern observer. That is, it is possible to be the heir to a long tradition of invective against another people and yet not internalize it so completely that it determines the limits of possible relationships with those people. By Juan de Segovia's lifetime, Western Europe had produced an extensive body of writings on Muslim beliefs and practices, admirably studied in such works as John V. Tolan's *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (2002) and before that by Norman Daniel in his *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (1960). Tolan describes this history of Christian writing about Muslim enemies as a series of examples of how a group deemed to be "other" can be "pinned down through discourse, made explicable, rendered inert, made useful (or at least harmless) to one's own ideological agenda."[27] Juan de Segovia certainly knew of earlier work in this tradition, and he could have concluded that he "knew" everything about that other faith, for he could get all the necessary answers about it from works by well-respected Western writers. Certainly many of his contemporaries did. And yet the weight of that tradition was not enough, in his case, to

render Islam explicable or inert. He remained curious, and not convinced that he had the full story. And despite the fact that he harbored these derogatory views toward Islam, he was apparently able to restrain himself from expressing these views when he was speaking with Muslims. Otherwise, the ambassador in Medina del Campo presumably would not have returned for more talks, and Gidelli would not have corresponded with Segovia after leaving the Alps.

At the same time, the study of Juan de Segovia's works on Islam also cautions against an overly optimistic view of how far frequent interaction with "others" can go in nurturing understanding or positive regard. This is an issue at the heart of much of the recent scholarship on medieval Spain. As Alex Novikoff wrote in a recent article surveying the historiography on medieval Spain, specifically that surrounding the relations among the three religious groups, there has been a welcome surge in the study of medieval Spain. Much of this work has focused on explaining or defining either the tolerance or the intolerance during these centuries in which members of the three monotheistic religions lived side by side.[28] He noted that these terms, tolerance and intolerance, are much invoked but rarely defined, and that scholars who focus on the literary and artistic evidence often arrive at a rosier picture of relations among the various groups than those who study legal and archival evidence.[29] The challenge then becomes how to reconcile these studies that are based on different sets of evidence, even when accounting for the usual discrepancies among regions and time periods. Juan de Segovia denies both camps of scholars—those portraying relationships between Christians and Muslims as mostly peaceful or as fraught with conflict—ready evidence for their arguments and suggests that the more nuanced portrayals in recent approaches have merit.

One of the most constructive and sophisticated approaches is that pioneered by Thomas Glick in his *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (1979), which examined demographic, social, and agricultural practices in both the Christian north and the Muslim south from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries. Since then, Glick and others have continued to study the process of social change and interaction in medieval Iberia using sociological models. According to this body of scholarship, there is nothing contradictory about one group (Christians in Glick's work) freely adopting another group's technology, diet, literature, language, and urban structures while still harboring great hostility for the other culture. According to Glick, it is a fallacy to "assume that the lessening of cultural distance must perforce result in the diminution of social distance."[30] More recently, Brian Catlos has presented a theoretical model for explaining the varying degrees of distance between members

of disparate communities. He offers a "hierarchy of social formality," in which some activities, such as agriculture and technology, were invested with little religious or ideological importance, so interchange occurred easily in these areas. By contrast, a higher formality attended such exchanges as marriage or religious discussions, so groups would endeavor vigorously to protect social boundaries in these areas.[31]

Juan de Segovia's case appears to corroborate this line of research. Even before his heady conversations with Muslims in 1431, he lived in Castile and surely saw and interacted with real Muslims, unlike most Europeans, in the markets and plazas. This contact contributed to his more open attitude toward them, but it was not sufficient to dethrone some mighty ideas he had gathered from the long Christian polemical tradition. Perhaps the model offered by Catlos is helpful here. Despite the cultural exchanges that Christians and Muslims shared, there might have been certain things one did not normally talk about with members of the other group. The response of the future king of Granada, at least as Segovia later recalled it, seems to bear this out. He said that Muslims dared not have such conversations in Christian lands. Maybe Christians and Muslims in Castile freely discussed the price of eggs, the weather, taxes, where to get high-quality tools, and the health of their children and their farm animals, but not religion. This would explain why Segovia owed so many of his beliefs about Islam to the Christian polemical tradition and yet interacted easily with Muslims. The fact that the hostile Christian tradition was able to make in-roads into the thinking of one who not only lived in a land with a Muslim population, but was actively seeking to engage them in conversation, is a testament to the limits of daily interaction in overcoming a powerful received discourse.

This means that in the tension between those who attribute great power to a received tradition of thought in shaping someone's views and those who downplay that in favor of lived experience, Juan's case suggests a tie. In this case, at least, the discourse certainly exercised a power to construct Juan's mental world, but life experience could curtail its power. Concrete experience could cause him to question the received tradition of thought, but could not topple it.

A second lesson from Segovia's case concerns not intergroup relations, but the circulation of unconventional ideas in any group. The fate of Juan de Segovia's work and ideas serves as a warning to the modern world about how much is lost when the discordant voices are silenced or forced to the margins. Even without embracing Juan de Segovia as an apostle of tolerance and a darling of current multicultural sensibilities, it is difficult to deny that he was a powerful and interesting thinker, and not only on matters related to Islam. No era, it seems, has a surplus of rigorous and

innovative thinkers, so we can hardly afford to ignore the contributions of those who emerge. Segovia's contributions were ignored or stifled for a variety of reasons, from his conciliarist positions at Basel, which were unpopular with contemporary and later ecclesiastical authorities, and the appropriation of his personal library by a pope, to the ideological inclinations of traditional scholarship on Spain and on the conciliar era.

Juan de Segovia's relegation to the sidelines of ecclesiastical circles began during his lifetime but continued well after it. The Castilian theologian was the only cardinal appointed by Felix V, the pope elected at Basel, not to be confirmed in this office by Nicholas V after the council adjourned. Instead, Nicholas appointed him as head of the church in Caesarea, in Palestine. This was a titular office only, since Caesarea was not in Christian hands at the time.[32] It is probably not coincidence that Juan was also one of the most vocal advocates of church reform until the very end. A few years later, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, a humanist scholar who had admired Segovia when both were at Basel and who later became Pope Pius II (1458–64), wrote derisively of his former colleague's new circumstances: "Placed by Pope Nicholas at the head of the church of Caesarea, he secluded himself in the midst of some exceedingly high mountains, content in his little monastery." Piccolomini knew of Segovia's efforts to secure a better translation of the Quran. He wrote that the Spaniard had received some experts in Islamic law at the monastery and had translated into "our language" the book they call the Quran, in which are contained "not so much the mysteries as the delusions of the pseudo-prophet Muhammad." He closed his discussion of Segovia by saying that he had "unraveled its stupidities with reasons and arguments as well founded as they were realistic."[33] This criticism is particularly striking because the author had written so glowingly about Juan de Segovia's character, eloquence, and wisdom before his own "conversion" to the papal side of the dispute over church governance.[34] His newfound disdain for his former colleague seems related to Piccolomini's disillusionment with the church reform efforts and the gulf that widened between him and his former colleagues after he repented of his conciliar activities and swore loyalty to the pope.[35] It is also noteworthy that Piccolomini, after he became Pope Pius II, worked hard to rally Europe for a crusade against the Turks.[36]

Hence Nicholas V was not the only pope to take steps that would limit the diffusion of any ideas that Segovia hoped to advance. As Pius II, Piccolomini had a hand in this endeavor as well, and this occurred in a curious turn of events related to the disposition of Juan de Segovia's personal library after his death. Shortly before he died, Segovia donated almost all the volumes in his impressive collection, more than 100, to

the University of Salamanca, where he had studied and taught. His alma mater's library was meager at the time, and this would have been a significant gift. In his donation, he recalled his frustration in obtaining access to books as a student, and he specified that the works he was donating must be made accessible to interested readers.

However, in a 1459 bull, Pius II claimed for himself an unspecified number of the books that Segovia had listed in his donation, and he enjoined perpetual silence regarding his preemptory seizure on the University of Salamanca and the other destinations for the books.[37] Another document, contained in Rome's Archivio di Stato, reports that a relative of Juan de Segovia received fourteen florins of gold from the papal coffers to reimburse him for expenses incurred in his travels to Geneva (not far from Aiton) to retrieve some books at the pope's request and bring them to Rome.[38] The papal gag order might have had its desired effect; most of the library seems to have disappeared early on.[39] The pope's seizure was not necessarily a deliberate attempt to stop the spread of conciliar ideas or of works promoting a softer approach to the Muslim world. The Council of Basel had given rise to an active market for books, and in the 1440s Piccolomini was among those eagerly seeking out books available for purchase.[40] He could have seen Segovia's library as a prime acquisition opportunity. Still, the fact that so many books simply disappeared invites suspicion and partly explains why an intellectual of his stature was not more widely known and acclaimed in the centuries following his death, particularly at Salamanca.

Juan de Segovia's participation in the Council of Basel ensured that even centuries after his death, there was some anxiety around promulgating his works. Certainly it created a delicate situation for the Jesuit Juan de Pineda (d. 1636). In the early seventeenth century, a treatise by Segovia was discovered in the library of the cathedral of Seville. The archbishop wrote to the king urging its publication, arguing that the treatise, a defense of the belief in the immaculate conception of Mary, would advance the renown of the church in Seville and Spain. It fell to Pineda to write the preface for this volume, and he labored valiantly to explain why Segovia was virtuous and credible in spite of his participation in a council and a papal election then considered illegitimate. He explained that Juan's zeal and ardor had led him to adhere to Basel, but that everyone errs, and even very serious and learned men had participated in illegitimate councils. He studied Piccolomini's writings and saw that Piccolomini had written to Segovia about the coronation festivities for Felix V, the pope elected by the council, which had by then been declared illegal by the pope in Rome, and he argued that Segovia must not have been present for events. Thus he must have had misgivings about them.[41] Turning to

Nicholas V's decision not to confirm Segovia as a cardinal, Pineda suggested the pope was bowing to Juan's natural modesty, which had been the reason Segovia had retired to a remote monastery in the mountains. The Jesuit also reasoned that it was probably fitting that Juan was not a cardinal, since others needed his counsel and prayer.[42]

In the modern world, as well, Segovia's ecclesiastical career has likely contributed to his absence from most lists of major late medieval thinkers. This may come as a surprise to some, who have described the bibliography on him as lengthy,[43] but compared to peers like Nicholas of Cusa or Piccolomini, scholars have just begun to explore his work. Only a handful of his dozens of writings have been published. I suspect that the general development of the historiography on the Reformation and the conciliar era has played a role in limiting the attention that Juan de Segovia has received. The conciliar movement has long been considered a precursor to the Reformation, with all the attendant denominational battle lines that implies. James Tracy has noted that, until recently, one could only find courses on the Reformation in Protestant seminaries and colleges. Students learned there that a courageous Martin Luther "freed ordinary believers from the domination of a corrupt and greedy clergy" and "centuries of superstition, imposed on a gullible people by the Catholic Church." In Catholic colleges and universities, on the other hand, scholars nursed a nostalgia for the high Middle Ages, "when universities flourished and virtuous rulers and urban guilds worked to lay the foundations of a just social order." According to this view, Martin Luther unleashed destructive impulses that harmed church and society.[44]

In this confessionally charged academic environment, Protestant scholars, heralding those who sowed the seeds of the freedom from Catholic tyranny and superstition, could hardly devote their energies to studying leading conciliarists from traditionally Catholic countries. Catholic scholars were unlikely to study thinkers who were leaders in a wayward and destructive movement that "attacked" the supremacy of the pope. This was probably especially true for Spanish scholars working during the decades of Francisco Franco's rule. A telling example is Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, a Dominican priest whose research in the sixties and seventies significantly advanced our knowledge about the University of Salamanca and its personnel in its early centuries. Beltrán de Heredia confessed that he was no admirer of Juan de Segovia "due to his disloyal behavior toward [Pope] Eugene IV, from whom he had received so many favors, and toward the University of Salamanca, which he represented in the council." He continued: "But the integrity of history demands that his errors are communicated in this account, having been sustained during a half century of contact with the university. The dishonor and

offense that his bad behavior meant for the university was compensated fully by the brilliant and loyal defense of Eugene IV that was made by another son of our academy, Alfonso García de Santa María, as we shall see."[45] In such an environment, few would want to claim Juan de Segovia as their own.

For many years, moreover, Spain simply did not interest historians as much as other European countries did. In the English-speaking world, this could have been the result of a long tradition of anti-Spain historiography in which Spain was characterized as the antithesis of modernity and enlightened values, especially the values that the United States supposedly embodied. Richard Kagan, a historian of early modern Spain, has shown that one strong strain within this anti-Spanish historiographical tradition was that Spain was hampered by Catholicism, a backward and intolerant religion which hindered the nation's "opportunity to join the modern world."[46] If this was long the dominant perspective of historians writing on early modern Spain, and Kagan's argument is compelling, it is no wonder that a fifteenth-century Castilian theologian associated with movements and ideas developed in later ages would not be welcome in their narratives. Segovia would not have helped anyone to show that Spain was a backward and intellectually stagnant place.

It is tempting to think that the modern world is no longer afflicted by the kinds of forces I have described here, and that today a thinker of Segovia's stature and rigor would receive respectful attention. Indeed, thankfully, current scholarship is not afflicted by such a negative view toward Spain, and today scholars on the conciliar era and the Reformation are less likely to see their work as defending one church tradition or another. In addition, interest in Juan de Segovia's work has been increasing. Nevertheless, as the saying goes, fish do not know they are wet, and it is likely that our age has generated its own orthodoxies, unseen and unacknowledged by us, that silence certain thinkers and stifle certain lines of inquiry. The orthodoxies that are visible to us are disturbing enough. In our times, those who have dared to question foreign policy, for example, have been subjected to questions about how much they love their country. Those who call for further study on the roots and causes of terrorism have been accused of offering excuses for "evil," as if seeking to understand these phenomena is a shameful endeavor.

Certainly in modern times, arguably no less than in Segovia's day, Catholic officials have sought to stifle some conversations in the church. During the twenty-six year reign of Pope John Paul II, it is estimated that more than a 100 Catholic theologians were either silenced or reprimanded, many of them at the hands of the cardinal who would later become John Paul II's successor, Benedict XVI.[47] In 1999, the Catholic

bishops of the United States bowed to Vatican pressure to adopt guidelines for the implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, a document promulgated by John Paul II in 1990, guidelines which gave the bishops greater authority over Catholic universities in their dioceses and required that Catholic theologians obtain a "mandate" to teach from local bishops.[48] Juan de Segovia was a person of deep faith and rigorous theological training. He thought creatively and "outside of the box" on a number of issues. He had much to offer any discussion he entered. One wonders if he would have found ready welcome in Catholic university circles today, especially given his passionate and public calls for restraints on papal authority, or if he would have found himself instead silenced, reprimanded, or simply not hired. His case, along with the grave reservations that church leaders had about the circulation of his ideas, sounds a note of caution about how much can be lost when dissident voices are suppressed.

A third lesson from Juan de Segovia's experience concerns the nature of religious language and how it is used by religious groups. In our times, those most comfortable wielding biblical references in the public arena are often those associated with military aggression. In the 1990s, for example, Israel's Likud Party prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, actively courted the support of Jerry Falwell and the evangelical pastors Falwell could influence, as a way of consolidating American support for his party's hard-line military policies against Palestinians. He was not the first Likud leader to do so. The party came to power just weeks after a speech by President Jimmy Carter in March of 1977, in which the new president announced that he supported human rights for Palestinians, including the "right to a homeland." Likud mobilized a campaign to drive fundamentalist and evangelical Christians out of Carter's political base. The campaign included full-page ads in major American newspapers urging Christians to "affirm their belief in biblical prophecy and Israel's divine right to the land."[49] Nor has this recourse to a cosmic drama linked to the end times been limited to fundamentalists' support for Israel. In 2003, Lieutenant General William Boykin, deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, spoke to Christian groups around the country, often in uniform, and told them that Muslim extremists hate America "because we're a Christian nation and the enemy is a guy named Satan." In September 2006, President Bush called the "war on terror" a "confrontation between good and evil."[50]

Juan de Segovia provides a foil to this line of thinking because he based his rejection of war so firmly on biblical texts.[51] He was a churchman through and through, having spent the better part of his adult life teaching theology, including courses on the Bible, and working on church reform. Faced with the recent Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and

responding to Jean Germain's call for a military campaign, Segovia noted that, in the Bible, God had freed plenty of faithful from various predicaments, but it was never by the sword.[52] When Germain protested that the danger from the Turks was real, Segovia reminded him that Christ had indicated on the cross how Christians should respond to threats just as real: "With a loud cry and tears, he begged the Father to forgive them, since they did not know what they were doing."[53] Christ said that he had come to testify to the truth (*ut veritati testimonium perhiberet*),[54] a mission that seemed to Segovia to support his suggestion that Christians in his day take a similar approach with the Muslims. In a letter to Nicholas of Cusa, Segovia recalled Christ's mandate to the apostles: "Go, teach all nations. Lo, I am with you every day until the end of time." He stressed that this was an eternal command (*eternum mandatum*).[55] By far, his main inspiration for seeking a "way of peace" with the ascendant Ottoman Empire was scriptural, rooted in the example of Christ and the apostles.

Obviously, those who would reach for their Bibles to seek divine blessing for their military plans would find no ally in this medieval thinker. The question "What would Jesus do?," popularized in evangelical circles in recent years, seems answered in these medieval texts in a way that would not support a faith-based war, even one to regain recently taken territory. In fact, Juan de Segovia seemed to have in mind a Christianity that perhaps not many could embrace. At a public forum at the University of Minnesota following 9/11, a man in the audience rose in the question period and admitted that all of this confused him. He said he considered himself a Christian, and he thought he was supposed to love and forgive those who harmed him, but he could not bring himself to love Osama bin Laden. I am reminded of a startling sign held by a woman protesting the current war in Iraq in the downtown square in Portland, Oregon: "Who would Jesus bomb?" Segovia's words are equally arresting, and I suspect he would have appreciated this sign. So one lesson our generation could take from his arguments is that the use of religious language need not lead to the hardening of the confessional identity lines nor to heightened confrontation. There is no reason why the bellicose should dominate the use of Christian imagery and references and consider it theirs.

Juan de Segovia was especially wary of those who read the Bible in search of prophecies. This is even more significant than it might first seem, since he did have a keen interest in the book of Revelation, and especially in the story of the war in heaven described in Revelation 12. Yet this did not lead him to speculate about who the various parties in this war might represent, or to read contemporary events as if they must be what Revelation was referring to. Instead, he treated such texts as establishing an important historical precedent meant to guide human

behavior for all time. He thought of the conflicts over church leadership in his day as yet another example of an archetypal drama that would unfold repeatedly throughout history. The lesson for believers was that they should rouse themselves and resist any who challenge the authority of Christ.[56] Segovia had no patience for those who endeavored to discern when the end of the world would be, or how it would come about, from scripture. He called these attempts a "simple labor of human invention."[57] His arguments simply could not accommodate a belief that any given conflict was a specific battle between good and evil predicted in the Bible. The suggestion that Christians should involve themselves in driving people off their land to establish a Jewish state because of biblical prophecy would have been unfathomable to him. Most likely, he would urge those who espouse such ideas to look to the example of Christ and follow it.

A final reminder that Juan de Segovia's case offers the modern world, perhaps a "lesson," is that encounters between people of different faith traditions or different cultures are normally not smooth and unproblematic, and we are naive if we expect them to be. Christian Europeans (and Americans) might be inclined to see Juan de Segovia as a hopeful example of the possibility for cordial, respectful relations with Muslims. Even though, as I have pointed out, he embraced many of the disparaging images given to him by the legacy of European thought, at least he was interested in learning, and at least could see things from the Muslims' point of view enough to realize that war against them in the name of Christ would not dispose them to accept Christianity. All to the good. However, his goal was, in fact, to convert Muslims, not merely to understand them. His story could stand as a caution to Muslims, especially in our postcolonial era, not to trust Europeans. He could serve nicely as an example of someone who presented himself as benevolent, but whose hidden motive was to induce Muslims to convert to Christianity. In a way, he was a threat to Islam. A possible lesson for Muslims, then: Beware of Christian leaders who seem friendly and open to dialogue.

Medieval people knew the dangers of living alongside people of other faiths. In a conference presentation in May of 2005, Olivia Remie Constable noted that people today consider medieval Spain's *convivencia*, or "living-togetherness," a positive thing that produced a golden age of harmony and understanding, along with a flourishing cultural exchange. But people living in those times consistently recorded their anxiety about it. They expressed apprehension about young Christians knowing more Arabic poetry than Christian classics, intermarriage, Jews in positions of power, intergroup sexual relations, conversion or persuading others to convert, and Muslims adopting Christian ways. These anxieties emerged

during both Christian and Muslim rule, from both the majority and the minority populations, and across the whole medieval period. The story of a harmonious al-Andalus, or even Christian kingdoms where relations among the three religions were fairly congenial, appeals to modern American sensibilities but distorts the complexities of the historical record. Worse, the perpetuation of these myths undermines our ability to address modern world problems because the nostalgia for a lost paradise and the painful memory of its loss function as a lens through which modern situations are viewed, making it more difficult to bring a clear and open mind to new circumstances.[58]

This discussion may disappoint those who would like to find in Juan de Segovia either a promising sign or another chapter in the story of European intolerance. But it is appropriate that his story leaves us instead with cautions, reminders, and calls to pay attention to our practices and assumptions. Historians are right to be reticent about mining the past for lessons because so often it leads to distortion of the past and avoidance of truthful confrontation with the present. Still, the present is prone to distortions of its own, and the past can provide salutary perspective that might help us avoid the worst of them. Another reason it is fitting that Juan de Segovia's story offers no easy answers is that he was, after all, a remarkably versatile and complex thinker. It would be out of character.

Notes

1. Juan de Segovia, *Repetitio de fide catholica*, Córdoba, Biblioteca de la Catedral, MS 128, fols. 181v–193r. See the discussion in my "Juan de Segovia and Western Perspectives on Islam in the Fifteenth Century" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 2003), pp. 114–125.
2. Juan de Segovia, Letter to Jean Germain, December 18, 1455, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 2923, fols. 64r–64v. This incident is discussed in Darío Rodríguez Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico* (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1952), pp. 100–102.
3. Juan de Segovia, *De gladio mittendo divini Spiritus in corda Sarracenorum* (1454), Seville, Biblioteca Colombina, MS 7-6-14, fols. 19r–20v. See the discussion and Latin text in my "Juan de Segovia and Western Perspectives on Islam," pp. 130–134 and Appendix 2.
4. Antony Black, *Council and Commune: The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth-Century Heritage* (London and Shepherdstown, VA: Burns & Oates, Patmos Press, 1979), p. 2.
5. Juan de Segovia, Prologue to trilingual edition of the Quran, Vatican City, Biblioteca Vaticana, MS lat. 2923, fol. 188v, in Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, p. 286.

6. One such report came from John of Ragusa, who wrote from Constantinople in November 1436 of the "horrors" committed by the Ottomans against the Hungarians the previous year and of the general anxiety concerning the Ottomans' power among the Greeks. This document is in Spain's Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado, Francia, K-1711, fols. 96v–99r. It is summarized in Vicente Ángel Álvarez Palenzuela, *La situación europea en época del concilio de Basilea: Informe de la delegación del reino de Castilla* (León: Centro de Estudios e Investigación "San Isidoro," Archivo Histórico Diocesano, 1992), pp. 334–335. Another report conveying the Greeks' concern over Ottoman advances came a few months later from another ambassador of the Council in Constantinople, dated February 13, 1437. This is AGS, Estado, Francia, Legajo K-1711, fols. 124v.–125r, in Álvarez Palenzuela, *La situación europea*, pp. 342–343.
7. Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 60–62.
8. Juan de Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 182v: "Et cum finem accepisset, opusculum meum, cuius initium, medium, finisque est ut pacis magis quam belli via intendatur ad conversionem sarracenorum."
9. Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, p. 118.
10. See the discussion in my "Western Perspectives," pp. 226–230.
11. Juan de Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 180r.
12. Juan de Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 174v.
13. Juan de Segovia, Letter to an unknown friend, April 18, 1458, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 2923, fol. 198r. In Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, p. 340.
14. This Prologue is published in Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, pp. 279–302. See the discussion of this translation endeavor in Thomas Burman, *Reading the Qur'an in Latin Christendom* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). Leyla Rouhi has considered the encounter from a different angle in her "A Fifteenth-Century Salamancan's Pursuit of Islamic Studies," in *Under the Influence: Questioning the Comparative in Medieval Castile*, ed. Cynthia Robinson and Leyla Rouhi (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 21–42.
15. Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, especially the Introduction and Chapter 3.
16. Cabanelas, *Juan de Segovia y el problema islámico*, p. 262.
17. See, for example, the discussions in John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval Christian Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 61–62, 152, 166, 237, 240, and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, rev. edn. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1993), esp. Chapter 5.

18. Segovia, *Repetitio de fide catholica* (1427), Córdoba, Biblioteca de la Catedral, MS 128, fol. 190r.
19. Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 176v.
20. Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 173r.
21. Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 177v.
22. Juan de Segovia, *Liber de magna auctoritate episcoporum in concilio generali* 4.2.4, ed. Rolf de Kegel (Frieburg, Switzerland: Unversitätsverlag, 1995), p. 223.
23. Segovia, *Liber de magna auctoritate*, p. 224.
24. Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 170v.
25. Segovia, *De gladio*, Seville, Colombina, MS 7-6-14, fol. 4v.
26. For the text of this speech, see Benedict XVI, "Regensburg: University Address September 12," *L'Osservatore Romano*, September 20, 2006: 6–7, 11. For examples of media coverage of the ensuing controversy, see "Lesson for the Future: Fury over Pope's Speech Reveals How Much Christians Have to Learn about Islam," *Toronto Sun*, September 24, 2006, final edn.; "Pope, in New Step to End Crisis, Pays Respect to Islam," *Los Angeles Times*, September 21, 2006, home edn.
27. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. xxiii.
28. Alex Novikoff, "Between Tolerance and Intolerance in Medieval Spain: An Historiographic Enigma," *Medieval Encounters* 11.1–2 (2005): 7 (7–36).
29. Novikoff, "Between Tolerance and Intolerance in Medieval Spain," pp. 11, 34.
30. Thomas F. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages: Comparative Perspectives on Social and Cultural Formation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 165.
31. Brian A. Catlos, *The Victors and the Vanquished: Christians and Muslims of Catalonia and Aragon, 1050–1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 399.
32. Benigno Hernández Montes, *Biblioteca de Juan de Segovia. Edición y comentario de su escritura de donación* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Francisco Suárez," 1984), p. 124.
33. All of these quotes from Piccolomini are my translations from the Spanish edition entitled *Europa en mi tiempo*, ed. Francisco Socas (Sevilla: Universidad, 1998), Chap. 42, p. 172.
34. For examples of his interactions and esteem for Segovia, see *Reject Aeneas, Accept Pius: Selected Letters of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II)*, ed. and trans. Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald Christianson, and Philip Krey (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2006), pp. 108, 122, 125–131, 166, 196, and Piccolomini, *De gestis concilii basiliensis commentariorum*, ed. and trans. Denys Hay and W.K. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 25, 141, 145, 147, 237.

35. On the reversal in his loyalties, see the discussion in Izbicki, Christianson, and Krey, Introduction to *Reject Aeneas, Accept Pius*, pp. 4–6, 24, 33–39.
36. Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, p. 140.
37. Dated February 7, 1459, this bull is published in Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Bulario de la Universidad de Salamanca (1219–1549)*, vol. 3 (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1966), no. 95.
38. Rome, Archivio di Stato, Fondo Camerale I, vol. 834, fol. 78r, cited in Lino Gómez Caneda, *Un español al servicio de la Santa Sede. Don Juan de Carvajal, Cardenal de Sant' Angelo, legado en Alemania y Hungría (1399?–1469)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1947), p. 30, n. 8.
39. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the donation, see Benigno Hernández Montes, *Biblioteca de Juan de Segovia*, pp. 47–50. Neither Hernández Montes's searches in the Vatican Library nor an earlier thorough study of the library of Pius II produced any clues. By the late sixteenth century, three of the volumes had arrived at the Escorial by some unknown path. It is not known how many of the works from Segovia's library went to Salamanca directly following his death.
40. Izbicki, Christianson, and Krey, Introduction to *Reject Aeneas, Accept Pius*, p. 31.
41. Juan de Pineda, *Venerabilis M. Ioannis de Segobia, Archid. de Villa Viciosa, huius Operis ratio, Scribendi Occasio, y Consilium*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, MS 3999, folios 15r–16r [fols. 11v–18v].
42. Pineda, *Venerabilis M. Ioannis de Segobia*, fol. 14v.
43. One example is Leyla Rouhi, "A Fifteenth-Century Salamancan's Pursuit of Islamic Studies," pp. 23–24.
44. James D. Tracy, *Europe's Reformations, 1450–1650* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 10.
45. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Cartulario de la Universidad de Salamanca (1218–1600)*, vol. 1 (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad, 1970), pp. 314–315. Translation mine.
46. Richard Kagan, "Prescott's Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain," *American Historical Review* 101.2 (April 1996): 429 [423–446].
47. Following the death of John Paul II and during the election proceedings for a new pope, there was considerable discussion of these matters in the popular press. See for example, Jay Tolson, "Defender of the Faith," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 2, 2005, pp. 26–39; Alan Cooperman and Daniel Williams, "Catholic Dissidents Call for Openness; John Paul Silenced Many, Critics Say," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 2005, final edition.
48. For an insightful discussion of this vote and its likely effects, see Peter Steinfels, *A People Adrift: The Crisis of the Roman Catholic Church in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 131–161.
49. Donald Wagner, "Reagan and Begin, Bibi and Jerry: The Theopolitical Alliance of the Likud Party with the American Christian 'Right,'" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20.4 (Fall 1998), p. 42 [33–51]. Another excellent

discussion of this alliance is Yaakov Ariel, "American Fundamentalists and the Emergence of a Jewish State," in *New Dimensions in American Religious History*, ed. Jay P. Dolan and James P. Wind (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993): pp. 288–309.

50. "In the World of Good and Evil," editorial in *The Economist*, September 16, 2006, pp. 37–38.
51. See my discussion in "Precedents and Paradigms: Juan de Segovia on the Bible, the Church, and the Ottoman Threat," in *Scripture and Pluralism: Reading the Bible in the Religiously Plural Worlds of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Thomas J. Heffernan and Thomas E. Burman (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 143–160.
52. Segovia, Letter to Jean Germain, December 18, 1455, Vat. lat. 2923, fol. 46r.
53. Segovia, Letter to Jean Germain, December 18, 1455, Vat. lat. 2923, fol. 68v.
54. Segovia, Letter to Jean Germain, December 18, 1455, Vat. lat. 2923, fol. 54v.
55. Segovia, Letter to Nicholas of Cusa, December 2, 1454, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS 19, fol. 171r.
56. See my discussion in "Precedents and Paradigms: Juan de Segovia on the Bible, the Church, and the Ottoman Threat," in *Scripture and Pluralism*, pp. 150–151.
57. Wolf, "Precedents and Paradigms," 159. This is in Segovia, Letter to Germain, Vat. lat. 2923, fol. 45v.
58. Olivia Remie Constable, "Is Convivencia Dangerous?" Unpublished paper presented at the International Medieval Congress, Kalamazoo, MI, May 5, 2005. I am grateful to the author for providing a copy of her paper.

CHAPTER 2

READING *DON QUIJOTE* IN A TIME OF WAR

Leyla Rouhi

"One day," wrote conservative columnist James Pinkerton in *Newsday* in July 2003, "this Iraq war will be thought of as the Intellectuals' War. That is, it was a war conceived of by people who possessed more books than common sense, let alone actual military experience."

> Disregarding prudence, precedent and honesty, they went off—or, more precisely, sent others off—tilting at windmills in Iraq, chasing after illusions of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and false hope about Iraqi enthusiasm for Americanism, and hoping that reality would somehow catch up with their theory. The problem, of course, is that wars are more about bloodletting than book learning. Tilting at windmills is what Don Quixote did. When I left for Iraq in June, I took along a copy of *The History and Adventures of the Renowned Don Quixote*, the comic/epic/tragic novel by Miguel de Cervantes. I had never read the book, but I knew of critic Lionel Trilling's recommendation: "All prose fiction is a variation on the theme of Don Quixote." And given that much of what was said about Iraq was so obviously fiction, I figured that the work would be an enlightening travel companion.[1]

Since September 11, 2001, the relevance of *Don Quijote* for the problems of multifaith coexistence and hostility has been the subject of considerable attention well beyond the confines of academia. Richard Cohen of *the Washington Post*, in "Two Leaders Who See What They Want to See," concludes his comments on the search for a link between Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein with the following remark: "This brings me not to a joke but to the wisdom of the late Don Quixote, who says something to remember when this or that intelligence report

is trumpeted by Cheney or Bush in justification of an unjustified war. 'Facts are the enemy of truth.' "[2] For his part, Edward Rothstein comments in the *New York Times* that Cervantes wrote, "not as warrior but as a philosopher. His empathy for the Moors is cautious but unmistakable."[3] Cervantine motifs are invoked in multifarious ways, reflecting a range of interpretation that is quite familiar to *Quijote* scholars. The invocation can express the blogger or journalist's disdain: "Dick Cheney has become 'Dick Quixote' and he is tilting at windmills to the detriment of America's security."[4] It can represent an ambiguous failure: "OK. Our Don Quixote–like charge into Iraq hasn't exactly gone well."[5] Or it can denote idealism: "John Quixote tilts at common Iraq myths."[6]

Tacitly, every canonized work is perceived as being "relevant" to the contemporary reader. From local book clubs to university classrooms, canonical works often come to life most when they are shown to illuminate a problem in the contemporary reader's world. Miguel de Cervantes' *Don Quijote de la Mancha* is no exception: its themes of lunacy, illusion, idealism, have long been cast as relevant to various ideas and issues in different ages: German Romantics, postmodern artists, psychoanalytically inclined theorists, have all found relevance in Cervantes' novel for their own thinking. Yet this kind of co-opting should be approached with a critical spirit: indeed, we need an ongoing critique of the values and power structures that determine the canonization of any given work of art or literature. In an eloquent analysis, the scholar Brad Epps takes up the question of *Don Quijote*, reminding us that Cervantes' "greatness" has often been taken as standing for the "greatness" of Spain, and referring the reader to a passage by the polemical Basque thinker Fernando Savater:

> In his "Instructions to Forget *El Quijote*," from 1984, Savater notes that "it is evident that Don Quijote de la Mancha is not only a character of literary fiction, but also many more and many graver things: a national myth, an ironic ideal, the silhouette of a conception of the world, the origin of a pejorative or praiseful adjective, the last hero and the first anti-hero. . . . It is not [Cervantes'] fault; indeed, I suspect that it is not even his merit. There is something in *Don Quijote* that begs to be transcendentalized, something which relates it to the *religious* world." What Savater signals is the national and religious dimensions of Cervantes and the *Quijote*, or rather the national and religious appropriations of them.[7]

This alertness to the almost mythical projections of *Don Quijote* must be kept at the forefront of any discussion of its relevance today. In Spain and elsewhere, the novel has been co-opted by various intellectual currents as a symbol of a particular ideological stance. On a figurative level, the image of tilting at windmills, or the curious idealism of Don Quixote himself

are among the tropes that have been used by intellectuals, politicians, and journalists in defense of any number of contemporary causes. On a thematic level, the novel's complex engagement with such widely diverse topics as Islam, war, madness, and the relations between the sexes have been interpreted not only as historically informative but also as relevant to the same topics in a contemporary setting.[8] One issue that has gained considerable prominence in recent studies of Cervantes is his stance on Islam. There is certainly much material to work with in this case, given the many levels of exposure to Islam in Cervantes' life and texts. The substantial part of the author's life (1547–1616) occurred during the reigns of Philip II (1556–1598) and Philip III (1598–1621): he thus witnessed some of the most overt moves against the Morisco population of Spain in the shape of punishment, restrictions, and exile.[9] In 1568, the Moriscos of Granada rose in a violent rebellion that took the forces of Philip II more than two years to suppress. Following the bloody conflict, nearly all of Granada's Moriscos were forced to resettle in diverse areas of northern Spain. In 1609, Philip III issued the edict to expel all of Spain's Moriscos, a process that was completed by 1614.[10] With these events shadowing his life, Cervantes also spent five years in captivity in Algiers. In 1575 his ship, on the way back to Spain from naval battle, was captured by pirates and the author and his brother were taken to Algiers as slaves. He spent five years there as a captive until the requisite sum was procured for his ransom. His writings contain several representations, some of them substantial, of Muslims, Moors, Turks, and Moriscos. *Don Quijote*, some of the *Exemplary Novels*, and the dramas known as the "Algiers" plays all feature such portrayals, though *Don Quijote* allows for the most complex treatment of the character of Muslims and Moriscos within Spain.[11] Research on this aspect of Cervantes' art and life has usually centered upon the quest for an answer to the following question: "What was Cervantes' view of Islam, the Muslim, and the Morisco?" The anxiety that mobilizes this question is rooted in two issues. The first is the debate on Cervantes' degree of tolerance toward Islam: did he understand and accept Muslim Otherness, or was he a steadfast citizen of his Christian empire who dismissed such Otherness? The second is the broader situation of Spain, and the fact of centuries of Muslim life on the Iberian Peninsula, which constitutes some of the context for literary production in medieval and early modern Spain.

To focus on *Don Quijote*, three moments in the novel rely on Islam and/or the Morisco as basic parameters to advance the story. The first is Cervantes' use of a fictional writer, a Muslim named Cide Hamete Benengeli, who according to the author wrote the story of the mad knight in Arabic and whose text fell into Cervantes' hands.[12] The news that this Arab wrote the story is first given to the reader in Chapter 9

of Part I of the novel.[13] Cide Hamete subsequently appears on several occasions throughout the novel as one of the narrators. In a gesture that would inspire the envy of the most accomplished postmodern fiction writer, Cervantes traces the evolution of the story as a translation from Arabic into Castilian, and sustains the trope of the double author (himself and Cide Hamete) at different junctures. Cide Hamete is not held up consistently as the narrator, and only emerges every so often: but when he does, he serves to jolt the reader into remembering that this story has more than one author. The next mention of Islam in the novel occurs in Part I, Chapters 37 to 42, centering upon a scene often referred to as "The Captive's Tale."[14] Here, as Don Quijote and his unlikely entourage are lodging at an inn, a Christian Spaniard in Moorish garb walks in accompanied by a seemingly Muslim girl. He tells his tale: as a soldier fighting the Ottomans, he was held captive for years in Algiers. There, a young and wealthy Muslim girl communicated to him—via translation—that she would help him escape back to Spain if he took her along with him and facilitated her conversion to Christianity. After a number of adventures, they end up at the inn, and subsequently set off for Seville to start their new life as Christian husband and wife. Their fate remains unknown, and the novel does not revisit them. The third engagement of the novel with Islam occurs late in the tale, in Chapter 54 of Part II, this time involving a Morisco.[15] Here Sancho runs into a fellow villager named Ricote, a Morisco expelled under the decree of 1609, who has returned to Spain in disguise and at great risk to himself to recover a treasure he left at the village. Ricote and Sancho have a friendly conversation, in which the Morisco laments his exile even though he insists that he understands the monarch's reason for expelling his people:

> In short, it was just and reasonable for us to be chastised with the punishment of exile: lenient and mild, according to some, but for us it was the most terrible one we could have received. No matter where we are we weep for Spain, for after all, we were born here and it is our native country[.][16]

These apparently contradictory stances have given many scholars cause to study the episode closely, attempting to determine whether or not the scene showcases any of Cervantes' own feelings towards the expulsion. In Chapter 63 of Part II, Ricote's story ties in with a meeting of Don Quijote and Sancho in Barcelona with a young and beautiful woman, disguised as a boy, named Ana Félix, who turns out to be Ricote's daughter.[17] She states repeatedly that she is a devout Christian, and explains the series of convoluted adventures that have compelled her

to take on masculine disguise and that now bring her back to Barcelona from Ottoman lands. Anxious to be united with her beloved, an "old" Christian named Gaspar Gregorio, her fate too remains unclear once the novel takes leave of her.

The bibliography on the above episodes is already substantial and still growing. On the one hand, the claim made by scholars is that these portrayals show Cervantes' subversive yet silent compassion for Moriscos and even for Islam. On the other hand, the contention is that given his life and times, Cervantes could never have felt such sympathy for the enemy of his religion and state, and that these passages therefore bear out neither a secret critique of the Expulsion nor any serious compassion for Muslims.

A significant point of origin for this debate is Américo Castro's emphasis on what he termed *convivencia*—the coexistence of Jews, Muslims, and Christians in medieval Iberia—for the understanding of Spanish history and identity formation, and his view that many great Spanish writers of that era were *conversos*.[18] Following Castro, whose major scholarly production took place in the middle of the twentieth century, scholars such as Francisco Márquez Villanueva and Stephen Gilman continued to pursue this line, making a case for implicit compassion towards minorities and a critique of official policies in well-known Spanish works of literature. Thus, when considering the case of Ana Félix the daughter of the Morisco Ricote, Márquez Villanueva states:

> Aside from other considerations, the immediate interest of this for us lies in the showcasing, in full, of the harsh reality of the human problem of the expulsion. The story of Ana Félix is only partly about the well-known motif of the sudden move from despair to happiness. Its real and much more terrible knot still needs to be untied, and it may never be, given that Ricote and his daughter both continue to be victims of the expulsion decree.[19]

Not coincidentally, this wave of discussion on Cervantes as pro-Morisco and pro-Islamic, as well as the first major claims that the coexistence of three religious groups shaped Spanish identity, occurred during General Franco's regime. Scholars who rejected Francoism made an avid case for the advocacy of diversity, cultural difference, and humanism in works such as the *Quijote*.[20] If this relevance to their contemporary Spain was not always explicitly stated, it was still visible in their quest to uncover a history that would, in part, act as a contrast to Franco's vision of a monolithic and Catholic Spain. The idea of the artistic "masterpiece" was linked by these critics to the ability of that masterpiece to promote, through formal and thematic organization, the critique of homogeneity

and xenophobia. Juan Goytisolo—himself an admirer of Américo Castro's ways of reading—has brought the issue of relevance to the forefront by critiquing appropriations of the *Quijote* as the "Bible of the Spanish nation."[21] Of his own novel *El Conde Julián*, he says:

> It was for me a way of protesting against a curious phenomenon of appropriating Cervantes, which in the case of Unamuno, reaches indecent proportions. The Generation of "98"'s view of the Golden Age is based upon old Christian myths which created the downfall of Spain. It is a gaunt and grotesque echo of retrograde values which the bourgeois world swept from the rest of Europe more than three centuries ago.[22]

If Spain's crestfallen intellectuals of the post-1898 "disaster" looked to the novel for some sign of their culture's past glory, some specialists in Cervantes in the present generation—among them, Darío Fernández-Morera—seek to make connections with current international challenges: "Historical debates regarding the conflicts between Muslims and Christians outside and inside Spain from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century echo in today's European debates regarding massive Muslim immigration," he writes. "So do today's debates regarding who is to blame for the lack of assimilation of those immigrants to Western laws and culture."[23] Fernández-Morera goes on to highlight the "[c]ultural practices among Moslems" that are "as conducive to their multiplication as in Cervantes' time."[24] Although he states that "Europe does not face a situation equivalent to that of the Spain in the seventeenth century,"[25] given that there is no equivalent of an Ottoman Empire today, he does go on to trace a causal connection between "Third World immigration in general and Moslem immigration in particular" and "Islamic terrorism either inside Europe or outside." He then asserts: "One can imagine, then, the state of paranoia of those Spaniards in the late sixteenth century, who faced an immensely greater Moslem danger from within and without[.]"[26] Thus, in his view, while Cervantes may have been generally sensitive to the plight of oppressed peoples, he could not spare any love for Muslims:

> [He] applauded both the general battle of Christendom against Islam on the Mediterranean stage, and also, though perhaps with sadness, a brutal measure [the Expulsion] that, from the point of view of security and the cultural survival of Christian Spain, though not from the point of view of human compassion, would have made to him eminent sense.[27]

Fernández Morera links this to the contemporary state of affairs, wherein "any European…today, who is otherwise resolutely against

Islamic immigration to Europe...can nonetheless understand and even sympathize with the human desire of Moslems to move to Europe [.]"[28]

Yet the questions that are most often linked with the idea of relevance are those of Cervantes' empathy for the Other—be it Muslim, female, or marginal in some other way—and his appreciation of a heterogeneous art and society.[29] Looking at some of Cervantes' narrative strategies, E.C. Graf states his purpose thus: "I am interested in reading Cervantes as the author of a multicultural manifesto on behalf of the Moriscos of Southern Spain."[30] Nina Davis, similarly, posits the ability of the *Quijote*—particularly in the Ricote and Ana Félix episodes—to give voice to all those narratives of minorities and marginal beings whose stories have been erased by official history.[31] She observes that the novel contains several instances of experiences that are "recalled and shared orally"[32] by specific individuals while others listen on. These individuals are often figures whose life stories would be "otherwise largely concealed from public record."[33] The novel then becomes a place in which the need to share memories—especially those which official history would rather not hear—resonates multiple times. The purposes for this act are many, including the "recovery of a former relationship to place and community,"[34] especially for those such as the Moriscos who have lost their place and their community. The novel, in other words, allows people to remember, speak, and share memories: and those who do so in the *Quijote* ordinarily would not have felt safe to do so. Even if legal justice is absent, at the very least "readers are allowed to savor represented success stories whose verisimilitude contests the terms of recorded history."[35]

In his article "*Don Quijote* and 9–11: The Clash of Civilizations and the Birth of the Modern Novel," Roberto A. Véguez pursues a line of argument initiated by Américo Castro and Francisco Márquez Villanueva, suggesting Cervantes' critical view of the Establishment and his tolerance of the Morisco and Muslim.[36] Referring to a "series of criticisms of Spanish military actions,"[37] as well as critiques of the Expulsion of the Moriscos in Cervantes' novel, Véguez suggests that Cervantes provides perspectives that are "completely at odds with what the propaganda machine was churning out" vis-à-vis Morsicos.[38] He concludes by asserting a crucial idea: "books have multiple interpretations.... Each interpretation responds to the idiosyncrasies of the reader—his or her social station, age, education—and every interpretation is possible."[39] Véguez asserts that Cervantes reveals the "blind spots"[40] of Philip II and III's policies in his rendition of Ricote and Ana Félix's fates, but only if one is alert to irony and ambiguity in Cervantes' narrative strategies. In short, the lesson to be drawn is that one should read carefully for irony and

for ambiguity, and weary of propaganda. At the same time, one should make room for contrary readings by others. One obvious implication of Cervantes' ability to inspire so many different readings is that there is no such thing as a superior reading; likewise, one could argue, those who wage war or terrorize are imposing one reading of the world—theirs—on everyone else's. This act is utterly contrary to the Cervantine intellectual project, for *Don Quijote* is nothing if not a massive tapestry that shows all the characters reading, each in his or her own way. It includes the readers outside the book as well. *Don Quijote* has inspired a dizzying range of interpretations. This alone proves that there is no one reading that would annul others, nor is the last word on the novel ever possible. In the diverse registers addressed above—journalism, blogs, philological research—we are also faced with a heterogeneous community of readers. Some look to *Don Quijote* and Cervantes for ways to better understand Muslim and Christian coexistence, some seek answers on lunacy, some on idealized love, and some on history. In much the same way as non-biologists have opinions about genetics, and non-economists have opinions about the economy, those who have not read the *Quijote* have an opinion about Quixotic behavior, and have become alert to the novel's potential for addressing religious conflicts and coexistence. With this wide diversity of focus in mind, the search for relevance can move one step beyond. The search can now grow to privilege the readers over the content of the novel, and to remind all readers that they are in fact Cervantes' main theme.

