BEFORE AND AFTER AVICENNA: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group

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Editors

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BEFORE AND AFTER AVICENNA

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وَلَعَلَّ هذه الحُلُولَ الَّتِي نُخَمِّنُها تَكونُ مَنابِعَ لِعُيونٍ تَتَفَجَّرُ نَحْوَ مَطالِبَ كَثيرَةٍ وَشُبَهٍ عَظيمَةٍ. فَإِنْ لم يُغْنِ ذلكَ، رَفَضْنا هذا المَأْخَذَ من البَيانِ، وَانْتَقَلْنا عَنْهُ الى غَيْرِه. فَلْيَتَأَمَّلْها مُشارِكونا في هذه المَباحِثِ، مُعَوِّلينَ على هِدايَةِ الحَقِّ الأوَّلِ، فَإِنَّهُ مَعَ كُلِّ مُجْتَهِدٍ وَنُورَهُ ساطِعٌ على كُلِّ قَلْبٍ.

Perhaps these solutions that we suggest will be the sources for springs that will gush forth over many problems and great uncertainties. If that is insufficient, we will abandon this source of explanation and move on to another. Let our colleagues consider carefully these subjects of investigation, relying upon the guidance of the True and First One, for He is with every diligent searcher, and His light shines on every heart.

– Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mubāḥaṯāt* (ed. Bīdārfar, Qum 1992), 139.9–12.

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AFTER AVICENNA

INTRODUCTION

The papers gathered in this volume represent in part the proceedings of The First Graduate Student Conference on Ibn Sīnā, convened at Yale University, 17–18 March 2001, along with three papers solicited from Dimitri Gutas, Jules Janssens and Robert Wisnovsky, all of whom served as respondents at that conference. Considered as a whole, these papers represent the major trends and concerns of current scholarship on the life and thought of Avicenna, perhaps the most important and influential philosopher of the pre-modern period in the East and West. The contributions of these scholars are here topically divided into three sections: Before Avicenna, The Age of Avicenna, and After Avicenna.

The section "Before Avicenna" contains four papers that address different aspects of the influence of the Classical heritage on Avicenna's thought as well as the many substantive modifications that Avicenna's own intellectual development brought to the articulation of Greek philosophy in Arabic. Specific issues of three of the philosophical disciplines treated by Avicenna, viz. logic, metaphysics, and psychology (theory of the soul), are taken up in these papers. A noteworthy aspect of all of these contributions is perhaps not the collective recognition of the degree to which Avicenna was indebted to his first master Aristotle, but rather the exploration of the philosophical concerns shared by the Greek commentators of Aristotle (both Peripatetic and Neoplatonic) and Avicenna. The study of this relation between the commentary tradition and Avicenna is one that traditionally has been undeveloped in Avicenna studies and so the observations offered in these four contributions will undoubtedly open up new horizons for scholars of Avicenna.

   Asad Ahmed's "Avicenna's Treatment of Aristotelian Modals" presents an analysis of the manner in which Avicenna addressed a problematic aspect of Aristotle's theory of modal syllogisms. For the purposes of clarifying the background to this problem, Ahmed sets forth useful accounts of Aristotle's theory and its "inconsistencies" and Avicenna's general approach to modal syllogistics. The case of

the two Barbaras, one of which Aristotle rejects, the other he inconsistently accepts (since the argument against the first turns out to be applicable to the second also), serves as a model example for the manner in which Avicenna addresses such seemingly contradictory elements of Aristotelian logic. Ahmed highlights the twofold approach Avicenna takes. On the one hand, he defends Aristotle's interpretation through an interesting reading of the major premise of the two Barbaras, a reading which appears to have had an impact on medieval Latin logicians' *de re/de dicto* distinction. However, Avicenna was not a slavish follower of Aristotle and when he departs from Aristotle's theory, he does so through a unique flexibility in the construal of the premises (in the case at hand, necessary conclusions can be drawn from assertoric premises). Ahmed suggests that this flexible construal of premises derives in part from Avicenna's reading of the commentaries of Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ahmed's contribution again makes apparent both Avicenna's mastery of the Classical tradition as well as his own significant contributions to the history of logic.

Amos Bertolacci's "Some Texts of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhīyāt* of Avicenna's *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ*'" traces one aspect of Avicenna's reliance on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhīyāt* portion of his magnum opus *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ*. Unlike the direct quotations of Aristotle in the *Ilāhīyāt*, the passages Bertolacci examines involve "anonymous quotations" of the *Metaphysics*. These passages have great significance for the study of Avicenna's reception of Aristotle. In a specific sense, they confirm Avicenna's use of Uṣṭāṯ's Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, evident in the nomenclature Avicenna employs in particular passages (in the example provided, the use of *huwīya* to render "existent" rather than the more common *mawǧūd*). In broader terms, these passages underscore the sophisticated exegetical techniques Avicenna employed in elucidating the doctrines of his Greek master. In addition, the analysis that Bertolacci applies to Avicenna's use of Aristotle provides a case example of the ways in which such background study will aid in the future critical editing of the *Šifāʾ*. By identifying the sources Avicenna used in composing the *Ilāhīyāt*, scholars will better understand his choices of philosophical terminology and will be better equipped to make sound editing decisions. Bertolacci's parallel translations of the texts of Avicenna's *Ilāhīyāt*, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and Uṣṭāṯ's version of the *Metaphysics* serve as a model for similar future investigations of Avicenna's reception of Aristotelian philosophy.

In "Towards a History of Avicenna's Distinction between Immanent and Transcendent Causes" Robert Wisnovsky investigates Avicenna's division of Aristotle's four causes into those that are intrinsic to their effect (formal and material causes) and those that are extrinsic to their effect (final and efficient causes). Arguing against an earlier thesis by Jean Jolivet that such a distinction was not only introduced by Avicenna but also represented a significant departure from Aristotle's own conception of causality, Wisnovsky provides a detailed overview of the Greek Neoplatonic commentary tradition to which Avicenna was heir. In the course of this overview, Wisnovsky makes it obvious that the commentators' division of causes is not as significant a departure from Aristotle's own "underdetermined" distinction of the four causes by matter (material cause) and form (formal, efficient and final causes). The Neoplatonic twofold division of Aristotelian causes apparently surfaces in Arabic philosophy for the first time in al-Fārābī's commentary on the *Physics*. Avicenna's own treatment of the four-cause theory evinces a progression in the chronology of his writings, the relevant passages of which Wisnovsky translates. In Avicenna's earliest work in this sequence, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*, the Neoplatonic instrumental and paradigmatic causes find a place in his treatment of this division. However, in his later work, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, the criterion for division of the causes into the immanent/transcendent dichotomy is discarded in favor of Avicenna's own distinction between essence and existence which in turn serves as the basis for the division of formal/material causes and final/efficient causes. Wisnovsky concludes that Avicenna's treatment of causality is representative of a larger characteristic of his metaphysics, in which we see elements of the Neoplatonic project give way to a uniquely Avicennan synthesis of Arabic Aristotelianism and medieval Islamic theology.

Another source of influence on Avicenna's thought, and one which has not been as vigorously investigated as the Aristotelian connection, is the work of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus. In "Intellect versus Active Intellect: Plotinus and Avicenna" Rahim Acar focuses attention on the question of Plotinus' influence on Avicenna's conception of the active intellect. Acar concludes that while there does not appear to be an immediately discernible relationship between the views of Plotinus and Avicenna (whether in the role Plotinus assigns the cosmic intellect in the creation of the human soul, or indeed in its actualization of the human potential intellect) we can credit Plotinus in part for Avicenna's theory that human knowledge

derives ultimately from the active intellect. In the process of comparing the theories of Avicenna and his philosophical predecessor Plotinus, Acar offers an illuminating revision of previous scholarship on the issue (most notably the work of Herbert Davidson). He notes that a more recognizable derivation of Avicenna's conception of the active intellect is to be located in the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius on Aristotle's *De anima* rather than in the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus' *Enneads*. This conclusion echoes in some respects the findings of Asad Ahmed in the realm of logic and Robert Wisnovsky in metaphysics, and highlights the importance of further research into Avicenna's reliance on, or at the very least, his knowledge of, the Aristotelian commentary tradition. Such research is now all the more readily possible with the English translations of nearly the entire ancient commentary corpus in the series *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*, under the general editorship of R. Sorabji.

"The Age of Avicenna" is a useful phrase which, loosely construed, applies to both the period of Avicenna's active career and also, considering the enormous impact of his thought in later times, the subsequent periods of development in Arabic-Islamic philosophy. The boundaries of this "age" here are equally fluid, but the papers gathered under the section so titled all treat elements of the historical, social, and intellectual contexts of Avicenna's own time.

Only in recent years, with the work of Dimitri Gutas and Yahya Michot, have we seen a development in the study of the historical context of Avicenna's career. In "Stealing Avicenna's Books" I seek to provide an overview of the historiographical sources available to us for a reconstruction of that context. A specific event reported by Avicenna, scil. the seizure of his works during the attack on Isfahan by the Ġaznavid forces in 421/1030, serves as a case study for the treatment of the few facts about Avicenna's life known to later historians. In the course of investigating this later historiographical tradition (in Arabic and Persian), it becomes clear that the biographer Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī in his *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, while basing his report about the seizure of Avicenna's works on the information provided by Avicenna and his students, perhaps intentionally dated that seizure to a putative *later* sack of Isfahan. In so doing, Ibn Funduq appears to be the source for the unverifiable legend that at least some of Avicenna's books were carted off to Ġazna where they would later be burned in the Ġūrid sack of that city in the mid-

sixth/mid-twelfth century. An examination of other contemporary or near-contemporary histories elicits no evidence to corroborate Ibn Funduq's report, but it is his report which, with various modifications, is taken up by later historians such as Ibn al-Aṯīr. As partial explanation for Ibn Funduq's manipulation of the facts in this case I present other instances in Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma* in which the literary topos of just recompense for the perceived faults of Avicenna play a role in Ibn Funduq's accounts of Avicenna's relations with his contemporaries. The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis suggest that very little information about the historical context of Avicenna's career were known to later historians beyond that provided by Avicenna himself and his students, and where that information was lacking later historians had no qualms about presenting a portrait of Avicenna influenced by their own reactions to him. Such a "re-invention" of Avicenna in this specific case is also found to have an impact on the accepted chronology of some of Avicenna's writings.

Avicenna's professional and intellectual relations with the Muʿtazilī theologians of his day have, to date, received very little scholarly attention. Avicenna's assessment of the intellectual rigor of Muʿtazilī views on topics in the Natural Sciences (aṭ-ṭabīʿīyāt) and some of their metaphysical presuppositions can be pieced together to some degree from random statements in the *Šifāʾ*, the *Naǧāt*, and other works. Alnoor Dhanani's contribution, "Rocks in the Heavens?! The Encounter between ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār and Ibn Sīnā," investigates a much more substantial source for such a reconstruction. In a (still unedited) letter to an unidentified recipient, Avicenna responds to a question about the nature of space (makān) in which Muʿtazilī kalām views and definitions are adumbrated and the leader of the Muʿtazila of the time, the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār (d. 415/1025) is expressly quoted. Dhanani examines the evidence for possible professional contacts between Avicenna and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār at the Būyid court at Rayy, and presents convincing arguments for Avicenna's knowledge of Muʿtazilī refutations of philosophy, along with a detailed account of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's testimony on physical theories. Dhanani's appraisal of the encounter between Avicenna and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār serves as a departure point for a valuable contribution to the ongoing research into the areas of contact and conflict between Aristotelian philosophical and Islamic theological views on physical theories in medieval Islam.

In "Medical Theory and Scientific Method in the Age of Avicenna," Dimitri Gutas examines the crucial question of Avicenna's conception of the relation between theory and method in medicine. Gutas notes that medicine was not accorded a place in the classifications of sciences inherited by the medieval Islamic world from late Greek antiquity, and thus presented an epistemological problem for philosophers such as Avicenna seeking to incorporate it into the educational curriculum of the period. Avicenna's attempt to accommodate medicine within such theoretical constructs shows a development over the course of his career. In an early schema, he subsumed it under a derivative category which included Astrology and Magic and which drew its principles from the theoretical (or "fundamental") science of physics (i.e., Natural Philosophy). Later in his life, and perhaps following his reported teacher al-Masīḥī, Avicenna demoted medicine still further, to a corollary, and thus non-theoretical, category of philosophy in general. Within such schemata, medicine was denied status as a theoretical science with demonstrative principles of its own (deriving such, rather, from physics), and its practitioners, insofar as they were physicians, were precluded from applying the knowledge they gained from experience to the investigation of principles of physics upon which their medicine was based. Gutas concludes that the intellectual and social context in which philosophers and physicians such as Avicenna worked inhibited an evaluation and development of medical theory that would extend beyond the simple description of medical practices. However, this does not mean that such descriptions, based on the observations and experiments of medieval Arab physicians, did not advance medieval medicine or that they do not actually constitute, for modern scholarship, an area for future research into medieval medical theory, and so Gutas enumerates a number of areas and sources that look particularly promising in this regard.

Tariq Jaffer's "Bodies, Souls and Resurrection in Avicenna's *ar-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī amr al-maʿād*" directly confronts Avicenna's theory of incorporeal resurrection as he articulated it in the *Aḍḥawīya*. As in Dhanani's contribution, Jaffer observes that Avicenna approaches the problem or immortality in this treatise within the context of a refutation of Muʿtazilī views on resurrection. A notable part of Avicenna's understanding of resurrection is his insistence on locating the individual identity of a person in the soul and his argument that since the soul is separate from the corruptible matter of the

body, it alone is immortal. Jaffer frames his analysis of the issue through a presentation of Avicenna's twofold refutation of the theologians and the supporters of metempsychosis. In the case of the theologians, the precise identities of Avicenna's opponents are left unspecified in the text, but through a careful sifting of the intellectual currents of Avicenna's time, Jaffer is able to offer viable suggestions about whom Avicenna may have had in mind when composing the *Aḍḥawīya*. In the case of the refutation of metempsychosis, Jaffer makes the important observation that Avicenna deftly overcomes the argument in favor of metempsychosis by refuting the theory of pre-existent souls implicit in his unnamed opponents' stance.

The papers in the section "After Avicenna" collectively constitute a chronological map of the intellectual legacy of Avicenna in the medieval Near East. From the work of Avicenna's student Bahmanyār to the reception of Avicenna in Syriac, all of these contributions make abundantly clear the monumental degree to which Avicenna's thought influenced subsequent intellectual trends. These contributions also represent some of the first detailed studies of a period (twelfth-eighteenth centuries) in Near Eastern intellectual history that has traditionally been considered a time of scholarly conformism and decline. The significant developments in the reception of Avicennan thought outlined below, however, suggest a very different picture of the period in question.

Almost immediately, Avicenna's philosophical legacy underwent considerable transformation at the hands of his student Bahmanyār, as Jules Janssens plots in his "Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān: A Faithful Disciple of Ibn Sīnā?" From the scant evidence that can be collected from Avicenna's papers, it would appear that the relationship between Avicenna and Bahmanyār was not the traditionally fideistic bond of master and disciple common to medieval Islamic educational praxis. One of the reasons suggested for this is that Bahmanyār also drew intellectual influence from the little known figure Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, whom Avicenna "much despised" (in the words of Janssens) as a result of an earlier public controversy that pitted Avicenna and Abū l-Qāsim against one another. It is, thus, reasonable to ask, as Janssens does in the present contribution, whether or not Bahmanyār's own philosophical work, *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, reflects any ambiguity in Bahmanyār's allegiance to Avicenna's ideas. Janssens finds that while Bahmanyār presents his work as a model of Avicenna's philosophy

in the organization of his material (following Avicenna's Persian
summa, *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī* in which metaphysics precedes physics),
such mimicry overlays substantive alterations to Avicenna's philoso-
phy. In a painstaking analysis of Bahmanyār's work, Janssens pre-
sents unquestionable evidence for Bahmanyār's innovations and
modifications to the Avicennan program of thought. These depar-
tures from Avicennan thought include the discussion of *all* of the
Aristotelian categories as well as much that belonged to Avicenna's
Physics in Bahmanyār's metaphysical discourse, and the complete
exclusion of theological issues from his Metaphysics. Janssens con-
cludes that rather than "re-Aristotelizing" the Avicennan philosophical
program, Bahmanyār's intention in reconceptualizing the parameters
of the philosophical disciplines may have been influenced by Abū
l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī's weak grasp of those disciplines.

An important episode in the reception of Avicenna's thought among
later Muslim theologians and philosophers is located in the com-
mentary by Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) of Avicenna's *al-
Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, followed by Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274)
super-commentary, which aimed in part to defend Avicenna against
what Ṭūsī deemed to be misapprehensions on ar-Rāzī's part. Avicenna's
Išārāt, intended as a highly condensed version of arguments and the-
ories developed in greater detail elsewhere, presented a considerable
challenge to the exegetical skills of later thinkers. In "Faḫr ad-Dīn
ar-Rāzī's Critique of Ibn Sīnā's Argument for the Unity of God in
the *Išārāt* and Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī's Defence," Toby Mayer ana-
lyzes the reception of Avicenna's metaphysical argument for divine
unity in these later commentaries. Mayer begins with a presentation
of Avicenna's argument that emphasizes its avoidance of positions
based on physical premises and its focus, instead, on the issue of
individuation. Mayer then notes that Rāzī's understanding of Avicenna's
proof produces enormous difficulties for his commentary in that it
leaves many of Avicenna's references without meaningful connection
to his premises. While Mayer's examination of Rāzī's views high-
lights its inconsistencies, it also recognizes an important philosophi-
cal presupposition on the part of its author, scil. the belief in a
complex God. Mayer suggests that such a belief is to be explained
by Rāzī's Ašʿarī allegiances, as well as perhaps his readings of the
philosopher Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī. Ṭūsī's response to Rāzī is
next set forth in equal detail. Mayer points out that in many instances,
Ṭūsī needs only challenge Rāzī's unreflective assertion that the philoso-

phers argue for the univocity of the term "existence" in order to demolish his predecessor's objections to Avicenna. In doing so, Ṭūsī introduces the idea of "the ambiguity of existence" (*taškīk al-wuǧūd*) into his debate with Rāzī. This raises the question of whether Ṭūsī is justified in using such an idea in defense of Avicenna, and so Mayer traces Avicenna's use of *taškīk al-wuǧūd* in his "private statements" found in the *Mubāḥaṯāt*, noting this important Neoplatonic element in Avicenna's thought as well as Ṭūsī's own significantly developed connotation of the term.

Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī appears again in Ahmed H. al-Rahim's "The Twelver-Šīʿī Reception of Avicenna in the Mongol Period," a bio-bibliographical account of the trajectory of Avicenna's influence on Šīʿī authors of the twelfth-fourteenth centuries. Al-Rahim begins his survey by noting the relative lack of scholarly attention directed toward the period in question, which has recently been termed the "golden age" of philosophy in Islamic civilization. Al-Rahim notes that partial reason for this may be the scholarly devaluing of genres such as the commentary and gloss, popular in the period, but presumed to be unoriginal. An important *isnād* of philosophers which links Ṭūsī directly to Avicenna's student Bahmanyār serves as the framework for al-Rahim's account of the transmission of Avicenna's philosophy in the centuries after his death. While much about this *isnād* is historically problematic in al-Rahim's view, it did serve as a means by which later theologians, particularly those associated with the Niẓāmīya *madrasa*s, could articulate their allegiance to Avicennan philosophy. Al-Rahim next presents a bibliographical survey of the most important Šīʿī philosophical works which served as a curriculum for the study of Avicenna, including those by Ṭūsī and his Twelver-Šīʿī student al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325).

Another important area for the reception of Avicenna's thought is to be located in the *Išrāqī* tradition of the so-called "school of Isfahan," and, in particular, the philosophy of one of its major representatives, Mullā Ṣadrā. In "Process Metaphysics in Islam? Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā on Intensification of Being," Sajjad Rizvi examines Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of *taškīk al-wuǧūd* (translated by Rizvi as "modulation of being") in relation to Avicenna's substance-based metaphysics. As Rizvi explains, the doctrine of *taškīk al-wuǧūd* forms a key part of a later Islamic metaphysics that directs attention toward the acts, or processes of being, rather than substance. Rizvi illustrates Mullā Ṣadrā's interpretation of a process metaphysics through

an analysis of his views on intensification in being and develops this aspect of Sadrian metaphysics by observing its Neoplatonic roots and outlining Mullā Ṣadrā's modifications to the standard Illuminationist interpretation. While Rizvi recognizes that the Peripatetic tradition, as represented by Avicenna, generally does not recognize intensity in being, he notes (as does Mayer in his contribution) that Ṭūsī's commentary on the *Išārāt* allows for such a conception of intensity, if not in causality, then certainly in other divisions of being; and this is perhaps also present, albeit in an ambiguous manner, in Avicenna's *Mubāḥaṯāt*. Rizvi thus characterizes Ṭūsī's views as a turning-point in Islamic philosophy which was further developed by Mullā Ṣadrā, who rejects both the Peripatetic and Illuminationist stances on modulation in being. Rizvi concludes with an explanation of how such intensification need not result in a complex divinity in Ṣadrā's thought.

Hidemi Takahashi's contribution, "The Reception of Ibn Sīnā in Syriac: The Case of Gregory Barhebraeus" closes the volume with an outline of an entirely neglected sphere of Avicennan influence: the translation and assimilation of parts of his thought in the medieval Syriac philosophical and scientific works of Barhebraeus. Takahashi provides a brief biographical study of Barhebraeus, followed by a detailed conspectus of those of his philosophical works related to the Avicennan tradition. This corpus includes original compositions influenced by Avicenna's thought and designed to be a philosophical curriculum in Syriac (including *Cream of Wisdom*, modeled on the *Šifāʾ*); translations of Avicenna's works, especially *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*; and theological treatises that contain much that can be traced to Avicenna. Takahashi emphasizes the importance of Syriac translations of Avicenna's works as witnesses for the critical editing of the Arabic originals, not simply for their translated material, but also because they often contain the parallel Arabic text. A detailed analysis of a few of the ways in which Barhebraeus employed Avicenna's *aš-Šifāʾ* in his *Cream of Wisdom* follows Takahashi's conspectus. Notable aspects of Barhebraeus' methods are that he added a section on practical philosophy absent in Avicenna's work, and his excerption of the *Compendium* of Nicolaus Damascenus (first century B.C.) as part of his discourse. In both cases, Takahashi observes a possible "re-Aristotelizing" (to borrow a phrase from Janssens' contribution) of Avicenna. Takahashi next provides a few examples of textual collation of the *Cream* and the *Šifāʾ* in order to demonstrate the type of paraphrase and alteration undertaken by Barhebraeus. The vari-

ous aspects of Barhebraeus' significance for Avicennan studies include his role as a thirteenth-century commentator of Avicenna (in which his endorsement of Avicennan philosophy fluctuates); the function of his work as textual witness to Avicenna's œuvre (often more useful than even the Latin translations); and his role as transmitter of Avicennan philosophy to Oriental Christianity. Much about the Syriac reception of Avicennan thought is little known to Arabists and Persianists; Takahashi's contribution thus constitutes an important foundation for the further development of Avicenna studies.

During the concluding session of The First Graduate Student Conference on Ibn Sīnā, and as a result of the mutual enthusiasm of the participants for the convivial atmosphere of shared scholarship, The Avicenna Study Group was formally created. The participants agreed that the recent growth in research directed toward the life and thought of Avicenna had reached significant a stage as to warrant a formal structure and vehicle for its continued dissemination. The purpose of The Avicenna Study Group is to facilitate communication concerning recent academic research on the life, times, and thought of Avicenna through annual meetings, to disseminate information on manuscripts, primary, and secondary material related to Avicenna and medieval Arabic philosophy in general, and to serve as the first stage in projected major collaborative research projects on Avicenna. The present volume represents the first collective activity of The Avicenna Study Group.

David C. Reisman
Chicago
27 October 2002

Note on the Transliteration of Arabic and Persian

The transliteration follows the rules of the *Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft* for both Arabic and Persian, with the exception of *aw* and *ay* for dipthongs instead of *au* and *ai*, and *á* instead of *ā* for the *alif maqṣūra*. The Persian *-h* (representing the *tā' marbūṭa*) is retained, and the Persian *iḍāfah* is represented as *-i* or *-yi*.

BEFORE AVICENNA

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CHAPTER ONE

AVICENNA'S RECEPTION OF ARISTOTELIAN MODAL SYLLOGISTICS: A STUDY BASED ON CONVERSION RULES AND THE *BARBARA* PROBLEMATIC*

Asad Q. Ahmed

Introduction

Chapters 8–22 of the first book of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*[1] deal with his theory of modal syllogisms. These sections have exercised historians of philosophy for quite some time due to what seem to be glaring inconsistencies in Aristotle's account. Here I present some contributions made by Avicenna in trying to find an interpretation of the theory amenable to Aristotle's conclusions. The first section offers a short account of Aristotle's conversion rules and a summary of the modalities of possibility and necessity. One of the main purposes of this section is to serve as a backdrop for comparative excursions (which I leave mostly to the notes). I offer in the notes of this section some aspects of the medieval Latin tradition[2] as it relates to the subject matter. I also sketch some comparisons with Avicenna which I develop more fully in the latter half of this paper.[3] The second

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* I dedicate this article to CJ.

[1] I use the following translations of the *Prior Analytics* (hereafter *AP*; all references below are to book I unless otherwise noted): *Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, tr. Robin Smith (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); *Prior Analytics*, tr. A. Jenkinson in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1:39–113. I also use the text and translation provided in *Aristotle: The Categories, On Interpretation, and Prior Analytics*, ed./tr. H. Cooke and H. Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) [hereafter Cooke/Tredennick].

[2] For this I am almost wholly indebted to Henrik Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000).

[3] My discussion of Avicenna is based mostly on the *Naǧāt* throughout this paper; see *Kitāb an-Naǧāt fī l-ḥikma al-manṭiqīya wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿīya wa-l-ilāhīya*, ed. M. Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Ǧadīda, 1985). For certain topics I also refer to Avicenna's *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq 4: al-Qiyās*, ed. S. Zāʾid (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qawmī,1383/1964) [hereafter *Šifāʾ*] and Avicenna, *Livre des directives et remarques (Kitāb al-Išārāt wa l-Tanbīhāt)*, tr. A.-M. Goichon (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1951) [hereafter Goichon].

section introduces the famous case of the two *Barbara*s and a corresponding problem found in first figure syllogisms composed of a problematic and an assertoric premise. In the third section, I expound Avicenna's conception of modal propositions with regard to his syllogistics.[4] Here I deal with Avicenna's multilateral readings of modals and set forth conversion rules essential to understanding his modal syllogistic. Finally, in the fourth section, I present Avicenna's construal of the problems presented by the Aristotelian tradition which I introduce in the second section.

Notation

I use → for implication, ↔ for mutual implication and, in accordance with the medieval tradition, I use "a" for universal affirmatives, "e" for universal negatives. For particular affirmatives, I use "i"; "o" is used for particular negatives. AaB is to be read as "A applies to all B";[5] AiB means "A applies to some B," etc. P stands for possibility, C, for contingency, N for necessity, I for impossibility (I discuss these modal operators below). Other symbols are explained as they are introduced.

I. *Modal Propositions and Conversions in Aristotle*[6]

I assume that the reader is already familiar with Aristotle's non-modal syllogistics—the three figures and the three main methods of

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[4] For a general account of the modalities in Avicenna, see A. Bäck, "Avicenna's Conception of the Modalities," *Vivarium* 30.2 (1992), 217–256. See C. Ehrig-Eggert, "Zur Analyse von Modalaussagen bei Avicenna und Averroes," *Deutscher Orientalistentag, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Suppl. VI*, ed. W. Rollig (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985), 195–199; and J.I. Saranyana, "Moglichkeit und Notwendigkeit bei Ibn Sina (Avicenna)," in *Orientalische Kultur und Europisches Mittelalter*, ed. A. Zimmermann and I. Craemer-Ruegenberg (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985) 207–218. For a theologico-philosophical discussion of modalities, see A. Hyman, "Aristotle, Algazali and Avicenna on Necessity, Potentiality and Possibility," in *Florilegium Columbianum: Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, ed. K.-L. Selig and R. Somerville (New York: Italica Press, 1987), 73–89.

[5] εἰ γὰρ τὸ A κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ B, *AP*, 25b39.

[6] For an in-depth study of this topic, see R. Patterson, "Conversion Principles and the Basis of Aristotle's Modal Logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 11.2 (1990), 151–172.

proof.[7] The familiar rules of conversion of assertoric premises are as follow:

$$AaB \rightarrow BiA$$
$$AiB \leftrightarrow BiA$$
$$AeB \leftrightarrow BeA$$

I mention the assertorics only to point out that for Avicenna their conversion is not as simple as one finds in Aristotle. The complexity of his conversion rules point to his multilateral approach to modalities, as is shown in the third section. Averroes' "Question IV"[8] on conversions offers a brief summary of Avicenna's contentions against Aristotle (the details of these contentions are in the notes and in the last two sections below):[9]

> Avicenna has doubts against the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] when he says that a particular affirmative contingent [proposition] converts with a contingent [particular affirmative proposition].[10] [He also disagrees with him with respect to the following claims:] that a necessary particular affirmative [proposition] converts with a necessary [particular affirmative proposition];[11] that a universal contingent [affirmative proposition]

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[7] I.e., *ad impossibile*, conversion, *ekthesis*. On *ekthesis*, see R. Smith, "What is Aristotelian Ecthesis?" *History and Philosophy of Logic* 3 (1982), 113–127.

[8] "Question IV—de conversionibus" (folio 363) in *Quaesita in libros logicae Aristotelis* in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Cordubiensis commentariis I* (Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1550), 361–379.

[9] *Avicenna dubitat contra Philosophum, quando dixit quod particularis affirmativa contingens convertatur contingens, et quod necessaria particularis affirmativa convertatur necessaria, et quod universalis contingens convertatur particularis. Et similiter dum ait quod negativa de inesse convertatur universalis, et contradicit suo sermoni per materias, nam ipse ait quod dum dicimus aliquis homo scribit est contingens, cum eius conversa non sit contingens. Et per idem etiam ostendit necessaria non convertatur necessaria, neque universalis contingens particularis.*

[10] *AP*, 25a37–41: "When it comes to possible premises . . . the situation with respect to conversion will be the same in all these cases with the affirmatives. For if it is possible for A to belong to every or to some B, then it will be possible for B to belong to some A." Avicenna contests this claim in *Naǧāt*, 30.

[11] *AP*, 25a27: "It will also be the same way in the case of necessary premises: the universally privative premise converts universally, while each kind of affirmative premise converts partially. . . . If A belongs to every or to some B of necessity, then it is necessary for B to belong to some A." Avicenna contests this view at *Naǧāt*, 30:

> The universal affirmative necessary [proposition] converts into a particular affirmative [proposition] as in the preceding account concerning the absolute [propositions]. However, it is commonly believed that its converse must be a necessary [proposition]. For if it were an absolute [proposition], its converse—included in the primary rules [of conversion]—would be an absolute [proposition]. So, some B would be A absolutely; [however], it was [the case that]

converts with a particular [contingent affirmative proposition].[12] [Avicenna disagrees] similarly when [Aristotle] says that a negative assertoric [universal proposition] converts with a universal [negative assertoric proposition].[13]

For Avicenna, modal and assertoric propositions may yield each other through conversions depending on how one construes the proposition.

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every [B was A] by necessity. In reality, it is not necessary that the converse of an absolute [proposition] be an absolute [proposition] without having any necessity in it. For this reason this [common] account does not follow. The correct [opinion] is that the converse of a necessary [proposition] can sometimes be absolute, as your statement, "Every writer is a man." Then you say, "Some men are writers;" and this is not in virtue of the [kind] of necessity which you want. Rather, if it is [by necessity], it is so in virtue of another necessity which is proper for everything that is contingent (*mumkin*).

[12] *AP*, 25a41. Avicenna's response is in *Naǧāt*, 30.

[13] *AP*, 25a7. Avicenna's response is in *Naǧāt*, 27–29. He writes:

It is commonly believed that the negative universal affirmative [proposition] converts into [something] like itself [henceforth *miṯla nafsihā* in this context will be translated "while retaining its original values (of affirmation and negation and truth and falsity)"]. For if we say, "No B is A," "No A is B" is true. Otherwise, let "No A is B" be false and let its contradiction be true, namely, "Some A is B." [Then] let us suppose that "some" to be something fixed/determined and let it be J. So, that thing which is J is both A and B. So *that* B [predicated of J] is A. However, [it was given as a premise that] no B is A; this is an absurdity. The truth with regard to this is that this conversion is correct not for everything that is considered (*yuʿaddu*) among absolute [propositions] but only for one in which the condition of the soundness of the joining of necessity is not a time/period which varies in individual [cases], but a concept other than time. An example of this is that the condition with which the joining of the modality of necessity is correct is the condition "for as long as the subject is described by that which was posited along with it." [It is] like our statement "Everything that is moving (*intaqala*) is changing." For if you join with it the modality of necessity, it is necessary that you utter (*an taqūla bi-lisānika*) or say in your mind "for as long as it is described as moving." Sometimes, it is not true to say "as long as its essence exists." In the likes of such absolute [propositions], this conversion is a necessary consequence. And in their likes, if [the universal negative] (*lā šayʾ*) is true, then the [particular affirmative] (*baʿḍ*) is false. Or the [particular affirmative] is true and the [universal negative] is false. [In this case, there is no] need to posit time itself as a condition; rather, [they are true or false] absolutely, [not in some designated period of reality]. Examples of these [propositions] are used in the sciences if they are more specific than necessary. . . . If it is not [as we have explained], then it is not necessary that the universal negative absolute [proposition] convert like the examples which Aristotle mentions among which the negation [of the proposition] obtains for some time, as in our statement "No animal is moving by will," i.e., at the time of its rest; [another] is our statement "No animal is sleeping." [Aristotle] takes these and their likes as the negations of absolute [propositions]. [Such propositions, however,] do not convert at all.

Returning to Aristotle, the rules of conversion of possibility are first mentioned at *AP*, 25a38. Aristotle says that affirmative possibility premises convert like the assertoric premises. The following rules are accepted:

$$P(AaB) \rightarrow P(BiA)$$
$$P(AiB) \leftrightarrow P(BiA)$$

In the same passage, Aristotle distinguishes among different senses of possibility: that which is not necessary, that which is necessary, and that which is potential.[14] In chapter 13, he says that that which is necessary is said to be possible only equivocally.[15] For we can say that it is possible for man to belong to no horse. In this case, the predication always fails to obtain and, for this reason, it is said to fail only possibly because possibility can be said to fail to obtain for some time.[16] This kind of universal negative possible premise converts with a universal negative possible premise of the same sort: P (as N) (AeB) ↔ P (as N) (BeA). This is so because the two terms are necessary and not accidental.[17] Insofar as possibility is merely lack of impossibility, it comes out to include necessity in certain cases. At least, this is what Aristotle seems to be saying at *De Interpretatione* 13, 22a26–30, where he explains that something is not possible if and only if it is impossible or necessarily fails to obtain.[18] In the same text, at 13, 22b20, he says the possible is that which is not necessary (in ordinary discourse). I will call the former possibility "possibility" (P), and the latter "contingency" (C) in accordance with the literature.[19] Thus:

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[14] *AP*, 25a36.

[15] *AP*, 32a20: Τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμωνύμως ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγομεν.

[16] *AP*, 25b3–11.

[17] In Quaesitum IV, Averroes explains that a term is necessary if it always stands for its subject (such as an eternal existent or a natural species), accidental if it stands for it sometimes, sometimes not. For example, "white" is an accidental term; "man" is not. Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics*, 32.

[18] See grouping II in Jenkinson, 35; see also *De Int.* 22a12–15: καὶ ταύτας οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, δυνατόν—οὐ δυνατόν, ἐνδεχόμενον—οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀδύνατον—οὐκ ἀδύνατον.... The negation of ἐνδεχόμενον implies the lack of contingency (hence some sort of positive or negative necessity). The negation of δυνατόν implies impossibility (ἀδύνατον). One may deny the contingency of x and still uphold the truth of x, but one may not deny the possibility of x and still uphold its truth.

[19] See J. Hintikka, *Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality* (Oxford:

Fig. 1. Summary of C, P, N, I

N C_1 = Avicenna's   I
                            mumkin ḫāṣṣī

_____   _____   _____

                    not − N and not − I

P = C_2 = Avicenna's *mumkin ʿāmmī*

There are two kinds of contingencies which convey the true sense
of the modal. The first kind is what obtains for the most part, as
in man's turning gray. For, given the existence of a man, one says
"It is possible that he turn gray."[20] This is possibility in terms of
potentiality and just falls short of necessity because, as Aristotle
explains, a man does not exist forever. But when there is a man,
the statement is true either necessarily or for the most part.[21] Aristotle
says that such possibilities do not convert as universal negatives.[22] In
the same passage, he allows for the conversion of such natural con-
tingencies with respect to particular negative propositions. So, pos-
sibility as a general rule or potentiality fails with respect to Ce
conversions, but Co conversions go through.[23] The second kind of
contingency is that which does not incline in either the direction of
realization or non-realization. In chapter 3, Aristotle argues for the
conversion of such propositions as (White e Coat).

    The promise to give an explanation for the failure of this uni-
versal negative conversion in the case of potentialities is not fulfilled
in chapter 13 where the topic is taken up again. So the argument

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Clarendon Press, 1973), 29, diagrams iv and v in particular. Kilwardby's summary
(apud Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics*, 23, n. 24) explains clearly Aristotle's divisions of
possibility. See Figure 1 above. Note that Kilwardby's C_2 is Hintikka's P. See also
De Int. 21a34−38 where Aristotle seems to have different concepts of possibility
in mind: δυνατόν, often translated "possibility" and ἐνδεχόμενον, translated as
"contingency."
    [20] *AP*, 32b3.
    [21] Such cases, according to Avicenna, may also be the fifth kind of necessity; see
below.
    [22] *AP*, 25b14−19.
    [23] See *AP*, XVII for discussion of this topic, and R. Patterson, *Aristotle's Modal
Logic: Essence and Entailment in the Organon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 26.

remains somewhat incomplete.[24] In chapter 13,[25] Aristotle speaks about another kind of conversion peculiar to contingency premises. This is what W.D. Ross calls a complementary conversion. Aristotle argues that in the case of possibility that inclines either way, the following conversion rules must obtain:

$$C(AaB) \leftrightarrow C(AeB)$$
$$C(AiB) \leftrightarrow C(AoB)$$

Those particulars which fall under the universals will also follow, as in

$$C(AaB) \rightarrow C(AoB)$$
$$C(AeB) \rightarrow C(AiB)^{26}$$

The proof for these conversion rules is very simple. Aristotle argues, for example, that if possibility means neither necessary nor impossible, then $C(A) \rightarrow$ [not N and not I]$(A) \rightarrow C(not\text{-}A)$. Similar proofs would apply in the other cases. P, insofar as it may be N, does not allow such conversions.

In the case of necessity premises, the rules of conversion are exactly the same as those for assertoric premises:

$$N(AaB) \rightarrow N(BiA)$$
$$N(AeB) \leftrightarrow N(BeA)$$
$$N(AiB) \leftrightarrow N(BiA)$$

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[24] Avicenna includes the first type of contingencies among his fifth type of necessities and the second type of contingencies among his fourth type of necessities. Patterson, op. cit., 26, says that Aristotle allows for the conversion of Pe but not Ce. However, he argues that the same reason may be applied for Pe conversions as for Ce. He uses the premise, P(no man is white) which would fail to convert to P(no white is man); but there are some white things which are necessarily men (Socrates, etc.) But, this is to assume that the import of P premises is possibility for time *t* at time *t*. Or it is to assume Socrates' existence *in re*; or it is to assume necessity of the present and to argue on its basis that this contingency statement assigns possibility for the present. Furthermore, Patterson overlooks the fact that he is giving an example of P insofar as it is C. But P can also be N, according to Aristotle. For a brief discussion of necessity of the present, see note 27 below.

[25] *AP*, 32a30–35.

[26] This conversion is not explicit but may be inferred from Aristotle's arguments thus far.

These conversion rules are found in a short paragraph of chapter 3 (25a26–35). I have found no substantial discussion in the *Prior Analytics* about different kinds of necessities comparable to the kind we find in Avicenna.[27]

II. *Two Problems*

The much discussed case of the two Barbaras,[28] which occur at *AP*, I,9, is as follows. Aristotle rejects:

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[27] Necessity of the present, in Aristotle, is assigned to present events that simply occur in a way analogous to but not identical with the necessity assigned to past events of the same nature. So, if it is the case that a man walk now, then it is not possible that he not walk now; therefore, it is necessary. This seems to be Avicenna's fourth N. One has to be careful not to confuse this view with Determinism or with the Principle of Plenitude (whereby all possibilities are at some point realized). Nor does this doctrine state that it is only necessary now as I speak that I speak. Necessity of the Present is not limited to now, but to any event the possibility of which is *its* now. In other words, necessity is a term relevant to events occurring at any time. The moment of the necessity and of the truth of the statement that it is necessary are identical. In symbolic notation, we would have:

Necessity of the Present: $pt \rightarrow N(tpt)$ (read: if p at t, then it is necessary that at t that p at t, and so on)
Necessity of the Past: $pt \rightarrow [All(t_1) > t]$ $[N(t_1 \, pt)]$
Determinism: $pt \rightarrow All \, (t_n) \, N[t_n \, pt]$
Where t=time now; p=any proposition

See J. Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time," in *Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies in the History of Modal Theories*, ed. S. Knutilla (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1981), 57–72, and C. Kirwan, "Aristotle on the Necessity of the Present," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1986), 167–187. Sarah Waterlow uses necessity of the present to explain Aristotle's claim that whatever is always the case is necessarily the case in her *Passage and Possibility: A Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), chapters 1 and 2. See *AP*, I, 4–6 for a discussion of *per se* (καθ' αὐτό) propositions in Aristotle. Kilwardby and Albert the Great seem to base their *per se primo et secundo modo* necessity propositions on these passages (Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics*, 30–31). The conversion of necessary propositions was problematic for Avicenna and other medieval Arabic/Latin logicians. For example, N(man a writer) → N(writer i man) does not seem to be true. Kilwardby's explanation, following Averroes, was to divide necessity propositions into *per se* and *per accidens*. *Per accidens* necessity propositions have a necessary connection between the term and substratum in virtue of some inseparable but inessential property. One may also try to explain the validity of this conversion as logicians in Kilwardby's time did, by reading "writer" as a rigid designator, not as a suppositum "writer." Averroes probably gets his inspiration from Avicenna. Accidentally necessary propositions, according to Averroes, do not convert. For a full discussion, see Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics*, ch. 2. In reference to note 53 in ibid., it is very likely that the example, N (man a writer) is taken from Avicenna and not through a mistranslation of *AP* into Arabic. See *Šifā'*, 98.15 and 99.3: *ba'ḍu mā yūṣafu bi-annahū kātibun huwa insānun bi-ḍ-ḍarūra.*

[28] See R. Patterson, "The Case of the Two Barbaras," *Oxford Studies in Ancient*

(AaB) N(BaC) → N(AaC)

He argues by *ad impossibile*; let us assume that the conclusion is true. Then, take the second premise along with the conclusion in a syllogism,

N(AaC) N(BaC)

The second premise converts to N(CiB). This, along with N(AaC), yields N(AiB). However, we assumed in the original premise that (AaB). The latter is an assertoric premise and carries no necessity along with it. For if one says that every man is sleeping, one is just as entitled to say that no man is sleeping. The conclusion N(AiB) asserts that it is necessary that some men be sleeping. This contradicts the original premise. Therefore, the contradiction of the conclusion assumed to be true must be true. In other words, it is not necessary that AaC. Aristotle accepts (AaC), an assertoric proposition, as the conclusion of the original syllogism. So,

(AaB) N(BaC) → (AaC)

Aristotle argues that in a *Barbara* constituted of a necessary and an assertoric premise, the conclusion is necessary only when the major premise is necessary. According to this rule, he accepts the following syllogism:

N(AaB) (BaC) → N(AaC)

Let us now return to the *Barbara* with a minor necessary premise and an assertoric conclusion.

(AaB) N(BaC) → (AaC) (accepted)

Let us assume (AaC) to be true and use it along with the second premise to see what conclusion we reach. (AaC) converts to (CiA)

Philosophy, 7 (1989) 1–40, and P. Thom, "The Two Barbaras," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 12 (1991), 135–149. The latter offers good summaries of recent attempts at giving a formal and consistent account of this Aristotelian problem. On a problem concerning the modes of mixed syllogisms, see A. Elamrani-Jamal "Ibn Rušd et les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 5 (1995), 51–74.

to yield the following first figure syllogism with a necessary major premise:

N(BaC) (CiA) → N(BiA)

N(BiA) converts to N(AiB). And now we have a problem in that N(AiB) is incompatible with (AaB) which was assumed to be a true premise in the original syllogism. It turns out that the argument used to reject the *Barbara* with the minor necessary and major assertoric yielding a necessary conclusion must apply against the accepted *Barbara* as well. In other words, the proof used to reject

(AaB) N(BaC) → N(AaC)

can be used to reject

(AaB) N(BaC) → (AaC)

Should both Barbaras be accepted? Rejected? What is the importance of the major premise?[29]

One famous attempt at explaining the problem is to distinguish between *de dicto* and *de re* necessity statements.[30] *De dicto* truths are

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[29] See Cooke/Tredennick, 241, n. c, and 190, for remarks about Aristotle's confusion over modals.

[30] Attempts to give a coherent account of Aristotle's theory have multiplied over the years. See A. Becker, *Die Aristotelische Theorie der Moglichkeitsschlusse: eine logisch-philologische Untersuchung der Kapitel 13–22 von Aristoteles' Analytica priora I* (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1931); J. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); S. McCall, *Aristotle's Modal Syllogisms* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1963); N. Rescher, "Aristotle's Theory of Modal Syllogisms and its Interpretation," in *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Karl A. Popper*, ed. M. Bunge (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 152–177; I. Angelleli, "The Aristotelian Modal Syllogistic in Modern Modal Logic," in *Konstruktionen versus Positionen: Beitr. zur Diskussion um d. konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie (Paul Lorenzen zum 60. Geburtstag)*, ed. K. Lorenz (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), 176–215; Patterson, *Aristotle's Modal Logic*. Theophrastus rejected the idea that a necessary and assertoric proposition can yield a necessary conclusion. He insists that the conclusion has the weaker of the two modalities (*peiorem* rule); see R. Smith, "Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 27–65. The distinction *de re/ de dicto* goes back at least as far as Abelard; see Patterson, ibid., 6–11; and W. Kneale, "Modality *de re* and *de dicto*," in *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science*, Proceedings of the International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 624.

those that are so just in virtue of the terms of the proposition, such as "all bachelors are unmarried." *De re* truths are true in virtue of the *res* to which the term refers as in "All white things on the mat are cats" (where all white things on the mat are indeed cats).[31] In fact, both these propositions are necessarily true, the first in virtue of the concepts involved and the second in virtue of the substratum of the subject term. For in cases where all white things on the mat are indeed cats, this is a necessary truth, because all cats are necessarily cats. This is not necessary, as is obvious, in virtue of the terms since being a white thing on the mat does not imply being a cat. In symbolic notation, the difference is clear:

De dicto N (x)[B(x) → A(x)]
De re (x) (B(x) → N[A(x)])[32]

Now, whereas the *de re* reading of the terms allows for Aristotle's argument to go through, the *de dicto* does not. However, a *de re* necessity does not convert, whereas a *de dicto* necessity does by the simple T-rule of modern modal logic:

(p → q) → (Np → Nq)

A similar problem arises regarding syllogisms consisting of a problematic and an assertoric premise if the *Barbara* rule is accepted. Aristotle accepts the following syllogisms:

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[31] Patterson, *Aristotle's Modal Logic*, 11, etc.

[32] Such *de re* truths may be at least of two kinds, according to Averroes. In one case, the subject term may be accidental, as in "Every walking being is an animal" when this is in fact the case. This statement is necessary *per accidens* and *de inesse per se*. The other case is where the subject term is necessary ("Every animal is white"). This is a *de inesse per se* proposition, but not necessary. *De dicto* necessary propositions seem to be those called *de inesse simpliciter* by Averroes. This is where both terms are accidental but are connected in a necessary fashion. Finally, propositions necessary *per se* are those where both terms are necessary and have a necessary connection with each other, thus implying also a necessary connection between the substratum and the predicate (animal a man). Incidentally, it seems that Patterson's weak necessity is a kind of *de re* necessity of the *de inesse per se*/necessary *per accidens* type; his strong necessity seems to be necessity *per se* (Patterson, *Aristotle's Modal Logic*, 11–14). So I have my doubts about whether Patterson's interpretation is at all novel, other than the fact that it points out essential and accidental relations and their importance to Aristotelian logic (and therefore, the importance of his *Metaphysics* to his logic).

C(AaB) (BaC) → C(AaC)
(AaB) C(BaC) → C(AaC)[33]

Aristotle claims that the first of these two is complete. Let us grant him that for the moment, assuming that he is reading his major premise in some manner that would allow the possibility conclusion to follow. We must assume—expecting Aristotle to be consistent— that he used a similar method of reading his major premise in the case of the two *Barbara*s with a necessary and an assertoric premise. But, then, why does he argue that a *Barbara* with a minor necessary premise yields an assertoric conclusion, but that one with a possible premise does not? Was it not the modality of the major premise that decided the modality of the conclusion?

For the second syllogism above, Aristotle argues through *ad impossibile* and supposition in chapter 15. The proof runs as follows:

1. (AaB) C(BaC) → C(AaC)
2. For suppose not-C (AaC) → Impossible (AaC) → N(AoC)
3. Suppose C(BaC) to obtain at some time (for this is false, but not impossible) → (BaC)
4. Therefore, N(AoC) (BaC) → N(AoB)
5. N(AoB) → not (AaB)
6. But AaB → C(AaC).[34]

Now, Aristotle says that the conclusion of this syllogism (5) would be N(AoB).[35] However, earlier (31b37) he established by means of terms that the conclusion of this mixed third figure syllogism is (AoB). So, already we seem to have an inconsistency.[36] Accepting N(AoB),

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[33] *AP*, 34a34.
[34] Throughout this passage, Aristotle uses δυνατός (potential) rather than ἐνδεχόμενος or ἐνδέχεσθαι. If we read potentiality as "that which stops short of necessity" such as the graying of every man, then it is a kind of contingency, and the proof is problematic. If we read it as potentiality in the sense of "having some potential," then it does go through. For every man necessarily has the potential for graying.
[35] *Bocardo* (third figure), 32a4–5.
[36] See Cooke/Tredennick, 270, n. b, for a possible compromise. See notes c and d in the same work for an elaboration of the difficulties associated with this proof. Avicenna, as we shall see, is more wary than Aristotle in giving a proof of this syllogism. But, I suspect that he also fails to satisfy all of Cooke/Tredennick's concerns. For one, he also does not take into account the negative value of the original

we have a contradiction to the given premise, (AaB). So, Aristotle's proof may work. However, if we adhere to 31b37 and recall that Aristotle does allow two contraries (and therefore a universal and a particular contradictory that falls under that universal's contrary) to be compatible in his earlier proof of the *Barbara*s, then the argument given here fails.[37] It is obvious, then, that there are some underlying tensions which need resolution. How does one resolve these problems? Avicenna supplies some answers to these questions; his suggestions are outlined in the fourth section.

III. *Avicenna: Modal Propositions and Conversion Rules*

Well aware of the ambiguities in Aristotle's modal logic and of the controversy surrounding it, Avicenna is keen to give a full account of his understanding of modalities within his logical works. The *Naǧāt* has a thorough exposition of the modalities of possibility and necessity. An equally important and meticulous account of the meaning of assertoric propositions is also given.

Possibility for Avicenna can be divided under two heads: possibility according to the common account and possibility according to the consensus of the "specialists." In the common account (henceforth PA), PA(A) ↔ not-Impossible (A). Avicenna says that in this account, necessity is just a species of possibility. This seems to be Aristotle's P.[38] There are, then, only two categories of relation for those who subscribe to this theory: possibility and impossibility.[39] The second kind of possibility (henceforth CA) has the following rule of equivalence:

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minor premise, although he does so with the contradiction of the assumed conclusion of the original syllogism. The full proof is to be found in section IV below.

[37] In certain instances, as in the proof of the necessity *Barbara*s, Aristotle would allow both of the following propositions to be true: "All horses are sleeping;" "no horse is sleeping." It should also be pointed out that in order for both statements to be true, there has to be some reference to time, but Aristotle views universals, at least at *AP*, 34b7–18, without temporal reference. However, if the lack of temporal reference is to lead one to assume the two statements to hold for different periods, then indeed the two contraries/contradictories are true. At *Šifā'*, 38, Avicenna wants the reader to keep in mind the reference to temporality. For if we disregard it, two universals may be true (i.e., we may assume both to be true for different periods). If we keep in mind reference to time (i.e., the same time) two contradictories may not be true (*Šifā'*, 39).

[38] See Figure 1 above.

[39] *Naǧāt*, 56.

CA(A) ↔ not-N(A) & not-I(A)

Such a possibility is Aristotelian C. For those who read possibility in this sense, there are three modal relations: possibility, impossibility, and necessity. Avicenna goes on to say that impossibility is just the necessity of non-existence. He points out the following problems with PA when it is confused with CA, i.e., when the common stock of people uses one concept confusing it for the other:[40]

PA(A) → PA (not-A)
PA(A) → N(A)
So, Necessary(A) ↔ Possible(not-A)

Also:

Necessary(A) → not-Possible(A)
Not-Possible(A) → I(A)
So, N(A) → I(A)

It is obvious that CA is Aristotle's C, a possibility that may just as well obtain as not obtain. PA, on the other hand, is ambiguous as it may be read either as Aristotle's pseudo-necessity, i.e., the application of possibility to things necessary, or as Aristotle's P (possibility in the sense of not-impossible, which coincides with the first part of this disjunction anyway).

Avicenna now turns to complementary conversions and, just like Aristotle, allows it in the case of CA. However, in the case of PA, he contends that complementary conversion would lead to a serious problem. For if P(A) ↔ P(not-A), then if P(A) ↔ N(A), then N(A) ↔ P(not-A). And this is absurd in that it says that that which has the possibility of not being must be. Avicenna does not allow complementary conversions for possibilities as potentialities and as genera of necessities.[41] Avicenna discusses the following rules of conversion:[42]

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[40] *Naǧāt*, 56–58.
[41] *Naǧāt*, 66.
[42] *Naǧāt*, 66–67.

> CAe complementary conversion allowed
> CA(AeB) ↔ CA(BeA) (rejected by example, "C(no man is a writer)" but "not-C(no writer is a man)"
> CA (AeB) → CA (BoA) (rejected; terms: man, writer)
> CA(AaB) → PA (BiA) (accepted in that PA, when not N, is not-I)
> PA(AaB) → PA (BiA)
> Proof: *reductio* not-PA (BiA) →N(BeA) → N(AeB); but PA (AaB); therefore PA (BiA)

However, this is not a valid proof for CA (AaB) → CA (BiA) because:

$$\text{Not-CA (BiA)} \rightarrow \text{N(BeA) v N(BaA) v N(BiA)}$$

The only thing that implies just N (BeA) is PA insofar as not-I, i.e., not-PA(BiA) → I(BiA) → N(BeA)

> PA(AiB) ↔ PA(BiA) (same proof as above)
> PA(AeB) → PA (BoA) (same proof as above)

Avicenna recognizes six kinds of necessary propositions.[43] They are the following:

> 1. Necessary for as long as the essence of the subject exists, the essence being such as to exist forever. An example is "God is living."
> 2. Necessary for as long as the essence of the subject exists, the essence not always existing. An example is "Man is an animal."

Both 1 and 2 are *de dicto* necessities and can be written as N[(x)(B(x) → A(x)]. Below it is shown that Avicenna describes a necessary predication which calls for a *de re* reading. However, it might be possible to give 1 and 2 the following *de re* reading where A and B are necessary terms, i.e., necessarily predicated of x, so implying each other:

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[43] *Naǧāt*, 58–59.

$$(x) \ [A(x) \ \rightarrow \ N(B)(x)]$$

This gloss seems identical to Patterson's strong necessity and to Averroes' necessity *per se* where, in the case of the latter, the subject always exists or is some species or genus and the terms are necessary, not accidental. It is also reminiscent of Kaplan's and Plantinga's efforts to reduce *de re* truths to *de dicto* truths.[44]

    3. Necessary for as long as the subject is described in a certain manner. An example is "Everything white cuts through the air for sight."

This is a *de dicto* necessity with both terms accidental, producing a necessary connection in virtue of themselves and not the *supposita*.[45]

    4. Necessary for as long as the predicate obtains. An example is "Zayd is walking."

This seems to be necessity of the present with a necessary subject and an accidental predicate. Avicenna also alludes to (4i) "Everything walking is a man." However, he does not seem to distinguish between the two. In the latter case, the subject term is accidental and the predicate term necessary. Unlike 4, this is a *de re* necessity.

    5. Necessary for a certain designated period of time. An example is "The moon eclipses."

This seems to be the necessity of nature for a specific period of time.

    6. Necessary for a certain unfixed period of time. An example is "Every man breathes."

This is the necessity of nature for an undesignated period with a time that is specified for each individual to whom the predicate applies.
  Avicenna says that the first two kinds of necessities are similar to

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[44] B. Brody, "*De re* and *de dicto* Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to an Aristotelian Essentialism," *Philosophy Quarterly of Israel*, 2.1–2 (1972), 117–136.
[45] This is what Averroes would call a *de inesse simpliciter* proposition.

each other in that they obtain for as long as the essence of the subject obtains. The last four kinds of necessities are in virtue of a certain condition of the subject not proceeding from its definition. The first two can be said to be necessities *per se*, the third and the fourth *per accidens*, the fifth and sixth, natural necessities.

Avicenna says that the universal negative necessary proposition converts with a universal negative necessary proposition.[46] However, in the case of universal affirmative necessary propositions, the converse need not be a particular affirmative necessary proposition. Universal affirmative necessary propositions can sometimes yield assertoric particular affirmative propositions. He uses an example, "N(every writer is a man)" whose converse is "Some men are writers" to prove his case. "Some men are writers may be necessary," he says, "but this is not the [kind of] necessity you want."[47] It is the kind of necessity applied to all possibilities (perhaps, contingent facts). Again, the particular affirmative necessary propositions need not yield necessary converses. Rules of N conversion:

$$N(AaB) \rightarrow N(BiA) \text{ but also, } BiA$$
$$N(AeB) \leftrightarrow N(BeA) \text{ (proof by } reductio \text{ and } ekthesis)$$
$$N(AiB) \rightarrow N(BiA) \text{ but also } BiA$$

Finally, Avicenna accepts two manners of looking at assertoric propositions.[48] He claims that assertoric propositions can be, according to Theophrastus, those where there is no explicit modality mentioned. The proposition may or may not be necessary according to the last four types of necessities mentioned. Such propositions will allow complementary conversions (e.g., AeB ↔ AaB) as there is no guaranteed necessity in them. On the other hand, we find Alexander's account where assertoric propositions must be read in accordance with one of the last four types of necessities mentioned. Let us call Theophrastus' manner of looking at assertoric propositions AT and Alexander's manner AA.[49]

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[46] *Naǧāt*, 65–66.
[47] *Naǧāt*, 66.
[48] *Naǧāt*, 60–62.
[49] Avicenna's presentation of the views of the Alexander and Themistius is found in the *Naǧāt*, 60–1.

Important rules of assertoric conversions are as follows.[50] AeB ↔ BeA[51] is allowed only for that kind of assertoric proposition in which there is no specific and different time designated for the individual subjects for the proposition to be necessary.[52] The conversion is true when there is no reference to time, for example, (horse e man). The terms are mutually exclusive *per se*. An example of an assertoric e conversion which fails due to temporal reference is: "No animal moves by will" (i.e., at its time of rest). This proposition does not imply that nothing which moves by will is an animal.[53] We should bear in mind that here the converse is a proposition relating the substratum of the accidental subject term to a necessary predicate, whereas in the original statement we have a necessary subject term related to an accidental predicate. One wonders if this is a fair standard of conversion to begin with. Either one must allow some reference to time for the original statement to be true. In this case, the converse should also have a temporal reference (otherwise it fails only by homonymy). Or one must read the predicate in the original proposition as a rigid designator (as one does automatically for the converse when that predicate becomes the subject). In the latter case, both propositions would be false. For assertoric propositions, Avicenna admits the following conversions:

> a → i but also a → Ni example: (writer a man) → N(man i writer)[54]
> i ↔ i but also Ni

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[50] *Naǧāt*, 63–65.

[51] *Šifāʾ*, 75–77.

[52] Aristotle, *De Int.* 7, 17b23–25.

[53] However, with reference to the same time, both propositions would be true and the conversion would go through. However, Avicenna points out (as Aristotle says about contingencies which incline both ways) that such propositions are not used in demonstrative sciences.

[54] Avicenna proves the assertoric to necessary conversion by *ekthesis*. The common (*mašhūr*) proof by *ad impossibile* is problematic, he explains, because it involves the conversion of e propositions which are themselves not always convertible (see above). *Naǧāt*, 64; *Šifāʾ*, 88; and Goichon, 166: "Car souvent le prédicat n'est pas nécessaire pour le sujet, tandis que le sujet est nécessaire pour le prédicat." Avicenna seems to have a happy balance of essentialist and non-essentialist tendencies. Conversions of assertoric to necessary types require theorizing about essences and *per se* relation of terms. Such conversions would not always be true for Avicenna (if, for example, the terms are "white" and "book").

This brief exposition of possible, necessary, and assertoric propositions has prepared the way for a presentation of Avicenna's solutions to the two problems I outline above.[55]

IV. *Avicenna's Solutions*[56]

In the case of the two *Barbara*s, Avicenna's defense of Aristotle seems to lie in his peculiar manner of reading the major premise.

> N(AaB) = Everything described by B, or is the subject of B or is B at some time, necessarily or not necessarily, always or not always, this thing is A at all times or at no time (depending on a or e).[57]

This definition can be written in symbolic logic as:

$$(x) \ [B(x) \ \rightarrow \ N(A)(x)]$$

Such a construal of the necessary major premise certainly does allow Aristotle's conclusions to follow through. For if the major premise says that whatever is B (in any way) is necessarily A, then the minor premise can have any modality attached to it and still yield a necessary conclusion (provided the minor premise obtains). However, in the case where the minor premise is necessary, this definition is of no help in yielding a necessary conclusion. It is read as A is predicated of whatever B is in fact predicated and B is predicated necessarily of C, then A is still predicated *simpliciter* of C. In fact, the term B is not even important. It could be an accidental or essential predicate for C. What is important for the conclusion to be necessary is that B should have a necessary relation with A and must be

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[55] Avicenna's account of conversions is very meticulous. He takes into consideration several different ways of looking at a proposition and the proof methods for conversion before settling on its validity. In many cases, there are multilateral judgments on a proposition's convertibility. I am currently undertaking a full study of these conversion rules as found in the *Naǧāt* and *Šifā'*. What I offer here is more or less a gloss to give a sense of Avicenna's position and to prepare the reader for the next section.

[56] What follows is based on Avicenna's discussion of syllogisms (assertoric and mixed) in *Naǧāt*, 33–44. The solutions to the two problems, in particular, are found on 37 and 40.

[57] Also *Šifā'*, 31.

a rigid designator for C. It may be an essential or accidental rigid designator—the result will be the same. In these cases, it is the *suppositum* of the subject term, B, not the term itself that counts. So, it seems that the medieval logicians of Abelardian stock may have been directly or indirectly influenced by Avicenna in offering a *de re* reading of the premise in order to let Aristotle's conclusion go through. However, the problem concerning the conversion of such propositions still persists. This is not a real problem for Avicenna, however, who openly subscribes to multiple readings of a necessary proposition. Depending on how a proposition is understood, different conclusions and conversions will follow. The *de re/de dicto* distinction seems to be present in Avicenna, if not in these precise terms (necessity 1 and 3, for example).

But Avicenna does have qualms with a too partial reading of Aristotle. So, he goes on to say that a necessary conclusion does come about when the minor premise is necessary, provided we read the major assertoric premise as AA. An example of this would be the following syllogism where the major premise is read as the third kind of necessity out of the six Avicenna enumerates:

> Everything white (necessarily) has the quality of splitting the air
>   for vision to occur
> All swans are necessarily white
> All swans necessarily have the quality of splitting the air for
>   vision to occur

In this case, the major premise is assertoric but stands as a general necessary case with open variables. The conclusion is necessary and provides a particular instance of the general rule established by the major premise. The conclusion is, therefore, necessary. The lesson Avicenna teaches us is that it is the manner of construing a premise that yields the kinds of conclusions one seeks.[58] As there are different manners of construing a premise, the same syllogism will sometimes yield one conclusion, sometimes another.

He teaches this same lesson when dealing with the second problem. The proof for validating the conclusion rests on *ad impossibile*

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[58] Using such construals, it seems possible to derive necessary conclusions even from two assertoric premises; *Naǧāt*, 30.

and a false but not impossible supposition (much like Aristotle). We need to establish the truth of the following syllogism:

(AaB) CA(BaJ) → CA(AaJ)[59]
ad impossibile → not-CA(AaJ) → N(AiJ) or I(AiJ) → N(AoJ)
False but not impossible supposition:
   CA(BaJ) → (BaJ)   (for if it is possible that
                            (BaJ), then (BaJ) may
                            obtain at some time
                            without it leading to an
                            absurdity).
So if,   N(AoJ)
          (BaJ)
          N(AoB) (this syllogism was proved earlier)
But,   (AaB) was a given premise which contradicts N(AoB) as (AaB) may or may not be necessary (Theophrastian reading).
So,   not-N(AoJ)
If   N(AiJ)
        (BaJ)
Then, N(AiB)
But,   (AaB) was a given premise which need not be necessary (Theophrastian reading).
So,   not-N(AiJ)
So, if not-N(AoJ) and not-N(AiJ)
Then, CA(AaJ)

But if AaB is taken as AA, then no contingency is proved.

Throughout this proof, Avicenna insists on pointing out that this conclusion would follow only if we read the assertoric premise as AT. For it is as AT that a proposition need not be necessary but may be so. However, if we read the assertoric as AA, then the conclusion would be AA. For we would read this major premise just as we read it in the case of the Aristotelian *Barbara*s. AT premises are PA premises in disguise; AA premises are N premises, i.e., the last

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[59] Again, he first grants that using the same *de re / de dicto* reading as in the *Barbara*s, the conclusion is CA if the major is CA. He then proceeds to gloss the syllogism in the manner indicated here as another interpretation.

four N premises out of the six. Again, Avicenna reminds us to be wary of our particular construal of the premises. Read in one way, Aristotle's conclusions are valid and read in another, they are not.

Concluding Remarks

This brief excursion into Avicenna's logic indicates that modalities can be synonymous and homonymous. That is to say, a certain modal operator under one construal is synonymous with another (as in the case of PA and AT) and under another, the same modal may refer to two different concepts (as in PA and CA). Aristotle's inconsistencies in the *Prior Analytics* may be explained in terms of his oversight regarding these matters. Avicenna, sensing this to be the possible source of the confusion, both defends Aristotle (when he specifies a valid construal of a modal for the First Teacher's conclusion to go through) and diverges from him (when he construes a modal in a way his master did not).[60]

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[60] Avicenna's inspiration seems to come partly from Theophrastus, Alexander, and Themistius. In order for one to understand the historical development of modal logic to the point when it reaches Avicenna and to appreciate Avicenna's own contributions and originality, one must research the ideas of these philosophers on the subject. This was unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER TWO

SOME TEXTS OF ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS* IN THE *ILĀHĪYĀT* OF AVICENNA'S *KITĀB AŠ-ŠIFĀʾ*

Amos Bertolacci

The present contribution deals with the Aristotelian background of the *Ilāhīyāt* ("Science of Divine Things") of Avicenna's *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ* ("Book of the Cure;" hereafter *Ilāhīyāt*).[1] The *Šifāʾ* in general, according to what Avicenna himself says in its prologue, is a work stemming from the Peripatetic tradition;[2] the *Ilāhīyāt* in particular is

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[1] Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt* (1), ed. G. Anawatī and S. Zāʾid (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1960); Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt* (2) ed. M.Y. Mūsá, S. Dunyā and S. Zāʾid (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1960). I have checked the text of the *Ilāhīyāt* printed in the Cairo edition (= c) against MS Oxford, Pococke 110 (= P110), MS Oxford, Pococke 125 (= P125) and the Tehran lithograph (= t). P110 and P125 are not taken into account in c, whereas t is incompletely reported in the apparatus (I wish to thank J.L. Janssens for having kindly put at my disposal a photostatic reproduction of t). An important witness of the Arabic text is the Latin Medieval translation (= l), recently edited in the Avicenna Latinus series (*Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, I–IV*, ed. S. van Riet [Louvain: E. Peters, 1977]; *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, V–X*, ed. S. van Riet [Louvain: E. Peters, 1980]; *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, I–X, Lexiques*, cur. S. Van Riet [Louvain: E. Peters, 1983]). Useful in this respect is also M. Horten's German translation (= h), in so far as it is based on a manuscript tradition that is different from that on which c relies; see his *Die Metaphysik Avicennas enthaltend die Metaphysik, Theologie, Kosmologie und Ethik* (repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960). An integral French translation of c is available in *Avicenne, La Métaphysique du Shifāʾ, Livres I à V*, Études musulmanes, XXI, tr. G.C. Anawati (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978); *Avicenne, La Métaphysique du Shifāʾ, Livres de VI à X*, Études musulmanes, XXVII, tr. G.C. Anawati (Paris: J. Vrin, 1985). The first volume of Anawati's translation contains a very provisional list of corrections of c. The *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ* is the most important and influential philosophical summa of Avicenna. The *Ilāhīyāt* is the fourth section of this work, and deals with the metaphysical science.

[2] Avicenna states that it is "more accommodating to my Peripatetic colleagues" than his *al-Ḥikma al-Mašriqīya* ("Eastern Philosophy") or *al-Mašriqīyūn* ("The Easterners"); see Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Manṭiq: al-Madḫal*, ed. M. al-Ḫudayrī, F. al-Ahwānī and G.C. Anawati (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1952; hereafter *Madḫal*), 9.17–10.7; English translation in Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, IV (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 51 (see also the remarks at 110–112).

portrayed in the same passage as containing "the science related to [Aristotle's] *Metaphysics*."³ Therefore, although it is not a literal commentary on the *Metaphysics*, but rather a reworking of it, the *Ilāhīyāt* is deeply dependent on the *Metaphysics*.⁴

In the present contribution two examples of the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhīyāt* are provided. I take into account two texts in which Avicenna anonymously quotes certain passages of the *Metaphysics*. I call them Text 1 and Text 2 respectively. They occur in chapter 4 of the sixth treatise (VI, 4) and chapter one of the seventh treatise (VII, 1). I provisionally qualify their quotation style as "paraphrase." They can be regarded as particularly significant for the following reasons.

While in other parts of the *Ilāhīyāt* Avicenna also paraphrases the *Metaphysics*, briefly or at length, without mentioning Aristotle, Texts

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³ *al-ʿilm al-mansūb ilá mā baʿda ṭ-ṭabīʿa* (*Madḫal*, 11.11). I discuss the exact meaning of this expression in my "The Structure of Metaphysical Science in the *Ilāhiyyāt* (Divine Science) of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* (Book of the Cure)," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 13 (2002), forthcoming.

⁴ On the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhīyāt*, see my "Metafisica A, 5, 986a22–26 nell'*Ilāhiyyāt* del *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* di Ibn Sīnā," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 10 (1999), 205–231; id., "From al-Kindī to al-Fārābī: Avicenna's Progressive Knowledge of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* according to his Autobiography," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 11.2 (2001), 257–295. Being deeply, albeit freely, linked to the *Metaphysics*, the *Ilāhīyāt* had a tremendous impact on the reception of the *Metaphysics* in the subsequent history of medieval philosophy. This is true in both the Islamic world and the Latin Middle Ages. In the former, the *Ilāhīyāt* superseded to a large extent the *Metaphysics* itself. In the latter, the Latin translation of the *Ilāhīyāt*, accomplished in the twelfth century, was acknowledged as one of the most authoritative interpretations of the *Metaphysics*. For the influence of the *Ilāhīyāt* on Albert the Great, see my "'Subtilius speculando,' Le citazioni della Philosophia Prima di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 9 (1998), 261–339; id., "Albert the Great, Metaph. IV, 1, 5: From the Refutatio to the Excusatio of Avicenna's Theory of Unity," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter*, ed. J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 881–887; id., "Le citazioni implicite testuali della Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001), 179–274; id., "La divisione della filosofia nel primo capitolo del Commento di Alberto Magno alla Fisica: le fonti avicenniane," in *La Divisione della Filosofia e le sue Ragioni, Lettura di testi medievali (VI–XIII secolo), Atti del Settimo Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale* (S.I.S.P.M.), Assisi, 14–15 novembre 1997, ed. G. D'Onofrio, (Cava de' Tirreni [Salerno]: Avagliano Editore, 2001), 137–155; id., "Albert The Great and the Preface of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*," in *Avicenna and his Heritage*, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet, forthcoming 2002; id., "The Reception of Avicenna's 'Philosophia Prima' in Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*: The Case of the Doctrine of Unity," in *Albertus Magnus 1200–2000*, ed. W. Senner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 67–78.

1 and 2 have three noteworthy features. First, in them, Avicenna employs an unusual Arabic term, *huwīya*, to signify "existent." In the rest of the *Ilāhīyāt*, Avicenna uses *mawǧūd*, rather than *huwīya*, to express this very concept. *Huwīya* is preferred over *mawǧūd* in our texts because of the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* that Avicenna employed in these particular cases. Second, the comparison with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* not only helps us to understand Avicenna's terminology in these texts, but also allows us to decide among some variants in the manuscripts of the *Ilāhīyāt*.[5] Third, Avicenna in these texts engages in a sophisticated type of exegesis: in paraphrasing the *Metaphysics*, he emphasizes the main points of Aristotle's argument, quotes additional passages from the *Metaphysics* itself, and occasionally refers to doctrines of other Aristotelian works.

I divide what follows into three parts. In the first part, as a preliminary step, I briefly discuss *huwīya* as a philosophical term, and its use in what can be regarded as the most important Arabic version of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and in Avicenna's *Ilāhīyāt*. The following two parts are devoted to the analysis of Text 1 and Text 2 respectively. The main purpose of this analysis is to identify the sources in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* of the texts I take into account. The comparison with the Aristotelian sources will help to disclose the particular meaning that *huwīya* assumes in Text 1 and Text 2, to emend in some passages the edited text of the *Ilāhīyāt*, and to show Avicenna's quotation technique. I will substantially neglect a further possible approach, the theoretical one, and I will address the issue of the doctrinal continuity and development of ontology from Aristotle to Avicenna only incidentally.

Huwīya *as a philosophical term and its use in the Arabic translations of Aristotle's* Metaphysics *and in Avicenna's* Ilāhīyāt

In philosophical Arabic *huwīya* bears three main meanings. First, in so far as it corresponds to the Syriac *hāwyā*, it means, as the latter does, the present participle "being" in the sense of "something that

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is" or "exists." Second, in so far as it is an abstract noun, *huwīya* conveys the meaning of the infinitive "to be" in the sense of "essence." Third, in so far as it was regarded as deriving from the particle *huwa* (the personal pronoun "he"), it occasionally means "identity," in the sense of the identity of something with something else, or "sameness."[6] For the sake of clarity, I will label these three meanings "existent," "essence" and "sameness" respectively.

I wish to stress two points in this respect. First, *huwīya* is used as a translation of the Greek ὄν ("being" in the sense of "existent") in the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* that Avicenna used. Second, Avicenna in the *Ilāhīyāt* always employs *huwīya* in the meaning of "existent" and "essence," never in the meaning of "sameness."

As to the first point, *huwīya* is the rendering of ὄν in the earliest and most extensive Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*. This is the translation ascribed to Usṭāṯ.[7] Usṭāṯ invariably translates ὄν in the *Metaphysics* as *huwīya*.[8] Among the extant Arabic translations of

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[6] G. Endress, "Die wissenschaftliche Literatur: Die Entwicklung der Fachsprache," in *Grundriss der Arabischen Philologie*, Band III: Supplement, ed. W. Fischer (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1993), 21–22; id. "Du grec au latin à travers l'arabe: la langue, créatrice d'idées dans la terminologie philosophique," in *Aux origines du lexique philosophique européen, L'influence de la latinitas*, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Éudes Médiévales, 1997), 143, 161; H. Hugonnard-Roche, "La tradition syro-arabe et la formation du vocabulaire philosophique latin," in ibid., 66–67.

[7] The extant parts of this translation are preserved in Averroes' *Tafsīr* ("Commentary") of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; see *Averroès, Tafsir ma baʿd at-Tabiʿat*, ed. M. Bouyges, 3 vols. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938–1948). Usṭāṯ belonged to the circle of translators who gathered around al-Kindī. *Huwīya* as a rendering of ὄν is common not only in Usṭāṯ's translation of the *Metaphysics*, but also in other translations/adaptations of Greek philosophical works which were produced by al-Kindī's circle, or had some connection with it (see G. Endress, "The Circle of al-Kindī, Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy," in *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism*, ed. G. Endress and R. Kruk [Leiden: CNWS, 1997], 60–61). This is especially true of the Neoplatonic metaphysical works translated or paraphrased into Arabic. Thus, we find *huwīya* as respondent of ὄν in the *Theologia Aristotelis*, in the Arabic version of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, and in the *Liber de Causis* (see C. D'Ancona, "L'influence du vocabulaire arabe: causa prima est esse tantum," in *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge, Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12–14 septembre 1998 organisé par la Société internationale pour l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, ed. J. Hamesse and C. Steel [Turnhout: Brepols, 2000], 55–57 and nn. 7, 9–11). In a passage of the *Theologia Aristotelis*, *huwīya* is apparently used to translate the Greek ταὐτότης ("sameness") as well (D'Ancona, "L'influence," 56, n. 10).