The use of the plural "readers" is deliberate here. It is imperative that the singular be replaced with the plural to denote a heightened awareness, on the part of Cervantes, to the heterogeneity of readership. *Don Quijote* portrays not only several specific life stories, but also the very acts of reading that accompany each story.[41] The novel begins with the account of an old man who reads countless romances of chivalry so obsessively that he apparently goes insane and embarks on an adventure in which he plans to replicate elements of what he has read. As he comes into contact with different characters, his choices are in turn read and interpreted by those around him. Each in his or her own way, those who meet Don Quijote have to grapple with his reading-inspired actions: did he read the wrong way? Is that why he went insane? Who is to say that he is insane? Is his project not worthwhile on some level, after all? And what exactly is a wrong or a right reading? For whom or what? To further complicate matters, the novel then goes on to relentlessly perform, discuss, critique, praise, and debate the act of reading by various characters, not just of the knight's behavior, but of their own life stories. Throughout the novel, characters discuss books, read manuscripts to one

another, act on what they have read, talk about reading, and confront the publication, the telling, and the reading of themselves. We the readers watch the characters reading or listening to stories. Each time we find ourselves deciding if we approve of the way they read and listen, or if we are at least entertained by their way of doing so. These facets—edification and entertainment—are of course age-old foundations for the purpose of literature. With *Don Quijote* they are mobilized in such a way that they do not allow for any stasis: each reading and telling is countered by its possible opposite or complement, observed from at least two angles. The result is not so much instability (as it would be in a post-modern text) but fluidity and constant intellectual stimulation. And this is precisely where the relevance of Cervantes resides, beyond his portrayals of Muslims and *convivencia*: he stimulates reflection, specifically on the role of the intellect in making sense of what it perceives.

For this to happen, Cervantes carefully stages the acts of reading and listening: he places the speaker and the writer, the listener and the reader, and the critic and observer in almost every important scene in which a story is being told.[42] On the most overarching level, he does this with Cide Hamete, our possibly fictional Arab author to whom we must now return. Cide Hamete's manuscript is first found by Cervantes who then appears in his own novel and whom we can call the second author. Then it is translated using the help of a person in the neighborhood whose native tongue is Arabic. As the novel moves on, often we forget that Cide Hamete was our original author; but on occasion, we are reminded of this supposed origin through Cide Hamete's comments about a scene or a character, all of this filtered through the second author Cervantes via the translation from Arabic. Here and there, Cervantes questions Cide Hamete's strategies of telling. Still, at the very end, Cide Hamete claims the product as his own and says the last word on Don Quijote (the man and the novel); but again, these are filtered through translation and the second author.

This complicated trajectory, and numerous other instances in which the act of delivering a story from origin to reception is shown, underscore an essential topic in *Don Quijote*: the choices that we make when we read or listen; the details that we forget, the frames that we leave behind, and our susceptibility to the idea that what we are reading is the truth. Every time Cide Hamete comes back, we remember that we were told he is the author, yet most of us forget this fact if he disappears for a few chapters. Similarly, we watch as others in the novel also tell stories and listen to them. In all of these episodes, we are invited to consume the plot with a full awareness of the parties involved: author, translator, critic, reader, and listener. It is of course almost impossible to do so

consistently, for—especially when the story is riveting—we can forget the original frame of its set-up. Still, where he can, the narrator reminds us of the very apparatus that gives form to the ideas in the novel. This is the apparatus of telling, receiving, translating, and reappropriating an event in history that then becomes an idea open to all kinds of dispute. The 1609 Expulsion, for example, is an historical fact: but as it finds its way into Cervantes' novel in the shape of its telling by Morisco Ricote and then his daughter Ana Félix, it becomes an idea open to interpretation. Regardless of how each one of us chooses to interpret the scene and to relate it current international tensions, we must note that we see several players as they tell their version of the Expulsion, not to mention at least two narrators and one translator in between.

The most urgent level of relevance in Cervantes' art, then, is its invitation to consider form as an intrinsic part of content, and its plea that the apparent clashes between form and content be accepted as the necessary fabric of every act of telling and reading. The teller of the story, its translator, its critic, and its receiver, the setting when the exchange of the story takes place, are every bit as important as what the story contains. We will indeed lose track of some of these parameters when we become engrossed in the story, but we should at least accept that our own reading occurs with precisely this kind of forgetting of context. The art of Cervantes does not deny that the truth exists, but it also cautions that no one has access to the whole truth. The truth is always narrated, by someone to someone, under particular circumstances, with webs of associations that can never be completely untangled, and the requirement that the reader remember things that are not always easy to remember. Cervantes' novel does not posit this incompleteness as a defect nor as an object of lament. Quite the contrary, it asks that this gap be accepted very much as a part of every exchange of information. The intrinsic irony that emerges from the insoluble tensions in the act of telling and receiving should be accepted and explained, not resisted and held up as an obstacle to an image of a monolithic truth. Otherwise the content, especially if compelling, risks giving the impression that it carries the whole truth. The subsequent danger is the reliance on this impression of a complete truth, forgetting that it was presented to the reader in a dynamic and elusive package of interactions, translations, and irony. Cervantes brings out the irony of telling and receiving, inviting us to accept the insoluble paradoxes of any act of telling, and to slow down in our reading process as a way of avoiding fast labels and judgments. It also invites us to reflect on our role as seekers of relevance: the search for answers to the problems of multifaith coexistence today requires a critique of our own process of consuming information every step of the

way. All the news items, blogs, documentaries, classes, and research with which we engage today as we search for solutions to conflicts ought to be framed in a critique of our own acts of reading. If the unlikely duo of a Muslim Arab and a Christian Spaniard—Cide Hamete and Cervantes—does not make us conscious of the need for such constant reflection, probably nothing else will.

Notes

1. James Pinkerton, "The Iraq War, or America Betrayed," *Newsday*, July 15, 2003: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article 4131/. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
2. Richard Cohen, "Grand Delusions. Two Leaders Who See What They Want to See," *The Washington Post*, June 21, 2004: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59146–2004Jun21.html. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
3. Edward Rothstein, "Regarding Cervantes, Multicultural Dreamer," *The New York Times*, June 13, 2005: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/13/arts/13conn.html. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
4. http://lawnorder.blogspot.com/2006/02/frameshop-dick-quixote-war-in-iraq.html. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
5. Joe Galloway, "No Solution to Iraq Quagmire," August 10, 2006: http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,109561,00.html. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
6. Joe Katzman, "John Quixote Tilts at Common Iraq Myths," July 13, 2005: http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/007168.php. Last accessed March 13, 2008.
7. Brad Epps, "Comparison, Competition, and Cross-Dressing: Cross-Cultural Analysis in a Contested World," forthcoming in *Islamicate Sexualities Studies: Translations Across Temporal and Geographical Zones of Desire*, ed. Afsaneh Najmabadi and Kathryn Babayan (forthcoming, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs). The quotation used by Epps comes from Fernando Savater, *Instrucciones para olvidar el Quijote y otros ensayos generales* (Madrid: Taurus, 1985), p. 17.
8. For a comprehensive look at some of the major issues in *Don Quijote*, see *Cervantes' Don Quixote: A Casebook*, ed. Roberto González Echevarría (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For specific issues such as feminism and psychoanalysis, see also *Quixotic Desire: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Cervantes*, ed. Ruth Anthony El Saffar and Diana de Armas Wilson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Maria Antonia Garcés, *Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive's Tale* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002); Ruth El Saffar, *Beyond Fiction: the Recovery of the Feminine in the Novels of Cervantes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
9. Morisco is the name given in early modern Spain to a Christian convert of Muslim Spanish descent, or a recent descendant of such a convert.

For further discussion, see Mary Elizabeth Perry's essay "Memory and Mutilation: The Case of the Moriscos," chapter 3 in this volume.

10. For discussions of the Moriscos in Spain see Francisco Márquez Villanueva, *El problema morisco (desde otras laderas)* (Madrid: Libertarias, 1991); Mary Elizabeth Perry, "Between Muslim and Christian Worlds: Moriscas and Identity in Early Modern Spain," *Muslim World* 95.2 (2005), 177–97; Mercedes García-Arenal, *Los moriscos* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1996); James B. Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians: Moriscos and Catholicism in Early Modern Spain* (New Orleans, LA: University Press of the South, 2002).
11. For *Los tratos de Argel*, which concerns the experience of captivity, see Enrique Fernández, "*Los tratos de Argel*: Obra testimonial, denuncia política y literatura terapéutica," *Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America* 20.1 (Spring 2000): 7–26.
12. On the figure of Cide Hamete, see Luce López-Baralt, "The Supreme Pen (Al-Qalam Al-A'la) of Cide Hamete Benengeli in *Don Quixote*," trans. Marikay McCabe, *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 30.3 (2000): 505–518; Jorge Moreno Pinaud, "La voz de Cide Hamete Benengeli: Autorreflexividad crítica en *El Quijote de la Mancha*," *Espéculo: Revista de Estudios Literarios* (2005) (no pagination); Shannon M. Polchow, "Manipulation of Narrative Discourse: from *Amadís de Gaula* to *Don Quixote*," *Hispania: A Journal Devoted to the Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese* 88.1 (March 2005): 72–81; Juergen Hahn, *Miracles, Duels, and Cide Hamete's Moorish Dissent* (Potomac: Scripta Humanistica, 1992).
13. Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, trans. Edith Grossman (New York: Harper Collins, 2003). All page number references will be to this edition.
14. Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, pp. 321–373.
15. Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, p. 809.
16. Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, p. 813.
17. Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, p. 875.
18. Américo Castro, *Cervantes y los casticismos españoles* (Madrid: Alfagüara, 1966).
19. "Aparte de otras consideraciones, su inmediato interés para nosotros reside en ofrecer el artificio funcional que vuelve a plantear de lleno toda la crudeza del problema humano de la expulsión. La historia de Ana Félix no responde sino de modo secundario al conocido motivo del paso repentino de la desesperación a la felicidad. Su verdadero y más terrible nudo queda aún para desatar y es muy dudoso que pueda serlo nunca, pues tanto Ricote como su hija siguen siendo reos del decreto de la expulsión." Francisco Márquez Villanueva, *Personajes y Temas del Quijote* (Madrid: Taurus, 1991), pp. 330–331.
20. See Américo Castro, *Cervantes y los casticismos españoles* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 2002).
21. Wolfram Eilenberger, Haukur Ástvaldsson and Francisco Herrera, "Nacionalidad cervantina: una entrevista con Juan Goytisolo, realizada

en París, el 4 de octubre de 1998." http://www.ucm.es/info/especulo/numero11/jgoytiso.html. Last accessed March 13, 2008.

22. Julio Ortega, "An Interview with Juan Goytisolo," *The Review of Contemporary Fiction* 4.2 (1984). http://dalkeyarchive.com/interviews/586/juan-goytisolo/ Last accessed March 13, 2008.
23. Darío Fernández-Morera, "Cervantes and Islam: A Contemporary Analogy," in *Cervantes y su mundo III*, ed. Kurt Reichenberger and Robert Lauer (Kassel, Germany: Reichenberger, 2005): p. 146 (123–166).
24. Fernández-Morera, "Cervantes and Islam," p. 147.
25. Fernández Morera, "Cervantes and Islam," p. 149.
26. Fernández Morera, "Cervantes and Islam," p. 150.
27. Fernández Morera, "Cervantes and Islam," pp. 154–155. Less resolute in tone than Fernández Morera, yet also convinced that Cervantes had little tolerance for Moriscos, is Michel Moner, who suggests that even if Cervantes reveals some reservations about the Expulsion, he shared the prejudices of most of his countrymen. See "El problema morisco en los textos cervantinos," in *Las dos grandes minorías étnico-religiosas en la literatura española del Siglo de Oro: los judeoconversos y los moriscos: Actas del "Grand Séminaire" de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, 26 a 27 de mayo de 1994*. (Paris: Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon), no. 588, pp. 85–100.
28. Fernández Morera, "Cervantes and Islam," p. 154.
29. See, e.g., Barbara Fuchs, *Passing for Spain: Cervantes and the Fictions of Identity* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Diana de Armas Wilson, "Cervantes Romances Inca Garcilaso de la Vega," in *Cultural Authority in Golden Age Spain*, ed. Marina S. Brownlee and Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 234–259.
30. E.C. Graf, "When an Arab Laughs in Toledo: Cervantes's Interpellation of Early Modern Spanish Orientalism," *Diacritics* 29.2 (1999): 68 (68–85).
31. Nina Davis, "*Don Quijote*: A Collective Legacy," *Romance Quarterly* 52.4 (Fall 2005): 271–280.
32. Davis, "*Don Quijote*," 272.
33. Davis, "*Don Quijote*," 273.
34. Davis, "*Don Quijote,*" 274.
35. Davis, "*Don Quijote*," 277.
36. Roberto A. Véguez, "*Don Quixote* and 9–11: The Clash of Civilizations and the Birth of the Modern Novel," *Hispania* 88.1 (March 2005): 101–113.
37. Véguez, "*Don Quixote* and 9–11," 104.
38. Véguez, "*Don Quixote* and 9–11," 109.
39. Véguez, "*Don Quixote* and 9–11," 110.
40. Véguez, "*Don Quixote* and 9–11," 109.
41. I am grateful to my colleague Jennifer L. French for prompting my reflections on reading as a form of relevance. See Michael Scham, "Emblems of Reading: Cervantes' *El coloquio de los perros* and Borges' *La biblioteca de Babel*," *Cincinnati Romance Review* 20 (2001): 79–90; E. Michael

Gerli, *Refiguring Authority: Reading, Writing, and Rewriting in Cervantes* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995); Carlos Fuentes, *Cervantes o la critica de la lectura* (Mexico: Editorial Mortiz, 1976); Elizabeth A. Spiller, "Cervantes avant la letter: The Material Transformation of Romance Reading Culture in *Don Quijote*," *Modern Language Quarterly* 60.3 (September 1999): 295–310. Spiller notes correctly on p. 295 that the acts of reading in the novel reflect, "how reading practices change during the early modern period."

42. Cervantes' dramatization of how narrative and telling actually work has been illuminated by many scholars, among whom one must name Ruth El-Saffar, *Distance and control in Don Quixote: A Study in Narrative Technique* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Dept. of Romance Languages, 1975); E.C. Riley, *Cervantes' Theory of the Novel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Charles Presberg, *Adventures in Paradox: Don Quixote and the Western Tradition* (State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 2001); Luis Andrés Murillo, *A Critical Introduction to Don Quijote* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990).

CHAPTER 3

MEMORY AND MUTILATION: THE CASE OF THE MORISCOS

Mary Elizabeth Perry

Pain jostled hope in the historical memory of Moriscos. The Hispano-Muslims who had to convert to Christianity or leave their Iberian homes in the early sixteenth century recalled the painful memory of defeat in 1492, when Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in Iberia, fell to Christian armies. Yet Fernando and Isabel had initially held out hope to the defeated Muslims as they promised in the 1492 terms of surrender that their new Muslim subjects would be free to practice their own faith.[1] Within a decade, however, vigorous official attempts to convert Muslims sparked a revolt that spread throughout the kingdom of Granada. As Christian soldiers defeated the rebellion in 1501, Isabel issued the decree that all Muslims must convert to Christianity or leave her Castilian kingdoms. Many Muslims left, but others remained and accepted baptism. Thousands gathered in fields where Christian clerics flung holy water to baptize them.[2] Over the next century, these "New Christians" and their descendants, who in the middle decades of the sixteenth century increasingly came to be called Moriscos ("moor-like," or "little Moors"), endured various forms of persecution and oppression. Their traditional Arabic written script was banned by royal decree in 1508, and a series of royal mandates in the 1510s and 1520s prohibited much of their traditional clothing, food, festive dances, and other elements of their culture that religious officials considered evidence of continuing allegiance to their supposedly discarded former faith. Despite their nominal baptisms, many if not most of the Moriscos continued as best they could to practice Islam behind the closed doors of their homes.

From the 1530s on, thousands of these "crypto-Muslims" endured arrest and imprisonment by the Inquisition, seizure of family property, humiliating public penitence and lashings, and in some extreme cases, execution. Finally in 1609, convinced that Moriscos would never assimilate to Spanish Christian society, Philip III ordered that they be expelled from his kingdoms. With the exception of only the small percentage of upper- and middle-class Moriscos who had managed via intermarriage with "Old Christian" families to integrate themselves into the power structures of the dominant society, the overwhelming majority of Spain's Moriscos were forced into exile between 1609 and 1614.[3]

Living under the difficulties of Christian rule, Spain's sixteenth-century Moriscos did not simply forget the past, nor did they limit their memories to events that each had personally experienced. Instead, they developed collective memories in which the experiences of each generation filtered what they would remember, what they would find useful from the past, how they would interpret it, and what they would forget.[4] Forced to accept new names and suspect status with baptism, many Moriscos sought to preserve some sense of their Muslim identity and traditions through memories of a glorious past when Muslims ruled al-Andalus. They interwove myth and history to develop a memory far more powerful than mere nostalgia. Moreover, their experiences of repression forged a memory that would support resistance to the Christian rulers of early modern Spain.[5]

Now in the twenty-first century, I argue that we must revisit the Moriscos' story because it provides urgent lessons about the politics of memory. We learn from the case of the Moriscos how history became relevant through historical memories that both empowered and disempowered people. Moriscos sanctified these memories through appeals to religion, and so did their oppressors. Their experiences in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries interacted with their stories of the past to shape subsequent historical memories that still influence the ways in which Spain's Muslim past is remembered. Their fate and their collected memories—alongside those of Spain's expelled Jews and often persecuted Judeo-conversos—have been used to undergird the traditional tragic narrative of Spain's transformation in the early modern period from a religiously plural society to one characterized by rigorously enforced Catholic identity.[6] Memory, as Elizabeth Jelin argues, "is obstinate; it does not resign itself to remain in the past, insisting on its presence." However, she cautions that memory does not remain the same, for "[a]ctors and activists 'use' the past, bringing their understandings and interpretations about it into the public sphere of debate. Their intention is to establish/convince/transmit their narrative, so that others will accept it."[7] Morisco memories that have survived in the

present time have changed since Moriscos' experiences of oppression and expulsion. Our task is to historicize their memories and look more critically at how people in the present time attempt to use them for their own political and ideological purposes.[8]

Both cautionary and hopeful, the Morisco story demonstrates the complexity of historical memory. Deeper layers of meaning become evident as we analyze historical evidence about Moriscos using the work of several scholars. Edward Said presents invaluable insights about memory and power in his studies of colonialism and postcolonialism.[9] Elizabeth Jelin's discussion of the politics of memory, the repression, and transmission of it, presents theoretical possibilities applicable to much more than the modern Latin American cases that she analyzes.[10] From anthropologist James C. Scott we learn how oppressed peoples develop weapons of resistance.[11] Murdo MacLeod raises important issues about how historical sources shape perception and memory in their accounts of—or silences on—violence and imperialism.[12] William Ian Miller's richly nuanced study of honor and shame deepens our understanding of the relationship of violence and memory.[13]

To explore the politics of memory through the case of the Moriscos, I will address four major questions. First, how did material artifacts and Morisco stories encourage a sense of identity, resistance to assimilation, yet also strategies of accommodation that promised survival and hope for the future? Second, how do documents and writings from the period reveal a dynamic process in which lived experiences of Moriscos filtered and interacted with what they remembered and sought to use? Third, how did Christian rulers use religion to justify oppression and how did their Morisco subjects use religion to resist their oppression? Finally, why is violence—whether physical mutilation or psychic wounding—the most persistent memory, eclipsing all other memories as it cries out for vengeance and ignites fears about power?

Stones and Stories

Moriscos in sixteenth-century Spain saw all around them material evidence of a time past when Muslims ruled the lands of Iberia. Their ancestors of al-Andalus had achieved not only remarkable intellectual and artistic achievements, but also lasting monuments of architecture and engineering.[14] In fact, most people living in sixteenth-century Spain learned of their history not so much from books as from the very stones on which they walked, the buildings of their towns and cities, the fountains and water ways, the towers that protected their lands and rivers. These daily reminders kept alive their historical memories.

In Seville, for example, women and children filled water containers at fountains that brought spring water through conduits and underground pipes that Muslims had constructed in the past.[15] Many of the fountains featured stone carvings or *azulejos*, the tiles that Muslim artisans painted and glazed in al-Andalus. A medieval Muslim tower, the Torre de Oro, stood vigil over the Guadalquivir River that ran through the city of Seville. Visible to both townspeople and those on ships that came into port, this distinctive tower had been built in the thirteenth century as one of a set of towers designed to stand on either side of the river holding a chain between them that could be raised or lowered to control river traffic. In the sixteenth century the twin tower had long ago disappeared, but the Torre de Oro still stood as a symbol of a Muslim past that was neither dead nor buried.[16]

Even after Christians had conquered the kingdoms of al-Andalus, they preserved a variety of Muslim constructions and buildings, mutilating some of them and violating their original purposes. Christian conquerors razed the great mosque of Seville to build a huge Gothic cathedral in its place, but they preserved the mosque's minaret and patio of orange trees. By the sixteenth century, they had incorporated the patio of orange trees as the cathedral cloister. They transformed the minaret, where a *muezzin* once called faithful Muslims to prayer, into the cathedral bell tower that has become a major landmark of modern Seville. Instead of destroying the Great Mosque of Córdoba in the thirteenth century, Christian conquerors renamed and sanctified it as a Christian cathedral, even while referring to it as "*la mezquita*." Some 300 years later, Charles V ordered the construction of a large ornate cathedral within the grand mosque. Yet not even this could dim the splendor of the bold marble columns and arches of the mosque, nor could it erase memories of a Muslim past.

Through construction and artistry, Morisco women and men of the sixteenth century helped to preserve an Hispano-Muslim culture.[17] They built town palaces for nobles such as the Enríquez de Ribera family in Seville. Known locally as the "Casa de Pilatos," their palace glorifies the Mudéjar style of architecture and decoration even more than the feats of the powerful family. Clearly an example of Christian nobles borrowing the aesthetics and artistry of former Muslims, the palace reveals as well Morisco determination to preserve their culture and perhaps, also, to ridicule the hegemonic pretenses of their overlords.[18] Here Morisco workers carved interior arches with the arabesques of Arabic script unrecognizable to most Christians. However, years later a knowledgeable visitor read—to his great amazement—the workers' message carved on one gallery arch: "Eternal happiness to Allah."[19]

Legends as well as material reminders of their historical past served to preserve the Moriscos' cultural identity. As in those writings analyzed by Denise Filios in her essay in this volume, the Moriscos' stories helped them to survive the drastic changes in their homeland and even their subsequent exile.[20] Moriscos, who had developed their stories over centuries as an oral tradition, wrote them down in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in *aljamía*, a Castilian dialect written in Arabic script.[21] Hidden when Christian officials prohibited all writings in Arabic, these legends resurfaced centuries later as workers pulled down ancient buildings and found hundreds of writings in false walls, floors, ceilings, and pillars.[22] Now a significant, but problematic, source of evidence, those legends that survive present protagonists who had to suffer—and in many cases overcome—injustice, hardships, defeats, and exile. Such themes must have appealed to Moriscos living under increasing oppression in the sixteenth century.

"The Story of the Maiden Carcayona, Daughter of King Nachrab, With the Dove" is a Morisco version of the Handless Maiden tale, a story that has been known in many variations around the world.[23] As a beautiful young girl, Carcayona disobeys her father and refuses to worship his idols after a golden dove tells her of the true God, Allah. In punishment, her father orders the amputation of Carcayona's hands and her abandonment in the wilderness—clearly, a death sentence. Yet it is in this wilderness where wild animals befriend her and a white doe interrupts the hunting of the handsome King of Antioch to bring him to the cave sheltering Carcayona. He falls in love with her and takes her home to his palace as his wife. While he is away on military duty she bears him an infant son, but mother and child are sent into the wilderness after a forged letter accuses Carcayona of bewitching everyone in the kingdom.

Again left to die in the wilderness, Carcayona falls asleep in prayer and awakens to find that Allah has restored her hands. Joyfully, she builds a shelter for herself, her young son, and the white doe that has helped her survive. The King of Antioch comes to find her after he discovers the ruse that had driven her and their son away from his palace. He tries to persuade her to come with him, but Carcayona refuses to return with him to his palace. Instead, she convinces him that they and their young son should go to the banks of the Euphrates River to found a new city where the religion of Allah could be taught.

As a story of power and weakness, victimization and transformation, the tale of Carcayona resonated with Moriscos of early modern Spain. Although we do not know the intentions of those who told or recorded the story, we do know that some Moriscos believed the story so important that they hid a written version when Christians burned Arabic and

Aljamiado writings in the sixteenth century. Hundreds of years later the story can be seen as a metaphor of Morisco history—the mutilation of their autonomy, their attempts to survive through accommodation, their fall from power, and subsequent exile, their hopes to preserve their faith and culture in a new home. Far more complex than an idealized Golden Age of tolerance and cultural accomplishments, this historical memory of stones and stories preserved a sense of identity that encouraged many Moriscos to resist assimilation. But it also motivated and justified efforts to survive through accommodation, to change the present and hope to create a better future.[24]

The Dynamics of Memory

Yet historical memory does not survive in a vacuum, for it is a dynamic process in which lived experiences filter and interact with what we remember of the past and how we use it. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, Moriscos experienced increasing oppression and forced baptism. After a junta of ecclesiastical authorities declared valid these forcible conversions, Charles V in 1526 extended to the Muslims of kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon the same mandate of conversion or expulsion given by his grandmother Isabel a quarter century earlier to Castile's Muslims. Christian Spain had now abandoned all vestiges of what twentieth-century historian Américo Castro retrospectively (and perhaps too idealistically) labeled *convivencia*—the Spanish medieval tradition by which "people of the book" (Christians, Jews, and Muslims) were allowed to live peacefully in their own faiths whether Muslims or Christians held dominant power.[25] Whatever the merits of the term convivencia for describing the state of affairs in medieval Spain, after 1492 it certainly no longer applied to the case of the expelled Jews; and following Charles V's decree of 1526, it was no longer the case for Muslims in any of the Spanish kingdoms. What is more, Christian rulers suspected that "New Christian" converts from Islam or Judaism merely pretended to be Christians. In fact, some Muslims became sincere Christians, but others followed the long-time tradition of *taqiyya*, or "precaution," which instructed the faithful to conform externally to official oppression while maintaining internal loyalty to Islam.[26]

Christian leaders not only forbade Islam in 1526; they also prohibited any Morisco "particularism," including songs, dances, bathing, circumcision, burial of the dead, and the ritual slaughter of animals.[27] Insisting that Moriscos must assimilate, Christian authorities transformed Morisco difference into deviance that must be punished. Moriscos responded to increased pressure to forget their own knowledge of themselves as

Muslims by withdrawing into their homes—perhaps remembering the earlier Muslim tradition of regarding the home as a refuge that protected the family, the core of the *umma*, or community of believers.[28] Medieval Muslim laws described an idealized family that restricted wives to bearing children and caring for their families, but in the sixteenth century many Morisco women expanded the traditions of home and family to play key roles in a form of domestic resistance to Christian prohibitions.[29] In countless everyday tasks in their homes, these women prepared food, consumed it with their families while sitting on the floor, laundered clothing and household linens as preparation for a Muslim "Sabbath," kept the fast of Ramadan, celebrated weddings and births, and prepared the bodies of the dead for burial—all in the tradition of Hispano-Muslims.

Morisco women often taught Islam to their children, continuing a tradition from medieval al-Andalus in which children learned Islam in their homes as well as in mosques and mosque-sponsored schools.[30] Even though men were expected to be religious teachers, Morisco women assumed this role along with many other roles traditionally left to men. Not only did it seem that Morisco men assimilated more quickly as they had more interactions with Christians; the men who did not assimilate often disappeared into hiding, piracy, slavery, or flight to North Africa and other nearby Muslim lands. In countless cases before the Inquisition Moriscos named women who had taught them to preserve the faith and practices of Islam in their own homes. Lucía de la Cruz, for example, was penanced for practicing Islam and teaching it to her daughter and others outside the family; and Angela Hernández, also known as Isabel Jiménez, called "La Hardona," was said to be a "teacher and dogmatist," whose house "was like a mosque."[31]

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Christian authorities recognized the Morisco home as the primary place of resistance and the women as the most "obstinate" in resisting Christianization. They instructed sheriffs to enter homes where they could observe possible transgressions, and they arrested and questioned thousands of Morisco women about their cultural as well as religious practices.[32] Inquisitors prosecuted Leonor de Morales for persuading her husband to follow Muslim practices, for dancing and singing as a Muslim at weddings, for eating while seated on the ground, cooking meat in oil, eating meat on Fridays, changing into clean clothing on Fridays, and "communicating with other Moors."[33] Under torture she confessed to changing into clean clothing and fasting and praying as a Muslim; but she confessed to nothing more, even though she was subjected to six turns of the cord—nor did she give names of any accomplices. Found guilty, she saved herself from being burned alive by asking to become "reconciled to Mother Church." The Inquisition

sentenced her to wear the *sanbenito*, a penitential sack-like garment meant to humiliate her, and it ordered that 100 lashes be given to her as she was driven through streets of Seville.

Contacts with the Inquisition marked Moriscos indelibly. When the Inquisition arrested an individual, they confiscated the family property to cover expenses for the room and board of the imprisoned person. Examination of uncooperative prisoners usually led to at least the threat of questioning under torture, and these questions repeatedly required the prisoner to name other family members and acquaintances involved in Muslim practices. The public *auto de fe* at which convicted prisoners were penanced became a permanent part of their lives and the lives of their families because guilt by association made vulnerable to prosecution or ostracism all family members of a prisoner. The public degradation and punishment of penitents tore apart Morisco families and widened the chasm of difference between Moriscos and Old Christians.[34]

In 1568 Moriscos in the Alpujarras Mountains near Granada led a rebellion against the increasing oppression of Christian rulers. Suffering twin blows of a falling silk market and a new decree invalidating legal documents in the Arabic language that for generations had guaranteed Moriscos' rights to use land, entire Morisco families went into the mountains where they engaged in guerrilla warfare. Women as well as men fought although, according to one Christian eyewitness, the women had no weapons but "stones and roasting spits."[35] Each side committed terrible atrocities against the other and used stories of the horrors they had suffered to justify more violence in response. Moriscos who were not killed were often captured, branded, and sold as slaves—especially the women and children.[36] For nearly two years rebels held off the armies of Philip II and his aristocratic supporters, but even before the last rebels had been killed or surrendered, Christian soldiers rounded up the Moriscos of Granada for "relocation" throughout Castile.[37] Some 50,000 had to leave their homes under armed guard, and nearly one-quarter of them died during their forced journey into internal exile.

Lay and ecclesiastical authorities carried out special surveillance of the newly relocated Moriscos, but growing suspicions and newly discovered plans for more rebellions finally led to the decision to expel Moriscos from all the Spanish kingdoms. Officials agreed to allow about 10 percent of the Moriscos to remain, mostly because nobles petitioned on behalf of certain Morisco vassals they deemed essential, and because Christian clerics certified that a few Moriscos were good and faithful Christians.[38] At least 300,000 Moriscos had to leave Spain, many required to leave behind their children of seven years or younger. As expelled Moriscos left the port of Seville in 1610, officials placed

in warehouses some 300 Morisco children taken from their parents. Here the children waited for Christians who would agree to raise them as "good Christians."[39] Could the mutilation and exile of Carcayona have seemed any more cruel than the lived experiences of many of the Moriscos of Spain?

Political Uses of Religion

Religious orthodoxy seared the historical memory of expelled Moriscos, for it had become a political imperative of the centralized state that Hapsburg monarchs were attempting to establish in Spain. Far more than simply the close collaboration of Crown and Church to legitimize dominance in Christian Spain, the intertwining of politics and religion reveals the significance of religion for a minority group struggling to survive and to preserve its own identity. It shows a fledgling state attempting to justify its assumption of more power and to unify many diverse regional groups against a religious minority that became a convenient common enemy.[40] In addition, it demonstrates the uses of religion to legitimize opposition and the many strategies that an apparently powerless minority used to develop its own power.

Within the context of early modern Spain, the struggle between Moriscos and their Christian rulers was about much more than religious orthodoxy and legitimacy versus religious tolerance and opposition. In many ways, the tension within early modern Spain resembles later European and American imperialism and the resistance against it. For example, "religious orthodoxy" in Hapsburg Spain covered a whole range of imperial ambitions as well as fears of defeat by a primary imperial rival, the Ottoman Empire, that seemed to benefit from Morisco informants.[41] In addition, Moriscos' resistance to Christian oppression often invoked Islam, a strategy followed by many colonial-nationalist groups in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[42]

In the first part of the sixteenth century, erasing the differences of Muslims through assimilation seemed to be a genuine possibility in Spain when Christian clerics preached and taught them Christian basics in the Arabic language.[43] In fact, Christian authorities in some cases permitted Moriscos to pay a tribute to protect their community from prosecution by the Inquisition, allowing them some time to change their customs. Aragonese Moriscos in 1526, for example, agreed to pay a tax of 40,000 ducats for freedom from prosecution by the Inquisition and for a ten-year grace period during which they could use their own language, dress, and cemeteries and receive recognition of consanguine marriages already consummated.[44] In this early modern context, religion increasingly

meant ethnicity and a call—not unlike later European imperialism—for hegemonic conquest by assimilation and education.[45]

Hoping to educate a new generation that would be loyal Christians, Jesuits devoted energy and raised money to found schools for Morisco children.[46] Girls received instruction mostly in Christian doctrine and household crafts, but boys learned reading, writing, numbers, and languages in addition to Christian doctrine. Selecting boys who showed the most aptitude and receptivity, Jesuits trained them to translate their Castilian words into Arabic when Jesuits went to preach to Morisco adults. Some of the boys went on to enter the Jesuit Order and carried on the work of converting other Moriscos. Not surprisingly, many Moriscos strongly opposed these schools as an attack on their parental right to teach their own children. Christian authorities accused Morisco women, in particular, of hiding their children to keep them from Christian schools—and presumably to subvert assimilation.[47]

By the middle of the sixteenth century, coexistence no longer appeared possible. Ecclesiastical leaders grew impatient with trying to Christianize people who seemed to resist their efforts, determined to preserve their own faith and culture. Political authorities, moreover, perceived growing threats from a Turkish and Berber presence that dominated the western Mediterranean and the North African coast. Spanish Christians who saw Moriscos of Granada and Valencia maintaining contact with Constantinople suspected these Moriscos were acting as a treacherous fifth column. Exacerbating this suspicion, Moriscos circulated prophecies of imminent assistance by the Turks against the Christians.[48]

Clearly, there are some parallels between this growing crisis of sixteenth-century Spain and present-day concerns about Muslims in the West. In both cases, a split widens between the West and Islam as Western non-Muslims decry Muslims' lack of assimilation, a situation that Daniela Flesler found in her research on Spanish attitudes toward contemporary Moroccan immigrants.[49] Moreover, many Americans and Europeans perceive Muslims not merely as an annoyance in the present time, but as part of a larger threat to Western geo-political concerns and interests. As Tariq Ali implied so unforgettably in his novel, *Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree*, sixteenth-century Christians' determination to destroy this potentially lethal enemy appear very similar to Western policies against contemporary Muslims and their determination to resist.[50]

To avoid an overly simplistic analogy, however, it is important to acknowledge that the world of the twenty-first century differs very distinctly from that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many Muslims in the contemporary West are regarded as migrants or temporary visitors, whereas Moriscos had lived in Spain as permanent residents for

many generations. At one time, in fact, Muslims were the ruling power in the Iberian Peninsula and they had developed their own memories of this "ideal lost homeland," as Denise Filios argues in another essay in this volume.[51] Moreover, sixteenth-century people did not have the same memories of imperialism and the resistance to it that form an important part of modern historical memory. Finally, technological developments since the time of the Moriscos have increased dependence on petroleum and the oil-rich Middle East so that it has become a more critical strategic concern for the West.

In early modern Spain specific social, economic, and political issues complicated Christian debates about Moriscos. Christian clerics such as Jaime Bleda warned that "the Moriscos were growing each day in number and in wealth, and we were becoming less in everything."[52] Yet growth in the Morisco population benefited some cities and towns that had become depopulated, enlarging the labor pool and lowering the cost of labor. In rural areas of La Mancha and Zaragoza, Morisco participation in local economies promoted their general acceptance.[53] In contrast, Morisco immigration to cities, whether voluntary or coerced, troubled urban officials who feared that their increased population density would spark Morisco rebellions.[54] Christian nobles in Aragon, Valencia, and Granada opposed the expulsion of Moriscos as economically detrimental, not only for landowners dependent on Morisco vassals for producing income from their land, but also for all people of the empire.[55] Moreover, these nobles wanted to limit powers of the growing central state that infringed on their own regional powers. Urban commoners, however, were likely to favor expulsion, for many of them resented the economic success of Moriscos whom they saw as too eager to make money that they hid or took out of Spain.[56] In addition, many ecclesiastical leaders urged the central monarchy to expel the Moriscos as enemies of the faith.

Yet to expel hundreds of thousands of people who had accepted baptism would violate the tradition that Christians did not expel other Christians, nor did they enslave them. In refutation, secular leaders pointed out that no other "Christians" had sought aid from the "infidel" Turks who wanted nothing better than to defeat the Spanish monarchy. Ecclesiastical leaders emphasized the treachery of Moriscos, who pretended to be Christians but still maintained the beliefs and practices of Islam. Even more troubling, authorities had to consider the issue of what to do with Morisco children. Certainly they had been born to Morisco parents who had revealed themselves as false Christians, but many of the children had not yet been taught by their parents to preserve Islam secretly and deceive their Christian teachers.[57] Philip III chose a middle course when he decided that Moriscos going to Christian lands could keep their

children with them as they left Spain, but those going to "infidel lands" must leave behind their children under seven years of age to be raised by Spanish Christians.[58]

Despite much opposition, the Royal Council finally decided to expel Moriscos from the several Spanish kingdoms beginning with Valencia in 1609. Not surprisingly, Philip III appealed to religious ideals in his decree. "Inasmuch as the reason of good and Christian government obliges one in conscience to expel from the kingdoms and republics the things that cause scandal and damage to good subjects and danger to the State, and especially offense and disservice to God our Lord," he began before listing the offenses of the Moriscos. "Not only have they not kept the obligations of our holy faith," he declared, "but they have also demonstrated aversion to it, in great detail and in offense of God our Lord, as has been seen through the multitude of those punished by the Holy Office of the Inquisition. And the rest have committed many robberies and murders against Old Christians. And not content with this," he continued, "they have conspired against my royal Crown and these kingdoms, procuring the aid and support of Turkey."[59] Here the monarch clearly revealed the crucial role of religion in protecting the political interests of his regime.

But Moriscos, too, had used religion for their own power interests. Many had tried to preserve their own identity as Muslims through quiet resistance in their homes. Others openly rebelled against Christian rulers, encouraging all Moriscos to join the rebellion of the Alpujarras and live as Muslims. Even after the forced relocation and special surveillance following the Alpujarras rebellion, Moriscos continued to cling to stories and practices of Islam. Perhaps the Aljamiado story of Job comforted them with the patience and trust of Rahma, Job's wife, who made a sling for his afflicted body and carried him on her back into exile when their village expelled them.[60] And it is her faith and willingness to work hard—even building a shelter with her own hands and offering to sell her hair in order to buy bread—that preserved Job's life until Allah was finally moved to compassion.

For Moriscos in 1609, however, it must have been difficult to find any compassion. Philip III tried to appear compassionate in his decree, declaring that even though all Morisco property should go to him, he would allow them thirty days to dispose of their property to take with them into exile—although not in money or precious metals or jewels or letters of exchange.[61] One of the royal officials clarified this declaration, writing that Moriscos were allowed to take what they could carry on their persons, but everything else was to be left to their lords in compensation for the lords' loss of their labor.[62] Philip III had piously declared, "I take and receive them under my protection and shelter and

royal security…"[63] Yet his words did little to protect the Moriscos from theft, rape, enslavement, and murder during their journeys into exile.[64] Nor would his words be any comfort to the children taken from Morisco parents who were leaving from the port of Seville in 1610, nor could his words ease the anguish of their parents.

Violence in Memory

For those Morisco children left behind and for their families who had to leave them, violence would indelibly mark their historical memory. It is true that Christian authorities attempted to clothe the violence of taking the children from their parents as an orderly, legitimate, even compassionate, act.[65] Undoubtedly, those Christian families who agreed to raise the Morisco children saw themselves as loyal Christians doing a good deed, easily ignoring their self-interest in supporting hegemonic Christianity and, at the same time, their economic benefit from the work these Morisco children would be obligated to perform for them after reaching the age of twelve.[66]

Violence in so many cases becomes the most persistent memory, especially if it is denied by the perpetrators. For the victims, violence then becomes "wounds of memory," in the words of Elizabeth Jelin.[67] Some Morisco families who were torn apart may have tried to forget their abandoned children, simply repressing the memory and accepting the expulsion. Other families may have reacted differently and incorporated into their conscious memory the loss of their children and their homeland. For them, the violence they perceived in their expulsion became a lens through which they saw their past, their present, and their future. It overshadowed all other memories, stirring up fears about power and victimization, honor and shame.[68] Each Morisco experience of violence seemed to cry out for vengeance. In so many cases of human history, memories of violence can evoke horror and shame, a strong defensive reaction, a determination never again to suffer as victims, to simply collude with their victimizers.[69] Once a violent act is committed, honor seems to demand reprisal. Tragically, the memory of violence and the determination to protect oneself from more victimization leads to yet more victims and a vicious cycle of violence and reprisal.

Not surprisingly, the historical memory of Moriscos seemed to focus on only one part of the Morisco experience: an ideology that transformed difference into deviance, beliefs into threats, and threats into open violence legitimized as order. This ideology was not limited to Spain, of course. In the early modern period Spaniards were able to extend this way of thinking to the most distant places of the far-flung Spanish empire.