[8] See the indexes in *Averroès, Tafsir*, III:(97)–(98), (231)–(232), (270), and S.M. Afnan, *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), 121–124.

the *Metaphysics*, Usṭāṯ's appears to be the only one in which *huwīya* is employed as a rendering of ὄν. Avicenna apparently used Usṭāṯ's translation in his literal commentary on book Λ of the *Metaphysics* in his *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* ("Book of the Fair Judgment") edited by 'A.R. Badawī in 1947,[9] and in his "Letter to the Vizier Abū Saʿd" recently edited by Y. Michot.[10] Very likely he had in mind, if not at hand, Usṭāṯ's translation also when he wrote the *Ilāhīyāt*.

The second point I wish to stress is the following. *Huwīya* is quite commonly used by Arab philosophers, both before and after Avicenna.[11]

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[9] Arabic text in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿarab*, ed. 'A.R. Badawī (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1947), 22–33. French translation and commentary in M. Sebti, "*Sharḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-lām li al-shaykh ar-Raʾīs Ibn Sina*, Traduction, annotation et présentation," unpublished thesis, Paris, École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1992. (I wish to thank the author for having kindly put at my disposal a copy of her work.) Sebti (1, nn. 2, 5; 5, n. 22) points out that the translation of the *Metaphysics* used by Avicenna in this work is that by Usṭāṯ.

[10] Y. Michot, *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir Abû Saʿd, Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique*, Sagesses musulmanes, 4 (Beirut: Les Éditions Al-Bouraq, 2000). Michot shows that four literal quotations of the *Metaphysics* according to Usṭāṯ's translation occur in this text: 45.12–14 (corresponding to Δ 26, 1023b32–34); 46.3–9 (corresponding to Δ 5, 1015b36–1016a1; 1016a1–4); 47.8–12 (corresponding to Z 11, 1037a22–24); 49.1–5 (corresponding to Z 10, 1035b6–8; Z 10, 1035b10). All of this does not entail, however, that Usṭāṯ's was the only translation of the *Metaphysics* that Avicenna used; I point out Avicenna's use of a different translation in my communication "La ricezione del libro G della *Metafisica* nell'*Ilāhīyāt* del *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ* di Avicenna," read at the international conference "Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici, Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe," C.N.R., Centro di Studio del Pensiero Antico/European Science Foundation, Network Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought, Rome 19–20 October, 2001.

[11] Before Avicenna, we find several occurrences of this term in the most famous and important metaphysical writing by al-Kindī, the *Falsafa al-ūlá* ("First Philosophy"), ed. M.ʿA. Abū Rīda in *Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafīya* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1950), 1:97–162, and, more recently, in *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'Al-Kindī, II: Métaphysique et Cosmologie*, ed. R. Rashed and J. Jolivet (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998), 1–117, with facing French translation. An English translation of Abū Rīda's edition, including a comprehensive introduction and a detailed commentary, is available in A.L. Ivry's *Al-Kindī's Metaphysics* (Albany: SUNY, 1974). The occurrences of *huwīya* in Rashed/Jolivet's edition are at 27.9 ("existence" Rashed/Jolivet; "being" Ivry), 35.14 ("existence" Rashed/Jolivet; "being" Ivry), 97.1, 3, 7, 10, 16 ("existence" Rashed/Jolivet; "being" Ivry). To these occurrences reported in the glossary of the edition (220), the following have to be added: 95.1, 95.2 ("sujet" Rashed/Jolivet; "existence" Ivry). In three of these occurrences (35.14; 95.1; 95.2) *huwīya* possibly has the meaning "existent." See *al-Kindī, Risāla fī māʾīyat mā lā yumkin an yakūn lā nihāya <lahū> wa-mā llāḏī yuqāl <fīhī> lā nihāya lahū* ("Treatise on the Quiddity of What Cannot be Infinite and What is said to be Infinite"), in *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'Al-Kindī*, II:153.22. Al-Fārābī devotes an entire section of *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* ("Book of Particles") to describing *huwīya* and the other terms employed in

It is also widespread in Avicenna's philosophical works.[12] In the text of the *Ilāhīyāt* printed in Cairo in 1960 this term appears twenty-four times (a complete list of occurrences of *huwīya* in the Cairo edi-

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Arabic to translate the Greek terminology for "being"; see *al-Fārābī, Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Hurūf)*, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dar al-Mašriq, 1969), §§ 83–86. *Huwīya* occurs also, in the meaning of "sameness," in al-Fārābī's *Fī aġrāḍ al-ḥakīm fī kull maqāla min al-Kitāb al-mawsūm bi-l-ḥurūf*, in *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ed. F. Dieterici, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1890), 36.16 (German translation in *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen*, tr. Dieterici [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1892], 54–60; French translation, with textual remarks, in Th.-A. Druart, "Le traité d'al-Fārābī sur les buts de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 24 (1982), 43: "quiddité"; Spanish translation in R.R. Guerrero, "Al-Fārābī y la 'Metafisica' de Aristóteles," *La Ciudad de Dios* 196 (1983), 211–240; partial English translation in Gutas, *Avicenna*, 242: "identity"). After Avicenna, al-Gazālī employs *huwīya* in the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (ed. M. Bouyges [Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927], 321.5; see *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, tr. M.E. Marmura [Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997], 197: "haecceity"). In F. Jabre, *Essai sur le lexique de Ghazali, Contribution à l'étude de la terminologie de Ghazali dans ses principaux ouvrages à l'exception du Tahāfut* (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1970), no entry is devoted to *huwīya* or *huwahuwīya*. For the use of *huwīya* in Averroes, see below n. 80.

[12] A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne)* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), 411–413 (see also ead., "Huwiyya," *EI²*, 3:644–645), records eleven occurrences of *huwīya* (three of which are taken from the *Ilāhīyāt*), and translates this term as "ipséité," "substance individuelle" and "essence." In the *Vocabulaires comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sīnā* (Paris: Desclée du Brouwer, 1939), 36a, Goichon regards *huwīya* in the meaning of "substance individuelle" as equivalent to πρώτη οὐσία, and in the meaning of "ipséité" as equivalent to ὅπερ τόδε τι. Among the occurrences which Goichon does not take into account, *huwīya* means "existent" in the opening chapter (I, 2) of the *Madḫal* ("Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*") belonging to the *Šifā'*; see *Madḫal*, 13.5, 13.7 (Latin translation in *Avicennae peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta . . .* [Venetiis, 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1961], f. 2ra: "identitas"; English translation in M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his *Shifā'*," *Journal of the History of Arabic Sciences* 92 (1980), 244–245: "individual identity"). Outside the *Šifā'*, *huwīya* means "existent" in the *Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya* ("Treatise on the divisions of the intellectual sciences"), where it occurs twice; see Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya*, in *Tisʿ rasā'il fī l-ḥikma wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿīyāt*, ed. Ḥ. ʿĀṣī (Damascus: Dār Qābis, 1986), 85.1, 89.19; French translation in G.C. Anawati, "Les divisions des sciences intellectuelles d'Avicenne," *MIDEO* 13 (1977), 326, 330: "identité"; French translation in J. Michot, "Les sciences physiques et métaphysiques selon la *Risālah fī aqsām al-ʿulūm* d'Avicenne, Essai de traduction critique," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 22 (1980), 68: "ipséité." In the commentary on book Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, belonging to the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* ("Book of the Fair Judgment"), Avicenna uses *huwīyāt* in the sense of "existents"; see Badawi, *Arisṭū*, 22.15 (Sebti, "Sharḥ," 2, translates this term as "êtres"). Other occurrences of *huwīya* are, for example (I owe some of these references to D.C. Reisman): *at-Taʿlīqāt* ("The Notes"), ed. Badawī (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣrīya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1973), 145.2, 147.23, 147.25, 148.5–6; *al-Mubāḥaṭāt* ("The Discussions"), ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1992), 59.7 (see also J.R. Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyār et al-

tion is provided in the Appendix below).[13] In this work, very often *huwīya* means "essence." In some fewer cases, however, it means "existent." This happens mainly, if not exclusively, in the texts I analyze below.[14] On the other hand, nowhere in the *Ilāhīyāt* does *huwīya* mean "sameness," though it is sometimes translated in this way. The term Avicenna uses in this work to signify "sameness" is distinct from *huwīya*, albeit similar to it, namely *huwahuwīya*. *Huwahuwīya* derives from *huwahuwa*, meaning "same," "identical." This being the case, as far as Avicenna's *Ilāhīyāt* is concerned, the semantic areas of *huwīya* ("essence" or "existent") and *huwahuwīya* ("sameness") have to be kept distinct.

We can now turn to the analysis of Texts 1–2. The tables provided in the following sections report, in three parallel columns (from left to right): Avicenna's text, the corresponding passages in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and their translation in Usṭāṯ's Arabic version of the *Metaphysics*. The emendations of the Cairo edition that are discussed are parenthetically glossed.[15]

Text 1: Ilāhīyāt *VI 4, 281.1–4*

Text 1 belongs to the fourth chapter of the sixth treatise of the *Ilāhīyāt*. The sixth treatise of the *Ilāhīyāt* deals with the doctrine of causality. Avicenna takes into account, one after the other, the four

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Kirmānī, Présentation, traduction critique et lexique arabe-français de la *Mubāḥatha III*," *Le Muséon* 110 (1997), 170: "ipséité"); *Risāla fī l-ʿAhd* ("Treatise on the Pact"), ed. Badawī in * Arisṭū*, 247.4 (see also Michot's translation in *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir*, 118: "ipséité"); *ar-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī l-maʿād* ("Treatise on the Return"), ed. F. Lucchetta (Padova: Antenore, 1969), 13.10–11 (at 12, Lucchetta translates *huwīya* as "ipseità").

[13] As we will see, in two such cases *huwahuwīya* ("sameness") has to be read instead of *huwīya*. The lexicon of the critical edition of the Latin translation (*Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, I–X*, 137, reports only twenty occurrences. J. Jolivet, "Le vocabulaire de l'être et de la création dans la *Philosophia prima* de l'Avicenna Latinus," in *L'élaboration*, 42, provides an incomplete summary of the data collected in the lexicon of the critical edition.

[14] *Huwīya* could mean "existent" in the *Ilāhīyāt*, 313.7, as well (see Appendix below). However, the lack of a close correspondence with the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* leaves obscure the precise meaning of *huwīya* in this case; furthermore, the close connection between *huwīya* and *waḥda* ("unity")—not with *wāḥid* ("one") as in Text 1 and Text 2—allows the translation of *huwīya* in this passage as "entity" rather than "existent."

[15] For other corrections, see below nn. 46, 65, 68, 76.

Aristotelian causes. After the treatment of the efficient cause in chapters 1–3, in chapter 4 Avicenna focuses on the material, formal and final causes. Within the discussion of the material cause we find a digression on "element" (*usṭuquss*), intended as the material constituent of something. This digression can be divided in two parts. Text 1 is its second part.

"Element" (στοιχεῖον) is one of the items Aristotle discusses in the fifth book (Δ) of the *Metaphysics*. *Metaphysics* Δ is a sort of glossary of fundamental philosophical terms. In Δ 3 Aristotle expounds the different meanings of "element." The first part of Avicenna's digression on "element" is a paraphrase of *Metaphysics* Δ 3. In this part Avicenna summarizes lines 1014a26–b9 of this chapter. Then, in the second part of the digression Avicenna starts paraphrasing another passage of the *Metaphysics*, namely chapter 3 of book B. Book B, the third book of the *Metaphysics*, is a collection of theoretical problems whose solution Aristotle provides in the rest of the work. In B 3 Aristotle faces the difficulty of whether the universal genera, or the particular constituents, have to be considered elements and principles of things. Thus, the theme of "element" is common to both Δ 3 and B 3. This is why Avicenna links together these two Aristotelian passages in Text 1.

Text 1 consists of eight sections. Let us follow step by step Avicenna's procedure.

Ilāhīyāt VI 4, 281.1–4	Aristotle's *Metaphysics*	Usṭāṭ's Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*
First part of the digression on "element" (280.14–17)	Δ 3, 1014a26–b9	497.9–498.11
Second part of the digression on "element" (281. 1–4):		
[1] (281.1–2) those who think things are generated only from genera and differentiae regard them [i.e., genera and differentiae] as first elements,[16]	(Δ 3, 1014b9–12) Now, since the so-called genera are universal and indivisible (for there is no formula of them), some say the genera are elements, and more so	(498.11–13) Since the things called genera are universals and do not get divided— because they do not have any formula—some say the genera are elements and

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[16] *wa-man raʾá anna l-ašyāʾa innamā tatakawwanu* [*takūnu* P125] *mina l-ağnāsi wa-l-fuṣūli ğaʿalahā l-usṭuqussāti l-ūlá. . . .*

(cont.)
Ilāhīyāt VI 4, 281.1–4   Aristotle's *Metaphysics*   Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation
                                                                    of the *Metaphysics*

	than *the differentia*, because the genus is more universal.[17]	more so, because the genus is more universal.[18]
	(B3, 998a20–23) Apart from the difficulty of stating the case truly with regard to these matters, it is hard to say, with regard to the first principles, <u>whether it is the genera that should be taken as elements</u> and principles, or rather the primary constituents of a thing.[19]	(215.13–14) These things are very obscure, and in attaining their truth a very big difficulty occurs. (217. 17–218.1) Also in knowing the principles a difficulty occurs,[20] since we try to know whether it is necessary to regard the genera, or the things from which all things come, as elements and principles.[21]
[2] (281.2) especially "one" and "existent" (*huwīya*).[22]	(B3, 998b9–11) And some also of those who say <u>unity and being</u> (τὸ ὄν), or the great and the small, <u>are elements of things</u> (ὄντα), seem to treat them as genera.[23]	(219.4–6) Some of those who maintain that "one" and "existent" (*huwīya*), and the great and the small, are elements of existents (*huwīyāt*) use them as, and make them be, genera.[24]

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[17] ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ καλούμενα γένη καθόλου καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν), στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη λέγουσί τινες, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν διαφορὰν ὅτι καθόλου μᾶλλον τὸ γένος. Greek text as in *Aristotle's Metaphysics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924); English translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. J. Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[18] *wa-li-anna llatī tusammá aǧnāsan hiya kullīyatun wa-lā tanqasimu wa-ḏālika li-anna laysa lahā kalimatun qāla baʿḍu n-nāsi inna l-aǧnāsa usṭuqussātun wa-innahā akṯaru fī l-usṭuqussīyati li-anna l-ǧinsa akṯaru kullīyatan.*

[19] Περί τε τούτων οὖν ἀπορία πολλὴ πῶς δεῖ θέμενον τυχεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν πότερον δεῖ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧν ἐνυπαρχόντων ἐστὶν ἕκαστον πρώτων.

[20] *fa-hāḏihī l-ašyāʾu ġāmiḍatun ǧiddan wa-fī daraki ḥaqīqatihā ṣuʿūbatun kaṯīratun ǧiddan.*

[21] *wa-fī maʿrifati l-awāʾili ṣuʿūbatun ayḍan fa-innā nafḥaṣu an naʿlama hal yanbaġī an yuzanna anna l-usṭuqussāti wa-l-awāʾila hiya l-aǧnāsu am hiya llatī minhā kaynūnatu ǧamīʿi l-ašyāʾi.*

[22] *. . . wa-ḥuṣūṣan al-wāḥida wa-l-huwīyata.*

[23] φαίνονται δέ τινες καὶ τῶν λεγόντων στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ὡς γένεσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.

[24] *wa-baʿḍu llaḏīna yazʿumūna anna usṭuqussāti l-huwīyāti huwa* [sic] *l-wāḥidu wa-l-huwīyatu wa-l-kabīru wa-ṣ-ṣaġīru yastaʿmilūnahā wa-yuṣayyirūnahā ka-l-aǧnāsi.*

(cont.)

Ilāhīyāt VI 4, 281.1–4	Aristotle's *Metaphysics*	Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*
[3] (281.2) Therefore, they assume that they ["one" and "existent"] are the principles that most deserve to be principles,[25]	(B3, 998b19–21) There will, then, be as many principles of things (ὄντα) as there are <u>primary</u> genera, so that <u>both being</u> (τὸ ὄν) <u>and unity will be principles</u> and substances;[26]	(219.14–220.1) The number of principles of existents (*huwīyāt*) corresponds to the number of first genera; "one" and "existent" (*huwīya*) are principles and substances of existents (*huwīyāt*),[27]
[4] (281.2) since they are the most universal and general principles.[28]	(B3, 998b21) for these are most of all predicated of all things (ὄντα).[29]	since these more than others are said of all existents (*huwīyāt*),[30]
[5] (281.3) If they were impartial in their judgment, they would know that		
[6] (281.3) independent subsistence belongs only to individuals,[31]	(Aristotle's *Categories*, 5, 2b5–7) So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.[32]	(Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn's Arabic translation, 8.9–10) Necessarily, then, if the primary substances did not exist, there would be no way of existence for any of those other things.[33]
[7] (281.3–4) so that the things that are close to them [i.e., to the individuals] are worthier to be sub-	(*Categories* 5, 2b7–10) Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is	(Isḥāq's Arabic translation, 8.12–13) The species, among the secondary substances, is worthier than the

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[25] *fa-qad ǧaʿalūhā awlá l-mabādiʾi bi-l-mabdaʾīyati.*

[26] τοσαῦται οὖν ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων ὅσαπερ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐσίαι.

[27] *fa-yakūnu ʿadadu awāʾili l-huwīyāti ʿalá ʿadadi l-aǧnāsi l-uwali wa-yakūnu l-wāḥidu wa-l-huwīyatu awāʾila wa-ǧawāhira l-huwīyāti.*

[28] *li-annahā ašadduhā* [*-hā* add. sup. lin. P110; om. t] *kullīyatan wa-ǧinsīyatan.*

[29] ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ πάντων μάλιστα λέγεται τῶν ὄντων. See also B 4, 1001a21–22: ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων = 261.13–14: *li-anna l-wāḥida wa-l-huwīyata awǧabu kullīyatan min sāʾiri l-ašyāʾi.*

[30] *li-anna hāḏihī akṯara ḏālika tuqālu ʿalá ǧamīʿi l-huwīyāti.*

[31] *wa-law anṣafū la-ʿalimū anna l-qiwāma bi-ḏ-ḏāti innamā huwa li-l-ašḫāṣi. . . .*

[32] μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

[33] *fa-yaǧibu iḏan in lam yakuni l-ǧawāhiru l-uwalu allā yakūna sabīlun ilá an yūǧada šayʾun min tilka l-uḫari.* Arabic text of the *Categories* as in *Manṭiq Arisṭū*, ed. Badawī (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīya, 1948), 1:1–55.

(cont.) *Ilāhīyāt* VI 4, 281.1–4	Aristotle's *Metaphysics*	Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*
stances and to subsist by themselves,[34]	nearer to the primary substance.[35]	genus to be described as substance, since it is closer to the primary substance.[36]
[8] (281.4) and [they would know] that they [i.e., the things that are close to the individuals] are worthier of unity (*waḥda*) [existence (*wuǧūd*) ed.] as well.[37]	(B3, 999a4–5) that which is predicated directly of the individuals will have more unity.[38]	(227.12–13) therefore the last one which is predicated is worthier of unity than anything else.[39]

The main point of section [1] is that some philosophers may think that genera and differentiae are elements of things. What Avicenna says in section [1] corresponds to Δ 3, 1014b9–12, where Aristotle maintains that some regard genera, and—to a lesser extent—differentiae, as elements. As far as genera are concerned, section [1] corresponds also to the first alternative Aristotle mentions in B 3, 998a20–23, namely the possibility of regarding genera as elements and principles. Thus, section [1] constitutes the transition from the first part of the digression, which is based on Δ 3, to the second part, which relies on B 3. It is noteworthy that one of the greatest Aristotelian scholars of modern times, W.D. Ross, when commenting on the passage of Δ 3 that Avicenna paraphrases in section [1], refers, in the same vein as Avicenna, to B 3.[40]

In section [2] Avicenna presents "one" and *huwīya* as special cases of genera which have actually been regarded as elements. Section [2] corresponds to B 3, 998b9–11. In this passage Aristotle selects unity and being (ὄν), together with the great and the small, as salient

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[34] *fa-mā yalīḥā awlá bi-an* [*bi-an* om. P125] *yakūna ǧawāhira wa-qā'imātin bi-anfusihā.*

[35] Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν.

[36] *wa-n-nawʿu mina l-ǧawāhiri ṯ-ṯāniyati awlá bi-an yūṣafa ǧawharan mina l-ǧinsi li-annahū aqrabu mina l-ǧawhari l-awwali.*

[37] . . . *wa-annahā awlá bi-l-waḥdati* [P110 P125 t l h : *wuǧūdi* c] *aydan.* According to the apparatus of c, the reading *wuǧūdi* is attested by MSS B, D, Ǧ; the reading *waḥdati*, on the other hand, is attested in the margin of MS B and in MSS Ṣ M.

[38] μᾶλλον ἂν ἓν τὸ ἔσχατον εἴη κατηγορούμενον.

[39] *fa-yakūnu l-wāḥidu l-maḥmūlu l-aḫīru awǧaba waḥdānīyatan min ġayrihī.*

[40] Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 1:295.

examples of genera regarded as elements. In Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation of this Aristotelian passage, ὄν is rendered as *huwīya*. Avicenna simply adopts the term *huwīya* that he finds in Usṭāṯ's translation as a rendering of ὄν ("being" in the sense of "existent"). I tentatively propose, therefore, to translate *huwīya* in section [2] as "existent."[41]

In section [3] Avicenna attributes to the aforementioned philosophers the belief that "one" and "existent" are primary principles. Section [3] corresponds to B 3, 998b19–21, where Aristotle states that being and unity are principles since they are primary genera. The fact that "existent" and "unity" are primary genera entails, in Avicenna's mind, that they are primary principles as well.

In section [4] Avicenna gives the reason why these philosophers have regarded "one" and "existent" as first principles. The reason Avicenna provides in section [4] is very much the same as the explanation Aristotle gives in B 3, 998b21.

Section [5] is an original addition by Avicenna.

In section [6] Avicenna switches from the *Metaphysics* to the fifth chapter of Aristotle's *Categories*. In this respect it is remarkable that A. Madigan also refers to the fifth chapter of the *Categories* in his recent commentary on book B when commenting on the passage of B 3 that Avicenna paraphrases in one of the next sections (section [8]).[42] Avicenna assigns independent subsistence only to individuals. This corresponds to the passage 2b5–7 of the *Categories*, where Aristotle calls individuals "primary substances" and gives them priority in existence over everything else.

In section [7] Avicenna recasts in general terms the principle that Aristotle in *Categories* 2b7–9 applies to the case of genera and species: the closer something is to individuals, the more it is a substance.

In section [8] Avicenna goes back to *Metaphysics* B 3. This section is a paraphrase of B 3, 999a4–5. In these lines Aristotle says that what is predicated directly of individuals has more unity than what is predicated indirectly of them.[43] If in section [8] we adopt the read-

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[41] The neologism "ipseity" seems to me a less viable alternative. Marmura's choice of translating *huwīya* in Avicenna's *Madḫal* of the *Šifāʾ* as "individual identity" (see above, n. 12) may be misleading, due to the possible confusion between "individual identity" and "sameness."

[42] Aristotle, *Metaphysics, Book B and Book K 1–2*, translated and commented by A. Madigan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 77.

[43] In other words, "man" is predicated directly of the individual man Socrates,

ing *waḥda* ("unity") instead of the reading *wuǧūd* ("existence") chosen by the Cairo editors, we obtain the same thesis as the one Aristotle expounds in the aforementioned passage. There are other good reasons to prefer the variant *waḥda* to the reading *wuǧūd*. *Waḥda* is attested by three of the six manuscripts of the Cairo edition; it is present also in the Tehran lithograph, and presupposed by the Latin and the German translations. The corruption of *waḥda* into *wuǧūd* can be explained as a scribal error, due to the similarity of the ductus (*rasm*) of these two terms. Moreover, if Avicenna were speaking of "existence," he would simply repeat now what he has already established in section [7] with regard to substantiality and subsistence. If, on the other hand, he is speaking of "unity," he is applying now to unity what he has just shown about substance and subsistence, in other words about "existent." The reading *waḥda*, therefore, is very much required by the constant parallelism between "existent" and unity in Text 1.

On account of all this evidence, I tentatively propose to read *waḥda* instead of *wuǧūd* in Avicenna's section [8].

Text 2: Ilāhīyāt *VII 1, 303.2–16*

Text 2 constitutes the beginning of the first chapter of the seventh treatise of the *Ilāhīyāt*. In this chapter Avicenna expounds the properties of unity and multiplicity.[44] Text 2 can be divided into ten sections. The dependence of sections [3]–[8] from *Metaphysics* Γ 2 has been already pointed out.[45] I wish to show here that sections [2] and [10] also depend on *Metaphysics* Γ. Book Γ is the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. In Text 2 Avicenna's paraphrase of Aristotle is quite straightforward and does not need to be analyzed in detail here. My observations will be limited to sections [1], [2] and [10].

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and therefore has more unity than "animal," which is predicated of Socrates only indirectly, in so far as Socrates is a man.

[44] In the following two chapters Avicenna engages in a criticism of the philosophies of Pythagoras and Plato.

[45] A. Bertolacci, "Avicenna ed Averroè come fonti del Commento di Alberto Magno alla Metafisica di Aristotele: la dottrina dei trascendentali nei commentatori arabi di Aristotele e nel tredicesimo secolo latino," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florence 1998, 65–107; R. Wisnovsky, "Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (*šay'iyya*)," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10 (2000), 198 and n. 34, 219.

Ilāhīyāt VII 1, 303.2–16	Aristotle's *Metaphysics*	Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*
[1 Title] (303.2–4) Chapter on the consequent attributes of unity, namely sameness (*huwahuwīya*) [*huwīya* ed.] and its divisions; the consequent attributes of multiplicity, namely "other" and difference; the types of opposition that are known.[46]		
[2 Introduction] (303.5–6) It seems we have exhaustively discussed, with respect to this aim of ours, the things that are proper to "existent *qua* existent" (*huwīya min ḥaytu hiya huwīya*) or are consequent attributes of it.[47]	(Γ1, 1003a21–22) There is a science which investigates being as being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.[48]	(296.5–7) Aristotle says that to a certain science belongs the investigation of "existent" (*huwīya*) in its nature and the investigation of the things that belong to "existent" (*huwīya*) in itself.[49]
[3] (303.6) Furthermore, "one" and "existent" (*mawǧūd*) are equal to each other in being predicated of things,[50]	(Γ2, 1003b22–24) If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principles and cause are, . . .[51]	(310.2–4) As to "one" and "existent" (*huwīya*), if they are one thing and have one nature, then they follow each other as principle and cause follow each other[52]

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[46] *Faṣlun fī lawāḥiqi l-waḥdati* [*wa-l-katrati* add. P110] *mina l-huwahuwīyati* [P110 P125 t h : *huwīyati* c] *wa-aqsāmihā wa-lawāḥiqi l-katrati* [*mina . . . katrati* add. mg. P110] *mina l-ġayri* [P110 P125 B Ǧ D Ṣ M : *l-ġayrīyati* c t] *wa-l-ḥilāfi wa-aṣnāfi t-taqābuli l-maʿrūfati.* According to c, the reading *huwīya* is attested by the sole MS Ǧ; *huwahuwīya*, on the contrary, is witnessed by MSS B, D, Ṣ, M. The Latin translation has *identitas.*

[47] *yušbihu an yakūna* [*nakūna* punct. P110] *qadi stawfīnā l-kalāma bi-ḥasabi ġaraḍinā hāḏā fī l-umūri llatī taḥtiṣṣu bi-l-huwīyati min ḥaytu hiya huwīyatun aw* [*wa* P125 B Ǧ D Ṣ] *talḥaquhā.*

[48] Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό.

[49] *Qāla Aristū inna li-ʿilmin wāḥidin mina l-ʿulūmi n-naẓara fī l-huwīyati ʿilá kunhihā wa-n-naẓara fī l-ašyāʾi llatī hiya li-l-huwīyati bi-ḏātihā.*

[50] *ṯumma l-wāḥidu wa-l-mawǧūdu qad yatasāwayāni fī l-ḥamli ʿalá l-ašyāʾi. . . .*

[51] Εἰ δὴ τό ὄν καὶ τὸ ἕν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον. . . .

[52] *wa-ammā l-wāḥidu wa-l-huwīyatu iḏā kānā šayʾan wāḥidan wa-kāna lahumā ṭibāʿun wāḥidun fa-ṭibāʿu kulli wāḥidin minhumā li-ṣāḥibihī ka-ttibāʿi l-awwali wa-l-ʿillati baʿḍihā baʿḍan.*

(*cont.*)
Ilāhīyāt VII 1, 303.2–16

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation
of the *Metaphysics*

[4] (303.7) so that each thing that is said "existent" (*mawǧūd*) in a certain respect can be properly said "one" in another,[53]	(Γ2, 1003b26–27) for one man and a man are the same thing, and existent (ὤν), man, and a man are the same thing[54]	(310.5–6) . . . since the expressions "one man," or "man is" (*huwa*), or "this man," signify one thing.[55]
[5] (303.7–8) and everything has one existence (*wuǧūd*).[56]	(Γ2, 1003b32–33) and if, further, the essence of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that *is* (ὄν τι)[57]	(310.11–12) We also say that the substance of each thing is one not accidentally, and therefore we say that the substance of everything is an existent (*huwīya*).[58]
[6] (303.8) Therefore sometimes it is thought that the concept of each of them is the same,[59]	(Γ2, 1003b25–26) (though it makes no difference even if we interpret them similarly—in fact this would strengthen our case)[60]	(310.4–5) Therefore, there is no difference in their relationship, even if we think in this way.[61]
[7] (303.8) but it is not so.[62]	(Γ2, 1003b24–25) . . . not in the sense that they are explained by the same formula.[63]	(310.4) . . . not because a single definition signifies both of them.[64]

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[53] *ḥattá anna kulla mā yuqālu* [*lahū* add. P125 t] *innahū mawǧūdun bi-ʿtibārin yaṣiḥḥa an yuqāla* [*naqūla* M P110] *lahū* [add. sup. lin. P125] *innahū wāḥidun bi-ʿtibārin.*

[54] ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος [καὶ ἄνθρωπος Ab Γ Al. Ross : om. EJ Asc. Syr. edd.], καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος. For the sigla, see *Aristotle's Metaphysics.*

[55] *li-anna qawla l-qāʾili insānun wāḥidun aw insānun huwa aw insānun hāḏā yadullu ʿalá šayʾin wāḥidin.* The Arabic translator employed a Greek MS similar to EJ.

[56] *wa-kullu šayʾin fa-lahū wuǧūdun wāḥidun.*

[57] ἔτι δ' ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι.

[58] *wa-aydan naqūlu inna ǧawhara kulli wāḥidin mina l-ašyāʾi wāḥidun lā bi-nawʿi l-ʿaraḍi wa-li-ḏālika naqūlu inna ǧawhara kulli šayʾin huwīyatun.*

[59] *wa-li-ḏālika* [*ka-ḏālika* P110] *rubbamā ẓunna anna l-mafhūma minhumā wāḥidun.*

[60] (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ἔργου μᾶλλον).

[61] *fa-lā faṣla fīmā baynahumā wa-in zanannā miṯla hāḏā z-zanni.*

[62] *wa-laysa ka-ḏālika.*

[63] ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα.

[64] *wa-laysa li-anna ḥaddan wāḥidan yadullu ʿalá kilayhimā.*

(cont.)
Ilāhīyāt VII 1, 303.2−16   Aristotle's *Metaphysics*   Usṭāṯ's Arabic translation
                                                                                of the *Metaphysics*

[8] (303.8−9) Rather they are the same in subject, i.e., each thing that is characterized by the former is characterized by the latter.[65]

(Γ2, 1003b26−27) for one man and a man are the same thing, and existent, man, and a man are the same thing.[66]

[9] (303.9−12) If the concept of "one" were the concept of "existent" (*mawǧūd*) in every aspect, then the many, in as much as it is many, would not be an existent (*mawǧūd*), as it is not one—even though "one" accidentally occurs to it as well, so that multiplicity is said to be "one multiplicity" (but not in so far as it is multiplicity).[67]

[10] (303.13−14) Therefore it is suitable for us to speak also of the things that are proper to unity and its opposite—i.e., multiplicity—as sameness (*huwahuwīya*) [*huwīya* ed.], homogeneity, congruence (*muwāfaqa*), equality, likeness and their opposites.[68]

(Γ2, 1003b33−36) all this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the essence of these is the work of a science which is generically one—I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same (ταὐτοῦ) and the similar

(311.1−3) Thus, it is known that the forms of "one" are as many as the forms of "existent" (*huwīya*), and the absolute investigation of these species and the knowledge of what they are belong to one science—I mean that the investigation of the same (*muttafiq*), the

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[65] *bal humā wāḥidun bi-l-mawḍūʿi, ay kullu mā yūṣafu bi-hāḏā yūṣafu bi-ḏālika* [P110 P125 B Ǧ D M t : *bi-ḏāka* c].

[66] ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος [καὶ ἄνθρωπος Ab Γ Al. Ross : om. EJ Asc. Syr. edd.], καὶ ὢν ἄνρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

[67] *wa-law kāna mafhūmu l-wāḥidi* [P110 B M : *l-mafhūmu l-wāḥidu* P125 : *l-mafhūmu mina l-wāḥidi* t c] *min kulli ǧihatin mafhūma l-mawǧūdi la-mā kāna l-kaṯīru min ḥaytu* [*ḥaytu* om. P110] *huwa kaṯīrun mawǧūdan ka-mā laysa wāḥidan wa-in kāna yaʿriḍu lahū l-wāḥidu aydan fa-yuqālu li-l-kaṯrati innahā kaṯratun wāḥidatun wa-lākinna lā* [*lā* om. P125] *min ḥaytu* [*min* post *ḥaytu* scr. et del. P125] *hiya* [*huwa* P110] *kaṯratun.*

[68] *fa-ḥariyun binā an natakallama aydan fī l-umūri llatī taḥtiṣṣu bi-l-waḥdati wa-bi-muqāba-latihā* [P110 P125 : *wa-muqābalātihā* t c] *ayi l-kaṯrati miṯla l-huwahuwīyati* [P110 P125 t h : *l-huwīyati* c] *wa-l-muǧānasati wa-l-muwāfaqati wa-l-musāwāti wa-l-mušābahati wa-muqābalātihā.* Among the MSS on which c is based, the reading *huwīya* occurs only in MS D. The reading *huwahuwīya* is witnessed by MSS B, Ǧ, Ṣ, M. The Latin translation has *identitas*.

(cont.)
Ilāhīyāt VII 1, 303.2–16   Aristotle's *Metaphysics*   Usṭāt's Arabic translation
                                                                                                                    of the *Metaphysics*

	and other concepts of this sort.[69]	similar and the other things which are similar to these, belongs to one science.[70]
	(Γ2, 1004a9–20) Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposite to unity . . . in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either form these or from plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above-named.[71]	(316.14–317.8) Since the investigation of opposites necessarily belongs to one science, and the opposite of unity is plurality . . . then it is known that the other, the dissimilar, the unequal and all the other things that are said in this way or in the way of plurality, are opposite to the aforementioned things. Since knowledge of unity belongs to the science we mentioned. . . .[72]
	(I3, 1054a29–32) To the one belong . . . the same (ταὐτὸ) and the like and the equal, and to plurality belong the other and the unlike and the unequal.[73]	(1286.1–2) . . . to one belong the same (*huwahuwa*), the similar and the equal, and to plurality belong the other, the dissimilar and the unequal.[74]

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[69] ὥσθ' ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, περὶ ὧν τὸ τί ἐστι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει θεωρῆσαι, λέγω δ' οἷον περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.

[70] *fa-maʿlūmun anna ṣuwara l-wāḥidi ʿalá ʿadadi ṣuwari l-huwīyati wa-li-ʿilmin wāḥidin an-nazaru l-muṭlaqu fī hāḏihī ṣ-ṣuwari wa-maʿrifatu mā hiya aʿnī anna li-ʿilmin wāḥidin an-nazaru fī l-muttafiqi wa-š-šabīhi wa-sāʾiri l-ašyāʾi llatī tušbihu hāḏihī.*

[71] Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς τἀντικείμενα θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δ' ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος . . . ὥστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν, τῆς εἰρημένης γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης.

[72] *fa-iḏā waǧaba li-ʿilmin wāḥidin an-nazaru fī l-mawḍūʿāti ʿalá l-muʿādalati wa-ʿadīlu l-wāḥidi fī l-waḍʿi l-kaṯratu . . . fa-maʿlūmun anna l-ašyāʾa llatī qīlat yuʿādiluhā fī l-waḍʿi l-ġayru wa-llaḏī lā šabīhun wa-llaḏī laysa musāwin wa-sāʾiru l-ašyāʾi llatī tuqālu bi-hāḏā n-nawʿi aw bi-nawʿi l-kaṯrati wa-iḏā kāna li-l-ʿilmi llaḏī qulnā l-maʿrifatu bi-l-wāḥidi. . . .* The Arabic translator read the second part of the Greek original text according to the following syntax: ὥστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος. καὶ τὸ ἕν τῆς εἰρημένης γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης. . . .

[73] ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑνός . . . τὸ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον.

[74] *fa-inna li-l-wāḥidi l-huwahuwa wa-š-šabīha wa-l-musāwī wa-li-l-kaṯrati l-ġayru wa-lā mutašābihun wa-lā musāwin.*

Section [1] is the title of the chapter. Among the properties of
unity, Avicenna includes "sameness" and its divisions. I am inclined
to adopt the variant *huwahuwīya* ("sameness") instead of the reading
huwīya, chosen by the Cairo editors. For this I rely on the follow-
ing considerations. First, most of the manuscripts taken into account
in the Cairo edition converge on *huwahuwīya*; this reading also occurs
in the Tehran lithograph and is presupposed by the German trans-
lation. The corruption of *huwahuwīya* to *huwīya* may be explained as
a haplography.[75] Second, according to Aristotelian parameters, "essence"
or "existent" are not properties of unity. *Huwīya*, therefore, mean-
ing "essence" or "existent," would be out of place in the present
context. Third, *huwīya* does not mean "sameness" in the *Ilāhīyāt*.
Avicenna uses the term *huwahuwa* to signify "same" both in the place
where he first mentions this concept (chapter I, 4), and in the place
where he deals with it in detail (the following part of chapter VII,
1 itself).[76] If *huwahuwa* means "same" in these two places, it can be
safely assumed that "sameness" is expressed by *huwahuwīya*, rather
than *huwīya*, also in section [1].

Section [2] is the introduction of the chapter, in which Avicenna
summarizes the topics he has dealt with in the previous part of the
Ilāhīyāt. He says he has treated the properties of *huwīya min ḥaytu
hiya huwīya*.[77] In the opening statement of chapter VI, 1, in a simi-

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[75] The evidence provided by the Latin translation, in this particular case, is less
helpful. In the Latin translation we find *identitas*. At first sight, this term would fit
very well as a rendering of *huwahuwīya*. But it is also used to translate *huwīya* in
Text 1 (section [2]). Hence, it is impossible to determine whether the Latin trans-
lator read *huwahuwīya* or *huwīya* in his Arabic manuscript.

[76] I, 4, 27.6; VII, 1, 303.15–16: "'Same' occurs when 'many' is made, in a way,
a unity and, in a [different] way, something other" (*fa-l-huwahuwa* [P110 P115 :
huwahuwīya c t] *huwa an yuǧʿala* [P110 P115 : *yuḥṣala* c t] *l-katīru* [P110 P115 : *li-l-
katrati* c t] *min* [om. c t] *waǧhin waḥdatan wa-min* [P110 : *min* P125 c t] *waǧhin āḫara*).
Two MSS of h (Horten's sigla B and C) report *huwīya* (= "Individualität") instead
of *huwahuwīya* (= "Identität"). The reported text is a paraphrase of *Metaphysics* Δ 9,
1018a 2–13—a passage missing in the extant part of Usṭāt's translation. See also
the occurrences of *huwahuwa* at 304.1–6.

[77] Avicenna uses two expressions ("things that are proper to 'existent *qua* exis-
tent'," and "[things that are] consequent attributes of it") to render the idea of
"things that belong to 'existent' in itself" in the Arabic translation. In I, 2, 13.13–17,
the "proper accidents" (*ʿawāriḍ ḫāṣṣa*) of "existent" (see also 13.13–17) are, together
with its "species" (*anwāʿ*), "the things which are consequent to 'existent *qua* exis-
tent' without condition" (*al-umūru llatī talḥaquhū bi-mā huwa mawǧūdun min ġayri šarṭin*;
see also 14.2). Hence, whereas the first expression that Avicenna uses in [2] cor-
responds to the Arabic translation and signifies the "proper accidents" (or proper-
ties) of "existent," the second expression is meant to be more general and to include

lar context, he refers to the properties of *mawǧūd bi-mā huwa mawǧūd*.[78] Furthermore, in sections [3], [4] and [9] Avicenna switches to *mawǧūd* in order to signify the very concept he expresses by means of *huwīya* in section [2].[79] He evidently regards *huwīya* and *mawǧūd* as synonyms.[80] *Huwīya* in section [2] therefore means "existent."[81]

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also the "species" of "existent" (namely the categories). Avicenna deals with the properties of "existent" in IV–VI, and with its species in II–III.

[78] VI, 1, 257.5–6: "It is suitable that we speak now of 'cause' and 'caused thing,' since they are also among the attributes (*lawāḥiq*) which are consequent (*talḥaqu*) to 'existent qua existent'" (*fa-bi-l-ḥarīyi an natakallama l-āna fī l-ʿillati wa-l-maʿlūli fa-innahumā ayḍan mina l-lawāḥiqi llatī talḥaqu l-mawǧūda bi-mā huwa mawǧūdun*).

[79] One possible reason for this change in terminology is that in section [5] Avicenna dealt with the concept of "existence." Now, *mawǧūd* does have a verbal noun (*maṣdar*) meaning "existence," namely *wuǧūd* (the term Avicenna uses), whereas *huwīya* does not.

[80] Averroes regards *huwīya* and *mawǧūd* as equivalent in a digression of his *Tafsīr* and in the *Talḫīṣ* (Concise Exposition) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; see *Averroès, Tafsir ma baʿd at-Tabiʿat*, II:557.5–558.6; and *Averroes, Compendio de Metafisica, Texto arabe con traducción y notas*, ed. C.Q. Rodríguez (Madrid: Maestre, 1919), 14, 12–21. The digression in the *Tafsīr* is omitted in the latin Medieval translation. A French translation is available in A. Martin's *Averroès, Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique d'Aristote, livre lām-lambda traduit de l'arabe et annoté* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984), 27–28, n. 8 (*huwīya* is not translated); Martin's translation is reproduced in L. Bauoloye's *La question de l'essence, Averroès et Thomas d'Aquin, commentateurs d'Aristote, Métaphysique Ζ 1* (Louvain-la-Neuve: E. Peters, 1997), 51–53. Besides the late Medieval Latin translation (*Averrois Cordubensis Epitome in Librum Metaphysicae Aristotelis, Jacob Mantino hebraeo medico interprete, in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII, Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, VIII [Venetiis apud Iunctas 1562, rep. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962]) and Rodríguez's Spanish translation contained in his above mentioned edition (21–22: "ileidad" [sic]), two German translations of the relevant section of the *Talḫīṣ* are available: M. Horten, *Die Metaphysik des Averroes (1198†), Nach dem Arabischen übersetzt und erläutert* (Halle an der Saale: Niemeyer, 1912; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960), 12–13: "Individualität"; S. Van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung und Erläuterung versehen* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1924), 9: "Ipseität" = "Individualität."

[81] The Latin translation renders *huwīya* in section [2] as "sameness" (*identitas*). The idea of sameness, however, is out of place in the present context. Avicenna cannot reasonably say in section [2] that the discussion of the properties of sameness has already been given. In the previous part of the *Ilāhīyāt* he has mentioned "same" (*huwahuwa*) only once, very briefly, in the chapter in which he describes the contents of the work (I, 4, 27.6). In other words, before Text 2 there is no treatment of sameness in the *Ilāhīyāt*. The properties of "existent," on the contrary, are the object of the treatises IV–VI of the *Ilāhīyāt*. It is therefore "existent" and its properties that Avicenna refers to in section [2]. The reason for the presence of *identitas* in the Latin version may be twofold. Either the translation was based on an Arabic manuscript having *huwahuwīya* instead of *huwīya* in section [2]—but this seems unlikely, since no such variant is recorded in c. Or, more probably, the Latin translator was mislead by Avicenna's use of the term *mawǧūd* in sections [3], [4] and [9] to signify "existent." From our point of view, this simply means that Avicenna employed *huwīya* and *mawǧūd* as synonyms. But the Latin translator might have misunderstood the switch in Avicenna's terminology and taken the presence of *mawǧūd* in sections [3], [4] and [9] in the meaning of "existent" as a sign of the fact that

The mention of "existent *qua* existent" (*huwīya min ḥaytu hiya huwīya*) and its properties in section [2] is a reference to *Metaphysics* Γ 1, 1003a21–22. In this famous passage Aristotle describes metaphysics as the science of "being *qua* being" (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and its essential attributes, in other words, its properties. By "being *qua* being" (in the sense of "existent *qua* existent") Aristotle means "being in itself," as distinct from physical being, mathematical being, and so on. *Huwīya* is the rendering of τὸ ὂν in Usṭāṯ's translation of the passage of the *Metaphysics* to which Avicenna is referring.

Some words, finally, on section [10]. Here again I propose to read *huwahuwīya* instead of *huwīya*. The reasons supporting this choice are the same I have mentioned with regard to section [1], plus an additional one. Section [10] is dependent upon *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1003b33–36 and 1004a9–20. Aristotle includes "same" (ταὐτό) among the properties of unity or "one" in Γ 2, 1003b33–36. The same happens in I 3, 1054a29–32. In the former case Usṭāṯ translates ταὐτό as *muttafiq*,[82] in the latter case as *huwahuwa*. It is tempting to assume that Avicenna conflated in section [10] both the aforementioned passages of Γ 2 and I 3. The two different renderings of ταὐτό ("same") in Usṭāṯ's translation of these two loci might explain the presence of both *huwahuwīya* ("sameness") and *muwāfaqa* (which I tentatively translate here as "congruence," in order to distinguish it from *huwahuwīya*)[83] among the properties of unity that Avicenna lists in section [10].[84] This hypothesis, however, will require further corroboration.

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huwīya in section [2] did not mean "existent," but something different. "Sameness" was the easiest alternative to "existent" as a translation of *huwīya* in this context.

[82] With the expression *tuwāfiqu bi-ṭ-ṭibāʿi* (211.2) he translates τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν in *Metaphysics* B 2, 998a6.

[83] *Muwāfaqa* is a *hapax logomenon* in the *Ilāhīyāt*. The term *al-muwāfiq* occurs in I 2, 13.1 and I, 4, 27.5. For the use of *wifāq*, see Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya*, 89.19.

[84] The other properties of unity that Avicenna mentions, with the exception perhaps of "homogeneity," are also taken from the *Metaphysics*. The term ὁμογενῆ occurs only once in the *Metaphysics* (I 7, 1057b29), where it is not related in any way to unity. It is translated as *muǧānasa* by Usṭāṯ (1355.13). Unity in genus, however, is one of the types of unity Aristotle distinguishes in Δ 6.

Conclusion

The results of the present investigation can be summarized as follows. First, the Aristotelian sources of the two Avicennan texts have been identified. The sources of Text 1, namely *Metaphysics* Δ 3, Β 3 and *Categories* 5, were unknown; those of Text 2, i.e., *Metaphysics* Γ 1–2 and Ι 3, were only partially ascertained. Second, the presence of the term *huwīya* in the *Ilāhīyāt*, at least in the cases in which it has the meaning of "existent," has been explained. It is due to Usṭāṯ's translation of the *Metaphysics*. Avicenna in Text 1 and Text 2 paraphrases the *Metaphysics* according to this translation. Now, in this translation the term *huwīya* is extensively used as a rendering of the Greek ὄν ("being" in the sense of "existent"). Third, the comparison with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* has allowed, both in Text 1 and Text 2, some emendations of the Cairo edition of the *Ilāhīyāt*. Finally, some light has been shed on Avicenna's quotation technique and his attitude towards Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Avicenna's paraphrasing amounts to a summary of the main points of Aristotle's text, or rather, *texts*. For Avicenna understands some passages of the *Metaphysics* in the light of others, and connects some parts of the *Metaphysics* with some parts of the *Categories*. In establishing some of these connections, he can be regarded as the forerunner of modern commentators. Avicenna is probably referring to this method in the Prologue to the *Šifāʾ* where he writes that in this work he is going to provide "a straightforward compendium" in which he wishes "to be concise and always to avoid repetition."[85]

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[85] Ibn Sīnā, *Madḫal*, I, 1, 9.10–16; English translation in Gutas, *Avicenna*, 51.

Appendix

List of occurrences of *huwīya* in the Cairo edition
and their rendering in the Latin, German and French translations
(the occurrences discussed in the article are 14–18)

Ilāhīyāt (ed. Cairo 1960)	Latin tr. (ed. Van Riet)	Horten's German tr.	Anawati's French tr.	proposed translation
(1) I, 7, 47.17 *al-huwiya fī l-wuǧūd* (syn. *ḥaqīqa*, 47.16)	55.53: esse id quod est	77: Individualität in der realen Existenz	1:122: ipséité dans l'existence	essence in concrete existence
(2) III, 5, 121.15	135.31: essentia	189: eigentümliche Natur	1:177: identité	essence
(3) V, 1, 197.10	230.56: essentia; ipsa essentia	288, n. 6: bestimmte Natur	1:234: essence	essence
(4) V, 1, 197.11	230.56: ipsa essentia	288, n. 6: bestimmte Natur	1:234: essence	essence
(5) V, 1, 197.11	230.57: essentia	288: individuelle Wesenheit	1:234: essence	essence
(6) V, 1, 197.11	230.57: essentia	om.	1:234: essence	essence
(7) V, 1, 197.13: *huwīyat al-insānīya*	230.58: ipsa humanitas	288: individuelle Wesenheit des Menschen	1:234: essence	human essence
(8) v, 1, 198.1: *huwīyat al-insānīya*	230.62: ipsa humanitas	289: individuelle Wesenheit des Menschen	1:234: essence	human essence
(9) V, 3, 214.12	248.35: essentia	312: individuelle Natur	1:246: essence	essence
(10) V, 3, 215.10: *fī huwīyatihī*	249.58: per se	314: eigentümliche Wesen	1:246: essence	in its essence
(11) V, 7, 237.7	V, 5, 267.94: esse	344: eigentümliche Wesenheit (n. 1: Individualität)	1:263: essence	essence
(12) V, 7, 237.7	om.	om.	1:263: essence	essence
(13) V, 7, 237.7	om.	om.	1:263: essence	essence
(14) VI, 4, 281.2	322.81: identitas	410: Individualität	2:34: identité	existent

Appendix (*cont.*)

Ilāhīyāt (ed. Cairo 1960)	Latin tr. (ed. Van Riet)	Horten's German tr.	Anawati's French tr.	proposed translation
(15) VII, 1, 303.3 legendum *huwahuwīya*	349.3: identitas	442: Identität	2:51: identité	sameness
(16) VII, 1, 303.5	349.8: identitas	442: Individualität[86]	2:51: identité	existent
(17) VII, 1, 303.6	349.9: identitas	om.	om.	existent
(18) VII, 1, 303.14 legendum *huwahuwīya*	350.21: identitas	443: identität	2:51: identité	sameness
(19) VII, 2, 313.7	362.72: identitas	457: Individualität (n. 1: bestimmte Wesenheit)	2:59: identité	existent [?]
(20) VIII, 4, 348.15	404.89: identitas	506: Individualität	2:89: *huwīya*	essence
(21) VIII, 5, 351.18	408.77: identitas	511: Individualität	2:92: identité	essence
(22) VIII, 6, 357.5	414.11: identitas	518: Individualität	2:96: identité	essence
(23) VIII, 6, 357.6	414.12: identitas	518: Wesen	2:96: identité	essence
(24) VIII, 6, 357.6	414.13: identitas	518: Sein	2:96: identité (*huwīya*)	essence

[86] Horten, 442, translates the Arabic . . . *al-umūri llatī taḫtiṣṣu bi-l-huwīyati min ḥaytu hiya huwīyatun aw talḥaquhā* as ". . . der Dinge, die als individua in eigentlichen Sinne bezeichnet werden, oder denen die Individualität anhaftet." This clearly shows that he understood *huwīya* as "Individualität."

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CHAPTER THREE

TOWARDS A HISTORY OF AVICENNA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT CAUSES*

Robert Wisnovsky

In an article published in 1991, Jean Jolivet argued that Avicenna's distinction between formal and material causes, which are *intrinsic to* or *immanent in* their effect, and final and efficient causes, which are *extrinsic to* or *transcend* their effect, was an original and radical "répartition" of Aristotle's theory of the four causes. This is because Aristotle, according to Jolivet, held that the four causes fell on either side of a more basic distinction, that between matter and form: the material cause fell on the side of the matter, while the formal, efficient and final causes fell on the side of the form.[1]

In my article—which satisfies the "Before" rather than "After" Avicenna criterion of this book's title—I argue that the immanent/transcendent distinction which Jolivet detects was not in fact original to Avicenna, but can be found in earlier Neoplatonic treatises and commentaries on Plato's and Aristotle's works. To be precise, the distinction between immanent and transcendent causes emerged over the course of several generations of Neoplatonic thinkers, starting with Plutarch of Athens (d. 432), and developing with his student Syrianus (d.c. 437); Syrianus' student Proclus (d.c. 485); Proclus' student Ammonius (d.c. 514); and Ammonius' students Asclepius (fl. 525) and Philoponus (d.c. 570), through whose "dictated" (ἀπὸ φωνῆς) commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and *Physics*, respectively, we can reconstruct much of Ammonius' own theory of causation.[2]

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[1] J. Jolivet, "La répartition des causes chez Aristote et Avicenne: le sens d'un déplacement," in *Lectionum varietates: Homage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987)*, Études de philosophie médiévale, 65, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), 49–65.

[2] For an introduction to these thinkers, see R. Sorabji, "The ancient commentators

It is often forgotten that these Neoplatonic thinkers were inter-
ested not only in Platonizing Aristotle but also in Aristotelianizing
Plato. A particular challenge for Neoplatonists who aimed to Aris-
totelianize Plato was figuring out how exactly to apply Aristotle's
very useful four-cause theory to the cosmology which they inherited
from Plotinus, and which derived many of its basic principles from
Platonic works such as the *Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, Timaeus* and
Parmenides, the last two of which served as the culmination of the
Neoplatonic curriculum. Arguing that Aristotle's four causes could
be divided along immanent/transcendent lines was crucial to the
Neoplatonists' attempt to face this challenge. When the Neoplatonists
were not appealing to Aristotle's four-cause theory—now distinguished
along immanent/transcendent lines—in their commentaries on Plato's
works or in their own independent treatises, they applied the imma-
nent/transcendent distinction in their commentaries on passages in
Aristotle's works where Aristotle discusses the four causes. It is a sign
of their interpretive acumen that the Neoplatonic commentators were
able to integrate the immanent/transcendent distinction with Aristotle's
four-cause theory in such a way that it seems a sophisticated, even
compelling, reading of Aristotle's texts.

In short, I hope to prove Jolivet wrong on two points. The first
is his claim that Avicenna's immanent/transcendent distinction is
original; in fact it was first articulated by Greek Neoplatonists. The
second is his claim that the immanent/transcendent distinction in
general represents a radical "déplacement" in understanding Aristotle's
four-cause theory; in fact Aristotle's theory is more underdetermined
than Jolivet makes it out to be, and a division of the four causes
along immanent/transcendent lines is, I would argue, just as war-
ranted as Jolivet's division of the four causes along the lines of mat-
ter and form. I also provide translations, arranged chronologically,
of passages from Avicenna's works where he articulates the imma-
nent/transcendent distinction, and conclude with some tentative obser-
vations on how these articulations of the immanent/transcendent
distinction throw light on his place in the history of philosophy.

It is certainly true, as Jolivet claims, that Aristotle often collapses
the efficient, final and formal causes. For example, when Aristotle
starts talking, in *De Anima* 2.4, about the ways in which the soul is

on Aristotle," in his edited volume, *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (London: Duckworth, 1990), 1–30.

the cause of the body, he maintains that the soul is the cause of the body as efficient cause, as final cause and as formal cause. There he says:

> [This is] because soul is a cause in the three ways we have mentioned above; that is, it is a cause as the origin of motion, and that for the sake of which the body exists, and it is the essence of bodies possessing souls.[3]

Jolivet is also correct to point out that Aristotle maintains that the formal, final and efficient causes often coincide in natural things. For example, in *Physics* 2.7 he says:

> It is clear that the causes are these, and that this is the extent of their number. Since the causes are four, it is the duty of the natural philosopher to know about each of them, and that the question "On account of what?" should be reduced to them such that the response to it is in accordance with the doctrine of natural philosophy; I mean the matter, the form, the mover, and that for the sake of which. Often three of them devolve into one: for what the thing is, is sometimes also that for the sake of which the thing is, as well as the thing from which the motion first comes, and that in a single sense.[4]

This passage, however, was interpreted by most Neoplatonic commentators as implying that the formal and final causes are identical in a stronger sense than the formal and efficient causes are.[5] I shall try to explain, by way of an example, what the commentators had in mind here. The formal cause and final cause of my son's coming-to-be are identical in number because the very same form of humanity instantiated in my son's body at conception serves *both* as a formal cause—as his essence, in other words—*and* as a final cause—as that in view of which the matter that made up his body was set in motion. I, however, am the efficient cause of my son's coming-to-be, with the result that my son and I are identical only in the weak sense

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[3] Aristotle, *DA* 2.4, 415b8–13/Arisṭūṭālīs, *Fī n-Nafs*, Dirāsāt Islāmīya, 16, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1954), 38.3–5.

[4] Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.7, 198a22–28/Arisṭūṭālīs, *aṭ-Ṭabīʿa*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī, (Cairo: ad-Dār al-Qawmīya li-ṭ-Ṭibāʿa wa-n-Našr, 1964), 1:137.15–138.3.

[5] See, for example, Philoponus *In Phys.* 2.7 (*ad* 198a14) [*CAG* XVI, ed. H. Vitelli, Berlin, 1887], 297,30–298,6 and (*ad* 198a24), 301,7–302,3 (tr. A. Lacey, *Philoponus On Aristotle's Physics 2* [London: Duckworth, 1993], 106 and 109–110); and Simplicius *In Phys.* 2.7 (*ad* 198a22) [*CAG* IX, ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1882], 363,32–364,15 and 365,14–18 (tr. B. Fleet, *Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 2* [London: Duckworth, 1997], 126 and 127–8).

that we are both subsumed under the species "human" (that is, we
both possess the form of humanity), and not in the strong (numer-
ical) sense of identity, where the form of human which is currently
instantiated in him is the very same form of human which is cur-
rently instantiated in me.

The notion that the formal and final causes are identical to each
other in a stronger sense than they are to the efficient cause, is sup-
ported in other passages where Aristotle simply collapses the end
into the form. For example, in a passage intended to encourage
philosophers to search for the nearest or most immediate cause of
a thing, Aristotle appeals to his four-cause scheme to explain the
coming-to-be of a human being:

> When it is asked, "What is the cause?" it is necessary, since "cause"
> is spoken of in many ways, that all of the ways in which a cause can
> be, be spoken of. For example, "What is the cause as matter of man?"
> It is the menstrual fluid. The cause as mover? The semen. The cause
> as form? It is the essence. The cause as that for the sake of which?
> It is the end. (It is likely that these two are one thing.)[6]

But while this passage clearly supports a strong identification of the
formal and final causes, it seems to undermine the claim that the
efficient cause is identical to the formal and final causes in only a
weak sense. This is because the example of the efficient cause in this
passage is not the father, but the father's semen. In fact, Aristotle
implies that, strictly speaking, it is not even the father's semen viewed
as a composite of matter and form which is the efficient cause of
the son's coming-to-be, but only the form of humanity contained in
the father's semen. This is because the matter of the father's semen
was not transferred at conception to the son, but dissolved and evap-
orated at conception; the form of humanity contained in the father's
semen, by contrast is transferred to the son (*Generation of Animals* 2.3,
737a8–16).

The result is that the form of humanity which was contained in
my semen and transferred at conception to my son *is* the very same
form of humanity which was instantiated in my son's body at con-
ception and which served as that in view of which the matter that
made up his body was set in motion. It turns out, therefore, that

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[6] Aristotle, *Metaph.* 8.4, 1044a32–b1/Arisṭāṭālīs {ap. Averroem}, *Averroès*, *Tafsir
ma baʿd at-Ṭabīʿat*, ed. M. Bouyges, 3 vols. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938–1948),
2:1073.15–1074.2.

the efficient cause is numerically identical—that is, identical in a strong sense—to the formal and final causes. I suppose it could be argued that although the very same form of humanity contained in my semen came to be instantiated in my son's body at conception, that form of humanity acted as an efficient cause only while it was contained in my semen. Once the form of humanity was transferred from my semen and came to be instantiated in my son's body at conception, it no longer served as his efficient cause, but started to serve as his formal and final cause. This argument is not really cogent, however, for the most one could hope to conclude is that the efficient cause and the formal and final causes are not numerically identical at the same time: before the moment of my son's conception, the form was contained in my semen; after the moment of conception, the form was contained in him. And once employed, the criterion of temporality could just as easily divide the formal cause from the final cause. The final cause—the form of humanity in view of which the matter that made up my son's body was set in motion—operated only during the process of formation. Once that process of formation was completed, the form of humanity, now fully instantiated in my son's body, operated only as a formal cause.

Partly in response to this confusion, Aristotle holds that some efficient causes are intrinsic to their effects, others extrinsic (τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἐνίων μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν ... ἐνίων δ᾽ ἔξω/wa-min hāḏihī l-anwāʿi mā -btidāʾu l-ḥarakati fīhi ... [wa-]min ḫāriǧin).[7] And in other passages Aristotle implies that the semen is not so much an efficient cause as something which the efficient cause (i.e., the father) uses as an instrument (ὡς ὀργάνῳ/miṯla ālatin).[8] To sum up, then, while Aristotle holds that the formal, final and efficient causes may sometimes be reduced to the same thing, it is unclear whether the formal cause can be identified in a stronger way with the final cause than either can with the efficient cause. It seems that this is true if the efficient cause is something extrinsic to the effect, such as a father is to his son; but false if the efficient cause is something intrinsic to the effect, such as the form of humanity contained in the father's semen and transferred at conception to the son.

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[7] *GA* 1.18, 724a31–35/*Fī Kawn al-ḥayawān*, ed. J. Brugmann and H.J. Drossaart Lulofs in *Generation of Animals: the Arabic translation commonly ascribed to Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq*, Publication of the De Goeje Fund, 23 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), 29.13–16.

[8] *GA* 1.22, 730b20/*Fī Kawn al-ḥayawān*, 47.7.

Even the apparently strong identification of the formal and final causes can be undermined. Philoponus points out in his comments on the *Physics* 2.7 passage above that it is only a particular category of final cause which can be identified with the formal. Aristotle holds that the final cause—that for the sake of which—can be spoken of in two ways: in the genitive, as "that in view of which"; and in the dative, as "that for the benefit of which." Aristotle articulates the distinction in *De Anima* 2.4 (τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ/*wa-maʿnā min aǧli ʿalá wiǧhatayni iḥdāhumā lahū wa-l-uḫrā fīhi*) and *Metaphysics* 12.7 (ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ⟨καὶ⟩ τινός/*wa-ḏālika anna mā min aǧlihī yūǧadu li-šayʾin wa-li-ḏī šayʾin*), and also alludes to it in *Physics* 2.2 and *Eudemian Ethics* 8.3.[9] Aristotle's distinction is very compressed and far from transparent. In the *Physics*, the distinction is introduced to show that nature is similar to art in that the form— "that in view of which" an artifact is created, such as the shape of an axe—must be taken into account by the natural philosopher, and not just the matter. Nature is also like art because the matter the artisan uses in creating the artifact is determined by the use which the customer—"that for the benefit of which"—makes of the artifact, given its form. Thus an axe is made of iron and not clay, given the function—cutting—which the form "axe" represents to the person who benefits from using it. By Philoponus' reckoning, therefore, the final cause and the formal cause are identical only if one is speaking of the final cause as "that in view of which."

In another very important case, the final cause cannot be held to be identical to the formal cause: the Unmoved Mover is the final cause of celestial activity, but It is not the formal cause or essence of the spheres. Because the Unmoved Mover is not confined to a material body, and because form, by Aristotle's reckoning (*Physics* 2.1, 193b4–5), is never separable from matter in the real world, but only when speaking in purely logical terms (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), the Unmoved Mover cannot be a formal cause. In other words, because

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[9] *DA* 2.4, 415b2/Aristūṭālīs, *Fī n-Nafs*, 37.15–16; and *Metaph.* 12.7, 1072b2–3/ Aristāṭālīs {ap. Averroem}, Averroès, *Tafsīr ma baʿd aṭ-Ṭabīʿat*, 3:1599.3 (reading *li-ḏī* for Bouyges' *li-ḏā*); cf. *Phys.* 2.2, 194a35–36 and *EE* 8.3, 1249b9–19. In the Arabic version of Themistius' *Paraphrase of the De Anima*, the distinction appears as *wa-llaḏī bi-sababihī yuqālu ʿalá ḍarbayni aḥaduhumā allaḏī min qibalihī wa-l-āḫaru allaḏī lahū*: Themistius, *In DA* 2.4 (*ad* 415b2–3), 50,11/*Šarḥ Kitāb an-Nafs li-Arisṭūṭālīs*, ed. M. Lyons in *An Arabic Translation of Themistius' Commentary on Aristoteles De Anima*, Oriental Studies, II (Columbia, South Carolina: Cassirer, 1973), 68.12–13.

Aristotle holds that the Unmoved Mover acts on Its effects as a final cause, and because the Unmoved Mover is separate from matter, there must therefore be *some* final causes which are separate from matter and hence not collapsible into formal causes.

A commentator could fairly infer from this that whenever a final cause is found to operate in the divine, superlunary world of eternal being, it will be separate from matter and therefore distinct from formal causes. By contrast, final causes which are found to operate in the natural, sublunary world of coming-to-be and passing-away, will be inseparable from matter and will usually, though not always, be collapsible into formal causes. A commentator could further infer that a final cause, when it is taken in itself—that is, when it is *not* collapsible into the formal cause—will be separate *from matter*.

Does the criterion of separateness also apply to the efficient cause? As mentioned above, Aristotle divides efficient causes into those that are intrinsic to their effects and those that are extrinsic to their effects. Given Aristotle's implication that in the case of a son's coming-to-be, the father is the true efficient cause while his semen is his instrument; and given the fact that Aristotle bases his distinction between male and female on the fact that the male is that which generates into another (εἰς ἕτερον/*fī ġayrihī*), while the female is that which generates into itself (εἰς αὐτό/*fī dātihī*) and is that out of which the generated thing is produced while remaining present in it (καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται ἐνυπάρχον ἐν τῷ γεννῶντι τὸ γεννώμενον/[this clause is missing in the Arabic]);[10] a commentator could fairly infer that taken in itself, an efficient cause will be separate *from its effect*.

Adding to the weight of evidence prompting a commentator to hold that an efficient cause is separate from its effect is the fact that in the lines immediately following the *Physics* 2.7 passage above (198a26–31), Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the type of moving cause which can be identified with the formal and final causes, and the type of moving cause which cannot. Only those moving causes which are also *moved by another*, Aristotle claims, will be at all identifiable with the formal and final causes. A commentator could fairly infer that a moving cause which is *unmoved*, by contrast, will not be identifiable with the formal and final causes.

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[10] *GA* 1.2, 716a18–23/*Fī Kawn al-ḥayawān*, 4.12–15.

Although the latter category probably refers to the Unmoved
Mover, which by Aristotle's reckoning acted as a final cause, the
context in which it is introduced is so clearly focused on the efficient
cause that Neoplatonic commentators such as Simplicius seized upon
it as one way to justify the view that Aristotle held God to be an
efficient as well as a final cause. Their reasoning seems to have run
as follows: given that a moving cause which is identifiable with the
formal and final causes will itself be moved by another; given that
a moving cause which is moved by another is distinct from a mov-
ing cause which is itself unmoved; given that a moving cause which
is itself unmoved will be the Unmoved Mover, or at least something
superlunary, divine and eternal; given that when Aristotle uses the
term "moving cause" he is usually referring to the efficient cause;
and given that what is superlunary, divine and eternal is separate
from matter; therefore, there will be one type of efficient cause—a
moving cause which is not moved by another—which is extrinsic or
transcendent in the sense that it is separate *from matter*, as well as in
the sense, mentioned just above, that it is separate *from its effect*.

Aristotle's distinction in *Physics* 2.7 between moving causes which
are moved by another and moving causes which are unmoved, and
his description of semen as an instrument in *GA* 1.22, also served
as evidence by which various Neoplatonic commentators could jus-
tify their distinction between the Middle Platonists' instrumental cause
and a true efficient cause. Instrumental causes operate in the nat-
ural, sublunary world of coming-to-be and passing-away, while true
efficient causes operate in the divine, superlunary world of eternal
being.[11] Simplicius traces the distinction to Alexander.[12] Philoponus,
by contrast, claims that Aristotle allows for the instrumental cause
only insofar as it is identifiable with the material cause, that is, in
the sense in which the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* uses matter as an
instrument.[13]

My general point in performing all this Aristotelian exegesis is
simply that Jolivet's analysis of Aristotle's own "répartition" of the

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[11] On the history of the instrumental cause, see R.J. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation
in Ancient Greek Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 342 and 380–381.
[12] Ap. Simplicium *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 194b29), 315,12–18; (*ad* 194b32), 316,6–14;
and (*ad* 195a3), 317,23–28 (tr. Fleet, *Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 2*, 72–73, 74,
and 75).
[13] Philoponus *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 194b16), 241,15–242,3 (tr. Lacey, *Philoponus On
Aristotle's Physics 2*, 53–54).

four causes along the lines of matter and form systematizes Aristotle's thought to an unwarranted degree. In other words, Jolivet's claim that Aristotle divides his four causes along the lines of a more basic distinction between matter and form is undermined by the evidence in Aristotle which implies, first of all, that the identification of the formal, final and efficient causes in natural things must be heavily qualified; and second, that there is an important category of final and efficient causes—namely, those final and efficient causes that are *not* subject to coming-to-be and passing-away—which are extrinsic or transcendent in some sense, either in the sense of being separate *from matter*, or in the sense of being separate *from their effect*. What is more, a commentator could argue that this category of final and efficient cause—those that are extrinsic or transcendent—represents what final and efficient causes are *in themselves*, because it is only this category of final and efficient causes which cannot be identified, in either a strong or weak way, with the formal cause.

Part of what prompted the Neoplatonists to focus on those passages in Aristotle which support the idea that the final and efficient causes are extrinsic or transcendent, was their desire to create a category of form which was also extrinsic or transcendent, at least in the sense of being separate *from matter*. Although Aristotle, as I mentioned above, clearly held that the form was inseparable from matter except when speaking in purely logical terms, the Neoplatonists were committed to the Platonic notion that forms down here in the natural, sublunary world of coming-to-be and passing-away are mere imitations of Forms or Ideas up there in the divine, superlunary world of eternal being. Since Aristotle's formal cause seemed to them to be hopelessly trapped in matter, the Neoplatonists invented a new category of cause—the paradigmatic cause—to accommodate the eternal Ideas. Proclus claims that the Academician Xenocrates was the first to come up with the idea of the paradigmatic cause and to identify it with the Ideas, thereby establishing the Ideas as a separate and divine cause.[14]

It is often unclear whether the Ideas are meant to cause their effects *solely* as paradigmatic causes; or as efficient and final causes

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[14] χωριστὴν αὐτὴν καὶ θείαν αἰτίαν: Proclus, *In Parm.*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris, 1864), 888,36–38 (tr. G. Morrow and J. Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987], 249); Hankinson is sceptical of Proclus' attribution: *Cause and Explanation*, 326–327 and 351.

as well, with their efficient causality directed towards their effect inso-
far as their effect is viewed as "proceeding" (πρόοδος), their para-
digmatic causality directed towards their effect insofar as their effect
is viewed as "abiding" (μονή), and their final causality directed towards
their effect insofar as their effect is viewed as "reverting" (ἐπιστροφή).
But because of this very ambiguity—because the Ideas could be seen
as paradigmatic causes, or variously as efficient, paradigmatic or final
causes—the transcendence enjoyed by the Ideas reinforced the notion
that *all* efficient, paradigmatic and final causes enjoy the quality of
being extrinsic or transcendent. The notion that all efficient, para-
digmatic and final causes are extrinsic or transcendent was further
reinforced by the evidence in Aristotle, mentioned above, which
allowed the commentators to infer that *in themselves*—in a strict or
proper sense, that is—efficient and final causes are extrinsic or tran-
scendent, either in the sense of being separate from matter or sep-
arate from their effect.

The Neoplatonists employed the transcendent/immanent distinc-
tion as a criterion in two ways. The first was to distinguish the *domain*
in which the final, paradigmatic and efficient causes operate, from
the *domain* in which the formal, instrumental and material causes
operate. That is to say, the final, paradigmatic and efficient causes
are transcendent in the sense that they are separate from matter,
and should therefore be seen to operate (at least immediately) only
in the divine, superlunary world of eternal being, a world which is
intelligible but not material. The formal, instrumental and material
causes, by contrast, are immanent in matter and should therefore
be seen to operate only in the natural, sublunary world of coming-
to-be and passing-away, a world which is mired in matter. Because
in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being the immaterial is higher and
the material lower; because to be higher in the Neoplatonic hierar-
chy of being can be reduced to the possession of a greater degree
of causality, while to be lower can be reduced to the possession of
a lesser degree of causality;[15] and because the final, paradigmatic
and efficient causes transcended matter while the formal, instrumental

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[15] Here I am convinced by the argument of D. O'Meara ("The hierarchical
ordering of reality in Plotinus," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. L. Gerson
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 66–81) that terms such as "higher"
and "lower," when applied to Neoplatonic cosmologies, are unhelpful and can even
be misleading; and that they ought, in fact, to be reduced to "causally prior" and
"causally posterior."

and material causes were either immanent in or simply consisted in matter; the Neoplatonists held that final, paradigmatic and efficient causes were causes in a proper sense (κυρίως), while the formal, instrumental and material causes were mere causal factors or conjoint causes (συναίτια), that is, causes in a derivative rather than in a strict sense.[16]

In his commentary on the *Parmenides*, Proclus claims that Plutarch of Athens, the teacher of Proclus' own teacher Syrianus (Proclus refers to Plutarch as his "grandfather," Syrianus being his "father"), invented the distinction between transcendent causes, which are causes in a proper sense, and immanent causes, which are really only conjoint causes. According to Proclus, Plutarch claimed that Parmenides' five hypotheses can be divided into three about "One" and two about "Non-existence" or "Others." The first hypothesis is about God, the second about Intellect, the third about Soul, the fourth about enmattered form, and the fifth about matter. Numbers 1, 2 and 3 are transcendent causes, while 4 and 5 are not transcendent causes but rather the above-mentioned conjoint causes, a category of cause first distinguished by Plato in the *Phaedo*, which Proclus cites here.[17] Proclus approvingly concludes (*In Parm.* 1061,8–10) that there

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[16] Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 13.1 (*ad* 1076a10) [*CAG* VI/1, ed. W. Kroll, Berlin, 1902], 82,2–13 and 14.5 (*ad* 1079b24), 118,25–26; Proclus, *In Parm.*, 983,1–3 (following, with Morrow and Dillon, Westerink's suggestion of τελικὰ for Cousin's τέλεια καὶ; see Morrow and Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, 336); *In Tim.*, Vol. 1, ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig, 1903, 2,1–4,5; 4,26–28; 17,15–30 (tr. A. Festugière, *Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée* [Paris: J. Vrin, 1966–8], 1:24–26, 27, and 45); 263,19–264,3 (tr. Festugière, 2:104–105); and Vol. 3, ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig, 1906, 126,11–13 (tr. Festugière, 4:162). At Proclus, *In Tim.*, Vol. 1, 239,24–240,1 (tr. Festugière, 2:71–72), and Vol. 3, 226,10–18 (tr. Festugière, 5:89), the efficient cause is referred to as ὑφ' οὗ, the paradigmatic as πρὸς ὅ, and the final as δι' ὅ, this being an example of what is sometimes called the "prepositional metaphysics" of the Neoplatonists. The prepositional scheme reappears in Simplicius, *In Phys.* 1.1 (*ad* 184a10), 10,32–11,5, and is applied to the αἴτια κυρίως/συναίτια distinction in Philoponus, *In Phys.* 1.1 (*ad* 184a10), 5,7–25.