Tariq Ali makes this point very well in the epilogue to his novel in which the commander of the Christian army that destroyed the Morisco village of al-Hudayl later reappears near the Aztec city of Tenochtitlan as "Captain Cortés."[70] And Murdo MacLeod argues that the violence of Spanish imperial conquest did not really establish a peaceful stable society, but simply redefined violence and redirected it underground where indigenous people also engaged in their own forms of violence.[71]

For Moriscos in the seventeenth century, expulsion clearly marked their memory, but it was only one part of their memory of violence. From older generations Moriscos knew of violence carried out against them in conquest, in betrayal of the conditions of surrender, in forcible baptisms. Most of them suffered the mutilation of their identities in the prohibition of their Muslim names, faith, and culture. Many knew the terror of being called before the Inquisition, of not knowing who had denounced them or why, their ordeal of trying to protect family members when questions during torture required them to name "accomplices."[72] Some knew the tyranny of the gag, forcibly silenced so that they could not talk with other Moriscos while held in the prisons of the Inquisition. Countless Morisco families suffered the confiscation of property and wealth, the loss of family reputation and permanent separation from family members. Moriscos of Granada lost their homes and experienced the hardships of forced relocation and increased surveillance after the defeat of the rebellion of the Alpujarras. As Christian officials debated "the Morisco question," some labeled Moriscos as "bad weeds" that multiplied excessively, oversexed pedophiles who could only be controlled by expulsion, extermination, castration, or slavery.[73]

Yet Moriscos also victimized others by inflicting violence. In both 1499 and 1568 they gathered up forbidden arms and fought in armed rebellions that included unspeakable atrocities, such as gouging out the eyes of Christians taken prisoner, and cutting to pieces before his mother's eyes a twelve-year-old Christian boy whom they had captured.[74] As bandits, highwaymen, and pirates, some Moriscos carried out theft, rape, and murder; and they cruelly enslaved some Christians who fell victim to them. Seeming to revert to past centuries when they regarded Christians as enemies in armed conflict, some Moriscos also passed information to Ottoman Turks and received arms from them.

Violence figures so powerfully in historical memory because it serves political purposes. In the early modern period, the Spanish state that was forming among several Iberian kingdoms required a common enemy more than a tradition of peaceful coexistence. To unify all the many regions of Spain, secular and ecclesiastical leaders encouraged a Christian identity formed in large part in reaction against Morisco difference and connections

with Ottoman Turks. The Reconquest and its accompanying Crusade would become the most powerful historical memory as religious leaders of the newly developing state looked at what they called the "Morisco problem." Not surprisingly, they acted to finally defeat the descendants of Muslims so clearly identified as the enemy during the Reconquest. In the early seventeenth century, they chose to expel Moriscos, justifying their decision as less cruel than slavery, castration, or killing.[75]

However, the Morisco story of Carcayona is about hope as well as suffering. It is true that Moriscos suffered the cruel amputation of their identities and autonomy, just as Carcayona suffered the amputation of her hands. It is also true that unjust authorities ordered both Carcayona and the Moriscos to be exiled and abandoned. Yet many Moriscos, such as Carcayona, found hope in their suffering and set out to build a new home in exile. Not all were successful, for in some parts of North Africa and the Middle East they encountered sharp suspicion that they were impure Muslims, tainted by their living with Spanish Christians. In Tunisia, however, an Ottoman governor welcomed Moriscos into agricultural communities, perhaps recognizing their political usefulness as a willing pool of new workers and a political balance to native Tunisians who resented Ottoman rule.[76] Many Morisco writings from exile sought to explain their oppression and expulsion through prophecies not only of the ruin of Christian Spain, but also about Morisco suffering and ultimate redemption.[77]

Although our contemporary world differs greatly from the Moriscos' world of early modern Spain, the relevance of Morisco history for the present time is clear. We, too, live in a world in which some people forbid and mutilate the cultures and identities of other people, regarding them as too different to be acceptable. The presence of an unassimilated Other did not end with expulsion of the Moriscos, nor has hatred of difference disappeared, nor violence against those seen as too different to be tolerated. In fact, we see all of these parallels reappear in our own world in issues of immigration, migrant workers, tribal conflicts, boundary revisions, and land settlements. Like the Moriscos of five centuries ago, we remember the past through stories and stones, the legends and material reminders of people long gone. We use this past as a means of identity, whether to modify through assimilation or preserve through resistance. Interacting with the lived experiences of our own lives, our past has become a dynamic memory, and we see very clearly in this twenty-first century how violence persists as the strongest memory of all. Certainly the cries of the Morisco children forcibly taken from their parents and left in warehouses echo still in the cries of children all over our globe caught up in the violence of present-day conflicts.

More than calling us to facile analogies or causal arguments for relevance; however, Morisco history challenges us to examine the politics of historical memory and to learn from the past. As both Elizabeth Jelin and Murdo MacLeod have argued, it is essential to examine carefully the historical context and available historical sources for the memories that have been used by succeeding generations to promote their own particular political positions.[78] A closer examination of context and sources raises important questions, such as why historical sources emphasize certain kinds of violence while ignoring others, why some historical experiences are so traumatic that those involved simply try to forget them in silence, why some memories of the past become respected legends used by succeeding generations to explain and justify and motivate others to support.

In the case of the Moriscos, it would be tempting to simply focus on the "relevance" constructed from the many parallels between them and groups of people living in our own time. A careful consideration of Morisco history, however, demonstrates the crucial importance of recognizing the limits of analogy. We live in a world that is not only similar to, but also different from, that of the Moriscos. Technological developments in communication, transportation, and warfare in the contemporary world allow us to manipulate and use memory even more effectively than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although culture wars of the modern world may resemble the Muslim-Christian struggles of earlier periods, a more nuanced understanding of historical memory urges us to recognize their significant differences. As Leyla Rouhi points out in her essay in this volume, the task of assessing relevance is neither simple nor easy. It requires critical and constant reflection, recognizing both ambiguity and complexity.[79]

Notes

I thank David Coleman, Simon Doubleday, Sherry Katz, my colleagues in the History Department of Occidental College, and members of the Occidental Writing Network, who critiqued earlier versions of this essay and provided many valuable suggestions.

1. Terms of surrender are in Luis del Mármol Carvajal, *Historia del rebelión y castigo de los moriscos del reino de Granada* (1600) in *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles* (Madrid: Atlas, 1946), p. 21 (146–150).
2. L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain 1250 to 1500* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), discusses the Christian policies that Muslims rebelled against in Granada, esp. pp. 330–334. See also Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, *Los moriscos españoles y su expulsion. Estudio histórico-crítico.* 2 vols. (Valencia: Francisco Vives y Mora, 1901), pp. 1, 108, for the mass baptism of Muslims;

Juan Aranda Doncel, *Los moriscos en tierras de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1984) discusses the impact of the 1501 pragmatic requiring religious conversion of Muslims of Granada, pp. 47–48.

3. On the use of the term "Morisco," see L.P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain, 1500–1614* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 2–6. For more on assimilation of Moriscos, see David Coleman, *Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492–1600* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); and especially James Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians: Moriscos and Catholicism in Early Modern Spain* (New Orleans, LA: University Press of the South, 2002).
4. Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York : Harper and Row, 1980), presents a persuasive argument about the collective nature of memory, but see also Elizabeth Jelin's critique of a "reified collective memory," and her discussion of the social nature of memories in her *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*, trans. Judy Rein and Marcial Godoy-Anativia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 11–12. For a very different approach to culturally filtered memory, see Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), esp. p. 12.
5. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 288, points out that domination breeds resistance. Although his observations are from the modern period, I believe they apply equally well to the late medieval and early modern periods when Spain was a nation and an empire in formation.
6. One of many examples is Jaime Vicens Vives, *Aproximación a la historia de España* (Barcelona: Centro de Estudios Históricos Internacionales, 1962), pp. 115–131.
7. Jelin, *State Repression*, pp. xiv and 26.
8. Jelin, *State Repression*, p. xv.
9. Edward Said, *The Pen and the Sword: Conversations with David Barsamian* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994); and by the same author, *Culture and Imperialism*.
10. Jelin, *State Repression*.
11. James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1990). See also his *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).
12. Murdo J. MacLeod, "Some Thoughts on the Pax Colonial, Colonial Violence, and Perceptions of Both," in *Native Resistance and the Pax Colonial in New Spain,* ed. Susan Schroder (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 129–142.
13. William Ian Miller, *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).
14. For more on the history and culture of Muslim Spain, see Harvey, *Islamic Spain;* for a more idealized view of al-Andalus, see Maria Rosa Menocal,

The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002).

15. Antonio Collantes de Terán Sánchez, *Sevilla en la baja edad media: La ciudad y sus hombres* (Seville: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1977), p. 84; and Jacinto Bosch Vilá, *La Sevilla islámica, 712–1248*, no. 92 of *Historia de Sevilla*, ed. Francisco Morales Padrón (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1984), pp. 228–233.
16. Bosch Vilá, *La Sevilla islámica*, esp. p. 160.
17. Collantes de Terán Sánchez, *Sevilla en la baja edad media*, presents evidence from *padrones* (census lists) that women as well as men worked in construction, p. 335; Klaus Wagner, *Regesto de documentos del Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla referentes a judíos y moros* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1978), found many Muslims listed as masons and potters, pp. 8–9; Ramón Carande, *Sevilla, fortaleza y mercado: Las tierras, las gentes y la administración de la ciudad en el siglo XIV*, 3rd edn. (Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1982), suggests that the numerical superiority of women over men in the 14th century may account for the fact that many women worked as peons for masons and tilemakers, pp. 50–51.
18. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak,* suggests many ways that disempowered people use everyday actions to ridicule those who have power over them.
19. Joaquín González Moreno, *Aportación a la historia de Sevilla* (Sevilla: Editorial Castillejo, 1991) p. 197.
20. See the essay by Denise Filios, chapter 4 in this volume.
21. Francisco Guillén Robles, *Leyendas moriscas sacadas de varios manuscritos existentes en las Bibliotecas Nacional, Real, y de D.P. de Gayangos*, 3 vols. (Madrid: M. Tello, 1885). Most scholars believe that these legends were originally told in Arabic, but translated into Aljamía because fewer Mudejares and Moriscos understood Arabic as they continued to live under Christian rule.
22. Luce López Baralt, *Islam in Spanish Literature: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. Andrew Hurley (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), pp. 171–174; A.R. Nykel, *A Compendium of Aljamiado Literature* (New York and Paris: Macon, Protat Freres, 1929), esp. pp. 29–30; Julián Ribera and Miguel Asín, *Manuscritos árabes y aljamiados de la Biblioteca de la Junta* (Madrid: Junta para Amplicación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas, 1912), pp. v–xviii, 138, 156–157; and Gerard Wiegers, *Islamic Literature in Spanish and Aljamiado* (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1994).
23. *La historia de la doncella Carcayona, hija del rey Nachrab con la paloma* is available as ms 5313 in the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (hereafter BN). Pino Valero Cuadra analyzes the story in "La leyenda de la doncella Carcayona," in *Sharq al-Andalus* 12 (1995): 349–366. Guillén Robles, *Leyendas moriscas*, presents both an aljamiado version (1:181–221) and Castilian version (1:42–53). Anti Aarne classified handless maiden tales as type 706 in his *The Types of the Folktale: A Classification and Bibliography*, trans. and enl. Stith Thompson, Folklore Fellows Communications, vol. 75, no. 184 (Helsinki: Helsingin Liikekirjapaino Oy, 1961), pp. 240–241; other

versions of this tale are entitled "The Handless Bride," "The Orchard," and "Silver Hands." Clarissa Pinkola Estés discusses the tale in her *Women Who Run with the Wolves* (New York: Ballantine, 1995), pp. 387–455.

24. For more on historical memory, see Karen Fields, "What One Cannot Remember Mistakenly," *History and Memory in African-American Culture*, eds. Genevieve Fabre and Robert O'Meally (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 161; and Jonathan Hill, "Introduction," *Rethinking History and Myth: Indigenous South American Perspectives on the Past*, ed. Jonathan D. Hill (Urban and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), esp. p. 5.
25. Américo Castro, *España en su historia* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2001 reprint of 1948 original); Mark D. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991) presents a careful consideration of the collapse of the tradition of *convivencia* in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel; see his Introduction, pp. 1–9.
26. Most scholars believe that *taqiyya* originated with Muslim Shi'i as living under Sunni domination, particularly those dissenters who joined the secret societies of Isma'ilis, Nu-sayris, and Druses. See, for example, H. Lammens, *Islam: Beliefs and Institutions*, trans. Sir E. Denison Ross (London: Methuen, 1968), p. 168; Louis Cardaillac, "Un aspecto de las relaciones entre moriscos y cristianos: polémica y taqiyya," in *Actas del coloquio internacional sobre literature aljamiada y morisca* (Madrid: CLEAM, 1978), 3: 107–122; and sura 16: 106 of *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary*, trans. and comm. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Hafner Publishing Co., 1946) 1: 685.
27. Archivo Histórico Nacional (hereafter AHN), Inquisición, libro 1254. But also see AHN, Inquisición, libro 1229, fol. 37, for the warning that intermarriage with Moriscos or Judeo-conversos could lead the faithful away from the Church.
28. For example, see Ibn 'Abdun, *Sevilla a comienzos del siglo XII. El Tratado de Ibn 'Abdun*, ed. and trans. Emilio García Gómez and E. Levi-Provençal (Seville: Servicio Municipal de Publicaciones, 1981), p. 112. See also Bosch Vilá, *La Sevilla islámica*, p. 242; and Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. p. 31.
29. *Leyes de moros del siglo XIV*, in *Memorial Histórico Español* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1853) V: 11–246. See also Ronald E. Surtz, "Morisco Women, Written Text, and the Valencia Inquisition," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 32.2 (Summer 2001): 421–433.
30. Julián Ribera y Tarragó, *La enseñanza entre los musulmanes españoles. Bibliófilos y bibliotecas en la España musulmana* (Córdoba: Real Academia de Córdoba, 1925), esp. pp. 72–73 and 84–86.
31. For Lucía de la Cruz, see AHN, Inquisición, legajo 2075, no. 11; the case of Ángela Hernández is presented in Rafael Gracia Boix, *Autos de fe y causas de la Inquisición de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Diputación Provincial, 1983), p. 246.

32. See the "Instrucción" and "Informe," reprinted in Mercedes García Arenal, *Los Moriscos* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1975), pp. 106–125.
33. Information on her case is in AHN, Inquisición, legajo 2075, no. 11.
34. For more on the impact of punishment through the Inquisition, see Mary Elizabeth Perry, *The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and The Politics of Religion in Early Modern Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 83–87.
35. BN ms R 31.736, *Relación muy verdadera sacada de una carta que vino al Illustre Cabildo y regimiento desta ciudad* (Seville: Alonso de la Barrera, 1569).
36. Aranda Doncel, *Los Moriscos,* estimates that at least 25,000 people were enslaved during the war, predominantly women and children. For more on atrocities, see Mármol Carvajal, *Historia del rebelión*, p. 203, esp.; and the petition of Doña Beatriz de Moya, requesting damages for the brutal murder of her twelve-year-old son, in Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS), Cámara de Castilla, legajo 2169.
37. Mármol Carvajal, *Historia del rebelión*, published much important information about this rebellion some thirty years after its defeat; for more firsthand information about the relocation of the Moriscos of Granada, see the letter of November 3, 1570, from Cristóbal del Aguila to Philip II, in AGS, Cámara de Castilla, legajo 2157.
38. Tueller, *Good and Faithful Christians,* discusses the criteria by which certain Moriscos established their Christian loyalty and escaped the expulsion. Demands and petitions by nobles to retain at least some of their Morisco vassals are discussed in Perry, *Handless Maiden*, esp. p. 146.
39. For the children left in warehouses in Seville, see AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, legajo 415, no. 60, part 2. A longer discussion of the decision to leave these children is in Perry, *Handless Maiden*, pp. 147–158 and 172–174. Very important work on this topic is presented by François Martínez, "Les enfants morisques de l'expulsion (1610–1621)," in *Mélanges Louis Cardaillac*, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi (Zaghouan: Fondation Temimi Pour la Recherche Scientifique et l'Information, 1995), pp. 499–539.
40. For more on the theoretical basis of this argument, see Anne Norton, *Reflections on Political Identity* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); and Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).
41. An excellent source on the concerns of Spanish rulers about Turks and Moriscos is Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Morisco prophecies of victory and aid from the Turks are in García Arenal, *Los Moriscos*, pp. 55–62.
42. Edward W. Said makes important points about Islam and postcolonial struggles in both his *Culture and Imperialism*, p. xiii, esp.; and in his *The Pen and the Sword*, esp. p. 91.
43. Arzobispo Martín de Ayala, "Doctrina Christiana, en lengua araviga y castellana" (Valencia: Joan Mey, 1566), BN R8782, is one example. See

also "Informe de Madrid a Valencia sobre instrucción de los moriscos," in García Arenal, *Los Moriscos*, pp. 116–125.

44. Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, *Historia de los Moriscos*, p. 24.
45. Edward Said refers to this strategy of imperialism for a later period as "ideological pacification" that taught subject people the superiority of their rulers' culture over their own; see his *Pen and the Sword*, p. 67.
46. Francisco Borja de Medina, S.I., "La Compañía de Jesús y la minoría morisca (1545–1614)," *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* 57 (1998): 3–136.
47. García Arenal, *Los Moriscos*, presents an account of the opposition of Moriscos to these schools, especially the opposition of women, p. 122.
48. Three of the Morisco prophecies of victory and aid from the Turks were translated for the Inquisition in Granada and are in Mármol Carvajal, *Historia del rebellion*, pp. 169–174.
49. See the thoughtful essay of Daniela Flesler, "Contemporary Moroccan Immigration and its Ghosts," chapter 5 in this volume.
50. Tariq Ali, *Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree* (London and New York: Verso, 1993).
51. See the important essay by Denise Filios, "Expulsion from Paradise: Exiled Intellectuals and Andalusian Tolerance," chapter 4 in this volume.
52. Jaime Bleda, *Coronica de los moros de España* (Valencia: Felipe Mey, 1618), BN R 15.119. On debates surrounding the expulsion, see especially Benjamin Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos: Juan de Ribera and Religious Reform in Valencia, 1568–1614* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
53. Mary Halavais, *Like Wheat to the Miller: Community, Convivencia, and the Construction of Morisco Identity in Sixteenth-Century Aragon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Carla Rahn Phillips, "The Moriscos of La Mancha," *Journal of Modern History* 50.2 (1978): D1067–D1095.
54. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1976) 2: 334–335.
55. *Memorial* of P. Sobrino, Sept. 1609, in García Arenal, *Los moriscos*, pp. 247–250.
56. See, for example, Bleda, *Corónica de los moros*, pp. 905–906.
57. All this information is in Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, *Los Moriscos españoles y su expulsion. Estudio histórico-crítico*, 2 vols. (Valencia: Francisco Vives y Mora, 1901), esp. 2: pp. 523–550.
58. *Declaración del Bando que se publicado de la expulsion de los Moriscos* (Seville: Alonso Rodríguez Gamarra, 1610), n.p.
59. *Traslado de la cédula real que se publicó en la ciudad de Córdova a diez y siete días del mes de enero* (Cordova: n.p. 1610), BN ms VE 36–4, n.p.
60. Guillén Robles has published this story as "Estoria y Recontamiento de Job," in his *Leyendas moriscas*, I:225–263. For more on the story, see Mary

Elizabeth Perry, "Patience and Pluck: Job's Wife, Conflict and Resistance in Morisco Manuscripts Hidden in the Sixteenth Century," in *Women, Texts and Authority in Early Modern Spain*, eds. Marta Vicente and Luis R. Corteguera (New York and London: Ashgate, 2003) pp. 91–106.

61. *Traslado*, n.p.
62. Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la corte de España, desde 1599 hasta 1614* (Madrid: J. Martín Alegría, 1857) p. 383.
63. *Traslado*, n.p.
64. Reports from Christian nobles, soldiers, captains, and from Moriscos describe countless misfortunes befalling the unfortunate people as they went into exile. See Perry, *Handless Maiden*, esp. pp. 148–156, and 159–161.
65. Miller, *Humiliation and Other Essays*, makes the very important point that "violence is perspectival," p. 55; and on p. 74 that "Clothing violence in legitimacy makes it hard to recognize. The presumption of legitimacy given to the state, for example, makes state violence almost invisible."
66. J. Ripol, *Diálogo de Consuelo por la expulsion de los Moriscos de España* (Pamplona: Nicolas de Assiayn, 1613, R14165 in the Biblioteca Nacional), p. 70.
67. Jelin, *State Repression*, p. 17.
68. Miller, *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor*, notes, on p. x, that honor is "rooted in a desire to pay back what we owe, both the good and the evil."
69. Jelin, *State Repression*, p. 19. Also, see Victor Perera's history of his Sephardic Jewish family, *The Cross and the Pear Tree: A Sephardic Journey* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995) and note especially how the memories of victimization galvanized his determination that his people should have their own homeland where they would be free from persecution.
70. Ali, *Shadows*, p. 240.
71. MacLeod, "Some Thoughts on the Pax Colonial," pp. 129–142, esp. p. 130.
72. The Spanish Inquisition was not unique at this time in using torture as an attempt to uncover the truth, nor is it difficult to understand why inquisitors would suspect that the practice of Islam by one family member probably meant that most family members also continued to follow Islam. For more, see Edward Peters, *Inquisition* (New York: Free Press, 1988); and Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999).
73. For accusations that Moriscos multiplied like "bad weeds," see the Informe of Don Alonso Gutiérrez, reprinted in Boronat y Barrachina, *Los moriscos españoles*, 1:635; and Pedro Aznar Cardona, quoted in García Arenal, *Los Moriscos*, p. 233. For a proposal for extermination, see Pedro de Valencia, "Tratado acerca de los moriscos de España," in his *Obras varias* (Zafra, 1606) BN ms 8888, beginning at p. 57. Castration of Moriscos is proposed in Alonso Gutiérrez, in Boronat y Barrachina, *Los moriscos españoles*, 1:634–638 and discussed in Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, *Historia de los*

moriscos, p. 71. Perry, *Handless Maiden*, discusses accusations of pedophilia and excessive sex, pp. 48–59.

74. An eye-gouging account appears in Mármol Carvajal, *Historia del rebelión*, p. 75. Testimony about the cutting into pieces of a Christian boy before the eyes of his mother is in AGS, Cámara de Castilla, legajo 2169, petition of Doña Margarita de Trevino and Doña Beatriz de Moya.
75. Pedro de Valencia, "Tratado acerca de los Moriscos de España," in his *Obras varias* (1606), BN ms 8888, pp. 57 ff; and Don Alonso Gutiérrez, *Informe*, reprinted in Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, *Los Moriscos españoles y su expulsion: Estudio histórico-critico*, 2 vols. (Valencia: Francisco Vives y Mora, 1901), 1: 634–638.
76. For Tunisia, see Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, esp. p. 121; for a larger discussion of Moriscos in exile, see Perry, *Handless Maiden*, pp. 159–166.
77. See, for example, MS 290, Bibliotheque Nactionale de Paris, pp. 410–416, discussed in Juan Penella, "El sentimento religioso de los moriscos españoles emigrados. Notas para una literature morisca en Túnez," in *Actas del Coloquio Internacional sobre Literatura Aljamiada y Morisca,* ed. Alvaro Galmés de Fuentes (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1972), pp. 447–473.
78. Jelin, *State Repression*, p. xv; MacLeod, "Some Thoughts on the Pax Colonial," esp. p. 142.
79. See Leyla Rouhi's essay "Reading *Don Quijote* in a Time of War," chapter 2 in this volume.

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CHAPTER 4

EXPULSION FROM PARADISE: EXILED INTELLECTUALS AND ANDALUSIAN TOLERANCE

Denise K. Filios

In popular culture, al-Andalus is nostalgically represented as a paradise of tolerant coexistence. Many novels, films, and popular histories depict Muslims, Jews, and Christians living together in harmony and prosperity; as a logical consequence, what destroyed al-Andalus was intolerance, be it Muslim as in Youssef Chahine's film *Al-Massir* (Destiny) or Christian as in Salman Rushdie's novel *The Moor's Last Sigh.* In these depictions, al-Andalus represents the ideal lost homeland, the place where almost everyone could have lived free from violence and discrimination because of ethnicity, religion, or political allegiance. Significantly, many of those who promote this idealized image of al-Andalus have suffered persecution, violence, and/or exile. Imaginatively inhabiting al-Andalus in their writing or filmmaking is a way to make a home for themselves to replace the one that has rejected them. Idealizing depictions of Andalusian coexistence enable their authors to explore possibilities for making the real world a more survivable place and/or for remaking the self in order to be more able to survive exile. Such depictions fuse history and fantasy to produce a credible Otherworld that mirrors this one and other selves who have survived and to some extent overcome the fragmentation of exile.[1]

"[Exile] is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted."[2] Thus Edward Said forcefully conveys how exile

disrupts one's connection with history and the enduring pain this rupture causes. Physical absence from the homeland, however, does not sever one's ties to it: "What makes exile the pernicious thing it is is not really the state of being away, as much as the impossibility of ever *not* being away—not just being absent, but never being able to redeem this absence."[3] The profound sense of loss is exacerbated by the continuing connection to the homeland which for an exile can exist only on the imaginary level, forcing him/her to rely on cultural symbols—ritual and memory—to maintain the affective ties that help (re)create national identity at a remove. Such practices can help stabilize an individual and a community in exile, but because they reduce the homeland to an idea, they can also result in an idealized image of the lost homeland and lead exiles "to insulate themselves from their surroundings, to retreat to their community as a place of refuge and spiritual fortress," to resist integrating into their host country and/or engaging with the world around them. The degrading nature of exile combined with the stigma and vulnerability of a refugee whose presence is often resented encourages exiles to embrace "the encompassing and thumping language of national pride,"[4] a triumphalist group ideology that mitigates the isolation of exile. As Sebastiaan Faber has shown, the writing of many exiled Spanish Republicans reflects such militant nationalism, including Américo Castro's historiography that benefited from an exile's critical detachment and freedom to question national myths yet also was an attempt to wrest cultural authority from the Nationalists by asserting a revisionary Spanish history. Assuming the elitist role of the "people's doctor" who "wields a paternal authority over his national 'patients'" and seeks to cure them of their national ills, Castro argued that the Fascist/Nationalist victory was inevitable due to the Castilian tradition of violent suppression of heterodoxy, dating from the *Reconquista,* and urged his readers to acknowledge and embrace the hybrid nature of Spanish culture in opposition to Franco's purist ideology of *nacionalcatolicismo*.[5]

The work of exiled intellectuals can revolutionize scholarship; it can also keep alive the conflicts that caused their exile in the first place. An exile's rupture with history can cause him/her to remain stuck in the past, at the moment of exile, continuing to fight old battles although history has moved on and promoting an exclusive nationalist ideology that is often out of date and perpetuates old hatreds that can impede both national and individual healing. Rather than adhering to triumphalist ideologies, Said advocates a cosmopolitan stance born of critical detachment, freedom from national ideologies, and familiarity with two or more cultures. Such a stance can help mitigate the unending pain of exile: "There is a unique pleasure in this sort of apprehension [of simultaneous similarities and

differences between the native and host culture], especially if the exile is conscious of other contrapuntal juxtapositions that diminish orthodox judgment and elevate appreciative sympathy."[6] Eva Hoffman also emphasizes the liberating aspects of plurality: "to have a deep experience of two cultures is to...discover that even the most interstitial and seemingly natural aspects of our identities and social reality are constructed rather than given and that they could be arranged, shaped, articulated in quite another way." Unfortunately, the painful, unstable nature of life in exile makes it a constant struggle to avoid triumphalist ideologies that lend stability and certainty to a fragile existence. As a result, exiled intellectuals, whatever their views, turn to discourse, to writing, to reconstruct and stabilize their fragmented identities: "Hence exiles' feverish urge to write: they feel a need to record, to solidify, if only discursively, what they have lost or left behind."[7] The act of writing can offer consolation and validation by articulating and exteriorizing one's experiences, yet it also encourages displacement of the self, projecting oneself elsewhere, into a world that exists primarily in writing. Depictions of al-Andalus can serve exiled intellectuals' need to construct an ideal homeland that is more or less historical to replace the former home that has become inhospitable due to warfare, regime change, or economic crisis.

María Rosa Menocal, Amin Maalouf, and Rachid Nini, exiled intellectuals all three, articulate themselves through their representations of al-Andalus. Each writes in a different genre with very different conventions and claims to truthfulness; but for each, al-Andalus enables them to depict a subject of history who reflects the author's experience as an exiled intellectual trying to make a home in a new land. Of the three authors I study here, Rachid Nini is the most direct in his depiction of self. A Moroccan writer who lived in Spain as an undocumented worker, Nini wrote about his experiences as an economic exile in *Diario de un ilegal* (1999).[8] For Nini, al-Andalus is the inverse of the intolerant Spain that he experiences, illustrating the rupture between the idealized past and inhospitable present. In his novel *Léon l'Africain* (1986), Maalouf indirectly tells his own story through the voice of Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi, better known as Leo the African.[9] In order to survive repeated exiles, Hasan/Leo develops a hybrid identity that rejects the singular, essentialist identities that tore apart a no longer ideal Granada that is a thinly concealed projection of Lebanon. Of these three authors, Menocal is the least open about representing herself in her *Ornament of the World* (2002).[10] Alternately identifying with the conquering exile Abd al-Rahman I and the successfully integrated exiled vizier-poet Samuel ibn Naghrila, Menocal portrays al-Andalus as a haven for the right sort of exile.

María Rosa Menocal's *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* is a much praised popular history that seeks to spread the idealized image of al-Andalus so familiar to the Arab world and Spain to the United States. Most of Menocal's book consists of stories about selected figures, times, and places that flesh out and humanize her brief overview of the history of Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula, 750–1605; she frames these vignettes with a polemical introduction and conclusion that offer Andalusian tolerant multiculturalism as a model for resolving religious and ethnic conflict in today's world. While Menocal wrote *Ornament* to make medieval Spain relevant to a broad American reading public, she also indirectly incorporates her own story as a Cuban exile and migrant intellectual into her history of al-Andalus. The dedication hints at the personal significance of her book: "For *un hombre sincero de donde crece la palma*, my father, the intrepid Enrique Menocal, who has lived in life-long exile from his own land of the palm trees."[11] Figuring her father as an exemplary Cuban in her appropriation of José Martí's most famous poem, this dedication also alludes to Abd al-Rahman I, the sole survivor of the Umayyad dynasty that was displaced by the Abbasid revolution, who fled Damascus and took refuge in Córdoba where he seized the throne to become the new emir of al-Andalus, which he remade in the image of his lost home. Menocal also calls Abd al-Rahman "intrepid," celebrates his planting a palm grove in Córdoba, and cites a poem attributed to him:

> A palm tree stands in the middle of Rusafa,
> Born in the West, far from the land of palms.
> I said to it: How like me you are, far away and in exile,
> In long separation from family and friends.
> You have sprung from soil in which you are a stranger,
> And I, like you, am far from home.[12]

The obvious echoes of Martí in Abd al-Rahman's poem, her emphasis on exile throughout her book, and her choice to celebrate the first Umayyad ruler of al-Andalus rather than, say, Tariq ibn Ziyad, the Berber leader of the Muslim forces that conquered the Iberian peninsula, underline Menocal's personal investment in depicting a heroic exile-refugee who remade his lost home in a new land, although she never explicitly refers to her own experience of exile in *Ornament*.[13] She presents Abd al-Rahman as an extraordinary exile who through his audacity, political savvy, and lineage, being "the grandson of the caliph, the successor to the Prophet and the supreme temporal and spiritual leader of the Islamic world,"

manages to heal himself by recuperating what was taken from him by the Abbasid "usurpers."[14] Clearly his story is not a typical exile narrative, as refugees usually are not in a position to force hospitality from their hosts whose language and culture often are not those of their guests. The vulnerability of exiles sustains their insecurity and alienation, and often leads them to respond in diametric ways—either forming ethnic enclaves that isolate them from their host country and enable them to maintain their old identity, or by assimilating, adopting the language and culture of their host country, sometimes thereby attaining a prestigious position albeit still remaining a minority. Modern exiled intellectuals like Menocal tend to follow the second option. Abd al-Rahman, the exiled conqueror, represents a third way that pertains more to the realm of legend than to the lived experience of real exiles.

A triumphant exile, Abd al-Rahman reclaimed his privileged position as hereditary ruler, founded a new Umayyad dynasty, and, Menocal claims, created a unique "culture of tolerance" which is what made al-Andalus ideal. However, in order to overcome subjugation, Abd al-Rahman had to subjugate others who in Menocal's view ought to have accepted their subjugation to the clearly superior Arab-Syrian Umayyads and their culture. Andalusian tolerant multiculturalism was thoroughly hierarchical: Syrian Arabs ruled, and all others had to accept lower positions due to their ethnicity and/or religion. Menocal harshly criticizes Andalusian Christians who not only refused to Arabize but violently resisted their subjugated status; she depicts Alvarus of Córdoba and the Mozarab martyrs as intolerant religious extremists who violated Islamic law by ridiculing the Prophet, thus "forcing the hands of the authorities of the city" to put them to death, language that reveals the limits of Umayyad tolerance. Menocal correctly says that the Mozarab protest was driven more by their loss of social and political power than by a lack of religious freedom. However, rather than acknowledge that the injustice and inequality visited upon disenfranchised minorities breed violent resistance, she proclaims the superiority of Arab language, culture, and literature, using the alleged inferiority of Latin and Hebrew literature to justify the subjugation of Christians and Jews and defending Andalusian inequality.[15]

While Menocal criticizes Christian refusniks, she praises Arabized Jews whose social mobility she presents as proof of Umayyad tolerance. A case in point is Samuel ibn Naghrila, who fled Córdoba after the fall of the second Umayyad caliphate and rose to the position of vizier in Granada. Menocal depicts Samuel and his son Joseph as partially able to overcome exile by building gardens and palaces that were, "like Abd al-Rahman's palm tree, the echoes and reconstructed memories of a mourned homeland." Samuel's palace is "now deeply buried and mostly

invisible," so Menocal attributes monumental status to his poetry: "His distinctively Andalusian voice not only rewrote the history of Hebrew poetry in a groundbreaking way but was also part of a landscape filled with all manner of poetic experimentation." However significant this literary achievement was, it did not protect his son Joseph from dying in the 1066 pogroms.[16] Joseph's story shows how precarious life could be even for successful, fully integrated Andalusian Jews.

Menocal's celebration of Arabized Jews is motivated by her need to defend her portrayal of Umayyad tolerance and by her use of Andalusian history to tell her own story indirectly. She depicts Iberian Jews collectively, and Samuel ibn Naghrila specifically, as exiles who gained social mobility by assimilating and becoming a vibrant intellectual elite. However, unlike Abd al-Rahman, Jews had to accept their subjugated status and accommodate regime change. Menocal tries to conceal the fact that even assimilated Jews were second-class citizens in Umayyad al-Andalus; nonetheless, it is highly significant that she requires conquered Jews and Christians to accept subjugation while she celebrates a heroic exile who refused to do so. Menocal's construction of Abd al-Rahman as an autonomous subject fully supplied with masculine agency and able to assert his will over a receptive new homeland recreates the idealized sovereign agent who is the constant hero of triumphalist national narratives. He is a fantasy construction, an exile turned conqueror who resists subjugation by asserting his essential, privileged identity as heir to the Umayyad caliphate. As Said comments, "Exiles...generally do not have armies or states...Exiles feel, therefore, an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people."[17] Abd al-Rahman incarnates a triumphant ideology and has an army to boot. That his triumph perpetuates an elitist, exclusive system that necessarily subjects others to violence, discrimination, and exile are inconvenient facts that Menocal tries to ignore. This hierarchical model of tolerant multiculturalism would hardly resolve the sectarian and ethnic violence of today's world, fueled by injustice, inequality, and exclusion.[18]

Amin Maalouf also depicts al-Andalus as a lost paradise of tolerant coexistence in his historical novel *Léon l'Africain*; however, unlike Menocal's Abd al-Rahman, Maalouf's Hasan/Leo accepts his status as a subjected subject.[19] Maalouf, like Menocal, uses his version of Andalusian history to tell indirectly his own story, although the expectations of historical fiction mean that the reader is far more likely to see his narrator-protagonist as Maalouf's alter-ego. His novel is the fictive autobiography of the legendary al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi, known in Europe as Leo Africanus, author of *La Descrittione*

dell'Africa. Maalouf's protagonist is born in Granada in 894 AH/1489 CE and lives most of his life in exile, repeatedly having to flee cities where he has made a home, including Fez, Cairo, and Rome. His many exiles help Hasan/Leo construct a resilient and contingent sense of self that enables him to adapt to radically changed circumstances and roles. Natalie Zemon Davis's work on the historical al-Hasan/Yuhanna (as she identifies him after his baptism) portrays him as a trickster who moves between two identities, as in his well-known tale of the amphibian bird who moves between the bird and fish kingdoms in order to avoid paying taxes to their respective kings. While Davis reads this story as illustrating al-Hasan/Yuhanna's dual identity, African and European, I would argue that, like Maalouf's Hasan/Leo, the historic al-Hasan/Yuhanna had a triple identity, Granadan, African, and Italian, the language in which he wrote his wily bird tale.[20] Seeing al-Hasan/Yuhanna's identity as triple acknowledges the profound changes produced in him by exile, conversion, and language learning, violent experiences of subjugation that also enabled him to redefine himself with respect to his homelands and his captors and to create a new subjectivity through his Italian writings. Maalouf's fictive protagonist also strives toward a complex identity that incorporates all the places where he is able to feel at home and all the languages that he speaks. The symbol of his multiple identity is al-Andalus, the Spain of three religions.

Although Maalouf celebrates Andalusian multiplicity, the Granada where his Hasan was born was not a paradise of tolerant multiculturalism. In many ways, Hasan was born in exile, since 1489 Granada had ceased to be the hospitable land of coexistence it once had been. Hasan's parents Salma and Mohamed, formed in this anxious and precarious city, imposed upon him a "tribal" identity, that of a respectable Muslim. This narrow worldview fed the conflict that surrounded them and that they enacted within their home across lines of gender, class, and religion. Their domestic battles mirror those that divided Granada between secular, intellectual Muslims symbolized by the Epicurean man of science Doctor Abu Amr, ironically nicknamed Abu Khamr, "father of wine," and fundamentalist Muslims such as Sheik Astaghfirullah, so called because of his frequent repetition of *Astaghfirullah*, "I implore the pardon of God." The weak and short-sighted sultan Boabdil exacerbated the conflict within Granada by engaging in palace intrigues while underestimating the power of the Castilian forces that threatened from without. As this summary shows, Maalouf's secondary characters incarnate a single world view or identity position, reflecting those found in the Muslim world today. Very few of his characters manage to adapt to a changing world. Hasan's parents do not; Mohamed and Salma's refusal to accept the changes in their lives

as a result of Castilian rule in Granada and exile to Fez destroys their marriage and all but impoverishes them. Hasan/Leo must struggle to transcend the tribal identity inculcated in him by Granada's *Reconquista* mentality and reinforced almost every place he goes, where someone in a position of power over him demands that he ascribe to a singular identity, based on clan, nation, religion, or language. In Rome Hasan/Leo finally finds a patron who encourages him to embrace and appreciate his fruitful hybridity; Pope Leo X's support enables Hasan/Leo to articulate his complex subjectivity by writing the autobiography that we read.[21]

Although he was born in Granada, the violence that surrounded him deprived Hasan of the benefits of coexistence that for Maalouf is the essence of his Andalusian heritage. In his prologue to Luciano Rubio's translation *Descripción de Africa*, Maalouf shows his identification with the historical al-Hasan/Yuhanna and his Andalusian homeland:

> Having personally suffered, like many others, the conflicts in the Mediterranean, I can't help but feel a certain nostalgia for that fortunate time, for those centuries of coexistence, of reciprocal influences, of cultural and human mixing, and recognize in this Muslim, born in Granada, who, with the passing of time, would become in Italy a protégé of the Pope, and who dedicated another of his works to Jacob, son of Simon, "my faithful Israelite friend," a beautiful personification of that lost paradise.[22]

Maalouf idealizes al-Andalus as a lost paradise of coexistence, cultural exchange, and mixing; his nostalgia reflects his sense of loss, both of his native country and of the imaginary haven of "la España de las tres religiones." In his novel, Maalouf depicts Hasan/Leo as an exemplary figure that should be emulated in the present so as to overcome the conflicts that forced Maalouf to abandon a Lebanon turned inhospitable. It is his hybridity that makes Hasan/Leo exemplary:

> I, Hasan the son of Muhammad the weigh-master, I, Jean-Leon de Medici, circumcised at the hand of a barber and baptized at the hand of a pope, I am now called the African, but I am not from Africa, nor from Europe, nor from Arabia. I am also called the Granadan, the Fassi, the Zayyati, but I come from no country, from no city, no tribe. I am the son of the road, my country is the caravan, my life the most unexpected of voyages.[23]

Hasan/Leo proudly asserts a multiple, contingent identity as an object of history repeatedly interpellated, marked, and transformed by the peoples, cultures, and places he has visited yet confined to none of them. He both is, and is not, what he is called; he embraces the two personal names bestowed upon him, names that incorporate those of his

fathers, Mohamed and Leo X, yet rejects those names that fix him to a nation or tribe. As Davis comments, the name of the historic al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Wazzan has three parts: his personal name, his patronymics, and his family or tribal name. Maalouf construes Hasan/Leo's triple heritage differently by identifying *la route* as his third parent to underline the protean, in-process nature of his subjectivity. Hasan/Leo's declaration is an act of self-naming that simultaneously embraces and resists those identities imposed upon him; in declaring himself, he negotiates an identity that he wishes his son (the fictive reader) and posterity to know him by and creates himself as fictive character, becoming in the process an agent, albeit a subjected subject marked by war, captivity, and exile.[24]

Hasan/Leo's refusal to embrace a national identity in the face of exile is extraordinary, as Said attests: "a state of exile free from...triumphant ideology—designed to reassemble an exile's broken history into a new whole—is virtually unbearable, and virtually impossible in today's world." Hasan/Leo's construction of a viable subjectivity that doesn't resort to revenge or hatred is not entirely successful, since he still feels bifurcated, dual despite his attempts to embrace his entire self, including the changes that come with successive exiles. At the end of his autobiography, Hasan/Leo reiterates his binary identity to urge his son to transcend it:

> In Rome, you were "the son of the [African"; in Africa, you will be "the son of the] Rumi." Wherever you are, some will want to ask questions about your skin or your prayers. Beware of gratifying their instincts, my son, beware of bending before the multitude! Muslim, Jew or Christian, they must take you as you are, or lose you. When men's minds seem narrow to you, tell yourself that the land of God is broad; broad His hands and broad His heart. Never hesitate to go far away, beyond all seas, all frontiers, all countries, all beliefs.[25]

Hasan/Leo continues to articulate his identity as dual, or rather, he sees himself as continuing to be constructed as dual and insistently foreign by close-minded others. His son, "[Giuseppe], that is to say Yusuf, like the father of the Messiah, like the son of Jacob, like Sultan Salah al-Din," will be able to escape such a confining worldview without having to change himself or his name. Hasan/Leo's sense of duality reflects his status as an exile and his inability to transcend fully the wound caused by expulsion from his native land. Although still troubled by those who reject multiplicity, the future he imagines for his son, born in Rome to an Andalusian *conversa,* emphasizes similarity over difference and figures the road as the way to a sense of wholeness that has eluded Hasan/Leo.[26]

Although Hasan/Leo never achieves a secure new home nor a whole sense of self, he disavows the sense of security that can come from embracing an essential identity, be it familial, national, or religious. In a powerful criticism of contemporary multiculturalism entitled *Les Identités Meurtrières*, Maalouf argues that singular definitions of identity are dangerous:

> Every time someone asks me who I am "in my heart of hearts," it presupposes that "deep down inside" everyone there is just one affiliation that really matters, a kind of "fundamental truth" about each individual, an "essence" determined once and for all at birth, never to change thereafter. As if the rest, all the rest—a person's whole journey through time as a free agent; the beliefs he acquires in the course of that journey; his own individual tastes, sensibilities and affinities; in short his life itself—counted for nothing.[27]

Maalouf criticizes the view that identity is determined at birth and unchangeable, despite one's experiences and choices, a view that reduces everyone to passive recipients of an imposed, singular identity. He argues that the pressure to adhere to a singular identity is especially damaging for those of mixed parentage, immigrants, and postcolonial subjects who find themselves marginalized and disenfranchised by simplistic constructions of identity and by restrictive laws that make it all but impossible to become a full citizen with complete rights within one's adopted country. In words that could be directed at Menocal, Maalouf rejects tolerance as insufficient, a mere substitute for equality and acceptance as a full-fledged citizen.

Maalouf recognizes that changing deeply-rooted attitudes is such a slow process that he will not live to see it. The final paragraph of *Les Identités Meurtrières* is a provocative rewriting of the final chapter of *Léon l'Africain*:

> For this book…I make a different wish. May my grandson, growing up and finding it one day by chance on the family bookshelves, look through the pages, read a passage or two, then put it back in the dusty corner where he found it, shrugging his shoulders and marvelling that in his grandfather's day such things still needed to be said.[28]

The possibility of truly transcending confiningly singular identities once again is incarnated by a baby boy who is, in this case, not the intended reader but the one who will be able to appreciate how dated his grandfather's essay has become. This imagined careless reading is a far cry from the attitude Hasan/Leo envisions his son adopting toward his

autobiography, which he bequeaths as a legacy that will form him even as Hasan/Leo hopes that Giuseppe/Yusuf will become yet more fully a migrant, transnational subject whose multiplicity will enable him to transcend the duality that still impedes his father.