[17] Proclus, *In Parm.* 1058,21–1059,19 (tr. Morrow and Dillon, 414–415). Plato hints at the distinction between true causes and συναίτια at *Phaedo* 99B2–4; *Gorgias* 519B1–2; and *Statesman* 281D11–E10; 287B6–8; 287C7–8; the distinction is articulated most explicitly at *Timaeus* 46C7–47A1 and 76D4–8. Because Proclus read the *Phaedo* with Plutarch, and the *Timaeus* with Syrianus (Marinus, *Vita Procli*, chapters 12 and 13; cited by Sorabji, "The ancient commentators on Aristotle," 7), it is difficult to determine whether Proclus learned of the distinction between transcendent causes, which are causes in a strict sense, and immanent causes, which are conjoint causal factors, directly from Plutarch (i.e., when reading the *Phaedo*) or indirectly through Syrianus (i.e., when reading the *Timaeus*).

are four principles after the first, two transcendent and two con-
joined (τέσσαρες οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ μετὰ τὴν μίαν δύο μὲν ἐξηρημέναι δύο
δὲ συμπληρωτικαί).

The second way the Neoplatonists employed the transcendent/imma-
nent distinction as a criterion was not in order to distinguish between
the *domains* in which different causes operate but rather to distin-
guish between *types* of cause. Sometimes, as I just explained, the
Neoplatonists used the transcendent/immanent distinction to buttress
their rigid assignment of domains to each set of causes, with tran-
scendence as the criterion by which the final, paradigmatic and
efficient causes were judged to operate in the divine, superlunary
world of eternal being, and immanence as the criterion by which
formal, instrumental and material causes were judged to operate in
the natural, sublunary world of coming-to-be and passing-away.
(Occasionally the different causes were held to occupy even more
rigidly assigned *stations* within each domain, with, to take the super-
lunary world as an example, the final causality of the Good at the
top, the paradigmatic causality of the Ideas in the middle, and the
efficient causality of the Demiurge at the bottom.)

Other times, however, the Neoplatonists' use of the transcen-
dent/immanent distinction took the form of a general law, accord-
ing to which final and efficient causes *in general* are extrinsic or
transcendent, while formal and material causes *in general* are intrin-
sic or immanent. In most cases the Neoplatonists turned to this sec-
ond way of employing the transcendent/immanent distinction when
they were not constructing their own theories in independent trea-
tises or commenting on one of Plato's texts, but were instead com-
menting on one of Aristotle's texts.[18]

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[18] Dexippus, *In Cat.* [*CAG* IV/2, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1888], 7,16 (τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων
ἃ μέν ἐστιν ἔξω χωριστά ἃ δὲ συμπάρεστιν); Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 13.10 (*ad* 1086b14),
162,25–27 (ὅμως δὲ οὐχ εἷς ὁ λόγος περὶ πασῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν στοιχειώδεις
ἀχώριστοι, αἱ ⟨δὲ⟩ κυρίως ἀρχαὶ χωρισταί); Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* Vol. 3.2, ed./tr.
H. Saffrey and L. Westerink, *Theologie platonicienne* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978),
11,10–11 (πρὸ τῶν συντεταγμένων αἰτίων τὰ ἐξηρημένα); Vol. 5.2, ed./tr. Saffrey/
Westerink, ib. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1987), 13,19–20 (τὰς μὲν ἐξηρημένας
αἰτίας . . . τὰς δὲ συντεταγμένας); 5.16, 53,19–20 (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐξηρημένως αἴτιός ἐστι
τῶν ἀπογεννωμένων, ὁ δὲ προσεχῶς); Philoponus, *In DA* 1.1 (*ad* 402a21) [*CAG* XV,
ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1897], 32,18–19 (ἀλλ' αὗται μὲν ἀρχαὶ συντεταγμέναι καὶ
οἷον στοιχειώδεις εἰσὶν ἀρχαί, τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον ἐξηρημένα); *In
Meteor.* 1.2 (*ad* 339a21) [*CAG* XIV/1, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1901], 11,8–11 (δῆλον
γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἐξηρημένον αἴτιον κυρίῳ ἐστὶ πρῶτον αἴτιον. . . . πρῶτον οὖν ἐστι τὸ

Applying this law to Aristotle's texts required less effort than might be expected, even given the ambiguities discussed in the first part of this article. For though Aristotle himself nowhere makes a canonical distinction between transcendent and immanent causes, in *Physics* 2.3 he contrasts the material cause and the efficient cause, saying that the material cause is "present in" or "immanent in" (ἐνυπάρχον) its effect.[19] Philoponus, perhaps following the implication—discussed above—of the *GA*, took the next step, stating explicitly that in contrast to the material cause, the efficient cause comes to its effect from outside (ἔξωθεν).[20]

Aristotle himself fleshes out the implication of *Physics* 2.3 when, in *Metaphysics* 5.1, he comes close to articulating a distinction between principles that are present in (ἐνυπάρχον) their effects, and principles that are not present in (μὴ ἐνυπάρχον) and thus extrinsic to (ἐκτός) their effects.[21] And while it is not really clear that Aristotle meant for the distinction to be applied to anything other than the difference between material and the efficient principles, Alexander of Aphrodisias extended the category of μὴ ἐνυπάρχον to cover final causes as well as efficient causes.[22] With Alexander now providing some Peripatetic cover, Syrianus, Proclus, Ammonius, Asclepius, Philoponus and Simplicius then paired the formal and material causes (that is, the "conjoint" or "contributory" causes), claiming that they are present in their effects, in contrast to the final and efficient causes (that is, the causes "in a proper sense") which are extrinsic to their effects.[23]

συντεταγμένον αἴτιον ὁ οὐρανός); and Simplicius, *In Cat.* (*ad* 1b25) [*CAG* VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Berlin, 1907], 66,2–3 (μήποτε οὖ, διττῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μὲν συντεταγμένης τῆς δὲ ἐξηρημένης). The Neoplatonists' use of the term συντεταγμένον appears to derive from Plato, *Laws* 930B6 and D3–4.

[19] ἐνυπάρχοντος at *Phys.* 2.3, 194b24/*wa-huwa fīhi*, Aristūtālīs, *aṭ-Ṭabīʿa*, 101.1.

[20] Philoponus *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 194b23), 243,29–244,3 (ἔξωθεν appears at 244,1).

[21] ἐνυπάρχοντος at *Metaph.* 5.1, 1013a4/*wa-huwa fī š-šayʾi* at *Tafsīr ma baʿd at-Ṭabīʿat*, 2:473.8, and μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος at 1013a7/*wa-laysa huwa fīhi* at *Tafsīr ma baʿd aṭ-Ṭabīʿat*, 2:474.3; τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός at *Metaph.* 5.1, 1013a19–20/*wa-baʿḍu l-ibtidāʾāti fī l-ašyāʾi wa-baʿḍuhā hiya ḫāriǧa* at *Tafsīr ma baʿd at-Ṭabīʿat*, 2:474.11–12.

[22] Alexander, *In Metaph.* 5.1 (*ad* 1012b34) [*CAG* I, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1891], 345,37–346,16 (tr. W. Dooley, *Alexander of Aphrodisias On Aristotle Metaphysics 5* [London: Duckworth, 1993], 13–14).

[23] See Syrianus (whose commentary on Book 3 of the *Metaphysics* was translated into Arabic; see al-Qifṭī, *Taʾrīḫ al-Hukamāʾ*, ed. J. Lippert [Leipzig: Th. Weicher, 1903], 42.6), *In Metaph.* 3.1 (*ad* 995b27), 7,8–10 (where he cites Alexander as the source of the distinction); and 3.2 (*ad* 996a21), 13,30–14,38; Proclus, *Inst. Theol.*, ed./tr. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), Prop. 75, 70,28–72,4; *In Tim.*,

The Neoplatonic effort to integrate the immanent/transcendent distinction with Aristotle's four-cause theory emerged in early Arabic philosophy, where the first evidence I can find of the distinction is contained in al-Fārābī's lost commentary on the *Physics*, an epitome of which is preserved in Latin. There al-Fārābī distinguishes between matter and form, which are inside the thing which they cause, and the agent and end, which are outside: *materia et forma (que due sunt intra rem) et agens et finis (que due sunt extra rem)*.[24]

In his article Jolivet cited and discussed a number of passages where Avicenna articulates the immanent/transcendent distinction. What I shall now do is provide translations of those passages in the chronological order suggested by Gutas;[25] and add to the passages cited by Jolivet two more passages, one from Avicenna's first treatment of four-cause theory, in the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*, his earliest philosophical *summa*, and the other from the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya*. I shall then make some tentative suggestions about how Avicenna's thought on this issue may have progressed, and what that progression tells us about his place in the history of philosophy.

1) *Al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*[26]

"Origin" (*al-mabdaʾ*) is that upon which a thing's existence depends, either its matter, if it is material; or its form, if it is composed of mat-

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Vol. 1, 237,9–11 and 239,24–240,1 (tr. Festugière, op. cit., 2:68 and 71–72); Vol. 3, 196,14–16 and 202,13–14 (tr. Festugière, 5:54–55 and 61); Asclepius, *In Metaph.* 1.9 (*ad* 991a8) [*CAG* VI/2, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1888], 84,7–33 and (*ad* 991a19) 87,29–30; 5.1 (*ad* 1013a17), 305,2–17 (where the distinction is stated most canonically: some principles—the formal and material—are present in the effect [αἰ μεν ἐνυπάρχουσι], while others—the final and efficient—are extrinsic to the effect [αἰ δὲ ἐκτὸς]); Philoponus, *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 194b16), 241,3–5, and implied at *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 195a26), 252,19–21 (tr. Lacey, op. cit., 53 and 64); Simplicius, *In Phys.* 2.3 (*ad* 195a3), 316,22–29 (tr. Fleet, op. cit., 74).

[24] Al-Fārābī, *Epitome of Aristotle's Physics*, ed. A. Birkenmajer, "Eine wiedergefundene Übersetzung Gerhards von Cremona," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Suppl.* 3.1 (1935), 475.7–8.

[25] D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, 4 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 145 (and 79–145 *passim*).

[26] Unlike many other sections of the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*, this passage is not copied in *an-Naǧāt*. The following is a transcription of the passage (MS Uppsala Or. 364, 4v16–5r5):

المبدأ هو ما يتعلق | وجود الشيء به وهو اما مادّته ان كان مادّياً واما صورته ان كان مركّباً || من مادّة وصورة
واما غايته ان كان لغاية ما وجد والمُيَسِّر والمُعين | والاّلة تلتحق بالفاعل والمثال لنقصان ذات الفاعل عن ان
يصدر عنه | ‹وَ› يوجد منه ما هوَ الفعل ‹وَ› الجوهر المركّب له سببان مقارنان مادّته وصورته | وسببان
مفارقان فاعله وغايته والعرض له ثلثة اسباب ليس | فيها الصورة والصورة والمفارقات لها سببان الفاعل
والغاية *

ter and form; or its end, if it exists for some end; whereas that which facilitates and particularizes, and the instrument, attach as concomitants to the agent; and the paradigm [exists] because of that very agent's imperfection with respect to the act's issuing and existing from it. A composite substance has two conjoint causes (*sababāni muqārināni*)—its matter and its form—and two transcendent causes (*sababāni mufāraqāni*)—its agent and its end. An accident has three causes, of which form is not one. Form and the separate [substances] have two causes: agent and end.

2) *Kitāb al-Hidāya*[27]

140.2–4: Every composite thing which comes-to-be has a cause. The cause is either an agent, or a receptor, or a form in the composite, or an end for the sake of which it exists, since the instrument and the paradigm perfect the agent as an agent in act (*iḏi l-ālatu wa-l-miṯālu yukmilāni l-fāʿila fāʿilan bi-l-fiʿl*).

237.4–5: Forms are causes as well as effects. But they are causes in association (*bi-l-mulāqāti*), since they necessitate the existence of what they are associated with, not what they are distinct from (*fa-innahā tūǧibu wuǧūda ma tulāqīhi dūna mā tubāyinuhū*).

243.5–244.3: The effect of each one [of the four causes] is either conjoined with that very [cause] (*muqārinuhū fī ḏātihī*) or is not like this. A conjoined effect is either such that the cause is a part of its constitution (*ǧuzʾu qiwāmihī*) or not. If the cause is a part of its constitution, then either [the part] is such that, left to itself, it is potentially an effect, such as wood for a chair, and [this] is the matter; or it is such that its coming-to-be necessitates the effect's being actual—such as "bedness"—and [this] is the form. If it [the cause] is not a part, then the effect cannot possibly be a part of it [i.e., of the cause], since a part is a constituent, but will instead be conjoined, without being a part of the constitution of the very thing it is conjoined to. And [such a thing] is either an accident, whose cause is the substrate; or the matter, whose cause is the form. Now that [kind of cause] which is separate (*mufāraqun*) without being accidental is either [that] for the sake of [which], namely the end, or that from which but not for the sake of which, namely the agent.

3) *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*[28]

Every cause is either a part of that of which it is a cause, or it is not (*kullu sababin immā an yakūna ǧuzʾan mimmā huwa sababun aw lā yakūna*). If it *is* a part, either it is that part of [the effect's] existence which, [when viewed] in isolation, bestows actuality on that of which it is a

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part; or it is that part of [the effect's] existence which, [when viewed] in isolation, bestows potentiality. That which bestows potentiality—that is, [that] by which a thing is potential and [that] in which a thing's potentiality is contained—is its "matter" and "*hylê*"; the other, which renders it necessary and is one of the causes which render [their effects] necessary, is called a "form." The causality of that which is *not* a part is directed at the subsistence of that other [that is, directed at the subsistence of the form] while itself either being distinct [from that form] or connected [to that form] (*bi-mubāyanati dātihī aw bi-muwāṣalati dātihī*). That which is [so] while itself being connected is called a "substrate"; while that which is [so] while itself being distinct either gives existence to that which is distinct from it by being [that] for the sake of which [the effect exists], or it does not. That for the sake of which the distinct [effect's] existence is dependent is called an "end"; and what is not that for whose sake [the distinct effect's existence is dependent] is an "agent." Both are causes which render [their effects] necessary.

4) *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ: al-Ilāhīyāt*[29]

We say that a thing's cause must either be intrinsic to its constitution and a part of its existence, or not (*immā an yakūna dāḫilan fī qiwāmihī wa-ǧuzʾan min wuǧūdihī aw lā yakūna/vel est intra essentiam rei et pars esse eius vel non*). If it is intrinsic to [the thing's] constitution and a part of its existence, then either it is the part on account of whose existence alone it is not necessary that [the thing] be in actuality, but rather only in potentiality, and is called "*hylê*"; or it is the part whose existence is identical to the [thing's] coming to be in actuality, and is "form." If it is not a part of [the thing's] existence, then either it is that for whose sake [the thing] is, or it is not. If it is that for whose sake [the thing] is, it is the "end." If it is not that for whose sake [the thing] is, then either [the thing's] existence comes from it with it not being contained in [the thing] except in an accidental way—and is the "agent"—or [the thing's] existence comes from it with it being contained in [the thing], and is also the "element" or "substrate."

5) *Kitāb an-Naǧāt*[30]

What is more, [a principle] must be either like a part of that whose effect it is, or not like a part. If it is like a part, it is either a part as a result of whose coming-to-be in actuality it does not follow that what is its effect exists in actuality (this being the element) . . . or [it is a part] as a result of whose existence in actuality the existence of its

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[29] Ed. M.Y. Mūsá, S. Dunyā and S. Zāʾid (Cairo: Wizārat aṭ-Ṭaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1380/1960), 258.1–8/Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina V–X*, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: E. Peters, 1980), 292.27–36.
   [30] Cairo, 1913, 344.2–14.

effect in actuality follows necessarily (this being the form). . . . If it is not like a part then it is either distinct from or associated with the effect itself (*immā an yakūna mubāyinan aw mulāqiyan li-ḏāti l-maʿlūl*). If it is associated, either the effect will be qualified by it (this being like the form for the matter [i.e., as opposed to the form for the composite]), or it will be qualified by the effect (this being like the substrate for the accident). If it is distinct, it will either be that from which the effect's existence comes, while not being that for whose sake [the effect's] existence is (this being the agent); or it will not be that from which [the effect's] existence [comes], but instead be that for whose sake [the effect's] existence is (this being the end).

6) *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī: Ilāhīyāt*[31]

There are two types of cause, one which is contained in the effect itself (*andar ḏāt-i maʿlūl*) of which it is a part, and another which is extrinsic to the effect itself (*bīrūn az ḏāt-i maʿlūl*) of which it is not a part. The cause which is contained in the effect itself is of but two types. . . . One is called the elemental cause, and the other is called the formal cause. The cause which is extrinsic to the thing is either a cause for whose sake the thing is, or it is not a cause for whose sake the thing is, but is instead that from which [the thing] is. The former is called the final or perfecting cause . . . while the other is called the efficient cause.

7) *Ar-Risāla al-ʿAršīya fī ḥaqāʾiq at-tawḥīd wa-iṯbāt an-nubūwa*[32]

A thing's cause is either intrinsic to its constitution and a part of its existence (*dāḫilan fī qiwāmihī wa-ǧuzʾan min wuǧūdihī*) or it is extrinsic to it (*ḫāriǧan ʿanhu*). If it is intrinsic, it will either be the part in respect

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[31] *Ilāhīyāt-i Dānišnāmah*, Silsilah-yi intišārāt-i anǧumān-i āṯār-i millī, Yādgār-i ǧašn-i hazārah-yi Abū ʿAlī Sīnā, Collection du millénaire d'Avicenne, 15, ed. M. Muʿīn (Tehran: Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1331Š/1951), 53.9–54.9.

[32] Ed. I Hilāl, Cairo, s.n., 18.5–11. In private correspondence David Reisman has alerted me to pieces of terminological, conceptual and grammatical evidence which cause him to suspect that the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* which we have before us today in Hilāl's edition is not Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAršīya* but instead a later work, probably from the Išrāqī tradition. These pieces of evidence are compelling, and I too now wonder whether the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* should in fact be assigned to Avicenna. But my general sense (admittedly unproven) is that later Islamic philosophical texts almost always presented the distinction between efficient and final causes on the one hand, and formal and material causes on the other, in terms of the *Išārāt*'s causes-of-existence/causes-of-essence distinction, rather than in terms of the transcendent/immanent distinction found in Avicenna's earlier works. Therefore the fact that the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* passage offers us the transcendent/immanent distinction (not to mention that it articulates the distinction in a very similar way to the *Šifāʾ*) makes me inclined, in the absence of decisive evidence otherwise, to uphold its attribution to Avicenna.

of which the thing is potential and not actual, namely the matter; or it will be the part in respect of which the thing comes to be actual, namely the form. If it is extrinsic, it will have to be either that from which the thing's existence comes, namely the agent; or it will be that for whose sake the thing's existence is, namely the purpose and end.

8) *Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*[33]

Warning: Something may be caused with reference to its essence and its inner reality (*bi-ʿtibāri māhīyatihī wa-ḥaqīqatihī*), and it may be caused in its existence (*fī wuǧūdihī*). You can consider the triangle as an example of this. Its inner reality is causally dependent on the plane and the line which is its side, both of which constitute it inasmuch as it is a triangle and possesses the inner reality of triangularity, as if the two were its material and formal causes. As far as its existence is concerned, [the triangle] is sometimes dependent on a cause other than these, one which is not a cause that constitutes its triangularity and that is a part of its definition. This is the efficient cause, or the final, which is the efficient cause of the efficient cause.

To my mind what is striking about the preceding passages is that a major shift can be detected between Avicenna's first articulation of the distinction between formal and material causes on the one hand, and final and efficient causes on the other, and his last articulation of that distinction. Avicenna's first articulation of the distinction, in the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya* passage, is contained in a brief discussion of the term *mabdaʾ*, "origin" or "principle," corresponding to the Greek ἀρχή. This gives us a hint that Avicenna viewed the distinction between immanent and transcendent causes as part of a tradition of interpreting *Metaphysics* 5.1, Aristotle's own discussion of ἀρχή. In fact, the metaphysics section of the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya* appears in general to be a version of the "philosophical lexicon" Aristotle offers in *Metaphysics* 5. In addition to *mabdaʾ*, terms such as "potentiality" (*qūwa*/δύναμις: *Metaph.* 5.12), "activity" (*fiʿl*), "necessary" (*wāǧib*/ἀναγκαῖον: *Metaph.* 5.5), "eternal" (*qadīm*), "perfect" (*tāmm*/τέλειον: *Metaph.* 5.16), "universal" (*kullī*/ὅλον: *Metaph.* 5.26) and "prior" (*qabla*/πρότερα: *Metaph.* 5.11) are discussed.

All the other passages—apart from the one from the *Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*—are simply reworkings of the distinction first articulated in the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*. The only conspicuous change is that Avicenna

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[33] Ed. J. Forget, *Ibn Sīnā: Le Livre des théorèmes et des avertissements* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1892), 139.14–20.

includes the Neoplatonists' instrumental and paradigmatic causes in the earliest treatments of the four causes, that is, in the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya* and the *Hidāya*, but discards them in subsequent works. As a result, the *Hidāya* passage can be seen to link Avicenna's earliest works, such as the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*, with those of his middle period, such as the *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, Kitāb an-Naǧāt* and *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī*. (What many of the middle-period works also have in common—unlike the *Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya*—is the further distinction between matter as cause and substrate as cause, a distinction which Avicenna may have inherited from Simplicius, who in turn traces its provenance to Alexander and ultimately to Boethus, the pupil of Aristotle's editor, Andronicus of Rhodes.)[34]

Most remarkable, however, is the fact that in the *Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt* passage, Avicenna's final articulation of the distinction, the formal and material causes are held to be distinct from the final and efficient causes not because the former pair is intrinsic to or immanent in the effect, while the latter pair is extrinsic to or transcends the effect. Instead, the criterion by which the two pairs of causes are judged to be distinct now consists in the fact that the formal and material causes are held to be causes of *essence*, while the final and efficient causes are held to be causes of *existence*. In other words, Avicenna now appeals to his own, more basic distinction between essence and existence, in order to supply the foundation on which formal and material causes can be distinguished from final and efficient causes. Because Avicenna's distinction between immanent and transcendent causes has now been exposed as part of a long tradition of interpreting Aristotle's four-cause theory, a "déplacement" can truly be said to have occurred only in the *Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, where Aristotle's four causes are now distinguished between those of essence and those of existence, instead of between those which are immanent and those which are transcendent.[35]

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[34] Simplicius *In Phys.* 1.7 (*ad* 189b32), 211,13–20.

[35] One problem remains. Even if we accept that the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* which we have before us today in Hilāl's edition is truly Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAršīya*, as I suggested in note 32, there is other evidence, again pointed out to me by David Reisman, which suggests that the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* may have been written *after* the *Išārāt*. (The evidence is contained in *al-Mubāḥaṯa aṯ-ṯānīya*, paragraphs 32–35 [*Kitāb al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992), 49.1–50.2].) If this is the case, we will have to suppose that in the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* Avicenna reverted to his old way of dividing the causes. Clearly more research needs to be done on the *Risāla al-ʿAršīya* than is feasible in the present article.

I argue elsewhere that Avicenna's metaphysics is best understood as representing the culmination of one tradition and the beginning of another. The tradition which culminates in Avicenna's metaphysics is what I have called the Ammonian synthesis, by which I refer to the Neoplatonic project of inventing new metaphysical tools for the purpose of integrating Platonic cosmology and Aristotelian natural philosophy. In another sense Avicenna's metaphysics lays the ground for a new synthesis, one between Neoplatonized Arabic Aristotelianism and the Islamic theology of the classical *mutakallimūn*. The shift in Avicenna's method of dividing Aristotle's four causes, from the Neo-platonists' immanent/transcendent distinction to his own essence/exist-ence distinction, which was itself inspired by *kalām* discussions of things and existents, can be seen as yet another example of how Avicenna bridges these two periods in the history of philosophy.[36]

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[36] R. Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, forthcoming; see also my "Notes on Avicenna's concept of thingness (*šay'iyya*)," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 10.2 (2000), 181–221, for evidence that Avicenna's distinction between essence and exist-ence derived from *kalām* discussions of things and existents.

INTELLECT VERSUS ACTIVE INTELLECT: PLOTINUS AND AVICENNA*

Rahim Acar

Introduction

It is worth comparing Avicenna's conception of the active intellect to Plotinus' conception of the cosmic Intellect with regard to two issues: 1) whether the function of the active intellect of Avicenna is the same as, or similar to, the function of the cosmic Intellect of Plotinus in causing the existence of the human soul; and 2) whether the active intellect's function is the same as, or similar to, the function of the cosmic Intellect in leading human potential intellect to the stage of actual intellect and providing it with intellectual knowledge. I argue that since neither the cosmic Intellect, nor the cosmic Soul of Plotinus stands to the human soul in the manner that the active intellect does in Avicenna, Plotinus' teachings do not show a traceable influence upon Avicenna with regard to the existence of the human soul and actualization of the human potential intellect. However, Plotinus' influence on Avicenna must be acknowledged with regard to the source of intellectual knowledge, namely intellectual knowledge is received directly from the active intellect.

In addition to highlighting the differences between Avicenna and Plotinus, I will make some remarks on the work of Herbert Davidson,[1] who produced some of the finest scholarship on this issue. In his article "Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect," and his book, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, Davidson draws on material

[1] Herbert A. Davidson, "Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect," *Viator* 3 (1972), 109–179 [hereafter Davidson 1972]; and id., *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) [hereafter Davidson 1992].

from Plotinus that he thinks is relevant to Avicenna's conception of
the existential and epistemological functions of the active intellect.
Since Davidson's goal is not simply limited to the existential and
epistemological functions of intellect with regard to the human soul,
but with regard to the whole physical universe, he is justified in bring-
ing in passages from paraphrases of Plotinus. However, the connec-
tion between Plotinus' conception of the cosmic Intellect and Avicenna's
conception of the active intellect is not as strong as Davidson's dis-
cussion suggests. Given the fact that Avicenna knew Alexander's and
Themistius' commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, and given the fact
that Avicenna's position looks closer to their position than that of
Plotinus, the passages from Plotinus that Davidson discusses to estab-
lish the influence of Plotinus do not demonstrate anything more than
that Avicenna utilized Plotinus' scheme of emanation.

Plotinus on the Origination of the Human Soul

It seems essential to draw a general outline of Plotinus' cosmology
in order to understand how Plotinus conceives the origination of the
human soul and the character of the relationship between the human
soul and its cause. According to Plotinus everything except for the
One exists as an emanation from its cause above. God or the One
emanates Intellect, i.e., the cosmic Intellect, the latter emanates Soul,
i.e., the cosmic Soul, and the cosmic Soul, in turn, emanates what
is below.[2]

   Although the cosmic Soul is not an independent agent, it is the
immediate cause of the physical universe below. The cosmic Soul is
in between the intelligible and the material realms, as the effect of
the cosmic Intellect and the cause of the physical world below.
Although there are three modes of existing (intelligible, psychic and
material) there are only two realms of existence: intelligible and mate-
rial. "Soul" is either in the intelligible realm, or in the material
realm, because it does not have its own realm.[3] The cosmic Soul is

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[2] *Uṯūlūǧiyā Arisṭūṭālīs/Theology of Aristotle*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Aflūṭīn ʿinda l-ʿarab/
Plotinus apud Arabes*, Dirāsāt Islāmīya, 20 (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya,
1955) [hereafter *Theology*], 50.9–10; 135.11–16, 136.1–8.

[3] While Plotinus does occasionally speak of three realms, e.g., *Theology*, 19.16–17,
145–146, passim, his basic distinction is twofold: *al-ʿālam al-ʿulwī/aš-šarīf* and *al-ʿālam*

in the intelligible realm. It is intellect in some sense, but still different from it. The difference between the cosmic Intellect and the cosmic Soul consists in the latter's being affected by lower things and in its having a desire towards them, or not. While the cosmic Intellect is not affected by lower things, and does not desire them,[4] the cosmic Soul has desire to do things, to create, and to govern. The fact that it does not have its own realm makes the cosmic Soul subsequent to and dependent on the cosmic Intellect, not only with regard to its own existence, but also with regard to creating the world below. In fact such a relationship of dependence is interwoven into the whole system of emanation. In this sense every effect depends on its cause for its existence, and hence for its acts.[5] Thus, the cosmic soul is a means of the cosmic intellect, through the mediation of which the cosmic intellect acts.[6] Thus, although the cosmic intellect is the true and ultimate agent behind what happens in the material world, it is not in direct contact with it. The cosmic Intellect emanates the cosmic Soul, and the cosmic Soul does the rest. The Arabic Plotinus writes:

> The soul, therefore, is an intellect which is informed (taṣawwara) with desire. However, the soul may either have a universal desire or a particular desire. When it desires universally, it makes (ṣawwarat) the universal forms actual, and governs (dabbarat) them in a universal, intelligible way without leaving its universal realm. When it desires particular things which are forms for its universal forms (ṣuwar li-ṣuwarihā l-kullīya), and decorates them (zayyanat), it makes them purer and more beautiful, and it repairs (aṣlaḥat) any defect that occurs to them, and governs them in a higher and nobler way than that of their immediate (qarība) causes, which are heavenly bodies.[7]

As Plotinus describes it, the cosmic Soul is an intellect, which is informed by a desire (šawq). With the desire it has, the cosmic Soul

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as-suflī, which refer to the intelligible and sensible realms respectively. For the prevalence of this twofold distinction, see, for example, *Theology*, 19.11, 20.2–4, 29–31, passim, 56.11–12.

[4] *Theology*, 18.16–19.1.

[5] In this sense God is the one who makes thing exist and who fashions their forms; *Theology*, 51.11–17. Compare also Plotinus' statement about the emanation of everything below the cosmic Soul by the cosmic Soul itself, *Theology*, 86.12–18, and his statement that the heavenly bodies are immediate causes of material things, *Theology*, 19.8–13.

[6] *Theology*, 51.3–10.

[7] *Theology*, 19.8–13.

wants to act and to ornament things that it sees in the (pure) Intellect.[8]
Seeing intelligibles in the cosmic Intellect, the cosmic Soul creates
the world below as a reflection, or illustration of what it sees in the
cosmic Intellect. It emanates the material world, and the forms that
appear in the material world.

> Soul emanates (*tufīḍ*) its power over this entire world . . . and nothing
> corporeal . . . is free of the power of Soul. . . . [E]ach body obtains of
> the power and goodness of Soul in accordance with its ability to receive
> that power and goodness. . . . [T]he goodness that Soul sends forth
> is "form," the underlying recipient of the goodness sent forth being
> "matter."[9]

The cosmic Soul's emanation of the physical world may be through
the mediation of nature. Depending on the particular thing that is
at issue, it may be through the mediation of a series of vertically
ordered causes.[10] The human soul is also among the things whose
origin lies in the cosmic Soul.[11] It is emanated by the cosmic Soul,
not by the cosmic Intellect. Moreover, the emanation of the human
soul is immediate. The link between the human soul and the cos-
mic Soul is so strong that one may even question the applicability
of the term emanation with regard to the existence of particular
souls. That is, particular souls are not completely distinct from the

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[8] *Theology*, 19.1–4.

[9] *Theology*, 86.12–18, and in Davidson 1972, 127. Davidson refers to the Arabic
text in *Theology*, 78, paralleling *Enneads* 4.8.6. However, I could not find the Arabic
text on that page; rather, the translation that Davidson supplies conforms to the
Arabic text on 86.12–18.

[10] *Theology*, 50.9–10: "We say that God, the high and the noble, is the cause of
the intellect, and the intellect is the cause of the soul, and the soul is the cause of
nature, and nature is the cause of all the particular things that are subject to gen-
eration (*akwān*)." See also *Theology*, 19.12–13.

[11] I could not find a separate and detailed discussion of the emanation of the
individual human souls in the *Theology*. But the idea that human souls are emanated
by the cosmic Soul and that they are part of it can be supported by passages from
the *Theology*. For example, if one wants to talk about the emanation of distinct indi-
vidual souls, then one should attribute it to the cosmic Soul rather than the cos-
mic intellect. This is because individual souls are issued in time, and time and
temporal things are under the control of the cosmic Soul and the cosmic Intellect
does not act in time. See *Theology*, 30.6–14, 31.2–9. That the human souls do not
descend directly from the cosmic Intellect but from the cosmic soul is confirmed
by the text of *Enneads* and by modern scholarship on Plotinus. See *Enneads* 1.8.14
and 4.3.9 in Davidson 1992, 31; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* 3.2, 5th ed.
(Leipzig, 1923), 603–4, apud Davidson 1992, 31; and H. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic
Elements in the *De Anima* Commentaries," *Phronesis* 21 (1976), 73–74, apud Davidson
1992, 25.

cosmic Soul. In other words, they do not have an independent iden-
tity. As Plotinus clearly states: "When Soul comes to be in particular
things, it is not imprisoned (*maḥṣūra*) in them, . . . but rather, it hap-
pens to be both in and out of them."[12] Even the wording of Plotinus—
or the person who paraphrased Plotinus' work—is interesting. It does
not speak of individual souls but rather of the cosmic Soul's com-
ing to exist in particular things. This shows how loose the connec-
tion of particular souls is to their bodies, and also how strong their
connection is to their source, the cosmic Soul. Hence it is difficult
to assert a distinct identity for individual souls on the basis of Plotinus'
teachings. This conclusion, i.e., that the human soul does not have
a separate identity from the cosmic Soul in Plotinus, has some impor-
tant echoes on the issue of the actualization of the human soul.

Potency and Actualization of the Human Soul and Intellectual Knowledge in Plotinus

Regarding the potency and actualization of the human potential
intellect, two questions may be asked of Plotinus: 1) Is the soul in
a state of absolute potentiality, when it enters into the material realm,
that is, when it comes to exist as a particular human soul? And
2) Is the human soul something that has the possibility of becom-
ing an intellect, at the beginning of its earthly journey?

Briefly stated, Plotinus' answer to the second question is negative.
The human soul is not something that becomes an intellect at the
beginning of its career in the material world. It is soul at the begin-
ning and it ends as a soul when it finishes governing a particular
portion of matter. All individual souls, including the human soul,
come from the cosmic Soul and return to it again, and not to the
cosmic Intellect.[13] This is because particular souls coming from the
cosmic Soul are not even totally independent from the cosmic Soul.
When the cosmic Soul is associated with a particular body, this does
not turn the particular soul into a potential intellect. Descending and
associating with particular bodies does not change the existential sta-
tus of the soul, even though it changes the conditions or status of
the soul in terms of its ability to know intelligibles.

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[12] *Theology*, 19.13–15.
[13] *Theology*, 20.6–16, 21.1–3.

Discussing the ability of the human soul to perceive intelligibles leads to the answer to the first question. Plotinus states:

> When the soul is in its intelligible place, it sees itself and things [in] there by its [own] power [fully], because things there are simple, and the simple is apprehended (*yudrikuhū*) by only something simple like itself. When the soul happens to be in the sensible realm, it receives that which is in the intelligible realm only by means of activity (*fiʿl*) that it makes use of here (*tastafīduhū hāhunā*), not by its own power. That is why [here in the material realm] the soul does not apprehend things that it used to see in the intelligible realm. That is because the activity (*fiʿl*) overwhelms (*yastaġriq*) the power [of the soul to apprehend intelligibles] in the sensible realm, and thus prevents the soul from apprehending what it used to apprehend.[14]

In the material realm, Soul's power to know intelligibles is weakened but not destroyed. Plotinus maintains that leaving its place in the intelligible realm and governing a certain particular body prevents Soul from enjoying the pure power of simple intelligible apprehension. However, it does not destroy the power of Soul to apprehend intelligible things,[15] because it has this power simply by being Soul. In this sensible realm, the human soul needs activity (*fiʿl*) in order to attain intellectual knowledge. But it does not start with such an absolute potency that an important transformation is required in the soul. In the material realm Soul has only to awaken (*nuhūḍ*) its power to know intelligibles by acting or striving for intellectual knowledge.[16]

This situation of the soul as particularized in a human being, i.e., as needing to strive for knowledge but being able to have it without any further condition, may correspond to the actual intellect of Avicenna which has passed two stages on the way to acquiring knowledge and which still needs to strive in order to acquire intellectual knowledge. Thus, it may be concluded that, according to Plotinus, the human soul is not potential in the sense that it is for Avicenna. Plotinus' theory reflects more of Plato's theory of the human soul's recollection of intelligibles than Aristotle's potential intellect becoming actual.

As I have noted above, according to Plotinus, intelligibles are found only in the intelligible realm, or in the cosmic Intellect. Even

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[14] *Theology*, 100.2–8.
[15] *Theology*, 100.17–20.
[16] *Theology*, 102.1–4. For detailed discussions of the issue see ibid., 99–103.

the cosmic Soul sees intelligibles in the cosmic Intellect; since it is soul it can only have what is "psychic."[17] Similarly, the human soul can acquire knowledge of intelligibles only from the cosmic Intellect or the intelligible realm. There is only one difference between particular souls and the cosmic Soul in this respect. Whereas the cosmic Soul does not need to make an effort to know intelligibles, the human soul must make an effort to attain that knowledge, because its innate power to know intelligibles is overwhelmed upon entering the material realm.[18] But in any case, intellectual knowledge is attained only directly from the cosmic Intellect.

While there appears to be a genuine similarity between Plotinus's concept of acquired intellect and that of Avicenna, in that Avicenna adopts the idea that intellectual knowledge is acquired from a transcendent intellect, nonetheless, the acquisition of intellectual knowledge has different implications for Plotinus and Avicenna.

Avicenna on the Origination of the Human Soul

Before examining Avicenna's position, I must address the manner in which I employ his writings on the soul. I draw on Avicenna's writings on the soul in the *Šifā'* and the *Nağāt*, but they certainly do not cover all of what Avicenna wrote on the topic.[19] In the *Šifā'* and the *Nağāt*, Avicenna develops similar positions regarding the origination and the actualization of the human soul. But he may have elucidated divergent positions in other works. Such a posited divergence may be taken to represent an evolution in Avicenna's conception of the soul. If so, the chronology of his works becomes

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[17] *Theology*, 19.1–4.
[18] *Theology*, 129.10–20, 130.1–4.
[19] In addition to these two major works, Avicenna wrote a number of smaller treatises on the soul. Among these are the treatises collected by Aḥmad F. al-Ahwānī in *Aḥwāl an-Nafs, Risāla fī nafs wa-baqā'ihā wa-maʿādihā* (Cairo: ʿĪsá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952). In addition to the title treatise, this collection includes *Mabḥaṯ ʿan al-quwá an-nafsānīya, Risāla fī maʿrifat an-nafs an-nāṭiqa wa-aḥwālihā*, and *Risāla fī l-kalām ʿalá n-nafs an-nāṭiqa*. Jean Michot provides a French translation of the first section of the title treatise in "Avicenne, *La définition de l'âme*, section 1 de *L'èpître des états de l'âme*, traduction critique et lexique," in *Langages et Philosophie, Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, ed. A. Elamrani-Jamal, A. de Libera, and A. Galonnier (Paris: J. Vrin, 1997), 239–256, and section 13 in "Prophétie et divination selon Avicenne," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 83 (1985), 507–535, with textual corrections of al-Ahwānī's text.

important. However, while the chronology of Avicenna's works is indeed important for our understanding of the direction of this evolution, dating those writings lies beyond the scope of this article.[20]

I take Avicenna's conception of the soul as articulated in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt* to be representative of Avicenna's position because, even though in his other writings the articulation of Avicenna's position shows some divergences, these do not imply a radical split from his position as articulated in those two works.[21]

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[20] Determining whether Avicenna's writings on the soul in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt* are earlier or later than his other writings is a topic of debate. Dimitri Gutas argues that Avicenna's treatise *Aḥwāl an-nafs* (ed. Ahwānī, op. cit.) was written before those two works and that it was used in composing them. J. Michot dates the treatise to sometime between 421–428/1030–1037 during Avicenna's stay in Isfahan. For a summary of both of their arguments, see Michot, "Avicenne, *La définition de l'âme*," 240–1.

[21] I cannot discuss here all of Avicenna's writings on the human soul to establish this assertion. However, without being exhaustive, I would like discuss Avicenna's position in the epistle *Aḥwāl an-nafs* as an example case. This epistle is one of the texts in which Avicenna may be expected to incline towards a more Neoplatonic position. I am interested in comparing Avicenna's position in this epistle to his position in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt* only to the extent that they are relevant to my topic. I give reference to the epistle but not to the *Šifāʾ* and *Naǧāt*, since his position in those works belongs to the main discussion in the body of the paper. The issues on which Avicenna is likely to have diverged in the *Aḥwāl an-nafs* from his position in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt* may be summarized as follows. (1) Naming the human soul; Avicenna states (53) that, as far as the human soul's specific substance is concerned, he would not call it soul, except in a figurative sense, but he would call it intellect. (2) Avicenna uses the terms "cosmic intellect" and "cosmic soul," instead of the "active intellect;" he mentions (54) the cosmic soul and the cosmic intellect sympathetically when he reports the usage of the terms "soul" and "intellect" by the ancients. (3i) The relationship between the human soul and the body, in which the human rational soul is not imprinted in the body; when he explains (54, 90) that the genus of soul should be perfection not form, even though body should be taken into account in the definition of the soul, he states "This is because the subsistence (*qiwām*) of the rational soul is not such that it is imprinted in (*tanṭabiʿ*) in the body. When it is called 'form' this is just by way of homonymy (*ištirāk al-ism*)." And (3ii) the relationship between the human soul and the body in which the body is an instrument of the human soul (e.g., 56, 100); when explaining the emergence of the human soul, as well as in his definition of the soul, Avicenna argues (100) that when a portion of matter is available to serve as an instrument for the soul, then separate causes (*al-ʿilal al-mufāraqa*) make the human soul come to be. But neither of these diverging points shows a strong change in Avicenna's position in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt*. (1) Even though Avicenna says that he would call the human soul "intellect" and not a soul, this is with regard to the ultimate destination of the human soul. Human soul does not come to be as an actual intellect. It comes to exist with the body as a soul that has the possibility of becoming an intellect. (2) Avicenna's use of the terms "cosmic Soul" and "cosmic Intellect" may not be a firm criterion in arguing for a dependence on Plotinus. Avicenna seems to be reporting a less complicated account of the relationship between soul and intellect, even if he does not argue that it is strictly the case. He identifies (111)

In the *Šifāʾ* Avicenna explains the existence of the universe, i.e., everything other than God, through his version of the theory of emanation. The existence of the human souls is no exception to the process of emanation from above.[22] The principle that emanates the human soul is the active intellect, which is the last member of the celestial intelligences. It is the giver of all forms appearing in matter, from the lowest ones to the highest one. It emanates a human soul when a portion of matter is prepared to receive the form coming from the active intellect.[23] The human soul is the most developed

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the intellect that leads the human potential intellect to the level of actual intellect as an active intellect (*ʿaql faʿʿāl*), and he identifies one substance for the human soul's coming to exist. I emphasize that Avicenna does not refer to the cosmic Intellect, but to an active intellect. Avicenna clearly states (112) that there are many separate intellects and many heavenly souls. This makes it unlikely that Avicenna's use of "cosmic intellect" is the result of the influence of a Plotinian cosmological scheme. (3i) Based on Avicenna's argument that the human rational soul is not imprinted in the body, one may infer that Avicenna's conception of the relationship between the soul and the body is not as strong as he argues in the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt*, although it is problematic. However, Avicenna argues in the *Šifāʾ*, as he does here, that the human rational soul is separable from the body; it does not undergo a corruption as a result of the corruption of the body at death. His statement "that human rational soul subsists by itself" is not a contradiction of his position in the *Šifāʾ*. He argues in the *Šifāʾ*, as he does here (e.g., 98), that the human soul undergoes a process of perfection. And its body and bodily conditions are the basis on which the soul's perfection and distinct identity depend. (3ii) Whether or not one can give a satisfactory answer to the problem of coherently combining Avicenna's two arguments, i.e., (a) the human soul's perfection is conditioned with its body, and (b) the body is an instrument of the soul and the soul occupies itself with the governance of the body (95), it is very difficult to consider Avicenna's position to be similar to that of Plotinus on the basis of Avicenna's argument that the body is an instrument of the soul. One has to take into account both arguments in understanding Avicenna's position.

   There are, however, topics on which Avicenna has the same position in the *Šifāʾ* and in this treatise. For example, he argues (100–101) that the human soul comes to exist when there is a body prepared to accept it. He also argues (96) that the soul does not exist before its existence in the body, because without the body there can be neither one nor many souls. Furthermore, Avicenna (111) describes the human soul as "material intellect." Finally, he describes (112) the human soul as potential intellect. Hence, despite some divergences between this treatise and the *Šifāʾ*, Avicenna argues in both that 1) the soul does not have a previous existence and it is emanated by an intellect, and 2) the soul is absolutely potential and becomes perfected in this life with the body.

   [22] For a detailed explanation of this process of emanation, see, for instance, Davidson 1992, 74–82.

   [23] See *Avicenna's De Anima (Arabic Text), Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ*, ed. F. Rahman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 261; and F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology, An English translation of Kitāb al-Najat, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition* (repr. Westport, CT, 1952), 59.

of the forms in the physical world, and it is the closest of them to
separate entities.

Avicenna rejects the idea that the human soul comes from a pre-
existing soul or that it exists before its association with the body.[24]
Before the attachment of the human soul to the body, there can be
neither numerically many souls nor one single soul that may be the
source of the human soul. There can be no prior numerically different
souls because the basis for numerical difference and identity of each
individual soul is the portion of body receiving it at a certain time
and under certain conditions. According to Avicenna, there also can-
not be one single soul before its attachment to the body. If there
were, the part of that one soul that is attached to the body and the
rest would be different things and thus the soul would be divisible.
This is not acceptable to Avicenna.

What Avicenna argues regarding the existence, or the origination,
of the human soul amounts to two things: 1) the active intellect is
the cause of the existence of the human soul; and 2) the human
soul does not come from a pre-existing soul, or a group of pre-exist-
ing souls. This is exactly the opposite of what Plotinus teaches regard-
ing the existence of particular souls or, more precisely, human souls.
Whereas for Plotinus it is the cosmic Soul which causes the exis-
tence of the human soul and not the cosmic Intellect, for Avicenna
it is the active intellect that is the cause which bestows existence on
the human soul. There is a difference in the level of being between
the cause and the effect. The cause is an intellect, which has a higher
level in the ontological gradation; the effect is a soul, which is below
its cause. This is an important point because the difference in level
of being ensures the distinct identity of particular human souls. It
also drives Avicenna to argue for the pure potency of the human
intellect at the beginning of its life.

<center>*Potency and Actualization of the Human Soul
and Intellectual Knowledge in Avicenna*</center>

The following is a broad outline of Avicenna's conception of the
actualization of the human intellect. There are four stages of intel-

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[24] *Avicenna's Psychology*, 56–7; *Avicenna's De Anima*, 223–4.

lect that the human soul goes through: 1) potential intellect; 2) habitual intellect; 3) actual intellect; and 4) acquired intellect. With the exception of the level of acquired intellect, all previous levels are potential, albeit in different senses. The potency of the human potential intellect, or material intellect is "absolute ability (*al-istiʿdād al-muṭlaq*) from which nothing happens to have come out in actuality (*lā yakūnu ḫaraǧa minhu bi-l-fiʿl*), like the potency of an infant (*ṭifl*) for writing." After this "absolute potency" there then comes the level of "possible potency," i.e., intellect *in habitu*, when the human soul has obtained primary intelligibles. These primary intelligibles are not acquired by effort (*iktisāb*), nor can one deny them once one knows them. Next is the level of "perfect potency," i.e., actual intellect, when the human intellect has known some secondary intelligibles but is not paying attention to them at the moment. In that stage the human soul has the ability to know secondary intelligibles whenever it intends.[25]

The level of the acquired intellect is the highest stage in the actualization of the human intellect. In a sense it is the stage at which the human intellect is truly actual. It represents the moment when the human intellect actually knows intelligibles, when it actually perceives them. For Avicenna, this stage of the human intellect, when the human soul actually knows, is called "acquired" because the human soul acquires intellectual knowledge from the active intellect.[26] After having images of material things in the retentive imaginative power, the human soul ponders (*iṭṭalaʿa*) them. This activity of pondering particular images puts the human soul into conjunction with the active intellect. It makes the human soul ready to receive the emanation of abstract intelligibles from the active intellect.[27] The effect of the active intellect through this conjunction is not to turn particular images in the imaginative power of the human soul into universal intelligibles. Through this conjunction, abstract universal intelligibles come to the human soul directly from the active intellect. Hence the human soul has intelligibles only at the moment when it pays attention to them and receives them from the active intellect.

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[25] *Avicenna's De Anima*, 48–9; see also *Avicenna's Psychology*, 50–1.
[26] *Avicenna's De Anima*, 50.
[27] Ibid., 235–6.

Since for Avicenna intellectual knowledge is found only in the active intellect and nowhere else, the human intellect has intellectual knowledge only when it actually attends to them. In other words, the human soul *knows* only when it is in conjunction with the active intellect, because the human soul cannot store intellectual knowledge.[28] The human soul has to receive the emanation of the active intellect every time it wants to have intellectual knowledge of a certain thing.[29] Thus, for Avicenna, conjunction with the active intellect is a "quotidian event" that occurs whenever the human soul actually thinks.[30]

Two issues highlight the differences between Avicenna and Plotinus: 1) potentiality of the human soul; and 2) the effect intellectual knowledge has on the human soul. With regard to the first issue, for Avicenna the human soul is devoid of even primary intelligibles, let alone the secondary intelligibles at the beginning of its existence in the body. The human soul has only an ability to ascend to a level of intellect to know intelligibles. Hence it is absolutely potential. For Plotinus, however, attachment to a particular body only weakens, or interferes with the human soul's power to know intelligibles. It is not absolutely potential, since it comes from an actual source, i.e., the cosmic Soul, and it does not undergo a transformation. With regard to the second issue, for Avicenna the human soul develops into an actual intellect by attaining intellectual knowledge, crossing over from being a simple animal soul to being an intellect. However, for Plotinus, the human soul comes closer to its previous state by acquiring intellectual knowledge. That previous state is when it was in the intelligible realm, before descending into the material realm. Here, the theories of Plotinus and Avicenna differ markedly.

The conception of the acquired intellect is the topic in which Avicenna follows Plotinus' lead. For Avicenna, acquired intellect is the state of the human soul at the moment when the human soul knows intelligibles. It is acquired intellect, (1) because the human soul acquires intellectual knowledge but does not produce intellectual knowledge on its own; and (2) the human soul acquires intellectual knowledge from the active intellect, because intellectual knowledge

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[28] Ibid., 245.
[29] Ibid., 247–8.
[30] Davidson 1992, 103.

can be found, or can exist, only in the active intellect. This conception of the acquired intellect based on the idea that only the active intellect has intellectual knowledge is definitely reminiscent of Plotinus' teachings. As stated above, for Plotinus, too, the cosmic Intellect is the source from which intellectual knowledge can be drawn. And it must be drawn directly. The similarity between Plotinus' position and that of Avicenna does not bear on the striving for intellectual knowledge,[31] but rather on the idea that intellectual knowledge must be received from a transcendent intellect, since intellectual knowledge cannot be anywhere, or contained in anything other than a pure intellect.[32]

Critique of Davidson

Having compared Plotinus' conception of the cosmic intellect and Avicenna's conception of the active intellect with regard to their function in the existence and actualization of the human soul, it is appropriate to examine Davidson's works on this issue and make some remarks. In his works "Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect" and *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect,* Davidson considers Plotinus as one of Avicenna's possible sources, because he maintains that both Plotinus and Avicenna assign to intellect a double function: intellect functions (1) "as the cause of the existence of the universe below itself;" and (2) "as the cause of intellectual activity in the soul."[33]

Regarding the existential function of the intellect, Davidson's conclusion that there is a similarity between Plotinus and Avicenna in that both the cosmic Intellect and the active intellect produce the world below as a whole, but not specifically the human soul, is acceptable. However, the similarity between Avicenna's position and that of Plotinus lies simply in their common emanationist scheme,

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[31] This is because the idea that the human soul makes an effort to attain knowledge does not belong exclusively to Plotinus.

[32] Davidson 1992, 86.

[33] Davidson 1972, 125–6. Although the passage there follows Davidson's comments on Alexander, his reference in note 119, which refers the reader to notes 82–85, obviously assumes that the passages from Plotinus that he discusses shows Plotinus' influence on Avicenna. In Davidson 1992, 31–32, Davidson cites the same passages.

according to which what is above in the ontological hierarchy ema-
nates what is below it. But whereas for Avicenna the active intellect
is the immediate principle emanating the sublunar world, for Plotinus
the cosmic Intellect is not the immediate principle; rather it is the
cosmic Soul. Davidson tends to downplay the difference between
Avicenna's position, which combines ontological and epistemological
functions in the active intellect, and Plotinus' position, which assigns
the ontological function to the cosmic Soul and the epistemological
function to the cosmic Intellect.[34]

In his treatment of Avicenna's position regarding the active intel-
lect's function in emanating forms in the sublunar world, Davidson
points out the similarity between Avicenna's position and that of al-
Fārābī in *Risāla fī l-ʿaql*, which Davidson believes shows Plotinus'
influence. Davidson writes: "*Risāla* . . . represents an adaptation of
Plotinus's position, wherein the active intellect, rather than Plotinus's
cosmic Soul, continually emanates the forms of all natural objects
in the sublunar world, and those forms actually appear whenever a
portion of matter is ready to receive them."[35] For Davidson, Avicenna's
position comes even closer to Plotinus' position because Avicenna
assigns to the active intellect not only the emanation of forms in the
sublunar world, but also the emanation of matter itself,[36] which
receives all forms emanated by the active intellect.[37]

The evidence from Plotinus that Davidson produces with regard
to the function of the cosmic Intellect in the existence of the sub-

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[34] Davidson 1992, 32; Davidson 1972, 127.

[35] Davidson 1972, 150–151.

[36] Regarding the emanation of matter, I follow Davidson's interpretation of
Avicenna. Nevertheless, this interpretation is open to question. If the prime matter
is "pure potentiality," then there is nothing to be emanated. But the active intel-
lect can be considered only the actualizing agent of the things by bestowing their
forms. In that case, one may ask: if the prime matter is pure potentiality and non-
existent, then on which thing does the active intellect bestow forms? Why not sim-
ply say that the active intellect emanates material things? If the existence of the
prime matter is considered simply something logical, then one may think that its
existence is the result of, or a concomitant of, the existence of the active intellect.
Hence in a broader sense, the active intellect is the cause of the existence of the
prime matter.

[37] In Davidson 1972, 159, Davidson considers Avicenna's position that active
intellect produces matter as well as forms in the sublunar world to be similar to
Plotinus' position. However, the similarity amounts to nothing more than the the-
ory of emanation. In Plotinus, Intellect never seems to be next to matter. Soul is
a kind of means of Intellect to make things in the material world. Intellect pro-
duces soul, and soul produces what is below. This is the case at least according to
the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus. See also Davidson 1992, 82.

lunar world shows that Avicenna adapts the scheme of emanation. But it shows no more than that. In fact, the existence of the human soul is one of the topics in which Plotinus and Avicenna do *not* have much in common. As explained above, according to Plotinus' position, individual human souls do not have independent identity, whereas for Avicenna each individual human soul is unique and totally distinct from its cause. For Avicenna, the active intellect, which has a higher place in the hierarchy of being, issues something below it in terms of ontological gradation. For Plotinus, on the other hand, the cosmic Soul dispatches to particular portions of matter particular souls of its kind, or associates itself to particular things. This distinct identity of the human soul from its source urges Avicenna to accept a potential human intellect that is closer to Aristotle's conception.

Regarding the actualization of the human soul, Davidson discusses some passages from Plotinus to establish the link between Avicenna and Plotinus.[38] He emphasizes the ambiguity of the Arabic texts referring to the cosmic Soul and Avicenna's interpretation of those references as the human soul. In one passage, taken from the *Risāla fī l-ʿilm al-ilāhī*, the phrase in question follows the argument that since Intellect is something nobler in the hierarchy of being, Soul does not produce Intellect by evolving on its own, or yield Intellect by a certain development. On the contrary there should be an Intellect that gives the soul intelligibles. Another passage that Davidson quotes in this respect is concerned with the conception of soul as analogous to matter, and therefore receptive of forms emanated by the Intellect and perfected by it. Davidson again emphasizes that the reference to the term "soul" in the text is to the cosmic Soul and that Avicenna understands by this "the human soul." As Davidson states: "Read in this manner Plotinus is describing the human rational soul as a kind of matter that is perfected and receives all of its intellectual knowledge through form coming to it from the realm of the incorporeal intelligences, specifically from the active intellect."[39]

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[38] Davidson 1972, 121, citing *Enneads*, 5.9.4; Arabic paraphrase in *Risāla fī l-ʿilm al-ilāhī*, ed. Badawī in *Aflūṭīn ʿinda l-ʿarab*, op. cit., 168.18–19. In the *Risāla* we find the phrase "potentiality passes to actuality only through a cause that is in actuality similar to [what] the former [is in] potentiality."

[39] Avicenna's comment on the paraphrase of Plotinus' *Enneads* is found in his *Šarḥ Kitāb al-Uṯūlūǧīya*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿarab*, Dirāsāt Islāmīya, 5 (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1947), 72, apud Davidson 1972, 121–122. See also Davidson 1992, 24.

Throughout his discussion of these texts, Davidson does not take into account Avicenna's apparent misunderstanding of the referent of the term "soul." However, the fact that Avicenna apparently misunderstands the term "soul" seems to be very important in this context, because it suggests that Plotinus' theory is not its source. It also shows that Avicenna read his own preconceptions into the text, certainly influenced by other sources. As Davidson states, the matter-form analogy between soul and intellect is also used by Themistius.[40] Since Avicenna's understanding of the paraphrase of Plotinus accords with Themistius' conception of the relationship between soul and intellect, it is clear that the real source of influence is Themistius not Plotinus. Hence these passages do not establish that Plotinus is among Avicenna's sources here.

Davidson relates another passage which can be thought to support the influence of Plotinus on Avicenna regarding the actualization of human intellect. From the *Risāla fī l-ʿilm al-ilāhī* Davidson quotes: "The intelligible sciences, which are the true sciences, come only from Intellect to the rational soul."[41] This statement is placed in contrast to the sensible knowledge of the human soul. Thus, it means that whereas the human soul's sensible knowledge depends on and comes from material objects, intellectual knowledge comes from the cosmic Intellect. This statement is about the nature of intellectual knowledge in which Avicenna shows a definite influence from Plotinus. However, one should note that this passage is not about the actualization process of the human potential intellect.

In his book, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, Davidson gathers together various statements from the Arabic paraphrases of Plotinus' work into a synthesis:

[1] A transcendent Intellect has to be assumed in order to account for the passage of the human rational soul from potentiality to actuality.

[2] Intellectual knowledge is transmitted directly by the transcendent Intellect to human rational souls that are properly oriented and ready to receive Intellect's bounty.

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[40] Davidson 1992, 27; Themistius, *On Aristotle, On the Soul*, tr. R.B. Todd (London: Duckworth, 1996), 100, 16 [references to paragraph and line number in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*].

[41] Davidson 1972, 121, citing the *Risāla*, 169.6–7, paralleling *Enneads* 5.9.7.

[3] The human intellect is like a mirror in which intelligible thoughts from above are reflected.

[4] Thought at a higher level, at the level of Intellect, is all together, which can be taken to mean that it is undifferentiated; at a subsequent level, it is unrolled, which can be taken to mean that thought becomes differentiated as it descends into the human rational soul.

[5] The relation of the human rational soul to the intelligible thought it receives is—as Aristotle already suggested and Alexander wrote explicitly—a relation of matter to form; and Plotinus adds that "clear principles" and the "intellectual sciences constituting the form of the rational soul come directly from the transcendent Intellect."

[6] Because thought is acquired by the human intellect from above, actual human thought is acquired intellect.[42]

On the basis of this synthesis, Davidson concludes that these views of Plotinus "prefigure Avicenna's account of the manner whereby the active intellect acts on the human intellect."[43] However, which of these views specifically belongs to Plotinus? And which concepts have the same meaning for Avicenna and for Plotinus? From these six major ideas, [1] does not specifically belong to Plotinus. As for statement [4], it may be argued that since for Plotinus the distinction between the cosmic soul and the human soul is not clear cut, and since the cosmic soul is the one that occupies Plotinus's attention, Avicenna's position is different from Plotinus' position. Avicenna's position in this regard may be closer to Themistius' position, because for Themistius, too, thoughts are all together in the transcendent intellect but are differentiated in the human intellect.[44] With [5], the matter-form analogy is not specifically Plotinian and, at any rate, in this analogy Plotinus means the cosmic Soul and the cosmic Intellect, while Avicenna understands an analogy between individual human souls and the active intellect. The idea of "clear principles" can also mean "primary intelligibles," which prepare the soul to reach the secondary intelligibles. In this sense, the idea that a transcendent

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[42] Davidson 1992, 25–26.
[43] Davidson 1992, 26.
[44] Themistius, op. cit., 109, 4. Themistius' position is also reiterated by Davidson 1992, 6.

intellect gives first principles to the human soul was commonplace, and Avicenna's understanding again is closer to the way the Aristotelian commentators understood it.[45] Three ideas belong to Plotinus specifically and are reflected in Avicenna's conception of the source of the intellectual knowledge: [2] the idea that Intellect gives to the soul intellectual knowledge; [3] the human intellect is like a mirror, in which intelligible thoughts from above are reflected; and [6] because thought is acquired by the human intellect from above, actual human thought is acquired intellect.

Avicenna adopts Plotinus' teachings concerning the origin and nature of the intellectual knowledge. Other than this, Avicenna's position is either totally different from Plotinus' position, or he sees Plotinus through peripatetic lenses. Themistius' teachings function as one of these peripatetic lenses between Avicenna and Plotinus. Consequently, except for the origin of the intellectual knowledge, Avicenna does not owe much to Plotinus, such that Plotinus' teachings would "prefigure" Avicenna's theories.

Conclusion

With the exception of the general emanationist model, there does not appear to be a specifically Plotinian influence (through the Arabic paraphrases of Plotinus) on Avicenna with respect to the existence of the human soul. For Plotinus, intellect emanates the cosmic Soul and the cosmic Soul emanates the physical world and particular souls attached to things in the material realm. For Avicenna, on the other hand, the active intellect directly emanates the matter and the forms in the material world as well as souls, including the human soul. Regarding the function of the intellect in the actualization of the human potential intellect, for Plotinus the human soul is not potential in the sense in which Avicenna thinks of the human soul. Moreover, for Plotinus the human soul never exceeds the boundary of being soul. For Avicenna, on the other hand, the human soul starts its career as pure potency and becomes an actual intellect, or reaches the level where it actually attends intelligible forms. With

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[45] See, for example, Themistius, op. cit., 98, 35–99, 32, and 102, 30–104, 14. See also Davidson 1992, 26.

respect to the nature and source of intellectual knowledge, Avicenna's position shows the influence of Plotinus in conceiving intellectual knowledge as something that must be received from the active intellect. More precisely, the similarity between Plotinus' theories and those of Avicenna regarding the function of a transcendent intellect in the existence of the human soul is only a general one which can better be subsumed under the theory of emanation. And with respect to the actualization of the human intellect, it is limited to the nature and source of intellectual knowledge.

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THE AGE OF AVICENNA

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CHAPTER FIVE

STEALING AVICENNA'S BOOKS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORICAL SOURCES FOR THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AVICENNA*

David C. Reisman

Introduction

In addition to Avicenna's Autobiography and the Biography written by his disciple al-Ǧūzǧānī, scholars have long drawn on Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* for historical information related to the social, political and intellectual context in which Avicenna lived and worked. Very few scholars have questioned the reliability of Ibn Funduq's incidental information on Avicenna, although there has been some minor discussion about the nature of his revised version of the Autobiography/Biography Complex which forms the bulk of his entry on Avicenna in the *Tatimma*.[1] In what follows, I present a brief overview of the historical context of Avicenna's career in order then to properly assess the contemporary and near-contemporary historical sources for the period. Since Ibn Funduq's information on Avicenna would appear to be the basis for much of the later historians' accounts, that information must be appraised in order to deter-

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  * I dedicate this study to the memory of Paul Kraus. I thank Dimitri Gutas and Franz Rosenthal for their valuable comments. The following analysis developed out of a hypothesis I set forth in my "The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Mubāḥaṭāt* (*The Discussions*)," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2001, concerning the dating of a letter from Avicenna to his student Bahmanyār. At the time I was convinced that the problems related to Ibn Funduq's anecdotes (on which see below) were the result of a simple error on his part; as will become apparent in this study, I now believe the reasons behind Ibn Funduq's misinformation to be more intentional.

  [1] See, for instance, Dimitri Gutas, "Avicenna II, Biography," EIr, 1:67, who lists Ibn Funduq's additions to the Avicenna Autobiography/Biography Complex and concludes "not much of this additional information can be taken at face value." However, in the same statement, Gutas explicitly endorses the veracity of Ibn Funduq's "bibliographic reports about the survival of some of Avicenna's books." It is precisely this aspect (at least in part) of Ibn Funduq's testimony that is questioned below.

mine its reliability. Aside from various incidental comments that Ibn Funduq makes about Avicenna which allow us to determine his attitude toward Avicenna, a report in three different versions in the historical works concerning the loss of Avicenna's books form the focus of the investigation. The versions of this report concern two events: the theft of four of Ibn Sina's books or works-in-progress during the occupation of Isfahan by the Ġaznavid Mas'ūd in 421/1030; and the plunder of Avicenna's library (*bayt al-kutub*) during a purported (and by no means historically verified) pillage of Isfahan by Mas'ūd's general Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī in 425/1034.[2]

Historical Overview

In the present state of scholarship, it would not be wise to attempt a thoroughgoing analysis of the political, social and intellectual developments of late fourth/tenth and early fifth/eleventh century Western Iran. The impression of the period and geography in question is that of unmitigated chaos, not only because of the turbulent events of the time but also because of the profound sense of confusion apparent in the reports of contemporary and later historians. Even if we limit our investigation to the immediate boundaries of Avicenna's birth and death dates, and further focus on only the dynasties which Avicenna served in various capacities or came into contact with, the historical record would still be far from smooth and consistent.

The date of Avicenna's birth remains unresolved, but this need not detain us here.[3] We can say with some confidence that in the last decade of the fourth/tenth century, Avicenna was employed for a very brief period as physician to the court of the Sāmānids in Buḫārā. It is at Buḫārā that his real philosophical research began;

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[2] Abū Sahl was appointed civil governor of Rayy and the Ǧibāl in 424/1033 and given the *muḫāṭaba* of aš-Šayḫ al-'Amīd; see C.E. Bosworth, "The Titulature of the early Ghaznavids," *Oriens* 15 (1962), 229, citing the Persian historian Bayhaqī, on whom see below. This date of appointment is contradicted by the later historian Muḥammad Mīr Ḫwānd, who gives the date 421 in his *Rawḍat aṣ-ṣafā'*, apud Sa'īd Nafīsī, *Dar Pīrāmūn-i Tārīḫ-i Bayhaqī* (Tehran: Furūġī Maḥfūẓ, 1342/1923), 2:718.

[3] See Dimitri Gutas, "Avicenna's *Maḏhab*, with an Appendix on the Question of his Date of Birth," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5–6 (1987), 323–336, who posits the birth date of 353/964. I am unaware of any scholarly response to Gutas's hypothesis. The following summary of Avicenna's career is based on the Autobiography/Biography Complex, ed./tr. William E. Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sīnā* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1974), and the correspondence of Avicenna and his students.

and he speaks of the court library of the Sāmānids, filled with all
the books of ancient philosophy, with a true scholar's appreciation.
With the collapse of the Sāmānid dynasty at the turn of the fifth/
eleventh century and the rise of the Ġaznavids, Avicenna began his
long travels, punctuated by periods of employment throughout Western
Iran.[4] In the first decade of the fifth/eleventh century, we find him
working as a lawyer for the Ma'mūnid dynasty whose days were as
numbered as the Sāmānids before them. Though he then sought
employment at the Ziyārid court, he arrived too late: the ruler Qābūs
ibn Vušmagīr had died shortly before Avicenna entered Ġurğān. In
Rayy, Qazwīn and Hamadan, Avicenna served one branch of the
Būyid dynasty, then nominally under the rule of Mağd ad-Dawla,
but largely directed by his mother, the Sayyida. We are told that
he served as their "business manager" but the details of his service
are obscure. It was not a pleasant period of employment; apparently
Avicenna would later refer to them as "those two despicable crea-
tures."[5] Between 405/1015 and 415/1024, Avicenna is found work-
ing as both physician and vizier for another Būyid, Šams ad-Dawla.
A vizier's relationship with the various factions of the army is almost
always crucial to his success. Avicenna did not fare well in this area;
we are told that the army called for his execution.[6] Finally, in 421/
1030, Avicenna managed to find respectable employment in Isfahan
with 'Alā' ad-Dawla,[7] the tireless campaigner and surely the strongest
ruler of the decidedly minor Kākūyid dynasty.[8]

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[4] These travels have been neatly discussed by G. Lüling in "Ein anderer Avicenna:
Kritik seiner Autobiographie und ihrer bisherigen Behandlung," *ZDMG* Suppl. III.1
(1977), 496–513.

[5] This inference is based on my identification of the Sayyida and Mağd ad-Dawla
as the referents of the dual adjective *al-makrūhayni* in Avicenna's *Risāla ilá 'Alā' ad-
Dawla*, ed. H.Z. Ülken in *Ibn Sina Risāleleri, 2: Les Opuscules d'Ibn Sina*, İstanbul
Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınlarından, 552 (İstanbul: İbrahim Horoz Basimevi,
1953), 44.2; and ed. 'Abd al-Amīr Šams ad-Dīn, *al-Maḏhab at-tarbawī 'inda Ibn Sīnā
min ḫilāl falsafatihī l-'ilmīya* (Beirut: aš-Šarika al-'Ālamīya li-l-Kutub, 1988), 399.2.

[6] Gohlman, *Life*, 52/53. I have argued elsewhere that the insurrection against
Avicenna may be related to the charge brought against him, likely by Abū l-Qāsim
al-Kirmānī, that he attempted to imitate the Qur'ān in his homilies; see "Avicennan
Tradition," Chapter Three, Section II.A.c.

[7] S.H. Burney, "A Critical Survey of the Anecdotes relating to Ibn Sīnā in the
Chahar Maqāla," *Indo-Iranica* 9.2 (1956), 41, has rightly noted that there is no evi-
dence that Avicenna was appointed 'Alā' ad-Dawla's *vizier*; Cl. Cahen, "A propos
d'Avicenne," *La Pensée, Revue du Rationalisme Moderne* 45 (1952), 81 (cited also by
Gutas, "Avicenna's *Maḏhab*, 326), raised doubts about whether Avicenna even served
as vizier to the Būyid Šams ad-Dawla, pointing out that it was not a common prac-
tice of the time to appoint court scholars and physicians to such positions.

[8] The history of the Kākūyid dynasty, including Avicenna's patron 'Alā' ad-Dawla,

In this brief summary of Avicenna's fortunes, no fewer than six dynastic courts appear, and that number alone should give us some idea of the very fragmented character of politics and power in Western Iran in the first part of the fifth/eleventh century. The relative order that had been achieved by the Būyids and their Daylamī soldiers in the latter half of the preceding century had rapidly disintegrated, in part because of the very decentralized nature of their rule, most evident in the existence of separate ruling families in each of the major cities of Iraq and Western Iran. The branch in Rayy, with which Avicenna came into contact, could claim only one strong ruler, Faḫr ad-Dawla. But his death in 386/997 left only his young and inexperienced son Maǧd ad-Dawla as a possible candidate at a time when military skills were all that could ensure success. The fact that his mother the Sayyida managed to hold their small enclave together for the next two decades is a tribute to her character alone. With the Sayyida's death in 419/1028, Maǧd ad-Dawla, no longer young but no less inexperienced, made the unwise decision to seek the aid of the Ġaznavid Maḥmūd (r. 388–421/998–1030) against his own restless army, and got imprisonment at the Ġaznavid court instead.[9]

While the fame we assign the Ġaznavids is rightly located in Maḥmūd's stunning victories in Afghanistan and India, there is no doubt that their own hopes of lasting renown lay in western expansion.[10] In a sort of policy statement from the Ġaznavid governor of the Ǧibāl province, Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī, a plan is outlined to push west to Baghdad and replace Šīʿī Būyid rule with the Sunnī ideology of the Ġaznavids and then move on to contest Šīʿī Fatimid control in Syria and Egypt.[11] We might advance as partial reason for

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is treated at length in C.E. Bosworth's "Dailamīs in Central Iran: The Kākūyids of Jibāl and Yazd," *Iran, JBIPS* 8 (1970), 73–95; and id. *New Islamic Dynasties: A chronological and genealogical manual* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 160ff. (note that his statement there "Muḥammad was the maternal uncle" should be corrected to "*Rustam* was the maternal uncle").

[9] See Bosworth, "Dailamīs," 76.

[10] For the metaphorical expression of this imperialist policy in relation to Masʿūd, whom the poet Manūçihrī called Šāhanšāh-yi ʿIrāq, see Bosworth, "Titulature," 219; Bosworth surmises that Manūçihrī used the title "to combat Buyid pretensions in western Persia."

[11] Bayhaqī, *Taʾrīḫ-i Masʿūdī*, P391ff./A414ff. [for these references, see n. 37 below]. Masʿūd had himself made a similar statement to the Qārāḫānid ruler Yūsuf Qadīr Ḫān upon his assumption of his father's throne; see Bosworth, "Dailamīs," 76, n. 21. Abū Sahl reiterated these to him in 424/1033 before he assumed his duties as ʿamīd of Rayy; see below for this investiture.

their failure to do so the singular personality of Avicenna's patron, the Kākūyid ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla.

This is not to say that ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla was all that stood between the Ġaznavids and Western expansion, nor even that ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's opposition to the Ġaznavids was rhetorically articulated as the last bulwark against such imperialism. The Ġaznavids, whose capitol was located in present-day Eastern Afghanistan, simply did not have the necessary military power to sustain permanent operations on three fronts: in India, in Northeastern Iran (where the rise of the Seljuks presented the real threat to Ġaznavid power), and in Western Iran. Real possibility for this western expansion emerged only at the end of Maḥmūd's reign when he and his son Masʿūd (r. 421–432/1031–1040) seized control of Rayy, Hamadan, and Isfahan. Within months of that success, however, Masʿūd was forced to race back to Ġazna to contest the succession of his brother Muḥammad on the death of their father Maḥmūd.[12] Thereafter, the most Masʿūd could accomplish in Western Iran in the course of the next decade was the appointment of relatively strong governors and military commanders who could take advantage of the ceaseless jockeying for power among the many contenders of the area.[13] The goal quickly became seizure of wealth from the local leaders of the area to finance the Ġaznavid military and cultural expenditures.[14] ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla, sitting on the golden egg of Isfahan, was thus a primary target for such plunder. ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla for his part appears to have been intent upon establishing limited control of the region. He did this by alternately challenging the minor successes of the Ġaznavids; and, when the tide turned against him, entering into treaty arrangements with them, as their deputy in Isfahan. Such treaties appear to have been mediated by his ally, the Būyid *amīr* Ğalāl ad-Dawla, who had the ear of the ʿAbbāsid caliph in Baghdad.[15]

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[12] Armed with a "resplendent string of fresh *laqabs*;" see Bosworth, "Titulature," 225–6, citing the Persian historian Bayhaqī.

[13] Masʿūd's choice of local military rulers was not always wise; when he departed for Ġazna at the death of his father he left the Turkish general Tāš Farrāš in charge. Ibn al-Atīr says of Tāš Farrāš's reign of terror in Rayy: "[He] had filled the land with injustice and tyranny, until the people prayed for deliverance from [the Ġaznavids] and their rule. The land became ruined and the population dispersed," apud C.E. Bosworth, "Maḥmūd of Ghazna in contemporary eyes and later Persian literature," *Iran, ĴBIPS* 4 (1966), 86.

[14] For examples of such expenditures and the resulting "financial oppression"; see Bosworth, "Maḥmūd of Ghazna," 85ff.

[15] Ibn al-Ğawzī records one such epistolary intervention in 421/1030; see his

The Genesis of an Anecdote

While Avicenna had managed to find a sort of tenured appointment
with ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla, the relative insecurity of his patron's power
meant that such tenure was subject to the fortunes of war. In this
regard, and for the purposes of addressing the loss of Avicenna's
books, three events recorded by the historians are of importance.

1. In 421/1030, the Ġaznavid Masʿūd, then commander for his
   father Maḥmūd, drove ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla out of Isfahan;
2. In 425/1034, Masʿūd's governor Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī battled
   ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla at the Karağ gate of Isfahan;
3. In 428/1037, the Ġaznavids Abū Sahl and Tāš Farrāš battled
   ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla outside Rayy.

We have reliable indications from the correspondence of Avicenna
and his students that in 421/1030, as he was fleeing Isfahan, Avicenna
was stopped at the gate of the city by a detachment of Masʿūd's
soldiers, his saddle-bags were searched, and his papers, including
four of his works (some complete, others in early drafts) were stolen.
On the other hand, we have very unreliable reports that in either
425/1034 or 428/1037, the conquering Ġaznavid army entered
Isfahan and raided Avicenna's *library*,[16] the contents of which, we are
told, were then transported back to Ġazna. It is my contention that
we can be relatively confident that copies of four of Avicenna's books
were confiscated in 421/1030, but we can have no confidence in
the anecdote concerning the plunder of Avicenna's library. Such an
anecdote appears to form the basis of one of those entertaining but
untrue topoi that often fill the gaps in real information set down by
medieval Arabic and Persian historians.

   The evidence from Avicenna and his students is found in two let-
ters by Avicenna (Avicenna 1 below: to Bahmanyār;[17] and Avicenna

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al-Muntaẓam fī taʾrīḫ al-mulūk wa-l-umam, ed. M. ʿAbd al-Qādir and M.ʿA.Q. ʿAṭāʾ
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1412/1992), 15:206–7.