Both Hasan/Leo and Maalouf envision a cosmopolitan future that mirrors the idealized, inclusive al-Andalus of the past. Their sense that the present moment is inhospitable and promotes fragmentation and violence reflects their experience as exiles severed from their past, their struggles to recover from the past an affirmative model for the future, and the difficulty of constructing an adaptive, contingent sense of self whose status as a subjected subject does not doom him to abjection. Maalouf does not believe in the fantastical sovereign subject that Menocal celebrates; neither does he believe an individual is unable to affect the world in which he lives, even though he may not live to see the new world he helped to create. This stance, simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic, is central to Maalouf's idealization of al-Andalus as a lost paradise. Although he can imagine a paradise regained or recreated, he cannot see himself in that ideal place.

Rachid Nini, unlike Maalouf and Menocal, does not believe in paradise. For him, while al-Andalus was a magnificent Arab civilization, it primarily serves today as a measure of the depths to which the Maghreb has sunk on both sides of the Strait. Nini's subject of history is essentially fragmented and disenfranchised and seeks not to transcend his historical limits in order to heal his wounded self, which is impossible, but to recognize and adopt an appropriately ironic posture with respect to his marginalization and to behave as ethically as he can toward others despite the anger and pain he feels. Nini's experience of exile profoundly differs from those of Menocal and Maalouf, both of whom permanently left their homelands because of an inhospitable political situation. Nini is an economic refugee, an educated yet unemployable Berber whose intelligence only enables him to recognize and resent the patronizing attitudes that other, less educated yet more privileged people adopt toward him, in both Spain and Morocco. He finds neither country hospitable; migration to Spain only exacerbates Nini's alienation and the instability of his life. He is constantly on the move in search of the only jobs he can get as an undocumented immigrant, low-paying, physically demanding, and degrading: harvesting oranges, cleaning nightclubs, making pizza, working in construction. While he does manage to make friends and construct a support system almost everywhere he lives, his frequent moves disrupt these fragile networks that in any case cannot shield him from the hostility that surrounds him nor from the constant threat of hunger. Nini's story underlines to what extent Hasan/Leo's exiles were

cushioned by money and status; even his experience of captivity is eased due to his being an ambassador. Despite his acute sense of vulnerability, Nini rejects triumphalist ideologies which he knows are lies. Even writing, which he calls a "vicio," doesn't help him construct a resistant and resilient sense of self. Thoroughly disillusioned, Nini often succumbs to what Said calls "the crippling sorrow of estrangement" and expresses anger, fear, and a sense of powerlessness; his despair forcefully illustrates the damage caused by the ubiquitous hostility and threat of violence that many exile-refugees face. Nini's experience as a migrant intellectual does not culminate in a secure position as tenured professor nor as an award-winning, internationally recognized author; instead, Nini returns to Morocco as impoverished as he left it, with nothing more than a book that chronicles his experiences as a clandestine worker in Spain. *Diario de un ilegal* is a testimony whose primary interest is not so much to document Nini's experiences as his understanding of those experiences and his struggles to create a livable life for himself in Spain. His failure to do so reveals the lie at the heart of triumphalist narratives like Menocal's and nuanced yet idealistic survival stories like Maalouf's: all human agents are subjected subjects whose freedom is fully dependent upon their circumstances and finally is illusory. While one may choose to migrate or not, this choice will not substantiate one's status as a free subject and may on the contrary serve to underline the fact that one is always already confined, no matter how many physical and ideological frontiers one may cross.[29]

Throughout his testimony Nini frequently uses al-Andalus as a reference point to construct, illustrate, and explore historical differences. Although Nini views the medieval Andalusians as the esteemed ancestors of present-day Moroccans, in Spain he finds them reduced to the abject *moro*, the humiliating and stereotypical role that he finds imposed upon him by his Spanish coworkers. This view is most effectively communicated in the following (rather lengthy) incident, which takes place in Benidorm, a tourist city on the Costa Blanca, where Nini works in a pizzeria that ironically mirrors al-Andalus, where Jews, Muslims, and Christians work side by side but not exactly in harmony:

> Yesterday Alfonso put the empty glasses in the dishwasher, looked at me, smiled, and asked if I knew Abu Abdallah, Boabdil as he called him. I acted like I didn't know what he was talking about, to hear his version. And, like a good student, he explained that Boabdil was the last of the Arab kings expelled from al-Andalus. King Fernando captured him, cut off both his ears, and threw him to the other side of the sea. I said that maybe Abu Abdallah was alone, without the support of other Arabs to defend his

> kingdom. Alfonso answered, laughing, that the Moorish king had to leave Granada in any case because Queen Isabel and King Fernando, her husband, wanted the throne, and that the era of Moors in Spain had come to an end. Joking, I said that now we were returning again. It's true that now we weren't soldiers in an army, that we didn't have a leader like Tariq ibn Ziyad, but we were once again invading al-Andalus. Alfonso laughed and said that it's very different to come to a country to make a living than as a conqueror. Conquerors don't make pizza, they don't climb trees to pick fruit, I said. We both laughed. Alfonso went to serve a couple that had entered the restaurant. I put some dough on the white marble and began to knead it with all my might. I thought that Alfonso was right. Being a conqueror is different. Our ancestors didn't knead dough in al-Andalus. They spent centuries creating something great that doesn't deserve now to be immortalized by Spaniards in a naïve celebration that does nothing more than remind new generations of the defeat the Moors suffered. But Fernando didn't cut off Abu Abdallah's ears as Alfonso had claimed in jest. At least Amin Maalouf's book, *Leo the African,* doesn't include that farce. Although I can't be sure, since I didn't finish it.[30]

Nini's retelling of Alfonso's story mixes indirect and direct citations and so is thoroughly double-voiced. He corrects Alfonso's terminology while leaving traces to let the reader know that Alfonso really said "Boabdil, el último rey moro." In Alfonso's version Fernando is a *toreador* who defeats and humiliates Boabdil, emasculating him and tossing his wounded body to the other side of the Strait. Nini marks his refusal to accept Alfonso's version by calling the king Abu Abdallah and by suggesting that the real story is much more complicated. Alfonso continues to assert the triumphalist Spanish narrative in which Isabel and Fernando correct the error of history that had temporarily allowed Arabs sovereignty; this time, Nini reproduces Alfonso's use of *moro,* although he tries to reappropriate it by telling the glorious story of Tariq ibn Ziyad and portraying his own presence in Benidorm as a second Muslim invasion. But the present is different, as both Nini and Alfonso recognize; Nini's choice to delay identifying the voice that enumerates the differences between the *conquistadores* of 711 and Moroccan immigrants at the end of the twentieth century momentarily fuses Nini's and Alfonso's voices, marking their unanimity on this issue. Nini feels he came out of their verbal battle the loser and displaces his anger onto the dough that he furiously kneads as he ponders the blind spots in Spanish narratives of al-Andalus. The "naïve celebration" to which Nini refers is Benidorm's annual reenactment of *moros y cristianos*, which he had earlier described as a sanitized version of the violent persecution of Andalusian Arabs by intolerant Christians. He ties Spanish hostility toward the Muslim other to their partial memory of

the past and their distortion of history. At the same time, Nini recognizes that his own knowledge of history is fragmentary, based on his reading of an novel that he didn't even finish, an admission that leaves him without much to substantiate his version of Andalusian history, of his own history.[31]

This exchange (and many others like it) makes Nini feel his historical irrelevance and exacerbates his sense of placelessness, at home neither in Morocco nor in Spain. Unlike Maalouf's Hasan/Leo, Nini is constantly vulnerable because of his insecure status as an undocumented immigrant and the hostility he meets with everywhere. Even when he's gainfully employed, as in Benidorm, his Spanish coworkers seem compelled to degrade him while masking their hostility as play, reviving Nini's sense of insecurity; nonetheless he resists the temptation to turn to violence to avenge the injuries he suffers, resorting instead to words, a profoundly ethical stance. Unfortunately, his partial knowledge of history leaves him unable to defend himself against petty verbal attacks, which makes him turn his anger inward, onto himself and his Moroccan past, which leaves him yet more vulnerable. His stance toward his Spanish coworkers is ambivalent; he engages in conversational sparring with them to establish a verbal hierarchy while maintaining a veneer of collegial amiability. Nini does get some satisfaction from these agonistic exchanges, but very little; he gets to demonstrate his intelligence and wit yet he almost always emerges the loser, reinforcing his inferiority as a *moro,* the role he reluctantly plays because he has no other option. Despite his deep disappointment in his homeland, in Spain he finds it impossible to escape his national identity, or rather, the parodic version of it that is constantly forced upon him by the Spaniards with whom he interacts.

Nini's sense of total disenfranchisement did not begin with his emigration; his stories of his Moroccan childhood and early adulthood parallel the degrading experiences he has in Spain, in which the powerful abuse the weak. In his account, his entire education served only to teach him his inferior place. His story of Tariq ibn Ziyad illustrates how glorifying official histories contribute to Moroccans' abjection:

> I remember now a history class about the conquest of al-Andalus in elementary school. It surprised me that Tariq ibn Ziyad, a Berber, as mentioned in passing, could burn the ships so that no one could return to Morocco.... The strange thing about that history class is that they only talked about Tariq at the moment of conquest, so we don't know what happened to that Berber general afterwards.... Now I also understand why, as soon as they see the lights of Andalusia, immigrants burn their papers and throw them into the sea.... Burning passports is like burning

> ships. It seems that this history lesson will keep repeating itself tragically throughout the centuries.[32]

Nini writes these reflections after he has decided to return to Morocco, unlike those original Berber invaders who could not return and whose heroism immigrants reenact in the present. Nini partially identifies with Tariq and his troops, but the present is not the past; their story, at least as taught in elementary schools, is misleading, focusing only on the moment of the conquest and excluding the harsh realities of emigrating and building a new life elsewhere. Such fragmentary, glorifying narratives are the stuff of national myths, and not coincidentally this version of Tariq's story closely parallels Menocal's depiction of the heroic Abd al-Rahman (with the obvious differences that Tariq didn't conquer the peninsula single-handedly, is Berber not Arab, wasn't born the legitimate successor to the Prophet, etc.). While these myths may form a necessary nationalist foundation for postcolonial peoples, giving them a sense of pride and enabling them to visualize and strive to create a new, more livable life by looking to the past, the selectivity of such myths harms those who believe in them and attempt to recreate them literally in the present. Burning ships and passports may be a heroic act, but it's often suicide, as is attempting to cross the strait in a row boat. Nini's testimony seeks to disabuse would-be emigrants by repeatedly articulating exactly those details omitted by triumphalist narratives, in which death, hunger, degrading manual labor, and the constant sense of danger that is the daily reality of undocumented migrant workers are suppressed. While Nini, like Maalouf and Américo Castro, could be read as assuming the intellectual exile's role of "people's doctor" attempting to cure impoverished Moroccans of unhealthy beliefs, he doesn't offer a new, illusory hope in return; he himself sees no way out of the despair caused by economic and cultural oppression.[33]

Nini's pessimism contrasts sharply with Maalouf and Menocal's idealism and reflects his experience living as an undocumented worker in an inhospitable country. Unlike Menocal and Maalouf, Nini abandons his new country and returns to his place of origin where at least he can feel more at home. As a voluntary economic exile, Nini can return, unlike Menocal whose native Cuba is closed to her, a reality that may explain her preference for Abd al-Rahman, the exile turned conqueror who incarnates her adherence to a triumphant national ideology. Her hierarchical model of tolerant multiculturalism that requires minorities to assimilate into the dominant culture could reflect her support for the dominant ideology of her host country and her sense that, as a successful exile, she ought not to challenge her hosts' values. Her experience as an assimilated intellectual resembles that of the Arabized Jews whose lives

remained precarious despite their social and intellectual achievements. Menocal privileges cultural products, especially buildings, poetry, and philosophy, over the right to express one's religious-ethnic identity in the public sphere, a right that many consider the essence of modern tolerant multiculturalism. More problematic, Menocal's celebration of Abd al-Rahman and his Umayyad successors inscribes essential inequality of individuals and cultures at the heart of al-Andalus. Since privilege depends on violently subjugating others, the model she offers of an ideal society could hardly eliminate the economic and social injustices that motivate so much of the religious-ethnic violence in the world today.[34]

Maalouf, whose exile is to some extent voluntary and who can and does visit Lebanon, may not need the support offered by triumphalist ideologies nor feel as indebted to his hospitable French hosts. Unlike Menocal and Nini, he formulates a program to eliminate ethnic hatred that tries to ignore privilege and extend the same opportunities and responsibilities to all. Maalouf criticizes both singular, tribal identities and dual identities like the one imposed on Hasan/Leo that leaves him split despite his attempts to embrace his own diversity. In a solution based on the Andalusian model of three cultures living in harmony, Maalouf proposes that everyone become trilingual:

> The only possible answer is a voluntary policy aimed at strengthening linguistic diversity and based on a simple idea: nowadays everybody obviously needs three languages. The first is his language of identity; the third is English. Between the two we have to promote a [second] language, freely chosen, which will…be…the language of the heart, the adopted language, the language you have married, the language you love.[35]

English is the lingua franca of the moment, while the other two languages are personally significant, one's native language or *langue identitaire* and a foreign language of one's choice. That choice will always be constrained, but in Maalouf's view, the voluntary nature of this choice will help make that language fully a vehicle for self-expression. That language will also be someone else's *langue identitaire,* and being able to engage in conversation with non-native speakers in the global sphere will help that person feel more included, respected, and valued, which in a small way will help make the world more hospitable and strengthen linguistic diversity.

Maalouf's program to remake Andalusian coexistence through universal trilingualism presumes that education can overcome social conditioning and that language learning makes one embrace not only the culture but also the people who speak that language, a belief unfortunately challenged by the Lebanese experience, where near universal

trilingualism did not prevent civil war. Another contrary example is Richard Burton, the amateur orientalist whom Kwame Anthony Appiah calls an anti-cosmopolitan because, despite speaking fluent Arabic, living among Arabs, and adopting some Arab cultural practices, he continued to consider them (and many other peoples) essentially inferior to the British.[36] On the other hand, Maalouf's program does provide hope for greater understanding of the self and others and does not exclude anyone from the obligation of working to become multiple, to cultivate and benefit from a hybridized identity. Maalouf's model is preferable to Menocal's celebration of universal assimilation into a dominant culture which construes the hegemonic culture as superior and does not require the dominant group to learn minority languages. Nini for his part does not propose any solution to postcolonial economic and social inequality, although he recognizes that mass emigration is not the answer; the best he can do is model ethical behavior in his personal narratives and combat harmful national myths.

Maalouf's program promotes cosmopolitanism, perhaps best defined as "a set of projects toward planetary conviviality," a postnationalist stance and set of practices that values true cultural diversity and seeks to ensure universal rights, representation and dignity to all. This movement is primarily occurring among international intellectuals, whether exiled, migrant, or not, and is being popularized by writers such as Appiah and Maalouf himself (although in his desire to avoid intellectualized discourse, Maalouf doesn't call his project cosmopolitan). Cosmopolitanism would build a new world that embraces both the local and the universal, the past, present, and future, and avoid cultural imperialism, including too-Western definitions of cosmopolitanism. It entails an appreciation for cultural diversity, which as Eva Hoffman says is a particular characteristic of exiles: "for those who move freely among countries and cultures, it becomes difficult to maintain the notion of any one nation's superiority or special destiny." Cosmopolitanism cannot be imposed but must be voluntary, like Maalouf's voluntary trilingualism, and it cannot simply replace old local structures with new global ones; as Sheldon Pollock argues, "affective attachment to old structures of belonging offered by vernacular particulars must precede any effective transformation through new cosmopolitan universals." Effective cosmopolitanism combines value for the local and the past with the willingness to adopt new views and practices that promote the welfare of all. It also includes looking to the past for models to adapt to the present: "To know that some people in the past have been able to be universal and particular, without making either their particularity ineluctable or their universalism compulsory, is to know that better cosmopolitan and vernacular practices are at least conceivable."[37]

Maalouf's vision for the future is thoroughly cosmopolitan, embracing the past and the present, the particular and the global:

> We must act in such a way as to bring about a situation in which no one feels excluded from the common civilization that is coming into existence; in which everyone may be able to find the language of his own identity and some symbols of his own culture; and in which everyone can identify to some degree with what he sees emerging in the world about him, instead of seeking refuge in an idealized past.[38]

Although Maalouf may idealize al-Andalus, he doesn't refuse to engage with the present. Instead, he attempts to overcome nostalgia and triumphalist ideologies by embracing his own diversity and even by becoming more diverse through language learning, transcending confining ideologies with an optimistic praxis. As Said says, "Exile is never the state of being satisfied, placid, or secure."[39] An exile can never attain full stability; instability can lead to insatiable ambition, to constant anger and fear, and/or to a desire to change the world, whether by trying to impose one's wishes on it through violence or by encouraging social change to make it more hospitable for all. Translating ideals into practice is always a hazardous enterprise, especially for something as fantastical as Andalusian coexistence. That an exile could try to leave behind his tribal identity and work to create a world in which everyone could be at home is enough to convince me that the fantastical is worth pursuing.

Notes

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1. In these comments I draw upon John C. Hawley, "Colonizing the Mind: 'Leo Africanus' in the Renaissance and Today," *Colonial and Postcolonial Incarceration*, ed. Graeme Harper (New York: Continuum, 2001), pp. 53–66.
2. Edward W. Said, "Reflections on Exile," *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 173 (173–186); André Aciman, "Permanent Transients," *Letters of Transit: Reflections on Exile, Identity, Language, and Loss*, ed. André Aciman (New York: New Press, 1999), p. 10 (7–14).
3. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 173.
4. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 177.
5. Sebastiaan Faber, *Exile and Cultural Hegemony: Spanish Intellectuals in Mexico, 1939–1975* (Nashville, TE: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), pp. 7, 195–197. José Luis Abellán, *De la guerra civil al exilio republicano (1936–1977)*

(Madrid: Mezquita, 1983), pp. 113, 132–136, also discusses how Castro's experience of exile affected his historiography.

6. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 186.
7. Eva Hoffman, "The New Nomads," *Letters of Transit,* pp. 35–63; quotation is from pp. 51–52.
8. Rachid Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, trans. Gonzalo Fernández Parilla (Madrid: Ediciones del oriente y del mediterráneo, 2002).
9. Amin Maalouf, *Léon l'Africain* (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattés, 1986); English translations from *Leo Africanus*, trans. Peter Sluglett (Chicago, IL: New Amsterdam, 1992).
10. María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 2002).
11. Menocal, *Ornament*, p. v.
12. Menocal, *Ornament*, p. 5, 60–61.
13. Menocal's monograph *Shards of Love: Exile and the Origins of the Lyric* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994) is, like *Ornament,* a historical recovery project designed to reveal the centrality of exile in lyric composition and in scholarly study of the lyric. In *Shards* Menocal openly discusses her Cuban identity (most powerfully on p. 28) and acknowledges how it affects her reading of the lyric.
14. Menocal, *Ornament*, p. 8. Compare the treatment of Abd al-Rahman I in Chris Lowney, *A Vanished World: Medieval Spain's Golden Age of Enlightenment* (New York: Free Press, 2005), pp. 65–66, 94; while praising Abd al-Rahman's "clear-sighted governance" (p. 65), Lowney also depicts him as a brutal ruler who exploited factionalism to come to power. In Muslim tradition, the Umayyads are predominantly seen as usurpers who seized the caliphate from more worthy candidates and held power through intrigue and exploiting factionalism; they are held responsible for the death of Husayn, the son of Fatima and Ali, whose martyrdom is a rallying point for the Shi'a. For a discussion of Muslim tradition regarding the Umayyads, see G.R. Hawting, *The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750,* 2nd edn. (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11–15, 50, 118.
15. Menocal, *Ornament*, pp. 66–78. The quotation comes from p. 70. Lowney's discussion of the "martyr-activists" of Córdoba, *Vanished World*, pp. 55–63, is an interesting comparison; he explicitly recognizes that both Christians and Jews were "second-class citizens" even as he argues that they enjoyed more religious freedoms than the letter of Andalusian law allowed and criticizes the "martyr-activists" for aggressively seeking martyrdom by ridiculing Mohammad before Andalusian authorities (p. 60). See Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a nuanced discussion of the treatment of Jews under Christian and Islamic rule.
16. Menocal, *Ornament*, p. 105, 106, 135. Compare Lowney's treatment of Samuel ibn Naghrila, *Vanished World*, pp. 94–108, especially his discussion of the tenuousness of Samuel's position, pp. 97–101.

17. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 177; see also his comments on nationalism and exile, pp. 176–178.
18. Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), demonstrates how the experience of living as a minority in non-Muslim countries encourages Muslim neofundamentalism, which in extreme forms manifests itself in terrorist violence.
19. In referring to Maalouf's narrator-protagonist as Hasan/Leo, I follow Davis's usage in her "Non-European Stories, European Listeners," *Zeitsprünge; Forschungen zur Frühen Neuzeit* 7.2–3 (2003): 200–219, in order to emphasize this character's multiple identity. See also Bernadette Andrea's "Assimilation or Dissimulation? Leo Africanus's 'Geographical Historie of Africa' and the Parable of Amphibia," *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature* 32.2 (July 2001): 1–23, for a discussion of his wily bird tale. For a discussion of Maalouf as a postcolonial migrant intellectual, see Hawley, "Colonizing the Mind," pp. 61–63.
20. Natalie Zemon Davis, *Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006); she discusses his tale of the amphibian bird (pp. 110–111). After his baptism and renaming as Joannes Leo, al-Hasan signed his name in Arabic Yuhanna al-Asad, "John the Lion" (p. 65).
21. I take the phrase "tribal identity" from Maalouf, *Les Identités Meurtrières* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1998); the English translation is entitled *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong,* trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Penguin, 2003).
22. "Habiendo sufrido personalmente, como tantos otros, los conflictos del Mediterráneo, no puedo sino experimentar cierta nostalgia hacia aquella época afortunada, hacia esos siglos de vida en común, de influencias recíprocas, de mestizaje cultural y humano; y reconocer en este musulmán, nacido en Granada, que llegaría a ser en Italia, con el paso del tiempo, un protegido del Papa, que dedicó otra de sus obras a Jacob, hijo de Simeón, 'mi fiel amigo israelita,' una hermosa personificación de aquel paraíso perdido." León el Africano, *Descripción de Africa y de las cosas notables que en ella se encuentran,* trans. Luciano Rubio, prologue Amin Maalouf (Madrid: Hijos de Muley-Rubio, 1999), unnumbered page.
23. "Moi, Hassan fils de Mohamed le peseur, moi, Jean-Léon de Médicis, circoncis de la main d'un barbier et baptisé de la main d'un pape, on me nomme aujourd'hui l'Africain, mais d'Afrique ne suis, ni d'Europe, ni d'Arabie. On m'appelle aussi le Grenadin, le Fassi, le Zayyati, mais je ne viens d'aucun pays, d'aucune cité, d'aucune tribu. Je suis fils de la route, ma patrie est caravane, et ma vie la plus inattendue des traversées." Maalouf, *Léon l'Africain*, p. 8; English translations from *Leo Africanus*, trans. Sluglett, p. 1.
24. Davis, *Trickster*, p. 15; by "patronymics," I mean the names of his father and his paternal grandfather. In these comments I draw on Judith Butler's discussion of interpellation and the emergence of a speaking subject in

her *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 2–13.

25. "À Rome, tu étais "le fils de l'Africain"; en Afrique, tu seras "le fils du *Roumi*." Où que tu sois, certains voudront fouiller ta peau et tes prières. Garde-toi de flatter leurs instincts, mon fils, garde-toi de ployer sous la multitude! Musulman, juif ou chrétien, ils devront te prendre comme tu es, ou te perdre. Lorsque l'esprit des hommes te paraîtra étroit, dis-toi que la terre de Dieu est vaste, et vastes Ses mains et Son cœur. N'hésite jamais à t'éloigner, au-delà de toutes les mers, au-delà de toutes les frontières, de toutes les patries, de toutes les croyances." Maalouf, *Léon l'Africain* p. 349. English trans. Sluglett, p. 360, corrected.
26. "Giuseppe, c'est-à-dire Youssef, comme le père du Messie, comme le fils de Jacob, comme le sultan Saladin." Maalouf, *Léon l'Africain* p. 303. English trans. Sluglett, p. 313, corrected. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 177.
27. "Lorsqu'on me demande ce que je suis "au fin fond de moi-même," cela suppose qu'il y a, "au fin fond" de chacun, une seule appartenance qui compte, sa "vérité profonde" en quelque sorte, son "essence," déterminée une fois pour toutes à la naissance et qui ne changera plus; comme si le reste, tout le reste—sa trajectoire d'homme libre, ses convictions acquises, ses préférences, sa sensibilité propre, ses affinités, sa vie, en somme—ne comptait pour rien." Maalouf, *Identités* pp. 10–11, 72–73; English trans. *In the Name of Identity* p. 2, corrected, 56–57.
28. "Pour ce livre…je formulerai le vœu inverse: que mon petit-fils, devenu homme, le découvrant un jour par hasard dans la bibliothèque familiale, le feuillette, le parcoure un peu, puis le remette aussitôt à l'endroit poussiéreux d'ou il l'avait retiré, en haussant les épaules, et en s'étonnant que du temps de son grand-père, on eût encore besoin de dire ces choses-là." Maalouf, *Identités*, p. 211; English trans. *In the Name of Identity* p. 164.
29. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 173; Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, p. 72. Nini is now a recognized public intellectual in Morocco and host of "Nostalgia," a serious cultural program on channel 2M ("Rachid Nini, Le fabuleux destin d'un poète clandestin," Web site, http://www.2m.tv/nostalgia/nini.asp, last accessed March 13, 2008; "Actualité Maroc: Rachid Nini, Phénomène de Société," Web site, http://www.casafree.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=4864, last accessed March 13, 2008. Nini's testimony reflects the idealization of al-Andalus by many postcolonial writers from North Africa and the Middle East, especially Egypt, who depict al-Andalus as an Arab Golden Age in their nationalist discourse. For an overview of representations of al-Andalus in twentieth-century Arab writing, see Pedro Martínez Montávez, *Al-Andalus, España, en la literatura árabe contemporánea. La casa del pasado*, Colección al-Andalus (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992).
30. "Ayer Alfonso puso los vasos vacíos en el lavavajillas, me miró sonriendo y me preguntó si conocía a Abu Abdallah, Boabdil, como él lo llamaba. Hice como que no sabía de qué me hablaba para conocer su versión. Y como un alumno aventajado, contó que Boabdil era el último de los

reyes árabes que expulsaron de Alándalus. El rey Fernando lo apresó, le cortó las dos orejas y lo echó al otro lado del mar. Le dije que tal vez Abu Abdallah estaba solo, sin apoyo árabe para defender su reino. Alfonso me respondió riendo que el rey moro tenía que salir de Granada de todas formas porque la reina Isabel y el rey Fernando, su esposo, querían subir al trono, y que el tiempo de los moros en España se había acabado. Bromeando le dije que ahora estábamos volviendo de nuevo. Cierto que ahora no éramos soldados de un ejército, ni teníamos un jefe que se pareciera a Táriq Ibn Ziyad, pero invadíamos Alándalus de nuevo. Alfonso se rió y dijo que es muy distinto venir a un país en busca de pan que como conquistador. Los conquistadores no hacen pizza, ni trepan a los árboles para coger fruta. Dije yo. Nos reímos juntos. Alfonso se fue a atender a una pareja que había entrado al restaurante. Puse la masa sobre el mármol blanco y empecé a amasarla con todas mis fuerzas. Pensé que Alfonso tenía razón. Ser conquistador es diferente. Nuestros antepasados no amasaban la pasta en Alándalus. Pasaron muchos siglos creando una grandeza que no merece ahora que los españoles inmortalicen en una celebración ingenua que no consiste más que en recordar a las nuevas generaciones la derrota que aconteció a los moros. Pero Fernando no había cortado las orejas de Abu Abdallah, como dijo Alfonso bromeando. Por los menos el libro de Amín Maalouf *León el Africano* no relata esa farsa. Aunque no puedo estar seguro, ya que no llegué a terminarlo." Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, pp. 97–99; translation mine.

31. Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, pp. 37–41; see Daniela Flesler's discussion of the *moro* in her essay, "Contemporary Moroccan Immigration and its Ghosts," chapter 5 in this volume.
32. "Recuerdo ahora una clase de Historia sobre la conquista de Alándalus en la escuela primaria. Me sorprendía cómo pudo Táriq Ibn Ziyad, un bereber, dicho sea de paso, quemar los barcos para que nadie pudiese regresar a Marruecos. . .Lo extraño de aquella clase de Historia es que sólo se hablaba de Táriq en el momento de la conquista, pero no sabemos qué le ocurrió a aquel caudillo bereber después. . .Ahora también entiendo por qué, en cuanto se distinguen las luces de Andalucía, los inmigrantes queman sus papeles y los arrojan al mar. . .Quemar los pasaportes es bastante similar a quemar el barco de vuelta. Parece que esta lección de la Historia seguirá repitiéndose trágicamente a lo largo de los siglos." Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, pp. 206–207; translation mine.
33. Faber, *Exile and Cultural Hegemony*, p. 196 discusses the role of "the people's doctor."
34. Faber, *Exile and Cultural Hegemony*, pp. 7–8, 21 discusses exiled intellectuals' tendency to tacitly or openly endorse the views and policies of their hosts, and on p. 6, their tendency to privilege culture and ideas over material concerns. Menocal, *Ornament*, p. 11 acknowledges that the Umayyad "culture of tolerance" that she portrays does not conform to modern standards of tolerance.

35. "La seule voie possible est celle d'une action volontaire qui consoliderait la diversité linguistique, et l'installerait dans les mœurs, en partant d'une idée simple: aujourd'hui, toute personne a besoin, à l'évidence, de trois langues. La première, sa langue identitaire; la troisième, l'anglais. Entre les deux, il faut obligatoirement promouvoir une deuxième langue, librement choisie,...elle serait...la langue de cœur, la langue adoptive, la langue épousée, la langue aimée." Maalouf, *Identités* p. 183; English trans. *In the Name of Identity* pp. 139–140, corrected.
36. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2006), pp. 1–8.
37. Walter D. Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism," *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 721–748; quotation from 721. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, p. xiii, criticizes the elitist connotations of the word "cosmopolitanism." Hoffman, "The New Nomads," p. 56; Sheldon Pollock, "Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History," *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 591–625, quotation from 624 to 625.
38. "Il faudrait faire en sorte que personne ne se sente exclu de la civilisation commune qui est en train de naître, que chacun puisse y retrouver sa langue identitaire, et certains symboles de sa culture propre, que chacun, là encore, puisse s'identifier, ne serait-ce qu'un peu, à ce qu'il voit émerger dans le monde qui l'entoure, au lieu de chercher refuge dans un passé idéalisé." Maalouf, *Identités* p. 210; English trans. *In the Name of Identity*, p. 163.
39. Said, "Reflections on Exile," p. 186.

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CHAPTER 5

CONTEMPORARY MOROCCAN IMMIGRATION AND ITS GHOSTS

Daniela Flesler

> *"In a state of nostalgia, the heart goes back to the past, but the past might be the future, sometimes when it is too late"*
>
> Miloudi Chaghmoum, "Shadow and Darkness."[1]

Hayden White, among others, has written extensively about how historical facts are not "given" and "found," have not simply happened to be then compiled by historians, but they are "constructed by the kinds of questions which the investigator asks," in a dialogue with the present.[2] Linda Hutcheon also explains that both history and fiction are narrative discourses by which we assign meaning to the past, a meaning that is not to be found in the events themselves, but in the narratives that make those past events historical "facts" with relevance for the present.[3] How we interpret the past is thus directly related to the types of narratives we choose to explain it. At the same time, the kind of past that is constructed by these narratives determines the ways we imagine and see our present and future. In Spain, today, we find a variety of narratives that attempt to come to terms with the profound social and psychological implications of having been transformed from an underdeveloped country that exported economic migrants to Northern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s into a modernized, economically advanced country that is fully integrated with Europe and that is itself the "Promised Land" for hundreds of thousands of migrants. These narratives also attempt to come to terms with the fact that with the new immigrants Spain, unlike other Western European nations, is not only experiencing the return of the

colonized but also that of its medieval "colonizers." North African immigrants, most of them Moroccans, cannot be easily "fixed" in the conceptual category of the return of the colonized. They embody both this return—as Spain also took part in the colonial scramble for Africa and "shared" Morocco with France in the first half of the twentieth century—and especially, more threateningly, the return of Spain's medieval conquerors. More acutely than other nations, then, Spain embodies the deep ambivalence of the politics of postcolonial hospitality, where the frontiers between who is host and who is guest cannot be easily determined.[4]

In this essay I consider, first, what type of past, and present, are constructed through the variety of social and cultural texts that posit the Moroccan immigrant as an embodiment of the ghost of the medieval Moor, and what purpose this construction serves. These texts include media reports on the arrival of immigrants, street confrontations between Spaniards and Moroccans, and fictional and semitestimonial texts such as Andrés Sorel's *Las voces del estrecho* (*The Voices of the Strait*, 2000) and Pasqual Moreno Torregrosa's and Mohamed El Gheryb's *Dormir al raso* (*Sleeping Unsheltered*, 1994).[5] Then I analyze the case of a particular text, Miloudi Chaghmoum's short story "La quema de los barcos" ("The Burning of the Ships," 2000),[6] which presents a radically different picture of the entanglement of Moroccans and Spaniards, both past and present, and, consequently, of the meaning of the past for the present and vice versa. Finally, I will attempt to provide an interpretation of these textual practices that no longer sees them as useless, anachronistic gestures, but as parts of a necessary working-through process, in which both Spaniards and Moroccans are trying to come to terms with the ghosts of their shared past.

If Spaniards have difficulty in "welcoming" Moroccan immigrants, it is because they perceive them not only as guests, but also as hosts who have come to reclaim what was "theirs." Moroccan immigrants are identified, through their characterization as "Moors," with the Arab and Berber Muslims who conquered the Iberian Peninsula in 711 and were responsible for its Arabization and Islamization in the Middle Ages, and with their subsequent reincarnations as different "Moorish invaders" throughout Spanish history. As if this were not enough, not only is the Moroccan immigrant the contemporary embodiment of a terrifying historical ghost, but also a reminder of Spain's own Oriental self, and, as such, the return of the repressed. Moroccans are the one group most directly implicated in the question of Spanish identity in relationship to Africa, and, therefore, in the question of Spain's status as a Western, European nation, becoming, in the Spanish collective imaginary, the embodiment of everything there is to fear from their history. It is not surprising then that they have

become the most ill regarded immigrant group,[7] the ones afforded the least preference in facilitating their permanence in Spain, and those who earn the lowest level of acceptance as neighbors.[8] As Sarah Ahmed contends, in each national context the policies and narratives of exclusion do not apply in the same way to all foreigners. In every encounter there are circumstances in play that result in that "some others are designated as *stranger than other others*."[9] The stratification and affective "ranking" of immigrants, based on their perceived ability to assimilate[10] is directly related to an understanding of identity in which history plays a crucial role. In order for a stranger to be designated as such, there needs to be a recognition, and this recognition, as is the case of Moroccans in Spain, is dependent upon a prior history of encounters. The recognition of an other as a stranger, says Ahmed, is constituted through an encounter in the present that reopens past encounters.[11]

One of the most troubling aspects of the current relationship of Spaniards as hosts and Moroccans as guests is the slippage by which Moroccans are transformed from migrants who have come in search of economic opportunities to invaders who have come to reclaim what was once theirs. Jacques Derrida states in *Specters of Marx* that "haunting is historical."[12] The presence of a ghost tells us that the past is not closed and solved, but that the present, in Avery Gordon's words, "is still haunted by the symptomatic traces of its productions and exclusions," by that which has been rendered ghostly, excluded, or marginalized.[13] As in the case of Marx's ghosts analyzed by Derrida, in which no disavowal has been able to make them completely disappear,[14] Spaniards' difficulties with Moroccan immigrants, and their perception of them as "Moors," becomes a symptom of the slippage between the present and past they produce, and the unsolved historical trauma they awake. As explained by Cathy Caruth, the relationship of past and present becomes essential to comprehend the nature of the traumatized condition, marking it as a particularly *historical* experience, "a symptom of history," by which traumatic symptoms appear in "another place, and in another time."[15] In a similar fashion, Derrida maintains, quoting Hamlet's phrase, "The time is out of joint," that ghosts happen in a "disjointed or disadjusted now."[16] We are presented with the "non-contemporaneity of present time with itself."[17] The ghost of the Moor inhabits precisely that "disadjusted now," that "untimeliness," a space deeply infiltrated by a past and inextricably entangled with it. The figure of the violent, lustful Moor, who invades Spain to kill and rape its inhabitants, has haunted the Spanish imagination, aided by what seemed to be "real" repetitions of the 711 invasion throughout Spanish history. As Derrida's specter, which "comes by *coming back* [revenant]. . .a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again,"[18] the Moor appears in Spanish

history through repetition, through his feared and expected return: at the end of the eleventh century, in the invasion of the Almoravids, who consequently took control of Al-Andalus; in the twelfth, by the subsequent Almohad invasion; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the form of frequent naval attacks on the Spanish coast by Berber and Turkish corsairs. In more recent times, in the form of the mercenary Moroccan troops that fought on the Nationalist side of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), who had previously been used by Franco in 1934 to crush workers' uprisings in Catalonia and Asturias and were made wholly responsible for some of the worse atrocities committed in the war.[19] As in the case of the corsairs' attacks, these twentieth-century interventions were also popularly perceived and interpreted as new "Moorish invasions," where much of the psychological terror caused by Moroccans was dependent upon this perception and "remembrance," this "recognition" that Ahmed identifies as central to the figure of the stranger.

The most obvious example of the slippage of past and present produced by Moroccan immigrants is in the way Spaniards name them, and thus recognize them, as "*Moros*" ("Moors"). The term is used very loosely in Spain to signify any Arab or Muslim, and carries with it considerable negative connotations. It also carries a very specific affective history, even when the memories themselves are somewhat vague. As Rachid Nini explains in *Diario de un ilegal* (*Diary of an illegal*):

> In some of those remote towns where we went to work on their farms, people hardly knew anything about Moroccans. All they knew went back to old legends about the Moors who had occupied their land. And that they had been expelled in a harsh way. Legends transmitted from parents to children told a fantastic story full of falsifications.[20]

This "untimeliness" also occurs in the depiction of the immigrants' crossings of the Gibraltar Strait in *pateras* as an unstoppable "invasion," or in comparison with the medieval Arab conquest of Spain. The "invasion" trope, a very common image to speak of immigration in many different national contexts, has in Spain very specific historical referents, awakening very local affects. The worst collective attack against Moroccans in Spain, that of 2000 in the town of El Ejido, in the province of Almería, on Spain's southeastern Mediterranean coast, can be read, together with the explosive economic and social circumstances that surrounded it, as an instance when the imaginary Moor—that threatening and violent being who comes to Spain to rape and kill its inhabitants—was blurred with the real immigrant. The language of physical and verbal violence with which dozens of vigilantes from the town and the surrounding areas engaged with the

Moroccans was that of violent confrontations of the past, of "la caza del moro" ("Moor hunting"), echoed in the slogans "¡fuera moros!" ("Moors Out!") and "¡muerte al moro!" ("Death to the Moor!").[21]

The discourse of past Moorish invasions is used not only in the media, which is more or less expected, but also in fictional and semifictional texts written with the explicit purpose of denouncing present-day racism and discrimination against immigrants. Such is the case of the semitestimonial text *Dormir al raso*, written by Pasqual Moreno Torregrosa and Mohamed El Gheryb. Describing one particular arrival, it equates migration with military invasion:

> On February 7 of that year (1992) 300 people disembarked from two boats on the same night on the coasts of Almería. It had been approximately eight centuries, since the last Almohad and Benimerin invasions, that so many Arabs disembarked together in the Spanish coasts![22]

In a similar way, when talking about the Spanish city of Tarifa, the southernmost point of Spain, overlooking the Strait of Gibraltar, and its attractiveness as a destination both for windsurfers and immigrants' boats, the narrator reminds us of another, much older arrival:

> There also arrived Tarif Ibn Malluk, Tarik's deputy, who was exploring for Musa the coasts of the Iberian Peninsula as an advance party for the Muslim invasion in the year 710.[23]

The novel *Las voces del Estrecho* by Andrés Sorel struggles with similar slippages. If in *Dormir al raso* what we have is a denunciation purpose itself haunted by the ghost of the "Moor," in *Las voces del Estrecho* the immigrants are, literally, ghosts, who have drowned crossing the Gibraltar Strait, and now tell their stories to Ismael, the town's gravedigger.[24] The nostalgia for the past permeates their voices, nostalgia for their lives before drowning, but especially, a deeper historical nostalgia of present Andalusia as past al-Andalus.[25] The leader of these ghosts, named el "Viejo de la montaña," (The elder of the mountain) tells the others: "Our nations, Arabia, Iraq, the Maghrib, were the center of the world.... And in al-Andalus, where we are now, we used to build the greatest and most beautiful mosques, and the loftiest and most elegant minarets ever contemplated." This remembrance of al-Andalus produces the slippage between past and present, since el Viejo de la montaña identifies himself so completely with the Turks, his ancestors, that he narrates their 1612 attack of Zahara de los Atunes, where the novel takes place, in first person plural, as if he were one of them: "We called this place Qalat

al-Sajra. . .we looked out to it with war and revenge cries from our coasts. The blood flooded, the smoke columns stood up everywhere and then silence returned."[26] Later on, the connection is explicitly stated by the narrator: "Today's boats were only a defeated people's poor imitation of the pride with which the Elder of the mountain talked about yesterday's Turkish ships." Even more problematically, the immigrants' ghosts are presented as rejoicing in these stories, especially those that highlight [Christian] Spaniards' suffering at the hands of their ancestors:

> They demanded from him. . .to talk about it, that, that, the hardships that the infidels suffered when they were strong, powerful, and with their big ships dominated the waters of the Strait, and captured them, made them prisoners, and martyred them and killed many and only liberated those who gave them succulent ransoms.[27]

El Viejo de la montaña proudly tells them of the attacks, with all the details of the atrocities committed against the Christians and a gory emphasis on sexual violence against Christian women.[28]

In a similar manner, the Moroccan narrator of *Diario de un ilegal* bitterly reflects upon the current "return of the Moors":

> She said that Spain was wonderful. I told her yes, wonderful, and that is why the Arabs could not stand its beauty and they all left. And look at that, now they have regretted it and they are coming back! One by one. Drowned, most of the time.[29]

This narrator also uses the rhetoric of medieval confrontations in which Christians were humiliated and defeated to establish a contrast to the present situation. Looking at the Andalusian countryside with his Spanish friend Merche, he explains to her what they see as the remains of a triumphant al-Andalus:

> On the mountaintops you can see old fortifications. Look, I tell Merche, pointing at them: in the old days, we used to live over there. Merche does not understand why we had to go all the way up the mountain to find a place to live. We built those fortifications on the mountaintops to be able to watch you, because you lived in the plains, I told her.[30]

As pointed out by Derrida, transformation is one of the characteristics of an apparition: a ghost never returns the same, it changes, returns as other. The ghost appears through repetition, in a return that is other but also the same: in *Dormir al raso*, current immigrants are like the first advance parties of the Arab conquest of 711, and like the North African tribes

who conquered the peninsula in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In *Las voces del Estrecho*, they are like those Arabs that built "the most beautiful mosques" of al-Andalus, sometime from the eight to the eleventh century, and like the aggressive Turkish corsairs of the sixteenth and seventeenth. In *Diario de un ilegal*, they are the exiled and the "oppressors."

This return of the past, in which the present arrival of immigrants is seen in analogy to past "invasions" embodies one of the most contentious issues in the present relationship between Spaniards and Moroccans, in which Moroccans are imagined, both in their fictional characters and in their social behavior, not so much as guests who have arrived in a territory that is foreign to them but as hosts who have come to reclaim what was once theirs. This fear and fantasy about Moors reconquering the Iberian Peninsula, so common during the sixteenth century, when the Moriscos' unrest was added to North African corsair attacks and tensions with the Turks, is voiced in different literary and cultural texts throughout Spanish history. Another current example is an interview given by José Chamizo in January of 2002 to the newspaper *El País*. Chamizo, who holds the position of Andalusian *defensor del pueblo* ["People's defender"], and is very much respected by immigrants as an ally in their economic, social and political struggles, talked about immigration issues in Spain. Answering a journalist's question as to why he thought there was more racism against immigrants from the Maghreb than against sub-Saharan ones, he stated:

> It is true. It is because the black knows he is black, he knows he gets attention and utilizes a strategy of not being seen; they have their lives, their groups, their places, and don't bother anybody. Not the Maghrebi. Because of the distance separating us, because of the eight centuries that they were here, because of Córdoba's mosque…Let's say that they think this is theirs.[31]

They think this is theirs: this phrase probably contains the most explicit utterance of Spaniards' greatest fear regarding Moroccans: they don't occupy their proper role as guests, they don't have "their lives, their groups, their places." There is not enough distance, there are the eight centuries of closeness, there is the mosque of Córdoba. They behave like hosts. "They think this is theirs." This declaration by Chamizo, which he had to retract after ATIME (Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España), the Moroccan Immigrant Workers Association, issued a formal complaint, voices and justifies the Moroccan/Moor slippage that partakes so powerfully in anti-Moroccan feelings in Spain.[32]

The implications of these slippages, among the many that anachronistically and often irresponsibly connect medieval and contemporary

Spain, go much farther than any literary representation, and have very real consequences in the lives of real people. Rey Chow, in her analysis of stereotypes' function as representational devices, argues that the "dangerous potential of stereotypes is not, as is usually assumed, their conventionality and formulaicness but rather their capacity for creativity and originality." So stereotypes are not only clichéd, mechanical repetitions but also—and this is what Chow stresses—"capable of engendering realities that do not exist. . . . Contrary to the charge that they are misrepresentations, therefore, stereotypes have demonstrated themselves to be effective, realistic political weapons capable of generating belief, commitment, and action."[33] In the same way that Chow does with stereotypes, we need to think about the function and "usefulness" of these anachronisms. What purpose does it serve to see contemporary Moroccan immigrants as Moorish invaders? What past and present are constructed through this slippage? The past is understood as a series of instances where "Spaniards" were attacked by "Moors," in which it was easy to distinguish between the two. Derrida states that "haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony."[34] In the Spanish/North African context, the hegemonic discourse haunted by ghosts is precisely this understanding of the past, this constructed image that assumes Spaniards' separation from the "Moors." Ever since Eulogius and Alvarus of Córdoba's mid-ninth century negative writings about the high level of cultural, religious, and social comingling of Christians with Muslims and Arab culture in general, there has been a part of Spain that took as its mission to try to expurgate the "Moorish" mark from the national body. This was first done through religious writings that tried to show the errors of Islam, to try to convince young Christians to stop converting, and then, after the Christian military victories, through cultural prohibitions, book burnings, compulsory conversions, torture, and burning of those suspected of Muslim practices, and physical expulsions from the peninsula. A parallel expulsion, the discursive one, constructed an image of Spain in which the Muslim presence left no traces in the "Christians" that remained, so that the only Muslims in the peninsula were those who had arrived in 711, who would have stayed separated from Christians and then left completely in the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609. Thus, given the modern Spanish state construction upon the silencing and physical expulsion of this part of itself, and the contemporary rejection of migrants who are seen as descendants of those Muslims of the past, it is not surprising that the repressed history of closeness between Hispano-Romans, Visigoths, Arabs, and Berbers, continues to haunt the official, hegemonic history of Spanish national identity.

So even though there is a pervasive agreement that the "problem" with Moroccan immigrants in Spain is their cultural differences, the incompatibility of their lifestyle with the now modern and European one of Spain, through an embracing of what Barker, Balibar and others have called the European discourse of new or culturalist racism,[35] the fact is that they become a problem not because of their cultural differences, as this consensus proclaims, but because, like sixteenth-century Moriscos, *they are not different enough*. Like Moriscos, they can easily pass. The threat consists in the possibility of being too close, of actually realizing that a slippage could occur and a Spaniard could, at any point, be seen as a Moor, and Spain, as not fully European. What is "dangerous" about the contemporary return of the "Moor" is that it awakens these fears, encapsulated in the French aphorism "Africa begins at the Pyrenees," precisely at a moment when Spain seems to have finally achieved truly "European" status. In this sense, the Moor's return becomes an uncanny phenomenon. Through a linguistic excursion into the ambivalence of the German word *unheimlich*, which literally means "unhomely," Freud explains that the uncanny is frightening not because it is unfamiliar, but because it is something very much familiar *made strange*: "this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it through the process of repression." A factor that undoubtedly produces uncanny feeling, he explains, is that of the recurrence of the same thing. Repetition gives us the idea of something fateful and inescapable, out of our control, and thus it becomes a special category of the frightening: something repressed that *recurs*, "something secretly familiar. . .which has undergone repression and then returned from it."[36] As with Caruth's explanation about the status of truth in post-traumatic-stress-disorder, in which she explains that what characterizes an event as traumatic is not the experience itself but its reception, Freud adds to his explanation of the uncanny that it does not matter if what is uncanny and thus frightening today was itself originally frightening in the past. So the question is not whether the 711 conquest, for example, was "truly" traumatic at the time, as later Christian chronicles would have us believe. Today's Moroccans' presence in Spain becomes uncanny because the distinction between the imaginary invading Moor of those Christian chronicles and the real-life Moroccan dissolves. As Freud suggests in his essay, the uncanny is easily produced by repetitions but also "when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality."[37]

These apparitions of Moorish ghosts in contemporary Spain serve, paradoxically, a double purpose. They symptomatically alert us to the

openness of the past, how it is not solved and closed but needs to be revisited. At the same time, the convocation of these ghosts attempts to dilute the most troubling ramifications of the past regarding the Arab identity of Spain, positing "Moors" not as an intrinsic aspect of this identity but in a definable space of otherness, as strangers, invaders, and military enemies. Not all social and cultural texts regarding the topic of immigration do this, however. The short story, "La quema de los barcos" by Miloudi Chaghmoum serves as an example of the construction of a radically different past and present.[38]

What we have in Chaghmoum's text is a focus point in the present that is seen as a new instance when peoples who have never been completely apart and who were never completely different on either side of the Gibraltar Strait reencounter each other. It is a present in which clear "essential" or ethnic differences between Spaniards and Moroccans cannot be traced. What makes people from one side of the Strait different from those at the other side is only circumstance. From the perspective of a possible, alternative present in which being part of the same causes no conflicts or anxieties, the past is constructed as a space of shared ethnic and religious identity. This image of the past is not then one of peaceful *convivencia*, of tolerating differences and learning to live with a neighbor from a different culture, but something much more radical. It is a past characterized by the versatility of identity, where identity and culture are not fixed categories within which people are born and die, and to which they always essentially belong, but rather something that continually changes depending on circumstances, convenience, suitability, and to preserve one's family's safety.

As pointed out by Mohammed Salhi, the title of the story refers to the traditional episode in which Tariq ibn Ziyad, upon his arrival in the Iberian peninsula in 711, sets his ships on fire so as to force his soldiers to follow him and not turn back, telling them: "Where can you escape? The enemy is before you and the sea behind." Chaghmoum recreates the legend and radically alters its meaning when similar words are pronounced by a character who is a contemporary immigrant who "burns his ships" to leave the enemy in his own country behind—the enemy of poverty and oppression—with "burning" meaning, in this case, to cross the Strait undocumented.[39] Instead of the enemy before and the sea behind, the author, in an epigraph to the story, describes the immigrants' situation as one in which the sea is before them and the enemy behind, and, he adds, the enemy is also ahead ("Tenéis al mar delante y al enemigo detrás. . .y delante también").[40] As in the previous texts, the Arab conquest of 711 is linked to the contemporary crossing of the Strait by Moroccan immigrants. The emphasis, however, is not in their crossing

as the repetition of an invasion, but as one more crossing in a historical series of movements of people between the two shores in which the motivation for travel is not military conquest but human survival. Ali Randi and Ueld En-niya are two more of a series of "ghosts," as the narrator calls them, who try to find better opportunities in Europe. The Strait is not crossed to meet the enemy, but to leave the enemy behind. Although, as the epigraph's afterthought indicates, there will also be other kinds of "enemies"—namely, racism, discrimination, and so on—waiting ahead.

As Ali Randi and Ueld En-niya, hidden in a cave on the beach, wait for the boat that will carry them across the Strait, they look straight ahead at the "captivating and disturbing (*espantosas*) lights of Andalucia," lights so powerful and evocative that they do not let them sleep. They talk about their families: Ueld En-niya's "first" grandfather was from Granada, Ali Randi's from Ronda, where he still has cousins. These words, exchanged among them many times, acquire new meaning when pronounced within sight of these lights, in the new circumstance of their "return" to the ancestors' homeland.[41] Looking at them, Ali Randi thinks of his grandfather, who did exactly the same as he is doing now; lying in a seaside cave, looking at the lights on the other side, waiting for a boat to take him "home." The only difference is that his grandfather was looking at the lights of Tangiers and Ceuta, in northern Morocco, from the Spanish shore. The historical exchanges between these two shores are thus encompassed in Ali Randi's family, who migrated to al-Andalus from Morocco in the eleventh century, became Jewish, then Muslim, then Christian, and then, again, Muslim. Ali Randi proudly explains these successive conversions as choices made by the members of his family "in order to integrate ourselves better," not as the result of force or coercion. In times of peace, says Randi, their fluid cultural identity brought them everybody's respect and cordiality, and the family prospered through agriculture and commerce. In times of war, their versatility was seen negatively, and they suffered at both Muslim and Christian hands, seen by both as traitors, apostates, and renegades. Finally, in 1490, the family lost everything, robbed by Christians as they had been robbed before by Muslims. This time, caught in between, they had nowhere to go, but they found someone to take them across the strait, where for generations they heard "Andalusian stories" and gathered once a month to remember and mourn what was lost.[42]

Ali Randi's family history is thus presented as a shared Andalusian past, common to Muslims, Christians, and Jews, in which some members stayed on one side of the Strait and some on the other. What makes this story different from others is that ethnic commonality between Spaniards and Moroccans is assumed fully and directly. The past is not one of living

side-by-side and "tolerating" differences, but one where people married each other and became family, where people converted and became the other. The reality of Ali Randi's family is one of syncretism and mixture, where people and identities are flexible and versatile, and this versatility is not a weakness, but a strength. The past and present this story constructs is thus one where today's crossings and encounters between Moroccan immigrants as guests and Spaniards as hosts are just the current version of a series of family encounters, in a history in which the two seashores function in counterpoint, and where one can easily be transformed into the other by a change in political circumstances.

We can relate Chaghmoum's challenge to fixed notions of identity to the change in focus brought by political independence to the Moroccan short story. Following Najib El Aoufi, Abdellatif Akbib situates the beginnings of the Moroccan short story in the 1940s, coinciding "with the birth of nationalism and anti-colonial resistance."[43] National identity was conceived in these years as a stable set of characteristics that needed to be defended against the threat posed by the colonizers. The period of postindependence, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, sees a shift from nationalism to the disillusionment brought about by independence, since "this period knew the setting of the traditional, direct colonizer and the rising of the new, indirect colonizer."[44] With the dismissal from power of the left wing in 1960, a "new colonialism" begins, "as there was now no rival to compete with the dominant political class, which was made up mostly of those who had cooperated with the European colonizer, and who were consequently the first to benefit from the independence by safeguarding the ex-colonizer's interest in the country."[45] We can trace, together with the political disappointment brought by the lack of real economical, social, and political independence, a transformation by which the dualistic, binary understanding of identity associated with nationalism and the anticolonial struggle, the firm "us" and "them" necessary to this political moment, becomes more ambivalent, uncertain, and ambiguous. I would argue that Chaghmoum's foregrounding of a fluid, flexible identity for his protagonist is related to this search to move away from fixed, "us" and "them" conceptions of identity. As we try to think of the ways in which the Spanish medieval past might be relevant for our present, this story's insistence on the possibility and desirability of versatility seems particularly poignant. This understanding of identity inexorably challenges the still pervasive belief in national cultures existing in isolation from one another, and needing to protect themselves against "invading" "foreigners."[46]

The exchangeable roles of host and guest between Moroccans and Spaniards in this short story are furthermore encapsulated in the larger

context of the movement of peoples across the globe: as Ali Randi is about to drown while trying to reach the Spanish coast, he is rescued by a fellow Moroccan aboard a ship called "Colombina." This Moroccan had himself been rescued once, as had most of the ship's crew, by the Colombian sailors who twice annually travel between Colombia and Italy. In exchange, they worked as sailors for a year. The ship's owner, explains the Moroccan sailor, offers the same opportunities he was offered when another ship plucked him out of the water close to the coast of Florida.[47]

Differences notwithstanding, the presence of the medieval past of al-Andalus, and its consequent ghosts, is pervasive in contemporary texts that attempt to explain the significance of the current presence of Moroccans on Spanish soil. This fixation on ghosts might suggest that what we have today in Spain is an unproductive melancholic attachment to the past. However, there is another possible dimension of these spectral returns. Having explained that trauma is caused by an absence of anxiety in the moment when the event occurs, Freud concludes that the repetitive dream (or our discursive ghostly "return of the Moor") has a specific function, a psychological usefulness, so that these repetitions not only serve the function of indicating that a trauma exists but can also participate in its "cure."[48] Along similar lines, both Derrida and Gordon underline that besides frightening and unsettling the present, ghosts, as materializations of the repressed or the excluded from history, present us with the opportunity of welcoming the previously unwelcomed, of finally giving ghosts a home. Derrida talks of granting them "the right...to...a hospitable memory...out of a concern for justice."[49] Gordon ponders on the possible transformative power of the encounter with the ghost: "a future possibility, a hope."[50] Dominick La Capra also proposes that mourning and melancholia, understood as working through and acting out, need not be seen in binary terms, but as interrelated processes, analytically distinguishable but intimately linked:[51]

> In acting out, the past is performatively regenerated or relived as if it were fully present rather than represented in memory and inscription, and it hauntingly returns as the repressed. Mourning involves a different inflection of performativity: a relation to the past which involves recognizing its difference from the present...Still, with respect to traumatic losses, acting out may be a necessary condition of working through.[52]

La Capra explains that there are, thus, problematic intermediary or transitional processes in between the two categories, conditions necessarily in the middle of these two. Contemporary responses to Moroccan

immigration, both sides of the Strait, can be read as precisely that: as elements in a transitional working through process, where we can see symptomatic traces not only of an unsolved trauma but also of people's effort at trying to come to terms with their ghosts; attempting, not always successfully, to differentiate past and present, to understand their past in order to fully inhabit their present and future.

Notes

1. Quoted in Abdellatif Akbib, "Birth and Development of the Moroccan Short Story" *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 54.1 (2000): 78 (67–87).
2. Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) p. 43.
3. Linda Hutcheon, *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) p. 89.
4. For further discussion of the anxieties permeating Spain's reception of contemporary Moroccan immigrants, see Daniela Flesler, *The Return of the Moor: Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration* (West LaFayette, IN: Purdue University Press).
5. Andrés Sorel, *Las voces del estrecho* (Barcelona: Muchnik, 2000); Pasqual Moreno Torregrosa and Mohamed El Gheryb, *Dormir al raso* (Madrid: VOSA, 1994).
6. "La quema de los barcos" is a fragment of a novel entitled, *The Women of the Randi Family*, published in 2000 in Arabic, and, to my knowledge, not yet translated to another language. This fragment appears in Spanish in the collection *Cuentos de las dos orillas* (*Short Stories from the Two Shores*), ed. José Monleón (Granada: Fundación El Legado Andalucí, 2001), pp. 49–61.
7. Francisco Checa, *El Ejido: la ciudad-cortijo. Claves económicas del conflicto étnico* (Barcelona: Icaria Antrazyt, 2001), pp. 177–178 and Gema Martín Muñoz, *Marroquíes en España. Estudio sobre su integración* (Madrid: Fundación Repsol YPF, 2003), p. 32.
8. Antonio Izquierdo, *La inmigración inesperada. La población extranjera en España (1991–1995)* (Madrid: Trotta, 1996), p. 174.
9. Sarah Ahmed, *Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 6, emphasis in the original.
10. Ahmed, *Strange Encounters*, p. 100, Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in *Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities*, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 24 (17–28).
11. Sarah Ahmed, *Strange Encounters*, pp. 8, 13, 55.
12. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) p. 4.

13. Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) pp. 17–18. Some scholars of Hispanism have already noted the possibilities offered by what has been called "Hauntology Studies" to reflect on issues of memory, the refusal to confront the traumas of the past: Jo Labanyi, "History and Hauntology; or, What Does One Do with the Ghosts of the Past? Reflections on Spanish Film and Fiction of the Post-Franco Period," in *Disremembering the Dictatorship. The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy*, ed. Joan Ramón Resina (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000) p. 65 (65–82); and the status of heterogeneous cultural processes: Jo Labanyi, "Introduction: Engaging with Ghosts; or, Theorizing Culture in Contemporary Spain," in Jo Labanyi, ed., *Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 3 (1–14), in contemporary Spain. For ghosts having to do with Spain's effort to repress its own history as a colonial power, especially in regards to Latin America, see Joseba Gabilondo, "Historical Memory, Postnational Spain, and the Latin American Postcolonial Ghost: On the Politics and Ethics of Recognition, Apology and Reparation," *Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies* 7 (2003): 247–266. For an examination of the theory of hauntology in relationship to medieval Spain and to the practice of historical writing, see Simon Doubleday, "Tormented Voices in the Haunted House of Empiricism," in *The Experience of Medieval Power, 950–1350*, ed. Robert Berkhofer (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 273–287.
14. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 37.
15. Cathy Caruth, ed. *Trauma. Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) p. 5–8.
16. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 3.
17. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 25.
18. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 10.
19. Their actions were obviously condoned and even encouraged, it seems, by their Spanish superiors; see María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los moros que trajo Franco. . .la intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Martínez Roca, 2002), pp. 296–299.
20. "En algunos de esos pueblos remotos a cuyos campos fuimos a trabajar, la gente apenas sabía nada de los marroquíes. Todo lo que sabían se remontaba a antiguas leyendas sobre los moros que habían ocupado su tierra. Y a los que habían expulsado de mala manera. Leyendas transmitidas de padres a hijos que cuentan una historia fantástica repleta de falsificaciones." Rachid Nini, *Diario de un ilegal* (Madrid: Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo, 2002), p. 74.
21. For a more detailed account of the particular situation of El Ejido and the confrontations that took place there, see Francisco Checa's *El Ejido: la ciudad-cortijo*.
22. "El 7 de febrero de ese año [1992] desembarcan 300 personas de dos barcas en una misma noche en las costas de Almería. ¡Hacía aproximadamente ocho siglos, desde las últimas invasiones de almohades y benimerines, que

no desembarcaban tantos árabes juntos en las costas españolas!" Moreno Torregrosa and El Gheryb, *Dormir al raso*, p. 57.

23. "Allí acudió también en el año 710 Tarif Ibn Malluk, lugarteniente de Tariq, que por encargo de Musa exploraba las costas de la península ibérica como avanzadilla de la invasión musulmana." Moreno Torregrosa and El Gheryb, *Dormir al raso*, p. 75.
24. The town gravedigger's name, Ismael, is meant to resonate as Muslims' forebear. In the Old Testament, Ishmael was the son of the patriarch Abraham by the Egyptian handmaiden Hagar. Islam traces its lineage from Abraham through Ishmael and Judaism and Christianity through his half-brother Isaac.
25. This nostalgia for a lost al-Andalus in which Muslims were the victors and owners of most of Spain is constantly invoked in writings about Muslims *written by Spaniards*. With this, I do not mean to say that this nostalgia does not exist in the Arab world or in the minds of "real" (as opposed to fictional) immigrants. What I want to stress is that this ventriloquism of Muslim immigrants by Spaniards tells us more about the anxieties of those Spaniards producing the texts than about the preoccupations of real immigrants. Nostalgia for an al-Andalus characterized as the site of peaceful coexistence of Arabs, Christians and Jews (which is a different nostalgia than the one felt by the characters of *Las voces*, who are said to miss their *power* over Christians) exists across national, ethnic and religious barriers, as it is analyzed in other essays in this volume. See Abend's essay (chapter 6) on how Spain's Muslim converts have made this idealized image of al-Andalus their "spiritual home," and Filios' essay (chapter 4), in which she analyses the nostalgic idealization of al-Andalus by María Rosa Menocal, Amin Maalouf, and Rachid Nini. In a similar fashion, the equation of current Moroccan immigration with the Arab conquest of 711 does not solely belong to the Spanish side.
26. "Qalat al-Sajra llamamos nosotros a este lugar…[n]os asomábamos a él con gritos de guerra y venganza desde nuestras costas. Corría la sangre, se elevaban por doquier las columnas de humo y luego regresaba el silencio." Sorel, *Las voces*, p. 84.
27. "Las pateras de hoy no eran sino un pálido remedo del pueblo vencido frente al orgullo con el que el Viejo de la montaña hablaba de las naves turcas del ayer…Le exigían a él…que les hablase de ello, eso, eso, las penalidades que sufrieron los infieles cuando ellos eran fuertes, poderosos, y con sus grandes naves dominaban las aguas del Estrecho, y los apresaban, los llevaban prisioneros, y los martirizaban y daban muerte a muchos y solamente liberaban a quienes les proporcionaban suculentos rescates." Sorel, *Las voces*, p. 89.
28. Sorel, *Las voces*, p. 100.
29. "Dijo que España era maravillosa. Le dije que sí, que maravillosa, y que por eso mismo los árabes no soportaron su belleza y se marcharon todos. ¡Y mira tú por dónde ahora se han arrepentido y regresan! Uno a uno. Ahogados, la mayoría de las veces." Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, pp. 9–10.

30. "En las cimas de algunas colinas se ven antiguas fortalezas. Señalándolas le digo a Merche: mira, ahí vivíamos antiguamente. Merche no comprende por qué teníamos que subir a la cima de la montaña para encontrar un lugar donde vivir. Construíamos esas fortalezas en lo más alto para poder vigilaros, porque vosotros vivíais en los llanos, le dije." Nini, *Diario de un ilegal*, p. 11.
31. "Es verdad. Es porque el negro sabe que es negro, sabe que llama la atención y utiliza una estrategia de no ser visto; van a su historia, están muy agrupados, tienen sus locales y no molestan a nadie. *Son conscientes de estar en territorio ajeno. El magrebí, no. Por la distancia que nos separa, por los ocho siglos que estuvieron aquí, por la mezquita de Córdoba. . .Digamos que se creen que esto es de ellos*." Sol Alameda, "Entrevista José Chamizo Defensor del pueblo andalúz," *El País Digital*, January 6, 2002: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/CHAMIZO/_JOSe/pueden/encontrar/soluciones/definitivas/inmigracion/elpepusocdmg/20020106elpdmgrep_5/Tes. My emphasis.
32. In her essay about Spain's Muslim converts (chapter 6 in this volume), Lisa Abend discusses the social reception of some controversial initiatives promoted by this group. She quotes Rosa María Rodríguez Magda, a writer and Popular Party member of the Valencia council for culture, as an example of those who see Muslim converts and their worshipping of an idealized al-Andalus as a threat to national security and identity. Rodríguez Magda's anxiety-ridden discourse seems to operate in the same terrain than the discourse of the "re-invasion" of Spain by Muslim/ Moroccan immigrants that I trace in this essay. In her book *La España convertida al Islam*, she explicitly conveys this fear. As quoted by Abend, she says: "The foundational myth of the recovery of al-Andalus, as its differentiating sign of identity. . .is especially worrisome given that the re-Islamization of al-Andalus as the first step in the reconquest of Europe, whether that reconquest is seen as imaginary nostalgia, peaceful occupation via conversion and the expansion of the Muslim immigrant population with its high birth rates, or through violence, is a topic common to both moderate sectors (of Islam) and fundamentalists." Her linking of nostalgia for al-Andalus, conversion to Islam, Muslim immigrants, and terrorist violence is extremely problematic, to say the least. This groundless argument is common in the writing of other Popular Party affiliates such as César Vidal. See his *España frente al Islam: de Mahoma a bin Laden* (Madrid: Esfera, 2004).
33. Rey Chow, *The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 53–59.
34. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 37.
35. See Martin Barker, *The New Racism. Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe* (London: Junction Books, 1981); and Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" pp. 17–28.
36. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud* (SE), vol. 17 (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), pp. 234–245 (219–256).

37. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," p. 244.
38. Chaghmoum, "La quema de los barcos." Abdellatif Akbib situates Miloudi Chaghmoum as representative of the generation of Moroccan writers working in the 1970s and 1980s ("Birth and Development of the Moroccan Short Story" *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 54.1 (2000): 73 (67–87). Akbib, following Mohammed Berrada, sees dreams and their possibility of bridging past and present as one of the thematic currents of this period (p. 78). We can certainly follow this thread to the short story "La quema de los barcos," in which, as we will see, the memory of the past illuminates the present and vice versa.
39. Mohammed Salhi, "Las luces encantadoras y espantosas de Andalucía" in *Cuentos de las dos orillas*. Ed. José Monleón (Granada: Fundación El Legado Andalucí, 2001), pp. 25–26 [23–30].
40. Chaghmoum, "La quema de los barcos," p. 49.
41. Chaghmoum, "La quema de los barcos," pp. 52–53.
42. Chaghmoum, La quema de los barcos," pp. 54–56.
43. Akbib, "Birth and Development," p. 69.
44. Najib El Aoufi, *An Approach to Reality in the Moroccan Short Story* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Center, 1987), p. 183.
45. Akbib, "Birth and Development," p. 70; El Aoufi, *Approach to Reality*, pp. 188–192.
46. Susan Martin-Márquez finds a similar thrust in the work of artists such as Miquel Barceló and José Luis Guerín, whose work "contests the current emphasis on the incompatibility of the different racial, ethnic, cultural or religious affiliations that traditionally have been mobilized to define 'humanity' ": "Constructing *Convivencia*: Miquel Barceló, José Luis Guerín, and Spanish-African Solidarity" in *Border Interrogrations*: *Crossing and Questioning Spanish Frontiers*, ed. Benita Sampedro and Simon Doubleday (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 90–104.
47. Chaghmoum, "La quema de los barcos," pp. 58–60.
48. Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud* (SE), vol.18 (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), p. 32.
49. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 175.
50. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, pp. 63–64.
51. Dominick La Capra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 65–71.
52. La Capra, *Writing History*, p. 70.

CHAPTER 6

SPAIN'S NEW MUSLIMS: A HISTORICAL ROMANCE

Lisa Abend

Late in December 2005, five girls shuffled into a classroom in Córdoba's Condesa de las Quemadas elementary school for their weekly religious instruction. In keeping with the season, the lesson for the day was about the life of Jesus. Mr. Martínez, their teacher, led them through the manger birth, the entry into Jerusalem, the scenes in the Temple, and all the way to the death on the cross. At that point, however, the narrative veered a bit from standard Spanish instruction, "Christians believe Jesus was resurrected," their teacher informed them. "But we Muslims believe he ascended immediately to heaven."

That classroom scene was the culmination of more than a decade's efforts to persuade the Spanish government to extend some degree of the privilege it affords the Catholic Church to other religions. Yet it was also a telling indication of the role that converts to Islam have played in Muslim affairs within Spain. In 1992, Felipe González's Socialist government signed an agreement that paved the way for Islamic instruction in public schools. At the time of the signing, convert Mansur Escudero officially represented the Muslim community in his capacity as secretary general of the Islamic Commission, and it was he, along with his fellow converts in the Junta Islámica, who kept pressure on successive governments until the measure was finally put into practice in September 2005 (at which time three regions on the mainland began offering the courses; Spain's North African coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla had started in 2001). Thirteen years after the original *convenio* was signed, then, pressure brought in part by converts had finally persuaded the Spanish government

to honor its obligations to Muslims. At that time, it was another convert, Suleiman Martínez, who began teaching five Muslim girls in Córdoba—their parents all immigrants from Morocco—about Islam.

If the scene within the Córdoba classroom emphasizes the prominence of converts within public Muslim life in Spain, it also highlights the distinct version of Islam that many Spanish converts profess. Suleiman Martínez's lesson on Jesus sprang from his desire to teach his students what they have in common with other faiths, and to help them fit their religion within the traditions of their adopted country. "This isn't a *madrasa* where they only memorize the Koran and learn the *shari'a*," Martínez said at the time. "It's part of a more open culture." That openness also led him to assign the girls skits to perform enacting ethical dilemmas, even though the Quran prohibits theater. "True Islam has nothing to do with fundamentalism," he asserted.[1]

That view—that true Islam has "nothing to do" with literal readings of the Quran, to say nothing of the rigid interpretation that the Taliban or Salafistas profess—is common among Spanish converts to the faith, and one for which they find ample evidence in Spain's medieval past. Spain's Muslim converts—especially those who make up the prominent Junta Islámica, based in Almodóvar del Rio, not far outside the city that was once seat of the Caliphate—are a community inspired less by a strict interpretation of scripture than by an imagined history (by imagined, I do not necessarily mean false). Part of a larger movement that led several thousand Spaniards to convert from Catholicism to Islam in the 1970s, the Muslims who eventually took up residence in Almodóvar told themselves a history—about a medieval Islam tolerant of other faiths, supremely accomplished in culture and technology—that was grounded partly in fact, partly in romance.

That idealized history allowed them to do something that few others at the time could: to remind Spaniards that their past—indeed their very lineage—was not monolithic, to posit an identity that was not defined by the militarism and National Catholicism that defined Spanish public life for the nearly forty years of the Franco regime. In the suffocating atmosphere of the dictatorship's declining years, conversion to Islam functioned as dissent, even subversion. Thirty years after the dictator's death, however, what was once a means of resistance—an explicit rejection of the culture that both supported and was perpetuated by the Franco regime—had, in the wake of September and March 11, become accepted by the mainstream. Much as Martin Luther King's version of the Civil Rights Movement, with its emphasis on democracy, human dignity, and Christian brotherhood, became acceptable to wide swaths of the American public when juxtaposed against Malcolm X's more radical

version, so too has the tolerant, Sufi-inflected religion of Spain's latest *conversos* become the palatable face of Islam, the version accepted—even promoted—in newly multicultural Spain. Although the ratio of converts to native-born Muslims is minute, the influence of New Muslims (as many prefer to be called, turning the tables on the post-Reconquest rhetoric of "New Christians") is great. Indeed, it is the discourse of the convert community, with its emphasis on Andalusian Islam and an "alliance of civilizations," its promotion of women's rights, and its rejection of violence, that non-Muslim liberal Spaniards, including Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, have embraced.

Because the Spanish census does not count religion as a category, no one knows for sure how many Muslims there are in Spain. Most estimates settle these days on the round figure of 1 million, and of those, an estimated 20,000 are thought to be converts to the faith. But if the numbers are uncertain, the origins are not: conversion to Islam in modern Spain began at a precisely located moment, when the Scottish convert Ian Dallas, after renaming himself Shaykh Abdalqadir As-Sufi al Murabit, began traveling through southern Spain, teaching about an Islam that was both Sufi and Andalusian in its inspiration. Indeed, the name that Murabit took, and the one he gave his followers—the Morabitun, derived from the Almoravids, the Berber tribes who took control of al-Andalus in the eleventh century. Morabitun arrived in Spain in 1975, just as Franco was dying, and from his base in Granada found followers eager to accept his religious philosophy. Self-identified progressives—some would call them hippies; many at one time belonged to the Communist Party—they were drawn to the Morabitun critique of the West as exhausted and capitalism as corrupt. Some thirty years later, those themes are still present in Morabitun writings:

> The significant thing that explains the birth of Capitalism and its carcinogenic development as corruptor and predator, creator of immense inequalities, destroyer of the environment, is that, in the intentions of the conquests of the New World, especially in the 17th and 18th century centuries, the materialist seed is already present, the vision of conquest and the ambition to dominate nature developed by Enlightened rationalism.

By contrast, Islam, which, like capitalism, also spread dramatically across large swaths of the world, was never motivated by "material greed, but rather by a spiritual force, for the intention of pleasing and obeying God and establishing justice on earth."[2] In 1997, traces of that Marxism still remained in the thought of Hashim Cabrera, one of the original converts who had since broken with Shaykh Abdalqadir: "The ethical or moral

economy that Christian searchers have vainly looked for in Capitalism, appears clearly in *Shari'a*. The synthesis that the West has been unable to achieve between individual necessity and communal wellbeing is perfectly described in the Quran. Islam's recognition of private property in no way prevents the existence of mechanisms to redistribute wealth."[3]

Indeed, although it was radically different in most other ways, the Islam that drew converts in the late 1970s already derived some of its appeal from its position as a religion of the marginalized. That position helps explain the intellectual prominence of Roger Gaudry, the French former Communist who converted to Islam and eventually took up residence in Córdoba, as one of the leading theorists for Spain's New Muslims. Criticizing the West for stripping its Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage of all "Oriental" influences, he condemns it for its aberrant promotion of individualism. "Western man has lost all unity in his relations with nature, society, and the divine," Gaudry writes, adding that "Islam, which is not perverted by the mutilating Western vision behind colonialism, can help us become conscious of this unity."[4]

Islam also appealed to an incipient nationalist movement in Andalusia. Many members of Front for the Liberation of Andalusia would become Muslims, prompted by the belief that the religion was a key element of southern Spain's distinct national identity. In addition to working for an independent contemporary Andalusia, several of the Front's members would go on in 1980 to found the Yama'a Islámica, a cultural organization that, a few years later, would promote a new political party—Andalusian Liberty—that stood for parliamentary election in 1986. In all these incarnations, Islam formed a primary foundation for a separate identity, as Ali Kettani, a leader of the Yama'a, would make clear. "I see Andalusian nationalism as a common cultural history, first as an experience of Islam, then as an Inquisition, and finally as the enslavement of those people expelled from their lands."[5]

In the immediate post-Franco era, these ideas exercised a uniquely subversive, if utopian, purchase. On the one hand, they functioned as a direct rebuke to Franco, who, from his days as a military commander in North Africa, embodied Spanish imperialism, and, once he was in power, demanded a centralizing authority so strong that it not only squashed political nationalisms but prohibited the very expression of regional languages such as Catalan and Euskera (Basque). From the very beginning of his rise to power during the early months of Spanish Civil War, Franco resuscitated the symbol of the crusade. While the war was going on, he would have his troops disguise themselves by wrapping turbans around their heads and darkening their faces with walnut oil, the better to terrify Spanish citizens with the frightening specter of the returned

Moor. The Caudillo's favorite iconographic representation of himself was a "crusading" El Cid—witness the fresco that portrays him in medieval armor, sword aloft, on the ceiling of the Military Academy at Segovia.

The dictatorship rested, of course, on an ideology of National Catholicism, which defined Spain as essentially Catholic, and prevented the public exercise of any other religion. The 1958 Law of the Principles of the National Movement offered a succinct summary. "The Spanish Nation considers as a badge of honor its adherence to the Law of God according to the doctrine of the Holy Roman and Apostolic Catholic Church, the only true faith inseparable from the national conscience, and the inspiration for its legislation." Closely linked to the regime, which never missed an opportunity to remind Spaniards of how it had saved the country from the "godless communist hordes," the Catholic Church functioned as a mechanism of social control, monitoring local mores, enforcing the regime's social codes, and even supplying the clergy who would act as effective jailers for convicted dissidents.

By the time that Franco died, those once suffocating strictures had relaxed enough that, for example, a tiny mosque had sprung up in Córdoba, a gift from the dictator to the Moroccan soldiers who had fought with his army. But ethnically, racially, and religiously, most Spaniards still perceived their nation as an almost entirely homogeneous, Catholic place. In that setting, conversion to another religion—any religion—can itself be seen as a form of resistance to the stultifying, forced homogeneity of the Franco era. And given the iconography of the regime, the choice of Islam in particular was a particularly sharp rebuke. Both these aspects—the embrace of the reviled Moor, the rejection of a monolithic Catholicism harnessed irrevocably to a legitimized dictatorship—made Islam a particularly potent form of critique, one that was especially attractive to young political progressives.

But if the embrace of Islam was a means for rejecting the immediate past, it also provided a way to run headlong into the hoped-for future. These days, when leaders of the Junta Islámica make the case, as they are constantly called upon to do, that democracy and Islam are not incompatible but mutually supportive, their comments are directed at the specter of undemocratic Islamism, at the real nations and imagined caliphates where religious difference is not tolerated, where slavery is legal, where women are legally defined as inferior to men. But in the uncertain times of the Transition, the same New Muslims were equally adamant about Islam as a means to certain democratic ends. It is true that some converts noted that their religion did not, for example, subscribe to the concept of individual rights that has guided Europe since the Enlightenment. "The Muslim community is not based on a declaration of human rights,

but on the knowledge and revelation of human responsibilities," writes Abderrahman Medina.[6] But they also saw their "reversions" to Islam as intimately connected to Spain's transition to democracy. "In those early moments," writes Cabrera, "the first Muslims experienced the euphoria of their spiritual discovery, just as Spanish society together experienced the euphoria of newly-debuted citizenship."[7] Indeed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it was still not at all assured that democracy would take root in Spain, the mere presence of Islam seemed to offer a way to foment progressive values like pluralism and freedom of religion. "The practices of organizations like the Junta Islámica and the Islamic Commission of Spain not only deepen Spanish democracy and develop religious freedom, making it possible to live a live as a Muslim in Spain" writes anthropologist Pedro Antonio Sánchez, "but they also challenge different ways of qualifying society as a space that can connect different cultures."[8]

It was history that taught Spain's New Muslims to see this vaunted pluralism in Islam. "When, some time ago now, we heard public talk of the achievements that Andalusi culture had brought to the peoples of the west, including the very notion of civilization, and heard for the first time the concept of legacy, we were able to see that our lives as Muslims in contemporary Andalusia would be favored and sheltered by this history. . .of *convivencia*, knowledge, and existential meaning," writes Hashim Cabrera. Indeed, in many ways it is this legacy, this "history of *convivencia*" that he and other converts have converted *to*. Like today's Islamists, they express a desire to return to a pure Islam. But for them, purity lies not with the age of Mohammed, nor with a literal reading of the deeds and teachings described in the Quran. It lies with Spain's medieval past.

Al-Andalus, the Hispano-Muslim kingdom renowned for its architectural splendors, its scientific advancements, its literature, its medicine, is the spiritual homeland of today's converts. In books and articles they celebrate the irrigation systems, the lyrical poetry, the philosophical debates, the technological wonders that gave al-Andalus its reputation for cultural and intellectual richness. "The Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, said, 'Certainly Allah is beautiful and loves beauty,'" recounted Mansur Escudero at a recent conference. "And this love for beauty is one of the Andalusian Islam's most important gifts: beauty that is art in architecture, in city planning, in objects, in a rich and healthy cuisine. It is human perfection, good character, good behavior, social harmony; it is ecology, it is science, it is the best of the human spirit. It is, in a word, Islam."[9]

Of all al-Andalus' beautiful accomplishments, social harmony—*convivencia*—is the most important for today's New Muslims. Indeed,

many derive meaning and a sense of identity from their perception of al-Andalus as an exceptional social experiment. "Our land is a place of encounters," writes Hashim Cabrera, "and we are the result of a long and profound *mestizaje*."[10] In this view, the Muslim reign of Spain constituted an era not just of tolerance for diversity, but active, constructive engagement among distinct groups of people. "I am convinced," writes Abderrahman Medina Molera, one of the founders of the Yama'a Islámica, "that pluralism is the principal treasure of our common identity and, without a doubt, of the uncertain future still to come."[11] As Medina suggests, that historical example continues to set a precedent for the future: "We recognize ourselves as members of a community that managed to give to the world one of the most beautiful civilizations that man has known," writes Mehdi Flores, "a civilization that, with its light and shadows, was able to reach levels of humanity that still serve today as an example in our quest for models of how to live and live together."[12]

The desire to return to a medieval *convivencia* is present in the cross-cultural conferences that the Junta sponsors, in its ecumenical activism, and even in classrooms like Suleiman Martínez's. But for New Muslims, the term *convivencia* refers to more than just harmonious relations between Muslims, Jews, and Christians. It also encompasses a liberal—even progressive—attitude toward women. Jadicha Candela, for example, has argued publicly on many occasions that Islam guarantees full equality between men and women, and that it is only political interests that have distorted the Quran into a misogynistic reading. "Islam, which arose from the inhumane and sexist system of Arabs in the 6th century," she writes, "inaugurated a humanitarian system that integrates equally not only women but all other discriminated minorities, such as orphan girls and slaves."[13] This belief, that Islam is not inherently misogynistic, has supported the efforts of some converts, like Anhi Cardillo, to find examples of exceptional women in al-Andalus. Indeed, although she clearly explains that most women were confined to the home, Cardillo also notes the exceptional activities that al-Andalus offered female poets and *katibat*—or educated "wise women."

The less uplifting aspects or contradictions that scholars such as Serafín Fanjul have found in al-Andalus—the restrictions of women's movement and dress, for example, or the occasional persecutions of Jews—find little traction in the discourse of New Muslims. In fact, the desire to see in that medieval realm an exemplary society occasionally leads them to embrace ideas that lie beyond the pale of mainstream historiography. Ignacio Olagüe's work, *The Arabs Never Invaded Spain*, for example, is prominently featured—and reproduced in its entirety—on the WebIslam Web site. In that work, Olagüe denies that the Iberian Peninsula was

invaded by military force in 711, arguing instead that Islam penetrated the Iberian Peninsula via "force-ideas," powerful theological concepts derived from the Quran, which took root in Iberian soil already prepared by Arianism:

> We know that Islam descends, genetically speaking, from Unitarian Christianity. Thus it follows that the penetration of Quranic principles happened slowly...[The expansion of Islam] has slipped in, and then prospered, through the same dynamic that has always controlled the propagation of similar movements. In a favorable environment, the idea has spread through anonymous and at times secret acts.[14]

Olagüe maintains as well that West and East collaborated in creating an imagined history of invasion because it benefited both, providing a heroic picture of power for Muslims, and an explanation of collapse for Christians.

Many New Muslims are persuaded by Olagüe's account. In an essay on Islam in contemporary Spain, Mansur Escudero writes,

> The few Muslims who arrived from the Arab and Berber world to the Iberian Peninsula in the 8th century did not conquer it by the sword. The principal victory for the Muslims consisted of synthesizing with a people of mainly Unitarian belief that found itself dominated and tyrannized by a government and a religious hierarchy in decline. Jews as well as Unitarian Christians, persecuted and oppressed by the power of a Church that tried to impose its Trinitarian dogma and socio-economic system, accepted the Muslims as true liberators who would return their political, social, and religious rights.

According to Escudero, that acceptance soon turned to admiration. "The vigor and purity of Islam, as well as the example set by Muslims, took hold with such force," he writes, "that in a period of a few years, Islam had spread among the indigenous population of the peninsula, and become the majority religion."[15] This interpretation of Spain's medieval past, radically different from the one taught in most Spanish schools, comes as a revelation for a convert such as Audalla Abdelhadi Conget: "For a Muslim, a pure-bred Spaniard like myself [the work] is fascinating and disturbing because it thoroughly questions the history upon which the Spain that we think we know is based, and because it opens up the possibility of a new vision...of the 'necessary myth,' which sustains the hatred behind the so-called clash of civilizations"[16] So peaceful and harmonious is the al-Andalus imagined by converts, then, that it cannot admit a violent origin.

If the Muslim conquest was peaceful, however, the Christian one was not. "The civilization of al-Andalus, which produced a flourishing of arts and sciences without peer exactly at the time in which Europe was submerged in the greatest cultural darkness, ended with one of the greatest tragedies that humanity has suffered: the genocide of Muslims, Jews, and Unitarian Christians, and the systemic destruction of an entire civilization."[17] That destruction—the wars, the forced conversions, the pogroms, the expulsions—is a touchstone for New Muslims, the key event that provokes their outrage, and justifies their activism. Perhaps even more than the arrival of Islam to Iberia, it is the surrenders and expulsions—of 1492, of 1505, of 1609—that endow a sense of collective identity. When the new Granada mosque, founded by converts, opened in 2003, its leaders wrote, "The Inquisition, which has inspired Serbians, Zionists, imperialists, and colonialists has been one of the blackest remnants of our history during the last 500 years. But the 250 years of Inquisition which were needed to eradicate the Islam of al-Andalus may finally reach their end and be able to produce the example of justice and freedom that regenerates peaceful *convivencia*."[18] Often New Muslim discourse on the Reconquest slides into criticism of the arrogance and violence of the "West" today: an attack on the hegemonic brutality of the Catholic kings slips easily into a critique of the United States in Iraq, or Israel in Palestine.