   [16] As we will see, the distinction between a rifling of saddle-bags and the seizure
of four of Avicenna's books, and a wholesale plunder of a *library* is an important one.

   [17] The passage is found in *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār,
1371Š/1992), 49.1–50.4; tr. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to
Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and
Studies, IV (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 57; cf. "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Four,

2: to al-Kiyā),[18] a letter by Ibn Zayla,[19] and al-Ğūzğānī's Biography of his master.[20] The incidental information we can glean from these texts collectively refer to the rifling of Avicenna's saddle-bags at the gate of Isfahan in 421/1030 by Masʿūd's troops and the removal of four of his works. Ibn Zayla refers to the "late Sultan," by whom he means Maḥmūd, whose forces in that year were commanded by his son Masʿūd, and al-Ğūzğānī's report makes this explicit. In no other military incursion into Isfahan was Masʿūd himself involved.

Avicenna 1	"Aš-Šayḫ al-Fāḍil [Bahmanyār]'s letter arrived, indicating his well-being and the joy that has at last come to him as a result of my deliverance from those life-threatening shocks. As for his sorrow at the loss of *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, I believe a copy of this book may remain preserved. As for *al-masāʾil al-mašriqīya*, I had already packed them up in their quires, or most of them, in such a way that no one's attention would be drawn to them, and I also recorded some things from *al-Ḥikma al-ʿaršīya* on slips of paper, and it was these that were lost. . . . But certainly *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* could not but be extensive and rewriting it would be laborious."
Avicenna 2	"The [*Kitāb al-Inṣāf*] was lost in the course of some rout, since there was only the first draft."
Ibn Zayla	"In the year that the horsemen of the late Sultan overran these lands, Avicenna was prompted for some reason to occupy himself with a book which he called *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*. . . . But before all of this was transcribed into a clean copy, he was hindered by a military rout in which all his belongings and books were carried off at the gate of Isfahan."
Al-Ğūzğānī	"The Šayḫ wrote *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, but on the day that Sultan Masʿūd entered Isfahan, the army rifled the Sayḫ's saddle-bags (*raḥl*) containing the book, and not a trace of it was found afterward."

II.B.a. For the few known biographical facts on Avicenna's student Bahmanyār, see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, II.B.

[18] The passage is found in the Letter to al-Kiyā in *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, 375.8–9; tr. Gutas, *Avicenna*, 64.

[19] The passages below are found in *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, 80.3–4, 81.3–4; tr. Gutas, *Avicenna*, 66. On Avicenna's student Ibn Zayla, see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, II.C.

[20] The passage from al-Ğūzğānī's Biography is found in Gohlman, *Life*, 80/81; tr. Gutas, *Avicenna*, 132–3.

While it is undeniable that al-Ǧūzǧānī's Biography of Avicenna contains much that can reasonably be considered rhetorical, hagiographical, and in some cases even propagandistic,[21] it nonetheless contains much incidental information that can serve as a means of assessing later authors writing on Avicenna. Of even greater value for the life of Avicenna are the private papers and correspondence of Avicenna and his students (represented above by Avicenna 1–2 and Ibn Zayla), in which incidental records of events gain value by their solely conversational nature. Obviously, the writings of Avicenna and his students form *the* primary record of events in which they were involved; and the authenticity of information in later historical works which also make reference to those events must be judged by their standard.

In this regard, and particularly with respect to the reports translated above, we find different versions of what I call the Plunder Anecdote in later authors that have bearing upon the event mentioned by Avicenna and his students. Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī inserted a detailed version of the Plunder Anecdote into his revision of the Autobiography/Biography Complex in the very place that al-Ǧūzǧānī remarks on the loss of *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*. Two additional versions of the anecdote are found in the fifth–sixth/twelfth–thirteenth century hybrid history one of whose titles is *Zubdat at-tawārīḫ* (the *Zubda* below), and Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil fī t-taʾrīḫ*, completed around 627/1230. These last two versions are very problematic. In both we find dates different from the one related to the evidence from Avicenna and his students and implicitly used by Ibn Funduq and, in the case of the *Zubda*, we find a new element: the plunder of Avicenna's *library*. This difference in dates has led scholars to believe that Avicenna's works were subject to two different seizures and thus has affected theories about the composition dates of his works, i.e., those works mentioned in his and his students' texts. The reference to Avicenna's *library* has no support in any of the other available literature.[22]

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[21] We may also observe in al-Ǧūzǧānī's Biography of his master a single-minded attempt not only to stress his master's Aristotelian allegiances (even when Avicenna began to depart from those allegiances; see Gutas, *Avicenna*, 108–9) but also to emphasize his own role in his master's life, to the singular exclusion of all other colleagues and students; see "Avicennan Tradition," 199ff. Recently, Y. Michot has argued that al-Ǧūzǧānī's work is "hagiographie plutôt que biographie," in *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir Abû Saʿd, Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique*, Sagesses musulmanes, 4 (Beyrouth: Les Éditions al-Bouraq: 2000), 53* ff.

[22] The following reports are found, respectively, in Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī's

Versions of the Plunder Anecdote

Ibn Funduq	*Zubdat at-tawārīḫ*	Ibn al-Aṯīr
"Then General Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī, along with a group of Kurds, plundered the Šayḫ's saddle-bags containing his books and only parts of *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* were [later] found. In 545/1150–1, 'Azīz ad-Dīn al-Fuqqā'ī az-Zinǧānī claimed, 'I bought a copy of [*Kitāb al-Inṣāf*] in Isfahan and transported it to Marv.' God knows better. As for *al-Ḥikma al-mašriqīya* in its entirety and *al-Ḥikma al-'aršīya*, al-Imām Ismā'īl al-Bāḫarzī said that both were in the libraries (*buyūt kutub*) of Sultan Mas'ūd ibn Maḥmūd in Ġazna until Malik al-Ǧibāl al-Ḥusayn and the army of Ġūr and Ġuzz [Turks] set fire to it in 546/1151–2."	"Then General Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī went with Tāš Farrāš to Isfahan with an army that filled the length and breadth of the earth and he drove out of it [i.e. Isfahan] 'Alā' ad-Dawla Abū Ǧa'far, and raided his treasuries (*ḫazā'in*) and his palace (*dār*). Aš-Šayḫ al-Ḥakīm Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā (God have mercy on him!) was the minister of King 'Alā' ad-Dawla [at the time], so the army of Tāš Farrāš raided Abū 'Alī's library (*bayt kutub*) and transferred most of his [own] writings (*taṣānīf*) and his books (*kutub*) to the storehouses of books (*ḫizānat kutub*) in Ġazna and they all remained there until Malik al-Ǧibāl al-Ḥasan [*sic*] ibn al-Ḥusayn set fire to [the storehouse]."	"And when Abū Sahl took control of Isfahan, he seized the treasuries and money of 'Alā' ad-Dawla. Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā was in the service of 'Alā' ad-Dawla, so his books were taken and transferred to Ġazna, and put in the storehouses of books (*ḫazā'in kutub*) until the armies of al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ġūrī set fire to them, as we will record, God willing."
(implicitly dated 421/1030)	(implicitly dated after 428/1036)	s.a. 425/1034

These three reports coincide in some particulars, viz. that Abū Sahl was the Ġaznavid general who led the sack of Isfahan (for all of the three dates), and that Avicenna's books were later burned in the sack of Ġazna in the mid-sixth/mid-eleventh century. But they differ in important respects. Ibn Funduq, who undoubtedly based his report

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Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, ed. M. Šafī' (Lahore, 1351/1932), 56.1–7; *Zubdat at-tawārīḫ/Aḫbār al-umarā' wa-l-mulūk al-salǧuqīya*, facsimile of MS British Museum Stowe Or. 7, with Russian translation in *Akhbar-ad-daulat as-Seldzhukiiia: zubdat at-Tavarikh fi akhbar al-umarā' va-l-Mulūk as-Seldzhukiiia, Soobshcheniia o Seldzhukskom gosudarstve, Slivki letopisei, soobshchaiushchikh o Seldzhukskikh emirakh i gosudariakh, izdanie teksta, perevod, vvedenie, primechanii i prilozheniia* Z.M. Buniiatova (Moskva: Nauka, 1980), 4v.5–12; and Ibn al-Aṯīr, *al-Kāmil fī t-Ta'rīḫ*, ed. Abū l-Fiḍā' 'Abd Allāh al-Qāḍī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīya, 1407/1987), 211.25–212.1.

on the texts of Avicenna and his students, notes that Avicenna's *saddle-bags* were plundered, whereas the *Zubda* mentions the plunder of a *library* of Avicenna's books, a term that perhaps echoes, if incorrectly, Ibn Funduq's own mention of libraries in connection with the conflagration of Ġazna. Ibn al-Aṯīr's report is more sparse in the details of the sack of Isfahan, noting simply that Avicenna's books were taken, without elaboration. Ibn Funduq's report is implicitly dated 421/1030, because he discusses *after* this report the battle at the Karaǧ gate in 425/1034 (57.2ff.), which was the next major clash between the Ġaznavids and Avicenna's patron ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla.[23] The report in the *Zubda* is implicitly dated after 428/1036–7 because of the location of the anecdote in its sequential report of events, scil. the anecdote comes after mention of the date 4 Muḥarram 428/28 October 1036 in this sequence. This is simply incorrect, but may not be overly significant. It is possible that the anecdote was appended to the original text of the *Zubda*, without due consideration to correct dating.[24] Ibn al-Aṯīr places his anecdote under the year 425/1034. Herein lies the major ambiguity scholars have faced in reconciling these reports with historical fact, but again, it may not be of great importance: Ibn al-Aṯīr is known to have confused his dates in other instances.[25] At any rate, we may appropriately note that aside from his discourse on the survival of Avicenna's three works, Ibn Funduq has reproduced accurately the act of plunder from Avicenna's saddle-bags mentioned by Avicenna and his students, although the appearance of Abū Sahl is less accurate. The other two reports are very problematic, both with regard to their dating and, in the case of *Zubda*, the mention of Avicenna's *library*.

The Evidence from Contemporary Historical Sources

All of the three reports about the seizure and transportation of Avicenna's books translated above issue from the mid-sixth/mid-twelfth century or after. On the basis of the evidence from Avicenna

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[23] See "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Four, II.B.a.

[24] For additional details on the transformations of the *Zubda*, see below.

[25] For instance, Bosworth ("Dailamīs," 79) has noted Ibn al-Aṯīr's error in dating the battle waged by Tāš Farrāš and Abū Sahl against ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla outside Rayy to 427/1036, which must be corrected to 429/1037–8.

and his students, there certainly occurred a theft of books from Avicenna's saddle-bags in 421/1030; less confidence can be placed in the reports of a plunder of 'Alā' ad-Dawla's treasuries, of any kind, whether it be in 425/1034 or 428/1036–7. If we are to accept as historically accurate a removal of Avicenna's works from Isfahan other than that which occurred in 421/1030, and since we have no other evidence from Avicenna and his students concerning such a second event, a brief excursus on the available contemporary sources is required.[26] This is necessary in order not only to determine the origin of the Plunder Anecdote but also to verify or to contest the specific facts of the three versions of the Anecdote.

There are many problems associated with an evaluation of the contemporary historiography of fifth/eleventh century Western Iran that hinder investigations such as this one. The fact that the area was subject to repeated military incursions during Avicenna's life and for a period of some two centuries after his death in 428/1037 means that many contemporary written records are irretrievably lost. Furthermore, not only are original works no longer extant; they also often did not even survive through incorporation into later histories in areas that politically were somewhat more stable. Thus, for instance, histories written outside of Iran that record events that happened in Western Iran do not on the whole demonstrate substantial borrowing from local histories.

An equally problematic issue has to do with the very nature of history writing in fifth/eleventh century Iran. There is an undeniable shift in the historiography of the period that moves from annals-based records of fact to compositions that mix records of fact with entertaining stories. This new form of historiography is written in a very ornate literary style that does not hesitate to sacrifice dates and names to the greater glory of the well-turned phrase. With a few very significant exceptions, we can agree with Claude Cahen's judgment that between the end of the fifth/eleventh century and the inception of the Mongol period in the seventh/thirteenth century the writing of history in Iran was reduced to the collecting of morally

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[26] By historical sources I mean the literary historical sources, i.e., written histories. Much progress has been made in the numismatic and archaeological record for this period, but this is of little use in evaluating literary topoi.

instructive anecdotes.[27] It would be supercilious to suggest that this
shift in style and intention coincided with the rise of Persian histo-
riography if only for the fact that one of the best examples of this
literature for the period is al-ʿUṭbī's *Kitāb al-Yamīnī*, written in Arabic.[28]
However, the rise of Persian historiography did result in another
problematic feature of the primary sources: there was a fundamen-
tal split in the access to records of the past. Historians writing in
Persian on the whole did not draw upon earlier Arabic chronicles;
and later historians who knew only Arabic and who covered fifth/
eleventh century Western Iran were very limited in the amount and
quality of material available to them.[29] These problems must be borne
in mind in the search for the origin of the Plunder Anecdote and
the determination of its authenticity.

For the late Būyid period, Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi''s (d. 448/1056) supplement
to Miskawayh's *Tağārib al-Umam* might have proved of enormous value
for determining the authenticity of the Plunder Anecdote, but the
extant portion breaks off before the turn of the fifth/eleventh century.[30]

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[27] Claude Cahen, "The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period," in *Historians of
the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press,
1962), 75.

[28] In fact, it has been argued that the development of ornate Persian prose is
the result of attempts to mimic Arabic epistolary styles; see Bosworth, "The Poetical
Citations in Baihaqī's *Taʾrīkh-i Masʿūdī*," *ZDMG*, Suppl IV [*XX. Deutscher Orientalistentag
Erlangen, 3–8 October 1977*] (1980), reprinted in his *The Arabs, Byzantium and Iran,
Studies in Early Islamic History and Culture*, Collected Studies Series, CS529 (Aldershot:
Variorum, 1996), VII, 43f. and the references cited there.

[29] Cahen, op. cit., makes note of this "cleavage of language." A good example
is the case of Gardīzī's *Zayn al-aḫbār*: it contains a good deal of very solid factual
information (though extremely telescoped), but does not appear to have been drawn
upon by authors until the eleventh/seventeenth century and then only by authors
writing in Persian; see M. Nāẓim, English intro. to his edition of *Zayn al-aḫbār*, E.G.
Browne Memorial Series, 1 (Berlin: Iranschahr, 1928), 2.

[30] The extant portion of Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi''s *Dayl Tağārib al-Umam*, covering the years
989–992, was originally edited and translated by H.F. Amedroz in *The Historical
Remains of Hilāl al-Ṣābī* (Leiden, 1904) and later reproduced in volumes 3 (Arabic
text) and 4 (English translation) of Miskawayh's *Tağārib al-umam*, *The Eclipse of the
ʿAbbasid Caliphate: Original Chronicles of the Fourth Islamic Century*, ed./tr. H.F. Amedroz
and D.S. Margoliouth (London: Basil Blackwell, 1916–1921). The *Dayl* as a whole
most likely covered events up to Tuġril Beg's entry into Baghdad in 447/1055; see
Cahen, ibid., 60. While Sibṭ ibn al-Ğawzī (d. 654/1257) used it extensively in his
Mirʾat az-zamān fī taʾrīḫ al-aʿyān (although he apparently did not have access to the
years 433–447/1041–1055; see Cahen, ibid.), what he did use gives no real infor-
mation on Ibn Sīnā, though he does appear to have drawn on Hilāl's history for
his brief report of Masʿūd's seizure of Isfahan in 421/1030; see Ğanān Ğalīl M.
al-Hamūndī's edition of the years 345–447 (Baghdad: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa, 1990),
345. Hilāl's son Gars an-Niʿma Muḥammad (d. 480/1088) continued his father's
work up to 479/1086 in his *ʿUyūn at-tawārīḫ* which in turn was also drawn on by

Our primary sources for the Ġaznavids[31] in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century include al-ʿUṭbī's *Kitāb al-Yamīnī*[32] and al-Gardīzī's *Zayn al-aḫbār*.[33] Al-ʿUṭbī's work we can dispense with immediately: it stops at the year 411/1020 and thus is of no use for any of the years in question. But al-Gardīzī's work, extending to about 440/1048, also makes no mention of any plunder of books. Gardīzī does relate the attack on Rayy by Maḥmūd in Ǧumādá al-Ūlá 420/May–April 1029, and notes that at the death of Maḥmūd on 3 Rabīʿ al-Āḫir 421/10 April 1030, his son Masʿūd had taken Isfahan (Sipāhān).[34] Further, he notes that Abū Sahl was in Ġazna at the time.[35] This contradicts Ibn Funduq's report that it was Abū Sahl who led the attack on Isfahan in 421/1030.

Sibṭ ibn al-Ǧawzī. For the career and works of Ġars an-Niʿma, see now C.E. Bosworth, "Ghars Al-Niʿma Hilāl Al-Ṣābi's [*sic*] *Kitāb al-Hafawāt al-Nādira* and Būyid History" in *Arabicus Felix, Luminosus Britannicus, Essays in Honour of A.F.L. Beeston on His Eightieth Birthday*, ed. A. Jones (Reading, 1991), 129–41, reprinted in his *The Arabs, Byzantium and Iran*, VIII, with correction to the title.

[31] C.E. Bosworth has treated three of the following mentioned historians, viz. al-ʿUṭbī, Gardīzī, and Bayhaqī, in his "Early Sources for the History of the First Four Ghaznavid Sultans (977–1041)," *IQ* 7.1 (1963), 3–22; and by J.S. Meisami, *Persian Historiography to the End of the 12th Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 47ff., in greater depth and with historical context.

[32] There are four early printings of al-ʿUṭbī's *Kitāb al-Yamīnī*: 1) ed. Mowlawy Mamlukal Alyy and A. Sprenger (Delhi: Lithographed at College Press, 1847); 2) with the commentary of Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Manīnī (d. 1172/1759) entitled *Hāḏā Šarḥ al-Yamīnī al-musammá bi-l-Fatḥ al-Wahbī*, 2 vols. (Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Wahabīya, 1286/1869); 3) in the margin of Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil fī t-taʾrīḫ*, vols. 10–12 (Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kubrá al-Amīra, 1290/1873); and 4) Lahore, 1300/1883. Everett Rowson, who is preparing a critical edition of the work, informs me in private correspondence (30 Sept. 2001) that (3) is dependent on (2), and (4) is dependent on (1), with additional typographical errors. There is also an English translation based on the Persian translation (done about 603/1201) of Abū š-Šaraf Nāṣir al-Ǧurbāḏqānī by J. Reynolds entitled *The Kitáb-i Yamíní, Historical Memoirs of the Amír Sabaktagín and the Sultán Mahmúd of Ghazan*, Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland (London: W.H. Allen, 1858), and which M. Nāẓim, *The Life and Times of Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1971) 4, n. 1, deemed "hopelessly incorrect." For a general discussion of al-ʿUṭbī and his work, see Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 53ff.

[33] Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Hayy ibn aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardīzī's *Zayn al-aḫbār*, written around 440/1048 (cf. P. Hardy, *History and Theory* 20.3 [1981], 340, who gives the date "between 1050 and 1053"), deals with Iran "from earliest times to the middle of the fifth/eleventh century," although the extant portion breaks off during the account of the Ġaznavid Mawdūd ibn Masʿūd (432–41/1041–9); see Nāẓim, op. cit., 5. M. Nāẓim's edition has been noted above. The portion covering the beginning to the Saffārids was edited by Saʿīd Nafīsī (Tehran, 1333Š/1954). See also Bosworth, "Early Sources," 8–10; Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 66ff.

[34] Ed. Nāẓim, op. cit., 91.

[35] Ibid., 93.

The single most important historical work written under the
Ġaznavid reign and relevant for our purposes is the *Tārīḫ-ī Masʿūdī*,
a work written in Persian but with strong Arabic influence by the
bureaucrat Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad Bayhaqī who died perhaps around
470/1077.[36] The *Tārīḫ-ī Masʿūdī* is actually the only extant portion
of a massive reservoir of historical documentation gathered by the
author during his service in the correspondence section of the Ġaznavid
court bureau and entitled simply *al-Muǧalladāt*, or *The Volumes*.[37]
Bayhaqī's position in the Ġaznavid administration afforded him a
unique position for recounting the daily events and correspondence
of his masters. We are told that through the course of his career he
copied many official documents, diplomatic dispatches, treaties, and
private conversations of the Ġaznavid court which, in the leisure of
his retirement, he undertook to organize in a systematic manner.[38]
His *Volumes* were divided according to the reign of Ġaznavid rulers,
and so the volume now entitled *Tārīḫ-ī Masʿūdī* covers Masʿūd's reign,
421–432/1031–1041.

The fact that Bayhaqī's *History* contains no report of a plunder of
Avicenna's saddle-bags in 421/1030 or indeed of his (hypothetical)
library in Isfahan in 425/1034 or 428/1036–7 is significant, but

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[36] For general discussions of Bayhaqī and his *History*, see, M. Nāẓim, *Life and
Times*, 6–7; M. Minovi, "The Persian Historian Bayhaqī," in *Historians of the Middle
East*, op. cit., 138–40; C.E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and
Eastern Iran 994–1040* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963), 10; id., "Early
Sources," 10–14; M.R. Waldman, *Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative: A Case Study
in Perso-Islamicate Historiography* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), with
additional references, 22, n. 9 [Waldman's work is a partially successful discussion
of Bayhaqī's history in light of speech-act theory; see P. Hardy's review in *History
and Theory* 20.3 (1981), 334–344]; S. Nafisi, "Bayhaḳī," EI2, 1:1130–1; Ġ.-Ḥ. Yūsofī,
"Bayhaqī, Abū l-Fazl," EIr, 3:889–894 (with an extensive bibliography); S. Humphreys,
Islamic History: A Framework for Enquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),
128ff.; J.S. Meisami, "The Past in Service of the Present: Two Views of History in
Medieval Persia," *Poetics Today* 14.2 (1993), 247–75 [compares Bayhaqī and Firdawsī];
id., *Persian Historiography*, 79ff.

[37] The extant portion covers the years 421/1030 to 432/1041, although lengthy
quotations in later histories [not all of which can unequivocally be said to be depen-
dent on Bayhaqī] were collected by Saʿīd Nafīsī in his study *Dar Pīrāmūn-i Tārīḫ-i
Bayhaqī*, op. cit. The edition of the *Tārīḫ* used here is that of Q. Ġanī and ʿA.A.
Fayyāḍ (Mašhad: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Mašhad 1324Š/1945; repr. 1391Š/1971)
[hereafter "P"]. There is also an Arabic translation based on the Ġanī/Fayyāḍ edi-
tion by Yaḥyá al-Ḫaššāb and Ṣādiq Našʾat, *Taʾrīḫ al-Bayhaqī* (Beirut: Dār an-Nahḍa
al-ʿArabīya, 1982) [hereafter "A"]. For other editions and translations, see Waldman,
Toward a Theory, 50, n. 49; Yūsofī, "Bayhaqī," 890.

[38] Bosworth, "Early Sources," 11.

requires some qualification, since so little of the original work is now extant. First, Bayhaqī repeats regularly that he has made plans to set aside a special chapter for all that happened while Abū Sahl was in charge of Rayy and the Ǧibāl;[39] we might reasonably assume that he would have addressed the various attacks on Isfahan in this chapter, but it does not appear to be extant. Second, scholars have noted that Bayhaqī's *History* exhibits a lacuna covering several months in the years 424–5/1034–1035.[40] In this missing text Bayhaqī might have mentioned a sack of Isfahan that led to the plunder of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's treasuries and, with them, Avicenna's books (as we find in Ibn al-Aṯīr), but there is no way of knowing this with certainty.[41] Finally, we might note that he makes no reference to such an event under his account of the year 428/1036–7, the implicit date of the *Zubda* report.

However, Bayhaqī's *History* is not entirely inconsequential for our purposes. While the focus of his narrative is on daily court events in Ġazna, it also contains information on the planning and repercussions of activities further afield, including those in Rayy and Isfahan. Thus, we learn that immediately after the death of Maḥmūd in 421/1030, Masʿūd left Tāš Farrāš in charge of Isfahan, since he had to return to Ġazna to contest succession to the throne [P12/A12]. More importantly, Bayhaqī tells us that on his way back to Ġazna Masʿūd received letters by express courier from Ġazna, including one from Abū Sahl [P17/A17]. This confirms Gardīzī's report that Abū Sahl was in Ġazna at the time; consequently, Ibn Funduq's information in this regard is not to be trusted. It was only in 424/1033 that Abū Sahl began to play a direct role in events in the Ǧibāl

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[39] See, for example, P521/A564; and P535/A582.

[40] Bosworth, "Early Sources," 11, with additional references in n. 1; Yūsofī, "Bayhaqī," 890a, who gives examples. N. Aḥmad, "A critical examination of Baihaqi's narration of the Indian expeditions during the reign of Masʿūd of Ghazna," in *Yādnāmah-yi Abū l-Faḍl Bayhaqī*, ed. Ǧ. Matīnī (Mašhad: Dānišgāh-yi Mašhad, 1350Š/ 1971), 48ff., summarized the earlier findings of Hodivala on this issue. Waldman, *Toward a Theory*, 45, questions whether the inference of missing parts is a justified one, but offers no counter-arguments.

[41] Arguing against a possible reference by Bayhaqī to such an event either in the lost part of his *Tārīḫ-i Masʿūdī* or in the "special section" that he mentions in the extant part is the fact that Ibn Funduq, who knew and used Bayhaqī's history (*Tatimma*, 13.4), does not cite him for any information of events related to Avicenna. Ibn Funduq's citation of Bayhaqī in the *Tatimma* is to be contrasted with his complaint, in his *Tārīḫ-i Bayhaq*, about the difficulty of finding copies of Bayhaqī's work; see Aḥmad, "A critical examination," 39.

since it was in this year that he was appointed *ʿamīd* of Rayy to replace Ṭāhir al-Kātib, the *kaṯẖuḏā* there (P387ff./A410ff.).[42]

With regard to a possible plunder of Isfahan in 425/1034, we have only a report from Bayhaqī that in Ṣafar 426/December 1034–January 1035, Masʿūd, while in Nishapur on his way to Marv, *prognosticated*[43] that as a result of hearing the news of his arrival in Nishapur "the aim of Abū Sahl and Ṭāš will have become strong and they will have made those [in Rayy] their servants and Ibn Kākū [i.e., ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla, Avicenna's patron] will become obedient to us; Ṭāš will go to Hamadan where there are no enemies, and send to the court [at Ġazna] the money, gold and fineries he will have gathered" [P444/A473]. Setting aside the report from Ibn al-Aṯīr, dated 425/1034 (see above), Bayhaqī's report of Masʿūd's prognostications is the only other piece of evidence we have for a plunder of Isfahan around that year. While al-Ǧūzǧānī does tell us that there was a battle at the Karaǧ gate of Isfahan in that year and that ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla and Avicenna were forced to flee to Īḏāǧ (see above), he provides no comment about a plunder of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's treasuries or Avicenna's books (or indeed his "library"). Surely, as calamitous an occurrence as the loss of Avicenna's books in 425/1034 would have received the type of attention Avicenna, al-Ǧūzǧānī, and Ibn Zayla gave the earlier rifling of Avicenna's saddle-bags in 421/1030.

In this regard, a series of reports from Bayhaqī on subsequent events are difficult to reconcile with a putative plunder of Isfahan in 425/1034. Bayhaqī informs us that on 8 Ḏū l-Qaʿda 427/2 September 1036, a letter arrived from Abū Sahl in Rayy describing the flight of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla; Masʿūd then wrote to thank Abū Sahl [P501/A540; Bosworth, "Dailamīs," 78]. Next, shortly after Ṣafar 428/November-December 1036, Masʿūd received a letter from Abū Sahl informing him that ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla had sought reprieve and asked to be appointed amir of Isfahan; this reprieve Masʿūd granted, because of the intercession of the vizier of the ʿAbbāsid caliph,

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[42] For a general description of the responsibilities of the offices of *ʿamīd* (civil governor) and *kaṯẖuḏā* (quartermaster), see M. Nāẓim, *Life and times*, 141; and Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, 84–5, 122, and index.

[43] That Masʿūd is predicting what will happen is evident from the use of the subjunctive present, the present, and the past in the respective clauses of the Persian, which in the modern Arabic translation are rendered by the future present, and past tenses. The English future perfect and future tenses are used in the translation above to render these aspects.

Muḥammad Ayyūb [P510–11/A552; Bosworth, ibid.]. Finally, on 21
Ǧumādá al-Ūlá 428/12 March 1037, Abū Sahl sent notice that ʿAlāʾ
ad-Dawla had deceived him and was gathering an army; in this let-
ter Abū Sahl explicitly states that all of the Turkmen of the area
were joining ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla *because of the great amount of money and
stores that he had* [P521/A564] (my emphasis).[44] If ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's
treasuries in Isfahan had been seized in 425/1034 as Ibn al-Aṯīr
states, where did this "great amount of money and stores" come
from? As circumstantial as this evidence is, it does argue against a
plunder of Isfahan as described by Ibn al-Aṯīr in the year 425/1034.
Finally, if there had been such a wholesale seizure of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's
treasuries, we might suppose that such booty would have made its
way to Ġazna; indeed, the *Zubda*, and Ibn al-Aṯīr make it clear that,
at the very least, Avicenna's books were sent to Ġazna. Surely we
might expect that Bayhaqī would make note of such a transfer?
Bayhaqī says not a word about the arrival of *anything* in Ġazna from
Isfahan, let alone the treasuries of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla or even Avicenna's
books.

   In the interest of completeness, we may note incidentally that
Bayhaqī does provide a brief report on the losses incurred by the
Ġaznavids in the battle with ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla outside of Rayy, which
occurred probably in Ǧumādá al-Ūlá 429/February–March 1038[45]
and during which Ṭāš Farrāš was killed and Abū Sahl had to take
refuge in the citadel of Rayy (P535–6/A581–2; Bosworth, "Dailamīs,"
78–9). Thus, the implicit dating of the sack of Isfahan to sometime
after 1036–7 that we find in the *Zubda* is proved wrong: the final
battle between the two armies happened outside Rayy and not in
Isfahan.

   While it is true that Bayhaqī's information on events in the Ǧibāl
is derived only from dispatches from the Ġaznavid generals and
bureaucrats assigned to the region, and while it might be conjec-
tured that more precise and detailed information on those events
could have been found in the "special chapter" Bayhaqī tells us he

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[44] Masʿūd's vizier tried to convince him of the necessity of going to Ḫurāsān and
ultimately Rayy in aid of Abū Sahl, but Masʿūd retorted that Abū Sahl had a
strong army and was trustworthy and that as long as this was the case, no one
should have any worries about "Ibn Kākū [ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla], the Daylamīs or the
Kurds;" Bayhaqī, P523/A567.
[45] In other words, it did not occur in 427/1036 as Ibn al-Aṯīr reported; see note
22 above.

planned to write about those events or in the lost portion of his reports for the years 424–5, the information that we do have from the extant part of his *History* does not corroborate the reports from Ibn al-Aṯīr or the *Zubda* about a plunder of 'Alā' ad-Dawla's treasuries, and Avicenna's books, in either 425/1034 or 428/1036–7. We might reasonably assume that such reports do not have their origin in anything Bayhaqī wrote.[46]

Other works of the Ġaznavid period may also be dismissed as sources for the Plunder Anecdote. The *Kitāb Ḏikr aḫbār Iṣbahān* by Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī, who died in 429/1038, should have provided us with a wealth of information about any attacks on the city, but Abū Nuʿaym's insular world did not extend beyond documenting the *isnād*s of the traditionists of Isfahan.[47] Next, Abū Manṣūr aṭ-Ṯaʿālibī, who died in the same year as Abū Nuʿaym, compiled a collection of biographies of the poets of his age, with some incidental historical information entitled *Yatīmat ad-dahr*.[48] Again, we find not a word on any sack of Isfahan.[49] We might also note Mufaḍḍal ibn Saʿd al-Māfarruḫī's *Kitāb Maḥāsin Isfahān*, composed between 465–485/1072–1092.[50] While not strictly speaking a historical work, the rela-

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[46] Indeed, the tenor of Bayhaqī's work would allow us to suggest that such a fantastic anecdote about the plunder of Avicenna's library would sit awkwardly in his otherwise astute and reasoned presentation of history. Meisami, "The Past," 265, emphasizes Bayhaqī's expressed intention of reporting verifiable historical reports; see also Bayhaqī's comment about Masʿūd and the importance of impartiality in historiography, translated in Bosworth, "Early Sources," 13; Yūsofī, "Bayhaqī," 892a, final paragraph, reiterates Bayhaqī's "commitment to the truth," with additional references; and Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 81, who also notes the "ethical dimension" of Bayhaqī's work and compares this aspect to Miskawayh's historiographical intentions.

[47] Edited by Sven Dedering as *Geschichte Iṣbahāns [von] Abū Nuʿaim*, 2 vols. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1931–4).

[48] *Yatīmat ad-dahr*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 4 vols. in 2 (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat aṣ-Ṣāwī, 1934). Aṭ-Ṯaʿālibī also wrote a continuation of his own work: *Tatimmat al-Yatīma*, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl, 2 vols. (Tehran: Maṭbaʿat Fardīn, 1353Š/1934), which includes a section on Abū Sahl, 2:60–2.

[49] It should be noted here that Gohlman's reference to the *Yatīma* in his *Life of Ibn Sīnā* (136, n. 106) is simply to the name of Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī and not to any report of a sack of Isfahan in 425/1034 as might be expected from his syntax.

[50] *Kitāb Maḥāsin Isfahān*, ed. Ǧalāl ad-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī (Tehran: Maṭbaʿat Maǧlis, 1312Š/1933); Ḥusaynī notes the composition date in his introduction, ǧ. See also the study by J. Paul, "The Histories of Isfahan: Mafarrukhi's *Kitāb maḥāsin Isfahān*," *Iranian Studies* 33.1–2 (2001), 117–132, who notes that the stories in the work cannot "be taken as factual in the sense that we could use them directly as historical reports," (126).

tive proximity of its composition date to Avicenna's time period might lead us to believe that it would contain some reference to any incursions into Isfahan. Again we find nothing of use for the reconstruction of the history of the period.[51] Other minor Ġaznavid sources are of little use for our enquiry. For instance, we may dispense with the *Dīwān*s of the poets Farruḫī (d. 429/1037–8), ʿUnṣurī (d. 431/1039–40), and Manūçihrī (d. 432/1040–1) who often followed their masters on campaign and from whose panegyrics we can glean some minor historical facts; but not in this case.[52]

The preceding investigation into extant historical sources composed during Avicenna's lifetime or shortly thereafter leads to two conclusions. First, it is very unlikely that the Plunder Anecdote, and particularly its narrative placement in either 425/1034 or 428/1036–7, is a product of fifth/eleventh century historiography. Second, none of the extant sources from the period corroborate specific facts of any of the versions: Abū Sahl was not in Isfahan in 421/1030 (Ibn Funduq); the altercation between ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla and the Ġaznavid forces in 428/1036–7 occurred outside Rayy, not in Isfahan (the *Zubda*); there is no conclusive evidence for a seizure of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's treasuries in 425/1034 (Ibn al-Aṯīr), but there is some circumstantial evidence against it; and finally, there are no reports of a transfer of any goods, including Avicenna's books, to Ġazna from Isfahan (Ibn Funduq, the *Zubda*, and Ibn al-Aṯīr).

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[51] Al-Māfarrūḫī does record, 46–7, an anecdote which indirectly involves ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla: Masʿūd, upon arriving in Isfahan (no date given) summons the madman Abū l-Fawāris (who has a "salty manner of speaking," *malīḥ al-alfāz*) and asks him whom he prefers, himself or ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla, to which Abū l-Fawāris responds: "You will depart, but he will not return."

[52] On the careers and panegyrics of the first two of these poets, see J.S. Meisami, "Ghaznavid Panegyrics: Some Political Implications," *Iran*, *JBIPS* 28 (1990), 31–44, and Bosworth, "Farrukhī's Elegy on Maḥmūd of Ghazna," *Iran*, *JBIPS* 29 (1991), 43–9, reprinted in his *The Arabs, Byzantium and Iran*, op. cit., XXII. The *qaṣīda* reportedly dedicated to Masʿūd by Farruḫī in Isfahan in 421/1030 and in which he exhorted his master to return to Ġazna and take the throne does not make reference to the recent seizure of Isfahan; Farruḫī, *Dīvān-i Ḥakīm Farruḫī Sīstānī*, ed. ʿAlī ʿAbd ar-Rasūlī (Tehran: Maṭbaʿat-i Maǧlis, 1311Š/1933), 301–3; and Meisami, ibid., 38. Incidentally, we can also dismiss a final possible historical source: the anonymous Persian *Muǧmal at-Tawārīḫ wa-l-qiṣaṣ*, ed. Malik aš-Šuʿarāʾ Bihār (Tehran, 1318Š/1939), a universal history written around 520/1126, perhaps by an author working at the court of the Kākūyids of Yazd (Cahen, "Historiography," 65) which contains a chapter on the Buyids (388ff.), and which makes reference to al-ʿUtbī and Bayhaqī for additional information on the Ġaznavids (405) but contains no information on any sack of Isfahan.

Sixth/Twelfth Century Historiography and the Genesis of the Anecdote

In fact, it seems that the earliest appearance of the anecdote is to be placed in the mid-sixth/twelfth century. This fact has a certain significance since it is in this century that we begin to see a proliferation of anecdotes about Avicenna in the *adab* works of the period, including those found in Niẓāmī ʿArūḍī's charming but utterly fallacious *Çahar Maqāla*.[53] It is also in the mid-sixth/twelfth century that Ibn Funduq (d. 565/1169–70) composed two works that are crucial for our investigation. The first, his *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, completed shortly after 553/1158–9[54] is a supplement to *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, an earlier collection of biographies of the philosophers, and may be described as containing some historical fact with a large dose of fiction.[55] Certainly, Ibn Funduq's intention in writing this work appears

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[53] Niẓāmī himself makes no historiographical claims for his work; see *Chahár Maqála ("The Four Discourses") of Aḥmad Ibn ʿUmar Ibn ʿAlī an-Niẓámí al-ʿArúḍí as-Samarqandí*, with introduction, notes, and indices by M.M. Qazvīnī, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, XI, 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill), 1910; tr. E.G. Browne as *Chahár Maqála ("The Four Discourses") of Niḏhámí ʿArúḍí l-Samarqandí*, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, XI, 2 (London: Luzac, 1921). Niẓāmī, who wrote his Fürstenspiegel (this is his own description of the work; see, for instance, tr., 22) sometime before 556/1161 (see Browne, intro. to his translation, 5), appears to be responsible for a number of literary anecdotes that have become a mainstay of modern scholarship on the period in question, including Maḥmūd's hunt for Avicenna and the Firdawsī-Maḥmūd legend, both incorporated, if not entirely credulously, in Bosworth's narrative in "The development of Persian culture," op. cit., 38, 39–40. See also the scathing criticism of Niẓāmī by S.H. Burney, "A Critical Survey," op. cit.

[54] For this date, see the references in "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Two, Section III.A.a.

[55] The *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, which Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma* was designed to continue (or "complete") and which is traditionally attributed to Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī as-Siǧistānī, was edited by ʿA.R. Badawī as *Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma wa-ṯalāṯ rasāʾil* (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Nubyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1974). Another attribution, to Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, Avicenna's debating opponent in Hamadan in 405/1014–15 and sometime interlocutor of the *Mubāḥaṯāt* (see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, Section One), was argued by W. al-Qāḍī in "*Kitāb Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma*: Structure, Composition, Authorship and Sources," *Der Islam* 58 (1981), 87–124, but questioned by J. Kraemer in *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam: Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī and his circle*, Studies in Islamic Culture and History, VIII (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 119ff. For a thorough study of the manuscripts and recensions of the work, see D. Gutas, "The *Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma* Cycle of Texts," *JAOS* 102.4 (1982), 645–50. Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimma* was edited by M. Šafīʿ as *Tatimma [sic] Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma* (Lahore, 1351/1932) [and derivatively and poorly by Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī as *Taʾrīḫ Ḥukamāʾ al-Islām* (Damascus: al-Maǧmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1365/1946)] and summarized in English by M. Meyerhof in "ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat Ṣiwān Al-Ḥikma*," *Osiris* 8 (1948), 122–217. For biographical information on Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī, see M. Shafi, "The Author of the Oldest Biographical Notice of ʿUmar Khayyam and

to be directed at recording the pithy statements of famous philosophers (the sources for which have yet to be identified) rather than biographical writing properly speaking. It is in this work, as part of his paraphrase of the Avicenna Autobiography/Biography Complex, that we find the earliest version of the Plunder Anecdote.[56] His second work is *Mašārib at-taǧārib*, a history of the Ġaznavids and Seljuks that was said to have been in four volumes.[57] It is no longer extant, but the fact that it was one of the few historical works written in Arabic for the period in question ensured that it would serve as the fundamental reference for later Arab authors, most especially for Ibn al-Atīr in his *al-Kāmil fī t-taʾrīḫ*, completed around 627/1230.[58] Ibn Funduq's comments in his own Autobiography and the *Tatimma* lead us to believe that he composed both works at the same time, and so we might expect that much of the purportedly "historical" information of the *Tatimma* was also to be found in the *Mašārib*.[59] The first dateable appearance of the Plunder Anecdote is, thus, found in Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma*, albeit in early form and derivative in part of the reports from Avicenna and his students; it probably also figured in his *Mašārib*. It is likely through one of these works that Ibn al-Atīr learned of it.

It is thus possible to dismiss Ibn al-Atīr as an author dependent, at least in this instance, on Ibn Funduq. But the problem of Ibn al-Atīr's dating nonetheless remains; while Ibn Funduq implicitly dates

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the Notice in Question," *Islamic Culture* 6 (1932), 586–623, and Q.S.K. Husaini, "Life and Works of Zahiru'd-Din al-Bayhaqi, the Author of the *Tarikh-i Bayhaq*," *Islamic Culture* 28 (1954), 297–318; much of this biographical information is perfunctorily repeated by P. Pourshariati, "Local Historiography in Early Medieval Iran and the *Tārīḫ-i Bayhaq*," *Iranian Studies* 33.1–2 (2001), 140ff. Pourshariati's analysis of Ibn Funduq's historiographical motivations, and indeed her description of his *Tārīḫ-i Bayhaqī*, are indebted to Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 209ff.

[56] The term "Autobiography/Biography Complex" was first used by W. Gohlman in his edition and translation *The Life of Ibn Sīnā* and has been used fairly consistently in the secondary literature since. For the relation of Ibn Funduq's paraphrase of the Complex to other versions and his bibliographical information, see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Two, Section III.

[57] Ibn Funduq himself says that his *Mašārib* was a continuation of al-ʿUtbī's *Kitāb al-Yamīnī*; see Cl. Cahen "Historiography of the Seljuqid Period," 64ff., who notes that Ibn Funduq cannot mean that he began his work where al-ʿUtbī left off, since we have a quotation of the *Mašārib* from an earlier period, concerning the Būyid vizier Ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995).

[58] See Cahen, ibid., 65–6, who notes Ibn al-Atīr's explicit reference to the *Mašārib* as well as some of the inconsistencies in his use of the work; see also Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 111ff.

[59] Cahen, 65.

the rifling of Ibn Sīnā's saddle-bags and the removal of his works to Ġazna to 421/1030, Ibn al-Aṯīr places a very similar report under the year 425/1034. There are a number of possible explanations for this discrepancy. A report similar to the one in Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma* may have been found in his *Mašārib*, but bearing the date 425/1034, and Ibn al-Aṯīr used that date. Or, Ibn al-Aṯīr could have drawn not on the *Mašārib* but on the *Tatimma*, with its implicit dating of the event to 421/1030 but, knowing full well that Abū Sahl was not in Isfahan in 421/1030, he could have quietly undertaken the hyper-correction of changing the date to 425/1034.[60] Finally, we have noted above that Ibn al-Aṯīr is not immune from making simple errors in his dating; this may be another instance of such slips.[61]

There are additional significant discrepancies between the reports of Ibn Funduq and Ibn al-Aṯīr but in order to address this, we must first turn to the evidence offered by the *Zubda*. This hybrid history of the Seljuks bears the dual title *Zubdat at-tawārīḫ* and *Aḫbār al-umarāʾ wa-l-mulūk as-Salǧuqīya*. The nucleus of the work is based on *Zubdat at-tawārīḫ* attributed to one Ṣadr ad-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Nāṣir al-Ḥusaynī (fl. 575−622/1180−1225), who in turn based his work, at least for the years 485−547, on the earlier *Nuṣrat al-fatra* by ʿImād ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (sixth/twelfth century); Ibn Nāṣir's *Zubda* was sub-stantially transformed through excisions and additions by an unknown author of the seventh/thirteenth century.[62] The first four folios of this work contain a skeletal account of the early Ġaznavids and their relations with the Seljuk Turks. The sources for this account are difficult to identify and it is at any rate unclear which of the vari-ous hands at work in the *Zubda* is responsible for it. The author(s), after a brief reference to Masʿūd's altercation with the Ḫwārazmšāhs which is dated 4 Muḥarram 428/28 October 1036,[63] records a ver-sion of the Plunder Anecdote which, while much more developed, resembles in many respects that of Ibn al-Aṯīr. Both the *Zubda* and

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[60] I use the term hyper-correction because, as we have seen, we have no unequiv-ocal corroboration of the plunder of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's treasuries and Avicenna's books in 425/1034.

[61] See above, n. 25.

[62] See Cl. Cahen, "Historiography," 69−72 who also provides references to other scholarly assessments. Cahen used M. Iqbāl's edition (Lahore, 1933) which I have not seen. See the reference to the published facsimile of MS Br. Mus. Stowe Or. 7 above, n. 22.

[63] Šafīʿ in his edition of Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma*, 56, n. 1, incorrectly transcribed this date from the Stowe manuscript as "427."

Ibn al-Aṯīr explain Avicenna's connection to ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla in order to introduce their anecdote; both make reference to ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's *treasuries* in Isfahan; both use the similar terms *ḫizānat al-kutub* (*Zubda*) and *ḫazāʾin kutub[ihā]* (Ibn al-Aṯīr) to describe where Avicenna's books were deposited in Ġazna; and both make the assumption that Avicenna's books were indeed transferred to Ġazna at the time of the plunder of Isfahan, something not at all explicit in Ibn Funduq's report. In fact, all of these elements are either implicit in or absent from Ibn Funduq's report. The fact that both the *Zubda* and Ibn al-Aṯīr leave out the details of book titles and identities of correspondents mentioned by Ibn Funduq should not be considered significant; these details would be far too specific for the broader perspectives of the *Zubda* and Ibn al-Aṯīr. Points of contrast among all of the versions include the *Zubda*'s mention of Tāš Farrāš in connection with Abū Sahl, which substitutes for Ibn Funduq's "a group of Kurds" and which is wholly neglected by Ibn al-Aṯīr. The fact that the *Zubda* implicitly dates the event to 428/1036–7 explains its addition of Tāš Farrāš: it is only in the final major altercation between ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla and the Ġaznavid forces that we find the two mentioned together in the sources (e.g., Bayhaqī). Thus, the *Zubda*'s first error of dating is consonant with the second error of including Tāš Farrāš.

Conclusions concerning the possible relationships of dependency among the versions of the Plunder Anecdote are difficult to reach. We can be relatively certain that Ibn al-Aṯīr based his report on information from Ibn Funduq, although whether he took that information from Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma* or his *Mašārib* is less certain. Given the present state of our knowledge concerning the lines of transmission in historical works dealing with the period in question, it would be hazardous to posit with certainty how the versions of the Plunder Anecdote in the *Zubda* and Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil* relate to one another. The composition history of the *Zubda* is still not completely resolved and since there does appear to have been a revision of the nucleus of the *Zubda* sometime in the seventh/thirteenth century, i.e., around the time that Ibn al-Aṯīr composed his *al-Kāmil*, it is impossible to know whether Ibn al-Aṯīr also drew on the revised *Zubda* or whether the anonymous revisor of the *Zubda* drew on Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil*. That the two reports are somehow related seems almost certain but more than that cannot yet be proved demonstrably. At any rate, it is almost a certain fact that both are ultimately derivative of Ibn Funduq.

The Biases and Motivations of Ibn Funduq

It is apparent from the foregoing that Ibn Funduq is the source of the early version of the Plunder Anecdote and that he based his report on the texts of Avicenna and his students. The latter conclusion is nowhere more evident than in the fact that the three works by Avicenna mentioned by Ibn Funduq are all found in Avicenna's first letter (Avicenna 1 above); and it should be noted that it is these very three works which had the most problematic process of transmission and loss in the Avicennan corpus.[64] The fact that Ibn Funduq only implicitly dated the rifling of Avicenna's saddle-bags and the fact that he commented on the survival of these works, particularly the survival and then destruction of two of them in Ġazna, led to the generation of the Plunder Anecdote in later histories, including the *Zubda* and Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil*. It remains to be determined what Ibn Funduq's motivation may have been for developing a survival story—ending in the burning of Avicenna's books—to add to the information he culled from the texts of Avicenna and his students. Some clues in this regard can be sought in the other anecdotal material pertaining to Avicenna that is found in his *Tatimma*.

In his brief biography of Avicenna's first teacher an-Nātilī,[65] Ibn Funduq charges Avicenna with intellectual plagiarism. Ibn Funduq claims that an-Nātilī was the first to conceive of the theory of a "sanctified soul" (*nafs qudsī*) and the corollary theory about intuition (*ḥads*), both of which are mainstays of Avicenna's psychology, but that Avicenna never credited his teacher with the theory.[66] He records

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[64] The survival of the *Išārāt* was apparently tenuous at the time that Avicenna wrote his letter to Bahmanyār, since he notes that [only] one copy may yet exist (see the translation in Avicenna 1 above). However, by the time of Ibn Funduq's writing, the transmission of the *Išārāt* in numerous copies was assured; hence Ibn Funduq did not include it in his "survival" report.

[65] *Tatimma*, ed. Šafīʿ, 22.1–23.5. Avicenna names an-Nātilī as his teacher in geometry and logic in the Autobiography, tr. Gohlman, op. cit., 20–23/21–25, nothing that he quickly surpassed an-Nātilī in mastery of these disciplines; see also Gutas's translation in *Avicenna*, 24–27, with additional references for the biography of an-Nātilī, such as it is known, 24, n. 9. Gutas, 193, also notes how uncommon it is in Arabic biographical literature for a scholar to emphasize how *little* he learned from a teacher; this very observation may have been behind Ibn Funduq's attempt to rehabilitate an-Nātilī. For further discussion of Ibn Funduq's report, see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Two, III.A.a.2.

[66] On these theories, see Gutas, *Avicenna*, 159ff.

two statements ostensibly by an-Nātilī in order to bolster this claim: "You must study the substance of the noble soul," and "The sanctified soul is not persuaded by the dialectical or rhetorical syllogism." Implicit in Ibn Funduq's report is that an-Nātilī was the progenitor of these theories, but that Avicenna did not acknowledge this "fact."

Ibn Funduq's account of Avicenna's opinion of the physician Abū l-Faraǧ ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib mixes quotations from a letter by Avicenna's student Ibn Zayla with his own opinions. Ibn Funduq says that "Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā] denounced [Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib] and disparaged his works."[67] He then quotes Avicenna as saying "[Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib's] works should be sent back to the seller and let him keep his money!"[68] Ibn Funduq next draws on the same letter to rehabilitate Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib and Avicenna's opinion of him by quoting Avicenna to the effect that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib may once have been a master of medicine but that "his discussion [of the topic] is not clear; some of it is sound and some of it faulty." What Ibn Funduq leaves out of this assessment is Avicenna's own supposition, recorded by Ibn Zayla, that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib suffered "a derangement due to illness that regularly befalls thinkers,"[69] replacing it with his own assessment: "I myself have seen a book by Abū l-Faraǧ . . .; I benefited from it and recognized that he was a learned man (ḥakīm)."[70] Ibn Funduq thus concludes that Avicenna was "hurtful (muʾḏin) and insulting (muhaǧǧin)" to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, without having to raise the question of an illness that may have affected Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib's faculties.

Ibn Funduq's account of Avicenna's opinion of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib serves to introduce his peculiar report of a meeting between Avicenna and Miskawayh which in turn serves to buttress his claim that Avicenna was disrespectful of his contemporaries. Immediately after his condemnation of Avicenna for his "hurtful and insulting" behavior toward Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Ibn Funduq recounts:

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[67] *Tatimma*, 27.8.
[68] This statement is reported secondhand by Ibn Zayla in a letter Gutas dubbed "Memoirs of a Disciple from Rayy," in *Avicenna*, 64ff. (and his translation of this sentence, 68). I have argued that the "disciple" is Ibn Zayla in "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, Section III.C.a, et pass., and that Ibn Funduq modified the quotation of Avicenna to refer to only one book by Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib instead of the original "books" by a number of the Baǧdādī scholars; ibid., Chapter Two, Section III.A.a.1, note.
[69] Tr. Gutas, *Avicenna*, 68.
[70] *Tatimma*, 28.8–9.

I saw in a book that Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā] visited Abū ʿAlī ibn
Miskawayh . . . who was surrounded by his students. Abū ʿAlī threw a
nut at him and said: "Describe the surface of this nut in measures of
grain!"[71] Ibn Miskawayh held aloft some fascicles on ethics and threw
them at Ibn Sīnā, saying: "You mend your morals first before I deter-
mine the surface of the nut, since you are more in need of mending
your morals than I am in need of the surface of a nut!" In much the
same way did Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā] take stabs at Abū l-Farağ [ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib] in his writings. Disparagement, rebuke and insult are not the
normal practice of contemporaneous philosophers; rather it is the deter-
mination of truth. Whoever determines the truth has no need to cen-
sure the misguided (ahl al-bāṭil)—may God safeguard us against vices
and bestow upon us in full measure the grace of virtues![72]

The literary function of the "surface of a nut" topos is particularly
obscure. But, while it is not clear to me what Ibn Funduq may have
intended by it,[73] nor indeed whether or not he drew upon the works
of Avicenna or Miskawayh to construct it,[74] we certainly should not

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[71] I believe this is the sense of the statement: *bayyin misāḥata hāḏihī l-ğawzati bi-š-
šaʿīrāt*, *Tatimma*, 29.2.

[72] *Tatimma*, 28.11–29.7. Ibn Funduq's censure of such scholarly excesses is repeated
regularly in his *Tārīḫ-i Bayhaq*; see additional examples in Meisami, *Persian Historiography*,
221ff.

[73] Implicit in this statement is my opinion that, despite Ibn Funduq's vague ref-
erence to a book in which he read this account, we can be fairly certain that it is
he himself who is the author of the anecdote. See the next note for a possible
identification of Ibn Funduq's source as Avicenna's *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*.

[74] It may be related in some way to Miskawayh's comments on the deception
of the senses in measuring aspects of the natural world in his *Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq*, ed.
C. Zurayk (Beirut: AUB, 1966), 7.14–8.16, but such comments are very common
in philosophical works. The next defence of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in Ibn Funduq's narra-
tive involves the correspondence between Avicenna and Bīrūnī and this may also
have suggested the topos; consider Question Three of the correspondence, con-
cerning dimensions, especially of the circle, and Question Six on the movements
of shapes like the egg and the lentil, in *al-Asʾila wa-l-ağwiba*, ed. S.H. Nasr and
M. Mohaghegh, Islamic Thought (Al-Fikr Al-Islāmī), Series of Texts, Studies and
Translations, III (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995). Finally, we find a mention of
Miskawayh in Avicenna's *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, a collection of correspondence between
Avicenna, his students, and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī. The reference to Miskawayh
is found in a passage of a letter to Bahmanyār, in which Avicenna chastises the
latter for what he perceived to be rude behavior: "This is all I can say about each
question in one sitting when my aim is to be both brief and enigmatic, as a rec-
ompense for impoliteness. Each question in itself could warrant an unequivocal
answer filling many pages, but that would have been only if each question had
been isolated, self-contained, and its response sought after an interval and in a polite
manner, for it would be unseemly of me to behave like Miskawayh, al-Kirmānī,
and these kinds of people," *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, par. 113; tr. "Avicennan Tradition,"
Chapter Three, II.A.a; cf. tr. J. Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyâr et
al-Kirmânî, présentation, traduction critique et lexique arabe-français de la *Mubâḥaṯa*

conclude from the anecdote as a whole that Avicenna and Miskawayh ever actually met.[75] Rather, what Ibn Funduq appears to be attempting in this anecdote is the defence of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib through the chastisement of Avicenna by his elder contemporary Miskawayh. In fact, such a defence of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib by another contemporary, the scientist Abū r-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī, follows this in Ibn Funduq's narrative and is even more explicit in its ramifications for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib. He says:

> Abū r-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī had sent some questions to Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā]. Abū ʿAlī responded to them and Bīrūnī objected to the responses of Abū ʿAlī, insulted him and his remarks (*kalām*), and gave him a taste of the bitterness of insults. Abū ʿAlī addressed [Bīrūnī] in a way not even commoners would, let alone philosophers. So when Abū l-Faraǧ [ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib] examined the questions and responses [of Bīrūnī and Avicenna], he said: "He who mistreats people will in turn be mistreated by them. Abū r-Rayḥān served as my proxy."[76]

III," *Le Muséon* 110.1–2 (1997), 189–190. This passage concludes Avicenna's discussion of the different ways in which people of varying levels of intelligence come upon the syllogistic solutions to difficult questions. [I thank Dimitri Gutas for reminding me of this passage.] This context might also be behind al-Qifṭī's report about a putative meeting between Avicenna and Miskawayh. Al-Qifṭī says: "Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā said in one of his books, after stating a problem 'I presented this problem to Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh and he repeated it a few times and had difficulty understanding it. I finally left him and he still had not understood it'." Al-Qifṭī then qualifies his information (or tips his hand) by saying: "This is [only] the sense (*maʿnâ*) of what Ibn Sīnā said, because I wrote [this] report from memory," *Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ*, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig: Th. Weicher, 1903), 332.7–10; German translation by H. Preißler, "Vergleich zwischen Avicenna und Miskawayh," in *Avicenna/Ibn Sina 980–1036, II: Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, ed. B. Brentjes (Halle/Saale: Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1980), 35. Qifṭī's report is repeated by Bar Hebraeus, *Taʾrīḫ Muḫtaṣar ad-Duwal*, ed. Anṭūn Ṣālḥānī al-Yusūʿī (al-Ḥāzimīya: Dār ar-Raʾīd al-Lubnānī, 1403/1983), 306.14–17.

    [75] The historical impossibilities that we face when attempting to verify such a meeting on the basis of such an anecdote are not as neatly overcome as M. Arkoun's discussion might suggest; see *L'humanisme arabe au IVᵉ/Xᵉ siècle: Miskawayh, philosophie et historien*, 2nd ed., Études Musulmanes, XII (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), 85–6; cf. Preißler, "Vergleich," 41, n. 1. M. Waldman's criticism (*Toward a Theory*, op. cit., 3) of the uses to which modern scholars put medieval Arabic historical sources, while somewhat indiscriminate, is appropriate in this instance. Of biographers after Ibn Funduq (e.g., Yāqūt, al-Qifṭī, Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʾa), none take up this anecdote (but compare a similar one by al-Qifṭī in the previous note), with the exception of al-Mīrzā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḫwānsārī (d. 1313/1895), *Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt fī aḥwāl al-ʿulamāʾ wa-s-sādāt* (Beirut: ad-Dār al-Islāmīya, 1991), 1:266–7. Al-Ḫwānsārī's biographies are no more trustworthy than those of Ibn Funduq; see the notes in "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, Section II.B.

    [76] *Tatimma*, 29.7–30.1; the meaning of the last statement is that Bīrūnī treated Avicenna in the same manner that Avicenna treated Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib.

In this report, Ibn Funduq again employs a contemporary of Avicenna
to serve as a witness against what he perceives as Avicenna's poor
treatment of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib. It also introduces an additional element
for our analysis: simple untruth. A reading of the correspondence
between Avicenna and Bīrūnī makes it very clear that Avicenna in
fact did not address Bīrūnī in a derogatory way; indeed, a notable
aspect of Avicenna's responses to Bīrūnī is his explicit deferment to
the latter's expertise in the field of geometry.[77] Furthermore, Ibn
Funduq's report in this part of the *Tatimma* is contradicted some-
what by the related report in his biography of Avicenna's student
al-Maʿṣūmī, later in the *Tatimma*:

> When Abū ʿAlī responded to Abū r-Rayḥān's questions, Abū r-Rayḥān
> challenged those questions and used words that amounted to bad man-
> ners (*sūʾ al-adab*) and insolence (*safāḥa*). So Abū ʿAlī refused [to con-
> tinue] the debate. Then al-Maʿṣūmī responded to Abū r-Rayḥān's
> challenges and said: "If you had chosen expressions other than these
> in addressing the Šayḫ [i.e., Avicenna], it would have been more suited
> to reason and learning."[78]

It is clear from Ibn Funduq's manipulation of his sources in his
biographies of an-Nātilī and Abū l-Faraǧ ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib that he was
greatly shocked by what he perceived as Avicenna's arrogant atti-
tude toward contemporary philosophers and scientists. Ibn Funduq's
reaction to Avicenna, articulated through a revisionist, perhaps even
patently false, presentation of those contemporaries' own responses
to Avicenna, equally mars his version of the Autobiography/Biography
complex. For example, Ibn Funduq inserts into al-Ǧūzǧānī's Biography
of Avicenna the following account, designed to explain why the
Ġaznavid Masʿūd laid siege to Isfahan in 421/1030, which in turn
led to the rifling of Avicenna's saddle-bags and the theft of his works:

> A war occurred between the general Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī, ruler of
> Rayy for Sultan Maḥmūd, and ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla. Then Sultan Masʿūd
> ibn Maḥmūd advanced on Isfahan and took ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's sister.
> So Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā] sent a dispatch to Sultan Masʿūd and said, "If

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[77] See *al-Asʾila*, op. cit., 29.5–7. This is not to say that Avicenna was unaware
of Bīrūnī's insulting attitude in the course of the correspondence; consider, for
instance, his comments in the response to Question 2, 14.3–4: "As for your state-
ment [concerning intellectual fanaticism], such provocation (*muǧāyaza*) and rudeness
(*muḫāšama*) is offensive."

[78] *Tatimma*, 95.6–10.

you marry this woman who is a satisfactory match for you, ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla will cede rule to you." So Sultan Masʿūd married her. Then ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla prepared for war [against Masʿūd], so Sultan Masʿūd dispatched a messenger to him and said, "I will give your sister over to the rogues[79] of the army!" So ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla said to Abū ʿAlī "Respond!" Abū ʿAlī [wrote to Masʿūd and] said: "Since the woman is the sister of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla, she [should] be your wife, and if you divorce her, then she is your divorcee—and alimony is the responsibility of husbands, not of brothers." The Sultan scorned this but sent back ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla's sister safely and in honor. Then General Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī, along with a group of Kurds, plundered the Šayḫ's baggage, etc.[80]

Any attempt to verify the historicity of such an anecdote on the part of modern historians would be pointless, indeed it would be methodologically naive.[81] Ibn Funduq has inserted this report into the original text of al-Ǧūzǧānī's Biography for one purpose only: to explain the reason for the attack on Isfahan by Abū Sahl (note the anachronism) as being the result of Avicenna's obnoxious attitude toward the Ġaznavid Masʿūd. Avicenna's attitude toward Masʿūd brought on the rifling of his saddle-bags and the loss of his works.

This type of literary causality, in which invented recompenses are incurred by Avicenna for his actual or perceived behavior, is a conspicuous characteristic of Ibn Funduq's treatment and must be considered in his account of the survival and subsequent destruction of Avicenna's books in the library of Ġazna. In fact, a quick survey of Ibn Funduq's accounts of the survival of Avicenna's books is interesting in this regard, particularly when we consider that all of those books that Ibn Funduq mentions are those that have had the most tenuous transmission records. Of Avicenna's *al-Ḥāṣil wa-l-maḥṣūl*, no longer extant, Ibn Funduq says that it "was in the library of Būzǧān,

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[79] "rogues," translates *runūd* (sg. *rind*), which is Šafīʿ's conjecture for his base manuscript's reading *w.ʔ.w.d.h*, on the basis of the seventh/fourteenth century Persian translation of the *Tatimma* (*Durrat al-aḫbār va Lumʿat al-anvār*, ed. M. Šafīʿ, 2nd ed., Tehran: Šarikat-i Sihāmī, 1318Š/1939) which has *rindān*, 42.4. A. de B. Kazimirski, *Dictionnaire arabe-français* (repr. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, s.n.), 1:933a, records the Arabic *rind, runūd*, with the translation "buveur, homme adonné à la débauche ou au vin." Kurd ʿAlī, in his edition of Ibn Funduq's *Tatimma*, op. cit., 67.11, conjectures *wulūdihī* (voc.?), but this seems unlikely. "Rogues," *runūd*, appear again in Ibn Funduq's *Tārīḫ-i Bayhaq*; see P. Pourshariati, "Local Historiography," 159.

[80] *Tatimma*, 55.3–56.7.

[81] The topos of legal marital problems surfaces again in Ibn Funduq's unverified explanation of the cause of the historian Bayhaqī's imprisonment; see the summary by Yūsofī, "Bayhaqī," 889.

but was lost."[82] Of his *al-Birr wa-l-iṯm*, which Avicenna himself tells us existed only in his holograph, Ibn Funduq says "in 544/1149–50 I saw [a copy of] it in the possession of the Imām Muḥammad al-Ḥāriṯān as-Saraḥsī[83]—God have mercy on him! [It was written] in a poor and cramped (*muqarmaṯ*) hand." This report, which cannot be verified, would appear to have been made simply to accommodate the description of Avicenna's handwriting.[84] Ibn Funduq's account of the survival of the three works lost in the rifling of Avicenna's saddle-bags has been translated above. In that report, it is worth noting that, according to Ibn Funduq, Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* was purchased by ʿAzīz ad-Dīn al-Fuqqāʿī az-Zinğānī.[85] The historian Yāqūt (d. 626/1229), who identifies this individual as ʿAzīz ad-Dīn Abū Bakr ʿAtīq az-Zinğānī, or ʿAtīq ibn Abī Bakr, notes that he made his career as a purveyor of beer and other alcoholic beverages[86] to the Seljuk Sultan Sanğar (r. 511–552/1118–1157).[87] It cannot but be significant that Ibn Funduq would inform us that one of

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[82] *Tatimma*, 44.4–5.

[83] Ibn Funduq has a brief report on Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥāriṯān as-Saraḥsī in the *Tatimma*, 159–60, to which Šafīʿ, 159, n. 3, adds additional information from al-ʿImād al-Iṣfahānī's *Ḫarīdat al-qaṣr wa-ğarīdat al-ʿaṣr*, including Ibn al-Ḥāriṯān's death date 545/1150: "He wandered and roamed and surveyed most of the climes at his own risk in search of consummate wisdom. . . . He and I had a discussion concerning [the thesis] that two or three [logical] conceptualizations must precede affirmation [of an argument]; I recorded this [discussion] in my *Commentary on the Naǧāt*."

[84] It is worth noting that Ibn Funduq's characterization of Avicenna's handwriting contradicts that of Manṣūr ibn Muslim, known as Ibn Abī l-Ḥarağāyn (fl. 457–510/1060–1117 in Damascus), whose copies of other of Avicenna's holographs exist in MS Istanbul University A.Y. 4755 and who says that Avicenna's handwriting was "a strong and excellent script using a fine nib" (*ḫaṭṭ qawīy ğayyid bi-qalam daqīq*); see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter One, Part Two, Section I.A.b.

[85] Šafīʿ followed his base manuscript (Berlin Petermann 737) for the reading "ar-Rayḥānī" instead of "az-Zinğānī," which is found in MS Köprülü 902 (recorded by Šafīʿ, *Tatimma*, 56, n. 4) and confirmed by Yāqūt's information, on which see n. 87 below.

[86] Indeed, this appears to be the origin of his *kunya* al-Fuqqāʿī; according to Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (repr. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 6:2428c, *fuqqāʿ* is a sort of beer made from barley.

[87] Yāqūt, *Muʿǧam al-Buldān/Jacut's Geographisches Wörterbuch*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1869), 4:50; cited also by Šafīʿ, *Tatimma*, 194, and Max Weisweiler, "Avicenna und die iranischen Fürstenbibliotheken seiner Zeit" in *Avicenna Commemoration Volume* (Calcutta: Iran Society: 1956), 62, n. 4 (see also Gutas, *Avicenna*, 133, n. 2).

Avicenna's major philosophical works, no longer extant in its entirety, was purchased by a seller of illegal beverages![88] We return finally to Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-mašriqīya* and *al-Ḥikma al-ʿaršīya*, both of which Ibn Funduq, on the authority of the otherwise unknown Ismāʿīl al-Bāḫarzī, tells us were lost when the library of Ġazna was burned down during the Ġūrid sack of Ġazna. To understand why Ibn Funduq might have invented such a story,[89] we must turn again to Avicenna's own account of his early years of learning. In his Auto-biography, Avicenna describes the library of the Sāmānids where he undertook what D. Gutas has called his "graduate education":[90]

> One day I asked [the Sāmānid ruler Nūḥ ibn Manṣūr's] permission to enter the library, look through it, and read its contents. He gave me permission and I was admitted to a building with many rooms. In each room, there were chests of books piled one on top of the other. In one of the rooms were books on the Arabic language and poetry, in another jurisprudence, and so on in each room a separate science. . . . I saw books whose very names are unknown to many and which I had never seen before nor have I seen since. I read those books, mastered their teachings, and realized how far each man had advanced in his science.[91]

The sense of awe with which Avicenna describes the library is self-evident. Perhaps less so is his intimation that he alone had access to books otherwise unknown to his contemporaries and that such a period of study granted him alone the ability to judge the relative intellectual merits of scholars. It is in this context that we might assess a final report from Ibn Funduq which he inserted into his version of the Autobiography at the end of Avicenna's description of the Sāmānid library:

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[88] For the approbation later authors levied against Avicenna for imbibing wine and an analysis of the place of such a habit in Avicenna's philosophical praxis, see Gutas, *Avicenna*, 184ff.

[89] Despite the fact that Ibn Funduq ascribes this report to al-Imām Ismāʿīl al-Bāḫarzī, it is more likely that Ibn Funduq himself is responsible for the information. At any rate, I have not found any references to an Ismāʿīl al-Bāḫarzī in the literature.

[90] *Avicenna*, 153–4.

[91] Gohlman, *Life*, 35–6; the translation above contains only a minor modification in syntax to Gutas's translation, *Avicenna*, 28–9. Cf. the German translations by P. Kraus, "Eine arabische Biographie Avicennas," *Klinische Wochenschrift* 11 (1932), 5–6, and Weisweiler, "Avicenna," 50.

It is agreed that this library was burned down and all of the books were consumed. An adversary [unnamed: *baʿḍu ḫuṣamāʾ*] said that Abū ʿAlī set fire to the library in order that those sciences and [their] precious knowledge (*nafāʾis*) would accrue to him alone and that the credit for those intellectual benefits (*fawāʾid*) would be cut off from their proper authors.[92]

Who is this anonymous hostile witness? He is likely none other than Ibn Funduq himself. Throughout the *Tatimma* Ibn Funduq makes very clear his disapproval of Avicenna. We have seen the lengths to which he goes in defending Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib against what he perceived as the rude judgment of Avicenna; we have seen also the method by which he sought to levy recompense against Avicenna for what he perceived as Avicenna's surliness toward his contemporaries. I submit that the works stolen from Avicenna's saddle-bags in 421/1030 never reached Ġazna and certainly did not perish in the Ġūrid destruction of its library. Rather, Ibn Funduq invented such a survival story as the just balance to an equally apocryphal story of Avicenna's act of arson against the Sāmānid library.[93]

Revisiting the Modern Record

The evaluation of the historical sources related to the transmission of Avicenna's works has previously been left undone in modern scholarship. This fact has produced an implicit assumption of the veracity of Ibn Funduq's report. Equally, the relationship between Ibn Funduq's report and those of later historians, viz. Ibn al-Atīr and the author(s) of the *Zubda*, has not been previously plotted. This fact has led to the assumption, not always implicit, that later reports somehow offer independent verification of Ibn Funduq's information.

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[92] *Tatimma*, 43.9–11.
[93] It should be clear from the foregoing that Ibn Funduq's historiographical intentions did not include solely the "collection of facts" but rather was directed towards the moral "edification" of the reader (see Meisami's correction of Lambton's perception of Ibn Funduq in *Persian Historiography*, 213); such edification was obviously determined by a conception of specific virtues deemed desirable by Ibn Funduq himself or his broader cultural context. We have seen the ways in which such edification undermined the presentation of historical fact in Ibn Funduq's biographies but, while it is perhaps unfair to expect such edification to conform to our modern notions of historicity, we should nonetheless be prepared to discount its value for the establishment of such historical fact.

Paul Kraus appears to be the first modern scholar to outline the extant evidence concerning the loss of Avicenna's works. His "Plotin chez les arabes," published in 1941, contains a detailed note (n. 3, 273–4) in which he listed the testimonies of al-Ǧūzǧānī, Ibn Funduq, and the *Zubda* on the loss of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* in 421/1030, without mentioning the other works listed by Avicenna in his letter to Bahmanyār (see Avicenna 1 above).[94] He noted that Ibn Funduq named Abū Sahl al-Ḥamdūnī as leader of the expedition against Isfahan instead of the Ġaznavid Maḥmūd (then Sultan) or his son Masʿūd (who actually led the expedition), but did not comment on the incongruity. A little over a decade later (1954), Shlomo Pines made incidental reference to "the sack of Isfahan, which happened in 1034" in a brief note on the loss of Avicenna's books in his "La conception de la conscience de soi,"[95] without providing any reference to the extant historical works for this date. Two years later (1956) Max Weisweiler *did* cite the relevant primary sources for the date of 425/1034 as that of the loss of Avicenna's books, but he did not subject those sources to the analysis that would have led to a modification of this date.[96] In 1974, W. Gohlman published his edition and translation of the Autobiography/Biography Complex and in the course of commenting on al-Ǧūzǧānī's testimony (see above, al-Ǧūzǧānī), raised the issue of when the sack of Isfahan may have occurred. Although Gohlman gave a narration of the attack on Isfahan by Masʿūd in 421/1030, he nonetheless endorsed the date

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[94] Kraus, "Plotin chez les Arabes, remarques sur un nouveau fragment de la paraphrase des *Ennéades*," *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte* 23 (1941), 263–295. Kraus followed Šafīʿ's erroneous dating (*Tatimma*, 56, n. 1) of 427 (and not 428) for the report in the *Zubda*. Also, it is not surprising that Kraus would neglect mention of the other works, since they do not have as direct a bearing on the transmission of Plotinus as does *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* and related texts.

[95] Pines, "La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez Abu'l-Barakât al-Baghdâdî," *AHDL* 29 (1954), 21–98; reprinted in *Studies in Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Physics and Metaphysics, The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines*, ed. S. Stroumsa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 1:181–258. The reference above is to 44, n. 2 of the original publication.

[96] "Avicenna," 62, n. 6, citing Ibn Funduq, al-Qifṭī, Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa [*ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ*, ed. M. Müller, Cairo, 1299/1882], Ibn al-Aṯīr, Ḫwāndamīr [*Ḥabīb as-siyar*, Tehran Lithograph, 1857; derivative of his uncle Muḥammad Mīr Ḫwānd's *Rawḍāt aṣ-ṣafāʾ*, itself a verbatim translation of Ibn al-Aṯīr's *al-Kāmil*; see Nāẓim, *Life and Times*, 12–13], and the *Zubda* (apud Šafīʿ). We have seen that the first, fourth, and last of these sources all have different dates for the plunder of Avicenna's saddle-bags; Weisweiler thus made an implicit choice in favor of 1034.

425/1034 on the basis of Ibn al-Aṯīr's testimony.[97] In 1988, Dimitri
Gutas staked claim to the middle ground on the issue in the course
of developing his theory concerning the dates of composition and
loss of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*.[98] Drawing on Avicenna's letter to
Bahmanyār (Avicenna 1) and seeking to reconcile the datings in the
reports of Avicenna and his students, Ibn Funduq, and Ibn al-Aṯīr,
Gutas argued that Avicenna was referring to two separate events:
the loss of *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* in 421/1030; and the loss of (a copy of) *al-
Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt, al-masāʾil al-mašriqīya* (Ibn Funduq: *al-Ḥikma al-
mašriqīya*), and *al-Ḥikma al-ʿaršīya*. As salubrious as this compromise
must have appeared at the time, it nonetheless could only be an
informed hypothesis until such time as a broader analysis of the his-
toriography of the problem could be undertaken.[99]

   The preceding evaluation of that historiography brings to light a
number of interesting facts about the later representation of Avicenna
and the historical events in which he was involved. It now seems
clear that Ibn Funduq, while drawing on the texts of Avicenna and
his students, added significant, and unverifiable, information con-
cerning the survival of Avicenna's books and works-in-progress after
421/1030. The intention behind Ibn Funduq's manipulation of the
historical record would appear to derive from his personal antipathy
to Avicenna and was designed to levy against him a literary rec-
ompense for perceived faults in Avicenna's treatment of his con-
temporaries. The ambiguity in the dating of Ibn Funduq's report is
most likely the cause for the confusion concerning when Avicenna's
books were subject to pilfer. This ambiguity produced the alternate
dates of 425/1034 for the unfortunate event in the later Arab his-
torian Ibn al-Aṯīr's account, and 428/1036–7 in the later recension
of the *Zubda*.

   The fact that Avicenna and his students make no comment on
another loss of Avicenna's books (or the plunder of his *library*) is per-

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[97] Gohlman, *Life*, 135–6, n. 106.
[98] Gutas, *Avicenna*, 134–6.
[99] There are yet more random statements by modern scholars on the date of the
sack of Isfahan in relation to Avicenna's books; for instance, Cahen, "A propos
d'Avicenne," 82, in an uncommonly careless moment, dated it to 1033 (i.e., the
very beginning of 424). The references above, however, are sufficient to plot the
general trajectory of the debate.

haps sufficient to discredit the hypothesis that there were two occasions on which Avicenna's books were subject to the fortunes of war. However, the fact that none of the extant records of the period corroborate such a second event and, in the case of Bayhaqī's *History*, actually offer circumstantial evidence against it, further obliges us to revise the historical record. We thus must take seriously and at face value the evidence offered by Avicenna and his students concerning the theft of his works from his saddle-bags in 421/1030 by endorsing the dates of composition and loss for the books mentioned by them. This means that, contrary in part to modern treatments of the chronology of his works, we can say with certainty that: 1) *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* was written before 421/1030 and lost *in toto* in that year;[100] 2) that *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt* must have been composed prior to 421/1030[101] and that only a copy was lost in that year. As for Avicenna's testimony concerning the works *al-masāʾil al-mašriqīya* and *al-Ḥikma al-ʿaršīya*, the identity, contents and survival of these works remains the subject of ongoing research.[102] A final important observation that emerges from the preceding study of the historiography of Avicenna's time is the absolute paucity of information directly related to him

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[100] In response to Kraus's question ("Plotin," 274, n. 1) concerning the nature of the extant remains of this work (ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿarab*, Dirāsāt Islāmīya, 5 [Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1947], 22–74), I have suggested elsewhere that they are likely Ibn Zayla's notes to (or excerpts of?) the work; see "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Three, II.C.c.4

[101] See the alternate date in Gutas, *Avicenna*, 145.

[102] The necessary study of the textual transmission of the work now called *al-Mašriqīyīn* has been undertaken by D. Gutas, "Avicenna's Eastern ("Oriental") Philosophy: Nature, Contents, Transmission," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10.2 (2000), 159–180, but the question concerning the relation of this work to the text entitled *al-masāʾil al-mašriqīya* in Avicenna's letter remains (see my hypothesis in a note to "Avicennan Tradition," Chapter Four, II.D.a.). Also, I do not believe that the work entitled *ar-Risāla al-ʿAršīya* which circulates today under Avicenna's name is the work referred to by Avicenna in his letter, or indeed that it is by Avicenna at all. The text of Pseudo-Avicenna's *ʿAršīya* can be found in *Maǧmūʿat Rasāʾil aš-Šayḫ ar-Raʾīs Abī ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā al-Buḫārī* (Hayderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṭmānīya, 1354/1935); edited more recently by Ibrāhīm Hilāl, *ar-Risāla al-ʿAršīya fī ḥaqāʾiq at-tawḥīd wa-iṯbāt an-nubūwa* (Cairo: n.p., 1980*)*, on the basis of the Hayderabad publication and MS Maǧlis 7851; English translation by A.J. Arberry, *Avicenna on Theology* (repr. Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1992), 25–37; German translation by Egbert Meyer, "Philosophischer Gottesglaube: Ibn Sīnās Thronschrift," *ZDMG* 130 (1980), 226–277. I hope to pursue this in a revisionist study of the Pseudo-Avicennan corpus. For now, see the additional comments by Robert Wisnovsky in the present volume.

in that literature. This raises serious questions about the glorified professional status al-Ǧūzǧānī accords his master in his Biography, but that is a topic for future research.[103]

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[103] Throughout his Biography of Avicenna, al-Ǧūzǧānī makes it apparent that Avicenna had garnered an important public reputation in the course of his early career and this is endorsed by Avicenna himself in his narrative of their first meeting; see Gohlman, *Life*, 42/3, and compare Gutas's comments in "Avicenna II, Biography," 67b. It is with regard to such contexts that I would propose that rhetorical historiography supercedes almost immediately (in a temporal sense) the record of factual history by a contemporary historian; cf. Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 289.

CHAPTER SIX

ROCKS IN THE HEAVENS?!
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN ʿABD AL-ǦABBĀR
AND IBN SĪNĀ

Alnoor Dhanani

There are two aspects to the "encounter" between ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār
(d. 415/1025) and Ibn Sīnā: the personal and the intellectual. By
"personal encounter" I mean the actual historical engagement between
them, whether in person or via explicit references in their texts. Since
they are also the foremost representatives of the disciplines of *kalām*
and *falsafa* during the late fourth and early fifth/late tenth and early
eleventh centuries, their "intellectual encounter" reflects the more
general encounter between these opposing disciplines. These two
aspects are of course inter-related, for the personal encounter also
incorporates elements of the intellectual encounter. I begin here with
what is known about the personal encounter between them and then
discuss some aspects of their participation in the intellectual encounter
between *kalām* and *falsafa*.

One of the surviving items of Ibn Sīnā's correspondence is his
Letter from one of the mutakallimūn to the Šayḫ, so he replied which is also
known as the *Risāla fī l-makān*. In the letter, Ibn Sīnā is questioned
by an unidentified correspondent (who, according to the title of the
text was a *mutakallim*) who states:

> In the days of my youth (*šabābī*), I saw a man who asked me: "What
> is this expanse which extends over all things? Some of the Ancients
> called it *ilāh* (god) and worshipped it; others called it *faḍāʾ*, still others
> called it *makān* and *markaz*, while the *mutakallimūn* called it *ǧiha* and
> *ḥayyiz*, and the Muʿtazila called it *muḥāḏāt*. All of them refer to it by
> *ḥaytu* and *ayna* [where]. In his *Šarḥ Lubāb al-maqālāt ʿan al-Balḫī*, Qāḍī
> ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār relates: by the term *faḍāʾ*, the proponents of *faḍāʾ*
> mean the same thing which we mean by the term *muḥāḏāt*. As long
> as they do not assert that it [i.e., *faḍāʾ*] is a body, nor that it is capa-
> ble of motion (*ḏāhib fī l-ǧihāt*), nor that it is contiguous (*muǧāwara*), nor
> that it inheres in (*ḥulūl*), the difference between us and them is merely
> in the use of terms (*fī l-lafẓ*) not in their meaning (*fī l-maʿnâ*). . . ."

> I ask our Master, the wise *Šayḫ*, may God perpetuate his high status,
> that he explain to me what he has found regarding this [subject] so
> that it can be a cure (*šifāʾ*) and so that by this action he may, God-
> willing, earn joyful tidings and the blessings of an abundant reward in
> the hereafter.[1]

Almost at the end of his reply to the posed question, Ibn Sīnā refers
back to his correspondent's mention of ʿAbd al-Ğabbār:

> With regard to what the author of this problem has mentioned, that
> is, regarding ʿAbd al-Ğabbār, that the meaning of *faḍāʾ* is the same
> as the meaning of *muḥādāt*, this is an error regarding both terms.[2] This
> is because *muḥādāt* [being face-to-face or opposite] is a relational attribute
> of [one] opposing body (*muḥāḏī*) in relation to the body which opposes
> it (*muḥāḏī*). Therefore if either one of them were absent, then the exis-
> tence of both would be impossible.[3]

It follows from this text then that when Ibn Sīnā's correspondent
was a young man, he was questioned regarding the nature of space
by an unidentified discussant. Many years later, the correspondent
wrote to Ibn Sīnā seeking to elicit his views on the exchange, in
particular seeking further information about the views of the ancients
regarding space.[4]

   We find two references in this *risāla* to ʿAbd al-Ğabbār: the first
is by Ibn Sīnā's correspondent who tells us about the general *kalām*
use of *ğiha* and *ḥayyiz* for space and the specific Muʿtazilī use of
muḥādāt. This later usage is attributed to ʿAbd al-Ğabbār, in par-
ticular, to his *Šarḥ Lubāb al-maqālāt ʿan al-Balḫī*, who equates *muḥādāt*
with *faḍāʾ*. The second reference is by Ibn Sīnā himself, when he
refers back to his correspondent's citation of ʿAbd al-Ğabbār regard-
ing the Muʿtazilī use of *muḥādāt*. Ibn Sīnā then disputes ʿAbd al-
Ğabbār's assertion that *muḥādāt* and *faḍāʾ* are equivalent and that
they both refer to space on linguistic grounds. We cannot, unfortu-
nately, verify the account of Ibn Sīnā's correspondent regarding ʿAbd
al-Ğabbār's intent in equating *muḥādāt* with *faḍāʾ*, for the commen-

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   [1] *Risāla fī l-makān*, MS Ahmet III 3447, 38v. I would like to thank David Reisman
for providing me with copies of this work.
   [2] *fa-ammā mā ḏakarahū ṣāḥibu hāḏihī š-šubhati wa-huwa ʿAbdu l-Ğabbār bi-anna l-maʿná
bi-l-faḍāʾi huwa l-maʿná bi-l-muḥādāti fa-huwa ġalaṭun min kilayhima* . . . (ibid., 41r).
   [3] Ibid., 41r.
   [4] The nature of space seems to have been an issue in vogue during this period,
for we have a similar *risāla* by Ibn al-Hayṯam; see his *Risāla fī l-makān* in *Mağmūʿ
ar-rasāʾil* (Hayderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṯmānīya, 1357/1938), no. 5.

tary which is mentioned here is lost. Nevertheless, in his treatise on
Definitions and Realities ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's student aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍá
(d. 436/1044) provides a definition of the Muʿtazilī use of *muḥāḏāt*,
which probably reflects his teacher's use of the term, as the space
(*al-ǧiha*) which the atom (*ǧawhar*) may occupy.[5] Not surprisingly, al-
Murtaḍá does not define *faḍāʾ*, since this was not a term used by
the *mutakallimūn*. Thus ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's equation of *faḍāʾ* with *muḥāḏāt*
was primarily meant to inform his readers of the equivalence of these
two terms, the former utilized primarily in *falsafa* contexts, possibly
in doxographical accounts of the views of early Greek philosophers
on space, and the latter utilized by the Muʿtazila.

This *Risāla* therefore is evidence of a textual encounter between
Ibn Sīnā and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār or, more accurately, Ibn Sīnā's tex-
tual encounter with ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār. We do not know where or
when the *Risāla* was written, whether it was before or after Ibn Sīnā's
stay in Rayy where, as we shall see, Ibn Sīnā may have met ʿAbd
al-Ǧabbār. However, we can be sure that Ibn Sīnā must have been
exposed to *kalām* early in his career, certainly before this encounter
in the *Risāla* with ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's views on space. In his *Autobiography*,
Ibn Sīnā tells us that his initial studies included the study of Ḥanafī
Islamic law (*fiqh*) with Ismāʿīl az-Zāhid and we also know that dur-
ing his stay in Gurganǧ at the court of the Ḫwārazamšāh ʿAlī ibn
Maʾmūn he became a jurist.[6] He must have been introduced to at
least the rudiments of *kalām* in the course of his engagement and
study of *fiqh*.[7] However, the mature Ibn Sīnā's knowledge of *kalām*

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[5] Aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍá, *al-Ḥudūd wa-l-ḥaqāʾiq* in *Rasāʾil aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍá*, ed. A. al-
Ḥusaynī and M. ar-Raǧāʾī (Qum: Dār al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, 1405–/1984–), 2:282.
[6] Ibn Sīnā, *The Life of Ibn Sina*, ed./tr. W. Gohlman, (Albany, New York: SUNY,
1974), 20, 40; D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Islamic Philosophy and
Theology: Texts and Studies, 4 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 25 (and n. 10), 29.
[7] The individualistic character of education does not allow us to ascertain what
texts Ibn Sīnā read with Ismāʿīl az-Zāhid. Nevertheless, the study of *fiqh* requires
a grounding in the fundamentals of the Islamic creed, in this case, according to
the Ḥanafī rite. While it is difficult to draw the general conclusion of the affiliation
of legal *maḏhab*s with *kalām* orientations, Bulliet claims that in the case of the patri-
cians of Nishapur in the medieval period, "all of the known or presumed Ashʿarīs
are Shāfiʿīs, and all of the known or presumed Muʿtazilīs are Ḥanafīs" (R. Bulliet,
Patricians of Nishapur [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972], 36). Bulliet cautions
however, that biographical dictionaries for the most part record an individual's law
school, and more rarely his theological orientation. Moreover, Bulliet's discussion
does not include the Māturīdīs who were widespread in Central Asia. Ibn Sīnā
recognizes the relationship between *kalām* and *fiqh*, not surprisingly, from within his
falsafa perspective. He suggests that the relationship of *kalām* to the religious sciences

was anything but rudimentary. For example, in his discussion of physical theory in the *Šifāʾ*, in particular, atomism, he demonstrates detailed knowledge of *kalām* arguments concerning atomism between Abū l-Huḏayl (d. 227/841–2) and his anti-atomist nephew an-Naẓẓām (d. between 220–230/835–845).[8] Such familiarity suggests that he was well-versed with *kalām* texts which discussed such arguments in some detail, quite possibly the *maqālāt* genre of texts. Since these arguments regarding atomism are not found in the surviving *maqālāt* works by al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935) or al-Balḫī (d. 319/931),[9] could Ibn Sīnā have relied on ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's commentary of al-Balḫī's *Maqāla fī l-makān*? We cannot be absolutely certain about this because, as has already been mentioned, this text, like other *Maqālāt* texts, has not survived.

Nevertheless, the claim that Ibn Sīnā may have relied on a source close to ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's school has some merit because of the indirect evidence provided by texts of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's students. In his *Taḏkira fī aḥkām al-ǧawhar wa-l-aʿrāḍ*, Ibn Mattawayh (d. 469/1076?) discusses the arguments between Abū l-Hudhayl and an-Naẓẓām in great detail;[10] and in his *Masāʾil al-ḫilāf bayna l-baṣrīyīn wa-l-baġdadīyīn*, Abū Rāšid an-Nīsābūrī (d. mid-5th/11th century?) details the questions on which the Basrian Muʿtazila had differed from al-Balḫī.[11] We may reasonably suppose that these students relied on ʿAbd al-

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is analogous to the relationship of metaphysics to the physical sciences, in so far as "the *faqīh* takes his principles for granted, namely the necessity of the text of revelation, accounts of the Prophet, consensus, and analogy from the *mutakallim*" and his "verification of his sources" is not *qua faqīh* but as a *mutakallim*. Similarly "the physicist (*ṭabīʿī*) takes his principles for granted from the metaphysician (*ilāhī*)"; see Ibn Sīnā, *Fī l-Aǧrām al-ʿulwīya* in *Tisʿ rasāʾil fī l-ḥikma wa-ṭ-ṭabīʿīyāt wa-fī āḫirihā qiṣṣat Salāmān wa-Absāl*, ed. A. Hindīya (Cairo, 1908), 42. I believe that this recognition of a relationship between these two disciplines is not just theoretical, but based on the actual historical relationship of these two disciplines as seen by religious scholars, perhaps including Ismāʿīl az-Zāhid.

    [8] Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ, aṭ-Ṭabīʿīyāt: as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, ed. S. Zāʾid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣrīya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1983), 184–202; P. Lettinck, "Ibn Sīnā on Atomism: Translation of Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt: al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī*, Third Treatise, Chapters 3–5," *aš-Šaǧara* 4 (1999), 1–50.

    [9] Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī, *(Bāb) Ḏikr al-Muʿtazila min Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn* in *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-muʿtazila*, ed. F. Sayyid (Tunis: ad-Dār at-Tūnisīya li-n-Našr, 1986), 63–119.

    [10] Ibn Mattawayh, *Taḏkira fī aḥkām al-ǧawāhir wa-l-aʿrāḍ*, ed. S.N. Luṭf and F.B. ʿAwn, Silsilat Nafāʾis al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1 (Cairo: Dār aṭ-Ṭaqāfa, 1975), 162–207; A. Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām, Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology*, Islamic Philosophy and Science, Texts and Studies, 14 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 172–181.

    [11] Abū Rāšid an-Nīsābūrī, *Masāʾil al-ḫilāf bayna l-baṣrīyīn wa l-baġdādīyīn*, ed. M. Ziyādah and R. as-Sayyid, (Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmāʾ al-ʿArabī, 1979).

Ğabbār's commentary of al-Balḫī's *Maqālāt* or perhaps even the parts of the *Muġnī* which are lost for this material. We thus have the intriguing, although likely, possibility of Ibn Sīnā's acquaintance with portions of ʿAbd al-Ğabbār's works.

ʿAbd al-Ğabbār al-Hamaḏānī (b. 320/932) was originally an Ašʿarī *mutakallim*. He moved from Hamadhan to Basra where he converted to Muʿtazilī *kalām*, studying with the masters of the day. He commenced his writing and teaching career in Baghdad, moved to ʿAskar, and then to Rāmahurmuz in 360/970, where he began dictating his *magnum opus*, *al-Muġnī*. He finally moved to Rayy, at the invitation of the Muʿtazilī-leaning Būyid vizier Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995) and was appointed chief *qāḍī*. Here, in 380/990, ʿAbd al-Ğabbār completed dictating his *Muġnī*. During the twenty years it took to dictate the *Muġnī*, ʿAbd al-Ğabbār composed several other works, including the above-mentioned *Commentary on al-Balḫī's Maqālāt*. In 385/995 he turned to write his *Taṯbīt dalāʾil an-nubūwa*. In the same year, following the death of Ibn ʿAbbād, ʿAbd al-Ğabbār was dismissed from his position of chief *qāḍī* and arrested by the Būyid prince Faḫr ad-Dawla. We do not have further information about ʿAbd al-Ğabbār's career at court, particularly whether or not he was reinstated following Faḫr ad-Dawla's death. He died in Rayy in 415/1025.[12]

The biographer of the Muʿtazila, al-Ğušamī (d. 494/1100) evaluates ʿAbd al-Ğabbār's standing and influence, telling us:

> I have not found any report which would detract from ʿAbd al-Ğabbār's place with regards to virtue or his high standing in knowledge. For he is the one who tore (*fataqa*) *kalām* open, unfolded it, and put it down in great books. As a result, *kalām* spread far and wide, reaching the East and the West. In these books he included the minutiae (*daqīq*)[13] of *kalām* as well as its larger questions (*ğalīl*) [in a manner] which none before him had accomplished successfully.[14]

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[12] Al-Ğušamī, *Šarḥ al-ʿuyūn* in *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, op. cit., 366; S.M. Stern, "ʿAbd al-Ğabbār b. Aḥmad," *EI²*, 1:59–60; C. Cahen and C. Pellat, "Ibn ʿAbbād," *EI²*, 3:671–3; C. Cahen, "Fakhr ad-Dawla," *EI²*, 2:748–9; J. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age*, Studies in Islamic Culture and History, VII, Second Revised Edition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 261–262, 272; M.T. Heemskerk, *Suffering in Muʿtazilite Theology, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice*, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, Texts and Studies, 41 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000), 36–53.

[13] The minutiae (*daqīq*, *laṭīf*) of *kalām* primarily refer to cosmological questions. Hence Ibn Mattawayh's work is also known as *Taḏkira fī laṭīf al-kalām*. I discuss this in "Kalām and Hellenistic Cosmology: Minimal Parts in Basrian Muʿtazilī Atomism," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1991, 21–28.

[14] Al-Ğušamī, *Šarḥ*, 365.

As consolidators of their respective disciplines of *falsafa* and *kalām*,
as teachers, as authors, and as public officials, Ibn Sīnā and ʿAbd
al-Ǧabbār are therefore clearly comparable figures of the late tenth
and early eleventh centuries. Moreover, both were also pressed into
the service of the Būyids, and as such, their lives were intertwined
with the political vagaries and rivalries of their patrons. Like ʿAbd
al-Ǧabbār, Ibn Sīnā also entered the service of the Būyids in Rayy.
But he did so as a member in the court of the young prince Maǧd
ad-Dawla, son of Faḫr ad-Dawla, and his regent mother as-Sayyida.[15]
Ibn Sīnā remained in Rayy until it was attacked by Šams ad-Dawla.
We can therefore date Ibn Sīnā's stay in Rayy to 403–405/1013–15,
that is, when he was in his late twenties and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār was
in his late seventies and early eighties. The presence of Ibn Sīnā
and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār in Rayy during this period clearly provided
ample opportunity for a personal encounter.[16] If the composition of
the *Risāla fī l-makān* predates Ibn Sīnā's sojourn in Rayy, then he
must have been aware of the now elderly ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's renown.
But even if the *Risāla* was written later, it is inconceivable that Ibn
Sīnā would not already have been aware of the renowned Muʿtazilī
teacher before his arrival in Rayy or, at the very least, after his
arrival there. Unless ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār was completely out of favor at
court, there may have been official occasions where they were both
present. But we may rightly ask: even if these two intellectuals had
met, what would they have discussed? Their world-views were quite
incommensurable. ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār had already written his most
significant works, in many of which he had argued against positions
of the *falāsifa*. On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā's career was rising. He
was working on the *Qānūn* but had yet to write the *Šifāʾ* and the
Naǧāt. But he was also familiar with the views of the opposition, in
this case the *mutakallimūn*, and had expressed his views against them
in his exchange with al-Bīrūnī.[17]

These particulars then, namely, Ibn Sīnā's textual encounter with
ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār in the *Risāla*, his probable familiarity with ʿAbd al-

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[15] Ibn Sīnā, *Life*, 48; C.E. Bosworth, "Maḏjd al-Dawla," *EI²*, 5:1028.
[16] Gutas, *Avicenna*, 261.
[17] For this correspondence, see Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Sīnā, *al-Asʾila wa-l-aǧwiba*, ed. S.H. Nasr and M. Mohaghegh, Islamic Thought (al-Fikr al-Islāmī),
Series of Texts, Studies and Translations, III (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995); Gutas,
Avicenna, 145.

Ǧabbār's commentary on al-Balḫī's *Maqālāt* or sections of the *Muġnī* or some other work from ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's school detailing *kalām* arguments on physical theory, and their simultaneous presence in Rayy, constitute the extent of the known historical encounter between them. There is no indication on the part of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār of a textual encounter with Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless we may presume that he too may have known about the young Ibn Sīnā's presence in Rayy, particularly in light of Ibn Sīnā's close relationship with the prince Maǧd ad-Dawla. Moreover ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār was also a keen participant in the intellectual encounter between *kalām* and *falsafa*. Not only was he interested in, and familiar with, the views of the Ancients and their contemporary exponents among the *falāsifa*, but more importantly, he was highly critical of their doctrines and carried on the *kalām* tradition of attacking them in writing as well as in debate.[18] A substantial portion of this critique, particularly with regards to physical theory and the eternity of the world, which were the usual areas of disagreement between the *mutakallimūn* and the *falāsifa*, was probably recorded in the first three lost volumes of the *Muġnī*. In the parts of the *Muġnī* which have survived, but even more so in the *Taṯbīt dalāʾil an-nubūwa*, ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār directly attacks the *falāsifa* on their doctrine of the status of celestial beings and their role in influencing terrestrial events. Aspects of the discussion in the lost sections of the *Muġnī* can be gleaned from his critique of the Sabaens in the fifth volume of the *Muġnī*. He recounts here the areas of disagreement regarding the eternity of the world and theory of matter, but also sharply emphasizes the difference over celestial beings:

> Know that everything we have related here regarding their views we have refuted in the preceding chapters which we have dictated. For we have shown that bodies are created in time (*muḥaddaṯa*) and the theory of prime matter (*hayūlá*) is baseless. We have shown that the planets, since they are bodies (*aǧsām*), are not capable of making bodies and that they are not gods (*āliha*). We have shown the falsity (*ibṭāl*) of the doctrine that they are governors [of affairs in the terrestrial world] (*mudabbir*) and that they are alive (*ḥayya*). . . .
>
> Regarding the argument (*kalām*) against the astrologers (*munaǧǧimūn*) and the partisans of the Sphere (*aṣḥāb al-falak*) we have already discussed this, because much of what they believe, regarding which there

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[18] Kraemer, *Humanism*, 178f.

is a dispute between us and them, concerns their belief in the eter-
nity of bodies (*qidam al-aǧsām*) or the Sphere, and that they or some
of them are governors [of affairs in the terrestrial world], and their
theory regarding natures (*al-qawl bi-ṭ-ṭabāʾiʿ*). We have already shown
the falsity of all of these [views].[19]

Certainly Ibn Sīnā also questioned the veracity of astrology,[20] never-
theless it is well-known that he shared and strongly defended the
falsafa view that celestial entities influence the affairs of the terres-
trial world via their emanations and that they are alive, precisely
the positions attacked by ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār. The special status of the
celestial realm of course plays a central role in *falsafa*, interweaving
its cosmology, epistemology, and metaphysics. We should note, how-
ever, that one leading figure among the Muʿtazila struggled with the
normative *kalām* view which denied celestial efficacy. Biographical
dictionaries preserve several anecdotes about Abū ʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī
(d. 303/915) which show that al-Ǧubbāʾī conceded the predictive
aspect of planetary conjunctions, albeit denying a causal role, advo-
cating instead a customary association between conjunctions and ter-
restrial events.[21] But Abū ʿAlī's views failed to win support among
the *mutakallimūn*.

   A detailed version of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's polemic against the *falsafa*
position on the privileged status of celestial beings survives in the
Taṯbīt dalāʾil an-nubūwa where it is repeated in several places. The
Taṯbīt is a polemical work which aims to discuss the indications for
the prophecy of Muhammad. In the course of this enterprise, ʿAbd
al-Ǧabbār launches personal attacks on those who deny prophecy in
general and the prophecy of Muhammad in particular. These per-
sonal attacks permit an assessment of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's attitude
towards contemporaries and predecessors. His critique of the *falsafa*
view of the celestial realm occurs in several places. The most promi-
nent of these is ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's rejection of the Aristotelian doc-

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[19] ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, *al-Muǧnī fī abwāb at-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl*, ed. M. al-Ḥuḍayrī, (Cairo:
Wizārat aṭ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qawmī, 1958), 5:153–154; J.R.T.M. Peters, *God's
Created Speech: a study in the speculative theology of the Muʿtazilī Qāḍī l-quḍāt Abū l-Ḥasan
ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 30.
[20] Y. Michot, *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir Abû Saʿd, Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de
Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique*, Sagesses musulmanes, 4 (Beyrouth:
Les Éditions al-Bouraq, 2000), 23–26.
[21] Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyá ibn al-Murtaḍá, *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*, ed. S. Diwald-
Wilzer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1961), 94, 98–99.

trine of the unchanging heavens in the context of the incident of
the swooping down of the stars (*inqiḍāḍ al-kawākib*):

> One of [Muhammad's] signs (*aʿlām*) which occurred while he, may the
> blessings of God and peace be upon him, was in Mecca is the swoop-
> ing down of the stars and their filling the sky in all directions in a
> manner which breaks from the customary course of events (*ʿāda*) and
> departs from the norm (*muʿtād*). This is a great sign (*āya*), a majestic
> indication, and a momentous manifestation. [Even] the Quran has spo-
> ken about this event, relating the account of the jinn: "We searched
> the heavens and found them to be filled with strong guards and mete-
> ors. We would sit on seats to hear; but anyone listening now finds a
> meteor waiting for him!" (72:8)[22]

As ʿAbd al-Ğabbār relates, this indication of Muhammad's prophecy
had occupied many of the Muʿtazila. The objection they faced was
that this event is not unique. The swooping down of stars is men-
tioned by earlier poets and in the books of the non-Arabs (*ʿağam*). It
cannot therefore be a sign of Muhammad's prophecy. Both Abū ʿAlī
al-Ğubbāʾī and Abū Hāšim al-Ğubbāʾī (d. 321/933) conceded that
the swooping down of stars (perhaps they mean the phenomenon of
meteor showers?), had indeed occurred before Muhammad. Never-
theless, the occurrence of this event to indicate Muhammad's prophecy
was a break from the customary course of events because it, unlike
earlier events, was different in degree, namely, it filled up the sky.
This, in their view, was similar to floods which had certainly occurred
before Noah, but the Deluge represented a departure from the norm
with regards to its extent and degree. It is this aspect of the degree
of the swooping down of stars which is absent in pre-Islamic poetry
or the books of the non-Arabs.[23]

On the other hand, earlier *mutakallimūn* like an-Naẓẓām and al-
Ğāḥiẓ (d. 255/868) agreed that ancient poets had indeed mentioned
the swooping down of stars but it was not clear that they regarded
this to be a sign for the prophecy of Muhammad. With regards to
the mention of meteors (*šuhub*) in the books of ancient non-Arabs,
al-Ğāḥiẓ asserted that there was no way to ascertain this (*lā sabīla*

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[22] ʿAbd al-Ğabbār, *Taṯbīt dalāʾil an-nubūwa*, ed. ʿA.K. ʿUṯmān (Beirut: Dār al-
ʿArabīya li-ṭ-Ṭibāʿa wa-n-Našr wa-t-Tawzīʿ, 1966), 1:64. Abū ʿAlī al-Ğubbāʾī's com-
ments on these verses of the Quran are preserved by the Šīʿī author Šayḫ aṭ-Ṭāʾifa
aṭ-Ṭūsī in his *Tafsīr at-tibyān*, ed. A.Ḥ.Q. al-ʿĀmilī (Najaf: Maktabat al-Amīn, 1963),
10:149–150.
[23] *Taṯbīt*, 1:69.

ilá l-ʿilmi bihī) because the translations and the translators could not be trusted.[24]

ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār also doubted the veracity of the translations, perhaps not so audaciously as al-Ǧāḥiẓ had done. But ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār added that these books were transmitted to the Islamic world by the enemies of Islam, those whose most coveted desire was to deny the prophecy of Muhammad. Not only were the translators enemies of Islam, but they had suppressed portions of the works which reveal the errors of the ancients. Moreover, they had used concepts and explications of Muslim intellectuals to dress up the works of the ancients.[25] After this digression, ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār then turns to discuss the books of the ancients which had mentioned meteors, in particular Aristotle's *Meteorology*:

> Scholars have examined the book known as the *Meteorology*, ascribed to Aristotle. One of the [Christian translators] translated it for an ʿAbbāsid Caliph as a gift. Scholars have not found any clear mention (*ḏikran muṣarriḥan*) of the swooping of stars in this book. Rather it is a comprehensive treatise on which scholars have written commentaries, claiming that by this, Aristotle meant that, that is to say [regarding swooping stars] it is something that originates on the earth and rises to the air, or something along these lines.[26]

It is well known that in the *Meteorology*, Aristotle theorizes that meteorological phenomena are produced by moist and dry exhalations rising from the earth as a result of the warmth of the sun.[27] The contact of the warm and dry exhalations in the highest parts of the terrestrial sphere with the circular motion of the ether produces the fiery bursts which we know as shooting stars, torches, and goats.

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[24] Ibid., 1:69–70; see also al-Ǧāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*, ed. ʿA. Hārūn, (Cairo: Maktabat Muṣṭafá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938–1945), 6:272–280. ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār relates the discussion between the followers of Abū ʿAlī and al-Ǧāḥiẓ on their difference of interpretation on the mention of the swooping down of stars in pre-Islamic poetry (*Taṯbīt*, 1:78).

[25] *Taṯbīt*, 1:75–76.

[26] Ibid., 1:77.

[27] Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 341b1–4. Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ, aṭ-Ṭabīʿiyāt: al-Maʿādin wa-l-Āṯār al-ʿulwīya*, ed. ʿA. Muntaṣir, S. Zāʾid, and ʿA. Ismāʿīl (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1965), 39; P. Lettinck discusses the views of the Greek and Arab philosophers on meteors in his *Aristotle's Meteorology and its Reception in the Arab World, with an Edition and Translation of Ibn Suwār's Treatise on Meteorological Phenomena and Ibn Bāǧǧa's Commentary on the Meteorology*, Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 10 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999), ch. 2, "Phenomena in the Upper Atmosphere," 66–96.

'Abd al-Ǧabbār asserts that one cannot rely on Aristotle's views even though his partisans trusted in him. Rather, he is not of sound mind (*fa-huwa ġayru kāmili l-ʿaql*) because, as these partisans relate, Aristotle believed that the sun, moon, and stars are indivisible, that the sun is neither hot nor is it possible for it to be hot, for heavenly bodies can be neither hot nor cold, neither wet nor dry, neither heavy nor light, neither rough nor smooth, nor can the stars be increased or decreased by even one star, nor can there be any more or less suns, nor does the sun have color, smell, or taste! For 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, the possibility of all of these is clear to the mind, regardless of whether one is learned or ignorant, a scholar or a layman.[28] 'Abd al-Ǧabbār continues:

> Aristotle's ignorance (*ǧahl*) includes his belief that the heaven, sun, moon, and stars/planets (*kawākib*) are intelligent, discerning, hearing, seeing, harmful, beneficial, bestowing life and causing death and that every event (*ḥādiṯa*) in the world derives from their action and influence. But the knowledge that the heaven, sun, moon, and stars (*nuǧūm*) are inanimate (*ǧamādāt*) and lifeless (*mawāt*) is like the knowledge that rays (*šuʿāʿ*) of the sun, rays of the moon, light (*ḍawʾ*) of the stars/planets, lightning, clouds, winds, rain, sea, water, air, earth, and fire are inanimate and lifeless. There is no difference between someone who claims this regarding earth, fire, water, air, and plants and someone who claims this regarding stars/planets.[29]

'Abd al-Ǧabbār and most *mutakallimūn* thus reject the *falsafa* view that celestial beings are alive, have attributes similar to those of living, intelligent beings, and influence the terrestrial realm by bestowing life and causing death. Rather they are lifeless and inanimate, like the terrestrial elements of the *falāsifa*: earth, fire, water, and air. As such they have neither souls nor intellects but are merely lifeless, in other words, just rocks in the heavens.[30]

The striking aspect of 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's discussion lies in what he does not state explicitly, but takes for granted. We will recall that the original discussion on the basis of the Quran and indication of the prophecy of Muhammad concerned meteors. 'Abd al-Ǧabbār

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[28] *Taṯbīt*, 1:78–79.
[29] Ibid., 1:79.
[30] The rejection of a causal role for the stars/planets is discussed by 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's student Šarīf al-Murtaḍá in his *ar-Radd ʿalá l-munaǧǧimīn* in *Rasāʾil*, op. cit., 1:299–312.

knew that in the *Meteorology*, Aristotle regarded swooping stars to be
terrestrial phenomena, a result of terrestrial exhalations rising to the
upper atmosphere. Yet he slips into the discussion of celestial objects,
namely stars or planets without defending this move from meteors
to stars/planets. To a *faylasūf* this is a clear breach of the absolute
divide between the distinctive celestial and terrestrial realms. What
lies behind 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's seeming confusion or gloss over the
difference between meteors and stars/planets? I suggest that, despite
Aristotle, he failed to recognize or refused to acknowledge a dis-
tinction between the terrestrial and celestial realms. That is to say,
his failure or refusal was grounded in a world-view which denied
any distinction between the celestial and terrestrial realms.

When 'Abd al-Ǧabbār wrote the *Taṯbīt*, Ibn Sīnā was only fifteen
years old. Clearly, he was not then known to 'Abd al-Ǧabbār, and
had yet to author the works which would establish his reputation.
As a result, he escaped 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's acerbic critique of the
falāsifa in the *Taṯbīt*.[31] Nevertheless, should we not expect 'Abd al-
Ǧabbār to have been notorious in *falsafa* circles for his critique of
their views as well as for his attack on the veracity of the transla-
tions, which provided the basis for their link with the Ancients? After
all, many controversial subjects were discussed in public at court
seances (*maǧālis*), and in private between students and their teachers.
How can we conceive that Ibn Sīnā was unaware of these views of
'Abd al-Ǧabbār, particularly after his stay in Rayy? But did Ibn Sīnā
then seek to defend the *falāsifa* from 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's attack? We
cannot categorically ascertain this. But in his *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*,
which was written before his stay in Rayy, Ibn Sīnā remarks:

> One more thing remains, and that is, one may imagine that the var-
> ious [celestial] objects of desire (*mutašawwaqāt*) are [mere] bodies (*aǧsām*),
> not separated intellects (*ʿuqūl mufāraqa*). Hence it would be as if the
> body which is baser (*aḫass*) is imitated by the body (*mutašabbahan bi-l-
> ǧism*) which is prior (*aqdam*) and more noble (*ašraf*).[32]

The target of Ibn Sīnā's criticism is not mentioned by name. Ten
years after his stay in Rayy, during the last decade of his life in

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[31] The absence of al-Fārābī among the *falāsifa* attacked by 'Abd al-Ǧabbār is
remarkable. I believe that this is due to his relative obscurity, particularly in the
circles 'Abd al-Ǧabbār frequented in Basra, Baghdad, and Rayy.

[32] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Nūrānī, Wisdom of Persia, 36
(Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1984), 66; Gutas, *Avicenna*, 292.

Isfahan, in the *Metaphysics* of the *Šifāʾ* and the *Naǧāt*, he elaborated
on the same theme:

> One more thing remains, and that is, one may imagine that the var-
> ious [celestial] objects of desire are [mere] bodies (*aǧsām*), not sepa-
> rated intellects. Hence it would be as if a body which is baser is
> imitated by a body which is prior and more noble. This is like what
> a group (*qawm*) of recent so-called Islamic philosophers (*aḥdāṯ al-mutafal-
> sifa al-islāmīya*) have supposed, making a muddle of philosophy (*falsafa*)
> for they do not understand the goals of the Ancients. Thus we say:
> This is impossible (*muḥāl*) because imitation of it [i.e., the celestial
> object of desire] requires similarity to its motion, similarity to the direc-
> tion of its motion, and the purpose which it [i.e., the motion] makes
> evident.[33]

The *Šifāʾ* paragraph occurs in the ninth *maqāla* of the *Metaphysics*,
which treats central aspects of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics: the First
Principle (i.e., God); the emanated celestial beings, their souls, intel-
lects, motions, activity, desire, and rank; the manner of generation
of the elements from primary causes; providence; and the return of
the individual human soul after its separation from the body. Ibn
Sīnā takes the divide between the terrestrial and celestial realms for
granted. He is adamant in his defense that celestial objects of desire
whose motions are, in his view, imitated by celestial bodies are sep-
arated intellects, not bodies. Unlike the account in the *Mabdaʾ*, Ibn
Sīnā now tells us that the opponents of this position are recent (*aḥdāṯ*)
and belong to the Islamic so-called philosophers (*mutafalsifa islāmīya*).
In *Fī l-Aǧrām al-ʿulwīya*, Ibn Sīnā applies the appellation *mutafalsifa*
to those who had tried to deal with philosophical questions but had
gone beyond their depth (and therefore "we do not permit common
people (*nās*) to occupy themselves with these sciences").[34] This is
clearly also true in our passage from the *Šifāʾ* and *Naǧāt*.

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[33] Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, G. Anawatī, and S. Zāʾid, Revised
Edition (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Qāwmī, 1960), 399. This question
was also important for non-Muslim monotheistic communities (as is implied by ʿAbd
al-Ǧabbār). A Jewish correspondent asked the Christian *faylasūf* Yaḥyá ibn ʿAdī
(d. 363/974) to explain to him the argument for, and the doctrine of, the vitality of
the stars; see *Maqālāt Yaḥyá ibn ʿAdī*, ed. Ṣ. Ḫulayfat (Amman: al-Ǧāmiʿa al-Urdunīya,
1988), 325, 333–334. Yaḥyá's response does not directly address the question.

[34] Ibn Sīnā, *Fī l-Aǧrām al-ʿulwīya*, op. cit., 46, 52, 54. Elsewhere in the meta-
physics of the *Šifāʾ*, in his critique of those who deny universals, he states, "We
have mentioned this objection (*šakk*) despite its weakness and absurdity because in
our day there has arisen a problem (*šubha*) as a result of it, promulgated by a group

The passage in the *Nağāt* differs from the *Šifāʾ* passage in one significant respect. Instead of an anonymous group, Ibn Sīnā names Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992) as the proponent of the position which he is attacking.[35] Like ʿAbd al-Ğabbār and Ibn Sīnā, al-ʿĀmirī had also resided in Rayy in the service of the Būyids, but as a member at the court of the vizier Abū l-Faḍl ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) during the years 350–365/961–976. He did not therefore meet ʿAbd al-Ğabbār in Rayy, although he may have met him in Baghdad.[36] In any case it is quite likely that they knew each other. Al-ʿĀmirī's view of celestial beings is found in his *Kitāb al-Amad ʿalá l-abad* whose subject is the afterlife. He begins with the views of Greek philosophers, attempting to show that their beliefs were orthodox even though independent of revelation.[37] Al-ʿĀmirī maintains a distinction between the terrestrial and celestial realms and asserts the causal influence of celestial bodies on the terrestrial realm. However, he discusses only celestial bodies, not celestial souls nor intellects, and considers the power of celestial bodies to be natural (*ṭabīʿī*). In contrast, terrestrial rational souls can resist the influences of these bodies because their power is voluntary (*iḫtiyārī*). There is no evidence that al-ʿĀmirī recognized a celestial hierarchy, nor that he considered celestial motion to originate from desire.[38] Ibn Sīnā's epithet "recent Islamic so-called philosopher" certainly characterizes al-ʿĀmirī.

Ibn Sīnā also discussed imitation (*tašabbuh*) and the object of imitation (*mutašabbah*) as they relate to celestial beings in his last major work, the *Išārāt*, albeit in the characteristic manner of "pointers and remarks." These remarks provided Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī the occasion to relate the brief remarks here to the discussion in the *Šifāʾ* and *Nağāt*:

(*ṭāʾifa*) of those who have floundered in [their] attempt at philosophizing (*tafalsafa*)," *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, 202; cf. Michot's translation in *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir*, *15.

[35] Ibn Sīnā, *an-Nağāt min al-ġarq fī baḥr aḍ-ḍalālāt*, ed. M.T. Dānišpažūh (Tehran: Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1985), 645. The paragraphs in both the *Šifāʾ* and the *Nağāt* need to be verified with the manuscripts and with each other as the variant readings قدم, قوم, and فدم are orthographically close but entail different interpretations, in particular whether the opponents of this position are just one person or a group of persons. See also Gutas, *Avicenna*, 292.

[36] I.e., during al-ʿĀmirī's visits to Baghdad in 360/970 and 364/974–75; see E. Rowson, *A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1988), 3–7; Kraemer, *Humanism*, 223–241.

[37] Rowson, *A Muslim Philosopher*, 21.

[38] Ibid., 102.

> Know that one (*baʿḍ*) of the Islamic so-called philosophers (*al-mutafal-sifa min al-islāmīyīn*) and others inclined to the view that what is imitated is the [celestial] body (*ǧism*). . . . The master refuted this view on the basis that this requires similarity of their motions [both] with regards to direction (*ǧihāt*), and axes [of revolution] (*aqṭāb*). . . .[39]

Ṭūsī therefore explicitily tells us that the position which Ibn Sīnā had attacked was held by more than one individual. Ṭūsī's comment, it seems, reflects both the *Naǧāt* and the *Šifāʾ* readings. That is to say, Ṭūsī acknowledges the one so-called philosopher of the *Naǧāt*, without naming him, but also the reading of the *Šifāʾ*, that the position was held by a group which, in Ṭūsī's opinion, does not consist of "so-called philosophers."

Clearly ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār and Ibn Sīnā hold diametrically opposite positions on celestial beings. We may describe this opposition as an encounter of opposing ideas. As we have seen, *kalām* in general, and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār in particular, has a position on celestial beings which was more radical than that of al-ʿĀmirī and therefore perhaps a better candidate for Ibn Sīnā's critique. Not only does ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār deny celestial souls and intellects, but he also denies any kind of influence by celestial objects, even just celestial bodies, on the terrestrial realm, which al-ʿĀmirī concedes. ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār even has the audacity to claim that some terrestrial objects which are supportive of life are more deserving of the characteristics the *falāsifa* attribute to celestial objects! Could Ibn Sīnā's critique then not also have been directed towards ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār in particular or the *mutakallimūn* in general? After all the *Šifāʾ* and *Naǧāt* texts also support the reading of "a group of recent Islamic so-called philosophers" and this is also consistent with Ṭūsī's reading of the passage in the *Išārāt*.[40]

While this is indeed a speculative question, I believe that it is difficult to answer it categorically in the negative. That is to say, it is difficult to imagine how Ibn Sīnā could not have known about the *kalām* critique of celestial beings and thereby have responded to it in his attack on "recent Islamic so-called philosophers." Of course this assertion raises a number of issues. We can be justified in maintaining that there is an *intellectual disagreement* between Ibn Sīnā and

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[39] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1957–1960), 3:574.

[40] See note 35.

'Abd al-Ǧabbār. But can we go further and make the claim that from a historical perspective, while Ibn Sīnā was explicitly arguing against the philosophaster al-ʿĀmirī, he also was engaged in the defense of the *falsafa* position on celestial beings which was under a more serious attack by the *mutakallimūn*? Why then did he not attack the *mutakallimūn* or ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār directly by name? I would suggest that the answer may lie in Ibn Sīnā's need to be cautious, and caution was dictated by the political vagaries of his time. In the same vein we may also ask why he did not identify al-ʿĀmirī by name as a proponent of the position under attack in the *Mabdaʾ* even though al-ʿĀmirī was no longer alive? Was this out of respect for the views of a kindred *faylasūf*? This seems rather unlikely given the strong charge of philosophical pretense. Is it likely that Ibn Sīnā's failure to mention al-ʿĀmirī previously was grounded in political reality? Was Ibn Sīnā concerned about alienating patrons, some of whom, like the Būyids, were patrons of proponents of positions that he attacked, for example, al-ʿĀmirī and that only later, when it was safe to do so, Ibn Sīnā named al-ʿĀmirī as holding the position that celestial objects were bodies? Or is the answer more simple, as Dimitri Gutas believes, and grounded in the early Ibn Sīnā's customary practice of not directly naming opponents?[41] We cannot of course answer these questions decisively except to note that for some reason Ibn Sīnā decided to name al-ʿĀmirī in the *Naǧāt*, but not in the *Šifāʾ* or earlier works, and that interestingly this occurred after his probable personal encounter with ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār in Rayy.

Leaving aside the question of why Ibn Sīnā decided to name al-ʿĀmirī in the *Naǧāt*, what about the reason for his failure also to name the *mutakallimūn* as proponents of the view under attack? Even in his critique of what are clearly *kalām* positions regarding physical theory, Ibn Sīnā refrains in the *Šifāʾ* from directly attributing them to *kalām* or the *mutakallimūn*, preferring instead designations like "partisans of the vacuum" (*aṣḥāb al-ḫalāʾ*);[42] "those who believe that time (*zamān*) . . . is an aggregate of instants" (*awqāt*);[43] "those who believe that bodies are actually constituted out of a finite number of [indivisible] parts,"[44] etc. In the *Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya*, where he describes

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[41] Gutas, *Avicenna*, 292.
[42] Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ, aṭ-Ṭabīʿīyāt: as-Samāʾ aṭ-ṭabīʿī*, 116, 123, 145.
[43] Ibid., 151.
[44] Ibid., 184–5.

the positions of various religious groups on the afterlife, Ibn Sīnā designates one of the groups which "only uphold a physical after-life" as "the dialecticians among the Arabs" (*ahl al-ğadal min al-ʿarab*), a clear reference to the *mutakallimūn*.[45] But this work is in the form of a letter to Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUbayd and was not intended for public dissemination.[46] In the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, Ibn Sīnā explic-itly mentions the *mutakallimūn* regarding their theory of time and the Muʿtazila regarding their doctrine of existence, the customary course of events (*iğrāʾ al-ʿāda*), God's knowledge, God's essence, and essence and attributes.[47] However, this work, a collection of private discus-sions between Ibn Sīnā and his students, was also not intended for public dissemination.[48] Similarly the mention of *mutakallimūn* in the two sections of the *Naǧāt* is not found in the manuscripts but is most certainly an editorial addition in the printed text.[49] While it is cer-tainly obvious that in his publicly available works, the references to partisans of the atom or the vacuum, etc., are indeed to the *mutakallimūn*, these references identify particular positions on physi-cal theory. I believe that a direct attack on the *kalām* view of the celestial realm in the guise of those who deny that the planets have souls or intellects or believe that planets are merely bodies or believe that the celestial realm has no influence on the terrestrial realm would have exposed Ibn Sīnā's cosmology and metaphysics—with its eternal world, emanated beings, celestial spheres, souls, and intel-lects, where spheres are moved by souls out of desire to imitate intel-lects; the influence of these celestial beings on the terrestrial realm, etc.—to "the common people who should not be occupied with these sciences." Such a stance would certainly have compromised Ibn Sīnā's ability to secure patrons and perhaps even his personal safety. This

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[45] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Aḍḥawīya fī l-maʿād*, ed. Ḥ. ʿĀṣī (Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-Ğāmiʿīya li-d-Dirāsāt wa-n-Našr wa-t-Tawzīʿ, 1984), 91.

[46] Ibid., 85; *Life*, 104.

[47] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Mubāḥaṭāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992), 93, 152, 234–235, 241–242, 344.

[48] The brief mention of an-Naẓẓām in particular or the *mutakallimūn* in general in the *Risāla ilá l-wazīr Abī Saʿd* (see Y. Michot, *Ibn Sînâ, Lettre au vizir*, 6, 16) should also be interpreted in the same vein.

[49] Ibn Sīnā, *Naǧāt*, 522, n. 2, 529, n. 1. The symbol ج in Dānišpažūh's edition is not clearly identified in his discussion of the manuscripts and editions of the *Naǧāt* (xcix-c) but must refer to the edition printed in Cairo in 1357/1938 by Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī. The section titles are found in the printing "verified and intro-duced" by M. Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Ğadīda, 1985) which is based on the Cairo edition.

may be the reason why even in the *Risāla fī l-makān*, he is restrained
in his criticism of the views of 'Abd al-Ğabbār or of *kalām* on space,
and does not take the opportunity provided to directly attack *kalām*
physical theory *in toto*. Indeed, the ambiguity of the term "recent
Islamic so-called philosophers" allows for the interpretation that even
the *mutakallimūn*, who were meddling in philosophical matters, had
entirely misunderstood the goals of the Ancients. Moreover, naming
al-'Āmirī in the *Naǧāt* passage can be regarded as an excellent foil
that allowed an attack on the *kalām* position without explicitly nam-
ing the *mutakallimūn* as proponents of this position, but nevertheless
strongly defending the point which is at issue, namely the doctrine
that celestial beings are not mere bodies.

   For the student of Islamic intellectual history, the encounter between
'Abd al-Ğabbār and Ibn Sīnā is both simple and complex. The his-
torical aspect is simple, based as it is on a few facts. Ibn Sīnā men-
tions 'Abd al-Ğabbār in a text and they were simultaneously in Rayy.
On the other hand, the intellectual aspect of the encounter is com-
plex and is not always readily apparent. Ibn Sīnā did not influence
'Abd al-Ğabbār, as the latter was an old man when Ibn Sīnā was
in his intellectual prime. Ibn Sīnā's influence on *kalām* belongs to a
later period, beginning with al-Ġazālī. However, the influence of
'Abd al-Ğabbār on Ibn Sīnā's understanding of the *kalām* perspec-
tive on several cosmological problems cannot be dismissed, despite
difficulties finding direct evidence. I have suggested that 'Abd al-
Ğabbār may be the source for Ibn Sīnā's knowledge of the *kalām*
debate on physical theory. I have also tried to show that Ibn Sīnā's
understandable reluctance to identify particular *kalām* opponents or
the *mutakallimūn* hinders our ability to make specific claims. If we
are to find areas of intellectual encounter, we must then examine
areas common to the programs of *kalām* and *falsafa*, in particular
those areas where their perspectives collide. There are several well-
known areas of physical theory which we cannot explore because
texts are unavailable. However, the status of celestial beings is an
area where textual evidence has survived. I have tried to explicate
the manner of their encounter regarding this question and outline
evidence for suspecting why the *kalām* discussion may have played
a role in Ibn Sīnā's discourse on this subject.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MEDICAL THEORY AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN THE AGE OF AVICENNA

Dimitri Gutas

The question of the relationship of theory to scientific method in classical Arabic medicine is a key area of research which should lead to a better assessment of its strengths and weaknesses and contribute to a historical understanding of the course both of its own progression and of those of the medical traditions dependent upon it, the medieval Latin and the Byzantine. In the present discussion of the issue, I will start from the axiomatic position that structures of knowledge, and the intellectual and social context in which they are valid, determine the nature, methods, and objects of medical research.[1] In Islamic civilization, within which Arabic humoral medicine flourished, the structures of knowledge that applied manifest themselves in the prevailing system of the classification of the sciences and the attendant concepts of categorization in the light of which medicine was regarded.

In late Greek antiquity, and in particular in fifth-sixth century Alexandria, scholars erected an elaborate schema of classification of

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[1] This position is not as ponderous or complex as it sounds; it is actually an observation. If we take contemporary North American society as an example, we see that medical knowledge, i.e., the various disciplines that collectively produce knowledge useful for medical theory and practice (biology, biochemistry, pharmacology, etc.), is classified under the sciences, one of the three branches of our university arts and sciences curriculum, the other two being the social sciences and the humanities. Since medical knowledge is so classified in an intellectual context, it is presumed to be attainable necessarily through the method reserved and appropriate for the sciences, i.e., scientific experimentation, while what does not readily fit into this construct is not researched and hence not considered scientifically knowable. A medical practice from another culture such as acupuncture, for example, apparently ill-fits our categories of knowledge and remains in an epistemological limbo. Second, the social context of the structures of knowledge is equally important in this respect. Research into the pathology of the diseases of the human female, for example, has lagged behind that of the male due to the latter's dominance historically in our society, while pharmacological research is notoriously determined by market forces and not by other considerations more germane to medicine *per se*, such as severity and seriousness of the disease.

Aristotle's works "in which individual treatises corresponded to a field of study. The result of this process was that the classification of Aristotle's works became, in effect, a classification of all the sciences, and hence of all human knowledge."[2] The function of this classification was initially descriptive and pedagogical, but later it also acquired normative value, purporting to reflect ontological reality; that is, the sciences are so many and they are so classified because reality, the world out there, is so structured. This classification was transmitted wholesale into Arabic during the period of the Graeco-Arabic translations from the eighth to the tenth centuries, and it became, with variations dependent upon the background and orientation of each scholar, the basis in medieval Islam of the classification and instruction of the translated Greek sciences. According to this classification—briefly and roughly put—Aristotle's *Organon* (i.e., the logical works, including the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, and prefaced by Porphyry's *Eisagoge*), constituted the canonical nine books on logic, the instrument of philosophy. Philosophy proper (or the sciences collectively) was then divided into theoretical and practical; theoretical philosophy was further subdivided into physics (i.e., natural science), mathematics, and metaphysics, and practical philosophy into personal ethics, household management (i.e., œconomics), and politics.[3] Medicine did not figure in this classification. As a result, Arabic scholars who inherited this schema and studied the Greek sciences in accordance with it, also did not consider medicine as part of the core higher curriculum and did not discuss it in this context.

Some Arabic philosophers and physicians did attempt to present medicine in relation to the basic theoretical sciences, but they could not break the mold of the transmitted structure of knowledge and accordingly ascribed to medicine a marginal place in their classificatory schemes. Avicenna (d. 428/1037), for example, in order to accom-

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[2] D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, 4 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 150 and the references cited there.

[3] For a discussion of the functions of Alexandrian classifications of the sciences and for charts depicting their development, see D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy: a Milestone between Alexandria and Baġdād," *Der Islam* 60 (1983), 255–67. A more recent general assessment of the subject in Arabic scholarship can be found in J. Jolivet, "Classifications of the sciences," in *Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science*, ed. R. Rashed and R. Morelon (London: Routledge, 1996), 3:1008–1025.

modate the sciences omitted by the schema he inherited, initially created a special subcategory of the physical sciences in which to put them (Fig. 1). He divided the physical sciences into two, fundamental (*aṣlī*) and corollary (*farʿī*), and put medicine, along with astrology, physiognomy, dream interpretation, magical instruments (talismans and magical prescriptions) and alchemy, under the second heading,[4] thus making medicine a corollary or derivative discipline of the theoretical science of physics.

Philosophy (all sciences)

Practical   *Theoretical*

Ethics   Œconomics   Politics   *Physics*   Mathematics   Metaphysics

Fundamental   *Corollary*
Natural Science   Medicine
Psychology   Astrology
Zoology, etc.   Magic, etc.

Fig. 1. Avicenna, *The Division of the Intellectual Sciences*

Later in his life, Avicenna changed his mind and demoted medicine even further. In the introduction to one of his last summae of all philosophy, *The Easterners*, he divided at the very outset all sciences into two, fundamental and corollary, eventually subdividing the former into the theoretical and practical, while relegating medicine, along with agriculture, astrology, etc., to the corollary or derivative group.[5] In this classification, medicine stops being a theoretical science at any level (Fig. 2).

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[4] J. Michot, "Les sciences physiques et métaphysiques selon la *Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm* d'Avicenne, Essai de traduction critique," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 22 (1980), 66–7.

[5] Ibn Sīnā, *Manṭiq al-Mašriqīyīn* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Muʾayyad, 1328/1910), p. 5. For details on this work, see my *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 115f., and "Avicenna's Eastern ('Oriental') Philosophy: Nature, Contents, Transmission," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10 (2000), 159–180.

Philosophy (all sciences)

Corollary
Medicine
Astrology
Agriculture, etc.

Fundamental

Non-Logic

Logic

Theoretical
etc.

Practical
etc.

Fig. 2. Avicenna, *The Easterners*

An older contemporary of Avicenna, and reportedly one of his teach-
ers of medicine, Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī (d.c. 401/1010), similarly classified
medicine as an applied (*mihnī*) particular science. As such, on the
one hand it is contrasted both with the particular theoretical sci-
ences of mathematics (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, and
optics) and with the universal sciences of physics and metaphysics,
and on the other it is grouped together with mechanics, agriculture,
and alchemy (Fig. 3).[6]

The Philosophical Sciences

Particular Sciences

Universal Sciences

Practical Sciences

Theoretical
Geometry
Arithmetic
Astronomy
Astrology
Music
Optics

Applied
Mechanics
Medicine
Agriculture
Alchemy

Physics
Metaphysics

Ethics
Politics
Œconomics

Fig. 3. Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī, *The Categories of the Philosophical Sciences*

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[6] See the complete schema of his classification given in Gutas, *Avicenna*, 151. It
is interesting to contrast with such classificatory schemata current in Arabic medi-
cine the Salernitan model discussed by D. Jacquart, "'Theorica' et 'practica' dans
l'enseignement de la médecine à Salerne au XIIᵉ siècle," in *Vocabulaire des écoles et*

This understanding of the place of medicine among the sciences, although ultimately derived from Greek principles, nevertheless differs significantly from that of Galen, for example, because the social and intellectual context in which medicine was discussed by Galen on the one hand and by the Arabic physicians like Avicenna on the other was different. Galen put forward his own discussion of the principles of medicine at a time when the Rationalist, Methodist, and Empiricist schools of medicine were living and viable competitors, deriving their respective philosophical underpinnings from the active philosophical currents of the early Empire: Skepticism, Stoicism, Middle Platonism, and Aristotelianism. The Aristotelianism of Galen's time, moreover, was still in a process of development and had not yet been codified into the "transformed" Aristotelianism (to use Sorabji's depiction) of the sixth-century Alexandrian scholars. By contradistinction, Galenic medicine in Arabic had only this latter, transformed version of Aristotelianism from which to draw its epistemological theory, while it knew of the other schools of medicine only as incidents in past history recounted in Galen's work "On the Sects for Beginners" and related treatises.[7]

Arabic philosophers and physicians thus viewed and *studied* medicine as a derivative and practical science not worthy of inclusion in the roster of theoretical sciences. Accordingly, the question of the source of its philosophical (and epistemological) underpinnings they could answer only in the context of the Aristotelian theory which stated that the first principles of every science are to be sought and discussed not in that science itself but in a higher science. In the introduction to his famous *Canon of Medicine* Avicenna put the matter succinctly:

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des méthodes d'enseignement au Moyen Age, ed. O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 105; reprinted in her *La science médicale occidentale entre deux renaissances (XIIe s.–XVe s.)* (Hampshire: Variorum, 1997), no. VII.

[7] Arabic physicians were well aware of the lapse of time since Galen's days and of the irrelevance in their own time of the sects recounted in Galen's works. As a matter of fact, it appears that some of them used this fact to argue in favor of studying not the integral Galen but only the medical distillation of his works as represented in later, both Greek and Arabic, compendia and digests, the *Summaria Alexandrinorum* (*Ǧawāmiʿ al-Iskandarānīyīn*) and their derivatives. See the arguments against the position in Ibn Ǧumayʿ, *Treatise to Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn on the Revival of the Art of Medicine*, ed. and tr. H. Fähndrich, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 46,3 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), §§ 84–5.

The physician, in his capacity as physician, should act as follows: for some medical matters he must form only cognitive concepts (*taṣawwur*) of what they are and grant assent (*taṣdīq*) that they, in fact, exist,[8] merely on the basis that they have been posited for his acceptance by the specialist of Physics [natural science], while for other medical matters he should provide demonstrative proofs in his discipline. He should accept on authority that whatever among the former set is like a first principle exists, because the first principles of particular sciences are taken as granted [in those sciences] and proven demonstratively only in other and prior sciences. [This process continues] in this fashion until the first principles of all sciences are ultimately studied in the science of Metaphysics.

Were a physician to begin discussing the proof of temperament, the elements, etc.—all of these things being posited for him in Physics— he would be making a double error because, first, he would be introducing into medicine something which does not belong to it, and second, he would be thinking that he is explaining something while [in reality] he will not have explained it at all.

The things about which the physician must form concepts of what they are, and which, though not immediately obvious, he must accept on authority that they, in fact, exist, are the following: the elements, their existence and their number; the temperaments, their existence and their number; the humors, their existence, their number and their quality; the faculties, their existence, their number and their location; the pneumata (vital spirits), their existence, their number and their location; and that every state changes or remains stable [only] on account of some cause, and the number of the causes.

As for the organs and their use, the physician must come to know them through [personal] perception [or: palpation, *ḥiss*] and anatomy (*tašrīḥ*).

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[8] As always, Avicenna posits as the primary stages of all cognition the two mental acts *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq*. In the very first chapter of the logic of *an-Naǧāt* (ed. Cairo, 1331/1912, 3–4), he describes these two terms as follows: "Every [kind of] cognizance and knowledge is either forming concepts or granting assent. Forming concepts is the primary knowledge and is acquired by definition or whatever is analogous to it, like our forming a concept about what man is. Granting assent is acquired only through syllogism or whatever is analogous to it, like our granting assent to [the statement] that the universe has an origin." Although these two concepts in Arabic logic have been much discussed, it would appear that they were ultimately inspired by the beginning paragraphs of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, as very perspicaciously observed by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (of whom more below), in his unpublished *Kitāb an-Naṣīḥatayn*, MS Bursa Hüseyin Çelebi 823, f. 91v.

> The things about which the physician must form concepts and for which he must provide demonstrative proof are the following: diseases, their particular causes, and their symptoms; how to eliminate disease and preserve health. Whatever of these things is not manifest, the physician should provide proof for it by stating in details its parts, its extent, and its duration.[9]

This introductory passage of the *Canon*, which reflects what had preceded in Arabic medicine and determines most, if not all, subsequent developments, establishes the epistemology that is valid for all parts of medicine: the *theory and principles of humoral pathology* are to be accepted as given in natural science (Physics) and their investigation is declared off-limits to the physician.

At this point some clarifications are in order about the terms "theory" and "practice" in this context because they are not unequivocal and it is necessary to define precisely to what they refer. As is well known, ever since Alexandrian medicine in late antiquity, medicine was divided into two major parts, theory (θεωρία) and practice (πρακτική). This subdivision reappears also throughout Arabic medicine, from Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq's *Mudḫal* (the Latin *Isagoge Iohannitii*) to Avicenna's *Canon* and beyond.[10] Avicenna takes great pains to specify what he means by "theory" and "practice": theory (*naẓar; ʿilm*) he says is "knowledge of the principles of medicine (*ʿilmu uṣūli ṭ-ṭibb*)," while practice (*ʿamal*) is "knowledge of how to practice medicine" (*ʿilmu kayfiyati mubāšaratihī*), or knowledge of procedural guidelines. Thus, Avicenna insists that both parts consist of *knowing* something and not actually practicing it.[11] For practice of medicine, Avicenna had another term, *taǧriba* (experience, the Greek πεῖρα) which he mentions not in this context in the *Canon*, but in the Autobiography:

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[9] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Qānūn fī ṭ-ṭibb*, ed. I. al-Qašš and ʿA. Zayʿūr (Beirut: ʿIzz ad-Dīn, 1413/1993), 1:15–16 (= Būlāq ed., 1:5).

[10] See the discussion and references by D. Jacquart, "'Theorica' et 'practica'," 102–4.

[11] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Qānūn*, 1:13–14 (= Būlāq ed., 1:3). Cf. D. Jacquart, "L'enseignement de la médecine: quelques termes fondamentaux," in *Méthodes et instruments du travail intellectuel au Moyen Age: Études sur le vocabulaire*, ed. O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1990), 107–8; reprinted in her *La science médicale occidentale*, no. XII. The Latin translation by Gerard of Cremona of Avicenna's text cited here is literal but inaccurate: *kayfiyat mubāšaratihī* is rendered as *operandi qualitas*, which does not mean precisely what Avicenna says, "how to practice medicine." One wonders to what extent this inaccuracy may have caused some of the difficulties in the relationship between *theorica* and *practica* traced by Jacquart.

> Medicine is not one of the difficult sciences and therefore I excelled at it in a very short time, to the point that distinguished physicians began to study medicine with me. I cared for the sick, and there opened up to me indescribable possibilities of therapy which can only be acquired through experience.[12]

According to Avicenna, then, there are four gradations between pure theory and sheer practice when it comes to medical matters: (a) "the theory of the theory of medicine," i.e., the theoretical foundation of medicine which provides the bases and proves the principles of the craft (ṣināʿa = τέχνη) of medicine, is discussed in Physics or natural science—it is outside of medicine; (b) "the theory of medicine itself," i.e., the theoretical part of the craft of medicine, which consists of knowing these principles in the form of doxography (Avicenna says in the same passage in the beginning of the *Canon* that one acquires "convictions," *iʿtiqād*, through it); (c) "the theory of practice," or the practical part of the craft of medicine, which consists of knowing, also in a doxographic form, the procedural guidelines for the application of medicine (Avicenna says in the same passage that one acquires "opinions," *raʾy*, about it); and (d) "the practice itself," i.e., experience, observation, and sense perception (*ḥiss*, as in the passage above), which constitute the actual practice of medicine—these also lie outside the craft of medicine proper. These four gradations of Avicenna's classification are outlined in Figure 4.

What this schema means then is that medicine, as an intellectual discipline, includes only items (b) and (c)—theory of medicine and theory of the practice of medicine—and these are the subjects of medical instruction and research. A theoretical or "academic" physician who was not interested in treating the sick would thus be considered as knowing all of medicine were he to study just these two parts—(b) and (c)—i.e., the subjects actually treated in the Arabic medical textbooks written in the course of Islamic civilization. The

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[12] Gutas, *Avicenna*, 27. The translation of the last sentence above is by M. Ullmann in his review of W.E. Gohlman's *The Life of Ibn Sina* in *Der Islam* 52 (1975), 148–151, which should also be consulted for the significance of the term *taǧriba* here. Cf. also the discussion of the *muǧarrabāt* in his *Die Medizin im Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 311–313. Avicenna says that medicine is not difficult because, in accordance with his classification of it in the hierarchy of the sciences, as mentioned above, he does not consider it a theoretical science in need of syllogistic demonstration, but only an applied or corollary science that can be learned through rote memorization and, he adds, experience; see the discussion in Gutas, *Avicenna*, 190.

PHILOSOPHY *(all sciences)*

Practical *Theoretical*

Physics Mathematics Metaphysics

Fundamental *Corollary*
Natural Science Astrology
(a) theory of the theory of medicine Magic, etc.
Psychology
Zoology, etc. Medicine

Theoretical Practical
(b) theory of medicine (c) theory of the practice
of medicine

(d) Practice of medicine

Fig. 4. The gradations of medical engagement in relation
to Avicenna's classification of the sciences

activities of the practicing physician on the other hand must neces-
sarily extend to cover also item (d), the practice of medicine, which,
however, lies outside of the intellectual discipline or craft of medi-
cine. This is so because, in addition to knowing the *theory* of medi-
cine and the *theory* of its practice, the practitioner must necessarily
engage in *diagnosis*, or diagnostic pathology, and *therapy* (including,
by definition, surgery, regimen, and pharmacology). Now all of these
are to be known by means of a scientific method that consists of a
combination of theoretical medical knowledge, reasoning, observa-
tion, and testing, as I will discuss. In terms of the ancient schools
of medicine, Avicenna is advocating essentially Galenic Rationalism,
or a mixture of the Empiricist method tempered by Rationalism.

The scientific method hinted at by Avicenna is futher delineated
in the work of one of his contemporaries, Ibn Hindū. Before turn-
ing to him, however, it is necessary to point to another germinal
idea of Aristotle which, coupled with Galen's pronouncements about
the origins of medicine, contributed to the formulation of the scientific
method.

In the epilogue of the *Sophistici Elenchi* (183b16–184b8) and in the
context of specifying his own contributions to logic, Aristotle describes
the progress of knowledge in general. At first, he says, the particu-
lars of a science are applied in practice without knowledge of its
rules and principles; second, somebody discovers the basis of this sci-
ence, but because the "beginning of anything is the most important
and hence the most difficult" (μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ
λέγεται, διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον, 183b23), little progress is made by that
person; subsequent generations, finally, through continuous elabora-
tions and new discoveries, grant the discipline "amplitude" (πλῆθος).
This depiction of the progress of knowledge was seized upon by
Alexandrian scholars in late antiquity who used it to develop a styl-
ized conception of the history of philosophy and science. Avicenna,
borrowing directly from them, continued this trend and fashioned a
dynamic conception of the development of the sciences in continu-
ous progress through the accumulated knowledge of generations of
scientists.[13]

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[13] See Gutas, *Avicenna*, 202ff. and 219ff. for a full discussion of the implications
of this notion for the philosophical work of Avicenna.

Ibn Hindū (d. 410 or 420/1019 or 1029) applied the same conception to the history and method of medicine, adding to it Galen's occasional remarks about the origins of medical reasoning. In his apologetic tract in defense of medicine against its detractors, *The Key to Medicine* (*Miftāḥ aṭ-ṭibb*), he describes as follows the origins of medicine:

> Reason discovers medicine by first adopting principles from things that are the result of chance, or intentionally tried, or learned from dreams, or observed from the instinct[ive acts] of animals; then it proceeds from them toward setting thought in motion and empowering analogical reasoning; those principles are thus strengthened and corollaries are built upon them.[14]

The development of medicine, and the scientific method followed in the process, are described by Ibn Hindū in the following passage:

> Man first observes (*raṣada*) the beneficial and harmful effects which climatic and environmental factors, foods, drinks, and medications have upon his body and the bodies of others, and how they repel disease from bodies. He then draws analogous conclusions (*qāsa ʿalá*) on the basis of the firm knowledge he has of these things, and derives, through a process of reasoning, similar cases [where the same effects could be expected.] Then other people come after him who receive his knowledge, add to it, and increase it by performing the same observations and drawing the same analogous conclusions. All this eventually leads to the appearance of the craft of medicine: it becomes firmly rooted in the minds of its practitioners and devotees until they come to understand every disease from its symptoms and signs; they also understand the treatment that each requires because they are familiar with its causes and certain that something is resisted by its opposite.
>
> For this is the case with every discipline, as Aristotle said: it begins with successive small increments discovered by one individual after another, until when one person forms a conception of these small increments and combines the pieces of information, the ability which

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[14] Ibn Hindū, *Miftāḥ aṭ-ṭibb wa-minhāǧ aṭ-ṭullāb*, ed. M. Muḥaqqiq and M.T. Danišpažūh, Maǧmūʿah-yi Tārīḫ-i ʿUlūm dar Islām, 1 (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭālaʿāt-i Islāmī, 1989), 49–50. Ibn Hindū's immediate sources here would appear to be Galen's "On the Sects for Beginners," ch. 2, and "An Outline of Empiricism," ch. 2; see M. Frede, *Galen, Three Treatises on the Nature of Science* (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 4–5 and 24–5. For Ibn Hindū's work on medicine in general, see F. Rosenthal, "The Defense of Medicine in the Medieval Muslim World," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 43 (1969), 519–532; repr. in his *Science and Medicine in Islam*, Variorum Collected Series, CS 300 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), no. VIII.

in this fashion comes about in his mind acquires the status of a craft while he, in accordance with the extent to which he actualizes this ability, deserves to be called proficient and skilled.[15] This is what the philosophers who discovered the craft of medicine did. [. . .]

Philosophers undertook to observe (*taraṣṣud*) chance happenings, derive information about specific instances by means of testing (*taǧriba*), and draw analogous conclusions (*qiyās ʿalá*) on the basis of principles coming about through observation (*raṣad*) and personal inspection (*mušāhada*). By means of this procedure there arose the medical craft among the Hindus, Persians, and Greeks, who derived benefit from it and distinguished themselves from the other pre-Islamic nations (like the Arabs, Turks, Slavs, and Africans) who relied upon the action of nature in caring for their bodies.[16]

In this passage we observe the rudiments of an experimental scientific method. The dialectical interplay between observation and theory feeding each other is clearly indicated, while the principle of the reproducibility of an experiment which we hold as one of the criteria of such a method is also expressed: "Then other people come after him who receive his knowledge, add to it, and increase it *by performing the same observations and drawing the same analogous conclusions*" (emphasis added).

Having established this, however, it is necessary to make several further observations. First, this method was applied only to diagnosis and therapy (level [d] in Figure 4), never to the theory of humoral pathology (level [a] in Figure 4), since, as Avicenna (and others) said and believed, that was the domain of the theoretical philosopher dealing with natural science (Physics). Second, and because of the first, a theoretical discussion of medical epistemology such as this is not to be sought in Arabic (text)books of medicine because what they include is the theories of medical principles and practice (levels [b] and [c] in Figure 4), not method; it has to be elicited implicitly from other sources. Such a discussion by its very nature, and because it applies to diagnosis and therapy, is in essence a description of a *practice*, not of a theory and, as was evident in the discussion of Avicenna's analyses, medical practice (level [d] in Figure 4)

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[15] This passage represents an expert combination of Aristotle's views of the development of the sciences from the epilogue of *Sophistici Elenchi* with Galen's statements about the formation of a physician in "On the Sects for Beginners," ch. 2, Frede, *Three Treatises*, 4.

[16] Ibn Hindū, *Miftāḥ aṭ-ṭibb*, 11.12–12.8, 12.13–17.

itself does not belong to the craft of medicine (levels [b] and [c] in Figure 4). This attitude is naturally not only Avicenna's. In ancient and medieval medical writings, whatever the language (Greek, Arabic, Latin), description of practices *as supporting theory*, including specific case histories, was the exception and not the rule. It would appear that the mental disposition behind this general aversion to describing specific practices in the context of a discussion of theoretical subjects was—what I would call the evil legacy of Platonism—the belief that a single incident, as opposed to a universally valid theory, was ephemeral, not universally applicable by its very nature, and hence not to be recorded, since it did not provide useful knowledge to other people and other times. This fact, however, which has to do with social and intellectual conventions of documentation, should not lead us, through a faulty argument *e silentio* to the conclusion that practices that were not recorded did not in fact actually take place.

This method of observation and testing was applied to the *practice* of medicine—that is, to diagnostic pathology and therapy—but not to the theory of humoral pathology. Because, however, it is not to be found in medical textbooks, little systematic research on it has been conducted by modern scholarship, and its nature and extent have to be implicitly drawn from all available evidence.[17] Ibn Hindū again gives us an example, drawn from Galen, which clearly presents its nature. Wanting to cure scabby pus-filled wounds, Galen knew that he had to apply medication that would clean the wound and help it grow healthy tissue. One salve that he knew was excessively effective in cleansing the wound, to the point of cauterization, while another (κηρωτή), rather than cleansing the wound, added to the impurities. He thought to combine the two salves so that they would mutually eliminate their extreme effects. "Having discovered this by means of analogical reasoning, he tested the compound, and found it in fact to be so."[18]

Pharmacology appears to be the area where this method was most consistently applied. We have numerous statements that this was so

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[17] The evidence in Arabic in this regard has yet to be thoroughly and consistently investigated; for an impressionistic sketch, see F. Klein-Franke, *Vorlesungen über die Medizin im Islam*, Sudhoffs Beihefte 23 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982) ch. VII ("Die empirische Medizin"), 95–100. The evidence in Latin is in the process of being better investigated; see D. Jacquart, *La science médicale occidentale*, xiv–xvii.

[18] Ibn Hindū, *Miftāḥ aṭ-ṭibb*, 46–7.

from various sources. The philosopher al-Fārābī (d. 339/950–1), for example, toward the end of his *Enumeration of the Sciences*, makes the following incidental statement:

> The physician can become perfect in his treatment only by means of two capabilities. One is his ability to command the general principles and rules which he acquires from books on medicine. The second is the ability that comes to him through lengthy application to practicing medicine upon the sick, and the experienced judgment (*ḥunka*) concerning this practice [that comes about] through lengthy testing (*taǧriba*) and personal inspection (*mušāhada*) of the bodies of individuals. By means of the latter ability the physician is in a position to regulate the dosage (*yuqaddir*) of the medications and therapy according to each individual body and each individual case.[19]

Al-Maǧūsī (the Haly Abbas of the Latins, d.c. 380/990) says in the introduction to his *al-Kitāb al-Malakī* that medication is necessarily different in different climes; the people of Iraq, for example, reject Greek drugs and develop their own, based on their own experience and testing (*taǧriba*).[20]

The actual pharmacology practiced in Arabic medicine, however, has been very little researched, if at all.[21] What is needed is an investigation into the medicinal properties, from the biochemical point of view, of the vast *materia medica* and drug prescriptions in Arabic pharmacology. For example, in the *Dispensatorium* of al-Kindī (d. after 256/870), a prescription for black bile diseases, or mental disorders, contains thirty-six ingredients, including opium (*afyūn*) and henbane (*banǧ*).[22] Even to a non-specialist in pharmacology it is obvious that at least these two narcotics are the active ingredients, which explains why they should be prescribed for mental disorders. The question, however, is with the other ingredients, as well as the active ingredients in all the other prescriptions, which are not immediately obvious.