The almost uniformly positive view that New Muslims hold of al-Andalus, the sweepingly negative view of the Christian kingdom that followed, and the contemporary correlations they are used to draw, has led critics like Rosa María Rodríguez Magda to contend that their version of history is not merely inaccurate, but dangerously revisionist. By demonizing what she calls "Spain," and idealizing "Islam," converts exploit the past in order to justify their contemporary abhorrence for the West. "They are disseminating a romanticized and self-interested recreation of a non-existent past. . .that prepares the ground for the well-intentioned multiculturalism stimulated by the self-guilt of Western culture." The New Muslim view of al-Andalus, in short, is a "dangerous alibi for cultural relativism."[19]

Certainly the New Muslim view of al-Andalus is romanticized, but in this, it is little different than the one that appears on the well-received pages of María Rosa Menocal's *The Ornament of the World*. The difference, of course, is that however idealized Menocal's reconstruction may be, and however much that reconstruction is intended to function as a commentary on the present, her al-Andalus is an object of academic study, a world admired, perhaps, but ultimately disappeared. For today's New Muslims, al-Andalus is not past. In addition to being a vibrant

example of a culturally diverse, tolerant society that could act as a model for post-Franco democracy, for people such as Mansur Escudero al-Andalus is a living memory. Note the pronouns that Escudero chooses: "[a]l-Andalus will continue being al-Andalus for Muslims of all epochs. It is there, we have not created it. Here we have our dead, who remain alive, awaiting the Day of Resurrection."[20]

We, our: many converts feel themselves to be direct descendants of those early Hispano-Muslims, possibly by blood, definitely by affinity. It is this perceived ancestral link that has led Escudero, to call for citizenship for the Moroccan descendants of the Moriscos expelled from Spain in the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries. And it is this same sense of ancestry that many New Muslims cite as the compelling factor in their conversion. "Many Andalusian Muslims discover in Islam a form of life that gives meaning and continuity to almost all the experiences they have lived prior to the moment of their recognition as Muslims, that moment which sometimes is called conversion," writes Cabrera. "In many cases they have found in Islam something that is truly theirs, a form of life that seems known and fitting to them, that has to do as much with their inner state as with their memory."[21]

If the notion of al-Andalus as a recovered memory helps explain why many New Muslims speak of "reversion" rather than "conversion," it also makes sense of the larger convert "project," if we can speak of such a thing. Stimulated by the remembrance of a splendid age when Spain itself was Muslim, but still tolerant of difference, New Muslims are dedicated to reminding contemporary Spaniards that their past is hardly monolithic. "We stand before the possibility of rewriting the history of the peninsula from the point of view of an encounter between civilizations and cultures, of reconsidering our past as an expression of a pluralism that always should have prevailed in a land situated at the confluence of worlds," writes Abdelkarim Osuna. "We are in a privileged moment to reconstruct our history, in order to overcome these totalitarian temptations and plant a future where the *convivencia* among different religions and conceptions of the world will be possible."[22]

The spirit of cultural exchange and acceptance are hallmarks of Andalusian Islam, and reminds New Muslims that their religion is distinct from versions found, say, in the Arab world. Escudero himself rejects the notion (although, as we will see, he also at times helps promote it) of an Islam "made in Spain," as some of the Spanish newspapers have glibly called it. He and his co-religionists are not, he argues, creating a new brand of the faith, but recovering the true one, one that held sway centuries ago in the same areas where the largest convert communities are now based. But there is an undeniable sense among New Muslims that the religion

they practice is European, in the sense that it both has its historical roots in Europe and that it affirms European Enlightenment values. "The spirit of al-Andalus—its respect for freedom of conscience, its recognition of women's rights—is what we consider genuine Islam."[23]

"Genuine" Islam: the phrase is a familiar one in these post–September 11, post–March 11 days. The West has become fearful of these modern-day Reformations, certain that the Islam imagined in them is one that rejects modernity, demands conformity, and abhors the contemporary Euro-American way of life. But the restoration imagined by Spain's New Muslims is wholly different than that of other would-be reformers, because its point of reference, the Golden Age from which all comparisons emanate, is different; it is not Medina in 622 but rather Córdoba in 976. It is that origin, both native and imagined, that has given New Muslims a position of relative status within Spanish democracy.

By the early 1980s, the original *converso* "movement" sparked by Dallas had splintered. In 1980, the New Muslim Abderrahman Medina, founder of the nationalist Andalusian Liberation Front, had gone on to start the Yama'a Islámica de al-Andalus. With groups in cities throughout Andalusia, the Yama'a combined religious education, including classes in Arabic, with a Marxist rejection of capitalism, and a regional nationalism founded on the notion of a distinct Andalusian heritage. Within a few years, that organization (now without Medina, who had been expelled for spying for Morocco) would give birth to Córdoba's Universidad Islámica de Averroes. Opening in 1994, the school offered instruction in Sufi theology, the history of al-Andalus, and Arabic before closing soon after founder Ali Kettani's death in 2001.

In 1983, Escudero and other New Muslim intellectuals had also broken with the Morabitun, alienated by Dallas' dogmatism, and his purported misuse of funds that he collected in Saudi Arabia. Soon, they had turned Almodóvar del Rio into the center of operations for the Junta Islámica, and begun publishing first a print magazine called *Verde Islam*, and later an influential Web site, called WebIslam, that Rodríguez Magda today refers to as "the mirror in which Spanish and Hispanic Muslims in general see themselves."[24] It was members of the Junta Islámica, including Escudero, Mehdi Flores, the secretary for the United Left Party in Ceuta, and Jadicha Candela, a Socialist Party activist and lawyer, who would lead the Federacion Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas when it formed in 1989. That organization emerged in response to the need for an institutional group that could negotiate with the Spanish government for an agreement that would fulfill the privileges granted religions with "notorio arraigo" in the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom. Although the FEERI was intended to represent all Muslims, in

fact, the creation two years later of the UCIDE (Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España), an organization for foreign-born Muslims (mostly Syrian at this point in time) living and/or nationalized in Spain, reduced the former's constituency greatly. In truth, neither organization ever represented all of Spain's many distinct Muslim communities (including the Morabitun, still active in Granada), but it was these two groups, united in1992 into the Islamic Commission, that continue to act as the institutional liaison between Spanish Muslims and the Spanish government.

In the year of its creation, the Islamic Commission, with Mansur Escudero as co–secretary general, signed the *Convenio de cooperación*, an agreement with the Socialist government of Felipe González. That agreement granted the Muslim community the right to build and maintain its own cemeteries, recognized Muslim wedding ceremonies, and guaranteed the presence of Muslim chaplains in the military, prisons, and public hospitals. More significantly in a country where classes in Catholicism were still obligatory in public schools, it allowed for instruction in Islam in centers with at least ten Muslim students, and paved the way for taxpayers to check a box on their returns that would direct a small percentage of the money they owed the government to Muslim organizations, just as Catholics can do.

Not a single one of these measures would be put into effect until José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero took office in April 2004. Neither González, in the three years that remained in his term, nor Aznar in the eight years he was prime minister, enacted the measures of the Convenio. Part of that failure stemmed from the inefficiency of the Islamic Commission, which suffered from the conflict that arose both between the FEERI and the UCIDE, and within the FEERI itself. However weak it was, the FEERI nonetheless continued to represent publicly a kind of Islam that upheld Western European values. Three years after the imam of Fuengirola, Mustafa Kamal, published a book in which he outlined the acceptable ways for Muslim men to hit their wives, for example, the FEERI formally denounced him, initiating legal action.

Throughout the Aznar years, converts continued to play a dominant role within a Muslim community that continued to grow, as immigrants, above all from Morocco began to arrive in Spain in unprecedented numbers. The Morabitun led the efforts to build the first specifically dedicated mosque in Granada since the surrender of Boabdil in 1492. Financed largely with money from the United Arab Emirates and located across from the San Nicolás church, the construction provoked dismay among some Granada residents who saw the Muslim building as intruding on a space sacred to Catholics. But by the time it was opened in 2003, the new mosque was being celebrated throughout the Muslim world, and

had become a significant addition to the roster of local sites—not just the Alhambra and Albaicín now, but Moroccan tea shops, Nazari ceramists, Arab baths—that were drawing new waves of tourists in search of Spain's Muslim past. Meanwhile the Junta Islámica, from its base in Almodóvar del Rio, established an institute that functioned as the country's chief halal certifier, set up WebIslam, and continued to advocate, at home and abroad, for greater protection of Muslim rights in Spain.

By the time that José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected prime minister, just three days after Islámist terrorists killed 191 people on commuter trains in Madrid, the Junta Islámica was well positioned to reassure Spaniards that not all Muslims were a threat. They were not, it is true, alone in this endeavor. The Islamic Cultural Center of Madrid, also known as the "M-30 Mosque" because of its position alongside the city's ring road, had become the largest in Europe. Its imam, Sheikh Mohamed Moneir, was Egyptian, and the center was funded largely with Saudi money. In the weeks and months following the Madrid bombings, Moneir, who admitted knowing at least one of the suspected bombers, preached to both followers and the international media a message of peace and *convivencia*. So did Riay Tartary, head of the UCIDE, and co-secretary general of the Islamic Commission.

But it was members of the Junta in particular that emerged more often than not as spokespeople for Muslims in Spain. Part of this was because of language: Moneir speaks very little Spanish, and Tartary's Castilian is heavily accented. A native-born Spaniard, Escudero of course speaks Castilian flawlessly, and manages well enough in English to conduct interviews with the BBC and CNN. He and other Junta members also had a cultural advantage, demonstrating a clear knowledge of how Western media—and local politics—worked.

It was not only these practical advantages that propelled the Junta to a dominant role in Muslim relations. Escudero had met with Zapatero when the latter was secretary general of the PSOE, and had won a promise that, if the Socialists were elected, they would put the 1992 *Concordia* into practice. Now after the long years of resistance from the Aznar government, Junta members—and many other Spanish Muslims—saw an opportunity for advancement with the new Socialist government. In the wake of the Madrid bombings, the Ministries of Justice and Interior consulted frequently with Junta members on how the government was being perceived within the Muslim community. As a result of those consultations, for example, the government was careful to distinguish between "Muslim" and "Islamist." "In fact, they haven't even used that term," noted Escudero, "because we have explained on many occasions that one cannot characterize as 'Islamic' something that is totally prohibited in

Islam. Instead, the government has tried to characterize the attacks as the result of 'international' terrorism."[25]

There is little doubt that the Zapatero government's de facto alliance with Escudero and the Junta was politically expedient; after the Madrid bombings, the government needed to show that it was both cracking down on radicalism and extending a hand to those Muslims—the vast majority, as Zapatero himself emphasized—who were appalled by what had happened at the city's Atocha train station on March 11, 2004. In July, Justice Minister Juan Fernando López Aguilar met with Mansur Escudero and Riay Tartary to announce "a new cycle of cooperation and understanding" after "eight years of obstruction." With its ready condemnation of violence and its media-ready press releases, the Junta was an especially welcome ally. And as Spaniards learned the extent of the terrorist threat, as the Spanish papers filled regularly with accounts of investigations, arrests, and trials of Islamists, the Junta continued to seek out opportunities to present a friendly, more familiar face of Islam. It was not wholly submissive—when José Antonio Alonso, minister of Interior proposed, in 2004 that mosques and imams be monitored, Escudero took the lead in denouncing the measure. "The Minister's proposal displays an absolute ignorance of the foundations of Islam and the Muslim community," he said. "They are dangerous statements that demonstrate that we haven't learned anything from what has happened."[26] But in many ways, the goals of the Junta, and those of the Zapatero government were complementary. By now, many New Muslims were confident enough of their position to speak of a contemporary Spanish Islam. As Silvia Taules puts it in her 2004 book *La Nueva España Musulmana*:

> You have these Muslims of Spanish origin who demand that Islam should remain in the hands of citizens of Spanish culture and with a tradition in the country. Spanish Muslims are a small minority but very united, whose faith is tightly tied to modern, Western society. Converts to Islam are certain that the imams who preach in mosques should be Spanish, they consider that only their mode of religion can survive without losing the Spanish essences that they have conferred on it. They fear that foreigners are gaining the power of Islam, and they are especially afraid that the countries from which those foreigners come are getting it.[27]

On the first anniversary of the bombings, the Junta spearheaded a move by the Islamic Commission to issue a fatwa—the first ever—against Osama bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda. Calling them apostates, the fatwa condemned the use of violence as un-Islamic and called on Muslims to fight actively against terrorism. For its justification, the edict relied on *Shar'ia*,

or the Islamic legal code, which states that anyone "who deems permissible that which God has declared 'haram,' or prohibited, such as killing innocent people in terrorist attacks, becomes a 'Kafir Murtadd Mustahlil,' or apostate." "Since Osama bin Laden and his organization defend the legality of terrorism and base that defense in the sacred Quran and the Sunna, they are committing the crime of *istihlal*, and have made themselves apostates, and should not be considered Muslims nor treated as such."[28]

"We see this as our contribution," Escudero said at the time. "A declaration from the Muslim community that says that bin Laden and al-Qaeda are not Muslims, that they are outside of Islam." Although the fatwa, issued in an obviously non-Muslim country, was not legally binding, it was intended, according to Escudero, to serve "as a call to conscience" for Spanish Muslims. Yet as primary author of the document, Escudero was reportedly singled out as a target on the Abu Maysara al-Iraqi webpage, and as we will see, his decision to issue the fatwa may have played a role in his eventual ouster from the head of the Islamic Commission. Even at the time, skeptics saw in it an attempt to underline converts' difference from other Muslims. Waleed Salah, professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid questioned whether the declaration's true purpose may have been to protect the group that issued it rather than to prompt genuine change. "This is a way for the Islamic Commission to distance itself from the people responsible for the attacks, to demonstrate their innocence," he said. But whatever criticism the fatwa garnered among some Muslims, it also generated approval from non-Muslims in Spain and abroad. The BBC, Fox News, and CNN ran segments on the fatwa, and newspapers from the *Times* (London) to the *Pittsburgh Post Gazette* published articles. That kind of attention—as well as the Junta's desire to distinguish itself as the representative of European-style Islam—has helped it win official support from the Spanish government in the wake of March 11. Since 2004, both Junta and the Ministry of Justice have argued that the key to stamping out terrorism lies with better integration of Muslims into Spanish society. To aid in that process, the Junta created a post-graduate course at Spain's public National Distance Learning University (UNED). Taught jointly by the school's academics and by convert Muslim leaders such as Escudero, Mehdi Flores, and Abdulluh Trevethen of London's Islamia School, the course is designed to train experts in Islamic civilization and culture and includes sections not only on the Quran and Islamic history, but on how *Shari'a*, fits within the juridical framework of Spain. One instructor, a historian of Islam, was explicit about the course's purpose. "One of the things we want to do here," said Bernabé López, "is normalize Islam so that it is not identified with terrorism, and is instead seen as just another religion."[29]

In its first year, most of the 132 students enrolled—a record number for the university's postgraduate courses—were not themselves Muslims, but rather journalists, NGO workers, police officers, or educators who had a professional interest in deepening their knowledge of Islam. But German Ruipérez, co-director of the course, described the 2005 offering as a pilot for a more ambitious kind of training. "In the near future we hope to offer courses for potential imams or mosque administrators," Ruipérez explained, "and we aspire to offer a kind of credentialing for religion course teachers in the public schools."[30]

For Escudero, that goal is perhaps the most important one for state-sponsored initiatives like the UNED course to meet. "At this time, when there are so many errors being spread in the name of Islam, we need people who can clarify what the religion really stands for," he said. "There are 100,000 Muslims in public elementary and high schools, and we have to find a way to train the instructors who will teach their religion classes."[31]

Currently, only a fraction of those 100,000 students are actually enrolled in the public school classes. Nine years after the Spanish government agreed to offer religion classes to Muslim students as it does to Catholic ones, sixteen instructors—all appointed by the Islamic Commission—began teaching about Islam in three Spanish provinces in September, 2005. Most of the instructors, like Suleiman Martínez, travel to several schools in the course of a week. Because the Islamic Commission must certify those teachers, they tend to hold the same values as the Commission itself.

The Junta also sponsors an annual, international conference on Islamic feminism. In its first year, the conference drew notable speakers such as Amina Wadoud, who, only months before, had sparked a scandal within the Muslim world when she preached to a mixed-sex congregation in New York. With its calls for gender equality and its critique of Islamic fundamentalism, the conference won the financial support of several government institutions like the Catalan Generalitat and the national Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

There are also hints of New Muslim rhetoric in the Alliance of Civilizations that Zapatero proposed to great acclaim—and not a little skepticism—at the United Nations in September 2004. Urging an international effort designed to foster exchange and sufficient understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim countries to combat international terrorism, Zapatero began his speech by referring to himself as the leader of an "ancient and diverse country, with different languages, different traditions, different cultures," and went on to emphasize that Spain was a Mediterranean country, thereby drawing links to the Magreb countries

across the water.[32] The Alliance won the support of UN secretary general Kofi Annan, who appointed a high-level committee to create a concrete plan of action for the Alliance. There were echoes of the Alliance's influence at the opening of Madrid's Casa Arabe, dedicated, as Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos said, "as an center of encounter, dialogue, and tolerance." That the center's second branch, which opens in February 2007, will be in Córdoba is, of course, no accident.

Not all of the Junta's activities, however, have been uniformly well received by non-Muslims in Spain. Soon after Spain became the third country in the world to legalize gay marriage, Escudero publicly suggested that the same right should be extended to polygamous relationships. Escudero, who himself had two wives until his first, Sabora Uribe, was mysteriously murdered in 1998, argued that given the change in the law, it was time to take up the issue of another "marital option." In truth, he was advocating solely for polygyny—"neither I nor any other Muslim can try to change or falsify Islamic principles so that they fit with what is politically correct at the time"[33]—and this apparent differentiation in rights between the sexes prompted many feminists to criticize the proposal sharply.

Yet the anxiety and outrage provoked by Escudero's (not everyone in the Junta supported this motion) promotion of polygamy, are comparable perhaps only to the controversy that erupted from a more direct claim on the history of al-Andalus that the Junta made in 2003. At that time, a virulent debate erupted—and continues as of this writing—around the Junta's attempts to redefine one of the most famous remnants, and symbols, of Spain's Muslim reign: Córdoba's gorgeous Mezquita.

Begun under the Caliph Abdal-Rahman I in 786, the Mezquita, with its acres of striped arches stretching far beyond ordinary sight lines, was considered one of the wonders of the Muslim world, an architectural triumph that quickly came to epitomize the cultural, religious, and educational achievements of the caliphate. In the sixteenth century, the decision was made to rip out the center arches and replace them with a Catholic nave, better befitting the Mezquita's new status as Córdoba's cathedral—a status it retains to this day. Ever since, critics have lamented the destruction of the mosque's aesthetic unity, but the truth is that not even the heavy, ornately cared choir stall, nor the florid paintings of saints and Virgins that line the chapel walls, have succeeded in eradicating the thoroughly Islamic style of the building. The Mezquita may be Córdoba's cathedral, but there is no getting around the fact that it is also a thoroughly Islamic structure.

That does not mean, however, that Muslims are allowed to worship there. Córdoba's bishopric, which today owns the Mezquita, hires private

security guards whose main job is to keep the hordes of tourists passing through each day from taking flash pictures and leaning against the arches. But they also have a mandate to prevent Muslims from worshipping there. Indeed, any Muslim who prostrates him or herself in prayer within the Mezquita is forcibly ejected from the building. For the Junta Islámica, that kind of exclusive proprietorship of a building that they see as religiously and historically sacred, and indeed, over which they feel a certain degree of proprietorship themselves, is unacceptable. In March 2004, two days before the Madrid bombings, two representatives from the Junta traveled to Rome to petition the Vatican for the right to open the Mezquita for ecumenical—including Muslim—worship: "In these difficult times, it could be an important symbol for both Catholics and Muslims, an expression of willingness to enter in dialogue," stated Mansur Escudero. "We're not trying to take the Mezquita away from anyone," he added, "but simply open it up."[34]

The effort won the support of many ecumenical groups, but not the one that counted: the Catholic Church. Although Archbishop Michael Fitzgerald, the Vatican's president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, declared that the matter had to be decided by the local bishop, he also made the pointed suggestion that "Muslims must accept history." Córdoba's bishop, Juan José Asenjo, refused repeatedly to comment on the subject, before finally noting that Christians were kept out of Saint Sofia (today the Blue Mosque) in Istanbul as justification for the Mezquita's quid pro quo. Politically, the Junta believed that it initially had the support of Córdoba's communist mayor, Rosa Aguilar, but as the controversy received media attention, the city government backed off. By May of 2004, Andrés Ocaña, Córdoba's lieutenant mayor, was making anodyne statements like: "The Mezquita should be a subject for dialogue between the two religions, not the secular government."[35]

In December 2006, with a new pope in Rome, the Junta announced it would again appeal to the Vatican. This time, the response was more blunt. Bishop Asenjo quickly said that the diocese would not consent to Muslim worship in its Cathedral: the temple had been Christian since its conquest in the thirteenth century, and opening it to Muslim prayer would "only generate confusion among the faithful."[36] In response to this renewed rebuff, Escudero staged a sit-in of sorts that would be even more ill-received: against the backdrop of dozens of flashing cameras, he unrolled his prayer mat in the gardens of the Mezquita, and began to pray. "We Muslims have no need to recover some nostalgic version of al-Andalus," Escudero had written, "Spain is al-Andalus and al-Andalus is Spain."[37]

The same sense of guardianship that inspired the Junta to request the opening of the Mezquita also led it to take up the cause of Moriscos,

those Muslims who lived under Christian rule in Spain before finally being expelled in 1609. Today, many descendents of those original exiles live in Morocco, where they guard the culture and memory of their families' time in Spain. In August 2006, the Junta called on the government to grant those Muslim exiles the same right to citizenship given to descendents of medieval Spain's Jews, expelled in 1492. The point, said Escudero, was "to repair the historic amnesia to which Moriscos have been subjected, and treat them like Sephardic Jews, who have already received Spanish nationality."[38]

The United Left Party, and the Andalucista Party both supported the Junta's proposal, but with Morocco's geographic proximity, and the clear desire—evidenced by the tens of thousands who arrive each year—of many Moroccans to move to Spain, the idea of a thousands of Moriscos laying easy claim to Spanish citizenship has not been publicly well-received. In an editorial for *ABC*, Serafín Fanjul, professor of Arabic studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid, wrote: "To hand over to them, in the twenty-first century, passports (supposing that they can identify themselves as true Morisco descendants), with no other argument than to play the role they choose (that of the victim) in a history that is already remote, is not any kind of restitution but just another entry in the account of the President of 'whatever.' "[39]

Increasingly, then, New Muslims' pleasing discourse about al-Andalus seems insufficient to maintain their privileged position. In part, this is a function of converts' evolving goals: as Muslims have gained basic religious rights within Spain, they have begun to request others—such as polygamy, and citizenship for Moriscos—that can make liberal Spaniards and their government nervous. Yet the group's liberal efforts have not been enough to convince some critics that converts are not implicated in the radicalization of European Islam, especially since it was discovered that three converts were among those charged with planning the London airline attacks in the summer of 2006. Indeed, two prominent members of the conservative Popular Party (PP) have recently published books that raise alarms about the presence of converts in Spanish society. Gustavo de Arístegui, a PP congressman, and author of *La Yihad en España*, who said in an interview that he has been warning about converts for "the past ten years," argues in his book that converts represent an effective means for spreading extremist ideas. "Jihadist groups were once suspicious of converts because they feared that they were intelligence agents trying to infiltrate their cells," Arístegui says, "but someone with blue eyes and a Western last name raises fewer suspicions, so the jihadists are realizing that they can be effective cannon fodder for suicide missions. They are

almost impossible to detect, especially if they have not revealed their conversion to their family."[40]

Aristegui admits that the number of converts who are active, practicing Jihadists is very small (of the more than 200 Muslims arrested in Spain in conjunction with 9/11 and 3/11, only one, Yusuf Galán, is a convert). "But the number who support the ideals that feed terrorism is much greater," he says.

Rosa María Rodríguez Magda, a writer and Popular Party member of the Valencia council for culture, worries less about terrorism than about what converts are doing to democratic values in Spain. In her book *La España convertida al Islam*, she blames converts for attempting to win greater democratic rights for a religion that, in her opinion, is fundamentally anti-democratic. She also blames converts for what she sees as inconsistency, critically contrasting their purported support of women's rights with their "anti-feminist" embrace of polygamy. But more than anything, Magda worries that converts are the "Trojan horse" through which fundamentalist Islam will take hold in Spain. "Perhaps this friendly face of Islam is more dangerous than the fundamentalist affirmations of certain imams," she says. "At least with the latter we know who the enemy is, they're not wolves in sheep's clothing."

In particular, she decries a slippery slope that leads from converts' claims of descent from al-Andalus, and Islamist demands to reclaim the historic kingdom. "The foundational myth of the recovery of al-Andalus, as its differentiating sign of identity. . .is especially worrisome given that the re-Islamization of al-Andalus as the first step in the reconquest of Europe, whether that reconquest is seen as imaginary nostalgia, peaceful occupation via conversion and the expansion of the Muslim immigrant population with its high birth rates, or through violence is a topic common to both moderate sectors (of Islam) and fundamentalists."[41]

Rodríguez Magda is not alone in this anxiety. In December 2006, the conservative newspaper *ABC* reported on plans to build large mosques in Seville and at Medina Azahara, the ruins of a caliphal palace located outside Córdoba, with notable concern:

> Those who follow the Córdoba and Seville projects will remember the claims about "al-Andalus" that not only radical Islamist groups. As much for extremists as for moderates, Andalusia has a historical evocation, and it is in this context where sources consulted place the interest in making Islam in the Andalusian community "more visible."

The paper goes on to point out that various Muslim groups "comprised mainly of converts" were behind the purchase of lands in both cities.[42]

Despite the fears of conservatives, more fundamentalist Muslims don't necessarily see themselves as working in accordance with their convert co-religionists. In fact, New Muslims find themselves increasingly at odds with foreign-born Muslims. Part of this tension surely results from the natural displacement that converts feel both as more immigrant Muslims arrive, and as the latter begin to feel more comfortable in their adopted country. But the friction also reveals a certain fissure between the version of Islam preached by the Junta and other convert groups, and that of "old" Muslims.

The clearest sign of this rupture came early in 2006, when the FEERI ousted Escudero from his leadership position, and hence also removed him as co–secretary general of the Islamic Commission a role he had played since the founding of both organizations. The reversal came as a complete surprise to Escudero, and provoked concern among New Muslims about the direction that Islam was taking in Spain. Warning of the growing influence of Saudis, Abdennur Prado comments, "Arab culture cannot offer the model for Islam's integration into lay society broken the monopoly that certain foreign groups have in Western Europe,"[43] Many saw the ouster as the expression of discontent with certain Junta actions, especially the fatwa against Osama bin Laden. Some also noted that it also acted as a referendum on the Junta's more liberal interpretations of the faith. Although the new secretary general, Felix Herrero, is a convert himself, many liberal Muslims and non-Muslims have accused of him being controlled by powerful Saudi interests, and his mosque in Málaga was the subject of police investigations for terrorism.

"When people talk about the incompatibility between Islam and the West, they are implicitly denying our very existence. We are Western Moors, as much members of our societies as anybody else, and this puts us in a privileged position to talk about these supposed incompatibilities." With that declaration, Escudero justifies a specific claim for the present by referring to the past. In a time when European society grapples with the outrage provoked by cartoons depicting Mohammed, debates whether or not to ban headscarves in public places, and fears that its way of life is threatened both by Islamist terrorism and, at times, by governmental responses to it, his claim promises a third way through the dichotomy of clashing civilizations. And that third way, in the minds of today's New Muslims, gains credibility because of its perceived basis in Spanish history. When Escudero refers to himself and his cohorts as "Moors," he does not merely conjure up al-Andalus, but establishes it as a paradigm, a model that can serve the West today, and one for which New Muslims, with their particular historical memory, believe themselves to have a privileged relationship.

It is too soon to tell whether a romanticized version of history—no matter how appealing—can indeed protect Spain from the harsh confrontations with its Muslim citizens suffered recently in France and the United Kingdom or inoculate it against Manichean vision of clashing civilizations within its own borders. Given so many factors—the large numbers of Muslim immigrants arriving annually in Spain, the investigation and prosecution of dozens of Muslims for suspected involvement in the March 11 bombings, the increasing entrenchment on all sides of the issue—it is frankly difficult to imagine that New Muslims will be able to continue to sway the shape of Islam in Spain with their memory of al-Andalus as a guide. But in a tiny classroom located a few minutes' walk from a mosque that was once the glory of the Muslim world, Suleiman Martínez and his five Muslim charges continue to try.

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CHAPTER 7

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PAST IN THE ALBAICÍN: GRANADA'S NEW MOSQUE AND THE QUESTION OF HISTORICAL RELEVANCE

David Coleman

"For every Muslim, Andalusia exists as a romantic theme, a dream, a part of our poetry…But now it is not a dream; we are here as a community."[1] With these words, Abdalhasib Castiñeira captured the joy of many of his fellow Granada Muslims in the wake of the long-awaited opening of the city's impressive and monumental new "Great Mosque" (*Mezquita Mayor*) on July 10, 2003. Built at the summit of the historic Albaicín district adjacent to the Plaza de San Nicolás with its commanding vista over the city's most famous artifact of its rich Islamic past—the Alhambra palace/fortress complex—the mosque's inauguration attracted both national and international publicity. Global interest in the project owes principally to Granada's powerful symbolic significance as the last outpost of Spanish Muslim rule that fell to the "Catholic Monarchs" Isabel and Fernando on January 2, 1492, marking the figurative culmination of the Christian "Reconquista," and the passing of nearly eight centuries of Islamic political power on the Iberian Peninsula. That Islam has now "returned" to the city more than five centuries later in such a visible and symbolically powerful way poses a wide range of questions concerning local, regional, and national identity, as well as the meaning of Granada's and Spain's religiously plural past in shaping present conditions and realities.

Figure 7.1 Granada's New Mosque, Albaicín, opened 2003

The story of this most striking symbol of Islam's return to Spain covers some thirty years, dating back to the earliest days of modern Spanish democracy in the wake of the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975. Over those decades, local promoters as well as opponents of the mosque project have crafted and deployed in the midst of their debates a wide array of historical arguments. These varied and often contradictory interpretations of the meaning of Spain's and Granada's past speak directly to the central themes and questions that we attempt to address throughout this volume. Specifically, what (if any) are the relationships between Spain's multireligious medieval legacy and the troubling conflicts that confront not only Spain but also the entire modern West and the Islamic world, in our own increasingly global age? Are such appeals to one vision or another of Spain's and Granada's religious history inherently misleading and/or distorted, or do some of them speak to genuine historical connections between past and present?

To address these questions, the following pages will explicate and analyze some of the principal historical arguments and interpretations set forth in the very public controversies concerning the mosque project by its promoters as well as by their friends and opponents (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) in Granada's broader community. To be sure, amidst debates so clearly burdened by potential "lessons" for contemporary global dilemmas as those concerning the meaning of more than eight centuries of historic cohabitation of Islam and Christianity (not to

mention Judaism) in "medieval" Granada, and the developments of the century following the 1492 Christian conquest that purportedly brought to a "close" that state of affairs, one could hardly hope to avoid finding multiple cases of interpretive simplification or manipulation.

Even amidst (and largely because of) such distortion and simplification, the Granada mosque debate constitutes a particularly poignant case through which to explore the dynamics of what it means for individuals, groups, and/or communities to lay claim to—or, conversely, to deny or contest others' claims to—"historic legacies." Not unlike "heritage," of course, the term "legacy" typically sets off alarms in the minds of scholars.[2] Like "heritage," in fact, "legacy" connotes to many historians the very sorts of imagined connections to romanticized or mythologized pasts that most of us take as one of our principal missions to debunk, especially via careful empirical attention to revealing, through primary source analysis, the past (to borrow Ranke's classic, if impossibly idealized, formulation) "as it actually was." Medievalists from other disciplines have proven in some cases less uncomfortable with the risk, or even inevitability, of anachronism that comes from exploring the sorts of connections across distant time implied by the term "legacy." From her vantage point in medieval English literary studies, for instance, Carolyn Dinshaw has gone so far as to explicitly embrace what she calls "affective history" and the resulting formation of "affective communities" across time as a necessary, integral, and enabling reason for "doing history" in the first place. She does not shy away in the process from what she calls the "intentional collapse of conventional historical time;" as she explains, "I do not tremble at the very concept of anachronism, but rather want to explore its potential productivity."[3]

Although I strongly share with Dinshaw a recognition of the inherently and profoundly political dimensions of historical inquiry itself, I am not convinced that arguments concerning historical relevance necessarily require "the collapse of conventional historical time." As a result, I would like to explore in this essay the potential contribution of a theoretically informed and self-consciously eclectic empiricism to the question of "historical relevance." I begin with the axiom that any assertion that the past is somehow "relevant" to the present in some way beyond loose analogy depends upon the ability to demonstrate, via evidence, some form of meaningful continuity across time, even (and especially) distant time. This does not necessarily mean attempting to build mechanistically reductive chains of "cause and effect" over many centuries—the result of which in this case would no doubt come across as a series of Kiplingesque "just-so" stories that likewise grotesquely simplifies the myriad of interacting historical processes that have produced what we see

and hear in the streets of a modern city such as Granada. It does, however, imply a willingness to call into question the generally accepted results of the perennial historical imperative of periodization, with the associated conceptual constraints of assumptions of the "closure" of past eras and the opening of new ones.[4]

The necessity and conceptual limitations of periodization have, of course, long been a matter of methodological debate among historians generally and medievalists in particular. To many readers of this essay, Marc Bloch's name will immediately jump to mind in this regard.[5] Yet even dedicated empiricists (among whom I customarily count myself) have to grant that postmodernism's rigorous and persistent emphasis on the inherent subjectivity of historical writing has added fresh energy and perspective to such debates in recent decades. For his part, the assertively postmodernist philosopher of history, Beverley Southgate, interestingly posits a conceptual parallel between the inherent provisionality of historical interpretation itself and the ineluctable resistance of historical processes themselves to clean and definitive closure:

> Historians may be justified in exuding some complacency. In a time of fast-moving change, constant educational upheavals, built-in obsolescence, and immediate redundancy for many, they can take some comfort from the thought that, however public attitudes toward their own preserve may fluctuate, at least one thing seems sure: as E.M. Powicke notes above, "nobody can abolish the past." We've seen that there may well be attempts to do just that—to abolish the past at both personal and public levels: as individuals, we may try to suppress those aspects of our past that we'd rather be without; and ideological reasons abound for excising those memories of a national past that conflict with current political aspirations. But, whatever attempts are made, "the past" persists—eluding containment, seeping through boundaries and barriers into present consciousness once more, resurfacing against the odds, and finally resisting abolition.[6]

Southgate's critique of the concept of historical "closure" provides a springboard for my consideration here of the role of Granada's distant past in making sense of its present. How, specifically, might Granada's long "medieval" history of interaction and conflict between Muslims and Christians have "resisted abolition," and "resurfaced against the odds" in ways that shed useful light on the city's recent past? I will begin with a look at two specific individuals' opposing claims concerning the significance of the new Albaicín mosque with respect to the "legacy" of Spain's medieval past. I will then broaden the discussion to consider the story of the Albaicín mosque alongside that of another, far less publicized, and in some ways "rival" mosque that grew in Granada simultaneously over

the past three decades, examining the rhetoric surrounding the broader community's reception of each, as well as each mosque community's impressions of the other. Finally, I will attempt to outline how, specifically, the past "persisted" (to borrow Southgate's terminology) to influence the reception and place of the Islam and these mosques in Granada today.

An "Unpaid Debt": Laying Claim to (and Questioning) an Historical Legacy

For nearly three decades, the leaders of Granada Albaicín mosque project have consistently attempted to tie their efforts not only to the sorts of generalized and often romanticized visions of a "paradisiacal" al-Andalus addressed in many essays in this volume but also to specifically local details of Granada's own historical encounter between Islam and Christianity. Abdalhasib Castiñeira, the current cultural director and principal public spokesman of the Albaicín mosque, for instance, has often noted that his community's historical significance is especially underscored by the fact that Muslim Granada's fall in 1492 came not as the result of a violent siege, but rather by a negotiated surrender. By the terms of that surrender agreement—the "Capitulations of 1492"—the Catholic Monarchs guaranteed Granada's final Muslim ruler, the beleaguered Boabdil (Abu Abdullah), that he and all of his coreligionists in the former sultanate would continue in perpetuity to enjoy the free practice of Islam under the protection of their Christian rulers. Castiñeira further notes that the guarantees of religious liberty granted to Granada's Muslims in the 1492 Capitulation accords were endorsed not only by the monarchy but also by Pope Innocent VIII himself.[7]

As points of documented historical fact, these are true claims with which no historian would disagree. Granada's surrender agreement participated in a long-standing "medieval" tradition of similar accords recognizing the religious autonomy of the Mudéjar communities (i.e., Muslims living under Christian rule) of many other cities incorporated into the expanding Christian domains of the crowns of Castile and Aragon between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.[8]

As had also often been the case in such earlier agreements, however, the accommodating terms of the 1492 surrender soon began to erode under the tense political realities of the postconquest city. Only a month after the handover of the city to its new rulers, for instance, Isabel ordered it announced on February 6, 1492 that the captulations' guarantees that Granada's Mudéjars be allowed to keep all weapons except firearms was rescinded, and that the city's Muslims were immediately ordered to turn over to Christian authorities all swords, spears, and even knives

of more than a specified length. Over the next few years, the queen remained frustrated by the slow pace of local conversions to Christianity managed by the conquered city's first archbishop Hernando de Talavera. Eventually, this frustration culminated in the queen's consent in 1499 to a more aggressive campaign of proselytization and conversion advocated by the archbishop of Toledo and noted humanist scholar and Franciscan reformer Francisco Ximénes de Cisneros. With a claim that, as we will see, still resonates in local debates concerning the city's identity, Cisneros asserted that a number of Granada's supposed Mudéjars were actually *elches*—renegade Christians who had fled Christian rule and converted to Islam. Because the actual numbers of Berbers and Arabs who had entered the peninsula in the wake of the 711 original Muslim invasion and the later eleventh- and twelfth-century incursions of the Almoravids and Almohades had been so small, moreover, most of the rest of Granada's Mudéjars were, in the eyes of Cisneros and other clergymen, almost certainly descendents of Visigoth and/or Celto-Iberian Christians who had themselves converted to Islam over the centuries following the conquest. In the closing months of 1499, Cisneros targeted with special vigor those whom he believed to be *elche* apostates, imprisoning and even subjecting to torture those who refused to convert. Incensed by what they perceived to be a blatant violation of the terms of the capitulation accord, local Muslims rioted in the streets of the Albaicín. As royal authorities pacified the urban revolt, the violence spread to the nearby mountains of the Alpujarras, where two years of bloody combat followed before crown forces managed to defeat the rebellion in 1501.[9]

For their part, the monarchs held that the act of rebellion had itself nullified once and for all the terms of the 1492 Capitulations—terms that they of course had hardly observed rigorously in any case. As the rebellion still raged in the Alpujarras, Granada's remaining Mudéjar community (thousands who had the means to do so had already fled by that point to North Africa) was forced at swordpoint to convert to Christianity in a series of mass baptisms in January and February 1500. For the next seven decades, the tens of thousands of Castilian Christians who came to settle in the conquered city would share the urban landscape with a mostly hostile, recalcitrant, and largely "crypto-Muslim" community of "Christians newly converted to the Holy Faith," as they were called initially, or Moriscos ("little moors") as they increasingly came to be labeled in the middle decades of the sixteenth century.[10] Their eventual fate, along with that of their fellow Moriscos from other areas of the Spanish kingdoms, is well known to historians. During and after the "Second Rebellion of the Alpujarras," 1568–1571, nearly the entirety of the Morisco population first of the city of Granada, and later of the Alpujarras and the rest

of the former sultanate, were expelled and dispersed to other cities and towns throughout the crown of Castile, where royal and Church authorities hoped that they might in such diaspora prove easier to assimilate to Christian beliefs, norms, and identity. Frustrated by what they perceived to be the continuing failure of such efforts, the government of King Philip II eventually chose simply to expel nearly all of the Moriscos from the Spanish kingdoms between 1609 and 1614.[11]

Albeit not a professional historian, but a man well read in the historiography of his adoptive city, Abdalhasib Castiñeira contends explicitly that Granada's modern Muslim community generally and the Albaicín mosque specifically are the direct heirs to the promises made in the 1492 Capitulations: "To restore the rights, the guarantees, the proprieties and the statute of protection ensured by the surrender agreement *is an historical debt* of unquestionable justice, and the time for the repayment of this debt and the righting of this wrong is at hand."[12] Because of the papal approval, he adds, the 1492 Capitulations were not within the Catholic Monarchs' legal right to annul unilaterally in any case.

As those familiar with Spanish surnames may already have surmised, Castiñeira is certainly no Berber, much less Arab, but rather a native Spanish citizen from Galicia, born in 1955 in Pontevedra on Spain's northwestern coast. He converted to Islam during a year-and-a-half stay in England in the late 1970s before moving to Granada in the early 1980s. By laying claim to Granada's Muslim legacy, he therefore certainly does not mean to imply that he is the genetic descendant of the local Muslims who lined up in the Albaicín for forced baptism on those fateful days of January and February 1500. He asserts, however, that he and many of his fellow Granada Muslims today share with their persecuted local Mudéjar and Morisco forebears a bond nearly as important—that of Spanish identity and (for lack of a better and less anachronistic term) citizenship. Turning Cisneros on his head and reading back historically the religious freedoms guaranteed by Spain's 1978 modern democratic constitution, Castiñeira explicitly embraces the fifteenth-century clergy's contention that Granada's Mudéjars and later Moriscos were descendents of Spanish Christians. To Castiñeira, this simply means that those who suffered persecution were, like himself, "native, autochthonous Spanish Muslim" converts, and not invaders or foreigners of any sort.[13]

The question of whether or not Spain's historical Mudéjar and Morisco communities were "Spaniards" is one over which politically charged rhetoric continues to fly even today, both locally and nationally. In his recent book *La quimera de al-Andalus*, Serafín Fanjul devotes an entire chapter, titled explicitly "Were the Moriscos Spanish?" ("*Eran españoles los moriscos?*") to disproving such claims, asserting that all attempts to cast

the recalcitrant Moriscos as "Spaniards"—hostile as they were toward all things associated with their conquerors—simply reflect historically indefensible misrepresentations in the service of a misguided "politically correct" contemporary leftist agenda.[14] He reserves his harshest criticism for Aurelia Martín Casares' recent study of Muslim and Morisco slaves and slavery in sixteenth-century Granada, which he casts as the paragon of what he characterizes as a useless cultural politics of "victimization" and guilt.[15] To be sure, Fanjul asserts that all Muslims in Spain today, whether native or immigrant, are thankfully free to practice their faith, but he contends that religious freedom in modern Spain is not grounded in the legacy of an imaginary medieval *convivencia*, nor is it a concession to right the historical wrongs of 1492 or 1609 (or 1499–1501, or 1568–1571, for that matter). Instead, claims Fanjul, religious freedom in Spain owes above all to the European and Western liberal tradition—and its commitment to essentially ahistoric, philosophical, universalist concepts of "natural human rights"—of which modern, democratic Spain is an expression, and within which the religious freedoms guaranteed by the Spain's 1978 Constitution were framed.[16]

Though they obviously disagree profoundly on most issues, it is interesting to note that Castiñeira's and Fanjul's visions both appeal to the quintessentially Enlightenment value of religious freedom as a "natural right"—Fanjul by divorcing it from anything in the Spanish or European pre-Enlightenment intellectual or political traditions, Castiñeira (perhaps equally or even more "ahistorically") by reading it backward as a lens through which to interpret and correct medieval/early modern "injustices." Yet can historical memory of developments so sweeping and consequential as the fate of Spanish Islam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries really be so easily bleached clean or "closed"—one way or the other—by what the noted eighteenth-century British defender of historical tradition and critic of French revolutionary excesses Edmund Burke once famously satirized as the "conquering empire of light and reason?" The stubbornly persistent conjurings of the Muslim past in local debates over Granada's civic identity from the seventeenth century to the present, as we will see, may at least suggest that the question is not as simple as Fanjul would have us believe. Nor, as we will also see, are Castiñeira and his Albaicín mosque group alone among Granadinos who lay contested claims to the historical mantle of the city's Mudéjars and Moriscos of old.

A Tale of Two Mosques

Because questions concerning religion are legally prohibited in the Spanish census, it is difficult to gauge the precise size of Granada's

Muslim community today, and estimates vary dramatically. Out of a total municipal population of about a quarter million, Granada today houses between 5,000 and 17,000 Muslims—or somewhere between 2 percent and 6 percent of the city's residents. A significant minority of the city's Muslims (estimates range from 500 to 2,000) are, like Castiñeira, native Spaniards who have converted to Islam in the decades since the death of General Franco in 1975. Far larger, though, are the numbers of North African, mostly Moroccan, immigrant Muslims in the city. Among Granada's Muslims of recent Maghrebi descent, a significant number are now naturalized Spanish citizens, and many are even Spanish-born second-generation children of immigrants who arrived in the city in the 1980s. In addition, Granada's Muslim community also includes large numbers of recently arrived Moroccans and Algerians, some of whom are undocumented laborers. In addition to the Maghrebis, Granada's Muslim community also includes some West Africans, many from Senegal, as well as an appreciable number of Near Eastern immigrants, largely from Syria and Lebanon.[17]

Despite the frequent claims to the contrary in the international press reports concerning the opening of the much-publicized, visually impressive new Mezquita Mayor of the Albaicín, it was not at all the "first new mosque established in the city in more than five hundred years." It was, nonetheless, modern Granada's first new mosque *building*, since the four local mosques that had preceded it in the 1980s and 1990s were installed in already existing buildings or storefronts. Of these other local mosques, arguably the most important is the Mezquita al-Taqua, founded in the mid-1980s in a lower Albaicín neighborhood adjacent to the old city's central Plaza Nueva and known locally as the Calderería—a colorful, vibrant barrio famous among tourists and locals alike as the home of exotic Moroccan-style teashops, craft stores, bakeries, and an atmosphere consciously designed to evoke the spirit of a North African souk. At only a slight risk of oversimplification given the occasional links as well as persistent tensions between them, much of the story of Granada's Muslim community in the past three decades and its contested visions of the significance and meaning of the city's past can be cast as a "tale of two mosques"—that of al-Taqua and its faithful on the one hand, and that of the Albaicín Mezquita Mayor and its promoters on the other.

For its part, the Albaicín Mezquita Mayor project has been above all the brainchild of a mysterious, eccentric, and yet—to his dedicated followers—charismatic British convert to Islam known as Shaykh Abdalqadir as-Sufi al-Murabit. Born in Scotland around 1933 with the name "Ian Dallas," the future Shaykh converted to Islam during a time of study in Morocco in or around 1965. In the 1970s in England and,

after the death of Franco in 1975, in Córdoba, Spain, he attracted a small but dedicated corps of followers who shared his rejection of materialism, modern culture, and capitalism. He and his followers openly cast his brand of Islam as a sort of Sufism. Some critics (including some of his former disciples), however, have characterized it as a syncretic cult only tangentially related to Quranic Islam, from which they argue Dallas/Abdalqadir has simply chosen certain elements and grafted them onto an ideology based even more fundamentally in anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism.[18]

Whatever the validity of such accusations, and despite the international attention garnered by their Albaicín mosque as a symbol of Islam's return to Spain, Abdalqadir's group has for more than two decades operated self-consciously as a group apart from the mainstream of contemporary Iberian Islam. Calling themselves by what opponents contend is the intentionally provocative and symbolically loaded title *Morabitunes* ("Almoravids," after the eleventh-century North African Muslim invaders of the Iberian Peninsula), the Scottish shaykh's community, including the aforementioned Abdalhasib Castiñeira, have consistently declined affiliation with the prominent national-level Muslim organizations in which most Spanish Muslims, including those of Granada's al-Taqua mosque, participate. By far the most important of these umbrella organizations of Spanish Islam today is the *Comisión Islámica de España*, or CIE, formed in 1992, which functions as Muslim Spaniards' primary representative organization and mouthpiece for dealing with the national government.[19]

The Morabitunes' refusal to participate in broader organizations such as the CIE may in part reflect their founder's distinct theological vision. It also, however, meshes well with an "us against the world" narrative that has become enshrined in the Morabitunes' official depictions of the struggle to build their new mosque.[20] According to the Morabitunes' telling of the story, Shaykh Abdalqadir came to Granada from Córdoba in 1980 with a small group of disciples, and in 1981 they purchased the plot of land in the upper Albaicín on which they planned to build their mosque as a monument heralding Islam's triumphant return to Spain. From the very beginning, though, they faced opposition in the form of a neighborhood association of Albaicín homeowners who lobbied Granada's city council intensively to block the proposed mosque. These efforts resulted in 1984 in a municipal zoning change that reclassified the Morabitunes' property as strictly residential. Over the next six years, Abdalqadir's constant calls for reconsideration were met only with proposals that the Morabitunes consider shifting their proposed mosque to a different and less sensitive location in an industrial, peripheral neighborhood of Granada, far from the highly visible and symbolically loaded Albaicín site. Finally, in 1991,

a more "enlightened" municipal council revised the zoning ordinances to permit the possibility of building a mosque on the Morabitunes' land. When they revealed their architectural plans for the project in 1993, however, "reactionary" elements (to use the Morabitunes' term) throughout the community ignited a year-long 1993–1994 local media blitz in a last-ditch stand against the mosque. Responding to these pressures, Granada's municipal council took the "unprecedented" step of forcing the Morabitunes to build a full-scale model of the proposed minaret, the height of which the local government forced Abdalqadir and his followers to scale back in the interest of the neighborhood's "architectural and aesthetic integrity." Finally, at the end of 1994, the local government issued the building permit. Funding difficulties combined with archeological salvage work on the site, however, led to nine years of further delays. The final completion and inauguration of the mosque on July 10, 2003, stands in the eyes of the Morabitunes not only as testimony to their faith in God's providence but also to what they call the "legendary patience of Granada's Muslims" epitomized by the persistence in the face of all challenges of their leader Shaykh Abdalqadir.

To be sure, the Morabitunes suffer no shortage of caustic sound bytes and public denunciations leveled against their mosque project by local Granadino individuals and groups over the past quarter century to which they are able to point to substantiate their claim to status as a persecuted or oppressed group. To provide one example, in the words of one historically confused local mosque opponent at the height of the 1993–1994 controversy:

> This type of tower, or minaret, does not fit with the sorts of bell towers found throughout the neighborhood, but seems more appropriate for other latitudes…This neighborhood (the Albaicín) is known for its *gypsy* roots [*sic!*], and is a model of *convivencia*, but what would happen if it were known as a Muslim neighborhood is not certain.[21]

As the Morabitunes were quick to point out in response, all of the historically Muslim neighborhood's parish churches rest on the foundations of former mosques built during the city's many centuries of Muslim rule, and the bell tower of Albaicín's nearby San José parish church just a few hundred meters down the hill from the mosque site (pictured here) *is* in fact a minaret dating from the tenth century, to which the Christian conquerors simply added a small superstructure in the sixteenth century to house the church bell. The minaret of the 1993 proposed mosque design was, moreover, intended very consciously to resemble the bell tower of the San Nicolás parish church next door.

Figure 7.2 Tower of Parish Church of San José, Albaicín, Granada

In April, 1994, a national organization called the Sociedad española de defensa de tradición, famila y propiedad, better known by its initials "TFP-Covadonga" (after the northern Spanish battlefield site where the semi-legendary Asturian Christian king Pelayo made his stand against Muslim invaders in 722 AD), reinforced the efforts of the Albaicín neighborhood association and other local opponents of the mosque.[22] Their public statements of opposition to the planned mezquita were echoed less formally by spray-paint graffiti artists who peppered the Albaicín throughout 1994 with terse but clear messages such as "*Moros Fuera*!" (Moors Out!) and "*Muerte a los Moros!*" (Death to the Moors!).

Granadino journalist Tomás Navarro contends that the heated rhetoric surrounding the mosque project during the 1993–1994 controversy ironically served above all the interests of the Scottish shaykh himself on the one hand and local conservative politician Gabriel Díaz Berbel on the other. To Navarro, the proposed mosque became a metaphorical "Tower of Babel" exploited by proponents and detractors alike to confuse and distract various local, national and international audiences, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. For their part, the Scottish shaykh and his Morabitun followers publicized both within Spain and abroad the most extreme statements of local mosque opponents as evidence of the persecution under which they lived. According to Navarro, they in turn

Figure 7.3 Anti-"Moor" Graffiti, Albaicín, 1994

used this publicity not only to divert attention away from their doctrinal distinctiveness and their separation from the vast majority of their fellow Muslims in Granada, including those of the al-Taqua mosque, but also to attract much-needed donations from across the Muslim world. The resultant generosity of the oil-rich Emir of Sharjah (of the United Arab Emirates) proved especially crucial in pushing the mosque project toward its eventual completion.[23]

On the opposite side, according to Navarro, Berbel—the leader of the local conservative Partido Popular (or "PP") and an outspoken opponent of the proposed mezquita—exploited the fears generated by the mosque plans and the city's November, 1994 approval of the building permit to solidify and energize his own political base of traditionalists and religious conservatives to help him score a narrow victory in Granada's mayoral election the following year.[24]

It would be very misleading, however, to depict the opposition of Berbel, the TFP-Covadonga, and their local supporters as somehow typical of the opinions of the community of Granada as a whole toward either the proposed mosque or the city's Muslim populace. Even as opponents attacked the project during the 1993–1994 debates, individuals and groups from across the city organized various countermovements and demonstrations in support of the proposed Mezquita. The motives of mosque supporters in Granada's broader non-Muslim majority community were obviously varied. Many simply feared that the loud and at times blatantly xenophobic opposition to the mosque was turning Granada into a "laughing stock" of a modern democratic Spain supposedly dedicated to religious liberty.[25] By themselves, such appeals to "religious freedom" mesh well with Serafín Fanjul's point concerning the essentially "ahistorical" nature of the place of Islam in a contemporary, democratic, post-1978 Constitution Spain. Yet interestingly, mosque supporters among Granada's non-Muslim community at large were even more likely in the 1990s to appeal to visions (albeit always romanticized and idealized ones) of their city's "medieval," Andalusi past as to the 1978 Constitution to make their point against mosque opponents. For example, the 1994 graffiti pictured here—painted on a wall only about 200 meters west of the proposed mosque site and clearly intended as a rejoinder to the sorts of blatantly xenophobic graffiti discussed earlier—includes a dramatically romanticized image of a medieval Muslim princess in a tower, holding a scroll with an inscription celebrating the Albaicín's multicultural, multireligious heritage.[26] Also emblematic of this sort of sentiment are the words of a local university student identified only by his first name "Iñigo," who lived in the Calderería neighborhood, and who was asked in a February 1994 interview for the local newspaper *Ideal* to explain his

impressions of his Muslim neighbors and the prospect of a new mosque in the Albaicín. The interviewer José Antonio Guerrero explained Iñigo's response: "For his part, Iñigo believes that Granada is the single city in Spain most capable of forming a mixture of cultures and religions, and, he says, 'the Albaicín mosque is a great opportunity.' "[27] Signed by the names of thousands of like-minded men and women from across the city, petitions presented by mosque proponents—few of whom knew much about Shaykh Abdalqadir, much less his differences with the al-Taqua community or the "mainline" national Muslim organizations—played an important role in the eventual granting of the building permit in November, 1994.[28]

Within the panorama of Spanish national politics, the province of Granada since the advent of democracy in the 1970s has in fact leaned firmly Left, and is considered today a fairly safe stronghold of the socialist *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (or PSOE), which has won at least a plurality of the province's ranada's votes in every national election since 1982.[29] Berbel's win in the 1995 mayoral race was considered locally an aberration—the PP's first-ever mayoral victory in Granada, and one which no doubt owed at least as much to corruption scandals besetting Prime Minister Felipe González's national PSOE government at the time as to local conflicts over the mosque. Four years later in 1999, in fact, Berbel's reelection campaign was routed by his PSOE opponent, and

Figure 7.4 "Romantic" Graffiti, Albaicín, 1994

in the end, his open and unqualified opposition proved of no avail in stopping the construction of the mosque.

Overall, the municipal government's stance in recent years—whether PSOE or PP, with the exception of Berbel's four-year term—has generally been to cultivate and promote the city's the new mosque as a part and expression of Granada's historical legacy. Billing the city as a paradise open to all and a persistent living symbol of medieval convivencia in modern Spain, Granada's municipal establishment has embraced the symbolically powerful mosque project, showing off the final product on official post-2003 suggested tourist itineraries among the city's many impressive monuments.

To be sure, the city's careful cultivation of its image as a uniquely paradigmatic symbol of the lessons of an imagined Andalusian past for the globally troubled present has an important economic as well as political dimension. Tourism is by far the city's largest industry. Especially in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities of 9/11 in the United States and March 11, 2004 in Madrid (along with the global controversies brought on by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Spain's participation in which under José María Aznar's PP government in 2003–2004 proved even more unpopular in Granada than in Spain as a whole),[30] the Alhambra has become a destination of nearly pilgrimage-site status for visitors from Spain and around the world, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. To many tourists, an Alhambra visit indeed serves a sort of cathartic purpose—a release or escape from, or at least an alternative vision to, Huntington's so-called clash of civilizations.[31] The mushrooming number of visitors in recent years has in fact elevated Granada's Alhambra to the status of Spain's most visited landmark. The Morabitun Abdalhasib Castiñeira captures as well as anyone the hopes projected onto the Alhambra and, by extension, the city of Granada as a whole, by many of the hundreds of thousands of visitors who flock to the city each year. As he explained in a December 2006 interview, "It is hard to convince somebody who has seen the Alhambra that Islam is about brutality, about violence."[32]

Even as Castiñeira's Morabitun group and their mosque project grabbed all the headlines (not to mention the large international donations) in the 1990s, the al-Taqua mosque in the Calderería continued to be the spiritual home of a larger and more diverse group of Granada's Muslim faithful. At the height of the local mosque controversy on February 18, 1994, Granada's leading local newspaper *Ideal* ran a full-page story aimed explicitly at defusing some of the then-raging public polemic over the proposed Albaicín mezquita by showing that it would not at all be the modern city's first mosque. To many Granadinos whom he noted may not have been aware of their existence, *Ideal* local affairs

reporter José Antonio Guerrero introduced the city's four already existing mosques, including most importantly that of al-Taqua in the Calderería, where he had spent considerable time preparing his story. His interview with the then-president of the al-Taqua mosque, Yusuf Idris (who, like Castiñeira, was a native northern Spaniard, in his case originally from León, and a convert to Islam), was especially revealing concerning the status of Granada's Muslim community as a whole at the time of the 1993–1994 controversies:

> Idris considers al-Taqua the first heir of the Albaicín mosques that the "Catholic Monarchs" transformed into Christian churches. Nevertheless, he enthusiastically awaits the day when he will hear the *muezzin's* call from the future mosque of San Nicolás (i.e., the Morabitunes' mosque in the upper Albaicín). "It will be an emotional day," he says. But he does not hide his hope that this new mosque will become a nexus of union among Granada's Muslim community—one which will allow them to return to the situation of ten years ago, when Granada's Muslims were grouped as a united community.[33]

Even as he staked his own group's claim to the legacy of his Granadino Muslim forebears, Idris simultaneously expressed enthusiasm over the upper Albaicín mosque project as well as hinted at the divisions between his own group and the Morabitunes. As Idris suggested, those divisions ran back to the early 1980s, when many native Spanish converts to Islam as well as Moroccan immigrants (both legal and illegal) who were coming and settling in the city began to find Dallas/Abdalqadir's leadership of Granada's Muslim community too stifling and exclusive.[34] While the Morabitunes became ever more, through the 1980s, a closed group dominated by European converts to Islam, the al-Taqua group became increasingly international, including among its numbers not only some Spanish-born converts such as Idris, but also even larger numbers of Moroccans and other immigrants from across the Islamic world, even welcoming in 1981 two prominent Mauritanian imams as the community's principal religious instructors.[35] And while Dallas and his followers generally spent the 1980s staying to themselves, grouped in a number of houses around the ruins of the old parish church of San Luis in the most isolated corner of the Albaicín, the larger and more diverse community of Muslims that formed the core of the developing al-Taqua mosque integrated themselves into the far more central Calderería neighborhood.[36] It was from among this group, for instance, that emerged the entrepreneurial initiatives that established many of the neighborhood's now famous teashops, craft stores, and bakeries.[37] In his 1994 interview in *Ideal*, Idris—in what has been ever since a common refrain in local

conversations among Muslim and non-Muslim Granadinos alike—noted enthusiastically that the growing Muslim community of the Calderería had taken what had been before their arrival a downtrodden, crime-ridden neighborhood plagued by heroin addictions and knifepoint robberies and turned it into a showplace in which all Granada takes pride.[38]

As Idris predicted nearly a decade earlier, the opening of the Morabitunes' glorious new mezquita on the top of the Albaicín Hill in 2003 did in fact mark a bittersweet moment for the al-Taqua mosque community. To be sure, there were Muslims from across the city, including the al-Taqua group, who joined the celebrations marking the inauguration of the new mosque, and Muslims from across the city and indeed around the world have prayed there since its opening. Nonetheless, a caustic note attached to the July, 2003 coverage of the mosque's opening on the "mainstream" Spanish Muslim Web page "WebIslam" spoke in no uncertain terms to the continuing tensions between the al-Taqua community and the Morabitunes:

> The newly inaugurated mosque thus comes to join the al-Taqua mosque, located on the calle Correo Viejo, in addition to the hundreds of anonymous mosques into which true Muslims convert their homes as houses of worship. The new mosque is unique, though, in being the only one in the city constructed from the ground up entirely for the purpose of functioning as a mosque, since all of Granada's other existing mosques have been installed in pre-existing buildings. On a negative note, there were various voices at the inauguration who objected to the moniker emblazoned squarely on the new mosque's entrance: "*Mezquita Mayor de Granada*." They complained that this demonstrated a presumptuous lack of etiquette [*adab*] toward the city's already functioning mosques, in addition to being squarely false, since the character of being known as a "Mezquita Mayor" (or *aljama*) can only be earned through use and via recognition as such among the faithful, and not simply bought with petrodollars and pretentious attitudes.[39]

Of Echoes, Hauntings, and Historic Inheritance

Granada's new mosque clearly occupies a space at which contemporary local, national, and global debates intersect with controversial claims to deeper historical significance. Whether such claims to historic inheritances—be they on the part of either of the local Muslim groups to the legacy of Granada's persecuted fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Mudéjars and Moriscos, or on the part of the city as a whole to the imagined "paradisiacal" pre-1492 heritage of Andalusi religious

tolerance—hold any significance beyond simple rhetorical flourishes is, of course, a matter worthy of considered and informed attention.

Serafín Fanjul's challenge to all such claims to the "historical legacy" of al-Andalus is a serious one, and his arguments enjoy the benefit of a certain logic and elegance. I frankly share with him a sincere wish that debates concerning the place of minority religions and cultures within our pluralistic modern Western democratic societies *could* in fact occur always in a context within which a universal (and therefore essentially ahistoric, since it does not depend on the contingencies of time and place) "human right" to freedom of religion and conscience remains a constant, pervasive, and unquestionable assumption and commitment. As a scholarly specialist in the culture and literature of medieval al-Andalus, moreover, Professor Fanjul has no difficulty marshaling the standard litanies of less-than-tolerant aspects of life in the so-called Andalusian "lost paradise" of old. If it was possible in early to mid-eleventh-century Muslim Granada for the prominent Jewish statesman Samuel Ibn Naghrila to rise to the exalted position of vizier in the sultan's court—to cite one of the many boilerplate examples he employs—it was also possible in 1066 for his son to be massacred along with most of the city's Jewish community in a violent pogrom carried out by a large segment of the city's Muslim majority.[40] And as Fanjul and others have often pointed out, the legal status of women in Andalusi society was by no means "paradisiacal," and certainly no more, and possibly less, enviable than that of women in the contemporary medieval Christian Spanish kingdoms or the rest of Christian Europe.[41]

Yet even if we, with Fanjul, dismiss as historically misguided (or at least incomplete), all-romantic portrayals of al-Andalus as a model of multicultural understanding that we should seek to emulate in our increasingly globalized present, we are still left with a modern city—and for that matter a Spanish nation and a world—in which moral appeals to "right the historical wrongs" of the period 1492–1609 resonate at some level among broad audiences, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. To Fanjul, the rejection between Mudéjars/Moriscos on the one hand and Christians on the other was mutual in that era, and however unfortunately violent the process, the indelible result of the expulsions was that Spain, for better or worse (he clearly believes for better), set itself squarely on a European track of historical development.[42] The historical "book" of al-Andalus and Muslim Spain was thus for all meaningful purposes, he claims, closed. As Islam has returned gradually to Spain in the decades since Franco's death in 1975, it has done so in the context of a squarely western nation, and the growth of Islam via conversion and immigration over that period has, to Fanjul, no more to do with

Spanish Islam's medieval past than do similar recent cases of the growth of Islam in France, the United Kingdom, or any other modern Western European democracy.

Viewed from twenty-first century Granada, however, Fanjul's positing of a fundamentally formative and supposedly "Muslim-free" Spanish historical parenthesis 1609–1975 raises intriguing questions, his answers to which are at best problematic. Although the ideas of postmodernist theorist Jacques Derrida have in general found little in the way of a receptive audience among scholarly historians, his notion of historical "haunting" has enjoyed a degree of traction among some historians of Spain as well as Hispanists from other disciplines, and I believe may be of use here in making sense of the role and meaning of Granada's past in understanding its present.[43] As Derrida explained in his book *Specters of Marx*, "haunting is historical."[44] By this, he meant to suggest that past exclusions and marginalizations—of which the fates of Islam and Judaism in Christian Spain in the fifteenth and sixteenth century might be considered prime examples, though Derrida himself obviously never explored them in his own work—have rarely if ever produced the sorts of clean historical closures they intended or claimed. Rather, figurative "ghosts" produced by such historical traumas continue to "haunt" words, minds, and deeds in the societies in which such disjunctures occurred, even long after the object of exclusion has disappeared from plain view. Such "haunting," to Derrida, tends to be periodic or episodic, emerging at unexpected times and often in shocking ways to "traumatize" the present with the ultimately unresolved (or "unexorcised?") "ghosts" of the past. One does not necessarily have to buy into Derrida's ethereal terminology to consider the possibility that unexpected historical echoes of the city's Islamic past may have resonated in Granada throughout Fanjul's alleged 1609–1975 interim in ways that have influenced, directly and/or indirectly, the reception of Islam, Muslims, and their new mosque(s) in the post-1975 city. By way of an intellectual experiment designed to test Fanjul's assertion of the "closing" of Spanish Islamic history, I would like to consider briefly the implications of a motley and admittedly incomplete arrangement of examples of such "echoes" or "hauntings" in local Granadino culture between the expulsion of the Moriscos from the city in 1570 (four decades before their general expulsion from the Spanish kingdoms as a whole in 1609–1614) and the death of Franco in 1975.

First, through the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—and even into the twentieth—a salient and recurring feature of Granadino culture was a fascination with and ongoing debate over

a complex of supposedly ancient local relic "discoveries" collectively called the *plomos* of the Sacromonte. A consensus that these purported relics were blatant forgeries came only gradually in the century following their 1595–1599 "unearthing" on a hillside just east of the city, and a dedicated local devotional cult continued to defend their veracity even long after their 1682 official papal condemnation as a fraud. Comprised of an odd assortment of leaden plaques and "books" with round, lead "pages" inscribed in an ancient, mysterious first century A.D. "proto-Arabic" script [*sic*!], the relics collectively told a story that threatened to rewrite the history of earliest Christianity and exalt Granada's position within it. According to the plomos, San Cecilio—the man who would later become Granada's first bishop—was a first century A.D. "Arab" resident of the Holy Land who, together with his brother Tesifón, was miraculously healed of various ailments by Jesus Christ himself. Personally converted to the new faith by Jesus, Cecilio and Tesifón then, after the crucifixion purportedly accompanied Christ's disciple Saint James ("Santiago" in Castilian) on his original missionary trip to Iberia, where the group performed the first mass ever spoken on the European continent on a hillside just outside the present location of Granada. Later, in 56 A.D., the two brothers, together with a number of followers from their mostly Arabic-speaking ([*sic*]—in the first-century A.D.!) flock in Granada were martyred by Roman imperial authorities on the same hillside. Their charred remains, together with their testimony in the form of the plomos, then supposedly rested entombed on that hillside for more than a millennium and a half—including through more than seven centuries of Muslim dominance—ever exerting over the city a miraculous Christian spiritual force, awaiting their glorious discovery after the final extirpation of the Muslim menace.[45]

The precise identities of the late sixteenth-century forgers of the Sacromonte relics remain a mystery, but nearly all who have studied the topic agree that the tricksters must have included at least one or more of the few hundred Granadino Moriscos who managed to remain in the city after the 1569–1570 local expulsions—a group comprised mostly of middle- and upper-class Morisco families who had integrated themselves into the post conquest city's political power structures and managed to convince Church and state authorities of their dedication to their Christian faith and the Castilian monarchy. Among a local Christian community to whom the city's centuries of Muslim political domination had previously remained something of an historical embarrassment, the plomos revealed shockingly that Granada deserved instead to be honored as the site of Europe's first Christian mass and

the site of the martyrdom of glorious ancient apostles who had known Jesus Christ himself and worked closely with Spain's patron Santiago. The forgers' packaging of this flattering exaltation of Granada's deep Christian heritage, however, required adherents to the local cult of the Sacromonte saints simultaneously to come terms somehow with the alleged Arabic roots of Granadan Christianity—the Arabic origin of its original apostles and Church leaders, and—even more shocking—the notion that Cecilio's earliest Christian flock in the city was mostly Arabic-speaking (testimony as it were to the purportedly deep Christian roots of the Moriscos' ancestors—i.e., taking one step further, albeit for a very different purpose, the aforementioned arguments made by Cisneros and his contemporaries a century before the fabrication of these "relics"). Despite the 1682 papal condemnation of the relics, moreover, periodic defenses of their veracity continued to appear in Granada through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and even into the twentieth century. As late as 1960, in fact, local Granada clergyman Zótico Royo Campos published a defense of the relics titled *Reliquias martiriales y escudo del Sacromonte*, in which he, like all Sacromonte advocates before him, was forced to explain how a primitive Arabic script could have existed in southern Iberia under Roman domination in the first century.[46] Might the stubborn, episodic endurance of Sacromonte discourses in Granada throughout the centuries separating the expulsion of the Moriscos from the return of Islam to the modern city stand as a paradigmatic exemplar of precisely the sort of shocking, unexpected historical "haunting" posited by Derrida?

A second example of the continuing resonance of the city's Muslim past in Granada in the centuries following the expulsions arrived in the city from abroad, in the form of a series of European and North American travelers and writers of the early nineteenth century. To such iconic figures of the Romantic movement as René de Chateaubriand and Washington Irving, Granada's past proved an irresistibly rich symbolic combination of two perennially beloved romantic themes—on the one hand, an exotic and imaginatively fertile (albeit generalized and mythical) "Orient"; and on the other hand, a chivalric "Middle Ages" filled with gallant, individualized heroes. Borrowing heavily from local lore about which they learned during their extended visits to the city, Chateaubriand in his 1826 *Les aventures du dernier Abencérage* and Irving in his 1832 *Tales of the Alhambra* turned Granada into a subject of international literary attention and even a sort of dreamy, imaginative longing—similar to and perhaps even echoed by many of today's tourist visitors to the city. For a simple gauge of the currency,

"relevance," and long-range impact of the romantics' "Alhambrist" fantasies, in fact, one has only to look in the gift-shops that dot the city's historic district today, nearly every one of which prominently displays dozens of copies of Irving's *Tales of the Alhambra* not only in its English original, but also in Spanish, French, German, Italian, and even Japanese translations.

To be sure, the resulting so-called Alhambrism—a major and well-studied sub-theme within the Romantic movement—contributed profoundly to the nineteenth-century's deepening perception of Spain both domestically and abroad as a place apart, distinct from the Western European mainstream, a perception encapsulated by the old French popular (and, according to many Africans as well as Iberians, doubly racist) maxim that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." It is in large part this perception, in fact, that scholars such as Fanjul (along with Claudio Sánchez Albornoz before him) have attempted to combat via their assertions and defenses of modern Spain's essentially "European" character. Yet even some Spanish romantics themselves also joined the nineteenth-century's "Alhambrist" craze, including José Zorilla y Moral, whose unfinished 1852 epic poem "Granada" celebrated the city's Muslim past in ways similar to those of the foreign romantics.[47] To be sure, the city of Granada itself produced no well-known romantic "Alhambrist" poet of its own in this era. Nevertheless, the knowledge that their city was famed throughout nineteenth-century Europe above all as the site of a sultan's sumptuous "oriental pleasure palace" and home of gallant Muslim horsemen of old could hardly have avoided reminding Granadinos regularly of the "ghosts" of a supposedly long vanquished Muslim alter ego.

Finally, a third and quite different example of such historical "haunting" came to Granada in the early days of the Spanish Civil War in 1937, when the city was confronted with a dilemma in the form of the corpses of some fifty Moroccan soldiers hired to serve in Franco's nationalist army. These very real Muslim men had been killed in action near Granada in the war's earliest stages. Much has been written about the role of the Moroccans in the nationalist forces and the revulsion many Spaniards nationwide (of both republican and nationalist sentiment) felt toward their alleged atrocities, as well as the national neurosis which imaginatively cast the Moroccan soldier of the 1930s as the reincarnate embodiment of the "marauding Moor" of old.[48] Amidst the tense climate of a deeply divided city, the decision of what to do with the cadavers carried, of course, serious political ramifications. In other Spanish cities in the civil war era, Moroccan

dead were typically disposed of quickly, their bodies burned or buried hurriedly in shallow, unmarked graves. In Granada, however, the cadre of nationalists who had gained control of the city by 1937 chose to burn the bodies and dispose of the ashes in what they understood to be sacred Islamic ground, in an old Muslim cemetery in the "Llano de la Perdíz" just outside the Alhambra.[49] Today, the Llano de la Perdíz cemetery has become the source of fresh controversy, as Granada's modern Muslim community has adopted it as their burial ground, and has charged the municipal government with inadequate attention to upkeep of the area.[50]

Even if this brief sampling of "Moorish hauntings" in post expulsion Granada is far from complete, I hope that it is sufficient at least to suggest that Fanjul's notion of a purely European or "Western" post-1609 Spain does not tell the entire story. Even aside from the (admittedly very few) practicing Muslims who continued to be found in Granada throughout that era,[51] the city's Muslim past was conceptually never all that far away, and not just in the physical, architectural remains such as the Alhambra that even Fanjul admits may be the one appreciable exception to his rule. It has thus been into a city and local culture prone for centuries to periodic "haunting" echoes of its past to which thousands of Muslims have come in recent decades. So, although Fanjul is no doubt correct that the modern, democratic Spanish state in which Granada's Muslims live today is obviously a very different sort of polity than the Castilian monarchy into which Granada's Mudéjars were incorporated following the 1492 conquest, it does not thereby follow that the city's distant history is necessarily irrelevant to its present circumstances.

Recognizing what Beverley Southgate calls the stubborn "persistence of the past" in this regard hardly implies, of course, that Granadinos today, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, react to the city's historical echoes in uniform ways. In Derrida's formulation, historical "haunting" is, after all, most often "traumatic" and a source of disjuncture and fresh questioning rather than tidy resolutions and definitive closures. Amidst the heightened international tensions between the Islamic world and the "West" in recent years, moreover, old debates about the place and meaning of the city's Islamic legacy have continued to resound in new and often surprising ways. Between 2001 and 2005, for instance, Spanish federal officials arrested in Granada a total of six Muslim men in dragnets aimed at rooting out suspected Islamic extremist terrorist cells—four for alleged logistical support of al-Qaida in the planning of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and another two in connection with the March 11, 2004 terrorist train bombings in Madrid. To be sure, there has been a good deal of local

attention to and concern over the question of whether other possible terrorist cells still exist amidst the city's Muslim community, but of those arrested and imprisoned so far, none were long-term residents of the city, and none appears to have had any meaningful ties either to the Morabitunes or to al-Taqua.[52] For their parts, and despite the many differences that separate them, the Morabitunes and the leaders of the al-Taqua community have been unanimous in their public condemnations of all forms of terrorism.[53]

To be sure, Spain's national government has reacted to the global tensions of recent years with, among other measures, a series of little-publicized but nonetheless dramatic reductions in the amount of legal immigration allowed into Spain from Muslim North Africa and the Near East.[54] The city of Granada, however, appears largely to have avoided the sort of public, blatant "maurophobic" outcry that one might have expected to see given the intensity and ferocity of the local mosque debates of the 1990s. To be sure, evidence of the existence of extremists and terrorist cells in their midst shocked many Granadinos, non-Muslim and Muslim alike, and suspicion above all of foreign Muslim immigrants no doubt still abounds in the minds of many locals. Yet neither the editorial pages of the city's newspapers nor the whitewashed walls of the Albaicín have as yet witnessed since the 2003 opening of the Morabitunes' mosque the sorts of rhetorical vitriol on the issue to which locals became accustomed in the 1990s.

Instead, alongside Islam's growing visibility in the area via the opening of the Morabitunes' new mosque and the ongoing development of the Calderería neighborhood, the Albaicín has ironically become increasingly "gentrified"—a process that has been accompanied by very different sorts of controversies. The municipal government's recent investment of millions of euros in "urban renewal" in the Albaicín has brought with it the renovation of hundreds of medieval buildings across the hillside, some of which have become popular tourist rental flats, and others residences for wealthy Granadinos. Still other renovated medieval buildings have been converted into fashionable, "historically themed" boutique hotels such as the award-winning, three-star "Casa Morisca" pictured here. The coincident rise in rental prices across the formerly largely working-class zone has elicited new kinds of conflict. Despite noticeable attempts to clear the neighborhood's once ubiquitous graffiti, spray-painted scrawls still abound in today's Albaicín. Rather than Islam and the neighborhood's so-called "*moros*," however, the targets are most frequently the area's oft-vilified real estate speculators and developers. As one such 2005 protest put it, "*De barrio obrero a parque temático*" (From working-class neighborhood to theme park). Similar disdain for realtors and developers

Figure 7.5 Casa Morisca Hotel, Albaicín, Granada

Figure 7.6 Graffiti, Albaicín, Granada, 2005

was expressed by the writer of the graffito depicted here in figure 7.6 Ironically, then, the commodification of the city's Islamic "legacy" in the interest of the lucrative local tourism industry may thus represent a new and very different sort of "historical haunting" that may continue to be a source of local discord well into the twenty-first century.

Notes

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1. Charles Sennott, "Seeking Madrid Motives in a Cradle of Muslim Glory," *Boston Globe*, March 28, 2004: http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2004/03/28/seeking_madrid_motives_in_a_cradle_of_muslim_glory/. Last accessed March 14, 2008.

2. David Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
3. Carolyn Dinshaw, commenting on her book *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), in "Got Medieval?" *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 10.2 (April 2001): 202–212. "Developing queer history through the concept of affective connection—a touch across time—and through the intentional collapse of conventional historical time, I wanted in *Getting Medieval* to help queer studies respond to such desire. In fact, I wanted to make affect central to the project of queer history writing; this would, I contended, further the aim (shared by me and other restive historians of sexuality) of transforming history writing altogether." The second quotation comes from "Got Medieval?" p. 209, fn 8.
4. On the issue of "closure," see also Gil Anidjar's probing essay "Postscript: Futures of al-Andalus," chapter 8 in this volume.
5. Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), pp. 27–47.
6. Beverley Southgate, *What Is History For?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 133.
7. See the following articles by Abdulhasib Castiñeira: "La reconciliación de España con su historia," http://www.mezquitadegranada.com/islamenalandalus/capitulaciones_intro.html, last accessed March 14, 2008; and "Capitulaciones de Granada: Punto de partida para la reconciliación de España con su historia," http://www.mezquitadegranada.com/materialonline/articles/capitulaciones.html, last accessed March 14, 2008.
8. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Los mudéjares de Castilla y otros estudios de historia medieval andaluza* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1989), pp. 26–37.
9. All of this is discussed in greater detail in my book *Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492–1600* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 36–39.
10. On the origin and use of the term *Morisco*, see L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain, 1500 to 1614* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 2–6.
11. The literature on this subject is vast. For overviews and citations, see Benjamin Ehlers, *Between Christians and Moriscos: Juan de Ribera and Religious Reform in Valencia, 1568–1614* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, pp. 204–237, 291–331.
12. "Restaurar paulatinamente los derechos, las garantías, las propiedades, y el estatuto de protección garantizado en la rendición de Granada es una deuda histórica de indiscutible justicia y la hora de pagar esa infamia está ya cerca": Castiñeira, "Capitulaciones de Granada." The emphasis is mine.
13. Castiñeira, "Capitulaciones de Granada": "No fueron árabes los expulsados de España, fueron musulmanes de la Peninsula Ibérica: celtíberos, hispanomusulmanes, exterminados por españoles cristianos. . .Es decir, eran muslumanes nativos, autóctonos, al igual que los bosnios son un pueblo eslavo musulmán o los sudaneses son un pueblo musulmán africano."

14. Serafín Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2004), pp. 55–93; Serafín Fanjul, *Al-Andalus contra España: La forja del mito* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2002).
15. Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus*, pp. 71–74; Aurelia Martín Casares, *La esclavitud en la Granada del siglo XVI* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000).
16. Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus*, pp. 244–247.
17. "El Islam crece a hurtadillas," *WebIslam*, March 20, 2007: http://www.webislam.com/?idt53763. Last accessed March 14, 2008.
18. See especially Tomás Navarro, *La Mezquita de Babel: El nazismo sufista desde el Reino Unido a la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía* (Granada: Ediciones Virtual, 1998), pp. 61–64.
19. The CIE and its constituent groups are discussed in greater detail in Lisa Abend's essay "Spain's New Muslims: A Historical Romance," chapter 6 in this volume.
20. "Shayj Dr. Abdalqadir As Sufi, Fundador de la Mezquita de Granada," December 13, 2006. http://www.mezquitadegranada.com/materialsonline/articles/saqfundador.html. Last accessed March 14, 2008.
21. Cited in Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, p. 77: "Este tipo de torre (*alminar*) no se ajuste a la tipología de los campenarios del barrio, sino que es más propia de otras latitudes…Este barrio es conocido por su ascedencia payo-gitana, de la que es un modelo de convivencia, la connotación de musululmán que le pueda sobrevenir no sera cierta."
22. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, p. 79. The TFP-Covadonga is the Spanish expression of an international group of conservative Catholic "TFP" organizations started in Brazil in 1960, which subsequently spread across Latin America and later into North America and Europe.
23. "Una nueva mezquita para Granada," *WebIslam*, n. 217, July 14, 2003: www.webislam.com/?idn5465. Last accessed March 14, 2008.
24. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, pp. 78–82.
25. Amina Nasser, "El colegio de arquitectos insinúa que el Ayuntamiento oculta una maniobra para no construer la mezquita," *Ideal* (February 26, 1994): 4: "El hecho de que el Ayuntamiento ahora se eche atrás supone que Granada sea el hazme reir de toda España."
26. The inscription reads: "A los artistas que plasmaron en su obra el encanto de este barrio, las culturas que forman sus raices, y a todos sus vecinos que hacen del Albayzin en sí, una ciudad saludable." (To the artists who mold through their works the enchantments of this neighborhood, the cultures that form its roots, and all of the inhabitants who make the Albaicín, in itself, a thriving city.)
27. José Antonio Guerrero, "La Meca: tan lejos, tan cerca," *Ideal* (18 February 1994): 6: "Iñigo, por su parte, cree que Granada es la ciudad de España major capacitada para formar la mezcla de culturas y religions, 'y la mezquita del Albaicín es una buena oportunidad.'"
28. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, p. 77. On this issue, also worthy of mention are the efforts of an international organization of scholars and authors

who organized and presented the "Manifiesto 2 de enero" to Granada's municipal government in January, 1995 (less than two months after the granting of the building permit for the mosque). The group, which included Juan Goytisolo and Antonio Gala among many others, used this occasion to call upon Granada's municipal government to put to an end or significantly alter the city's annual January 2 celebration of the anniversary of Granada's Christian conquest (*Toma*). Today, the annual observances continue, and they are customarily accompanied by controversy between supportive right-wing organizations on the one hand and left-wing opponents of the festivities on the other: http://www.andalucia.cc/manifiesto2enero/presentacion.htm. Last accessed March 14, 2008. My thanks are owed to Gregory Hutcheson for calling my attention to the continuing controversies on this issue.

29. See Ministerio del Interior Web site for official election results: http://www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm. Last accessed March 14, 2008.
30. The margin by which the PSOE of current Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero defeated the more conservative PP (of former prime minister José María Aznar and current PP head Mariano Rajoy) in the province of Granada mushroomed from a paltry 2 percent edge in 2000 (44%– 42%) to a 15 percent thumping (51%–37%) in the landmark March 14, 2004 elections (although Aznar's support of U.S. president George Bush's Iraq policy must obviously be considered only one of many factors in the PP's 2004 electoral defeat, both locally and nationally). In both elections, the remaining votes went almost entirely to the far left-wing Izquierda Unida (United Left) and the Andalusian nationalist party. In 2008, the PSOE won 49.5% of the provincial vote to the PP's 41.5%, although the PP continued to enjoy a lead in the muncipio of Granada itself.
31. The literature on Huntington's theory is vast. For his original, controversial statements on the idea, see Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.
32. Cited in Victoria Burnett, "Islam Returns to a Tolerant Andalusia," *Financial Times* (17 December 2006):
33. José Antonio Guerrero, "La Meca, tan lejos, tan cerca," *Ideal* (18 February 1994): 6. "Idris considera a Al Taqua como la primera heredera de las mezquitas del Albaicín que los Reyes Católicos transformaron en iglesias. No obstante, reconoce que espera con ilusión el dia en que escuche el almuecín desde la futura mezquita de San Nicolás. 'Sera un dia emocionante,' dice. Tampoco esconde que esta mezquita se convierta en un nexo de unión entre los musulmanes de Granada, que les permita volver a la situación de hace diez años cuando estaban agrupados en torno a una misma comunidad."
34. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, pp. 41–42.
35. "Mezquita At-Taqua: En el origen del Islam en Granada," *Verde Islam*, número 2 (Fall 1995): http://www.webislam.com/default.asp?idt53732. Last accessed March 14, 2008. The article includes a transcription of an

interview with one of the Mauritanian imams, Shakh Hamid Umar al Waly.

36. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, p. 42.
37. "Mezquita At-Taqua" notes that at that time (1995), approximately 90% of the businesses in the Calderería were owned by Muslims. The article also hints at the tensions between the al-Taqua mosque and the Morabitunes. On a recent (January, 2007) visit to the "Kasbah" teashop on Calle Calderería Baja, I was informed that it was owned by a local native Granada businessman, and that some of the other businesses in the increasingly popular neighborhood had also been bought by local non-Muslim Granada businesspeople.
38. Guerrero, "La Meca," 6.
39. "Una nueva mezquita para Granada," *WebIslam*, n. 217, July 14, 2003. www.webislam.com/?idn5465: "La Mezquita inaugurada viene a sumarse a la Mezquita at-Taqua, situada en la calle Correo Viejo, además de los cientos de mezquitas anónimas que hacen de los hogares de los musulmanes verdaderas casas de adoración. Tiene la particularidad de ser la única construida enteramente desde sus cimientos para su actual function, mientras que las mezquitas existents han sido adaptadas en edificios anteriores. Como aspecto negativo, varias voces señalaron lo desacertado del lema que figura a la entrada del recinto: 'Mezquita Mayor de Granada.' Según dijeron, esto constituye una falta de *adab* con las mezquitas en funcionamiento, además de una falsedad. El carácter de mezquita mayor (o *aljama*) tan solo puede ganarse con el uso y con el reconocimiento de los fieles, y no con petrodólares ni actitudes pretenciosas."
40. Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus*, p. 46.
41. Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus*, pp. 9–11.
42. Fanjul, *La quimera de al-Andalus*, pp. 14–15.
43. On the concept of "haunting" in Spanish historiography, see Jo Labanyi, "Introduction: Engaging with Ghosts; or, Theorizing Culture in Contemporary Spain," in *Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain*, ed. Jo Labanyi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1–14; Simon Doubleday, "Tormented Voices in the House of Empiricism," in *The Experience of Medieval Power*, ed. Robert Berkhofer (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005). See also Daniela Flesler's essay "Contemporary Moroccan Immigration and its Ghosts," chapter 5 in this volume.
44. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 4.
45. For the most comprehensive recent treatment of the Sacromonte phenomenon and its long-term impact on Granadino culture, see A. Katie Harris, *From Muslim to Christian Granada: Inventing a City's Past in Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). See also Coleman, *Creating Christian Granada*, pp. 188–201.

46. Zótico Royo Campos, *Reliquias martiriales y escudo del Sacromonte*, ed. Miguel López Muñoz (Granada: 1960. facs. ed., Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995).
47. For an overview of "Alhambrism" in the Romantic Movement, see Gerhart Hoffmeister, "Exoticism: Granada's Alhambra in European Romanticism," in Gerhart Hoffmeister, ed. *European Romanticism: Literary Cross-Currents, Modes, and Models* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), pp. 113–126.
48. María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los moros que trajo Franco: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Martínez Roca, 2002).
49. Navarro, *La mezquita de Babel*, pp. 17–18
50. See, for instance, Juan Carlos de la Cal, "Zakaria entierra sin féretro," *El Mundo* (March 4, 2007): http://www.elmundo.es/suplementos/cronica/2007/592/1172962803.html.
51. Washington Irving reported that during his stay in Granada in 1829, he met a "turbaned Moor" who turned out to be a Moroccan immigrant who lived in Granada and sold spices in the Zacatín. See the chapter titled "The Court of the Lions," in Washington Irving, *Tales of the Alhambra* (Granada: Ediciones Miguel Sánchez, 1994), p. 79.
52. Those arrested in connection with the September 11, 2001 investigations included the particularly controversial case of the Syrian-born *al-Jazeera* journalist Tayssir Alouni, as well as Jamal Husein, Hasan al-Husein, and Mohammed Zaher Asade, all of whom are now serving lengthy prison sentences in Spain. Those arrested in the aftermath of the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings included two brothers, Abdelhamid Ali and Ahsan Ali, who had moved to Granada in the late 1990s and who operated small businesses in the Cartuja neighborhood. Two other March 11 suspects with Granada connections were among those who allegedly committed suicide after setting fire to their flat in the Madrid suburb of Leganes as law enforcement officials surrounded the building in April 2004. These two men, Abdenabi Kounjaa and Rachid Oulad Akcha, are known to have been renting at that same time another flat in the Granada suburb of Albolote. For a summary of what is known about ties of specific Muslims in Granada to specific terrorist attacks, see Carlos Moran, "Yihad.com," *Ideal*, February 14, 2007: http://www.ideal.es/almeria/prensa/20070502/local_almeria/yihad_20070502.html.
53. Katya Adler, "Spanish Mosque Calms Extremism Fears," *BBC News*, March 9, 2004: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3544237.stm.
54. Ricard Zapata-Barrero, "The Muslim Community and Spanish Tradition: Maurophobia as a Fact, and Impartiality as a Desideratum," in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*, eds. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidoo, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 143–161.