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[19] Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, in *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla wa-nuṣūṣ uḫrá*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1968), 71:4–8.

[20] Facsimile edition published under the title *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣināʿa aṭ-ṭibbīya/The Complete Medical Art* by F. Sezgin (Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1985), 1:7.1

[21] For a general assessment, see A. Dietrich, "Islamic Sciences and the Medieval West: Pharmacology," in *Islam and the Medieval West*, ed. K.I. Semaan (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1980), 50–63.

[22] M. Levey, *The Medical Formulary or Aqrābādhīn of al-Kindī* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 198.

The same considerations as in pharmacology also apply to surgery. Galen's anatomy was always the starting point, but it was at times superseded, by following the scientific method based on observation and testing, and tacitly emended. Testimony to this is borne out by the advances in surgery effected by the Andalusian az-Zahrāwī (d. after 400/1009), the detailed and scientific analysis of which has yet to be undertaken.[23]

Galen, moreover, was not above being openly criticized by Arabic physicians, both in philosophy and in medicine. With specific reference to anatomy we have the testimony of the scholar, philosopher, and physician 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (d. 629/1231) who, after personal inspection of over two thousand human skulls, observed against Galen that the lower jaw-bone is made of one suture-less bone, not of two bones joined at the chin. Having made the observation, he concluded by restating as follows the epistemological foundation of the scientific method to be followed in medicine. By observing the skeletons, he says,

> [W]e gained knowledge not obtainable from books, because books either do not mention [these facts that we observed] at all, or indicate them insufficiently, or their contents are contradictory to our observations—but sense perception (ḥiss; cf. Avicenna's passage quoted above) is a stronger guide than learning from books. For although Galen had reached the highest degree of cautious inquiry in the task which he undertook and reported, sense perception tells the truth better than he.[24]

Similar remarks by other Arabic physicians may be found strewn in the vast literature of Arabic medicine that has yet to be edited from the manuscripts and translated, let alone studied.[25] Nevertheless, even at this preliminary stage of investigation into Arabic medicine, the following summary remarks would appear to be warranted by the discussion thus far.

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[23] Cf. the comment by M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, 149, n. 5: "Über die Chirurgie des abū l-Qāsim [as-Zahrāwī] ist manches geschrieben worden, weniges jedoch von berufener Hand."

[24] 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, *The Eastern Key*, tr. K.H. Zand, and J.A. and I.E. Videan (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), 274. See further the references cited in Ullmann, *Medizin*, 67–8.

[25] See, for example, the similar statements made by the great physician Ibn an-Nafīs (d. 687/1288) based on his anatomical observations, cited by A. Dallal, "Science, Medicine, and Technology," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. J.L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1:1225b.

In general, it seems clear, as I have tried to show, that the bases, or elements, of scientific method and experimentation, as we would define them, were known and ascribed to by scientists in Arabic medicine. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Arabic medicine, for all its advances and its progressive character, in comparison with Byzantine Greek and Latin medicine in the early Middle Ages, ultimately never went beyond Galenism and Avicennism. The causes for this are manifold.

In the first place, the scientific method implicit in the works briefly noted here was not applied beyond the narrowly practical concerns of diagnostic pathology, therapy, and pharmacology. As a result, the medical epistemology upon which it was based was not discussed in a theoretical (i.e., epistemological) context because the question was not posed in the context of medicine as a theoretical science: within the received and canonized classification of the sciences in Islamic civilization, medicine was a practical and applied craft whose principles were to be sought outside of itself. What discussion there was, was either incidental or in the context of apologetic or protreptic discourse, and hence the question did not receive the serious analysis that it might otherwise have.

Second, the principles of observation (*taraṣṣud*) and testing (*taǧriba*) by means of the senses (*ḥiss*), although correctly placed at the heart of the medical epistemological process, had no real object to which they could systematically be applied as long as the received dogma of theoretical humoral pathology could not be altered either by the anatomy which was learned in actual practice by generation after generation of physicians, or by therapy that proved effective on the basis of whatever pharmacological or surgical advances had been made. This is because the principles upon which humoral pathology are based were to be found in Physics (natural science) and as such were off-limits to, or not to be questioned by, those medical practitioners most able to effect a change on the basis of their discoveries. In concrete terms, what this meant, if we take Avicenna's four gradations of medical engagement (see Fig. 4), is that the theory of the theory of medicine (level [a]), as part of Physics, could not be altered by information based on experience or testing gained in the practice of medicine at level (d)—levels (a) and (d) were not in contact and could not influence each other. The contact, in the case of a practicing physician, was between the theory of practice and practice itself—levels (c) and (d)—but the results gained in this

fashion were *ad hoc* solutions to medical problems of specific patients; again, they were never generalized to the level of medical theory so that they could influence level (b), let alone level (a), the theory of medical theory.

Third, and as a corollary to the preceding, medicine, given the status accorded to it in the classification of the sciences, never became part of the mainstream *theoretical* academic curriculum; it was only a practical craft, learned and transmitted mostly by way of apprenticeship, in the hospitals.[26] Al-Maǧūsī makes the recommendation explicitly. He says that young physicians should become interns in hospitals and attach themselves to professors of medicine in order to treat patients.[27]

Thus, the theoretical and epistemological underpinnings of medicine, although known and incidentally described, never became the focus of discussion and argumentation that would have helped its advancement. Given this structural deficiency in the theory and practice of medicine that separated them into two separate fields not in mutual communication, the scientific method described by a scholar like Ibn Hindū had no sources from which to rejuvenate itself other than the received wisdom of Galenic humoral pathology, and it necessarily lost its heuristic power.

These factors were certainly operative in Arabic medicine, and they would seem also to have played a similar inhibiting role in medieval Latin and Byzantine medicine, which derive directly from it, for there also we see a similar inability for experience gained from practice to dissociate itself from the theory of humoral pathology. It should be remembered that the very same *Canon of Medicine* by Avicenna whose theoretical introduction I quoted above was the main textbook in European medical faculties well into the seventeenth century.

If, then, the immediate cause for the inability of Arabic medicine and its Latin and Byzantine Greek extensions to develop into experimental medicine prior to the seventeenth century are to be sought neither in its theoretical position, which was fully cognizant of scientific epistemology, nor in its scientific method, which manifestly contained

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[26] See B.N. Şehsuvaroğlu, "Bīmāristān," in *EI*[2], 1:1225b, middle; and Ṣ. Sajjādī, "Bīmārestān," in *EIr*, 4:257b, second half.

[27] *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣinā'a aṭ-ṭibbīya* (i.e., *al-Kitāb al-Malakī*), op. cit., 10.2ff.

significant elements of experimentation, but in the structures of knowledge in the respective traditions, the distant causes are certainly to be found in the societies that fostered these structures of knowledge in pre-modern Europe and the Near East. Alternatively put, the question is what had changed in Western European society by the seventeenth century that generated different structures of knowledge which enabled the scientific methods inherited from humoral medicine to develop into modern experimental medicine—but that is a different subject.

BODIES, SOULS AND RESURRECTION IN AVICENNA'S *AR-RISĀLA AL-AḌḤAWĪYA FĪ AMR AL-MAʿĀD*

Tariq Jaffer

Although Avicenna devotes much of his treatise *ar-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī amr al-maʿād*[1] to a refutation of various doctrines on the fate of the soul, his ultimate intention is to offer a solution to the problems of personal identity and individual immortality. These problems are evident throughout the treatise, particularly in the refutation of the Muʿtazilī position on the "return" (*maʿād*), for Avicenna uses an argument from personal identity to refute the doctrine that resurrection belongs to bodies only. Avicenna's own argument in favor of a philosophical "return" contains two demonstrations; first, that the identity of man resides in his soul, and second, that the soul is a separate, immaterial and, hence, immortal substance. The intention of this paper is to offer an exegesis of Avicenna's refutation of the opponents of the *Aḍḥawīya*, including the *mutakallimūn* and those who support metempsychosis (*ahl at-tanāsuḫ*).

In the *Aḍḥawīya*, Avicenna refutes three principal doctrines on the subject of the fate of the soul.[2] The first two doctrines belong to the *kalām* schools in Islam, and the third belongs to those who support metempsychosis (*tanāsuḫ*). Although Avicenna does not refer to the

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[1] *Avicenna, Epistola sull vita futura, al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī l-maʿād, I: Testo arabo, traduzione, introduzione e note*, ed. Francesca Lucchetta (Padova: Antenore, 1969) [hereafter *Aḍḥawīya*]. For a general description of the issues involved in Avicenna's discussion, along with useful notes, see J.R. Michot, *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenna* (Louvain: Aedibus Peeters, 1986), 14ff.

[2] The return (*maʿād*) is defined in the first chapter of the treatise: ". . . its real meaning is the place or situation which a thing was in, then separates from, then returns to; then, [it means] transportation to the first state or place, or to the place which is a man's becoming after death" (*Aḍḥawīya*, 17). Avicenna states his own position on the subject in the clearest possible terms: "If it is false that the return belongs to the body only, and if it is false that it belongs to the body and soul together, and if it is false that it is for the soul by way of metempsychosis, then the return belongs to the soul alone. . . ." (*Aḍḥawīya*, 139).

mutakallimūn by name (he refers to them as *ahl al-ǧadal min al-ʿarab*),
al-Ġazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* indicates that the doctrines of bodily res-
urrection and the joint resurrection of the body and soul belong to
the *kalām*. Avicenna's objections to the theological doctrines of res-
urrection are rooted in a deeper dispute over personal identity and
the nature of the self. The brunt of Avicenna's argument is that the
kalām doctrines are unable to account for the continuity of personal
identity through time. In his refutation of metempsychosis, the third
and final doctrine he refutes, Avicenna does not specify his oppo-
nents. Since Greek and Islamic doctrines of metempsychosis were
well known by this time, Avicenna could have had any number of
thinkers in mind when he attacked this doctrine.[3] In his refutation
of metempsychosis, Avicenna disregards the principal objection of
those who support metempsychosis: if human souls are separate sub-
stances, and do not transmigrate with the corruption of the body,
then there would be an actual infinity of coexisting separate souls,
but this is impossible since the actual infinite is impossible.[4] Instead,
he refutes a claim inherent in their doctrine, namely that the soul
pre-exists the body.

The Refutation of the Kalām *Positions*

Avicenna's arguments against his opponents begin in the third chap-
ter of the *Aḍḥawīya*. The first doctrine Avicenna refutes belongs to
a group of theologians who hold that life is an accident created in
the body. Avicenna presents this doctrine as follows:

> Those who uphold that resurrection is for the body only are a group
> of dialecticians who believe that the body alone is animal and human
> through a life and a humanity created in it. These [latter] are two
> accidents, death being their non-existence in them or that [i.e., an
> accident] which is contrary to them. In the second life there is cre-

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[3] Avicenna's predecessor Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. 935) is a possible candidate; see
Th.-A. Druart, "Al-Rāzī's Conception of the Soul: Psychological Background to his
Ethics," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 245–263, and her recent article on
Avicenna, "The Human Soul's Individuation and its Survival after the Body's Death:
Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soul," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*
10.2 (2000), 259–273.
[4] On this issue, see M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite
Number of Souls," *Mediaeval Studies* 22 (1960), 232–239.

ated in that body life and humanity after it had decayed and disinte-
grated, and that very same human returns to life.[5]

The above doctrine, which Avicenna attributes to a "group of dialecti-
cians," can be traced to Muʿtazilī circles. Some of the Basrian Muʿta-
zila argued that "life" and "humanity" are accidents of the body.
When a body has a certain structure (e.g., human or animal), it be-
comes possible for the accident "life" to inhere in every one of its
component atoms,[6] which in turn lays the foundation for the inher-
ence of the accidents of the autonomous power of action, will, and
knowledge.[7] The accident "life" is created directly by God. If God
were to refrain from creating the accident "life," the body to which
that accident attaches would cease to exist. This is precisely what
occurs at resurrection; God returns the annihilated body to existence
and re-creates the accident "life" that had been annihilated.[8]

The majority of the Basrian Muʿtazila were atomists; they held
that the soul was not immortal, and that it survived only in unity
with the body.[9] They differed, however, over whether death (the
quality of being inanimate or non-living) was the non-existence of
life or the existence of its opposite in the body (i.e., the accident
"death"). Avicenna was well aware of this dispute and alludes to it
in his presentation of their doctrine of resurrection.[10] Moreover, the

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[5] *Aḍḥawīya*, 21–3; tr. M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Kalām," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 7 (1992), 197.

[6] The accident "life" inheres either in all the atoms which constitute the body, or in the specific structure these atoms constitute as a whole. Man is alive, know-ing, has autonomous power, and exists; these attributes are a result of accidents that inhere in the atoms that constitute him. The case is otherwise with God; God has the essential attributes (predicates true at all times) of being Eternal (*qadīm*), Alive (*ḥayy*), Knowing (*ʿālim*), having the Power of autonomous action (*qādir*), and Existent (*mawǧūd*). For discussions on this subject, see A. Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 18; R.M. Frank, *Beings and their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1978), 42ff.

[7] There is some dispute over whether the accident "life" inheres in one atom or many atoms. Some of the Basrian Muʿtazila argued that each atom needed to have the accident "life" inhere in it so that the whole could be alive, while others argued that the accident "life" could inhere in a single atom, and that the pres-ence of the accident in a single atom could give life to the body.

[8] Al-Ġazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers/Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, tr. M.E. Marmura, Islamic Translation Series/al-Ḥikma (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 219.

[9] J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990–1997), 4:514ff.

[10] See *Aḍḥawīya*, 23, where Avicenna states that the "dialecticians" thought that death was either the non-existence of the accident "life" or the presence of its

Mu'tazila did not agree on the relation of this accident to the body, and disagreed about the relation of *nafs, rūḥ*, and *ḥayāt* to each other. Although Avicenna does not tell us anything about the nature of the accident "life," some *kalām* fragments suggest that at least some of the Mu'tazila held that life was an entitative accident. By this they meant an attribute that is simply possible (*ǧā'iza*), since the being has such an attribute with the simultaneous possibility of its not being so qualified, or of its being qualified by a contrary or different attribute under the same conditions. The accident "life" has an effect upon the substrate of the composite; it is by virtue of the accident "life" in each atom of the living that the whole becomes ontologically a single being, and life's determinant effect on its substrate is that it renders it living, sentient, and capable of serving as the substrate of certain other accidents.[11]

But how is life (*ḥayāt*) related to the body and how does it differ from spirit (*rūḥ*)?[12] Unlike Avicenna, who insisted that the soul originates as a separate substance and survives the corruption of the body, the Mu'tazila insisted that the soul could exist only with the body. Though the Mu'tazila disagreed over whether life and spirit were identical, a number of them agreed that life was an accident by virtue of which man becomes alive, and thus also sentient, willing, knowing, etc. It was undoubtedly this doctrine that Avicenna had in mind when he criticized the schools of *kalām* on the subject of resurrection.[13] This doctrine was in circulation in Mu'tazilī circles in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, and is found in a number of *kalām* sources. According to 'Abd al-Ǧabbār's *Muġnī*, Abū l-Huḏayl (d. 227/841–2) regarded life as something distinct from the body, though he (Abū l-Huḏayl) seems to be uncertain whether

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contrary (viz. death). Avicenna probably had in mind Abū 'Alī al-Ǧubbā'ī (d. 303/915), who held that death was the contrary of life, and Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbā'ī (d. 321/933), who held that death was not the contrary of life, which has no contrary. 'Abd al-Ǧabbār (d. 415/1025) should be ruled out as a candidate, since he held that life was not an accident; to be non-living was simply the absence of life and of the unity of being that life entailed; Frank, *Beings*, 50, n. 23; but cf. Abū Rāšid an-Nīsābūrī (d. mid-5th/11th century?), who, in speaking for the Basrian theologians, states that the contrary of the accident "life" is not death, and that death is not an accident; see Dhanani, *Physical Theory*, 49, n. 97.

[11] Frank, *Beings*, 107–8.

[12] On this subject, see M. Fakhry, "The Mu'tazilite View of Man," in *Recherches d'Islamologie: Recueil d'articles offert à George C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis* (Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1977), 107–121.

[13] *Aḍḥawīya*, 23.

life should be classified as an accident or a body.[14] But al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935) makes it clear that Abū l-Huḏayl regarded *nafs, rūḥ*, and *ḥayāt* as different things, and that life (*ḥayāt*) was an accident (*ʿaraḍ*).[15] Abū ʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 303/915) held that spirit (*rūḥ*) is the body, and that it is other than life, which is an accident.[16] Al-Ašʿarī's own view seems to have been that life is an accident (*ʿaraḍ*), and that it is created (*muḥdaṯa*). He contrasts this with God's attribute (*ṣifa*) "life," through which God does not cease to be living, which is eternal life and not an accident, as it subsists by virtue of itself and is not created.[17] He distinguished spirit from life; spirit in itself is inanimate or non-living, but is essential to the maintenance and continuance of life in the body.[18] Ibn Fūrak makes it clear that al-Ašʿarī claimed that spirit (*rūḥ*) is a subtle body (*ǧism laṭīf*) circulated in the cavities of the organs of the body. But man is alive by virtue of the accident "life," not through the spirit, since "life" is derived from "living," whereas "spirit" is derived from "spiritual."[19] The subsistence of the body depends on spirit, just as its subsistence depends on nourishment, food, and drink. The condition of the existence of the accident "life" is the existence of spirit and nourishment;[20] the maintenance and continuance of the accident "life" thus depend on spirit, which was commonly understood as a corporeal element or organ distinct from life.[21]

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[14] This is Abū l-Huḏayl's view, according to ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār's *al-Muġnī fī abwāb at-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm an-Naǧǧār and Muḥammad ʿAlī an-Naǧǧār (Cairo: al-Muʾassasa al-Miṣrīya al-ʿĀmma, 1965), 11:310. On this issue, see Frank, *Beings*, 42f.

[15] Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Ašʿarī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa-iḫtilāf al-muṣallīn*, ed. H. Ritter, Second Edition (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963), 337. According to Ašʿarī, Ǧaʿfar ibn Ḥarb (d. 236/850) also held that life was other than the spirit (*rūḥ*), and that life was an accident (*ʿaraḍ*), see ibid., 334. Cf. Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār an-Naẓẓām (d. between 220–230/835–845), who claimed that spirit (*rūḥ*) is the soul (*nafs*), which is identical with the body; the spirit is alive by virtue of itself and not by the accident "life"; ibid., 333–34 and ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, *Muġnī*, 11:310.

[16] Al-Ašʿarī, *Maqālāt*, 334.

[17] Ibn Fūrak, *Muǧarrad Maqālāt al-Ašʿarī*, ed. D. Gimaret (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1987), 257.

[18] Other Muʿtazila, including an-Naẓẓām, held that spirit (*rūḥ*) was identical with life (*ḥayāt*), and that it exists in the body by way of interpenetration; see ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, *Muġnī*, 11:310. Ašʿarī makes it clear that an-Naẓẓām equated the spirit (*rūḥ*) with the body, and that it is the soul; spirit is alive by virtue of itself and not through the accident "life"; *Maqālāt*, 333–34.

[19] Ibn Fūrak, *Muǧarrad Maqālāt*, 257.

[20] It is for this reason that God can be qualified by life, but not by spirit; ibid.

[21] Frank, *Beings*, 49, n. 14.

Avicenna uses an argument from personal identity to refute the doctrine that resurrection belongs to bodies only. He directs his attack against the Muʿtazilī theologians who identified man with the body.[22] The dispute over personal identity is thus rooted in a deeper disagreement over the nature of the self. While a majority of the *mutakallimūn* adhered to a materialistic notion of the self, and claimed that there was no self-subsisting soul that managed the body,[23] Avicenna argued consistently throughout his writings that the self is an immaterial substance. Many of the Muʿtazila thought that the self was either a subtle material substance that is diffused throughout the body, or an individual material atom to which the transient accident "life" attaches. Avicenna's argument is that if the self were the body, then resurrection of the body alone would at best produce a replica of the original man. For, since the parts of the body are continually being replaced by one another, the body cannot account for the identity of the same person through time. Avicenna completes this argument against the *kalām* by demonstrating that man is man neither through the body nor through an accident which inheres in the body. The individual, he claims, is what he is by virtue of his soul, and the identity of man resides in his substantial form that exists in his matter. The theologians, Avicenna argues, claim that man is man through the body, and go so far as to deny that the soul and spirit have existence at all; they maintain that bodies become alive by virtue of a "life" created in them, so that life is not the existence of the soul for the body, but is one of the accidents created in bodies.[24]

Avicenna refutes the doctrine that resurrection belongs to bodies only by objecting to the doctrine that the self is a body. He presents this argument as follows:

> The human is not human by reason of his matter, but through the form that exists in his matter. Human acts proceed from him, only

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[22] Avicenna argues that even if one were to accept that life were an accident (which, according to Avicenna, it is not), resurrection would be impossible. This argument is presented by al-Ġazālī in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* as follows. Even if one were to accept the claim that life is an accident, a "return" would be impossible. For if the accident "life" must pass from existence to non-existence, then to existence, its continuity would be interrupted, and its identity through time requires the endurance of its property "existence" through time; al-Ġazālī, *Incoherence*, 219f.

[23] Al-Ġazālī, *Incoherence*, 219.

[24] *Aḍḥawīya*, 41–3.

because of the existence of his form in his matter. If his form ceases
to exist in his matter and his matter returns to earth or to some other
elements, then that human in himself ceases to exist. If then in that
same matter a new human form is created, what comes into existence
as a result is another human, not that [former] human. For that which
exists of the first human is his matter, not form. Moreover, he is what
he is, praised or blamed, deserving of reward and punishment, not by
reason of his matter, but by reason of his form, and by reason of his
being a human, not earth.[25]

Man is not identical with his matter, but with his substantial form
that exists in his matter. If man were identical with his matter, then
the new human who is rewarded or punished would not be the one
who did good or evil, but another. As a result, praise and blame
would be ascribed to the wrong person.

The above argument is related to a more rigorous one in which
Avicenna insists that an individual is what he is by virtue of his soul.
This argument appears in *Risāla fī n-Nafs*,[26] and demonstrates the
immateriality of the self by way of an argument from personal iden-
tity. The point of the argument is that because the parts of the body
are continually being replaced, while the soul knows itself, or the
permanence of itself, as continually existing throughout its existence,
an individual is what he is by virtue of his soul. Thus, man remains
the same man through time by virtue of his soul.[27] Avicenna illus-
trates this point again in the fourth chapter of the *Aḍḥawīya*; he
defines the soul as that by virtue of which the subject is called "he"
and refers to himself as "I." In the same chapter, he defines the soul
as the thing through which man knows that he is he.[28]

The remainder of Avicenna's argument against the *kalām* doctrine
of bodily resurrection is presented by al-Ġazālī in his *Tahāfut*.[29] Either
life and the body both cease to exist—and God then returns the
annihilated body to existence and returns the accident "life," which

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[25] *Aḍḥawīya*, 63–54; tr. M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Kalām," 198.

[26] *Aḥwāl an-nafs: Risāla fī n-Nafs wa-baqā'ihā wa-maʿādihā*, ed. A.F. al-Ahwānī (Cairo:
ʿĪsá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952).

[27] Ibid., 183–84; M.E. Marmura, "Ghazzālī and the Avicennan Proof from
Personal Identity for an Immaterial Self," in *A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy
and Culture (Essays in Honor of A. Hyman)*, ed. R. Link-Salinger (Washington: The
Catholic University Press, 1988), 197.

[28] *Aḍḥawīya*, 145. In his *Risāla fī n-Nafs*, 183, Avicenna defines the soul as that
which each person refers to by the term "I."

[29] Al-Ġazālī, *Incoherence*, 219f.

had been annihilated—or the matter of the body survives as earth and this earth is gathered and constructed in the form of a human, and life is then created in it anew. The first scenario does not fulfill the conditions of a "return," since a "return" in the real sense involves the continuity of one thing as well as the emergence of another. But in this case, the return cannot be of the same man, since if the body passes out of existence, then there is a break in the continuity of the subject and hence an absence of the continuity of personal identity through time. Since it is impossible for something to pass from existence to non-existence, then back to existence (as this would entail a break in continuity and hence in identity), even if life is an accident (which according to Avicenna it is not), the return, then, cannot be of the same man, for there will still remain an absence of continuity, in this case that of the accident "life." Finally, if the body survives as earth, and is then reconstructed, then the resurrection could only involve the production of something similar to the original man. For, if the body does not cease to exist and life is returned to it, there is still no continuity of personal identity, for the parts of man are continually being replaced by food. Since man is man not by virtue of his matter but by virtue of his soul, and life or spirit ceases to exist but is then re-attributed to man, the return would at best involve a replica of the original man.

Avicenna presents a number of objections to the doctrine that resurrection belongs to the body and soul together.[30] The main argument against which he directs his objection is that the body at resurrection would join an already separated soul; the resurrected man would be the identical man since the soul would be that same soul. Here he uses a quantitative argument to demonstrate the impossibility that the body is resurrected to join an already separated soul. He argues that matter existing in the world is not sufficient to repro-

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[30] First, the existing matter in the world is insufficient to produce enough bodies for a resurrection. For Avicenna, there are an infinite number of souls and a finite amount of matter existing in the world. Because the corporeal infinite is impossible, the existing matter is insufficient to accompany the infinite number of souls. Second, the divine will, as immutable and unchanging, precludes the possibility of a resurrection. Third, absolute felicity opposes the existence of the soul in the body; true pleasures belong to the activity of the soul itself, and do not concern the body. Fourth, the matters mentioned about resurrection in the revealed law, if taken in their literal sense, would have unpleasant and impossible consequences; see *Aḍḥawīya*, 69–71.

duce enough bodies for a resurrection. If the world is pre-eternal (as Avicenna maintains), and humans have always existed in the past, and if souls after separation from their bodies retain their individuality, then the number of such souls is infinite. The amount of matter in the sublunar world is finite, however, and the matter available is not sufficient to accommodate all the souls. Hence, there can be no resurrection that involves the return of souls to bodies.[31]

Avicenna then blocks off the remaining escape route by arguing that it is impossible for the soul to return to any matter whatsoever. Here the *mutakallimūn* advance two possibilities: the human soul, an existent that survives the death of the body, could return to the original body when all the parts of that body have been collected, or it could return to some other body, whether that body is composed of the same parts as the original body or not. In both doctrines, the return would be of the same man, since man is man by virtue of his soul and not of his matter.

Avicenna's objection to the first doctrine is that such a resurrection, that is, one in which only those parts present at the time of death are recombined, would lead to the resurrection of people whose limbs had been amputated, or whose ears and noses were cut off, or whose limbs were defective, in exactly the same form as they had in the world.[32] If the supposition of return is confined to the recombination of the parts present at the time of death, resurrection would be an unpleasant and disgraceful event. Further, if it were true that all the parts which belonged to man during his lifetime were resurrected, then it would be necessary that the same part be resurrected as liver and heart and hand and leg at once, for some organic parts derive nourishment from the residuary nourishment of others.[33] Thus, if it is supposed that there are specific parts which had been the matter for all organs, then it is unclear to which organ these parts will return.

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[31] Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem," 232–39.
[32] *Aḍḥawīya*, 77–9; al-Ġazālī, *Incoherence*, 221.
[33] *Aḍḥawīya*, ibid.; al-Ġazālī, ibid.

The Refutation of Metempsychosis

The final argument Avicenna refutes belongs to those who adhere to some form of metempsychosis.[34] The supporters of metempsychosis hold that the number of (separate) souls is finite, and that these souls rotate over infinitely many bodies. Although Avicenna disagrees over the quantity of separate souls, he disregards this issue and bases his refutation on the claim that the soul cannot pre-exist the body. Avicenna begins his refutation of metempsychosis by presenting the argument of his opponents: those who affirm the transmigration of souls assert that souls are substances separate from matter, that they separate from bodies after death, and that material bodies are infinitely many.[35] The number of souls is either finite or infinite. But if the souls existing now (those separate from material bodies) are infinite, then an actual infinite would exist, and this is impossible. The number of separate souls is thus finite. Since the number of souls is finite and the number of bodies are infinite (since an infinite number has been produced in succession), the rotation of souls over bodies is necessary.[36]

The supporters of metempsychosis hold that the soul must pre-exist the body, and that once this is demonstrated, the rotation of separate souls over bodies is established. Their argument runs as follows. What comes into existence simultaneously with the body is a material form, and the material form is inseparable from the body. The soul, however, is separable, and since souls are separate substances, they do not perish; hence it must precede the body in existence. But there cannot be a new soul for each body, which would

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[34] By the time of Avicenna, a number of various views in favor of metempsychosis were prevalent. On the subject of metempsychosis, see al-Bīrūnī, *Alberuni's India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India about A.D. 1030*, ed. E. Sachau, (London: K. Paul, 1914), 43–44 and 49–51. See also W. Madelung, "Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī and Metempsychosis," *Acta Iranica* 16 (1990), 131–143; S. Schmidtke, "The Doctrine of the Transmigration of Soul According to Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (killed 587/1191) and his Followers," *Studia Iranica* 28 (1999), 237–254; P. Walker, "The Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Islam," in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. W. Hallaq and D. Little (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 219–38; and G. Monnot, "La transmigration et l'immortalité," *MIDEO* 14 (1980), 149–66.

[35] The infinite number of bodies, since they follow each other in succession and do not form a coexisting magnitude, do not form an actual infinite. The problem of an actual infinity arises with the separate souls because they coexist.

[36] *Aḍḥawīya*, 99.

result in an infinite number of souls (and this is impossible); there-
fore, there must be a finite number of souls rotating over an infinite
number of bodies, and this is metempsychosis.[37]

Avicenna agrees that souls are substances separate from matter,
and that they separate from bodies after death. He also agrees that
material bodies are infinitely many, since the bodies follow each
other in succession. The supporters of metempsychosis are well aware
of the problem of an infinite number of souls, for they use this claim
to establish their argument for transmigration: if immortal souls were
to coexist, they would form an actual infinite, but the actual infinite
is impossible. Avicenna disregards the problem of the infinite num-
ber of souls, and instead refutes the claim that the soul precedes the
body in existence. He argues that those who uphold metempsychosis
make the unwarranted assumption that whatever comes into exis-
tence simultaneously with the body is necessarily a material form.

Avicenna demonstrates that it is impossible for the soul to exist
before the body, and in doing so refutes the doctrine of metempsy-
chosis, which uses this claim as a premise. Avicenna argues as fol-
lows. If the soul were to exist before the body, then there would be
either a plurality of souls, or only one soul. But both of these are
impossible, and therefore the soul must come into existence with the
body. A plurality of souls is impossible, for in their prior existence
these souls are immaterial, and since matter is the individuating prin-
ciple, these souls cannot be many. Nor can souls in their prior exis-
tence be one, for if all souls were one, then the soul of Zayd and
'Amr would be one, and this is absurd.[38] Consequently, the soul can-
not exist before the body in any way whatsoever. Because the soul
cannot exist before the body, but comes into existence with the com-
ing into existence of the body, metempsychosis cannot hold true, for
then two souls could inhabit one body—the soul which originates
with the coming into being of the body, and the transmigrating soul.

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[37] *Adḥawīya*, ibid.: "Those who uphold metempsychosis support the validity of
what they maintain with their doctrine that it is true [in the case of souls] that
they are substances separate from matter, and that they separate from bodies after
death, and that material bodies are infinite. But it must be that souls are either
finite or infinite. If the souls existing now—those separate from material bodies—
are infinite, then that which is infinite in actuality would exist, but this is impossi-
ble. And if they are finite—and their bodies are infinite—then transmigration is
inevitable, as is their rotation over bodies."

[38] *Adḥawīya*, 125–7.

However, because each person experiences himself to be one person, not two, it is impossible for two souls to inhabit one body.[39] Metempsychosis is thus impossible on two counts. It admits the possibility of more than one soul inhabiting a particular body, and refuses to concede that the rational soul comes into existence with the coming into existence of the body as a separate substance.

Avicenna's arguments against the *mutakallimūn* and *ahl at-tanāsuḫ* are incisive. The arguments he advances, particularly those against the theologians, indicate that he was deeply dissatisfied with the theological positions on resurrection. His polemics against the two groups, however, are driven by an urge to explain resurrection in philosophical terms. Although much of the *Aḍḥawīya* is devoted to polemics, Avicenna's primary intention throughout the treatise is to establish that man's identity resides in his soul (and not the body or anything bodily), and that this soul is a separate, immaterial, and, hence, an immortal substance.

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[39] *Aḍḥawīya*, 133.

AFTER AVICENNA

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CHAPTER NINE

BAHMANYĀR IBN MARZUBĀN:
A FAITHFUL DISCIPLE OF IBN SĪNĀ?

Jules Janssens

Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān (d. 458/1066) is known as one of Ibn Sīnā's first generation students.[1] He was clearly involved in a direct correspondence with the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs, which became part of what is known as the *Mubāḥaṯāt*.[2] One of the participants in this correspondence was also Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, of whom we know very little,[3] except that he was much older than Ibn Sīnā and much despised by him. From the *Mubāḥaṯāt*, it is obvious that Bahmanyār and Abū l-Qāsim were in close contact with each other. Since the former was undoubtedly much younger than the latter, it might be that he chose Abū l-Qāsim as his tutor.[4] Ibn Sīnā explicitly regrets that Bahmanyār sometimes seems to take side with this minor thinker, and does not hesitate to reprehend Bahmanyār for such attitude.[5] Hence, the question may be raised whether Bahmanyār was a faithful

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[1] For a detailed account of both ancient and contemporary reports regarding Bahmanyār, especially his origin, life and relationship with Ibn Sīnā, see D.C. Reisman, "The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Mubāḥaṯāt* (*The Discussions*)," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 2001, 310–322.

[2] For a precise account of the material related to Bahmanyār (and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī), see Reisman, "Avicennan Tradition," 339–393, as well as 404–410.

[3] J.R. Michot, "Une nouvelle œuvre du jeune Avicenne, note complémentaire à propos du ms. *Hüseyin Çelebi 1194* de Brousse," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 34 (1992), 138–154, 148–150, inclines, but with caution, to identify this Abū l-Qāsim with a secretary of Rayy, called Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib by at-Tawḥīdī. See also id. (as Yahya Michot), *Ibn Sînâ, lettre au vizir Abû Saʿd, editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique*, Sagesses musulmanes, 4 (Beyrouth: Les Éditions al-Bouraq, 2000), 20.

[4] See Reisman, "Avicennan Tradition," 321–322.

[5] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1992), 57, § 52; 63, § 75; and 74–76, §§ 113–116; French translation by J. Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyār et al-Kirmānī, Présentation, traduction critique et lexique arabe-français de la *Mubāḥatha III*," *Le Muséon* 110.1–2 (1997), 143–221 (with reference to the paragraph numbers of Bīdārfar's edition).

disciple of Ibn Sīnā, or, on the contrary, did he distance himself
from his (major?) teacher in philosophy?

When looking at his *opus magnum*, i.e., *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*,[6] written in
all probability between Ibn Sīnā's and his own death, one initially
has the impression that it is a pure compilation of Avicennan texts,
Bahmanyār's own role being limited to the actual choice of the com-
bined fragments. Such an impression is only reinforced when one
reads the following at the very beginning of the work, immediately
after the dedication of the work by Bahmanyār to his maternal uncle
Abū Manṣūr Bahrām ibn Ḫuršīd Yazdyār:[7]

> (I have composed) a book of the wisdom (*ḥikma*) which the Šayḫ ar-
> Ra'īs Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā—may God have
> mercy upon him—has taught,[8] by imitating the order of the *Ḥikma al-
> ʿAlāʾī*,[9] by taking intentions (*al-maʿānī*) from the totality of his writings
> and from what happened through discussion (*muḥāwaratan*) between me
> and him, and by adding what my understanding (*naẓarī*) has acquired
> as derivations (*min al-furūʿ*) [while] being analogous to the fundamen-
> tals (*al-uṣūl*). Your looking into his books will furnish you the proof of
> these derivations.[10]

This opening statement rings distinctly pro-Avicennan. First, Bahmanyār
stresses that the wisdom which he will develop in his work is the
very same as the one Ibn Sīnā has taught, clearly suggesting that
this kind of wisdom was particular to the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs himself, in

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[6] All of my references will be to the edition of M. Muṭahharī, Second printing
(Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1375Š/1996). In his edition, Muṭahharī
often indicates source passages from different parts of the *Šifāʾ*. He also occasion-
ally refers to the *Naǧāt* or to *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*. Despite a few (minor) mistakes,
these references are generally trustworthy and cover a great deal of Bahmanyār's
text. However, since I have found two chapters of the *Dāniš̌nāmah*, although in
Arabic (see infra), it seems possible, not to say probable, that Bahmanyār also drew
on that work, and in a systematic manner. I plan a more thorough examination
of this issue for a later publication.

[7] I follow with Reisman, "Avicennan Tradition," 316, n. 80, the reading of the
Aleppan manuscript.

[8] D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's
Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: Texts and Studies, 4 (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1988), 11, n. 14 offers another possible translation, based on the variant
reading *lubāb* instead of *Kitāb*: "the gist of the philosophy which Avicenna revised."

[9] The work is commonly known as the *Dāniš̌nāmah*. The three parts of the work
were published in the series *Silsilah-yi Intišārāt-i Anǧuman-i Āṯār-i Millī, Yādgār-i ǧašn-i
hazārah-yi Abū ʿAlī Sīnā, Collection du millénaire d'Avicenne* (Tehran: Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān,
1331Š/1951): *Risālah-yi Manṭiq*, ed. M. Muʿīn and M. Miškāt, vol. 12; *Ilāhīyāt*, ed.
M. Muʿīn, vol. 15; *Ṭabīʿīyāt*, ed. M. Miškāt, vol. 13.

[10] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 1.

other words, that the latter has really innovated a very new way of philosophizing.

Then Bahmanyār evokes what looks like one of the basic expressions of this new way, i.e., a special ordering of the main parts of the philosophical project as adopted by Ibn Sīnā in his *Dānišnāmah*. Although in most of Ibn Sīnā's encyclopaedic works the classical order (logic-physics-mathematics-metaphysics) is indeed respected, this is not the case in his Persian work, which may well be his very last philosophical encyclopaedia.[11] There he adopts an evidently new order, i.e., logic-metaphysics-physics. It is striking that there is no mention of mathematics,[12] but more interestingly, and contrary to the classical curriculum (in its Platonic-Aristotelian line), metaphysics precedes physics. It is therefore not of secondary importance that Bahmanyār explicitly claims to follow this unique order. In doing so, he seems to valorize it as a major contribution of Ibn Sīnā's (mature) thought. This is all the more remarkable since he further claims not to offer a slightly reworked version of the *Dānišnāmah* itself, as later will be the case with al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid*,[13] but rather to have dealt with the totality of the writings of the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs and even to have taken into account those ideas which he has learned through direct communication with the Master.[14] The latter affirmation clearly implies that Ibn Sīnā has not written down all of his ideas. But is Bahmanyār not offering himself a pretext in order to introduce personal ideas, having no Avicennan basis at all? In other words, does this claim not constitute at once both a simple strategic

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[11] See my "Les *Ta'līqāt* d'Ibn Sīnā, Essai de structuration et de datation," in *Langages et philosophie, Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, Études de philosophie médiévale, 74, ed. A. Elamrani-Jamal, A. de Libera, and A. Galonnier (Paris: J. Vrin, 1997), 109–122, 122 (and n. 39). Let me remark that I do not claim that the *Dānišnāmah* is Ibn Sīnā's last encyclopedic work, but rather that this simply may be the case. To fix in a definite way the relative chronological order of Ibn Sīnā's works, much systematic research, based both on external and internal evidence, has still to be done, and therefore I refrain from any strong affirmation.

[12] Gutas, *Avicenna*, 113, observes that Ibn Sīnā always omits in his later works the mathematical part, probably since he considers its traditional exposé to be basically sufficient, and, hence, not open to any serious conflict.

[13] See my "Le *Dānesh-Nāmeh* d'Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?" *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 28 (1986), 163–177, especially 168–175.

[14] Although Bahmanyār's statement can be understood as pointing to an oral communication, it may equally refer in a loose sense to any form of communication, either oral or written. If the latter is the case, Bahmanyār may be alluding to his correspondence with Ibn Sīnā included in the *Mubāḥaṯāt* materials.

and apologetic move? His final affirmation clearly contradicts such an interpretation. He admits that he will present some ideas, not present in the Avicennan corpus, but he immediately adds that such additions are always derivative of principles the basis of which any serious thinker can easily detect in that very same corpus. Hence, at first sight, Bahmanyār's *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* appears as a basically Avicennan-inspired *summa*.

However, a somewhat closer examination of the work immediately elicits a serious qualification of such characterization. In fact, the very basic structure of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* is only *apparently* identical with that of Ibn Sīnā's *Dānišnāmah*. Surely, Bahmanyār still maintains a tripartite division, starting, as did Ibn Sīnā, with logic, and then continuing with metaphysics. But, contrary to the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs, the latter is not designated as "Divine science" (*ʿilm ilāhī*), but as "metaphysics" (*mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa*). Although this Aristotelian appellation is not necessarily un-Avicennan,[15] there is no doubt that Ibn Sīnā himself largely preferred the expression *al-Ilāhīyāt* when dealing with the highest science of philosophy, this designation being the one found in all his later major works. Note that this does not mean that the proper "subject" of metaphysics was, according to Ibn Sīnā, the "divine." Not at all! Since the existence of God has to be proved, He cannot be its primary subject. For Ibn Sīnā only "Being *qua* Being" can fulfill such a role. So, metaphysics is first of all an ontology. But it also includes an aetiology (or: archaeology), since it deals with the principles of all the other sciences, and, moreover, it entails a theology, God being the highest and, hence, most noble Being. Ibn Sīnā integrates these three elements, which were present but in a scattered and fragmentary way in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, into one coherent metaphysical system.[16] Bahmanyār, however, seems to limit the metaphysical project to the premises needed for the totality of the sciences.[17] This might explain why he favors the Aristotelian appel-

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[15] The expression *mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa* is, for example, mentioned in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī, Wisdom of Persia Series, 36 (Tehran: Tehran University, 1363Š/1984), 1.

[16] See G. Verbeke, *Avicenna, Grundleger einer neuen Metaphysik*, Rheinisch-Westphalische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge G 263 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983), 9–10. The basis for such an integrated vision was already present in al-Fārābī, more specifically in his treatise *Fī Aġrāḍ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa*, as recognized by Ibn Sīnā himself in his autobiography; see W. Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sīnā, A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1974), 34–35.

[17] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 2.

lation of "metaphysics." But since this affirmation is part of a general introduction, one should not over-emphasize it. A more systematic examination of the contents of this second part of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* is undoubtedly required for a correct evaluation of the relationship between Bahmanyār's "Metaphysics" and Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ilāhīyāt*.

Before working out a more detailed survey of the metaphysical part of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, attention has to be paid to the precise title Bahmanyār gives to the third part of his work. One might naturally expect him to designate it simply by "physics." This is not the case. In fact, Bahmanyār proposes a quite different appellation, i.e., *al-ʿilm bi-aḥwāl aʿyān al-mawǧūdāt*, "the science of the states of the most noble of Beings," or, perhaps better, "the science of the states of the essences of the existing Beings." That the latter translation is perhaps to be preferred reveals itself as soon as one takes into account Bahmanyār's further division of this section into two parts. The first deals with "the Necessary Existent in Himself and the enumeration of His attributes" (*fī maʿrifat wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihī wa-iḥṣāʾ ṣifātihī*), while the second treats of "the caused Beings" (*al-mawǧūdāt al-maʿlūla*).[18] Hence, the third part of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* encompasses the study of the totality of Beings, the divine Being as well as all created Beings. Whereas the examination of the latter is *a priori* not to be excluded from the domain of what Ibn Sīnā, with the Classical tradition, called "Physics," this is not the case with respect to God. For Ibn Sīnā, the existence of God can only be proved in the science of Metaphysics[19] and thus His essence and attributes can only be the object of research in this science. As for Bahmanyār, the very structure of the third part of his major work gives, at least at first sight, the impression that he, contrary to Ibn Sīnā, does not want to place the study of the "divinalia" wholly outside the scope of physics proper.

When Bahmanyār states in the introduction[20] that "the first sub-part (*maqāla*) indicates (*fī dalāla*) the Existent Being (*al-mawǧūd*) who

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[18] Ibid., 569, resp. 583.

[19] Ibn Sīnā, *Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿarab*, Second printing (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1978), 23–24, where he states that it is inappropriate, as Aristotle and the Commentators have done, to argue to the First Truth from motion (the passage has been translated into English by F. Zimmermann in E. Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 3, Series vol. 20 [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983], 109–110).

[20] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 2.

has [for His existence] neither secondary nor primary cause (*alladī lā sabab lahū wa-lā ʿilla*), and clarifies (*wa-fīhā l-ibāna*) the ultimate goal (*al-ġaraḍ*) of the *Theologia*[21] and of the book (*maqāla*) *Alpha elatton*,"[22] one may still hesitate somewhat in discerning his real intention. To speak of God in terms of "uncaused" rather than "unmoved" may reflect an Avicennan inspiration, although it may also directly derive from the *Theologia*, where God is primarily designated as the First Cause (*al-ʿilla al-ūlá*).[23] As for the reference to *Alpha elatton*, it is equally somewhat ambiguous. Insofar as Ibn Sīnā's proof "ex contingentia" is based on the idea of the necessary finitude of a series of causally connected Beings,[24] it may have a partial basis in that very part of the Stagirite's *Metaphysics*, since Aristotle tries to demonstrate in it the necessity of a First Principle based on the impossibility of an infinity of causes. But Aristotle, contrary to Ibn Sīnā, does not radically exclude any kind of possible link with the science of Physics. This is obvious at the very beginnings of his exposé, when he states: "The material generation of one thing from another cannot go on in an infinite progression [. . .]; nor can the source of *motion*" (my italics).[25] Although Bahmanyār makes no mention of motion, it looks as though he somehow wants to return to the original Aristotelian approach by placing the explicit treatment of God in what appears to be a more immediate connection with physics. Such an impression is only reinforced when he presents the aims of the second section of sub-part two as "[offering] knowledge (*fī maʿrifa*) of the celestial bodies, their souls, their intellects and their other states, and clarifying the ultimate goal of *On Heaven*, as well as (*wa-*) some [items] of *Alpha elatton* and of the *Theologia*."[26] Unfortunately, Bahmanyār does not specify here these items. However, there is little doubt that he has in mind some issues related to the heavens

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[21] Bahmanyār refers to the famous *Theologia Aristotelis*, but the present context does not allow one to decide whether or not he accepted its attribution to Aristotle.

[22] Here, the reference is clearly to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but it should be recalled that this book was the first book in the Arabic translation, and not the second, as in the Greek text as it has been transmitted to us.

[23] *Uṯūlūǧyā Arisṭūṭālīs*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿarab*, op. cit., e.g., 6 and 110 (title of ch. 10).

[24] See M. Marmura, "Avicenna's Proof from Contingency for God's Existence in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifāʾ*," *Medieval Studies* 42 (1980), 337–352, passim.

[25] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 994a4–6 (Loeb Classical Library, p. 271), tr. H. Treddenik (repr. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 86–87.

[26] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 2.

which had been discussed, at least partly and already by Aristotle himself, in metaphysics. However, again, a more systematic analysis is needed in order to offer a well-founded conclusion. Does the change of title of parts two and three involve more than a simple rewording? Does it reveal a fundamental rupture with Ibn Sīnā's thought, and, if this the case, to what extent? To put it briefly: is it really significant, or not?

As soon as one starts to read the work in a more systematic way, one cannot but be struck by its overtly Avicennan tone. Almost immediately one discovers that Bahmanyār quotes large passages, sometimes by way of paraphrasis, but even more often very literally, of Ibn Sīnā's main philosophical encyclopaedia, the *Šifāʾ*. It has to be noted that Bahmanyār uses almost all of its different books, and thus reveals himself to be very familiar with this basic work of the Šayḫ ar-Raʾīs. Moreover, one finds several quotations of the *Naǧāt* and of the *Išārāt*.[27] Most of them have been identified with due care by the editor of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, M. Muṭahharī.[28] However, while his indications on the whole are correct, they lack precision, insofar as no details are given as to the exact nature of the quotations, nor to their full extent. So, it is not immediately obvious whether one is dealing with literal quotations or rather with paraphrases, or when a quotation concerns a line, a paragraph, a page, or even a chapter. In order to illustrate the enormous difference which exists in this respect between several passages, I present here two examples.

The first passage, i.e., book II, *maqāla* I, *fann* 9 (pp. 320–322), deals with the physical notions of continuity, contiguity, etc. The editor presents *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī* (designated by him as *al-fann al-awwal*), *maqāla* 3,[29] chapter 2 as its direct source. A closer analysis shows that this is indeed the case, but that Bahmanyār omits many passages. The whole chapter turns out to be a collection of very literal quotations of different lengths of chapter 2 of book 3 of

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[27] Muṭahharī indicates in many cases the precise source of such quotations, but most of the time in a rather vague way, since he neither indicates the precise beginning or end of the quotations nor specifies their actual nature. Despite a few minor mistakes, he has performed a great service by establishing all these primary indications.

[28] See note 6 above.

[29] In fact, he refers to *maqāla* 2, but this is an obvious misprint.

as-Samā' aṭ-Ṭabī'ī, as the following concordance of page and line numbers makes perfectly clear:

Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl	Aš-Šifā', as-Samā' aṭ-Ṭabī'ī[30]
320.3–8	178.7–8
320.8–321.5	178.15–179.7
321.5–12	179.9–14
322.1	181.9–10
322.2–3	181.12

In all these cases Bahmanyār copies Ibn Sīnā *verbatim*. Certainly, large parts of the concerned chapter are not reproduced by him, but one cannot but observe that, when he does preserve a passage of the text, he remains faithful to the very wording of his master.

The second fragment, i.e., book III, *maqāla* II, *bāb* 2, *fann* 4 (pp. 657–663), discusses the Divine Decree (*qaḍā'*) and the problem of evil. The editor does not refer to any Avicennan text, and thus suggests that this chapter is an original contribution of Bahmanyār himself. This is clearly not the case, since many of the expressed ideas are already present in Ibn Sīnā's discussion of this topic in *aš-Šifā', al-Ilāhīyāt*, IX, chapter 6.[31] A few wordings, such as "which is often but not the most often" (*Taḥṣīl*, 659.9 = *Šifā'*, 422.10), "the good is willed by essence, not by accident" (*Taḥṣīl*, 569.11–12 = *Šifā'*, 421.1–2), are even literal derivations. But the whole chapter has rather to be qualified as a kind of paraphrasis of Ibn Sīnā's text, including the very basic ideas such as the link between evil and matter, or evil and the individual; the unavoidable occurrence of evil in *this* (i.e., the actual) universe; the divine providence having realized the best possible world, etc.—all of these have undoubtedly a genuine Avicennan ring. And even the evocation (661.10–663.1) of the notion of *da'wa*, supplicatory prayer, does not necessarily constitute an addition by Bahmanyār himself, since Ibn Sīnā's *Ta'līqāt*[32] includes a rather systematic analysis of this notion which bears some vague resemblances

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[30] Our references are to the edition by S. Zā'id, Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣrīya al-'Āmma li-l-Kitāb, 1983.

[31] One may also take into account the fourth to last chapter of the *Naǧāt*, which is very close in wording to the chapter of the *Šifā'*.

[32] Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta'līqāt*, ed. 'A.R. Badawī (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣrīya al-'Āmma li-l-Kitāb, 1973), 47–8. I will not discuss here the different recensions of this work, nor the problem of its authenticity, but I see for the moment no better hypothesis than the one I expressed in my "Les *Ta'līqāt* d'Ibn Sīnā," 116–118, scil. they constitute students' notes of lessons by Ibn Sīnā.

to Bahmanyār's exposé. While these surely do not suffice to qualify the *Taʿlīqāt* as a direct source, they may indicate that Bahmanyār based himself on Avicennan materials, possibly taken from oral discussions, or, at least, that he further developed ideas which had received only limited attention in Ibn Sīnā's work(s). As such, we are clearly no longer dealing with literal quotation, but rather with paraphrasis, or, in some cases, elaboration.

The above examples well illustrate that Bahmanyār deals with his Avicennan source(s) in different ways. Therefore, a close inspection of every single passage is needed in order to determine the exact kind of dependency on Ibn Sīnā. Such an enterprise clearly exceeds the limits of the present investigation, but let us simply note that there is ample evidence that (almost?) every chapter has a direct or at least indirect basis in Ibn Sīnā's writings. Assuming that this basic impression correctly reflects the facts, why should one still doubt that Bahmanyār was a faithful disciple of Ibn Sīnā? Basically because, as indicated above, the titles of books 2 and 3 of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* seem to imply important changes with respect to the very basic structure of the philosophical project as articulated by Ibn Sīnā in the *Dānišnāmah*. A more detailed analysis of the structure of each of these two books will show that a few important changes have indeed taken place.

In the first three chapters of *maqāla* I of book 2, Bahmanyār insists, in complete agreement with Ibn Sīnā, that Being *qua* being constitutes the very subject of the science of metaphysics[33] and, once more following his master, he evokes the basic divisions of Being: the ten categories; necessity, possibility and impossibility; truth and falsehood. In all this, he largely bases himself on *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, I, chapters 2, 5 and 8. Since *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* was conceived as a compendium,[34] the omission of some parts of the source-text is hardly surprising. Such is the case with *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, I, chapters 1 and 3, the former dealing with a negative approach, scil. what metaphysics is not, the latter with its utility and place. However, the systematic

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[33] It is worthwhile to note that Bahmanyār affirms that Being (*wuǧūd*) is something general (or: common, *amrun ʿāmmun*) which is predicated of what is beneath it not univocally but equivocally (*lā bi-t-tawāṭuʾ bal bi-t-taškīk*); see *at-Taḥṣīl*, 282.1. In my view, this affirmation somehow sustains the hypothesis I formulated years ago that Ibn Sīnā adheres to the idea of a transcendental analogy of Being, see my "Avicenna: tussen neoplatonisme en islam," Ph.D. dissertation, Leuven, 1983, 1:133–140.

[34] See note 1 above.

exclusion of any reference to God, which is predominantly present
in the very first book of *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*—more precisely in chap-
ters 4, 6, and 7—cannot be qualified as unimportant or, at best, of
little significance. For Ibn Sīnā, God remains the highest (though
not the first) object of the metaphysical investigation, and therefore
he does not hesitate to evoke in the mentioned chapters such issues
as the relationship of God with creation (including the topics of
prophecy and *maʿād*) and God's unity and unicity. By ignoring them,
Bahmanyār apparently wants to emphasize that the science of meta-
physics studies chiefly, if not exclusively, Being as such. He at once
seems to reject the inclusion into metaphysics proper of a (Neoplatonic)
exitus-reditus scheme as Ibn Sīnā had developed and integrated it
in an Aristotelian metaphysical framework.

Immediately afterwards, in chapters 4–6, Bahmanyār focuses on
the general notion of substance. The *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* is used only
in a very limited way, i.e., the first part of chapter 1[35] of book II,
in order to explain the distinction between substance and accidens.
The major source of inspiration is, however, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,
4; II, 4; and III, 1–3. Thus, Bahmanyār integrates a huge part of
logic into metaphysics. He may be imitating Ibn Sīnā, who also dis-
cusses the categories, and therefore also substance, both in the *Categories*
and the *Metaphysics*.[36] But even then, one looks in vain for the dis-
tinction between *maḥall* and *mawḍūʿ* afforded by Ibn Sīnā in the later
part of the above mentioned chapter 2 of the *Ilāhīyāt*.

Body becomes the central topic in chapters 7 and 8, where *aš-
Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, II, 2 is largely the source. As for the discussion of
continuity/discontinuity at the beginning of chapter 8, it reminds
one somewhat of *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, III, 2, and its presence
here may be due to Ibn Sīnā's remark in the *Ilāhīyāt* that corpore-
ity is the form of continuity.[37] Likewise, the refutation of atomism,
presented in chapter 10 and based on *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, III,
3–5 (as well as one chapter of the *Naǧāt*) can easily be explained by
Ibn Sīnā's observation that he has already treated this issue in the

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[35] Muṭahharī cites ch. 9, but this is clearly a mistake.
[36] A systematic study and detailed analysis of the *Categories* of the *Šifāʾ* (includ-
ing a thorough comparison with the related parts of the *Metaphysics*) unfortunately
is still lacking, although it almost certainly would contribute to a better under-
standing of Ibn Sīnā's basic philosophical conceptions.
[37] *Aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 64.6–7.

Physics.[38] As for chapter 9, which concentrates on such notions as contiguity and which is completely based on *aš-Šifāʾ, as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, III, 2 as shown earlier, it looks as though Bahmanyār considers it to be of the very same nature as the two surrounding chapters, that is, as being part of the discussion of corporeity.

In chapters 11–13 several precise articulations regarding the relation between form and matter are brought to the fore. This time *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, II (more specifically chapters 1, 2, and 4) reveals itself as the major source. But at the end of chapter 13 when Bahmanyār states that the number of bodies has to be finite, he once more quotes from *aš-Šifāʾ, as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, i.e., III, 8.

To summarize, the first *maqāla* of the second book of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* includes what may be characterized as a summary of books 1 and 2 of the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*. It is striking that Bahmanyār does not hesitate to incorporate passages taken from a logical and a physical part of the *Šifāʾ*, i.e., *al-Maqūlāt* and *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*. Nevertheless, this in no way involves a radical departure from Ibn Sīnā. In fact, the Šayḫ ar-Raʾīs regularly notes in his *Metaphysics* that knowledge of these sciences is required for a correct understanding of his metaphysical project. By elaborating on these parts, Bahmanyār facilitates to some degree the task of the reader of this metaphysical part. Thus, their inclusion here is perhaps the result of a pedagogical motive. However, we also detected a very significant omission, one which cannot but elicit the following question: does Bahmanyār completely exclude theology from metaphysics? Does he somehow want to return to Aristotle's original project? But then what about book *Lambda?* For now these questions remain unanswered.

The second *maqāla* of the part entitled "metaphysics" of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* examines one by one the nine categories besides substance, viz. quantity (and related topics; chapters 1–6); quality (and related topics; chapters 7–9); relation (chapter 10); when, where, posture and state (chapter 11); action and passion (chapter 12). For this exposé, Bahmanyār has made massive use of Ibn Sīnā's presentation of these categories in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, although he also quotes the *Ilāhīyāt*,[39] e.g., in his chapters 3–5 (on "unity") and chapter 9 (on "science"). Moreover, in chapter 6 (on "place," *makān*) he combines

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[38] Ibid., 65.8.
[39] For more details, the reader may consult the references given by Muṭahharī.

elements taken from *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, II, 6–9, and in chapter 8 (on the "quality of passion") he reproduces a part of *aš-Šifāʾ*, *Kitāb an-Nafs*, III, 2. After the logical and quite brief presentation of action and passion in chapter 12 (417–418.10), Bahmanyār extensively analyses the phenomenon of motion (418.11–431), based on *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, II, 14. Further topics related to motion are discussed in his chapters 13–15 according to IV, 3 of the same work. In chapter 16 attention is paid to the issue of the eternity of motion and time, while in chapter 17 the entire focus is on time. These two chapters also have their source in *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*; thus, chapter 16 combines passages taken from III, 11 and IV, 9, and chapter 17 combines passages from II, 10–13.

When comparing this second *maqāla* with Ibn Sīnā's exposé in the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*,[40] three remarks seem to impose themselves:

1. Contrary to Bahmanyār's *maqāla*, only three categories, i.e., quantity, quality and relation, are discussed in some detail in Ibn Sīnā's exposé. This creates the impression that for Ibn Sīnā, besides substance, only these three categories possess a real metaphysical relevancy, notwithstanding their being accidents, as is clearly and explicitly emphasized. Bahmanyār, by taking into consideration *all* categories, undoubtedly weakens the special status accorded the three categories by Ibn Sīnā's wording;[41]

2. In both works, the topic of unity as related to quantity, and the topic of science as related to quality are treated, but they no longer hold such a central position in Bahmanyār's exposé as they evidently had in Ibn Sīnā's, since they are embedded in a much more extensive account of all categories, and related topics;

3. Bahmanyār's systematic analysis in this framework of three basic physical notions, viz. motion, place and time, can hardly be justified by considering it an additional explanation which was naturally implied by Ibn Sīnā's text. What Ibn Sīnā had articulated in book 2 of the *Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, in the way of three shorter monographs,[42] as outspoken physical doctrines, becomes in Bahmanyār's work an integral part of metaphysics. Moreover, it has to be stressed

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[40] I refer to this work since it offers the most complete metaphysical exposé of Ibn Sīnā, including his basic ideas in the field.

[41] But, as earlier stated (see n. 36 above), a thorough examination of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine(s) of the categories, both on the logical and on the metaphysical level, is really needed in order to elucidate what appears to be some of his most fundamental philosophical ideas.

[42] As far as the form of presentation is concerned, these monographs remind one of what is usually designated corollaries with respect to Philoponus and Simplicius.

that Bahmanyār, when dealing in book 3 of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* with *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, no longer makes any mention of time, and evokes only a few particular items regarding motion and place.

Therefore, it is almost natural to conclude that in this second *maqāla* Bahmanyār rather blurs the boundaries between logic and metaphysics on the one hand, and physics and metaphysics on the other hand. As a disciple of Ibn Sīnā, such an attitude is surprising, since the Šayḫ ar-Raʾīs attached great importance to correct logical reasoning and to keeping distinct the respective domains of physics and metaphysics.[43]

Maqāla 3, which investigates the notions of anteriority and posteriority, and potency and act, is genuinely Avicennan. It has a solid basis in *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, IV, 1–2. The same evaluation applies to *maqāla* 4, which focuses on the couples universal/particular, multiplication/individualization and genus/species, and, moreover, on definition, it being based on book 5 of the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*. However, the very first chapter is an exception. It is entitled "On Perception (*idrāk*), and what is related to it," and contains elements taken from *aš-Šifāʾ, Kitāb an-Nafs*, II, 2 and V, 2, as well as from *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, VIII, 6 and V, 5.[44] It may still be accepted as strongly Avicennan, but Bahmanyār, before discussing the real metaphysical issue, imports elements from a natural science; in the present case this appears to be preparatory and thus may lead the reader to a better understanding of the relevant topics. *Maqāla* 5 may also be qualified as profoundly Avicennan. It focuses on the topic of causality, closely following the sixth book of the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*.[45] But again, one chapter, i.e., chapter 3 (on final causality), encompasses non-metaphysical materials. Based on *aš-Šifāʾ, as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, I, 13–14, the delicate problem of fate and chance is addressed. Its discussion in a causal context is certainly natural but, as with *Maqāla* 2, one gets the impression that Bahmanyār simply mixes up physics and metaphysics.

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[43] Regarding Ibn Sīnā's insistence on correct logical reasoning, see *Lettre au vizir*, op. cit., 2; and as for his sharp distinction between physics and metaphysics, see note 19 above.

[44] The reference to V, 5 is lacking in Muṭahharī's edition.

[45] Muṭahharī, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 524, refers to the *Išārāt, namaṭ* 5, but several elements of the texts are directly derived from *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, VI, 2. It has to be noted that Bahmanyār inverts the order of the chapter.

Maqāla 6 is of a composite nature. The first chapter, in conformity with *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, VII, 1, discusses consequential accidents (*lawāḥiq*), related to one and unity. In chapter 2, finity figures as a central notion: first, according to *aš-Šifāʾ*, *as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*, II, 8, arguments are adduced for the finitude of bodies and numbers; then it is established that there cannot exist an infinity of causes, on the basis of *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, VIII, 1 (albeit extremely summarized). Once more, one observes the introduction of a physical item, but in this case it clearly has a preparatory function. Based respectively on *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, IX, 7, and IV, 3, one finds in chapter 3 an account of pain and joy, and in chapter 4 one of the notions of perfect and more than perfect. In the latter chapter, one also finds a part on incorruptibility, which undoubtedly has been inspired by *aš-Šifāʾ*, *Kitāb an-Nafs*, V, 4. In this case, the physical element quite naturally fits into the surrounding metaphysical context, dealing with incorruptibility.

Overlooking the totality of *maqālas* 3–6, we may conclude that Bahmanyār offers a massively Avicennan-inspired doctrine of the modes of Being, the inclusion of physical elements not present in Avicenna being of a rather limited nature. However, when looks at the entirety of the metaphysics, the often massive presence of logical and physical doctrines is rather problematic. One gets the impression that Bahmanyār does not always respect the borderlines between these philosophical disciplines. Moreover, he does not mention Ibn Sīnā's rejection of Plato's theory of ideas (*aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, VII, 2–3) and his religious socio-political doctrine (*aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, X). In the former case, Bahmanyār perhaps considered the issue too historical and/or too technical for its inclusion in a (so-called?) basic presentation of Avicennan philosophy, whereas in the latter he may have decided that it is not really of metaphysical relevance, since, outside the *Šifāʾ*, this topic is never discussed in the metaphysical section of Ibn Sīnā's encyclopaedic works. Such reasons may indeed be plausible. However, of a very different nature is the omission of almost any theological item. As previously stated,[46] theology forms for Ibn Sīnā a constitutive element of metaphysics. Hence, by ignoring it, Bahmanyār seems to undermine one of the pillars of the Avicennan metaphysical system.

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[46] See above and n. 16.

It has already been noted that Bahmanyār did not entitle the third part of his *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* "Physics," but rather "the science of the states of the most noble of Beings," or, perhaps better, "the science of the states of the essences of the existing Beings," and that he discusses in its first *maqāla* the Necessary Existent, i.e., the divine Being. It thus becomes clear that he does not simply reject any philosophical theology, but rather he places it in what appears to be a somewhat different context from the one adopted by Ibn Sīnā. Before concentrating on that context, a brief examination of its contents is worthwhile.

Having indicated, rather than proved,[47] the existence of one single God, Bahmanyār develops a negative theology, insisting on the unity of the divine essence, denying any quiddity in Him, and rejecting any substantiality of Him.[48] As for the divine attributes, they are characterized by him as either negative, relative, or composed of both relation and negation. He then offers a summary proof for God's existence, based on the distinction between possible and necessary, and on the impossibility of an infinite series of causes. Further, he emphasizes that God is at once Knower, Known, and Knowledge, that is, His self-knowledge implies the knowledge of what is other than Him, that this gives rise to the emanation of all things without creating any plurality in His essence,[49] that God is absolute perfection and free of any desire, and that God is life and truth. Finally, Bahmanyār observes that from the One only one can proceed.[50]

All this rings very Avicennan, and actually may be characterized as a rather succinct summary of Ibn Sīnā's theology, based on *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, VIII, chapters 4–7, with a few small additions taken

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[47] The proof follows only later; see infra.

[48] It is somewhat surprising that Bahmanyār in this context does not mention Ibn Sīnā's famous saying that in God there is no other quiddity than his *annīya* (see, e.g., *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 344.10), but affirms that the divine essence is a *ḥaqīqa lā ism lahū* ("a truth having no name"), an expression present in the *Taʿlīqāt*, op. cit., 183.15–16 and 185.26.

[49] In this context, Bahmanyār evokes very briefly the notion of providence, stating that it means that God knows all things and is their final cause (*at-Taḥṣīl*, 579.3–4). A more systematic analysis of this basic notion is only offered in the *De Caelo* part, see infra.

[50] H.A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 75, n. 3, remarks that despite its Plotinian inspiration, this formulation seems to be original with Ibn Sīnā.

from the same work, chapters 4 and 6.[51] Nevertheless, it is striking that he concentrates mainly on the divine essence and the related topic of the divine essential attributes, and that he pays only very limited attention to the very proof of God's existence as well as to the relationship between God and creatures. Moreover, as previously indicated, this theology is no longer a part of metaphysics proper. It is now integrated into a study of Beings. Does this mean that there is no longer any room for Physics in Bahmanyār's view?

The second *maqāla* of the third part makes clear that such is not the case. It is divided into four sections, or *bāb*s, which constitute a basic survey of the first six parts of the Physics as conceived by Ibn Sīnā, i.e., Physics (general principles), Heaven and Earth, Generation and Corruption, Actions and Passions (Meteorologica I), Higher Influences (Meteorologica II), and On the Soul.[52] But again one finds significant displacements.

In the first section, after what appears to be a general and introductory division of the possible Beings in chapter 1, Bahmanyār elaborates the following physical issues, always based on *aš-Šifāʾ, as-Samāʿ aṭ-Ṭabīʿī*: motion (I, 6; IV, 9 and 14); finitude-infinity (III, 8–10); corporeal form (III, 10); direction of movement and *situs* (III, 14; with an addition taken from the *Išārāt*); natural place (IV, 9–11) and natural body as principle of motion (IV, 12 and 8). It is perhaps worth noting that most of the quotations derive from books 3 and 4 of *as-Samāʿ*. Of course, a large use of book 2 had already been made in the metaphysical part, when Bahmanyār discussed the topics of motion, place and time.[53] However, of much more importance is the fact that in the eighth and last chapter, Bahmanyār introduces a passage derived from *aš-Šifāʾ, as-Samāʾ wa-l-ʿālam*, despite his explicit

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[51] Muṭahharī, 570, also refers to *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*, I, 7 and V, 5, but the passage of Bahmanyār's text, which affirms the absence of any plurality or changeability in the divine essence, can in my view be related to ibid., VIII, 5. It has to be stressed that very literal quotations are rare in the whole *maqāla*, at least if the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* did constitute Bahmanyār's major source text for the present exposé. Let me simply note that thus far I see no better candidate.

[52] The omission of the parts on plants and animals is not overly surprising, insofar as Ibn Sīnā, as with mathematics (see n. 12 above) never reexamined them in his later works (as with mathematics, probably considering that they had been established in a satisfactory manner in the Aristotelian tradition before him).

[53] See above.

mention in the title of the section that it deals with the intentions of *as-Samā' aṭ-Ṭabī'ī*. In fact, while focusing on simple body and the reciprocal implication of generation and corruption, Bahmanyār clearly brings to the fore materials taken from *as-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*, more precisely, chapters 1 and 4. It would appear that he wants to avoid the treatment of such typically and exclusively earthly phenomena in the section on Heaven.

Although Bahmanyār presents the second section as an exposé (*kalām*) on *as-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*, using the title as given by Ibn Sīnā,[54] he nevertheless deals only with heavenly matters in its elaboration. In the first chapter, based on *aš-Šifā', as-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*, chapters 2–3, Heaven is described as the first body. Chapters 2 and 3, which are largely identical,[55] concentrate on the celestial Beings, viz. Intelligences, souls and bodies. It is insisted that the celestial movements are volitional and that the lower world in no way constitutes the motive for these movements. Moreover, a particular emphasis is placed on the role of the celestial Beings, especially the Giver of Forms,[56] in the process of emanation. These ideas remind one of *aš-Šifā', al-Ilāhīyāt*, IX, 2–5. Despite the absence of almost any literal quotation,[57] it is clear that Bahmanyār has been inspired by these chapters, or perhaps a text similar to them. Whatever the case, he obviously introduces outspoken (at least in the Avicennan perspective) metaphysical ideas into a clearly physical context. This becomes even more evident when, in chapter 4, divine providence is analyzed in detail. Its formulation is similar to *aš-Šifā', al-Ilāhīyāt*, IX, 6 (at the beginning), but Bahmanyār omits, at least in the present

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[54] As is well known, Aristotle simply mentions *On Heaven*.

[55] Almost identical are the following passages: 641.5–11 = 650.4–7 and 650.17–651.1; 642.2 = 651.5; 642.7–8 = 651.16–17; 642.10–15 = 651.18–652.6; 643.3–12 = 652.9–18; and 643.17–644.7 = 653.1–9. Generally speaking, chapter 3 appears to be an enlarged version of chapter 2. A detailed analysis of both chapters may reveal the exact nature of their mutual relationship, but this falls outside the scope of the present study.

[56] This is especially true in chapter 3, where Bahmanyār refers to it by its classical denomination, i.e., *wāhib aṣ-ṣuwar*; in chapter two, it is less emphasized and, moreover, one finds the unusual expression *al-mufīd li-ṣ-ṣuwar*.

[57] Muṭahharī gives no reference, but the doctrinal similarity with the indicated chapters is rather straightforward; indeed, the very wording is close to that of the *Šifā'*, e.g., ch. 2 § 1–IX, 2 (384); § 3–IX, 3 (396), § 7–IX, 2 (386–387), last paragraph-IX, 5 (411); ch. 3–IX, 4 (406).

context,[58] the key notion of knowledge. In the very same chapter the difficult problem of how to explain the existence of evil in light of the divine decree (*qaḍaʾ*) is given much attention. Here one encounters genuinely Avicennan ideas, viz. evil is the privation of existence or of the perfection of existence; evil happens often, but not most often; evil is accidental and only occurs in the individual; this world could not have been created free of evil otherwise it would not have been this world. A probable, if not certain, source for these doctrines is the remaining part of the very same chapter 6 of book 9 of *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhīyāt*.[59] However, the incorporation of the problematic of evil into a *De Caelo* context, together with the omission of mentioning any act of knowledge in the activity of providence, hardly allows for any understanding of the divine Decree other than in a purely natural way. In accepting such a view, Bahmanyār sharply deviates from Ibn Sīnā, who made a major effort to affirm God as the cause of the Universe while at the same time safeguarding a real link between God and his creation.[60]

Section three deals exclusively with physical matters. Based on *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Kawn wa-l-fasād*,[61] one finds a discussion of the four elements, alteration, growth, rarefication, condensation and mixture, more precisely in chapters 1–3 and 5. The phenomenon of light and of light rays forms the central issue of chapter 4. A large part of this chapter is directly based on two chapters of the *Ṭabīʿīyāt* of the *Dānišnāmah*,[62] as is clear from the following table.

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[58] In the first *maqāla* of the third part, Bahmanyār mentioned a very summary definition of providence, which still included an explicit reference to the divine knowledge; see n. 49 above.

[59] As for the chapters 2–3, Muṭahharī also provides no reference. It has to be noted that at the end of the chapter, 662–63, Bahmanyār adds a few remarks on *duʿāʾ*, which vaguely resemble a passage on the very same topic in the *Taʿlīqāt*, 47.20–48.12.

[60] See my "Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sīnā," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 7 (1997), 45–477.

[61] For details, see Muṭahharī's edition, but at 682, n. 2 one has to read "8" instead of "9."

[62] I made the discovery of these chapters while finishing the present paper. Due to time constraints, I was unable to investigate further the possible presence of other chapters of the *Dānišnāmah* in the *Taḥṣīl* (but see n. 6 above). Let me add that the present discovery seriously strengthens my hypothesis of the existence of an Arabic original of the *Dānišnāmah*. See my "Les *Taʿlīqāt* d'Ibn Sīnā," 110. Muṭahharī's reference to *aš-Šifāʾ, Kitāb an-Nafs*, III, 1–2 is not really adequate (perhaps he was misled by the title of the chapter).

Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl	*Dānišnāmah, Ṭabīʿīyāt*
686.7–11	42.1–8 (beginning of ch. 19)
687.1–6	42.10–43.3
687.7–688.3	43.7–44.6
688.3–6	45.1–2
688.7–14	45.8–46.4 (end ch. 19)
689.5–690.8	46.7–49.8 (entire ch. 20)

Some of the passages do constitute a literal translation, while others are of a rather paraphrastic nature. However, the similarities between the two texts are striking. It should be mentioned that at the end of the chapter a passage dealing with color has been added and which is clearly based on *aš-Šifāʾ, Kitāb an-Nafs*, III, 1. Chapter 6, in its turn, mentions the classes of elements, and discusses such phenomena as liquefaction, congelation, etc., by drawing on *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Afʿāl wa-l-infiʿālāt*, I, 1–2 and 5–9. Bahmanyār does not raise the issue of *mizāǧ* as developed from an outspoken medical context by Ibn Sīnā in the second part of the latter work.[63] As for chapter 7, it concentrates on sky-linked items, e.g., clouds, winds, etc., and is based on *aš-Šifāʾ, al-Āṯār al-ʿulwīya*, II, 1–5. In this case Bahmanyār omits the first part of Ibn Sīnā's volume where one finds an analysis of earth-linked phenomena such as the origination of wells, mountains, etc. The reason for this omission is not immediately evident.[64] Mention has also to be made of the fact that in the title of this third section, Bahmanyār refers to the *Book of Meteorology*, under the sole title of *al-Āṯār al-ʿulwīya*, the usual denomination of Aristotle's book in the Arabic tradition. Hence, it looks as though he rejects Ibn Sīnā's division of the Stagirite's work into two independent treatises.

In the fourth, and last, section, Bahmanyār summarizes *Kitāb an-Nafs* of the *Šifāʾ*. Respecting more or less its order, he discusses the following issues: demonstration of the soul, its substantiality and its incorporeality (*Nafs*, I, 1, 3); the vegetative powers of the soul (*Nafs*, II, 1); the five outer senses (*Nafs*, II, 2–5; III, 1, 5 and 8); the five inner senses (*Nafs*, IV, 1–3); theoretical and practical intellect and the acquisition of knowledge (*Nafs*, I, 5 and V, 1); estimation and dreams

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[63] See S. van Riet (ed.), *Avicenna Latinus, Liber quartus Naturalium, De actionibus et passionibus* (Louvain-la-Neuve: E. Peeters), 28*.