CHAPTER 8

POSTSCRIPT: FUTURES OF AL-ANDALUS

Gil Anidjar

In endeavoring to explore the "futures of al-Andalus," I mean to evoke both futures past and present. What, *if any*, were the futures of al-Andalus after it took place? And more precisely, perhaps, what was the image of al-Andalus such as it was shaped by ensuing generations of historians? How have past and present historians—political, cultural, or literary historians, writers and scholars of a place and time marked as "past"—construed, how do they continue to construe, the future of al-Andalus? And prior to these questions, what futures did al-Andalus construe for itself? What projections did it make for itself?[1] A second set of questions appears more urgent, however, having to do with present futures. Does al-Andalus—the fact of coexistence, the figure of its possibility and impossibility—still have a future, or even many? And if so, what do these possible futures teach us about al-Andalus? How do they reshape our understanding of al-Andalus? Is there, in other words, an "unfinished project" for al-Andalus, for al-Andalus as a figure, if not of modernity, at least of incompletion, even perhaps of infinity? What, finally, does it mean to speak of the futures of al-Andalus?

Today, the question of the futures of al-Andalus can perhaps best be called upon through what the political psychologist Ashis Nandy has theorized as "explorations of the future as dissent"—namely, Futures Studies. Detailing the stakes of such dissent, Nandy paradoxically puts testimony at the center of his reflections.

> We live in an age of testimony, some have claimed. Perhaps we do, but that testimony should encompass not merely the experience of organized mass violence based on self-other differences in our times. It should also

> pay homage to the often unheroic, everyday ability to negotiate these differences and the resistance that ability offers to mass violence. To pay that homage, we are obliged to stand witness to the many lost worlds of culture and culturally-based systems of knowledge that have been proclaimed obsolete and, along with the millions of their living practitioners, exported to the past with a remarkable intellectual sleight of hand. So much so that references to these living cultures and to the suffering and indignities of the millions who live with these cultures are seen as romantic time travel to the past.[2]

The complex attitude required to bear witness to the future, as Nandy phrases it, must not only give room to the past in its catastrophic dimensions; it must also acknowledge the enduring achievements, and continuing effects, of living cultures. This may require a radical change of attitude. For it is a striking fact that with al-Andalus, it is mostly to an irrevocable end and a catastrophic past that we are summoned and told we must bear witness. Al-Andalus, in other words, never had, nor does it have a future (however regrettable this may be). How could it be otherwise? The considerable violence that brought al-Andalus to its allegedly sealed conclusion, the even more massive cruelty that followed al-Andalus and the exiles provoked in both cases, have culminated in what has become one of the best remembered and most striking date in world history, namely 1492. Yet, like al-Andalus, to which they are intimately connected, the centuries that *followed* 1492 themselves bear witness to a different kind of historical unfolding. Against all historiographical odds, one discerns in them the "everyday ability to negotiate differences," the perhaps "unheroic resistance" of individuals who did more than survive a world said to have ended. Some did die, of course (always too many, in fact), and many more fled. Countless also remained, living under Catholic rule, maintaining and preserving their customs and rituals under varying, at times difficult and even excruciating, conditions, continuing to live among neighbors and opponents, adapting and transforming cultural practices all the way to the secrecy that would mark Judeo-conversos and Moriscos of post-1492 Spain, a secrecy that would govern their existence for many centuries, and does still in some parts of the world.[3] Distinct from sheer survival, such unheroic resistance could of course be seen in a mournful mode, as constituting (or rather, undoing) one of the lost worlds of millions of living practitioners, those among them who remained in the Iberian peninsula, those who left into exile, fleeing north into Christian countries or, more often, east and south, toward North Africa and later toward the Ottoman Empire.

Nandy is not writing about these exiles (although such a statement might be open to some justifiable contention), nor is he writing about

the late Middle Ages or al-Andalus. But his writing about "lost worlds of culture and culturally based systems of knowledge" provides an ideal springboard for an exploration of al-Andalus and of its futures. It is indeed crucial not to lose sight of the discrete but clear warning that articulates itself in Nandy's careful wording. The obligation to stand witness, which Nandy voices, is qualified by the need to remain vigilant not so much to effectively lost worlds, such as there were, but also to worlds and the *claims* that are made about them, including that which "some have claimed" is our world, our age of testimony. These are worlds akin to our "own," then, which "have been *proclaimed*" lost and obsolete, sites of nostalgia or regret, or indeed witnesses to the inevitable march of "progress." In this manner, these worlds, "along with the millions of their living practitioners," are "*exported* to the past with a remarkable sleight of hand. So much so, that references to these living cultures and to the suffering and indignities of the millions who *live* with these cultures *are seen as a romantic time travel to the past*." The nature of testimony is such that it is intricately connected with a set of rhetorical assertions concerning the temporality, concerning and indeed performing the historical distancing of lives and events tinged with pathological allegations ("nostalgia"). Intellectual or academic testimony would perhaps be most vulnerable to this risk, if also most adverse to its effects—exporting to the past that which is still living, even if under harsher, and even impossible, conditions. Constitutively mournful, yet with little affection for what they perceive as melancholia, historians today are quick to righteously bear witness to that which has happened, to raise high the flags of destructive and catastrophic events in need of resolution. Doing so, they no doubt play an important role in bringing some events to public consciousness and attempting to heal the collective psyche (the extent of that role can lately be seen in France, for example, where historians have been competing—or collaborating—with legislators in adjudicating on past events and the institutionalization of memory).[4] However, it is also the case that they thereby inscribe and even seal these events and what they stand for as past. They participate in the movement whereby the dead are left to bury the dead, if perhaps before their time, and they ensure that events said to have no practical import any longer are properly and resolutely left behind.[5]

Be that as it may, and with some irony (if one can call it that), there is indubitably something of an aura of "romantic time travel" attached to that continuous movement, the enduring interest in long lost worlds, and specifically to that lost world named al-Andalus. But again: what if the so-called past had not ended? What if al-Andalus had a future? What if bearing witness to al-Andalus meant to reconsider its being past, to enact its being-present and even future? Along with assertions about the end

(and the historical significance of that word "end" is in a way all that will concern me here), the evocation of futures may obscure the following truth, namely, that "what looks like a possibility in the future. . .may lie scattered or hidden at the margins today, making the futurist search a disguised self-exploration in the present."[6]

The End of Exile

To this day heavily invested in catastrophic events, Zionist discourse is perhaps paradigmatic (if not necessarily unique) in its peculiar relation to the past and to worlds said to have ended. Zionism, Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin explains, articulated this relation around the notion of the "negation of exile." The logic of negation here follows a gesture whereby a universal condition (exile) becomes the attribute of a particular community (the Jews) only to be further diminished in significance, as if sidelined by history itself. This was originally a Christian, theological gesture, which was appropriated by modern Zionist thinkers, and according to which the community can escape an exile that was only *its* exile, and put an end to it. It can be saved and "returned to history." It is perhaps noteworthy, then, that in its essential adaptations of a concept of catastrophic ends, Zionist discourse refrained from speaking of the "end of exile, *ketz ha-galut*." One can of course imagine, or even read, narratives whereby exile has ended. Or, more precisely, one can speak of exile as a past condition. But exile belies the possibility of a conclusive end.

Those who are exiled do not simply leave, later perhaps to come back. They are exiled not so much because they have left, exited or escaped, not because that which they leave is no more. Whatever solution might be found to exile has little to do with either "end" or "return." With the transformation of place and of world—for exile is a condition, not a conclusion—that cannot be contained to the local. Exile is always already global. And along with everything else, exiles are transformed with the world. They are symbolically or literally inscribed with a new name. This is something else than the effect of time's irreversibility, something else than what travelers or migrants experience upon return. Figuring the Holy Land (and, implicitly, al-Andalus) as exile, apprehending the entire world, therefore, as being in a state of exile, the thirteenth century *Zohar*, the founding and only sacred text of the Kabbalah, describes the peripatetic wanderings of its rabbis, as a becoming irrelevant of place. Paradoxically, the *Zohar* also offers the notion of a *making* of place: "even if it is a place other persons walk upon, now that the righteous walk on it, it is a new place. Now it is a new place, as if no one had ever walked on it before."[7]

As Raz-Krakotzkin explains, exile affects time itself and marks in fact its unraveling.[8] Exile is a universal condition that entails an ontological transformation, it produces a new place and the old places, though perhaps still there, are recast as new. Exile is a change in the condition of the world that encompasses more than the individuals or the community who seemingly undergo it. This is why, although exile is not necessarily linked to destruction, its beginnings are often figured as loss and destruction. As a site of mourning, exile is thus topological. It evokes a loss of world and is related to place but in a paradoxical way. Exile can be negated but it cannot be ended. Here too, the *Zohar* is instructive, which figures the highest sphere of the divine, and the furthermost site of theological longings as "ein-sof," a phrase that, parallel to the Greek *apeiron* literally means "no end" or "infinite," but was felicitously translated into French as "il n'y a pas de position de la fin": there is no position of and at the end. Exile is about the failure of ends, the vanishing of world and the absence of place. Hence, exile is always also temporal.[9] And in both of its dimensions, exile equally lacks borders. Exile is a marker of, an encounter with, finitude, but exile is not itself bounded. There is no end, then, to exile.

The curious infinity of al-Andalus functions as a privileged figure of exile, but it also brings about an additional paradox toward an understanding of exile. Clearly, al-Andalus is a ubiquitous site of exile. Al-Andalus bears as one or more of its futures the sense that it is no more; that it has vanished in a series of destructive events and occurrences. To be more precise, it was even before its destruction that al-Andalus had begun to manifest itself as a loss of place, a displacement and an unsettling translation from which one could not but feel exiled. This is the meaning of Moses Maimonides' use of the phrase "our place in al-Andalus," a phrase found in his writings only after his departure from the Iberian Peninsula. As a place, al-Andalus emerges belatedly, and precisely as a figure of exile, as the condition of exile rather than as its origin. Al-Andalus is not so much that from which one is exiled because it has ended. Rather, insofar as the place is (or is new, as the *Zohar* says), al-Andalus is that place. It is the condition of exile precisely because it *is* still, because it lingers. It comes to existence *as* exile.

There is no need to list the vast amount of commemorative volumes that were dedicated to 1492 as the marker of lost worlds (al-Andalus vanished, the Americas devastated by conquest) in order to consider not only the lingering force of the date and of the loss, but also to consider that its modern historiographical inscription not only contains but re-enacts the loss in numerous and, one would almost want to say, increasingly imaginative ways, as I will show in some details. An acknowledgment of

that inscription must precede the attitude taken toward it, be it nostalgic or corrective, literary or historical. For now, it is important to note that al-Andalus functions; it *is* the name of a lost world, the absence of place and the loss of context. The nature and content of the loss is, however, what changes. A recent and rich volume, otherwise hardly participating in the mournful tone to which the literature of previous years had habituated interested readers, nonetheless provides a small but curious illustration for the exilic loss I am trying to address. Describing the wide range of subjects covered by the volume (entitled *The Literature of al-Andalus*), the editors note that "some subjects and focuses are missing, for a range of different pragmatic reasons, even though they were originally planned: 'The Shapes of Culture' section, for example, was to have had an essay on religion."[10] Among the subjects and focuses said to be missing, religion is then found, or rather, it is lost. But what is "religion" here?[11] And how would the historian be able to isolate it, analytically distinguish it, from the different subjects that were ultimately included in the volume (language, music, spaces, knowledge, and love are the subjects and focuses that ended up being so included)? Clearly, *the Literature of al-Andalus* volume did not ignore the religion (or religions) it claims to be missing, nor could the current echoes and strategic deployment of the word be lost on its editors. Still, when reference is made to lost worlds (or is it religions?) of the Iberian Peninsula, to its living cultures and their living practitioners, to the millions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians that resided there, I would venture that, if religion is in fact missing, then perhaps the very context of al-Andalus, if not everything of it, is missing as well.

In this context, or rather in this very loss of context, the persistent inscription of al-Andalus as finite within historiographical discourse becomes even more remarkable. What I am referring is to the repetitive assertion that al-Andalus (Muslim Spain or indeed Spain as a whole) is fundamentally characterized by its end. Since Gershom Scholem, the major historian and scholar of Kabbalah, asserted, when witnessing the advent of Nazi Germany in 1933, that he could finally understand the meaning of 1492, discussions of al-Andalus in Western scholarship have repeatedly underscored this apparent evidence: al-Andalus has ended—it had no future. More precisely, perhaps, the Arabs (or even Islam) have been incapable of maintaining the shining, and exceptional, achievement which al-Andalus was (or was not, perhaps, says the historically correct doxa of the day). Beneath these assertions, the infinity, the endlessness of exile can be recognized in the image of negotiated borders to which al-Andalus gives rise. The distinctive forms of religious and cultural separateness, the "intricate structures of interpenetrating, layered lifestyles, cultures and self-definitions" would indeed seem to resist, rather than

encourage "the delineation of clear borders and well-defined selves."[12] On the other hand, it is precisely in response to the event that al-Andalus constitutes, that such a delineation, such an inscription of clear borders, takes place nonetheless in historiographical renderings. It is indeed difficult to think of comparable cases in which literary, ethnic and religious, but even national(!) and disciplinary boundaries, have been erected to such an extent and with such efficiency (in her *The Ornament of the World*, for example, Menocal writes that she has "focused on cultural rather than political events,"[13] while *The Literature of al-Andalus*, scrupulously true to its title, has hardly an explicit word to say about philosophy—an unlamented loss for once). This is not something that can be said of just any historical event. Similar urges seem lacking, for example, to claim that the Roman or the Ottoman empires (or other complex phenomena of different magnitudes) have ended, that they are no more, or that their authors or actors are no longer able to produce a historical encore. Harder still would be the assertion, explicit or not, that phenomena belonging to these events should be studied in complete isolation, and according to a single, limited disciplinary focus, managed by an exclusive coterie of experts. Clearly, the consequences of such mammoth events are still with us today, open to debate or lamented for the forgetfulness that surrounds them in spite of their determining force and value. One may therefore dispute the significance of particular dates toward their understanding.[14] More generally, one could even argue (ever so daringly), historical understanding is predicated on the definition of historical periods and on their past tense. Here, however, it remains the case that the specificity of exile—and in this case, of al-Andalus—appears to generate and multiply in quite extreme a fashion the assertion of its end, the affirmation of its limits and the construction of new ones, and ultimately, its transformation into an *exception*.

Equally puzzling, then, is the lament not only that al-Andalus has had no tomorrow, but also that no such future is now in sight. Here again, a recent illustration will perhaps suffice. María Rosa Menocal's *The Ornament of the World* could not have offered a more positive image of al-Andalus, nor could Menocal have insisted more compellingly on the importance of its consequences and lingering effects. She points out that "within the Muslim world. . .al-Andalus is reckoned more a nostalgic curiosity than anything else—and mostly, in the end, a failure, because Islam did not survive as one of the religions of Europe."[15] Underscoring her intent to locate the subsequent effects of al-Andalus on European soil and history (as well as the end, in the end), Menocal appears to disagree with such assertions of nonsurvival and yet reading her, one cannot help but wonder whether this is in fact the case.[16] Al-Andalus, she writes, was

after all a past and finite, if extraordinary, chapter. It "was the chapter of Europe's culture when Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived side by side." It is—one feels the overwhelming compulsion to say: it *was*—something that happened long ago and made its mark "before it disappeared altogether."[17] "What happened?" asks Menocal in her strangely doubled conclusion to the book (she writes these words as an epilogue to al-Andalus *and* as a postface to September 11). There is the end again. And again. The puzzle of a catastrophic event and of an abrupt end reflects back onto everything that precedes, spreading a dark and enigmatic light over it. Nothing is understood any longer and from this other catastrophe, one will then have to "read and hear everything somewhat differently—most of all, of course, of anything having to do with Islam, and with its relationship to other religions and cultures." After such an end, then, "it seems impossible to understand the history of what was once, indeed, an ornament of the world."[18] It seems impossible to understand Islam. After September 11, at any rate, al-Andalus culminates as absolute mystery, as absolute exception. As with Scholem and his comparison of 1492 with 1933, the catastrophe looms again. And paradoxically, it is unique. In his foreword to Menocal's book, Harold Bloom writes more sharply, as well as more typically, about this definite and regretful sense of a world lost: "There are no Muslim Andalusians visible anywhere in the world today."[19] One may wonder whether Bloom is equipped with the apparatus (visual, linguistic, or whatnot) that would enable him to recognize such Muslims (but why only Muslims? And against which horizons?). Or about what he thinks of all the Muslims (and non-Muslims) who today are prevented, by means of elevated walls, visa requirements and hyper-militarized police forces, from entering the very geography of al-Andalus.[20] Such prevention (such work of homeland security) is done by many, all skilled experts on the history of coexistence and tolerance—its mourning and its secure preservation.

One may also wonder today about the significance of the burden repeatedly placed on Islam by Western intellectuals (modern Flauberts or would-be Orientalists?) when describing the exceptional and ephemeral dimensions of "a culture of tolerance" in what is admittedly a litany of long centuries, a singularly European history, after all, of extreme intolerance, one that, far from remaining within its "own" borders, proceeded in 1492 to unleash itself upon the entire globe, all the way to empire, to colonialism and beyond. Whether or not al-Andalus was about peaceful or not-so-peaceful coexistence seems after all less important than the enduring, common site of adjudication and devastation of forms of life that have *not* taken over the world, not even potentially so. As Talal Asad puts it, "it is not the abstract logical status of concepts," or their historical

precision, "that is relevant here, but the way in which a specific political (or religious) discourse that employs them seem to mobilize or direct the behavior of people within given situations."[21] One may wonder as well about the meaning of one, singular catastrophe, contingent on its empirical location—for September 11, it is increasingly apparent, was a catastrophe, although hardly final and completed, and the effects of which have now affected entire countries and populations, altering as well individual and collective liberties, the legitimacy of discrimination, national and international laws, police, carceral, and military practices, and more. One may therefore wonder at the possibilities of determining the spatial and temporal limits of any event, catastrophic or not, and regardless of its magnitude at the time of occurrence. Nandy puts this matter clearly when he accounts for the kind of recoil and boundary setting, the inscription of strict and definite limits such as occur in certain kinds of collective mourning. When a collective—community or culture—fails to transform their suffering into a "shareable tragedy," Nandy writes, when suffering is marked with exceptionality and fails to transcend "the specificity of a case and [to stand] witness for all other victims of similar suffering;" when a collective "cannot admit that a victim's experience acquires moral grandeur and a higher level of authenticity" only if it is made "to represent the victimization of others caught in similar hinges of fate," it is a sign that there has occurred a "narcissistic failure." It is as if one "sought to establish a narcissistic monopoly over [one's] experience of victimization and to turn it into a source of grudge against the world."[22]

Exile is about the loss of world, then, which all too easily becomes the (devastated) world of the other, as well as another world. But exile has no end. It is the ruin of boundaries (and therefore the condition of their repeated reinforcement, the building of higher walls). I do not mean to diminish the empirical validity of the events, indeed, of the devastation that was brought over Muslim Spain or that of the 1492 exiles, the markers of loss—the sense of exile—but I do want to reflect on the response, the mechanisms and the secondary benefits, as Freud called them, that motivate a persistent inscription of "the end," the inscription of borders and limits that is also "a source of grudge against the world." I do not mean to ask, therefore, whether al-Andalus did or did not end. Instead, I want to interrogate the meaning and consequences of the repeated affirmation that it did. For what does it mean: to end? And what is it, finally, that ends? What kind of mastery, what kind of narcissistic recovery is at work that claims to measure and know what was lost—and to whom? What is eradicated, that lives still, when a world, when *the* world, is said thus to have ended? If al-Andalus is indeed a figure of exile, one may still be attending to its effects on history, to the lingering attitudes of

mind to which it still testifies. Such is precisely the consequence, the in-finity, that Mahmoud Darwish sought to convey in one of his striking and beautiful poems "on" al-Andalus.

> On the last evening on this earth, we cut off our days
> From our shrubs, and we count the ribs that we will carry with us
> And the ribs that we will leave behind, there...on the last evening
> We bid farewell to nothing, and we do not find the time for our end
> Everything remains as it is, the place changes our dreams
> And changes its visitors. Suddenly, we are no longer capable of irony
> And the place is ready to host our nothingness...here on the last evening
> We fill ourselves with the mountains surrounded by the clouds: conquest
> and reconquest
> An ancient time grants to this new time the keys of our doors
> Come on in, O conquerors, enter our homes, and drink the wine
> Of our complacent muwashshaha. For we are the night when it splits
> in two,
> No horse rider arriving from the last prayer call to deliver the dawn...
> Our green hot tea—drink it! Our fresh pistachio nuts—eat them!
> These beds are green made of cedar wood—surrender to drowsiness!
> After this lengthy siege, sleep on the feathers of our dreams
> The sheets are ready, the scents are at the door, and the mirrors are many
> Enter them so that we can come out! Soon we will seek what
> Has been our history around your history in the distant lands
> And we will ask ourselves in the end: was al-Andalus
> Here or there? On the earth...on in the poem?[23]

It is of course impossible to do justice to this intricate and complex poem, which inscribes its own multiple chronology, at once al-Andalus and Palestine, documenting the dates and times of 1492, 1948, 1967, 1992, and beyond. The poem can hardly be said to erase historical and political distinctions, however, even as it carries in the devastation of its poetic breath all certainties of past and future settlements, all past and future distinctions. Exile has no end, the poem tells us. And here, I can only hope that in the context of an exploration of futures of al-Andalus, my barely broached reading will be sufficient to signal toward the ways in which the poem itself constitutes a future, articulating as well the opening of futures that is also a reading of the past. Beyond an end that it cannot find, the poem does bear witness to catastrophe, articulating "the survivors' way of relocating their journey through violence in a universe of memory that is less hate-filled, less buffeted by rage and dreams of revenge" than the universe of their conquerors.[24] Conquest and reconquest. "Survivors remember their victimhood," Ashis Nandy writes, "they live with the trauma; they even re-do in their mind the journey across the border,

marking the end of innocence; even the ill-treatment and brutalization at the end of the journey in strange cities, refugee camps, in new vocational situations."[25] It is this generalized yet singular experience of the survivor as witness to a state of emergency that has become the rule that Darwish's poem writes.

The last evening on this earth produces the past as well as the future as it performs the uncertainty of exile, the impending possibility of an all-too-nigh apocalypse. The last evening hovers as looming threat and as past event, having already affected a community, a "we," that is about to leave the earth. The last evening of the earth is the time of a world on the brink of an apocalypse that, unique and singular, has nonetheless always already happened everywhere. Exile affects space and time, occurring at once to the place—which is already no longer a place, having been placed under the threat of devastation—as well as to those who cannot own but undergo the passing of the world. Exile is the generalization of the last evening, the universal promise of a tomorrow without tomorrow, which will affect, which has already affected everything and nothing, made everything into nothing. Thus, "we bid farewell to nothing," and "everything remains the same."

But at the same time exile changes everything. From the moment of exile—and the threat of exile, like the threat of castration, belongs to a temporality that abolishes the distinction between potential and actual (if it can be lost, then it is always already lost)—everything will in fact remain the same, and history itself, moving and displaced into an infinite space where there is no position of the end, history will be there where "we do not find the time of our end." Exile is less about the impossibility of return than it is a change in the rapport to place and world, a transformation by the place that henceforth affects us. The place has now produced a different world, as well as the uncertainty of a vanishing subject who inscribes itself as a "we." It is this "we" who, its days cut off, distanced from its own ribs, leaves itself behind and hardens, "no longer capable of irony."

No subject could own or claim exile for itself, but it could seek "to establish a narcissistic monopoly on its experience of victimization," and "to turn it into a source of grudge against the world." It could fail to show awareness that its suffering is a "shareable tragedy," and not stand witness.[26] The "we" that speaks in Darwish's language is undergoing a series of transformations, at times hermetically sealing for safekeeping the memories of the disaster, building defensive shields that protect it from the ghosts of the past ("we fill ourselves with the mountains surrounded by the clouds"), at times opening itself to the cataclysmic change ("for we are the nights when it splits in two"), the change that the place has

become as everything in it remains the same. "The place changes our dreams" and "its visitors." It is "ready to host nothingness."

The hospitality of the place toward nothingness, at once affirmation and denial of the impending devastation, is also the hospitality of time, which grants "the keys of our doors." Ultimately, it becomes the hospitality of the witness, that of the "we," who opens itself to and welcomes the newcomers—they are the tomorrow without tomorrow of the last day of the earth, riders of the apocalypse, the ever-renewed wave of conquerors, subjects of a history that, though lost to them and to us, must be sought in both, "our history around your history"—a hospitality without end and without conditions. Nothing enables or even justifies this hospitality, which is rigorously impossible. There is nothing to receive, and no time to receive. There is only time for time to receive time, time taking charge of the space, of the houses and of their doors and keys. One can only partake of this surrender to time, give sustenance toward the end of sustenance, and offer the conquerors sleep and "surrender to drowsiness." One can only offer hospitality—offer perhaps, and to invoke Derrida's pointed neologism, "hostipitality"—and loss. For the conquerors will get lost, they are already lost, entering the space of mirrors where they too will become, where they have already become, like the speaking "we," witnesses.

Exile is that whereby history is lost to them no matter how much they return to it. Exile is the generalization of an experience whereby "the mirrors are many," and whoever enters can only come out when others enter. This is not history as equivalence, nor history as return. It is rather history as the generalization of exile. History, like exile, without end. Still, the end is near and "soon we will seek what has been our history around your history in the distant lands." Are we going to the distant lands or is your history in distant lands the site of the other's history? Exile is the loss of place as that which can be owned. Exile is without end even if the end is coming. And the end is coming. The end is near—that is the future—and this future is a space of interrogation without end, in the end, on the end and the place of the end. Exile is al-Andalus without end. "And we will ask ourselves in the end: was al-Andalus here or there? On the earth. . .or in the poem?"

Our Place in al-Andalus

What would it mean to respond to exile without seeking to establish a narcissistic monopoly on one's experience of victimization, without seeking to master it with the power of the colonizing state (colonizing land, peoples, and minds, and history), without turning it into a source

of imperial grudge against the world? What would it mean to show awareness that one's suffering can become a shareable tragedy, to be able to transcend the specificity of a case and stand witness for other victims of similar suffering? What would it mean to acknowledge that a victim's experience acquires moral grandeur and a higher level of authenticity only when one is willing to represent the victimization of others caught in similar hinges of fate? And precisely when one has the power to do so? One recurring response consists not only in the hardening of selves but in the erection of walls (and yet more walls) and boundaries. Another, not unsimilar response erects an additional boundary of a different kind. It enacts a sort of emotional distancing, the assertion that the events were geographically or temporally remote, that they belong to other lives and other worlds. As it has hardened into a historiographical object, al-Andalus has served such a purpose, increasingly located within temporal and thematic, even disciplinary boundaries, that, I would argue, are constitutive of the responses evoked by Nandy. As an event which signals (and exceeds) loss, al-Andalus also demands another kind of response, one akin to the exploration of futures (and of pasts) that is at work in the poetic rendering of Mahmoud Darwish's words.

But al-Andalus was already an event of words, a linguistic event that was, that is still, an encountering with exile, a reading. Al-Andalus articulates a finite response to the infinity of the end. As an event of language, it is not a mournful rhetoric of sadness that speaks al-Andalus, but a different approach to its own language, one that distinguishes otherwise, and conceives otherwise, of religion, philosophy, and literature. This is hardly an abstract matter. Rather, it has everything to do with co-existence, with Jews and Arabs, and with Arab Jews, as the twelfth-century Arab-Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides demonstrates:

> Know that if one does not understand the language of a human being whom one hears speaking, one indubitably knows that he speaks but without knowing what he intends to say. Something of even graver import may occur: sometimes one may hear in someone else's speech words that in the language of the speaker indicate a certain meaning (*tadullu 'alâ ma'nâ*), and by accident that word indicates (*tadullu*) in the language of the hearer the contrary of what the speaker intended. Thus the hearer will think that the signification (*dalâla*) that the word has for the speaker is the same as its signification (*dalâla*) for him. For instance, if an Arab hears a Hebrew man saying *'aba*, the Arab will think that he speaks of an individual who was reluctant with regard to some matter and refused (*abâ*) it…This is similar to what happens with the multitude with regard to the speech of the prophets, excepting certain portions that they do not understand at all.[27]

Having attempted a reading of this passage elsewhere, I want to restrict myself here to a few comments.[28] First, the passage articulates a notion of communication, basis of the social bond across and within communities and cultures, that is predicated on misunderstanding, and even mishearing (not on harmony or conflict). It is unclear whether "the Arab" is spoken to or addressed, yet, like his allegorical counterpart, "the multitude," he is nonetheless a recipient of speech. Second, the passage reveals that the only monolingualism is "the monolingualism of the other."[29] It is only by assuming that the other speaks to me in one language, which is always my language, that misunderstanding occurs. Finally, the linguistic and political condition which Maimonides describes is one in which signification itself is defined as perplexity. This is why I have argued that the title of Maimonides' book might be better translated (if not necessarily better understood) as "signification according to those in a state of perplexity." But Maimonides also offers a different kind of allegory, one that reminds us that communication is a constant process of translation. This general, indeed, universal condition, however, cannot be adequately addressed in an abstract manner because it has as much to do with content as it has to do with form, that is to say, translation is a specific encounter between specific languages and words, and it gives rise to distinct effects and alterations. Like exile, then, translation has no end. It is a task that changes everything and requires less a solution than a provisional description of the new conditions that prevail. It is, of course, a relative commonplace to recall that translation, such as it was practiced in the Iberian Peninsula and in the South of France (between Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin), was an essential moment in the constitution of Europe, from the "renaissance of the twelfth century" to the Renaissance.[30] Here again, historicization leads us to forget that translation has no end. The philosopher Martin Heidegger makes this case when he writes somewhere that an error in reading, an error in translation, may have consequences that will last for hundreds of years. Beyond the linguistic predicament hereby acknowledged, what is here raised anew is the question of historical containment, for the mechanisms that operate to sediment the past as past serve, beyond all intentions, to adjudicate on the question of ends (whether historical, political, cultural, or other) and of worlds. These mechanisms produce and erect walls and boundaries that inscribe the memory of the past at the same time that they perform and buttress a no less active forgetting. Let me be more specific regarding the memory of al-Andalus as a "culture of tolerance."

Much like Maimonides' allegory, al-Andalus is now increasingly conceived as a model of tolerance and coexistence, the success of which can only be compared to its singular and exceptional character.

No doubt, the notion of tolerance (or *convivencia*) is no longer used to evoke an idyllic or peaceful image, which is why it seems to me more important to concentrate on the alleged exceptionality of the image that is hereby offered. Indeed, the change introduced by 1492, and increasingly confirmed by the modern commemorations of that event, establish a strict dichotomy between violence and coexistence, between violence and tolerance. The gradation of interactions between communities whose boundaries are otherwise articulated, a situation whereby an Arab could feel addressed by a Jew (who may or may not have called upon him), thinking that the Jew was speaking to him in his language (a fair assumption in that particular context in which Jews and Arabs were, of course, speaking Arabic), locate themselves on a continuum that reaches from misunderstanding to understanding, and from desire to outright refusal. Such a community, indeed, such a complex social arrangement of communities thrives "on the checks and counter-checks provided by its low-key communal loves and hates." In such an arrangement, social tensions and antagonisms are negotiated otherwise. "Having stereotypes and disliking other communities, yet granting them a place in the sun and even the right to dislike and keep a distance from one's own community" is an essential moment in this distinct kind of negotiations.[31]

Where are such communities to be found? Were one to listen to the mournful, if also joyous, celebration of al-Andalus, it would be easy to conclude not only that their historical number was highly restricted, but also that once they ended, they have not maintained, let alone repeated themselves in ensuing centuries.[32] Such is the end of al-Andalus. Muslims, Jews, and Christians longing for an image of coexistence would only have to look to that unique and exceptional (and long gone) period, a golden age of tolerance called al-Andalus. If one suspends, however, the largely phantasmatic character of such peaceful coexistence and considers not only social practices and exchanges but the rich political and theological, social and cultural, imaginary of Europe, it will be difficult to ignore the persistence of one measure or other of interaction through a much longer history. Jews and Muslims, for one, have remained present in Europe even after they were expelled (which happened numerous times, of course, among which 1492 is perhaps only the most massive, but not necessarily the more typical, since conversion was offered as an alternative choice, whereas no such choice was offered to the Jews of England and of France, even if it was there implicitly). One would hardly dare interrogate the significance of Jews in and for European history—speak of their worlds as having ended—under the pretext that they were expelled from England in 1290 (not to

return officially until the seventeenth century), or repeatedly expelled from France over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth century, and finally from Spain in 1492. And one would hardly measure the significance of the Jews within Western Christendom based exclusively on their physical presence throughout the realm. Similarly, the physical existence of Muslims in Europe—which can of course be historically measured in terms of the history of populations by considering not only Sicily and Spain, as well as Southern France, but also Italy and the Balkans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, European colonialism all the way to the current status of "immigrants" throughout Europe—is hardly the only criterion by which to assess the European investment in Islam, Europe's *coexistence* with Muslims, at one level or other of culture, theology and politics, and more. How, then, to measure the ubiquitous presence and visualization of Muslims on the walls of so-called Roman churches of twelfth-century France? Or the adoption of numerous and essential building techniques from Islamic architects in these same churches?[33] Beyond well-recognized contributions to medieval science, philosophy, and theology, beyond the Crusades and the "Reconquista," one may consider confronting Cervantes's Spain[34] and its Arabic and Moorish *present* or recall the mutual accusations of Turkish affinities between Luther and the pope (mutual accusations of each side as "the Turk" are more than a matter of distant pasts). One may try to explain Shakespeare's Venice or account for the constant obsession with the Turk—his armies or his coffee—all over Europe beginning in the sixteenth century and one may reflect on the invention of despotism—enduring figure of the East and once a key element of Western, *internal* critiques—or on the subsequent invention of the Semites—an essential moment of identification and political constitution of modern Europe. One may take the measure, in other words, of the pertinence of what Edward Said called "Orientalism" all the way to its modern operations. From the establishment of military units peopled with Muslim Turks who soon necessitated prayer rooms in eighteenth-century Prussia to the strange management of Muslim populations under the National Socialist regime; from the haphazard arrival of numerous individuals—soldiers or administrators—from the colonies to the European metropoles to the later import of colonial, administrative categories and practices to the metropole, and to the enduring coexistence of Jews, Muslims and Christians *in* Europe. But beyond European boundaries, one may wonder where coexistence (peaceful or not) has occurred and where it has been destroyed and by whom after hundreds and hundreds of years. From North Africa to Iraq, from Turkey to India, there is in fact nothing *exceptional* to

the historical coexistence of Muslims, Jews, and Christians, and many others, in a series of social arrangements that can be (and indeed have been) represented in countless narratives. "In these narratives other communities, and even parts of one's own community, emerge as scheming villains, conquerors, victims, traitors, friends, enemies and protectors."[35] It is precisely such narrative imagination, as well as a highly concrete and historical, social reality, that Maimonides allegorizes and that Mahmoud Darwish depicts and reinvents in his poem. It is hardly unique or exceptional, even if each instance remains highly singular and worthy of recognition as such.[36] The countless evidence to the coexistence—a word that would gain from being taken literally—of numerous communities under different historical conditions provides a rich and varied historical background, one against which the very assertion that al-Andalus was an exceptional occurrence, the unique and unrepeated event of an enigmatic "golden age" (testimony moreover to the fossilized nature of Islam, its otherwise general inability to grow or coexist with other cultures) becomes highly puzzling. It is the endlessness, rather than the exceptionality of al-Andalus that one should rather wonder over in these days of ruinous globalization (and of carpet bombings), much as one should question the attachment of historians and scholars to repeated assertions that cultures and communities are, as a general rule, in a permanent state of war, in endless clashes of civilizations that could be in any way comparable to the devastation brought about by modern warfare or by the sheer transformation of collective identities and of social relations in the modern state. Triumphalist evaluations on the basis of uninterrogated, "modern" criteria (are we not glad "we" do not live in the Middle Ages! As if it were a choice, the product of long and rational deliberations, or better yet, a source of pride and worth) will not do. The banalization of this specific modern change—the modern state and its equal (or not so equal) citizens, which out of Europe brought about unprecedented means to the service of the always highly inventive, capacity of most human societies for violence and cruelty (but not all prejudices are created equals, not all race sciences and their military and administrative implementations, not all colonial ventures or genocides, and Europe should get the credit it deserves on these fronts and a few others)—is repeatedly reinforced by the raising of historical periods and geographical locations to the level of isolated exceptions—no matter how praiseworthy. It is in the repeated encounter with a different kind of finitude, rather than in the denial of exile and its refiguration as past and bounded history, that the lessons—and the futures—of al-Andalus lie.

Notes

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1. As the editors of a recent volume dedicated to a partial, Judeocentric retrieval of al-Andalus point out, the "sense of absolute loss" that dominates the scholarly discourse on al-Andalus "has not always framed modern Jewish imaginings of al-Andalus": Adam Sutcliffe and Ross Brann, "Introduction," in *Renewing the Past, Reconfiguring Jewish Culture: From al-Andalus to the Haskalah*, ed. Adam Sutcliffe and Ross Brann (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 9. Not always, of course, but dominantly so. The inscription of al-Andalus, medieval Spain, in mournful memory should be evident from the expression need to *renew* the past, which the volume's title calls on. It is also widespread enough, indeed, hegemonic enough, as the examples I will elicit below make clear, but consider for now the not untypical title of a collection of essays thematizing the matter: Stacy N. Beckwith, ed. *Charting Memory: Recalling Medieval Spain* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000).
2. Ashis Nandy, *An Ambiguous Journey to the City: The Village and Other Odd Ruins of the Self in the Indian Imagination* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. x.
3. See Mary Elizabeth Perry's pertinent discussion of the Moriscos, "Memory and Mutilation: The Case of the Moriscos," chapter 3 in this volume.
4. Marc Nichanian has written a pointed account of this phenomenon in debates over the Armenian genocide: *La perversion historiographique. Une réflexion arménienne* (Paris: Lignes, 2006).
5. In recent years, and to this day, Israeli historians have thus contributed to an essential reconsideration of the events of 1948 as the "original sin" upon which the Zionist state was founded (French historians too are now admitting that colonialism occurred, as if it was over). And yet, in the spirit of Nandy's warning, one could wonder not only about the past dimension of these events, but also about their lingering effects, the consequences of the Nakbah and its implications for the Palestinian people. One could also wonder about the significance and even the strategic use of such an intense focus on distant past events.
6. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, p. xi.
7. I discuss this passage of the *Zohar* and its singular relation to place in my *"Our Place in al-Andalus": Kabbalah, Philosophy, Literature in Arab Jewish Letters* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 175–177.
8. Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "Exile Within Sovereignty: Toward a Critique of the 'Negation of Exile' in Israeli Culture" [in Hebrew]. *Theory and Criticism* 4–5 (1993): 23–56, 113–132.
9. For a discussion of such a notion of temporality with respect to another Andalusi figure, see Nina Caputo, *Nahmanides in Medieval*

Catalonia: Community, History, and Messianism Notre Dame (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).

10. María Rosa Menocal, Raymond P. Scheindlin, and Michael Sells, eds., *The Literature of al-Andalus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 21.
11. The most extensive and compelling historicization of "religion" is, of course, Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
12. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, 131.
13. María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), p. 13.
14. Consider Ranajit Guha's moving discussion of dates and their temporal constitution, their foretelling operations; 1492 would function as a precise, if still pertinent, inversion of the logic Guha depicts: Ranajit Guha, "A Conquest Foretold," *Social Text* 54 (Spring 1998): 85–99.
15. Menocal, *Ornament of the World*, p. 10.
16. There is much to be learned from Denise Filios' critique of Menocal, although as should be clear, I engage the idealization Menocal shares with those who would otherwise disagree with her assessment of *convivencia* (see "Expulsion from Paradise," chapter 4 in this volume).
17. Menocal, *Ornament of the World*, p. 11, 13.
18. Menocal, *Ornament of the World*, p. 283.
19. Menocal, *Ornament of the World*, p. xv.
20. See Daniela Flesler's description of their predicament and the ideological constructions that surround it: "Contemporary Moroccan Immigration and its Ghosts," chapter 5 in this volume.
21. Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, p. 185.
22. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, p. 40.
23. Mahmoud Darwish, *Ahada 'ashara kawkaban* (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1992), pp. 9–10. My translation.
24. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, p. 133.
25. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, p. 133.
26. Nandy, *Ambiguous Journey*, p. 40.
27. Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. Shlomo Pines, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), II: p. 29.
28. See my "*Our Place in al-Andalus*," Chapter 1.
29. Jacques Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other; or The Prosthesis of Origin*, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
30. Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (New York: Meridian, 1955); Charles Burnett, "The Translating Activity in Medieval Spain," in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), pp. 1036–1058.
31. Ashis Nandy, *Time Warps: The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), p. 160.

32. Speaking of such communities in their relation to freedom, to a form of coexistence that defines free peoples, Jean-Jacques Rousseau warned that freedom can be acquired, but that once lost, it cannot be recovered. The logic of the end is absolute.
33. See Claudio Lange, *Der nackte Feind: Anti-Islam in der romanischen Kunst* (Berlin: Parthas Verlag, 2004); and, for a different pictorial perspective, Debra Higg Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
34. Leyla Rouhi does so exemplarily in her essay "Reading *Don Quijote* in a Time of War," chapter 2 in this volume.
35. Nandy, *Time Warps*, p. 178.
36. The rich evidence for coexistence (something more complex than a "reality" governed by binaries like harmonious/conflictual or equal/unequal) includes the Mediterranean described by S.D. Goitein is his monumental work, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 5 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), but could equally include Egypt or Bosnia, the Ottoman Empire or India throughout the centuries and up to modern times.

CONTRIBUTORS

Simon R. Doubleday (co-editor) is Associate Professor of History at Hofstra University and Executive Editor of the *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies*, published by Taylor and Francis, an interdisciplinary forum for work on the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic cultures of the Iberian Peninsula from late antiquity to the reigns of the "Catholic Monarchs." He is author of *The Lara Family: Crown and Nobility in Medieval Spain* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), and co-editor of *Border Interrogations: Crossing and Questioning the Spanish Frontier* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008). He is currently working on a post-empirical study of the thirteenth-century border-crossing Castilian courtesan, María Pérez, la Balteira.

David Coleman (co-editor) is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Eastern Kentucky University and author of *Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492–1600* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), which won the 2004 "Best First Book" award from the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies. He is currently working on a study of the port of Málaga and connections between the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds in the era of Columbus.

Lisa Abend is a Madrid-based correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *New York Times*, writing extensively on contemporary Spanish and Moroccan politics and culture, and relations between the two countries, particularly with respect to the question of immigration and the role of Islamic communities in Spain today.

Gil Anidjar is Associate Professor in the Department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University. He is the author of *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and the editor of a recent edition of Jacques Derrida's *Acts of Religion* (London: Routledge, 2001).

Denise K. Filios is Associate Professor in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at the University of Iowa. Author of *Performing Women in the Middle Ages: Sex, Gender, and the Iberian Lyric* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), she has also published several articles on medieval Spanish poetry, cultural exchanges between North Africa and Europe, and representations of Islam in Spanish literature.

Daniela Flesler is Associate Professor in the Department of Hispanic Languages and Literature at SUNY, Stony Brook. In addition to her book *The Return of the Moor: Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), she has published extensively on issues of race, immigration, cinema, and culture in contemporary Spain.

Mary Elizabeth Perry is Adjunct Professor of History of Occidental College and a Research Associate in the UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies. A specialist in the history of gender, culture, and religion in early modern Spain, her books include *The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and the Politics of Religion in Early Modern Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) and *Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), which won the 1991 Sierra Book Award.

Leyla Rouhi is Professor and Chair of the Department of Romance Languages at Williams College. She is the author of *Mediation and Love: A Study of the Medieval Go-Between in Key Romance and Near Eastern Texts* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), and co-editor of *Under the Influence: Questioning the Comparative in Medieval Castile* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

Giles Tremlett is the Madrid-based correspondent for *The Guardian*, and the author of *Ghosts of Spain: Travels through a Country's Hidden Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2006) (U.S. edition published 2007 by Walker and Company under title *Ghosts of Spain: Travels through Spain and Its Silent Past*).

Anne Marie Wolf is Assistant Professor in the History Department at the University of Portland. She is the co-translator (with William Phillips) of *Testimonies from the Columbian Lawsuits*, vol. 7, *Repertorium Columbianum* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000). She is currently working on a book based on her dissertation, tentatively titled *The Path of Peace and the Sword of the Spirit: The Worlds of Juan Alfonso de Segovia*.

INDEX