[64] It might be that Bahmanyār judged them sufficiently fixed, as with mathematics (see n. 12 above) and with the section on plants and animals (see n. 52 above).

(*Nafs*, V, 7; IV, 2–3); motive powers (*Nafs*, IV, 4); intellect and the intellected (*Nafs*, V, 2 and 6); classification of the powers of the soul (*Nafs*, I, 5); origination and individuation of the soul, and rejection of the idea of transmigration (*Nafs*, V, 3–4, 7–8; I, 3); resurrection (*Nafs*, V, 4). At first glance, Bahmanyār offers a serious survey of the essentials of Ibn Sīnā's psychological views.

When overlooking the entire second *maqāla* of the third part of *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, one gets the impression that Bahmanyār at least partly seems to "re-Aristotelize" the physical project (in its broad sense) of Ibn Sīnā: as with the Stagirite, *On Heavens* deals exclusively with the super-lunar Beings and their activities. Of course, one can barely detect such a notion as that of providence in the Stagirite's work, but if one wants to include such a notion in an Aristotelian context, no other work seems more natural in which to do so.[65] Also the designation of *Meteorology* by one single title, as indicated above, points in the very same direction. However, at the same time, one cannot but observe that the omission of the basic treatment of motion, place and time here, and its transferal to the context of metaphysics, simply does not fit with a "return to Aristotle."

From a more encompassing point of view, *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* clearly deviates from Ibn Sīnā's new philosophical project. It dismisses the extraordinary attempt of that project to elaborate a unified metaphysics. It also seems to reject the unique valorization of theology as expressed by the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs. It rather makes God, as well as (His?) providence part of a (natural?) study of Being. In any case, it is definitely not Avicennan in several of its structural démarches, notwithstanding its massive use of Avicennan texts. By limiting metaphysics to a pure ontology, and by re-arranging several physical doctrines, one is occasionally inclined to believe that Bahmanyār had in mind a "re-Aristotelizing" of Ibn Sīnā's thought. If this is indeed the case, one may seriously doubt whether he has really understood the Stagirite's thought. The way he mixes up logic, physics and metaphysics clearly has no basis in the great Greek thinker. It rather points to the influence of a figure such as Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, accused

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[65] One may think of such passages as I, 4, 271a33 in order to include the very idea of providence in the Aristotelian framework. I thank G. Guldentops, J. Brams and W. Vanhamel for their helpful suggestions in this respect.

by Ibn Sīnā of being a weak logician and a slavish follower of a bad Aristotelianism. It therefore seems possible, if not probable, that Bahmanyār sided more with the latter than with Ibn Sīnā.[66] Whatever the case in that regard, our analysis has sufficiently shown that Bahmanyār cannot be characterized as a faithful disciple of Ibn Sīnā.

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[66] By way of hypothesis, and in a very provisional way, I would like to suggest that Ibn Sīnā tried to have the young Bahmanyār among his disciples (probably during his [first] stay in Rayy and/or his stay in Hamadan), but that already during his lifetime and surely in his later years in Isfahan, it became evident that Bahmanyār had taken sides with al-Kirmānī.

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FAḪR AD-DĪN AR-RĀZĪ'S CRITIQUE OF IBN SĪNĀ'S ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITY OF GOD IN THE *IŠĀRĀT* AND NAṢĪR AD-DĪN AṬ-ṬŪSĪ'S DEFENCE

Toby Mayer

Introduction

One of Ibn Sīnā's main aims in his handling of metaphysics seems to have been to cleanse it of non-metaphysical elements. He especially wished to remove premises drawn from physics in arguments with metaphysical conclusions. Ibn Sīnā says as much in the final section (*faṣl* 29) of *Namaṭ* 4 of the *Išārāt*, where he turns back to weigh up the whole *namaṭ*. In speaking in the course of the *namaṭ* on issues like God's existence, unity and transcendence of attributes (*barā'atuhū 'ani ṣ-ṣifāt*), Ibn Sīnā boasts that he has set aside God's activity (*fiʿl*) and creation, and considered nothing but being *qua* being (*nafs al-wuǧūd*).[1] He certainly admits that creation can be grounds for reaching these conclusions about God (*wa-in kāna ḏālika dalīlan 'alayhi*). Nevertheless, it is an inferior basis to being *qua* being. Wherever possible, metaphysical conclusions deserve commensurably metaphysical premises. Ibn Sīnā spoke sharply about the other ways of reaching such conclusions. In commenting on Book *Lambda* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, he even said "it is vile (*qabīḥ*) to proceed to the First Reality by way of movement and by way of the fact that It is the principle of movement."[2] Again, in the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, he is reported as saying "It is distressing for me that faith in the reality of the First Principle, and in the reality of Its being one, should be proceeded to by way of movement and the unity of the moved world."[3]

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[1] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt* with Ṭūsī's commentary, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1377–1380/1957–1960) [hereafter *Išārāt*], 3:482.
[2] *Šarḥ Ḥarf al-Lām*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Arisṭū ʿinda l-ʿArab* (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1947), 23.
[3] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Mubāḥaṭāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992), 84.

Such statements bear out that the main thrust of Ibn Sīnā's argu-
ment for God's existence is not *cosmological*, but ontological. Rather
than relying on the world's contingency in affirming a Necessary
Being, it prides itself on affirming a Necessary Being using nothing
but the idea of It, in the mind. But this is another story.[4] The issue
in this paper is not the existence of God, but God's unity. It turns
out to be equally true of Ibn Sīnā's argument for God's unity in
the *Išārāt* that it uses nothing but the idea of such a being. In this,
his argument starkly contrasts with the arguments for God's unity
found in Aristotle and *kalām*. Those arguments are glaringly rooted
in physics. In Aristotle, for example, the unity of the world-*motum* is
the basis for concluding the unity of the world-mover.[5] Again, in
kalām, the fact that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos is taken
to imply the unity of the power governing the world. The *kalām*
argument uses the notion of "reciprocal hindrance" (*tamānu'*) and
has Quranic origins, notably the verse "Were any gods in [heaven
and earth] other than God, then [heaven and earth] would fall into
chaos (*fasadatā*)."[6]

In contrast to such proofs, how does Ibn Sīnā show that there
could be only one God, referring to nothing beyond the idea of
"God" itself ? The gist of his argument is in fact already familiar in
the thought of al-Fārābī (d. 339/951). In his *Kitāb Ārā' ahl al-madīna
al-fāḍila* and his *as-Siyāsa al-Madanīya*, Fārābī presents the argument
that if there were two first principles, each of the two would have
to have something in common by means of which they share in the
status of being "First," and at least one of the two would also have
to have something peculiar by means of which it is distinct from the
other. Thus, insofar as they are two, one of them would have to be
a compound of these factors. But a compound is an effect—an effect
of its intrinsic parts, if nothing else. And the First Cause cannot be
an effect. So it is one.[7]

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[4] See my "Ibn Sīnā's *Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn*," *Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies* 12.1 (2001),
18–39.

[5] *Metaphysics*, 1073a29.

[6] Qur'ān 21:22.

[7] Fārābī, *On the Perfect State* (*Kitāb Ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*), ed./tr. Richard
Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 60–61; id., *as-Siyāsa al-Madanīya* (Hyderabad:
Maṭba'at Maǧlis Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uṯmānīya, 1346/1927), 14. See also H.A.
Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and
Jewish Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 295.

The roots of Fārābī's argument reach back, via al-Kindī (d.c. 252/
866),[8] to Plotinus's *Enneads*. In the fifth *Ennead*, Plotinus gives an
argument against the duplication of the first of the Plotinian hypostases,
the One (τὸ ἕν). Two perfectly self-identical "Ones" are inconceiv-
able. The hypothetical duplicate would have to be a compound of
the shared "oneness" and a difference of some kind. So the dupli-
cate would be "one" only in the relative sense of the word or, as
Plotinus puts it, it would have to be a "one-many" (ἓν ἄρα πολλὰ
ἔσται). If the two hypothesized first hypostases are instead thought
of as "one" in the absolute sense, they would lose their distinctness
and resolve into one.[9] Such arguments as these are the forbears of
Ibn Sīnā's proof. However, Ibn Sīnā's argument in the *Išārāt* is more
complicated than those of Plotinus or Fārābī, in line with Ibn Sīnā's
tendency to elaborate, and to bear out conclusions in maximal detail.

Ibn Sīnā's Argument

The full discussion of the issue runs from *faṣl* 16 to 20. Of these,
the main argument which concerns us here comprises *faṣl* 16 to 18.
Faṣl 20 is the overall conclusion: "the 'Necessary Existent' is not
predicated of a multiplicity at all" (*wāǧibu l-wuǧūdi lā yuqālu 'alá kaṯratin
aṣlan*).[10] *Faṣl* 19 contains a supplementary argument rehearsed from
Aristotle, based on immateriality. Matter is the means by which a
single species proliferates in individuals. Matter is absent from the
Necessary Existent. So It may not proliferate.[11]

On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā's main argument from *faṣl* 16 to 18,
which builds on that of Fārābī, runs as follows. First come two pre-
mises. In the premise in *faṣl* 16, Ibn Sīnā lists all the kinds of inter-
nal relation which might be found in any identity involving some
attribute held in common and a multiple individuation. There are

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[8] G. Atiyeh, *Al-Kindī: The Philosopher of the Arabs* (Rawalpindi: Islamic Research
Institute, 1966), 65.

[9] *Ennead*, V.4.1.15–25.

[10] *Išārāt*, 472.

[11] *Išārāt*, 470–471. Compare Aristotle's argument, *Metaphysics*, 1074a33–37: "...
all things which are numerically many have matter. For one and the same definition
(*logos*) applies to many, for example 'man,' whereas Socrates is unique. But being's
first essential character has no matter, for it is complete actuality. Accordingly, the
unmoved First Mover is one both in definition and in number (ἓν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ
καὶ ἀριθμῷ)."

three elements to consider. The factor common to the kindred indi-
viduals;[12] the uncommon factor by which they are different individ-
uals;[13] and finally the linkage of these factors, either by way of the
strong relation of concomitance (*luzūm*) or by way of the weak relation
of accidentality (*ʿurūḍ*). The interaction of these elements results in
four possibilities. (1) The common factor might be an inseparable
concomitant of the uncommon factor. For instance, as Rāzī (d. 606/
1209) says, the nature of a genus might be a concomitant of the
natures of various differentiae.[14] "Animal," for example, is a con-
comitant of the differentiae "rational" and "irrational," in the case
of man and beast respectively. (2) The uncommon factor might be
a concomitant of the common factor. This, however, is absurd.
Otherwise the common factor might have permanent properties at
odds with one another. But that is impossible by the principle of
the excluded middle. We would, for instance, always have to think
of "rationality" and "irrationality" whenever we think of "animal."
In (3) and (4) come the corresponding accidental relations, which
are both feasible because they involve the separability of the factors.

In Ibn Sīnā's second premise, given in *faṣl* 17, he marks out the
scope of a quiddity's causal power. Something's quiddity, considered
in its own right independently of existence, may be said to cause
some attribute (*ṣifa*) that it has. Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) gives the exam-
ple of "rationality" (*nāṭiqīya*) causing "wonderment" (*mutaʿağğibīya*).[15]
But no quiddity, or subsidiary attribute thereof, could be said to be
the cause of its own very external existence. This is because "the
cause is prior in existence, and there is nothing prior in existence
to existence."[16] No quiddity, in other words, can somehow generate
itself in external reality and bear responsibility for what it precisely
lacks, i.e., existence.[17]

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[12] *mā tattafiqu fīhi, Išārāt*, 456.

[13] *mā taḫtalifu fīhi, Išārāt*, 456.

[14] Ibn Sīnā, Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, ed.
as-Sayyid ʿU.Ḥ. al-Ḥaššāb (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥayrīya, 1325/1907) [hereafter
Šarḥay al-Išārāt], 199.

[15] *Išārāt*, 458.

[16] *Išārāt*, 461–2.

[17] Incidentally, this shows how Ibn Sīnā's essentialism is far from crude. It seems
to amount to an explicit denial of *esse essentiae*.

As will emerge, these two premises are of use to Ibn Sīnā in *faṣl* 18—the proof itself of divine unity. The wording of the *faṣl* is far from easy, and the overall readings of Rāzī and Ṭūsī are badly at odds. However, the basic drift of the argument is clear from Ibn Sīnā's opening words.

> The individuated Necessary Existent, if that individuation of It is because It is necessary in existence, then there is no necessary existent other than It. And if Its individuation is not because of that, but for some other reason, It is an effect.[18]

Here Ibn Sīnā posits "the necessary existent" as a species. He does this only for the sake of argument, since to do so literally would yield many problems.[19] If it is taken provisionally as a species in this way, an alternative results. (A) The species might be at one with the individual, so that they are completely coterminous and the Necessary Existent is single insofar as the species is single. Or (B) the species and the individual might be distinct. The two, in fact, would have to be distinct, if there were more than one necessary existent, since they would constitute different individuals sharing in the common species "the necessary existent." But this separation of species and individual inside each hypothesized necessary being is absurd, since it entails contingency, and contingency is incompatible with the status of necessity. The very idea of intrinsic necessity of existence thus dictates (A). Ibn Sīnā goes on to show in detail how the separation between species and individual, required by (B), would involve absurdity, and he uses the premises given in *faṣl* 16 and 17 to this end. The fourfold list given in *faṣl* 16 is presented again, but is now applied specifically to the necessary existent. The following options emerge.[20]

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[18] *Išārāt*, 464.

[19] E.g., it would imply a quiddity, and hence that the Necessary is a compound of quiddity and existence. But that Ibn Sīnā in some sense entertains "the necessary existent" as a species is made explicit in the following *faṣl* (19) where he reasons on the basis of his argument here in *faṣl* 18 that "things which have a single species-definition (*ḥadd nawʿī*) are single, and are different only because of other causes," *Išārāt*, 470.

[20] In the following diagrams, X →− Y indicates that "X is the concomitant of Y" and X −→ — Y indicates that "X is the accident of Y."

(1)

species "the necessary existent"

individuations

(2)

species "the necessary existent"

individuations

(3)

species "the necessary existent"

individuations

(4)

species "the necessary existent"

individuations

It will become clear that Ibn Sīnā does not just rule out each of these options on the grounds that it absurdly inflicts contingency on the Necessary Existent, but that he brings out yet further absurdities.

He eliminates (1) with the words "If the existence of the Necessary Existent* were a concomitant of Its individuation, the existence would become a concomitant belonging to a quiddity or attribute of something else."[21] *Prima facie*, the problem here is just that the species

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[21] *Išārāt*, 465 (*reading *wāǧib al-wuǧūd* for *wāǧib al-wuǧūb*).

"the necessary existent," as a concomitant depending on the individuation, is absurdly made contingent on some cause (i.e., the individuation). This reading is confirmed, implicitly, by the way Ibn Sīnā shortly eliminates (2), in which "the necessary existent" is instead hypothesized as an *accident* of the individuation, for he now says ". . . then it is *a fortiori* due to a cause."[22] Nevertheless there is an intentional ambiguity in Ibn Sīnā's elimination of (1) in keeping with the allusive style typifying the *Išārāt* (*The Allusions*). It is a fact that, in their commentaries, both Rāzī and Ṭūsī focus on how (1) would violate the second premise (*faṣl* 17): a quiddity cannot bear responsibility for its own existence. And this is confirmed by the curious way Ibn Sīnā words his elimination. He does not say that "the necessary existent" would become the concomitant of something else, rather, that the existence of the necessary existent would become the concomitant of the quiddity or attribute of something else. In this, there is an unmistakable reference to the premise in *faṣl* 17, where he ruled that "it is impossible for the attribute which is the existence of the thing to be due only to its quiddity which does not consist in existence, or due to some other attribute."[23] It may therefore be taken that Ibn Sīnā has two absurdities in mind in his elimination of (1): the infliction of contingency on the Necessary; and the violation of the second premise.

In (2), as just stated, the species "the necessary existent" is even more obviously dependent on a cause since accidents are in a weaker relation with their subjects than concomitants. Hence, Ibn Sīnā says "it is *a fortiori* due to a cause" (*fa-huwa awlá bi-an yakūna li-ʿilla*). Ṭūsī says that "here, '*a fortiori*' points to a new need for a quite separate agent to bring about the things related and their combination."[24] We may counter that the Necessary Being is itself presupposed to be an ultimate agent, without any agent beyond it. If that is so, however, the individuation would have to bear sole responsibility for its own accident of "necessary existence," and this again violates the premise given in *faṣl* 17. A quiddity would again have been made responsible for its own very existence.

In (3) the individuations are the accidents of the species "the necessary existent." While Ibn Sīnā's manner of eliminating (3) is recondite,

[22] See below under (2).
[23] *Išārāt*, 458–462.
[24] *Išārāt*, 465.

the basic absurdity with this option is clearly that it makes "the nec-
essary existent" dependent in some respect, on something else. Again,
this cause may be quite separate, or, given that the Necessary Existent
is itself presupposed to be ultimate, it may be a factor within the
subject-accident complex. Ibn Sīnā's elimination is worded as follows.

> If that through which it is individuated [i.e., the individuations] were
> accidental to [the species], [the species] would be due to a cause.
> Then, if [the species] and that through which it is individuated were
> a single quiddity, that cause would be a cause for the particularity of
> that which by itself is necessary in its existence—and this is absurd.
> And if [the individuations'] accidentality were subsequent to the individ-
> uation of a prior First, our argument would be about that prior thing.[25]

Ibn Sīnā here considers an alternative. Either the species and the
individuation are always in union (as he puts it, they form "a single
quiddity"), or the species and the individuation are not always in
union but must be brought together. If they are always in union
(possessed as they are of the ultimacy which goes with the status of
necessity), nevertheless, within the union there is a dependence of the
species on the individuation, insofar as the species is particularized.
But the species in question is that of "the necessary existent" and it
is absurd for it to depend in any respect on something else. Alterna-
tively, if we set aside the claim of ultimacy for the being in ques-
tion, then the union of the species and the accident of individuation
must depend on a separate agent which has already been individu-
ated. The very same problems then afflict this new agent, or in Ibn
Sīnā's words, "our argument would be about that prior thing."

Finally, in (4) Ibn Sīnā dismisses the option in which the indi-
viduations are the concomitants of the species with the simple state-
ment "what is left of the disjuncts is absurd."[26] This option evidently
corresponds with the permutation which was presented in *faṣl* 16 as
intrinsically absurd, whereby the uncommon factor is the concomi-
tant of the common factor.

What is striking about this highly intricate argument is that Ibn
Sīnā at no point rests content with the reasoning that compounding
is inflicted on the Necessary Being by all the options. Quite sepa-
rate problems are highlighted in Ibn Sīnā's argument. First, contin-

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[25] *Išārāt*, 466–8.
[26] *Išārāt*, 469.

gency may be shown to follow for the Necessary in different and
highly specific ways. Second, a quiddity may be shown to have been
absurdly made responsible for its own existence. Third, the permu-
tation may be held up as intrinsically absurd.[27] Ibn Sīnā thus avoids
simply basing his proof on the principle of divine simplicity, that is,
the premise that the Necessary Being must be an absolute simplex.
While he of course admits the truth of that, he puts it aside in his
proof of God's unity in the *Išārāt*. It is unclear whether he does so
because he views it as something of a *petitio principii*, or because he
sets himself the challenge of going beyond the proof given by Fārābī,
Kindī, and Plotinus—since divine simplicity is evidently the basis of
their proofs.[28]

Rāzī's Attack

What is Rāzī's response to this reasoning? Rāzī mounts an extra-
ordinary onslaught against it, and it is not possible here to go into
every nook and cranny of his commentary. To begin with, Rāzī's
reading of Ibn Sīnā's proof strikes the reader as very odd. Ibn Sīnā
found intrinsically absurd the option in which the uncommon fac-
tor (the individuations) is the concomitant of the common factor
("necessary existence"). But this "absurdity" is understood by Rāzī
to mean that multiplicity in the uncommon factor would have to be
negated, so, as Rāzī says, "this would entail that it be said 'wher-
ever there is necessity, there is that individuation.' So, any neces-
sary existent is that individuated one (*muʿayyan*), so the Necessary
Existent is nothing but that individuated one, and it would be one
and not multiple."[29] In other words, Rāzī thinks that Ibn Sīnā's
proof comes down to this option. But this reading of Ibn Sīnā's
proof leads Rāzī into severe difficulties as a commentator. Ibn Sīnā
clearly marks out his intended conclusion in the opening words of
faṣl 18: "If the individuation of the individuated Necessary Existent
is *because* it is necessary in existence, there is no Necessary Existent

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[27] I.e., when the individuations are the concomitants of "necessary existence."
[28] In fact the simplicity of the First Principle turns out to be the consequence
rather than the premise of Ibn Sīnā's thinking. Since none of the internal relations
is viable within the divine identity, it follows that It is a simplex.
[29] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 205.

other than It."[30] Rāzī is thus obliged to take this statement to refer
to the option in question, in which the individuation is the con-
comitant of "necessary existence." But this leaves none of the four
options available to be referred to by Ibn Sīnā's closing words, as
already quoted: "What is left of the disjuncts is absurd." Ṭūsī rejoins:
"And there is no disjunct left here to which [Ibn Sīnā's] statement
'And what is left of the disjuncts is absurd' can refer! And there is
no doubt that what we have mentioned is more consistent (*ašaddu
intibāqan*) with the text of [Ibn Sīnā's] argument. God knows best
what is correct."[31]

We must agree with Ṭūsī. Rāzī's reading awakens us, however,
to an important feature of his outlook. He is inclined to admit rela-
tions *in divinis*. He has no problem speaking of X as the concomi-
tant, i.e., the property, of Y, in God. Rāzī, in other words, tends
to believe in a complex God. Undoubtedly, this tendency is explained
by Rāzī's grounding in Ašʿarism, which originally fought for a com-
plex God against the severe apophaticism (*taʿṭīl*) of the Muʿtazila.
Additionally, Rāzī's tendency may have been encouraged by his study
of the philosophy of Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. after 560/1164),
who also maintained a personalist stance in theology and who is
known to have influenced Rāzī in other areas of his thought.[32]

Be that as it may, Rāzī does not believe that the option in ques-
tion is the correct one. He instead upholds the one in which the
factors are related in reverse, with "necessary existence" as the con-
comitant of the individuation—the first permutation. Again, Rāzī is
influenced in this by his concerns as an Ašʿarī theologian. The *kalām*
motive is in fact quite explicit, for he openly says of the viewpoint
he defends "many of the theologians . . . say that the existence of
God (Exalted is He!) is additional to His quiddity, and is one of the

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[30] *Išārāt*, 464.

[31] *Išārāt*, 468.

[32] See S. Pines, "Études sur Awḥad al-Zamān Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī," *Revue
des Études Juives* 103–104 (1937), 59–60; reprinted in *Studies in Abū l-Barakāt al-
Baghdādī, Physics and Metaphysics*, The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, I (Jerusalem:
The Magnes Press, 1979), 28–9; id., "Abū l-Barakāt Hibat Allāh b. Malka al-
Baghdādī al-Baladī," *EI²*, 1:113. Nicholas Rescher rightly or wrongly maintains the
strong influence of Abū l-Barakāt on Rāzī in logic, and even upholds the idea that
Rāzī was a direct student of Abū l-Barakāt; see his *The Development of Arabic Logic*
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 67–68, 169–170, and 183–184.

attributes of His reality."[33] Indeed, al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) had earlier seen the divine identity in just these terms.[34]

But Ibn Sīnā has blocked the way to admitting the first permutation. Notably, there is his premise given in *faṣl* 17, that it is absurd for any quiddity to bear responsibility for its own existence. For if Rāzī is right, there is at least one case of a quiddity bearing such responsibility, namely, that of God, whose "necessary existence" is the concomitant of his quiddity. Most of Rāzī's arguments can be read as aimed at removing this premise, and making way for the concomitance of God's existence to His quiddity. The first stage in this comprises six arguments that existence is univocal, i.e., invariant in itself. Rāzī actually claims that this is in line with the philosophers' own views. But against Ibn Sīnā, who claims that God is wholly without quiddity, Rāzī holds that the univocity of existence means that there must be some factor in God other than mere existence, which serves to distinguish Him from contingents, namely, a divine quiddity. God cannot be mere univocal existence. However, this is not the only motive for Rāzī's arguments that existence is univocal. It additionally follows from the univocity of existence that if existence is invariant and is accidental to quiddity in contingents, then it must also be accidental to existence in God, "since the concomitant of the single reality occurs wherever it occurs."[35] As Ṭūsī neatly explains: ". . . since [Rāzī] saw the existence of contingents as a thing that is accidental to their quiddities, and he had ruled that the existence of the Necessary is equal to the existence of contingents, he ruled that the existence of the Necessary also is accidental to His quiddity, so His quiddity is different from His existence. Greatly exalted be God above that!"[36] In this way, having established that existence is univocal in his first six arguments, Rāzī immediately puts his conclusion to work in five arguments that existence must be accidental to quiddity. Next come Rāzī's arguments specifically aimed against the premise in *faṣl* 17, that it is absurd for a quiddity to bear responsibility for its own existence. Rāzī tries to show how this need not be so.

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[33] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 201.

[34] See Y. Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), 76.

[35] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 201.

[36] *Išārāt*, 458.

Finally, he identifies another hidden premise in Ibn Sīnā's elimi-
nation of the first option. This is that the factors involved, the indi-
viduation on the one hand, and its concomitant "necessity," on the
other hand, are positive or existential (*ṯubūtī*) in status. Rāzī proceeds
to give four arguments in *faṣl* 18[37] that "necessity" is a negative or
non-existential (*salbī*) attribute. He augments these with two arguments
that the individuation, also, is *salbī*. What are we to make of this
shocking apophaticism in handling "necessity" and "individuation"?
An obvious point is that it destroys the whole basis of this type of
Fārābīan argument for God's unity. The argument of course turns
on the claim that it is contradictory to hypothesize two radically sim-
ple beings. For according to the claim, they would have to be con-
ceptual composites combining a common factor and an uncommon
factor. But if Rāzī can show that the relevant factors are negative,
then they will not bring about compounding, and two radically sim-
ple beings could indeed be hypothesized, without contradiction. As
Rāzī puts it: ". . . from the fact that multiple things share in 'neces-
sity' it does not follow that there be [intrinsic] multiplicity. For things
variant in quiddity may share in negativity, without the occurrence
in them of composition. For each of two simplexes (*basīṭayn*) which
one may hypothesize will undoubtedly share in their negation of
everything else, although sharing in negativity implies multiplicity."[38]

Rāzī, to be sure, was no polytheist. He is not out to prove that
there might be two or more gods. He simply wants to bring out
that Ibn Sīnā's argument fails: you cannot prove God's oneness in
this way. Rāzī, as a *mutakallim*, instinctively preferred proofs of God's
unity rooted in God's acts and His creation, not God's intrinsic
nature. A look at a work like Rāzī's *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn* strongly bears
this out. There, he is again fiercely critical of Ibn Sīnā's type of
argument for God's unity,[39] but upholds those of the *kalām* type.[40]

Some examples of particular arguments from the chains of argu-
ments offered by Rāzī in his commentary are due. Among the six
arguments that existence is univocal are the following. Existence is
the contrary of non-existence. Rāzī now invokes the principle of the

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[37] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 205.
[38] Ibid., 206.
[39] See Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl ad-dīn* (Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿat Maǧlis Dāʾirat
al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṯmānīya, 1353/1934), 31ff.
[40] Ibid., 221–226.

excluded middle: "Our proposition that either a thing is or is not, is an exclusive disjunction."[41] Rāzī seems to tie the principle into his reasoning more tightly by his selection of terminology. Unusually, the word he uses for "existence" is *ṯubūt*, not *wuǧūd*, and the word he uses for non-existence is *intifāʾ* not *ʿadam*. These respectively suggest *iṯbāt* (affirmation) and *nafy* (negation). At any rate, Rāzī means us to understand that just as a *tertium quid* is ruled out in the principle of the excluded middle, a *tertium quid* must be ruled out between existence and non-existence. So existence is univocal. The tone of another argument might be dismissed as rhetorical but for its resemblance to modern "ordinary-language" philosophy.[42] In it, Rāzī draws attention to the difference between a poem in which a word recurs which is the same in form and meaning, and a poem in which a word recurs which is the same in form but has different meanings. The latter would merit the designation "rhyme" (*qāfiya*). On the other hand the former may loosely be called a "rhyme" but is really just repetition (*takrīr*). The word *ʿayn*, with all its meanings (spring, eye, spy, etc.), would qualify as a rhyme if repeated as a verse-ending. By contrast, says Rāzī, it is not conceivable for the word *wuǧūd* (existence) to be repeated to poetic effect. It only means one thing, and so is purely univocal.[43]

Among the five arguments that existence must be accidental to quiddity are the following. Doubting the modality of the world-cause (necessary or contingent), or whether it is a substance or accident, is not the same thing as doubting its very existence. Existence is thus different from questions of characterization (i.e., quiddity), and the two are distinct in God. While the philosophers hold that minds do not grasp "the reality of the Divinity's essence," nevertheless they hold that unqualified existence (*muṭlaq al-wuǧūd*), as a primary concept (*taṣawwur awwalī*), is innately known. This implies that God has both existence (the known) and a quiddity (the unknown). Again, with non-divine things, the same distinction is at work, but in reverse. The quiddity of a triangle is well-known to us, but whether the triangle has actual existence is unknown, to use Ibn Sīnā's own example.[44]

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[41] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 200.
[42] On ordinary-language philosophy, see e.g., J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (Penguin, 1968), 440–465.
[43] *Šarḥay al-Išārāt*, 200.
[44] Ibid., 202.

Another argument Rāzī gives is that the philosophers are quite happy
to reason inductively in many cases. For example, they argue that
since extensions (abʿād) require an underlying matter in observed
instances, extensions must require it always. Hence, they assert that
the celestial spheres need a material substrate of some sort, and they
deny something going from point A to point B without anything
intervening between the points—the doctrine of atomic leaps (abʿād
ḥālīya, "instantaneous distances"). The philosophers, in sum, hold
that the character of the induced species-nature (ṭabīʿa nawʿīya) does
not vary. Rāzī says, "When that is established, we say: 'Existence,
insofar as it is existence stripped of other accidents, is a single species-
nature, and it is impossible that what it requires varies. And since
it is like that, existence in our view is an accident in need of quid-
dity and requiring it'."[45]

We come to Rāzī's four arguments that, contrary to Ibn Sīnā's
claim in faṣl 17, it is not absurd for a quiddity to cause its own exis-
tence. Among these arguments is the following. It is wrong to insist
on a cause always being prior in existence to its effect. There is a
clear case of something causal which yet lacks existence, namely the
quiddity of contingents insofar as it receives existence. Rāzī says:
"Do you not see that the quiddities of contingents are prior to their
existences, so their quiddities are causes receptive to their existence,
in this case the priority of the receptive cause to the effect being
unnecessary?"[46] Rāzī then asks: if quiddity qua quiddity can be given
the status of receptive cause (al-ʿilla al-qābilīya), why should it not be
given the status of efficient or existentializing cause (al-ʿilla al-fāʿilīya)?

Ṭūsī's Defense

In his commentary, Ṭūsī slightingly says that "remarking on the
places where [Rāzī] slipped up is necessary, lest he distort the views
of beginners by [their] following in his tracks."[47] While Ṭūsī chooses
to answer Rāzī's arguments point by point in some cases, a single
adjustment is all that is needed to parry much of Rāzī's attack at

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., 203.
[47] Išārāt, 463.

one stroke. After all, the bulk of Rāzī's onslaught takes it that exist-
ence is univocal and that the philosophers themselves uphold this.
From this it followed for Rāzī that God must have a quiddity to
explain His transcendence of contingents, univocal existence not being
enough to mark Him off from them; and it also followed that God's
existence was accidental to His quiddity, since "the concomitant of
the single reality occurs wherever it occurs," i.e., it is the unvarying
nature of existence to be some sort of attribute of quiddity wher-
ever it is found. Rāzī was thereby forced to show that in one case,
that of the Necessary Being, it was not absurd for the quiddity to
bear full responsibility for its own existence, and not have it loaned
to it *ab extra*.

But according to Ṭūsī, Rāzī is quite wrong, in the first place, that
the philosophers hold existence to be univocal. Instead, what the
philosophers actually say is that existence is *not equivocal*. In other
words, it does not have a series of actually discrete meanings. But
while the philosophers thus hold existence to have some kind of
unified meaning (*ma'nan wāḥid*), they claim that it is *predicated unequally*.
There is a *tertium quid* between equivocity and univocity, namely,
ambiguity.[48] And this, according to Ṭūsī is the correct doctrine: the
ambiguity of existence (*taškīk al-wuǧūd*). As Ṭūsī says: "If [the ambi-
guity of existence] is proved, then the problems of this noble man
[i.e., Rāzī] are completely solved. This is because existence is pred-
icated of what is beneath it with a single meaning (*bi-ma'nan wāḥid*)
as the philosophers held, and the equivalence (*tasāwin*) of its subjects
(*malzūmāt*) does not follow from that (namely, the existence of the
Necessary and the existence of contingents) in reality. For [via ambi-
guity] things variant in reality might share in a single concomitant."[49]

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[48] Matching the commentators' terminology is awkward. Rāzī just uses the expres-
sions *ištirāk lafẓī* (verbal sharing), i.e., equivocity, and *ištirāk ma'nawī* (semantic shar-
ing), by which he clearly means univocity. Ṭūsī uses *ištirāk lafẓī* for equivocity and
tawāṭu' (agreement) for univocity. It seems that, for Ṭūsī, univocity and ambiguity
(*taškīk*) are both types of *ištirāk ma'nawī*, understood literally as "semantic sharing".
I tabulate the terms as follows:

Rāzī		Ṭūsī	
(a) equivocity	(b) univocity	(a) equivocity	(b) semantic commonness
(*ištirāk lafẓī*)	(*ištirāk ma'nawī*)	(*ištirāk lafẓī*)	(*ištirāk ma'nawī*)
			(i) univocity (*tawāṭu'*)
			(ii) ambiguity (*taškīk*)

[49] *Išārāt*, 460.

Ṭūsī is probably right. Rāzī seems to have misunderstood the position, traceable to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, that being must have a unified meaning on pain of the destruction of the subject matter of metaphysics, the science of being *qua* being. If being is equivocal and a sheer disunity, it cannot be studied systematically by a science, since "not to have one meaning, is to have no meaning."[50] But having a unified underlying meaning does not have to entail existence's flat equality, or univocity, as Rāzī believes.

If existence is ambiguous, then, how exactly does this destroy Rāzī's attack? Clearly, existence no longer would have an unvarying nature, as Rāzī claimed, requiring it to be an attribute of quiddity in every case. It therefore need not be an attribute of quiddity in God.[51] Anyway, Rāzī's whole motive in attributing God with a quiddity—namely, to explain how He is differentiated above contingents—collapses. Existence is instead intrinsically variegated, and what explains God's transcendence is not a quiddity separate from existence, but God's own special existence (*wuǧūduhū l-ḫāṣṣ*).[52] God can be pure existence (*wuǧūd maḥḍ*), as Ibn Sīnā famously held, yet still totally transcend contingents. Again, Rāzī's arguments that in the case of God a quiddity can bear responsibility for its own attribute of existence become quite superfluous. God no longer need be attributed with a quiddity at all, and the absurdity of a quiddity causing its own existence can be left as it stands.

Ṭūsī has a lengthy and fascinating exposition of the doctrine of the ambiguity of existence in his commentary on *faṣl* 17. To bring out what the ambiguity of existence means, he *inter alia* makes reference to the indeterminate spectrum of color and the inequality between the light (and heat) of the sun and that of lesser sources.[53] I do not propose to go over his exposition in detail here. The question naturally arises, however, of the validity of Ṭūsī's use of the ambiguity of existence to defend Ibn Sīnā's argument against Rāzī. Is it a doctrinal anachronism, foisted on the Šayḫ ar-Ra'īs in reaction to Rāzī's critique, or does it have some real basis in the Šayḫ's philosophy?

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[50] *Metaphysics*, 1006b8.
[51] *Išārāt*, 460.
[52] Ibid., 461.
[53] Ibid., 458–460.

In answering this, a difference must be noted between a more public doctrinal statement like the *Šifāʾ* and Ibn Sīnā's relatively private statements to be found, for example, in the teacher-disciple discussions contained in the *Mubāḥaṯāt*. Ibn Sīnā seems not to refer by name to *taškīk al-wuǧūd* in the *Metaphysics* of the *Šifāʾ*. But he does refer to it several times, and explicitly, in the *Mubāḥaṯāt*.[54] So Ṭūsī indisputably uses the doctrine on the Šayḫ's own authority. In fact we know that even before Ibn Sīnā, Fārābī used the doctrine.[55] Ṭūsī himself gives over several pages of his *Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ*—a refutation of Šahrastānī's critique of Ibn Sīnā known as the *Muṣāraʿa* (*The Wrestling Match*)—to disproving Šahrastānī's claim that the doctrine of *taškīk al-wuǧūd* was innovated by Ibn Sīnā, and had no earlier basis in "the logic of the sages" (*manṭiq al-ḥukamāʾ*). Ṭūsī quotes a series of proof-texts from Fārābī, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Aristotle, which attest to *taškīk al-wuǧūd*.[56]

But does Ṭūsī change the expression of the doctrine at all? For example, it is very noticeable in his exposition in the *Išārāt* commentary that Ṭūsī lists three kinds of variation (*iḫtilāf*) in existence. It varies in priority and posteriority, deservingness (*awlawīya*) and undeservingness, and strength and weakness (*aš-šidda wa-ḍ-ḍuʿf*).[57] It is this last kind of variation which jumps out of the list at the reader. Variation of existence in strength and weakness seems to amount to a heavily committed Neoplatonic doctrine of "degrees of reality," ill-fitting with basic Aristotelian logical principles like those of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. Additionally, it appears to fly in the face of Aristotle's unqualified assertion that substance (*ousia*), which is "primary being," does not admit of more and less.[58] It is indeed noteworthy that Ibn Sīnā, for his part, in the *Šifāʾ* states categorically that existence does not vary in strength and weakness (*lā*

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[54] *Mubāḥaṯāt*, 41, 218, 232.

[55] In a seminal study, H.A. Wolfson has cited Fārābī's use of existence as a basic example of an ambiguous term in his *Risāla fī Ǧawāb masāʾil suʾila ʿanhā*. Wolfson traces the doctrine beyond to Alexander of Aphrodisias, and finally finds it incipient in Aristotle's own thought. See his "The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides," in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, ed. I. Twersky and G.H. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 1:457.

[56] Ṭūsī, *Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ*, ed. Ḥ. al-Muʿizzī (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿašī, 1405/1984), 56–60.

[57] *Išārāt*, 459.

[58] *Categories*, 3b33.

yaḫtalifu fī š-šidda wa-ḍ-ḍuʿf), nor does it admit of "less" and "more
deficient."[59] But again, Ibn Sīnā seems more open in the *Mubāḥaṯāt*.
For in this more intimate context he again freely assents to the vari-
ation of existence in strength and weakness. Even here, however, he
is palpably defensive, and clearly feels that he must explain himself.
For instance he says: "Every existent whose existence is through
fewer intermediaries is more powerful in existence (*aqwá wuǧūdan*).
[For example] more powerful in existence is the substance, since it
exists for its part through fewer intermediaries [and] weaker in exis-
tence is the accident, since it is the reverse of this."[60]

It is clear in one passage in the *Mubāḥaṯāt* that Ibn Sīnā's teach-
ing that substance's existence was "stronger" than accident's, deeply
irritated more conventional colleagues. Michot has read this passage
as directed at Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī in particular—a hated com-
petitor at the Būyid court.[61] Ibn Sīnā explains that the variation in
existence which Kirmānī finds such an outrage is just a way of refer-
ring to its well-known variation in independence and need (*al-istiǧnāʾ
wa-l-ḥāǧa*). He protests that it is inexcusable (*lā ʿuḏra lahū*) that this
point escaped his rival.[62]

By the time we reach Ṭūsī's commentary, the variation of exist-
ence in independence and need has been eclipsed by its metaphys-
ically daring gloss, the variation of existence in strength and weakness,
since Ṭūsī's list leaves out the former and only speaks of the latter.
Ṭūsī speaks confidently in terms which Ibn Sīnā as yet uses only
fitfully and defensively, held back as he is by Aristotelian strictures.
An inconsistency follows in Ibn Sīnā's works, so that between the
Šifāʾ and the *Mubāḥaṯāt* he now admits, now denies strengthening
and weakening in existence.[63] The same inconsistency can be seen
in Ibn Sīnā's immediate disciples. In Bahmanyār ibn al-Marzubān's
Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl, in one place he categorically states that existence does

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[59] Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, ed. Ǧ. Anawātī and S. Zāʾid (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb
al-ʿArabī li-ṭ-Ṭibāʿa wa-n-Našr, 1380/1960), 276.
   [60] *Mubāḥaṯāt*, 306.
   [61] J. Michot, "La réponse d'Avicenne à Bahmanyâr et al-Kirmânî, Présentation,
traduction critique et lexique arabe-français de la *Mubâhatha III*," *Le Muséon* 110.1–2
(1997), 186.
   [62] *Mubāḥaṯāt*, 71.
   [63] Note that there is also an inconsistency within the *Mubāḥaṯāt* itself. Ibn Sīnā
affirms strengthening in existence elsewhere in the work, as we have seen; but he
also denies it on p. 286.

not vary in strength and weakness, citing the *Metaphysics* of the *Šifāʾ*.[64] However, earlier in the work he had already said "then know that existence is predicated of what falls beneath it ambiguously, not univocally. And the meaning of that is that the existence which has no cause is prior by nature to the existence which has a cause, and likewise the existence of substance is prior to the existence of accident. Moreover, some existence is stronger, and some of it is weaker (*baʿḍu l-wuǧūd aqwá wa-baʿḍuhū aḍʿaf*)."[65] In all this, it is as though we capture a crucial moment in intellectual history—the public emergence of a concept long in gestation.

Conclusion

Sense can be made of Rāzī's highly elaborate commentary on Ibn Sīnā's proof of divine unity in the *Išārāt* once it is seen as basically aimed at admitting the first of Ibn Sīnā's four options. According to this option, God's "necessary existence" is the concomitant of His quiddity. In proposing this option, Rāzī is driven by the understanding that existence is univocal. To begin with, the univocity of existence provides Rāzī with his motive for asserting that God has a quiddity. For, given the equality of existence, a divine quiddity is needed to explain why existence in the case of God wholly transcends existence in the case of contingents. Next, the univocity of existence also provides Rāzī with his explanation of how existence functions as an attribute of quiddity in God, just as in other beings. This is because, given that existence is univocal, it must behave as a single species-nature and its requirement may not vary. So if existence in contingents needs a quiddity as its subject, it must do so in God too. Lastly, Rāzī must refute Ibn Sīnā's premise in *faṣl* 17, namely, that it is never conceivable for a quiddity to bear responsibility for its own existence. If Rāzī is right, then while it is true that contingent quiddities always receive their existences from external agents, in the case of God we are confronted by a quiddity which is fully an agent for its own existence, so this must after all be a conceivable scenario.

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[64] Bahmanyār ibn al-Marzubān, *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. M. Muṭahharī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1375Š/1996), 529.
[65] Ibid., 281.

But Rāzī's thinking goes against core features of Ibn Sīnā's conception of God—that God is simple, and that He is pure existence untainted by quiddity. Indeed, as an Ašʿarī in theology, Rāzī is basically hostile to this philosophical view of God. In his response on behalf of Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī is quite right to single out the univocity of existence as the crucial premise in Rāzī's argumentation. According to Ṭūsī, while Rāzī is correct that existence is *not* equivocal, it does not follow that it is univocal. Between equivocity and univocity there is ambiguity, and once it is accepted that existence is ambiguous (*mušakkak*), Rāzī's case largely collapses. First, the ambiguity of existence destroys Rāzī's motive in claiming that God has a quiddity. No superadded divine quiddity is needed to explain why God's existence wholly transcends that of contingents—since ambiguous existence is instead *intrinsically* variegated. Second, an ambiguous reality cannot function as a species-nature. To be sure, it forms some sort of unity (unlike the referent of an equivocal term), but it does not have unvarying requirements. Thus, though existence requires a quiddity as its subject in contingents, it need not do so in God. And in that case, the premise in *faṣl* 17 can remain intact: it is absolutely inconceivable for a quiddity to be the agent for its own existence, in God as in contingents.

Finally, it is demonstrable that Ṭūsī does not use the doctrine of the ambiguity of existence arbitrarily here, in defence of Ibn Sīnā's proof. The doctrine is strongly attested in Ibn Sīnā's own metaphysics, and for that matter, in Fārābī's also. Intriguingly, however, Ṭūsī understands the ambiguity of existence *inter alia* in terms of an actual gradation of existence in strength and weakness. On occasion, Ibn Sīnā directly condemns this very notion, in accordance with vital features of Aristotle's thought, such as the denial that "substance" can increase and diminish, and the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. However, it is clear that in certain texts, notably the *Mubāḥaṯāt*, Ibn Sīnā himself does already assent to the gradation of existence in strength and weakness. I take this to mark a crucial development in Islamic philosophy.

THE TWELVER-ŠĪʿĪ RECEPTION OF AVICENNA IN THE MONGOL PERIOD

Ahmed H. al-Rahim

Post-Avicennan Arabic philosophy, with few exceptions, has received little scholarly attention, and remains to this day largely virgin territory.[1] This neglect is particularly true of its development during the Mongol-Tīmūrid period. Specifically, the period between Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631) and the formation of School of Isfahan has received little attention by scholars.[2] A major reason for this neglect is that many works of this period, the majority of which are still unedited, were written in the style of paraphrases, abridgements (muḫtaṣar), commentaries (šarḥ), super-commentaries, glosses (sg. ḥāšiya), and super-glosses. As such, they are considered unoriginal compositions, unworthy of modern scholars' attention.[3] Such stylistic assumptions are misleading given the extent of the period, its geographical scope, and the large number of works dating from this period that have yet to be studied. In considering the vast number of philosophical works extant from the Mongol-Tīmūrid period, some scholars have even concluded that this time was indeed the golden age for Arabic philosophy.[4]

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[1] See D. Gutas, "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works," in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic, and Medieval Latin Traditions*, Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, XXIII, ed. C. Burnett (London: The Warburg Institute, 1993), 59.

[2] For a periodization of Twelver-Šīʿī philosophy, see H. Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, tr. L. Sherrard (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 31–6; and J. Cooper, "From al-Ṭūsī to the School of Iṣfahān," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (London: Routledge, 1996), 1:585–96.

[3] For an example of this attitude, see W.M. Watt, "The Later Islamic Middle Ages 1250–1850: The Stagnation of Philosophical Theology," in his *Islamic Philosophy and Theology, An Extended Survey*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), 133–42.

[4] D. Gutas, "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 900–ca. 1350," in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet, forthcoming 2002 [I thank Dimitri Gutas for an advance copy]; and J.R. Michot who

With Hülegü's patronage of Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, following the Mongol capture of Alamūt in 654/1256 and the sack of Baghdad in 656/1258,[5] the Twelver-Šīʿī reception of Avicennan philosophy began under the aegis of the Il-Ḫāns. With respect to the Mongol's patronage of the sciences, Bertold Spuler notes, "[h]owever slight an interest the Īl-Ḫāns may have taken in learning for its own sake, they were far-sighted enough to make use of the Perso-Arab science for their own ends and encourage it so far as they could, or at least not to place obstacles in its way."[6] The Marāġa observatory, located near Tabrīz, was the center of philosophical and scientific activity during this period. Hülegü built it in 657/1259 according to the specifications of Ṭūsī, who became its director.[7] There, he prepared his renowned astronomical table, the *Zīǧ-i Il-Ḫānī*, which he completed near the age of seventy under Hülegü's successor, the Il-Ḫān Abāqā (r. 663–680/1265–1282) to whom it is also dedicated. The Marāġa observatory apparently had an extensive library which served as a locus for scholars from all over Western and Eastern Asia.[8]

With respect to the intellectual background of Ṭūsī, attention should be drawn to an *isnād* of philosophers allegedly connecting him directly to Avicenna. The *isnād* enjoyed a wide circulation and is reported in a number of works.[9] The *isnād* purports the following

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describes the sixth/twelfth century as "le triomphe de l'avicennisme," in "La pandémie avicenniene au VIᵉ/XIᵉ siécle, présentation, *editio princeps* et traduction de l'introduction du *Livre de l'advenue du monde* (*Kitāb ḥudūth al-ʿālam*) d'Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī," *Arabica* 40 (1993), 287–344.

  [5] For a history of the period, see B. Spuler, *The Muslim World, A Historical Survey, Part II: The Mongol Period*, tr. F.R.C. Bagley (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969); J.A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-Khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, The Saljuq and Mongol Period*, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 303–421; and for an account of the capture of Baghdad attributed to Ṭūsī, see ibid., "The Death of the Last ʿAbbāsid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account," in *Journal of Semitic Studies* 6 (1961), 145–161.

  [6] Spuler, *The Mongol Period*, 25.

  [7] See Ḫalīl ibn Aybak aṣ-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1962), 1:182; Muḥammad ibn Šākir al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-wafayāt*, ed. I. ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār aṭ-Ṭaqāfa, 1973–1974), 3:250; and F.J. Ragep, *Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Memoir on Astronomy (al-Tadhkira fī ʿilm al-hayʾa)*, Sources in the History of Mathematics and Physical Sciences, 12 (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993), 1:13–14.

  [8] On the modern excavation of the Marāġa complex, see P. Vardjavand, *La découverte archéologique du complexe scientifique de l'observatoire de Marāġé* (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1366/1946); Ragep, *Naṣīr al-Dīn*, 1:14, n. 5.

  [9] See the Persian translation of Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* entitled *Durrat al-aḫbār va-Lumʿat al-anvār*, ed. M. Šafīʿ, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Šarikat-i

chain of transmission: (1) Ṭūsī was a student of (2) Farīd ad-Dīn
Dāmād (or Dāmāt) an-Nišābūrī, who was a student of (3) Ṣadr ad-
Dīn as-Saraḥsī, who was a student of (4) Afḍal ad-Dīn al-Ġīlānī,
who was a student of (5) Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī, who in turn was
a student of (6) Bahmanyār, an acknowledged student of Avicenna.

Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad al-Lawkarī[10] is the author
of a *fihrist* (table of contents) of the *Taʿlīqāt*, a collection of notes
from explanations given by Avicenna on fundamental concepts in
logic, physics, and metaphysics recorded by Bahmanyār (d. 458/1066).[11]
He prepared the *fihrist* in 503/1109.[12] Ibn Funduq al-Bayhaqī (d.
565/1169) says in a well-known statement that al-Lawkarī was a stu-
dent of Bahmanyār and that it was under him that philosophy (*ʿulūm
al-ḥikma*) spread in Ḫurāsān.[13] However, little documentation exists
to detail its transmission. Al-Lawkarī's major work is *Bayān al-ḥaqq
bi-ḍamān aṣ-ṣidq*.[14] It is divided into three sections: logic, physics, and
metaphysics, and represents one of the earliest discussions of Avicenna's
philosophy, after Bahmanyār's *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*. The introduction to
the *Bayān* describes the work as a "middle book that combines com-
mentary and concise exposition" (*kitābun mutawassiṭun aǧmaʿa š-šarḥa*

Sihāmī, 1318Š/1939), 108; the summary translation of M. Meyerhof, "'Alī al-
Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma*," *Osiris* 8 (1948), 206–207; Muḥammad Bāqir
al-Ḫwānsārī, *Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt fī aḥwāl al-ʿulamā' wa-s-sādāt* (Beirut: ad-Dār al-Islāmīya,
1411/1991), 6:292; and an *iǧāza* by al-ʿAllāma Ǧalāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Asʿad
ad-Dawānī (d. 908/1502) in which Bahmanyār's name is omitted, see Āǧā Buzurg
aṭ-Ṭihrānī, *Ṭabaqāt aʿlām aš-Šīʿa* (Qum: Muʾassasat-i Ismāʿīlīyān, n.d.), 3:169; also
M. al-Amīn, *Aʿyān aš-Šīʿa* (Beirut: Dār at-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1406/1986), 9:415.

[10] On his *nisba*, see S. Pines, *Studies in Islamic Atomism*, tr. M. Schwarz (Jerusalem:
The Magnes Press, 1997), 47, n. 16.

[11] *At-Taʿlīqāt*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣrīya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb,
1973); on Bahmanyār, see H. Daiber, "Bahmanyār, Kīā Raʾīs Abu'l-Ḥasan b.
Marzbān Aʿǧamī Ādarbāyǧānī," EIr, 2:501–3.

[12] See Badawī's introduction to the *Taʿlīqāt*, 9.

[13] See al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, published as *Taʾrīḫ ḥukamāʾ al-Islām*
by M. Kurd ʿAlī (Damascus: al-Maǧmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1365/1946), 126; Meyerhof,
"'Alī al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat*," 176; D. Gutas, "The *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* Cycle of Texts,"
JAOS 102.4 (1982), 646.

[14] Thus far, only the *Eisagoge* of the logic and the metaphysics have been edited,
both under the general title *Bayān al-ḥaqq wa-ḍamān aṣ-ṣidq: al-Manṭiq, al-Madḫal*, ed.
I. Dībāǧī, (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1364Š/1986) and *al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī*, Maǧmūʿah-
yi Andišāh-yi Islāmī, 2, ed. I. Dībāǧī (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭālaʿāt-i Islāmī,
Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1414/1995); on al-Lawkarī's poetry, see I. Dībāǧī, "Šarḥ qaṣī-
dat *Asrār al-ḥikma*," in *Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language*, Wisdom of
Persia Series, VIII, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran: Tehran University
Press, 1974), 107–135.

wa-t-talḫīṣa), based on the works of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/951) and Avicenna. Its style and arrangement resemble that of Bahmanyār's *at-Taḥṣīl* which, as Bahmanyār states in the introduction, follows that of Avicenna's *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī*.[15] Aside from the *Bayān* and the *fihrist* of the *Taʿlīqāt*, little else is known about al-Lawkarī's life and works except that he taught at Marw and probably died there sometime in the first quarter of the sixth/twelfth century.[16]

As for Afḍal ad-Dīn al-Ġīlānī, he is ʿUmar ibn ʿAlī ibn Ġīlānī al-Balḫī, the author of *Kitāb Ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam*, an Ašʿarī work criticizing Avicenna's cosmogony.[17] He was among the first generation of students in the Niẓāmīya college at Marw and Nišābūr and he later had a number of disputations with Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī recorded one such disputation in the *Munāẓarāt* in which he criticizes al-Ġīlānī for his weak defense of the temporal creation of the world.[18] Because of the uncertainty of al-Lawkarī's death date, it cannot be established with any certainty that al-Ġīlānī studied with al-Lawkarī. The purpose of attempting to link al-Ġīlānī, an Ašʿarī theologian in the Niẓāmīya tradition, to al-Lawkarī, a peripatetic philosopher in the Avicennan tradition, may have been an effort on the part of the biographical tradition to connect the study of philosophy in the Niẓāmīya tradition to an authoritative source in the personage of al-Lawkarī.

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[15] Bahmanyār, *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. M. Muṭahharī, Second printing (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1375Š/1996), 1; see also J. Janssens' contribution to the present volume. For a discussion of the style and arrangement of the *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī*, see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, IV (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 114.

[16] C. Brockelmann gives al-Lawkarī's date of death as 517/1123, without citing his source, in *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1943; repr. 1996), I, 460. On al-Lawkarī's date of death, see D. Gutas, "Notes and Texts from Cairo Manuscripts, II: Texts from Avicenna's Library in a Copy by ʿAbd-ar-Razzāq aṣ-Ṣiġnāḫī," *Manuscripts of the Middle East* 2 (1987), 9, and 15, n. 16; Dībāġī also addresses the problem in the introduction to his edition of *al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī* of the *Bayān*, 14–16.

[17] Bayhaqī, *Taʾrīḫ*, 157; Meyerhof, "ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimmat*," 193. On al-Ġīlānī and Avicennism in the sixth/twelfth century, see J.R. Michot, "La pandémie," 287–323; and Michot's introduction to al-Ġīlānī's *Ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam*, ed. M. Mohaghegh (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭālaʿāt-i Islāmī, Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1377Š/1998), i–xv.

[18] Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, *al-Munāẓarāt*, ed. F. Kholeif in *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his controversies in Transoxiana* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1966), 59–63; Ibn al-Qifṭī states that ar-Rāzī authored a refutation of al-Ġīlānī, the *Kitāb Ǧawāb Ibn Ġīlān*; see *Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ*, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig: Th. Weicher, 1903), 293; and Michot, "La pandémie," 289.

Ṣadr ad-Dīn as-Saraḫsī is an otherwise unknown figure, except perhaps as a student of al-Ǧīlānī.[19] As for Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād, Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323), the librarian and copyist at the Marāġa observatory, names him as Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥaydar al-Faryūmaḏī (also known as al-Ḥakīm al-Uṣūlī), without mentioning the *nisba* an-Nišābūrī.[20] It is very likely that he was Ṭūsī's teacher because the latter quotes Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād in the epistle *Rabṭ al-ḥadīṯ bi-l-qadīm*, and refers to him as "my teacher (*ustāḏī*), Farīd ad-Dīn Muḥammad an-Nisābūrī."[21] Ṭūsī likely studied under him at the Niẓāmīya in Nišābūr between 610/1213 and 618/1221,[22] during which time he also studied under Quṭb ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad as-Sulamī al-Miṣrī (killed in 618/1221[23]).[24] Both Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād and Quṭb ad-Dīn al-Miṣrī studied under Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād's most important students were Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī and the Šāfiʿī Šams

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[19] Alternatively, his *laqab* is given as Ḍiyāʾ ad-Dīn and his *nisba* as an-Nišābūrī; see Dībāǧī's introduction to al-Lawkarī's *al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī*, 76–77.

[20] *Muʿǧam al-ādāb fī maǧmaʿ al-alqāb*, ed. M. al-Kāẓim (Tehran: Wizārat aṭ-Ṭaqāfa wa-l-Iršād al-Islāmī, 1416/1995), 3:241; this is an important source for the social and intellectual history of the Il-Ḫānid period. See also F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Fuwaṭī," *EI*², 3:769–70; and M. Iqbāl, "Ibn al-Fuwaṭī," *Islamic Culture* 11 (1937), 516–22. Aṭ-Ṭihrānī, *Ṭabaqāt aʿlām aš-Šīʿa*, 3:179, suggests that Farīd ad-Dīn an-Nišābūrī was the renowned Persian poet Farīd ad-Dīn al-ʿAṭṭār. This is incorrect since al-ʿAṭṭār appears to have died before Ṭūsī arrived in Nišābūr. Cf. H. Ritter, "ʿAṭṭār, Farīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm" *EI*², 1:752–5.

[21] *Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal bi-inḍimām rasāʾil wa-fawāʾid kalāmīya*, ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭalaʿāt-i Islāmī, Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1359Š/1980), 483. Despite the discrepancy between these two names, reports agree that they are indeed the same person.

[22] Al-Ḫwānsārī, *Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt*, 6:292, reports that he read Avicenna's *al-Išārāt* under Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād.

[23] Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ*, ed. A Müller (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Wahbīya, 1299/1882), 30.

[24] On Ṭūsī's life and works, see aṣ-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī*, 1:179–83; al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-wafayāt*, 246–52; al-Ḫwānsārī, *Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt*, 6:278–97; ʿAbd Allāh Afandī al-Iṣbahānī, *Riyāḍ al-ʿulamāʾ wa-ḥiyāḍ al-fuḍalāʾ*, ed. A. al-Ḥusaynī (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿašī, 1403/1982), 5:159–63; al-Amīn, *Aʿyān aš-Šīʿa*, 9:414–20; M. Raḍawī, *Aḥvāl va-āṯār-i Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan aṭ-Ṭūsī* (Tehran: n.p., 1335Š/1956); S.H. Naṣr, "al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammd ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan," in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, 13:508–14; H. Daiber and F.J. Ragep, "al-Ṭūsī, Abū Ḏjaʿfar Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan" *EI*², 10:746–52; and E. Alexandrin, "Éléments de bibliographie sur Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī," in *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant du XIIIᵉ siècle*, Actes du colloque tenu à l'Universiteé de Téhéran, 6–9 mars 1997, ed. N. Pourjavady and Ž. Vesel (Tehran: Presses Universitaires d'Iran, 2000), 207–13.

ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn ʿĪsá Ḫusrawšāhī at-Tabrīzī (d. 652/1263),
the author of an abridgement (*muḫtaṣar*) of Avicenna's *aš-Šifāʾ*.[25]

In his autobiography, *Sayr wa-sulūk*, Ṭūsī fails to mention Farīd
ad-Dīn Dāmād and Quṭb ad-Dīn al-Miṣrī among his teachers.[26]
Written for the chief Ismāʿīlī *dāʿin*, his autobiography is a stylized
rendition of his conversion from exoteric *kalām* to esoteric Ismāʿīlī
philosophy and *daʿwa*. This conversion may explain why he chose to
mention only his Ismāʿīlī teachers, including Kamāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad
Ḥāsib,[27] and neglected to recognize his non-Ismāʿīlī teachers from
the Niẓāmīya in Nišābūr.

The significance of the *isnād*, at least from al-Ġīlānī until Farīd
ad-Dīn Dāmād—all of whom, it appears, studied and taught in
Niẓāmīya colleges of Ḫurāsān—is in establishing that the curricu-
lum in these colleges was not restricted to the study of law and *ḥadīṯ*,
but also included philosophy, particularly the works of Avicenna.
The *isnād*, at least in connecting Ṭūsī to Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād, also
indicates that the Twelver-Šīʿī reception of Avicenna's philosophy,
in part, was based on the Niẓāmīya tradition of Ḫurāsān. Moreover,
the *isnād* reveals that the two centuries after Avicenna's death
(428/1037) were important in establishing his over-arching influence
on the history of philosophy, particularly in the East, and most impor-
tantly for the reception and transmission of his works.[28]

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[25] Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī*, 18:73–5.

[26] *Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar*, ed./tr. S.J.
Badakhchani (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); and F. Daftary, "Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and
the Ismaʿilis of the Alamūt Period," in *Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant*, 59–67.

[27] Kamāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāsib was a student of Bābā Afḍal ad-Dīn
Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Maraqī Kāšānī (d. 610/1213–14), as Ṭūsī states in the *Sayr
wa-sulūk*; see *Contemplation and Action*, Persian text, 3. On Bābā Afḍal's Ismāʿīlī
affiliation, see J. Rypka, "Bāba Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Kāšānī (or
Kāshī)," *EI²*, 1:838–9; and W. Chittick, "Bābā Afżal al-Dīn," EIr, 3:285–91. For
a discussion of his thought, see S.H. Nasr, "Afḍal al-Din Kashani and the Philosophical
World of Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy, Studies in
Honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. M.E. Marmura (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1984),
249–64. Kamāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāsib is often confused with Kamāl ad-Dīn
Ibn Yūnus, perhaps because they were both mathematicians (hence the former is
called Ḥāsib) and/or because they both have the same *laqab* Kamāl ad-Dīn. As
such it is sometimes believed that Ibn Yūnus was a student of Bābā Afḍal; see, for
example, Daiber, "al-Ṭūsī," *EI²*, 10:746.

[28] For a general picture of the transmission of knowledge in Ḫurāsān, see
R. Mottahedeh, "The Transmission of Leaning, The Role of the Islamic Northeast,"
in *Madrasa, La transmission du savior dans le monde musulman*, ed. N. Grandin and
M. Gaborieau (Paris: Arguments, 1997), 63–72 [I thank Beatrice Gruendler for
bringing this article to my attention].

With the Mongol advance to Ḥurāsān and most likely before the sack of Nišābūr in 618/1221,[29] Ṭūsī departed for Iraq. There, he studied in Mosul with the recognized astronomer and mathematician Kamāl ad-Dīn Mūsá ibn Yūnus aš-Šāfiʿī (d. 639/1242), who was once himself a student in the Niẓāmīya in Baghdad.[30] After completing his studies around the year 630/1233, Ṭūsī wrote his main contribution to logic, the *Asās al-iqtibās*.[31] While retaining the Arabic technical terms, this work is lucidly written in Persian, and thus rapidly became a model for later Persian logical works. It is divided according to the traditional eight books of the Aristotelian *Organon* and closely follows the logical parts of Avicenna's *aš-Šifāʾ*.

The major philosophical work on which much of Ṭūsī's reputation rests is the *Ḥall muškilāt al-Išārāt*, a commentary on Avicenna's *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*. Written as his last work during his Ismāʿīlī phase, around 643/1246 in Alamūt, it was a response to Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's critical commentary, the *Šarḥ al-Išārāt*.[32] It embodies his subtle understanding of Ašʿarī *kalām*, which he likely learned as a student of Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād and Quṭb ad-Dīn al-Miṣrī at the Niẓāmīya in Nišābūr. Ṭūsī's other defense of Avicenna was contained in his *Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ*,[33] a refutation of the crypto-Ismāʿīlī Tāǧ ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm aš-Šahrastānī's *Muṣāraʿat al-falāsifa*.[34]

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[29] See E. Honigman and C.E. Bosworth, "Nishāpūr," *EI²*, 8:62–4.

[30] As-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī*, 1:181; al-Kutubī, *Fawāt*, 3:24; Ibn Abī ʿUṣaybiʿa, *ʿUyūn*, 1:306–8; C. Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 859; see also F.J. Ragep's discussion in *Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Memoir*, 6–9. Another student of Ibn Yūnus is Aṯīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1264), the author of *al-Hidāya fī l-ḥikma* and *al-Īsāġūǧī*; see C. Brockelmann, "Abharī, Aṯīr al-Dīn Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar," *EI²*, 1:98–9, and G.C. Anawati, "Abharī Samarqandī, Aṯīr-al-Dīn al-Mofazzal b. ʿOmar b. al-Mofazzal," EIr, 1:216–17.

[31] Ed. M. Raḍawī, (Tehran: Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1367Š/1948); P. Morewedge, "The Analysis of 'Substance' in Ṭūsī's *Logic* and the Ibn Sīnian Tradition," in *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, ed. G.H. Hourani (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1975), 158–9.

[32] This work has been considered a commentary only on the physics and metaphysics of Avicenna's *al-Išārāt*; see G.C. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," *EI²*, 2:751–55. But it appears that ar-Rāzī's commentary originally also included a section on the logic of the *Išārāt*. [I thank Tony Street for drawing my attention to this.] Princeton University Library contains an early manuscript of Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* (MS New Series 2022, copied in 679/1280–1) that includes the logic section; see R. Mach and E.L. Ormsby, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 85–86, no. 371.

[33] Ed. Ḥ. al-Muʿizzī, Min Maḫṭūṭāt Āyat Allāh al-Marʿašī al-ʿĀmma, 11 (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿašī, 1405/1984).

[34] It is interesting to note that Ṭūsī's father was a second generation student of aš-Šahrastānī; see *Contemplation and Action*, Persian text, 3. Aš-Šahrastānī's work has

Ašʿarī criticism of Avicenna focused on advancing objections raised by al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. The three major objections refuted the theory of a pre-eternal world, the theory that God knows only the universal characteristics of particulars, as well as the Avicennan doctrine of the human soul that denies bodily resurrection.[35] It appears that Ṭūsī struggled with Ašʿarī criticism until his final days in Baghdad, where he wrote his last work, the *Talḫīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*.[36] This work is a critical discussion of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn*.

These two commentaries, *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* and *Ḥall muškilāt al-Išārāt*, spurred a series of adjudications (*muḥākamāt*) that evaluated the arguments of Rāzī and Ṭūsī. The earliest adjudication appears to be authored by Badr ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Asʿad at-Tustarī aš-Šāfiʿī (d. 732/1331).[37] Other adjudications are by Ǧamāl ad-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), also known as al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, and his student Quṭb ad-Dīn Muḥammad (or Maḥmūd) ibn Muḥammad al-Buwayhī ar-Rāzī (d. 766/1365), also known as Quṭb at-Taḥtānī.[38]

Ṭūsī's lasting influence on Twelver-Šīʿism came as result of two principal works. The first, an abridgement of the eight books of the Organon, is the *Taǧrīd al-manṭiq*, for which al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī wrote

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recently been edited and translated as *Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed./tr. W. Madelung and T. Mayer (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001); see also W. Madelung, "Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī's Ethics between Philosophy, Shīʿism, and Sufism," in *Ethics in Islam*, Ninth Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, ed. R.G. Hovannisian (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1985), 85–101. ʿUmar ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī (d. 540/1145), the author of *Kitāb al-Baṣāʾir an-naṣīrīya fī l-manṭiq*, also wrote a response to aš-Šahrastānī, the *Ǧawāb ʿalá š-Šahrastānī*, see GAL, S I, 830–1.

[35] See al-Ġazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, tr. M.E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), xix–xxvi; and M. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Kalām," ZDMG 7 (1991–92), 172–206.

[36] Ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī, op. cit.

[37] See Ḥāǧǧī Ḫalīfa, *Kašf aẓ-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1413/1992), 6:148; Āġā Buzurg aṭ-Ṭihrānī, *aḏ-Ḏarīʿa ilá taṣānīf aš-Šīʿa* (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 1403/1983), 20:133.

[38] Aṭ-Ṭihrānī, ibid. Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's *Muḥākama* does not appear to be extant; see S. Schmidtke, *The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1991), 58. Quṭb at-Taḥtānī's *Muḥākamāt bayna šarḥay al-Išārāt* is extant and has been published along with Ṭūsī's *Ḥall muškilāt* in *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt* (Qum: Našr al-Balāġa, 1375Š/1996). On Quṭb at-Taḥtānī, see aṭ-Ṭihrānī, *Ṭabaqāt aʿlām aš-Šīʿa*, 3:200–2; and ʿA.A. Niʿma, *Falāsifat aš-Šīʿa, ḥayātuhum wa-ārāʾuhum* (Qum: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1987), 528–30.

the first commentary, the *Ǧawhar an-naḍīd fī šarḥ Kitāb at-Taǧrīd*.[39]
The second work, the *Taǧrīd al-kalām*, was an abridgement of *kalām*
and Twelver-Šīʿī dogmatics (*iʿtiqād*) for which al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī also
wrote the commentary *Kašf al-murād fī šarḥ Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād*.[40] Through
al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī's commentaries, both works became a part of the
Twelver-Šīʿī college curriculum until the 1950s.[41]

Ṭūsī's *Taǧrīd al-kalām* can be divided into two sections. The first
section, an analytical discussion of metaphysics and *kalām*, explores
concepts of existence and non-existence (*wuǧūd wa-l-ʿadam*), quiddity
(*māhīya*), causality (*ʿilla wa-l-maʿlūl*), substance and accidents (*ǧawāhir
wa-l-aʿrāḍ*), bodies and forms (*aǧsām wa-ṣ-ṣuwar*), and predicables. This
section introduces the essential philosophical issues of Avicenna's
metaphysics into the tradition of Twelver-Šīʿī *kalām*. Ḥillī's com-
mentary is not only useful in clarifying Ṭūsī's discussions, but is also
itself a resource for the history of *kalām*.[42]

The *Taǧrīd al-kalām*'s second section is a discussion of dogmatics,
specifically, God, prophecy, *imāma*, and the return (*maʿād*). There are
fewer philosophical arguments in this section. Rather, the arguments
are primarily premised on doctrinal grounds, stemming from the
Quran and *ḥadīṯ*. For example, contrary to Avicenna's philosophical
arguments against bodily resurrection, Ṭūsī accepts bodily resurrec-
tion primarily on doctrinal grounds. This fact notwithstanding, the
importance of the work is that it is among the earliest, if not the
first, to introduce Avicennan philosophical concepts into Twelver-
Šīʿī dogmatics.[43]

In sum, Ṭūsī played a pivotal role in the revival of Avicennan
philosophy. He wrote a series of works effectively defending Avicenna
against Ašʿarī criticism, particularly against that of aš-Šahrastānī and
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. He also had a number of lively exchanges to

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[39] Ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992).
[40] Ed. Ḥ. al-Āmulī (Qum: Muʾassasat an-Našr al-Islāmī, 1417/1996); on the
work's date of composition, see Schmidtke, *The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī*, 61. On
the extensive commentary tradition of Ṭūsī's *Taǧrīd al-iʿtiqād*, see aṭ-Ṭihrānī, *aḏ-
Ḏarīʿa*, 3:352–5.
[41] Ḥillī's commentary *Ǧawhar an-naḍīd* was replaced with a more recent intro-
duction by Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar (b. 1904) entitled *al-Manṭiq* (Qum: Intišārāt-i
Fīrūz Ābādī, 1375/1955).
[42] The *Kašf al-Murād*, together with Ḥillī's *Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām* (ed.
F. al-ʿIrfān [Qum: Muʾassasat al-Imām aṣ-Ṣādiq, 1419/1998]), embody an exten-
sive source of information on the history of *kalām*.
[43] Al-Ḫwansārī, *Rawḍāt al-ǧannāt*, 6:281, says that Ṭūsī was the first among the
Twelver-Šīʿīs to write about dogmatics (*ʿaqāʾid*) in a philosophical way.

questions and criticisms about philosophy generally and Avicenna in particular.[44] His lasting contribution, however, was in securing the introduction of Avicenna's works into Twelver-Šīʿism.

Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (648–726/1250–1325) lived during the height of the Il-Ḫān rule in Iraq and Iran.[45] His native town, al-Ḥilla, is situated between Kufa and Baghdad near the ruins of ancient Bābil.[46] The town was surrendered to the Mongols shortly after the sack of Baghdad in 656/1258. Al-Ḥilla remained unscathed from the conquest despite its proximity to Baghdad. This was due in part to Ṭūsī's position as minister of Hülegü as well as his relationship with the patricians of al-Ḥilla, including al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's father. Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī began his studies of law and kalām in al-Ḥilla. Thereafter, he left, probably to Marāġa, where he studied under Ṭūsī and Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 657/1276). Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī is the author of ar-Risāla aš-Šamsīya, a work on logic, and Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, a work on physics and metaphysics. Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī wrote a commentary on both works, the Qawāʿid al-ǧalīya[47] and Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid,[48] respectively. Under Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī, Ḥillī studied logic, physics, and metaphysics. Al-Kātibī introduced Ḥillī to three important figures.[49] The first, Aṯīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1264), authored al-Hidāya fī l-ḥikma and an established introduction to logic, the Isāġūǧī. He also introduced Ḥillī to the works of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī[50] and Muḥammad al-Ḫunǧī (d. 646/1248).

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[44] See Annäherungen, Der mystisch-philosophische Briefwechsel zwischen Ṣadr ud-Dīn-i Qonawī und Naṣīr ud-Dīn-i Ṭūsī, Bibliotheca Islamica, 43, ed. G. Schubert (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1995); W. Chittick, "Mysticism versus Philosophy in Earlier Islamic History: The al-Tūsī-al-Qūnawī Correspondences," Religious Studies 17 (1981), 87–104; W. Madelung, "To See All Things through the Sight of God: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Attitude to Sufism," in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, philosophe et savant, 1–11. Ṭūsī's more technical correspondences are Aǧwibat masāʾil as-Sayyid Rukn ad-Dīn al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī, in Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language, op. cit., 216–76; and Muṭāraḥāt manṭiqīya bayna Naǧm ad-Dīn Dabīrān al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī wa-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, ed. ʿA.A. Nūrānī, ibid., 277–86.

[45] On al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's life and works, see S. Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, 9–74; and ead., "al-Ḥillī, ʿAllāma, Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. Muṭahhar," EIr, fothcoming [I thank the author for advancing me a copy]; ʿA. aṭ-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Maktabat al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (Qum: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt li-Iḥyāʾ at-Turāṯ, 1416/1995); aṭ-Ṭihrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām aš-Šīʿa, 3:52–4; and Niʿma, Falāsifat aš-Šīʿa, 272.

[46] See J. Lassner, "al-Ḥilla," EI², 3:389–90.

[47] Ed. F.Ḥ. Tabrīzīyān (Qum: Muʾassasat an-Našr al-Islāmī, 1417/1996).

[48] Ed. ʿA. Munzavī (Tehran: n.p., 1378/1959).

[49] Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, 18–9.

[50] Al-Kātibī also authored a commentary on ar-Rāzī's Muḥaṣṣal, the Mufaṣṣal fī šarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal, for which there is a copy of an autograph dated 717/1317; accord-

In all likelihood, Ḥillī left Marāġa after Ṭūsī's death in 672/1274. He taught mainly in al-Ḥilla and, for a time, the Il-Ḫān Ulǧaytū (r. 703–716/1304–1316) appointed him as a teacher in the *Madrasa Sayyāra* (mobile school), a distinguished position among scholars. This college served as a literary entourage that followed the Il-Ḫān on his travels. There, Ḥillī taught his most notable student, Quṭb at-Taḥtānī, who later authored *Risālat at-taṣawwurāt wa-t-taṣdīqāt*, the first in a series of works that dealt with Avicenna's epistemological notion that knowledge (ʿilm) is either through forming concepts or granting assent.[51]

Ḥillī continued Ṭūsī's defense of Avicenna in *Išārāt ilá maʿānī al-Išārāt*, *Īḍāḥ al-muʿḍilāt min šarḥ al-Išārāt*, and *Basṭ al-Išārāt*.[52] The *Kitāb Kašf al-ḫafāʾ min Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ* is his principle commentary on Avicenna's *aš-Šifāʾ*. It appears that he only completed the first two books of the logic, the *Eisagoge* and *Categories*, from this work.[53] Aside from his commentaries he wrote a number of philosophical expositions. His *magnum opus* is *Asrār al-ḫafīya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya*, which is divided into the three sections of logic, physics, and metaphysics.[54] His other major work is his *Tanqīḥ al-abḥāṯ fī maʿrifat al-ʿulūm aṯ-ṯalāṯ*, from which he later wrote an abridgement entitled *Marāṣid at-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid at-taḥqīq*.[55] Unlike his *kalām* works that address the arguments

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ing to the colophon of this autograph, the commentator completed his work in Marāġa in 662/1264 (thus preceding the author's death by thirteen years); see R. Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection, Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), no. 3041.

[51] Edited with Mullā Ṣadrā's *Risālat at-taṣawwur wa-t-taṣdīq*, in *Risālatān fī t-taṣawwur wa-t-taṣdīq*, ed. M. Šarīʿatī (Qum: Muʾassasat-i Ismāʿīlīyān, 1416/1995).

[52] These works do not appear to be extant; see Schmitdke, *The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī*, 59. It should be noted that Ḥillī also wrote a work critical of Avicenna's philosophy entititled *Kašf at-talbīs min kalām ar-Raʾīs* ("Exposing the Deceitful Statements of [Avicenna]"), no longer extant.

[53] The *Categories* is extant in a unique manuscript, dated 717/1317; see A.J. Arberry, *The Chester Beatty Lirbrary, A Handlist of the Arabic Manuscripts* (Dublin: W. Walker, 1955–1966), no. 5151.

[54] Ed. M.H. Mawlawī (Qum: Markaz-i Muṭālaʿāt-i va-Taḥqīqāt-i Islāmī, forthcoming).

[55] The extant portions of *Marāṣid at-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid at-taḥqīq* include only the logic part up to the fourth section of the *Topics* (*Kitāb al-Ǧadal*) and the metaphysics (*Ilāhīyāt*) section. For a description of the logic sections, see M.T. Dānišpažūh and ʿA.N. Munzavī in *Fihrist-i nusḫah-hā-yi ḫaṭṭī-yi Kitābḫānah-yi Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān* (Tehran: Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1330–1357Š/1951–1978), 9:934–35, no. 2301; this manuscript is dated 710/1310 and includes the author's iǧāza as well as that of his son, Faḫr al-Muḥaqiqqīn. I am preparing a critical edition and translation of the first book of the logic, the *Eisagoge*. As for the metaphysics section, found in another manuscript, see aṭ-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Maktabat al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī*, 185.

of the *mutakallimūn* together with those of the philosophers,[56] these philosophical works are primarily strict expositions of logic, physics, and metaphysics in the Avicennan tradition.

In conclusion, the twofold significance of Ṭūsī for the Avicennan tradition rests in defending Avicenna against an established Ašʿarī tradition within the Niẓāmīya and in successfully introducing Avicenna's philosophy into Twelver-Šīʿism. Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī is recognized for establishing these works as part of the Šīʿī commentary tradition that began with his own commentaries on Ṭūsī's *Taǧrīd*s. These commentaries fixed Ṭūsī's works and those of the Šāfiʿī Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī as part of the Twelver-Šīʿī college curriculum well into the modern period. The symbiosis between Twelver-Šīʿism and the Šāfiʿī-Niẓāmīya tradition is well documented, at least within the legal studies tradition.[57] This symbiosis is also documented for the Twelver-Šīʿī tradition of studying Avicenna's philosophy. In studying the Twelver-Šīʿī reception of Avicenna, one needs to begin with the Niẓāmīya tradition of studying Avicenna's works that began perhaps as early as Abū l-Maʿālī al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 478/1085)[58] and culminated in the works of al-Ǧazālī and Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī.

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[56] On Ḥillī's adoption of philosophical concepts in his theological works, see S. Schmidtke, "Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī and Shīʿite Muʿtazilite Theology," *Spektrum Iran* 7.3 (1994), 24–6.

[57] See D. Stewart, *Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998).

[58] Al-Ǧuwaynī's study of Avicenna is noted by R.M. Frank in *al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 15 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 1–2.

Ahmed H. al-Rahim

Avicenna
(d. 428/1037)

|

Bahmanyār
(d. 458/1066)

|

Al-Lawkarī

|

Al-Ġilānī

|

Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī   As-Saraḫsī
(d. 606/1209)

Quṭb ad-Dīn al-Miṣrī   Farīd ad-Dīn Dāmād Kamāl ad-Dīn ibn Yūnus
(killed 618/1221)   (d. 639/1242)

Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī
(d. 674/1276)   (d. 672/1274)

Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī
(d. 726/1325)

|

Quṭb ad-Dīn at-Taḥtānī
(d. 776/1374)

|

Aš-Šarīf al-Ǧurǧānī
(d. 816/1413)

|

Al-ʿAllāma ad-Dawānī
(d. 908/1502)

Fig. 1. Philosophers in the East after Avicenna

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CHAPTER TWELVE

PROCESS METAPHYSICS IN ISLAM?
AVICENNA AND MULLĀ ṢADRĀ ON
INTENSIFICATION OF BEING*

Sajjad Rizvi

Creative reconfiguration and dynamic dialectical development char-
acterize later Islamic metaphysics. While the central metaphysical
concerns of Avicenna remained broadly Aristotelian insofar as he
worked within the confines both of the theory of categories and the
primacy of substances within ontology, later developments shifted the
focus of metaphysics away from substances towards processes of acts
of being.[1] Process metaphysics privileges processes, or acts of being,
over things, or unchanging substances.[2] In attempting to discern a
process metaphysics in Islamic philosophy, a metaphysics that focuses
on being as a processual "structure of events" that undergoes con-
stant motion and which is not primarily a substance,[3] I shall examine
the dialectical method whereby Mullā Ṣadrā, the seventeenth-cen-
tury Iranian Išrāqī philosopher develops his doctrine of intensification
in being as such and as substance in particular, as a critique of
Avicenna's denial of intensity in motion and of the Aristotelian denial
of motion in the category of substance. Avicenna remains the ground
of Sadrian philosophical inquiry. But Mullā Ṣadrā, while acknowl-
edging the great master, is no slavish disciple. His rejection of *taqlīd*,
or the rehearsal of philosophical doctrines in awe of the authority

[1] Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī l-asfār al-ʿaqlīya al-arbaʿa*, 3rd ed. (Beirut:
Dār Iḥyāʾ at-Turāṯ al-ʿArabī, 1981) [hereafter *Asfār*], 1:259.5, 260.9. See also
P. Morewedge, *Essays in Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism* (Oneonta, New
York: SUNY, 1995), xiii.
[2] N. Rescher, *Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy*, SUNY Series
in Philosophy (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1996), 28.
[3] *Asfār*, 3:82.19, 84.18. See F. Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, Studies in
Islamic Philosophy and Science (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1975), 35–36, 97.

of previous masters, is also entirely consonant with Avicenna's own stress on the philosopher's need for verifying truth and forgoing adherence to authority.[4]

I shall first present the Sadrian argument for intensification in being. Then I shall consider his treatment of the Avicennan denial of intensity in being and in substance in particular. Third, I shall assess his critique of Avicenna and his espousal of intensity as the key to his doctrine of modulation of being (*taškīk al-wuǧūd*). Finally, I shall consider some implications for theology that are raised by intensification.

I. *Intensification of Being*

> Existents have degrees in existentiality, and being has different domains, some of which are more perfect and noble (*atamm wa-ašraf*) and others more imperfect and more base (*anqaṣ wa-aḫass*).[5]

Modulation by intensity occurs within the circle of being, from the arc of descent (*qaws an-nuzūl*) from the One to the arc of ascent (*qaws aṣ-ṣuʿūd*) back to the One.[6] As Ṣadrā's student, Fayḍ Kāšānī (d. 1090/1680) says in his *Uṣūl al-maʿārif*, a work that summarizes Sadrian metaphysics,

> Being descends from the heaven of absoluteness (*samāʾ al-iṭlāq*) to the earth of limitation (*arḍ at-taqyīd*) in *degrees* [emphasis added]. It starts from the most noble and ends with the basest. Thus, a descending path (*silsilat an-nuzūl*) makes its way in it [i.e., being]. Then, it [being] takes an ascent (*ṣuʿūd*), and it continues to progress from the lowest to the most excellent, until it ends with the most excellent in this ascending order.

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[4] D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Texts and Studies, 4 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 191–193. See also *Asfār* 1:20.8; Ṣadrā, *Iksīr al-ʿārifīn* in *Rasāʾil* (Tehran lithograph, 1885), 138; id., *Šarḥ al-Hidāya* (Tehran lithograph, 1313/1895), 3.13–14; Ṣadrā, *Sih Aṣl*, ed. M. Ḫwāǧavī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Mawlá, 1376Š/1956), 27.8–9, 79.1–3, 83.1–6, 108.2–3.

[5] *Asfār*, 4:277.1–2.

[6] L. Siorvanes, *Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 106. See also *Asfār*, 5:347.19–22; Ṣadrā, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Karīm*, ed. M. Ḫwāǧavī (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭālaʿāt va-Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī, 1987), 3:66.24.

> Whatever is closer to its Originator (glorified may He be!) is closer to simplicity, unity and independence, and further from differentiation, complexity and dependence.[7]

God is the limit case of absolute perfection, intensity and the point of origin and return in the circle of being.[8]

The beatific and ecstatic experience of the "doffing metaphor" of *Enneads* IV.8.1 is associated in the Illuminationist tradition with veils and degrees of light in a vertical hierarchy ascending up to the One.[9] Ṣadrā, in his *scholia* on *Šarḥ Ḥikmat al-išrāq*, uses this to explain modulation:

> Know that the reality of being is graded in levels, one above the other and the higher comprehends all under it in a real sense (*maʿnawī*). So everything that is more potent, is more intense in its comprehension and its rank is more enveloping. Everything that is less potent inclines towards what is more perfect than it. All levels of being are veils that prevent one from noticing the most perfect, the highest being that comprehends everything (*al-wuǧūdu l-atammu l-aʿlá l-muḥīṭu ʿalá kulli šayʾ*). All being is light except that it is differentiated in its luminosity and [those differentiations] become physical and corporeal forms, forms that are tenebrous in comparison to the higher [incorporeal] intellects and souls, since they are contaminated with privation.[10]

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[7] Fayḍ Kāšānī, *Uṣūl al-maʿārif*, ed. S.Ǧ. Āštiyānī (Qum: Daftar-i Tablīǧāt-i Islāmī, 1375Š/1996), 14.10–14.

[8] *Asfār*, 1:253.6–8; Ṣadrā, *al-Maẓāhir al-ilāhīya*, ed. S.Ǧ. Āštiyānī (Mashhad: Mashhad University Press, 1961), 63.3–4, and id., *al-Mašāʿir*, ed./tr. P. Morewedge (New York: SSIPS, 1992), 58.2–6. See also Plotinus, *Enneads*, V.6.2.13, tr. A.H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966–1988), 5:207; Āštiyānī, *Hastī az nazar-i falsafah va-ʿirfān* (Tehran: Nahḍat-i Zanān-i Musulmān, 1376Š/1997), 277. For arguments concerning God as a "limit case" in the hierarchy of being found in Neoplatonic and Thomist circles, see B. Miller, *A Most Unlikely God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), especially chapters 3 and 4.

[9] The original text is Plotinus, *Plotini Opera*, ed. P. Henry and H. Schwyzer (Bruxelles: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951–1973), 2:224; tr. Armstrong, *Enneads*, 4:397; Arabic tr. in *Aflūṭīn ʿinda l-ʿarab* (*Uṯūlūǧīya*), ed. ʿA.R. Badawī (Cairo: L'Institut Français, 1948), 22.1–4; Eng. tr. of the Arabic by G. Lewis in *Plotini Opera*, 2:225. For discussions, see F. Zimmermann, "The Origins of the so-called Theology of Aristotle," in *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Kraye, W.F. Ryan, and C.B. Schmitt (London: The Warburg Institute, 1986), 138–141. The passage is found in many instances in Islamic philosophical and mystical texts, and often correctly identified as Platonic in spirit; see, for example, Ibn ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya*, ed. ʿU. Yahyá (Cairo: L'Institut Français, 1972), 2:219, and Suhrawardī, *at-Talwīḥāt* in *Opera metaphysica et mystica*, ed. H. Corbin (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945), 1:112, and id., *Ḥikmat al-išrāq* in *Opera metaphysica et mystica*, ed. H. Corbin, Bibliothèque Iranienne (Tehran: L'Institut Franco-Iranien, 1952), 2:162–65.

[10] Ṣadrā, *Taʿlīqa ʿalá Šarḥ Ḥikmat al-išrāq* (Tehran lithograph, 1313/1895), 379, marginal note at top of page.

Veils of light are degrees of contingent being graded in intensities from the One, a translunary hierarchy that traverses the division between the sensible and intelligible realms.[11] The closer that a degree of being is to the One, the more intense it is, and the more distant it is, the less intense it is. Perfection in the scale of being is what tends towards simplicity and unity (and indeed the One) and what is most removed from complexity.[12] Every being thus has two aspects: one is a veil that hides the divine by confusing the perceiver into accepting what appears phenomenally before him, but the other is a manifestation of the divine. The former is its quidditative aspect and the latter its existential aspect. This is why beings that are devoid of quidditative features are purer lights that indicate the divine through their existence.

Intensification posits degrees of being that constitute modulation in degrees of perfection and participation. The latter dynamic is significant for the Neoplatonic roots of the problem. Damascius (d. after 529) affirmed that being *qua* soul constantly changes because the forms within it differ through differing levels of participation (*metexis*).[13] Perfect participation is perfect being, that is, God, who is the Agent of this hierarchy.[14] Beings participate in the general "pool of being" sharing in the very roots of being, and differing in their degrees of participation by perfection and imperfection, independence and dependence, and priority and posteriority.[15] The concept of intensification is taken from the Illuminationist tradition's vision of the hierarchy of lights. The Illuminationist tradition considers quiddities as universals to undergo intensification as well, a concept that Ṣadrā then applies to being.[16] Ṣadrā explicitly tells us that he is reversing

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[11] *Asfār*, 6:300.1–11.

[12] Suhrawardī, *al-Mašāriʿ* in *Opera*, op. cit., 1:293, and id., *Hikmat al-išrāq* in *Opera*, 2:87. See also G.Ḥ. Dīnānī, *Qavāʿid-i kullī-yi falsafī dar falsafah-yi islāmī* (Tehran: Muʾassasah-yi Muṭālaʿāt va-Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī, 1372Š/1993), 3:104–105.

[13] C. Steel, *The Changing self: a study on the soul in later Neoplatonism* (Brussels: Koninklijke Akademie, 1978), 108–109. It is important to note that this is a feature of Iamblichean Neoplatonism, since most other Neoplatonists reject it; see R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1995), 119–120.

[14] *Asfār*, 1:443.13–19; Ṣadrā, *Ittiṣāf al-māhīya bi-l-wuǧūd* in *Rasāʾil*, 118. The Agent is more perfect than its effects, following an old Aristotelian rule; see *Asfār*, 3:250.1–5; Ṣadrā, *al-Mašāʿir*, ed. H. Corbin, Bibliothèque Iranienne (Tehran: L'Institut Français, 1964), 44.8–9. See also A. Lloyd, "The principle that the cause is greater than the effect," *Phronesis* 16 (1976), 146–156.

[15] *Asfār*, 6:86.5–8.

[16] *Asfār*, 1:441.1–2, 443.2; 4:270.6–9; 5:92.8–13. See also Suhrawardī, *at-Talwīḥāt*, 13.22; and id., *al-Mašāʿir*, 299.

the Illuminationist position.[17] Modulation only applies to being since different intensities of being still permit causality, but if modulation were to occur in quiddity, one quiddity of a different intensity could not be a cause for another.[18] Quiddity cannot undergo modulation because a quiddity defines a certain nature with essential and accidental properties that are true of all its portions and individuals. If it could be more intense, then all those individuals would be so, and so too for debilitation. So quiddity cannot undergo modulation. What defines a quiddity is thus quite strict and what marks out a being is more "fuzzy" and naturally open to modulation. The law of Indiscernibles does not apply equally to both quiddity and being.[19]

Ṣadrā affirms intensity in substances with three degrees in each substance, a logical, an intelligible and a material, and the whole thing is a manifestation of the divine essence through its sustaining agency.[20] Substantial motion is a concomitant of being. Just as God's agency brings things into being so does it bring about substantial motion.[21] The relationship between being and motion is described as follows.

> Being permits intensification and debilitation (al-ištidād wa-t-taḍa"uf) meaning that it permits intensifying motion. Substance in its substantiality, that is, its substantial being, allows for essential change. The components of a single contiguous motion and their limits do not exist in actuality distinctly, but rather exist in a single being. The quiddities that correspond to these degrees of being, do not exist in actuality as distinct. Rather, they exist collectively like the components of definition [i.e., exist collectively as a definition].[22]

In the Sadrian doctrine, substance undergoes intensification and modulation because it is in motion.[23] Two examples are given for this. First, water when boiled turns into steam, not by changing from a definite substance "water" to a definite substance "steam" through a shifting intensity in its substantiality, but because the being intensifies

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[17] *Asfār*, 1:427.9–10; Ṣadrā, *aš-Šawāhid ar-rubūbīya*, ed. S.Ğ. Āštiyānī (Mashhad: Mashhad University Press, 1967), 134.14–135.4.

[18] *Asfār*, 6:21.7–14, 390.1–3.

[19] The Leibnizian Law of Indiscernibles postulates that "if a is identical to b, whatever is true of a is true of b"; see B. Russell, "On denoting," *Mind* 14 (1905), 47.

[20] *Asfār*, 2:313.9–314.8.

[21] *Asfār*, 8:256.15–19.

[22] *Asfār*, 9:186.8–13.

[23] *Asfār*, 4:273.5–8.

and the substance undergoes a change and modulation.[24] The vortex
of events of that being that is watery remains the substrate of that
change. The other famous example is that of the sperm in the womb
that develops and becomes an embryo. Substantial motion occurs in
bodily substances through the flux of being and the constant layer-
ing of ipseities with forms one after another.[25] It is constant renewal
of forms since hylomorphism demands that matter never be free of
form.[26] The ipseity that undergoes the change remains a constant
vortex.[27] The question of substantial motion was raised in Neoplatonism,
as Ṣadrā knew well. Motion and being are identical concepts in
Plotinus with the same reference in reality as properties of intellect.[28]
But they are mentally distinct as intentional objects and cognitive
activity. Both Iamblichus (d. c. 326) and Damascius (d. after 529)
held that the soul in its descent into the body and then its ascend-
ing reversion undergoes substantial change without violating its unity
and identity because it changed itself.[29] All the "lives" of the human
soul are so many faculties or manifestations of the same substance.[30]
What is also useful for us is the "architectonic" approach of later
Neoplatonism to the hierarchy of being, shunning the monistic ten-
dencies of both Plotinus and Porphyry.[31]

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[24] *Asfār*, 4:274.11–14.
[25] *Asfār*, 2:967.
[26] *Asfār*, 2:111.1–113.3. He draws on the Sufi tradition of Ibn 'Arabī (d. 638/1240)
for the doctrine of the renewal of forms (*taǧaddud al-amṯāl*); Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt
al-makkīya* (Būlāq, 1911), 3:303, 4:439, *inter alia*. See Ǧalāl ad-Dīn Humā'ī, *Dū risālah
dar falsafah-yi islāmī* (Tehran: Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997),
14, and William Chittick, *The Self-disclosures of God*, SUNY Series in Islam (Albany,
New York: SUNY, 1998), 57–66.
[27] *Asfār*, 3:96.8–10, 101.3–103.7; 4:273.22.
[28] L. Gerson, *Plotinus* (London: Routledge, 1994), 99, quoting Plotinus, *Enneads*,
VI.3.2.212, tr. A.H. Armstrong, 6:183.
[29] Steel, *The Changing Self*, 157–8. Steel, 55–6, shows how Priscianus uses
Theophrastus on this point against his thesis in the commentaries on *De Anima*.
According to Aristotle, when a substance changes, its identity is not retained but
transforms, since the integrity of its essence has been violated; see C. Witt, *Substance
and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VII–IX* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 3–9; T. Scaltsas, "Substantial holism," in *Unity, Identity and
Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M.L. Gill (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 121.
[30] Steel, *The Changing Self*, 62, quoting Priscianus.
[31] Steel, *The Changing Self*, 155.

II. *The Avicennan position*

However, in the Aristotelian and mainstream Neoplatonic tradition, *ousia qua* substance does not admit of more or less.[32] Avicenna denies intensity in being or, more specifically, substance:

> Being *qua* being does not differ in intensity or allow of more or less. It only differs in priority, posteriority, independence and dependence, necessity and contingency.[33]

The primary sense of being is substance.[34] Substance cannot undergo intensification and debilitation because it has no opposite and intensity requires opposition and contrariness. Avicenna's student Bahmanyār states:

> Substance does not allow of more intense and weaker. Intensification and debilitation is negated with the negation of opposition in which it is not possible to change from one to another through motion. Rather opposition in substance occurs simultaneously and not through motion. Motion does not occur in substances and it is unlike the change from blackness to whiteness.[35]

Bahmanyār makes the link between the denial of intensity and the denial of substantial motion that is critical for intensification. Intensification and debilitation occur where there is motion but one substance cannot be more intense than another nor weaker than another. This does not mean that a substance cannot be prior in substantiality to another. "First substance" is prior in substantiality to "second

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[32] According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1030b413, 1031b114, 1032a46, 1037a1820, intensity within substance violates its unity. See M.L. Gill, *Aristotle on Substance: the paradox of unity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 4; C. Evangeliou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 66, quoting Porphyry, *in Cat.*, 2b722, apud S. Strange (tr.), *Porphyry on Aristotle's Categories* (London: Duckworth, 1992), 84. See also L. Goodman, *Avicenna* (London: Routledge, 1992), 58.

[33] Avicenna, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, ed. Ǧ. Anawātī and S. Zāʾid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣrīya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1960), 276.13–15; id., *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qum: Intišārāt-i Bīdār, 1413/1992), 286.7–9; Bahmanyār, *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. M. Muṭahharī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1375Š/1996), 529.13–15; al-Ḥillī, *Kašf al-Murād*, ed. Ḥ. Āmulī (Qum: an-Našr al-Islāmī, 1988), 29.11–17. See *Asfār*, 2:188.13–189.10.

[34] Avicenna, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 57.7; Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 304.4–5. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1028a31–b2; and Witt, *Substance and Essence*, 47; M.V. Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 173.

[35] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 307.12–308.4. See Aristotle, *Categories* 4a10–21, *Physics* 190a13–21, 190b917 on the need for a continuant; see Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 6.

substance" but is not more intense. Priority is attached to the being of substantiality and intensity to the quiddity of substantiality.[36] Although substances are divided into primary (that is, individuals) and secondary ("man"), this distinction in their substantiality is not by grades of intensity or modulation since the distinction is not essential.[37] Substance cannot undergo motion.[38]

The Sadrian counter-argument runs as follows. Substance is extramental self-sufficient being. It is not a genus and, like being, undergoes modulation. Being is more primary than substance.[39] Things exist in grades of intensity and existential priority and posteriority. For example, "father" does not precede "son" either causally or in humanity, but rather existentially.[40] The distinction in substances and substantiality is not through the modulation of substantiality as the Illuminationists suggest.[41] Rather, substantiality is a singular undifferentiated concept, but it is the being of the substance that is modulated in grades of intensity.[42] This pertains to the horizontal hierarchy as well. Humans are prior and more intense than beasts in being and not by virtue of "greater substantiality."[43]

The Peripatetics held that being cannot remain single with grades of intensity (and hence must be multiple in reality) because intensity does not differentiate one from the other and it leads to two problems within the metaphysics of radical contingency.[44] First, there can be no causality, because there is no greater or lesser in potency and a cause must be present with its effect but also more potent than its effect through essential priority and not greater intensity.[45] Causality

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[36] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 308.7–9. Aristotle argues that change with respect to substances is irreversible and not intensifying; see *Metaphysics* 994a22–b3; and Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 92.

[37] *Asfār*, 4:263.6–11.

[38] *Asfār*, 3:229.12. In the Aristotelian account there is what Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 6–7, calls a "paradox of unity" in the description of substance, a conflict between the recognition of change and the need for horizontal unity of substance, that is, a continuant substratum in which changing attributes inhere.

[39] *Asfār*, 1:260.1.

[40] *Asfār*, 4:247.23–248.3.

[41] *Asfār*, 4:265.23–265.4. The Illuminationists do affirm intensity in substance; see Suhrawardī, *at-Talwīḥāt*, 13; and Ḥasanzādah in Ṣadrā, *Asfār*, 1:696.

[42] *Asfār*, 4:269.4–9.

[43] *Asfār*, 4:269.12–16.

[44] M. Intiẓām, "Ibtikārāt-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-muta'allihīn," *Ḫirad-nāmah-yi Ṣadrā* 12 (1998), 79.

[45] Avicenna, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 269.9–11.

functions with other scales of prior and posterior but not with intensity.[46] As Bahmanyār says,

> It holds for priority and posteriority because the cause exists in the first instance and the effect in the second. [It holds for] independence and dependence because the cause does not depend for its being on the effect but rather exists in itself or through another cause. The effect depends on the cause. [It holds for] necessity and contingency because the being of the effect in itself is not necessary since if it were, then it would be necessary without a self-sufficient cause. So its essence is contingent being and only necessary through its cause.[47]

Second, there can be no sufficient cause or preponderance, since no one side of a potential contingent, whether existence or non-existence, dominates.[48]

The Illuminationist response is to deny causality altogether since the hierarchy of lights is not causally related, and concepts such as substances and being are merely intentional.[49] For Ṣadrā, being has no cause since it must be necessary to exist.[50]

> Being exists by itself. It is the determination of itself and the being of its essence. With respect to itself, it is not attached to anything; rather [it is attached to other things] with respect to its accidental determinations and developments following it. So being *qua* being does not have an agent by which it is established, nor does it have matter which is impossible for it, and no substrate in which it is found, nor any form in which it is clothed, nor does it have any *telos*.

> Being is too great to be attached to any cause since it has been disclosed that it has no cause at all, nor any cause by which it is, nor any cause from which (*minhu*) it is, nor any cause in which it is, nor any cause which it has.[51]

Thus, the hierarchy of being is not a causal hierarchy. Hence there is no sufficient cause or preponderance.[52] Contingents exist not through

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[46] Avicenna, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 277.1–3.

[47] Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl*, 529.15–530.4; see also Avicenna, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 277.7–278.8.

[48] Avicenna, *al-Ilāhīyāt*, 278.4–7.

[49] Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-išrāq/The Philosophy of Illumination*, ed./tr. H. Ziai and J. Walbridge, Islamic Translation Series (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1999) 120.9–13. See also *Asfār*, 4:265.20–23.

[50] *Asfār*, 1:53.9ff. See also Ḥasanzādah, ibid., 1:88.

[51] *Asfār*, 1:54.6–13.

[52] Ḥasanzādah, ibid., 1:206ff.; Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī, *Šarḥ Ġurar al-farāʾid*, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran: McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, 1969),

such agency but because they exist by virtue of the Necessary. They cannot be non-existent or indifferent and then emerge as existents.[53] The cause of being is the One but there is no causality within the realm of being.[54]

Furthermore, degrees of intensity for the Peripatetics entail different species.[55] But intensification is not differentiated in actual being since, if it were, it would entail composition in motion of momentary entities that are infinite and that is impossible.[56] The Peripatetic mistakes distinctions as occurrent in essences; thus, he posits different species. But in fact *being* is what is considered.[57] The Peripatetic argument is rejected as follows:

> The nature of being accepts intensity and debilitation in its simple essence. There is no difference between individuals by an essential differential distinction (*mumayyiz faṣlī ḏātī*) or by an accidental type (*muṣannif ʿaraḍī*) or by a feature of species (*mušaḫḫiṣ*) that is additional to the ground of its nature. Their individuals and units only differ by essential intensity and debilitation (*aš-šidda wa-ḍ-ḍuʿf*), priority and posteriority, nobility and baseness (*aš-šaraf wa-l-ḫissa*). Universal concepts that are true of them [i.e., referents] are called quiddities that differ in essence by genus or species or accident. Because of this it is said that being differs in species and that the degrees of more intense and weaker are different species.[58]

But the Peripatetic tradition is not unified on the issue of intensity.[59] Avicenna's commentator Ṭūsī, in his commentary on *al-Išārāt*, remarks

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106; and T. Izutsu, *The Metaphysics of Sabzavari* (Tehran: Iran University Press, 1983), 115.

[53] *Asfār*, 1:221.15–17.

[54] *Asfār*, 1:401.12–15.

[55] *Asfār*, 2:187.12–14; Avicenna, *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, 166.16–167.1, states that different intensities of individuals entail a different species (*nawʿ*); Ṭūsī, *Maṣāriʿ al-muṣāriʿ*, ed. Ḥ. al-Muʿizzī (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿašī, 1405/1984), 58.5–6. See Scaltsas, "Substantial holism," passim, on Aristotle.

[56] *Asfār*, 4:276.3–9.

[57] *Asfār*, 2:188.13–189.10.

[58] *Asfār*, 9:186.1–7.

[59] Arguably Avicenna himself equivocates on the issue. Avicenna, *al-Mubāḥaṯāt*, 41.4–7 states:

> Being in the essences of being does not differ by species. Rather, if there is differentiation, it occurs through intensification and debilitation (*at-taʾakkud wa-ḍ-ḍuʿf*). It is in species that the quiddities of things which receive being differ, but the being that overlays them does not differ in species. For man differs from horse in species on account of his quiddity, not his being.

But this does not entail intensification necessarily. Later on, Avicenna, ibid., 71.12–13, clarifies that "intensification" (*at-taʾakkud*) is really priority that occurs in three types: modalities, priority and posteriority, and dependence and independence.

that modulation occurs in being, not only in terms of priority and precedence but also in terms of intensity.[60] In a concession to Avicenna, he does not permit intensity within causality but does within other divisions of being, including Necessary and contingent.[61] He argues that since quiddity cannot undergo intensity yet occurs in different modes, this suggests that the differences are existential instances of quiddity that differ in intensity. It is not quiddity that intensifies.[62] The Peripatetic doctrine holds that distinction by intensity occurs in quiddities through their *differentiae*. But this is rejected because *differentiae* are not grades of intensity and quiddity does not undergo intensification.[63] Being is not distinguished by *differentiae* since it is not a universal.[64] Ṭūsī is already part of a processist turn in Islamic philosophy because he does not automatically consider substance to be the primary referent and sense of being, unlike the other Peripatetics.

III. *The Sadrian response*

In the *Asfār*, Ṣadrā adjudicates at length between the Peripatetics and Illuminationists on intensity and modulation. The first issue is how things differ: do they differ by the whole of their quiddities, by parts of their quiddities, by extrinsic properties or by their existence? The Illuminationists pick the first option and the Peripatetics a mixture of the second and third. But the correct position is to assert that existents differ by intensity in their being.[65]

The second issue deals with varieties of "more or less." The first argument considers essences and individuals. The Peripatetics deny any modulation by precedence, priority or perfection within an essence. The Illuminationists permit such distinction. Ṣadrā takes the Illuminationist position and provides the example of light that is graded, intensifies and affects others by itself.[66] The individuation of beings and essences is precisely in such a hierarchy of intensity,

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[60] Avicenna, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. M. Šihābī (Qum: Našr al-Balāġa, 1375Š/1996), 3:33.3–10.

[61] Ibid., 3:34.1–2.

[62] Ṣadrā, *aš-Šawāhid ar-rubūbīya* in *Rasāʾil*, ed. H. Iṣfahānī (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Ḥikmat, 1996), 306.

[63] Ibid., 322.

[64] *Asfār*, 1:50.4.

[65] *Asfār*, 1:427–31.

[66] *Asfār*, 1:432.6–433.2.

precedence, excellence and perfection.[67] Against the Illuminationists he makes the point that the distinction between two black bodies is not that one is a more intensely black species than the other but rather that one's being is more intense, which manifests itself in being more black.[68] The unity of the thing is not compromised in intensifying motion since substance is not the primary ontic unit.[69]

The second argument of the Peripatetics is that intensity and modulation in being entails species distinction between individuals. This is a logical impossibility. The Illuminationists deny distinction by species or *differentia*. This is then related to the third argument that intensity and motion only occur in the categories of quantity and quality that are distinct types of modulation. Peripatetics deny intensity or motion in substance.[70] Ṣadrā, broadly agreeing with the Illuminationists, makes three objections. First, the Peripatetic argument on the distinction of scales of quantity and quality refer to ordinary and conventional language use. But these recourses do not amount to a philosophical proof. The Peripatetics distinguish between the two in a circular fashion entailing a *petitio principii*. In fact, both intensity and more or less are the same *process*.[71] Second, motion occurs not only to these two categories but also in substances. He uses the example of the color spectrum to illustrate this point.[72] Third, intensity occurs in reality, given that there is a vertical hierarchy of being. The higher intelligible world is more intense than this one since Platonic forms undergo modulation by intensity. The intelligible realm allows such gradation but not the *doxa*-ridden realm of *sensibilia*.[73] However, the sensible reflections of forms are of a lower ontological class and indeed "less real."[74] Ultimately, the Necessary is more intense than contingents.[75] One final point (though not an argument) that Ṣadrā makes is to accuse Avicenna of inconsistency since the latter affirms that some existents are more puissant and

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[67] *Asfār*, 1:433.13–434.2.
[68] *Asfār*, 1:436.8–11; 3:83.8–14, 434.1–2.
[69] *Asfār*, 8:71–74, 80–93, 257.
[70] *Asfār*, 3:85.12.
[71] *Asfār*, 1:434.1–2, 438.16–18.
[72] *Asfār*, 1:437.3–9.
[73] G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 65.
[74] Ibid., 73.
[75] *Asfār*, 1:440.21–441.5.

more intense than others and, within being, both time and motion are scales of intensity.[76]

IV. *Intensification and God*

Does intensification entail composition in the divine? Two objections to modulation can be raised in this context. If we take God as the highest degree of being, who is the Necessary and is equal to His attributes, then that entails composition in God. Second, if the actual supposition of modulation is applied to God as the highest and contingents below, then God is limited by the contingents. Since all share being and identity-in-difference, God is confined and bounded by the highest contingent degree. This is a problem, as we know that the being of God is pure and undetermined.[77] These objections are resolved in the following manner. First,

> The chain of existents (*silsilat al-mawǧūdāt*) in degrees of being with the supposition of modulation do not have accidental being such that each degree has a border with the other. Each higher degree is not distinguished from the lower by boundaries that are fixed. Rather the chain of degrees is vertical and causal. Each higher degree is the cause of the lower and the lower the effect of the higher. The being of all the modular degrees in the chain contains all the perfections below it but not vice versa.[78]

Second,

> The essence of the Necessary who is the highest degree in the chain has all the perfections of the degrees below it *in actu* existing in him. For the philosophers all contingent degrees exist truly and are effects of higher degrees, ultimately of God, and they indicate the greatness and glory of God. But for the mystics, being is exclusive to the essence of the Truth and all contingents are merely shadows and manifestations of Him. The attribution of being to them [contingents] is thus figurative.[79]

The final point about modulation by intensification is that there are two axes of intensification, a vertical hierarchy that traverses the

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[76] *Asfār*, 2:189.7–10; 3:252.2–5.
[77] Ḥusaynī-yi Ṭihrānī, *Mihr-i Tābān* (Mashhad: Intišārāt-i ʿAllāmah-yi Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1417/1996), 211.
[78] Ṭabāṭabāʾī, loc. cit., 212.
[79] Ibid., 213–14.

domains of being, intelligible, sensible and intermediary, and a hor-
izontal hierarchy that organizes this sublunary world of *sensibilia*. The
horizontal hierarchy of being also undergoes intensification.[80] There
is a gradual intensifying scale from the lowest being, that is, a min-
eral through the vegetable and animal until one arrives at the human,
the most intense type of natural being, of which the most intense is
the Perfect Man, the holder and deployer of *wilāya* (sanctified rank
and proximity to the One).[81] The unity of the structure of reality is
expressed using a common Neoplatonic and Hermetic metaphor of
referring to the macrocosm as a "living animal."[82] But this animal
is not a contiguous, atomic composite organism.

> The truth is that the circle of being (*dawr al-wuǧūd*) is one.[83] The whole
> cosmos is a single living great animal, whose limbs are connected one
> to the other, not in the sense of being quantitatively contiguous in sur-
> face and extension but in the sense that every perfect degree of being
> must be contiguous to a degree adjacent to it in existential perfection,
> either above it in intensity or below it in debilitation, without any
> other degree mediating between the two.[84]

The metaphor of the macrocosm is then reintegrated to the metaphor
of the microcosm, man.

> Man is a single existent possessing many faculties, some of which are
> intellectual, some psychic and some physical. All these [faculties] are
> degrees differing in excellence within their class. But the whole is still
> one essence.[85]

The vertical hierarchy moves from the basest, most passive level of
sensibility through the intelligibles to God in a scale of gradation of
perfection and modulation of intensity.[86] This is a unified multiplic-

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[80] *Asfār*, 5:342ff. See also ibid., 3:131.2–132.8, 402.1–6, 500.1–502.12.

[81] *Asfār*, 5:345–7.

[82] Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV.8.3.14–16, tr. Armstrong, 4:407.7–10. See also aš-Šayḫ
al-Yūnānī translated by Lewis in Plotinus, *Opera*, 2:235. It draws upon the Neoplatonic
concept of the world-soul. See Gerson, *Plotinus*, 63; S. Clark, "Plotinus: Body and
Soul," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. L. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 285; and J. Walbridge, *The Leaven of the Ancients*, SUNY
Series in Islam (Albany, New York: SUNY, 2000), 92.

[83] The lithograph has *dawr*, while the edition has *dār* (abode).

[84] *Asfār*, 5:342.12–16.

[85] *Asfār*, 5:343.6–8.

[86] *Asfār*, 5:79.4–16; 6:117.4–17. Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Taʿlīqa ʿalá Nihāyat al-ḥikma* (Qum:
Dar Rāh-i Ḥaqq, 1405/1984), 43–44, denies any modulation in the vertical hier-
archy of being. In response to my paper, Dimitri Gutas posited the objection that

ity in which each level of being is connected and ultimately dependent upon God.[87] The vertical scale also cuts across the modes of being: the concept and word are the least intense; mental being is higher but the reality of being is most intense.[88] The scale intensifies from pure privation to pure being. This is the "limit case" proof for the existence of God as well.[89] This hierarchy also traverses time and the "domains of being" across the distinction between this world and the afterlife. The beings of the afterlife are "more permanent, more intense and more perfect."[90] People also possess levels of being of which their being in the afterlife is more intense. Of such people, the person who is most intense in his being across all modes of being and all worlds and times is the Perfect Man (*al-insān al-kāmil*).

The Sadrian vision of reality is a singular unified but modulated circle of being. Distinction between the grades of being is determined by intensification and intensifying motion. Such an ontological vision is posited in contra-distinction to Avicenna in a deliberate dialectical interplay between Avicennan substance metaphysics and pluralism and Sadrian process metaphysics and monism. As such, the stark contrast brings out the centrality of the question of being and the Sadrian contribution to it in Islamic thought.

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it seems nonsensical to suggest that man somehow "exists more" than a horse who exists more than a chair and so on. How can "exist" be used in such a comparative, scalar way? However, such a use of "exist" in Neoplatonic semantics is not unusual. See J. Martin, "Existence, Negation and Abstraction in the Neoplatonic Hierarchy," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 16 (1995), 69–96.

[87] *Asfār*, 5:349.11–15. See also Ḥusaynī-yi Ṭihrānī, op. cit., 210.
[88] *Asfār*, 1:263.14–16.
[89] *Asfār*, 5:343.17–20.
[90] *Asfār*, 9:175.2–3.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE RECEPTION OF IBN SĪNĀ IN SYRIAC
THE CASE OF GREGORY BARHEBRAEUS

Hidemi Takahashi

I. *Introduction*

When we think of the relationship between Syriac and Arabic liter-
ature, we tend to think in the first place of transmission from Syriac
into Arabic in the early centuries of Islam and to forget that there
was also transmission in the other direction. Partly as a result, little
study has been conducted so far in this field, be it in the form of
straightforward translations from Arabic into Syriac[1] or of Arabic
works used as sources in Syriac writing. Those Christians, however,
who continued (and still continue to this day) to use Syriac as their
literary medium, did not live in isolation from their increasingly
Islamic and Arabic-speaking surroundings and those authors writing
in Syriac in the centuries following the Islamic conquest were clearly
well aware of the scientific developments taking place under Islam.[2]
It may be expected that borrowings from Arabic into Syriac will
have increased with the progress of the sciences under Islam and
that such borrowings will be quite common by the time we reach
the so-called Syriac Renaissance of the twelfth-thirteenth centuries.
Given the prominence of Ibn Sīnā in philosophy and natural sciences

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[1] See H. Teule, "A Forgotten Segment of Syriac Literature: Translations from
Arabic into Syriac," to appear in the proceedings of Symposium Syriacum VIII,
held in Sydney, 26th June–1st July, 2000.

[2] Relatively early instances where influence of Arabic writing has been detected
in Syriac works on philosophy and natural sciences include Moses bar Kepha's
Hexaemeron Commentary and the anonymous *Causa causarum* (10th c.?). See, respec-
tively, U. Rudolph, "Christliche Bibelexegese und Muʿtazilitische Theologie, Der
Fall des Moses bar Kepha (gst. 903 n.Chr.)," *Oriens* 34 (1994) 299–313; and G.J.
Reinink, "Communal Identity and the Systematisation of Knowledge in the Syriac
'Cause of All Causes'," in *Pre-Modern Encyclopedia Texts, Proceedings of the Second COM-
ERS Congress, Groningen, 1–4 July 1996*, ed. P. Binkley (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997),
275–288, and the literature cited there.

during those centuries, it may also be expected that such borrowings
in those fields will often go back directly or indirectly to the writ-
ings of Ibn Sīnā and that is indeed the case in the writings of the
greatest author of that period of Renaissance, the Syriac Orthodox
("Jacobite") prelate and polymath, Gregory Abū l-Faraǧ Barhebraeus
(Bar ʿEḇrāyā, Ibn al-ʿIbrī).[3]

Barhebraeus was born in 622/3 A.H. (1225/6 A.D.; 1537 A.Gr.)
in Melitene (Malatya), a city then under the rule of the Rum Seljuks,
but with a large and prestigious community of Syriac Orthodox
Christians. After periods of study in Antioch, Tripoli (both then still
in Frankish hands) and, possibly, Damascus, he was raised to the
episcopate at the tender age of twenty in 644/1246 and was appointed,
successively, to the sees of Gubos and Laqabin in the vicinity of
Melitene, before being translated, ca. 651/1253, to the more impor-
tant see of Aleppo, where he was to witness the fall of the city to
the Mongols in 658/1260. In 662/1264 he was raised to the office
of the Maphrian of the East, the second highest office in the Syriac
Orthodox Church with jurisdiction over those areas which had been
under Persian rule in pre-Islamic times, and it was during his tenure
of this office that he wrote most of his works. As maphrian, his nor-
mal place of residence would have been the Monastery of Mar Mattai
near Mosul, but he spent a significant part of his maphrianate in
Marāǧa and Tabrīz, the centers of power of the new Il-Ḫānid dynasty,
where he almost certainly came into contact with Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-
Ṭūsī (597–672/1201–1274), as well as with the group of scholars
gathered around him.[4] He died in Marāǧa on 5/6th Ǧumādá al-
Āḫira 685 A.H. (29/30th July 1286; 1597 A.Gr.).

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[3] On Barhebraeus and his works in general, see, e.g., A. Baumstark, *Geschichte
der syrischen Literatur mit Ausschluṣ der christlich-palästinensischen Texte* (Bonn: Marcus und
Weber, 1922; repr. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968) [hereafter *GSL*], 312–320; G. Graf,
Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur, StT 118, 133, 146, 147, 172 (Vatican City:
Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, 1944–53) [hereafter *GCAL*], 2:272–281; Iġnāṭiyūs Afrām I
Barṣaum, *al-Luʾluʾ al-manṯūr fī taʾrīḫ al-ʿulūm wa-l-ādāb as-suryānīya* (Homs, 1943; repr.
Glane/Losser: Bar Hebraeus Verlag, 1987) [hereafter *Luʾluʾ*], 411–430; Albīr Abūnā,
Adab al-luġa al-ārāmīya (Beirut: Maṭbaʿat Stārkū, 1970) [hereafter *ALA*], 493–508;
and for a bibliography, J.M. Fiey, "Esquisse d'une bibliographie de Bar Hébraeus
(† 1286)," *ParOr* 13 (1986) 279–312. For some additions to the bio-bibliographical
works on Barhebraeus listed by Fiey, 280–284, see Takahashi, "Simeon of Qalʿa
Rumaita, Patriarch Philoxenus Nemrod and Bar ʿEbroyo," *Hugoye: Journal of Syriac
Studies* (http://syrcom.cua.edu/Hugoye) 4.1 (Jan. 2001), n. 1.
[4] See Takahashi, "Simeon," n. 90.

Barhebraeus' literary output covers a wide range of subjects, including Biblical exegesis, dogmatic and moral/mystical theology, liturgy, jurisprudence, philosophy, historiography, belles lettres (*adab*), grammar/lexicography, the exact sciences, oneiromancy and medicine. Of these, the areas in which Barhebraeus is most likely to have been influenced by Ibn Sīnā are medicine and philosophy. The lists of Barhebraeus' works[5] mention a "book of the great Canon of Abū ʿAlī" (*ktābā d-qānōna rabbā d-Abū ʿAlī*), of which he had translated (or abridged?) four quires when he was overtaken by death. This work appears now to be lost, as are indeed the majority of Barhebraeus' medical works.[6] His philosophical works, on the other hand, have fared better and it is with these that we shall be concerned in this paper.

II. *Survey of Barhebraeus' Philosophical Works*[7]

Among Barhebraeus' works there are three original works of different lengths (nos. 1–3 below) which deal with philosophy in general,

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[5] A list of thirty-one works is found in the continuation of Barhebraeus' *Chronicon ecclesiasticum* by his brother Barṣawmā; see *Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon ecclesiasticum*, ed. J.B. Abbeloos and T.J. Lamy, 2 parts in 3 vols. (Louvain: Peeters, 1872–7), 2:467–486; and Joseph Simonius Assemanus, *Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana*, 3 vols. (Rome: S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1719–1728; repr. Hildesheim-New York: Olms, 1975, 1999), 2:268–272. Similar lists with slight variations are found in the metrical biography of Barhebraeus composed by his disciple Dioscorus Gabriel of Barṭelli (bishop of Gāzartā d-Qardū/Cizre, d. 699/1300, *Mêmrā ʿal qaddīšā Grīgōriyōs mafryānā d-hū Bar ʿEbrāyā da-ʿbīd l-Diyōsqōrōs Episqōpā d-Gāzartā mdittā d-Qardū šnat 1286 m.*, ed. Yūliyōs Yešūʿ Çiçek (Glane/Losser: Bar Hebraeus Verlag, 1985), 34–38; see also R. Payne Smith, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars sexta, codices syriacos, carshunicos, mendaeos complectens* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1864), 516–522; Assad Sauma, "Commentary on the 'Biography' of Bar Hebraeus," *ARAM* (Stockholm: Arameiska Akademikernas Förbund) 7.15–16 (1998), 35–68, here 39f., and in numerous manuscripts of Barhebraeus' works. See H. Janssens, *L'Entretien de la sagesse, Introduction aux oeuvres philosophiques de Bar Hebraeus*, BFPUL 75 (Liège: Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres/Paris: E. Droz, 1937), 17, n. 1; A. Vööbus, *Syrische Kanonessammlungen, Ein Beitrag zur Quellenkunde, I. Westsyrische Originalurkunden*, CSCO 307, 317, subs. 35, 38, (Louvain: Secrétariat du Corpus SCO, 1970), 502, n. 4; and H.G.B. Teule, *Gregory Barhebraeus, Ethicon (Mēmrā I)*, CSCO 534–535, syr. 218–219 (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), textus ix–x. Several works not mentioned in these lists (incl. the two Arabic treatises on psychology, see II.9–10 below) are also found attributed to Barhebraeus in manuscripts.

[6] See Takahashi, "Simeon," n. 93.

[7] The best general survey of Barhebraeus' philosophical works remains that provided by Janssens in the introduction to his edition of the *Discourse of Wisdom*

covering the three areas of logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics.[8]
The three works were no doubt intended to provide textbooks for
a progressive course in philosophy[9] and the alliterating titles they
share (*ḥêwaṯ ḥeḵmṯā, swāḏ sōp̄iya, têḡraṯ têḡrāṯā*) indicate that Barhebraeus
saw them as forming a kind of a trilogy despite the variance in the
dates at which they were composed. There is also a translation of
an Arabic work which covered the same range of subjects (transla-
tion of *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*; no. 6) and another which may have
done so (*Zubdat al-asrār*; no. 5). Barhebraeus also wrote a short trea-
tise dealing with logic only (no. 4), as well as two works, in Arabic,
devoted to the subject of psychology (nos. 9–10). In addition, "philo-
sophical" considerations play a large part in his theological works
(*Candelabrum, Rays*; nos. 7–8) and are also to be found in scattered
places in his other works.[10]

[Barhebraeus' works are referred to by a confusing array of names
in secondary literature. I give in parentheses in each case the orig-
inal Syriac title, followed by the title as given in Assemani's *Bibliotheca
Orientalis*, 2.268–321 (on which the names in subsequent European
literature are mostly based) and the title encountered in Arabic sec-
ondary literature, usually as found in Barṣaum, *Luʾluʾ*, 414–430.]

(Janssens, *Entretien*, op. cit., 1–34). Since relatively little has been achieved since
Janssens' time in the way of editing and studying these philosophical works, a com-
plete overhaul of his survey will have to await the progress of the edition of the
Cream of Wisdom now under way, but an attempt will be made on the following
pages to highlight some of the findings made since 1937.

[8] Only the *Cream of Wisdom* has an independent section dedicated to "practical
philosophy" (i.e., ethics, economics and politics); see Section III below.

[9] See F.E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs: the Aristotelian Tradition in Islam* (New York:
New York University Press, 1968), 108.

[10] Among this last category of works, one might mention in particular those
poems of Barhebraeus dealing with philosophical themes: e.g., the piece on Creation
and the rational soul (*Gregorii Bar-Hebraei carmina*, ed. Augustinus Scebabi [Rome:
Typographia Polyglotta, 1877], 35–46; *Mušḥāṯā d-Mār Grīḡōriyōs Yōḥannān Bar ʿEḇrāyā
map̄ryānā d-maḏnḥā*, ed. Pīloksīnōs Yōḥannān Dōlabānī [Jerusalem: Dayr Mār Marqūs,
1929; repr. Glane/Losser: Bar Hebraeus Verlag, 1983], 86–94, no. 7.4); and the
"Question of Kamīs bar Qardāḥē and Answers of Daniel bar Ḥaṭṭāb and Barhebraeus
on the fact that Our Lord does not fall under the ten [Aristotelian] categories,"
Scebabi, 153–156; Dolabani, 157–159, no. 11.2.

1. *Cream of Wisdom (Ḥêwaṯ ḥeḵmṯā, Sapientia sapientiarum Assemanus, recte Butyrum sapientiae alii, Ẓubdat al-ḥikma)*[11]

The longest and most celebrated of Barhebraeus' philosophical works is the *Cream of Wisdom*, which was one of the last works he composed, in 684/1285–1286.[12] As has long been known, this work is modelled on Ibn Sīnā's *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, while the title of the work may have been inspired by the words "the cream of truth and choice morsels of the sciences" (*zubdat al-ḥaqq . . . qafiy al-ḥikam*), which occur near the end of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, a work which Barhebraeus translated into Syriac.[13] We shall be looking at this work in greater detail below.

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[11] Of the total of twenty-two books which make up this work, only three have so far been published in full. Poetica: D.S. Margoliouth, *Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam* (London: Nutt, 1887; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 2000), 114–139. De plantis: H.J. Drossaart Lulofs and E.L.J. Poortman, *Nicolaus Damascenus, De plantis, Five Translations*, VNAW.L NR 139, Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1989), 68–113 (with English translation). Oeconomica, chap. I–II: M. Zonta, *Fonti greche e orientali dell' Economia di Bar-Hebraeus nell' opera "La crema della scienza*," AION.S 70 (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1992) (with Italian translation, incl. that of chap. III); chap. III: G. Furlani, "Die Physiognomik des Barhebräus in syrischer Sprache I," *ZS* 7 (1929) 1–16 (with German translation). There is a paraphrase, in Italian, of the book De anima: G. Furlani, "La psicologia di Barhebreo secondo il libro *La crema della Sapienza*," *RSO* 13 (1931) 24–52. Work is under way on critical editions of five more books, along with the re-edition of one, with a view to publication in the series "Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus" (Leiden: E.J. Brill), comprising Rhetorica: John Watt (Cardiff); De mineralibus and Meteorologica: Takahashi (Frankfurt); Ethica, Oeconomica and Politica: Peter Joosse (Frankfurt).

[12] The colophon in MS Birmingham, Mingana syr. 310, fol. 216r, gives the date of completion of the part on natural philosophy as 22 Āb 1596 A.Gr. (Aug. 1285), while those in Laur. or. 83 (olim Palat. or. 187), fols. 191v, 227r, tell us that the parts on metaphysics and practical philosophy were completed, respectively, at the end of Kānōn I 1597 (Dec. 1285) and on 8 Šḇāṭ 1597 (12 Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 684/8 Feb. 1286).

[13] *Al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1377–1380/1957–1960), 903.4f.; *Išārāt*, Syriac version, MS Florence, Laur. or. 86, 132r b12f.: ܩܠܝܕܐ ܕܫܪܪܐ . . . ܘܓܒܝܬܐ ܕܚܟܡܬܐ. The point was first made by D. Margoliouth, *Analecta*, 39f.; see also J. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1928–32), 1:88; H. Janssens, "Crème de la science ou Science des sciences?—le vrai titre d'un ouvrage de Bar Hebraeus," *Le Muséon* 43 (1930) 365–372, here 372. Allusions made in the proem of the *Cream of Wisdom* itself (Laur. or. 69, 2v a4ff.) suggest that Barhebraeus wishes us to associate the title with the "cream and honey" of Isaiah 7.15, on which the promised child, "born of a virgin" (Is. 7.14), would be fed (and, through the Isaiah passage, also with Luke 2.40).

2. *Discourse of Wisdom* (*Swāḏ sōp̄iya, Sermo sapientiae, Alloquium sapientiae, Entretien de la sagesse, Ḥadīṯ al-ḥikma*)[14]

The shortest of the three philosophical compendiums, which may have been written in the mid-670s/1270s, has been published in full with a French translation and a detailed commentary by H. Janssens, who found its contents to be essentially Avicennan[15] and found many points of contact between this work and Ibn Sīnā's *al-Išārāt wa-t-tan-bīhāt* and *an-Naǧāt*, as well as the *Risāla fī l-Ḥudūd*,[16] although he seems not to have made any systematic comparison of the Syriac text with the Arabic texts (as opposed to translations) of Ibn Sīnā's works and as a result does not quite go so far as to specify any of these as the principal source of this work.

Given that this work is based to a large extent on Arabic sources, it is rather ironic that it came to be translated "back" into Arabic, perhaps as early as within the fourteenth century, but more likely a little later.[17]

3. *Treatise of Treatises* (*Têḡraṯ têḡrāṯā, Negotiatio negotiationum*
Assemanus, *Mercatura mercaturarum* alii, melius *Tractatus tractatuum*,
Tiǧārat al-fawāʾid)[18]

Barhebraeus' medium-length compendium of philosophy, the *Treatise of Treatises*, is one of the least known of his works. The oft-encountered description of this work as an abridgement of the *Cream of Wisdom* is belied by the fact that we have a manuscript of the work dated 20th Īyār 1587 A.Gr. (May 1276/674; Cantab. Add. 2003),[19] ten

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[14] Edition: H. Janssens, *Entretien*, op. cit. For a discussion of the title of the work, see ibid., 18f.

[15] Ibid., intro., esp. 11, 28–31.

[16] Ibid., index, 362.

[17] Editions of the Arabic version: Iġnāṭiyūs Afrām I Barṣaum, *Kitāb ḥadīṯ al-ḥikma li-l-ʿallāma aš-šahīr wa-ḥuǧǧat al-falāsifa al-ḥaṭīr Mār Ġrīġūriyūs Abī l-Faraǧ Ibn al-ʿIbrī* (Homs: Maṭbaʿat as-Salāma, 1940); E. Platti, "'L'entretien de la sagesse' de Barhebraeus, La traduction arabe," *MIDEO* 18 (1988) 153–194 (incomplete, Books 1–2 only).

[18] Unpublished. For a list of manuscripts and published excerpts, see Takahashi, "Barhebraeus und seine islamischen Quellen, *Têḡraṯ têḡrāṯā* (*Tractatus tractatuum*) und Ġazālīs *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*," paper presented at the 2. Symposium zu Geschichte, Theologie und Liturgie der syrischen Kirchen, Wittenberg, 14–16 July 2000 (proceedings due for publication by LIT Verlag, Hamburg/Münster), nn. 17–19.

[19] See W. Wright and S.A. Cook, *A Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), 495.

years before the completion of the *Cream of Wisdom*. The *Treatise of Treatises* is also mentioned in the *Discourse of Wisdom*,[20] so that this work must, in fact, be the earliest of the three compendiums of philosophy composed by Barhebraeus.

A. Baumstark, who had earlier published an excerpt of this work, states in his standard work, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, that it is a reworking of Ibn Sīnā's *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*.[21] The particular passage of the *Treatise* published by Baumstark (on classification of sciences, Treatise 2, introduction) does indeed look like a paraphrase of a passage in the *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, but such correspondences are rather more difficult to find in the rest of the *Treatise*. A closer examination of the *Treatise*, in fact, shows that this work has much more in common with Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsafa*, both in its details and in its overall structure.[22]

Insofar as the *Maqāṣid al-falāsafa* is itself a reworking of Ibn Sīnā's *Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī*, we have here another instance where Barhebraeus has used an Avicennan work as his principal source.[23] As in his other works, Barhebraeus mixes the material taken from the *Maqāṣid* with materials from other sources. One of the more important secondary sources in the parts of the *Treatise* examined so far is the Syriac version of the Ps.-Aristotelian *De mundo*.

4. *Book of the Pupils of the Eye* (*K. d-Bābātā, L. Pupillarum, K. al-Aḥdāq, K. al-Buʾbuʾ*)[24]

Besides the three compendiums of philosophy as a whole, Barhebraeus wrote a short treatise dealing with logic, following the pattern of the the *Organon*. H. Janssens found the contents of this work,

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[20] *Discourse of Wisdom*, I.4, ed. Janssens [see n. 5 above], 54.4f., tr. 173; Arabic version, ed. Barṣaum [see n. 17 above], 7 ult. f.; om. ed. Platti, 173.14 (cf. apparatus, 191.3).

[21] Baumstark, *GSL*, 317; id., *Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom V.–VIII. Jahrhundert*, Syrische Texte, 1. Bd. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1900; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1975), 164f. and 182 n. 1.

[22] See Takahashi, "Islamische Quellen," op. cit.

[23] While Barhebraeus was capable of using Persian sources, a comparison of the relevant passages in the *Treatise, Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and *Dānišnāmah* would seem to show that it was Ġazālī's Arabic work rather than Ibn Sīnā's Persian work that Barhebraeus used in his *Treatise*, even though at the present state of research the possibility cannot be ruled out that Barhebraeus had access to the *Dānišnāmah* in addition to the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*.

[24] Editions: C. Steyer, *Buch der Pupillen von Gregor Bar Hebräus*, Diss. Leipzig (Leipzig:

too, to be largely Avicennan[25] and would place its composition before
that of the *Discourse of Wisdom*, largely on the grounds that Barhebraeus
accepts the fourth figure (*eskēmā, šakl*) of syllogism in the *Discourse of
Wisdom* but not in the *Book of the Pupils of the Eye*.[26]

5–6. *Translations*

The lists of Barhebraeus' works tell us that he translated into Syriac
a work by an older contemporary of his, Aṯīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī
(d. 663/1264),[27] entitled *Zubdat al-asrār* (*Medulla mysteriorum* Assemanus).
It appears that this work is lost both in its Arabic original[28] and in
Barhebraeus' Syriac version.

Pries, 1907) (with German translation of the introduction and Section 1); H.F.
Janssens, "Bar Hebraeus' *Book of the Pupil of the Eye*," *AJSL* 47 (1930/1), 26–49,
94–134; 48 (1932), 209–263; 52 (1935), 1–21 (with English translation to end of
Section 3). The information given on this work by N. Rescher, *The Development of
Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1964), 206f. is difficult to outdo
in its inaccuracy (seven factual errors and one major omission packed into seven-
teen lines!).

[25] Janssens, *Pupil*, op. cit., intro. vol. 47, 41–44, and translation (in vol. 52),
passim.

[26] Janssens, *Entretien*, op. cit., 17. Barhebraeus also accepts the fourth figure and
treats it at some length in the *Treatise of Treatises* (I.3, MS Cantab. Add. 2004,
22r.27f., 25v.14–26v.13) and the *Cream of Wisdom* (Analytica priora I.2.4, II.3.1–6,
MS Laur. or. 69, 72r b20–v a7, 76v b8–77v a22), recognizing five modes (*znayyā*)
of conclusion in both (cf. I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, 2nd
ed. [Paris: Vrin, 1969], 247).

[27] On whom, see G.C. Anawati, "Abharī Samarqandī, Aṯīr-al-Dīn," EIr, 1:216f.
and the literature cited there. In his *Muḫtaṣar ta'rīḫ ad-duwal* (traditionally wrongly
called *Ta'rīḫ muḫtaṣar ad-duwal*), ed. Anṭūn Ṣālḥānī, 2nd ed. (Beirut: al-Maṭba'a al-
Kāṯūlīkīya, 1958), 254.14–16, Barhebraeus mentions Abharī among the disciples of
Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and talks of him as being active in Asia Minor (Rūm).

[28] No work under this title is mentioned by Brockelmann in *GAL*, although he
does mention a work called *Tanzīl al-afkār fī ta'dīl al-asrār*, citing a manuscript in
Mašhad (*GAL* Suppl. I.843 fin.; this work is also mentioned by Ibn al-Akfānī [d.
749/1348]; see D. Gutas, "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical
Works," in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts, The Syriac, Arabic and
Medieval Latin Tradition*, ed. C. Burnett, Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, 23
[London: Warburg Institute, 1993], 61 with n. 157). The title *Zubdat al-asrār* is men-
tioned at the end of Abharī's *Hidāyat al-ḥikma*:

والوقوف على مذهب الحكماء فليرجع الى كتابنا المسمى بزيدة (بزبدة) الاسرار

(Quoted here from Maḥmūd Fāḍil, *Fihrist-i nusḫah-hā-yi ḫaṭṭī-yi Kitābḫānah-yi Ǧāmi'-i
Gawharšād-i Mašhad*, 3 vols. [Mašhad, 1343–7Š/1964–7], 3:1246, no. 915/5). Ḥāǧǧī
Ḫalīfa, who had a copy of the commentary on the *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* by Muḥammad
ibn Šarīf al-Ḥusaynī [fifteenth c.], wrongly attributes the *Zubdat al-asrār* to Ḥusaynī,

The other translation is that of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt* (syriace *K. d-Remzē wa-mʿīrānwāṯā*, *L. Indicationum et prognosticorum* Assemanus).[29] The *Išārāt* is, in fact, one of the three works of Ibn Sīnā which Barhebraeus mentions by name in the passage of his *Chronicon* devoted to Ibn Sīnā (the other two being the *Qānūn fi ṭ-ṭibb* and the *Šifāʾ*)[30] and he tells us there that he had himself translated this "marvellous book" (*kṯābā tmīhā*) into Syriac. According to its preface, the translation was undertaken at the request of Simeon of Qalʿa Rūmāytā (d. 687/1289), who rose to a position of some importance as a physician at the Il-Ḫānid court and whose son, Tāǧ ad-Dawla, and nephew, Philoxenus Nemrod (patriarch 681–691/1283–1292), were taught by Barhebraeus.[31]

The Syriac version remains unedited except for some excerpts from the section on logic published by G. Furlani in 1946, but it is

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evidently taking the sentence quoted above to be a part of Ḥusaynī's comments rather than a part of the text of the *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* (Ḥāǧǧī Ḫalīfa, *Kašf aẓ-ẓunūn*, ed. G. Flügel [London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1835–58], 3:534, s.v. زبدة الاسرار).

[29] Unpublished. Excerpts can be found in G. Furlani, "La versione siriaca del *Kitāb al-Išārāt wat-Tanbīhāt* di Avicenna," *RSO* 21 (1946) 89–101 (based on MS Vat. syr. 191/1). See now also H. Teule, "Barhebraeus' Syriac Translation of b. Sina's Kitab al-isharat wa-l-tanbihat," paper presented at the symposium "Redefining Christian Identity," Groningen, 7–10 April 1999 (proceedings due for publication by Peeters, Louvain, in the series OLA). Manuscripts: a) with the Arabic text in Arabic script: Florence, Laur. or. 86 (dated 1278 A.D., see below); b) with the Arabic text in Syriac script (Garshuni): olim Kandanaḍ, Kerala (1497 A.D.; see Barṣaum, *Luʾluʾ*, 420, n. 6; Mingana, op. cit., infra, 1031–34, ad no. 558); Charfeh, fonds patriarcal 743 (1584 A.D.; see Bihnām Sūnī [Sony], *Fihris al-maḫṭūṭāt al-baṭriyarkīya fī Dayr aš-Šarfa*, Beirut, 1993); Damascus, Syr. Orth. Patriarchate 6/4 (1907 A.D.; see Ph. Y. Dolabani et al., "Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque du Patriarcat Syrien Orthodoxe à Ḥomṣ (Auj. à Damas)," *ParOr* 19 [1994] 555–661); Charfeh, fonds patriarcal 744 Sony (olim 99, 1909 A.D.); Birmingham, Orchard Learning Resources Centre, Mingana syr. 558 (1930 A.D., see A. Mingana, *The Catalogue of the Mingana Collection of Manuscripts now in the Possession of the Woodbrooke Settlement, Selly Oak, Birmingham*, I [Cambridge: Heffner, 1933]); b.ii) Section on logic only: Vatican, syr. 191/1 (seventeenth c.?, see Furlani, op. cit.; Furlani's dating of the MS to the fifteenth c. rests on shaky grounds); Paris, Bibl. Nat. syr. 249 (1633 A.D.; see H. Zotenberg, *Catalogues des manuscrits syriaques et sabéens (mandaïtes) de la Bibliothèque Nationale* [Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1874]); Vatican, Borg. syr. 54 (1654 A.D.; olim Maronite College, Ravenna; see A. Scher, "Notice sur les manuscrits syriaques du Musée Borgia, aujourd'hui à la Bibliothèque Vaticane," *JA* 10e sér. 13 [1909], 249–287; A. Diotallevi, "Ricerca dei manoscritti del Collegio Maronita di Ravenna," *SROC* 1 [1978], 45, no. 30).

[30] *Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon syriacum*, ed. Paulus Bedjan (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1890), 219.14–221.8; tr. E.A.W. Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, the son of Aaron, the Hebrew physician, commonly known as Bar Hebraeus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), 1:196–198.

[31] See Takahashi, "Simeon," §33 et passim.

a generally faithful, word-for-word translation of Ibn Sīnā's Arabic text and, as such, could be of value as an indirect thirteenth-century witness for the text of the *Išārāt*, as well as being, for Syriacists, a hitherto unexploited source for lexicography.

One fact which has largely escaped the notice of scholars is that this Syriac version is usually found in the manuscripts not by itself but accompanied by the original Arabic text in parallel columns, meaning that these manuscripts are themselves direct witnesses of the Arabic text. This applies also to the oldest manuscript of the Syriac version, MS Florence, Laur. or. 86 (olim Palat. or. 185), which was copied within Barhebraeus' lifetime in 677/1278, making it also one of the older witnesses available of the Arabic text.[32] Although this fact is already mentioned by S.E. Assemani in his 1742 catalogue of the Florence manuscripts,[33] neither the Laurentianus nor any of the other manuscripts containing the Syriac version are mentioned in the standard lists of Avicennan manuscripts.[34]

7–8. *Theological Works*

Philosophical considerations also play an important role in the theological works of Barhebraeus, such as the *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary* (*Mnārat quḏšē, Candelabrum sanctuarii, Manārat al-aqdās*),[35] which was

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[32] The beginning of the Arabic text is missing. The Arabic text begins (in mid-sentence) on fol. 10r with the words تركيب فى حقيقتـه لم يمكن ان يدل عليه (in *al-Manṭiq*, *nahǧ* 2, ed. Dunyā, 251.3). Twenty folios in the middle of the manuscript (fols. 61r–80v) are in a different hand from the rest.

[33] Stephanus Evodius Assemanus, *Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae et Palatinae codicum MMS. orientalium catalogus* (Florence: Albizinianus, 1742), 328: ". . . constat 132 paginis, Syriacis literis, & sermore *cum textu Arabico* exaratus a Ioanne filio Bacchi, Sabbato, die decima sexta Canun prioris (Decembris) anno Graecorum MDXC. (Christi 1279). ut ad eius calcem adnotatur" (my emphasis; for the date "1279," read "1278").

[34] Brockelmann, *GAL* I, 454, S I, 816, no. 20; G.C. Anawati, *Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā / Essai de bibliographie avicennienne* (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1950), 6–9; Y. Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḥah-hā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn Sīnā / Bibliographie d'Ibn Sina* (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1954), 34; O. Ergin, *Ibni Sina bibliografyası*, Istanbul Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi yayınlarından, 27 (Istanbul: Yalçın Matbaası, 1956), 12.

[35] Edition in a single volume: Y.Y. Çiçek, *Mnārāṯ quḏšē meṭṭul šeṯêšē ʿēdtānāyāṯā men syāmē d-Mār Grī ḡōriyōs Yōḥannān Bar ʿEḇrāyā . . .* [*Lamp of the Sanctuary (Mnorath Kudshe) by Mor Gregorios Yohanna Bar Ebryoyo*] (Glane/Losser: Bar Hebraeus Verlag, 1997) (based on MS Jerusalem, St. Mark's 135). For critical editions of the individual bases (with French or German translation), see the list at Fiey, "Esquisse," 289f. The end of Base IV (list of heresies, corr. ed. Çiçek, 447–458), which is not in J. Khoury's edition of that base, can be found in F. Nau, *Documents pour servir à*

written around 1270[36] and deals with the whole spectrum of dog-
matic theology in twelve books, called "bases" (*šeṯêsē, fundamenta*), and
the *Book of Rays* (*K. d-Zalgē, L. Radiorum, K. al-Ašīʿa*),[37] which is essen-
tially an abridgement of the *Candelabrum*.

It has been noted in connection with the *Candelabrum* that a clear
distinction can be drawn between those parts of this work devoted
to philosophical arguments as a preliminary to the theological dis-
cussions and the theological discussions proper. For his philosophi-
cal arguments Barhebraeus evidently turned to the Islamic philosophers
in vogue in his day. In his study of the part of this work dealing
with the Resurrection, H. Koffler found that the philosophical argu-
ments used to establish the possibility of the Resurrection were taken
largely from the *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn* of
Faḫr ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ar-Rāzī (544–606/1149–1209).[38]

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l'histoire de l'Église nestorienne, PO 13/2 (Paris, 1916), 252–265. Edition of a modern
Arabic version: Diyūnīsiyūs Bihnām Ǧiǧāwī (ed. Grīġūriyūs Yūḥannā Ibrāhīm),
*Manārat al-aqdās li-l-ʿallāma Mār Ǧrīġūriyūs Abī l-Faraǧ Ibn al-ʿIbrī mafriyān al-mašriq
1226–1286*, Syriac Patrimony/at-Turāṯ as-Suryānī, 13 (Aleppo: Mardin Publishing
House, 1996).

[36] On the date of composition of the *Candelabrum*, see Takahashi, "Simeon,"
n. 45. The *Book of Rays*, as a summary of the *Candelabrum* is to be dated after it,
but before the *Nomocanon* (*K.d-Huddāyē*), in which both these works are mentioned.

[37] Facsimile edition: *Kṯābā d-Zalgē w-šurrārā d-šeṯêsē ʿēdtānāyāṯā men syāmē d-abūn
qaddīša Mār Grīġōriyōs d-hū Bar ʿEḇrāyā* [*Book of Zelge by Bar-Hebraeus, Mor Gregorius
Abulfaraj, the great Syrian philosopher and author of several Christian works*] (Istanbul: Zafer
Matbaası, 1997) [reproduction of a manuscript copied in 1996 from a manuscript
dated 1576 A.D. = MS Oxford, Bodl. Or. 467]. Edition of Book X (with French
translation) in N. Sed, *Le Candélabre de sanctuaire de Grégoire Abou'lfaradj dìt Barhebraeus,
Douzième base: du Paradis, suivie du Livre des rayons: Traité X*, PO 40/3 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1981), 464–503. Otherwise available in print in short excerpts only (two
excerpts already in Faustus Naironus, *Evoplia fidei catholicae-romanae historico-dogmatica*
[Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1694], 197f., 316f.).

[38] H. Koffler, *Die Lehre des Barhebräus von der Auferstehung der Leiber*, OrChr(R) 28/1
(Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1932), 202–207. Similar observa-
tions were made by J. Khoury in his edition of Base IV (Khoury, *Le Candélabre du
sanctuaire de Grégoire Abou'lfaradj dit Barhebraeus, Quatrième base: de l'Incarnation*, PO 31/1
[Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1965], 9, 41, 111, 246–249). See further A. Torbey, "Les
preuves de l'existence des anges, d'après le traité de Grégoire Bar-Hebraeus sur les
anges, Étude critique et sources," *OC* 39 (1955), 133: "L'étude de cette partie [sc.
Base V, de angelis] nous porte à conclure qu'Avicenne est la source principale de
presque toutes les preuves que l'auteur attribue aux philosophes païens." P.-H.
Poirier, "Bar Hebraeus sur le libre arbitre," *OC* 70 (1986) 32, 36 resp.: "Non seule-
ment sont-ils [sc. les musulmans] au centre de ses préoccupations apologétiques, . . . mais
l'argument même de la IXe base est élaboré en fonction de la problématique musul-
mane du libre arbitre telle qu'elle devait être fixée, déjà à l'époque de Bar Hebraeus,
par les *mutakallimūn*," and, "Il est donc clair que Bar Hebraeus a conçu son De

Similarly, in his discussion of mineralogy and meteorology in Base
II of the *Candelabrum*, Barhebraeus uses as his main source *Kitāb al-
Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqīya* of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī.[39] Insofar as ar-Rāzī and
other Islamic writers used by Barhebraeus as his sources themselves
depend to a large extent on Ibn Sīnā, these "philosophical" parts of
the *Candelabrum* and the *Book of Rays*, too, will need to be taken into
account when considering the reception of Ibn Sīnā in Barhebraeus.

   There are Arabic translations of these two theological works dat-
ing back at least to the seventeenth century, the *Book of Rays* having
been translated by Ġrīġūriyūs Yūḥannā ibn ʿAbbūd ibn al-Ġurayr
aš-Šāmī az-Zurbābī (Syr. Orth. bishop of Damascus 1078/9–1095/6
[1668–84]),[40] and the *Candelabrum* by Sarkīs ibn Yūḥannā az-Zurbābī
(d. c. 1080/1669).[41]

9–10. *Arabic Treatises on Psychology*[42]

The subject of the origin, nature and destiny of the human soul is
discussed at some length in all three philosophical compendiums, as

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Libero arbitrio en fonction de la problématique, traditionelle à son époque et dans
son milieu, de la théologie musulmane."

   [39] See Takahashi, "The Greco-Syriac and Arabic Sources of Barhebraeus'
Mineralogy and Meteorology in *Candelabrum sanctuarii*, Base II," paper presented at
Symposium Syriacum VIII, Sydney, 26th June–1st July, 2000. Besides *al-Mabāḥiṯ
al-mašriqīya*, Barhebraeus uses in this part the Syriac versions of the Ps.-Aristotelian
De mundo and Nicolaus Damascenus' *Compendium* (see Section III below). For his
geography he depends mainly on Bīrūnī's *Kitāb at-Tafhīm li-awāʾil ṣināʿat at-tanǧīm*.

   [40] He is known also as the translator of several other works of Barhebaeus. See
Samir Khalil Samir, "Bar Hebraeus, le 'Dafʿ al Hamm' et les 'Contes amusant',"
OC 44 (1980), 152–5, along with the literature listed there at 155, n. 55; to Samir's
list add Mīḫāʾīl Raǧǧī, "Yūḥannā aš-Šāmī az-Zurbābī al-mulaqqab bi-Ibn al-Ġurayr,"
Machriq 43 (1954) 129–156; Teule, *Ethicon* I [see n. 5 above], versio xiv; H. Kaufhold,
"Notizen über das Moseskloster bei Nabk und das Julianskloster in Qaryatain in
Syrien," *OC* 79 (1995), 77, 78f.

   [41] He is probably the son of Gregory John. The date of death above is that
given by Barṣaum, *Luʾluʾ* 461; cf. Raǧǧī, "Yūḥannā," 153 with n. 1. Earlier, Daniel
of Mardin (726–after 784/1326–after 1382; often confused with Daniel bar Ḥaṭṭāb)
had composed an abridged Arabic version of the third and fourth bases of the
Candelabrum under the title *Kitāb al-Išrāq fī l-uṣūl ad-dīnīya* (see F. Sepmeijer, "The
Book of Brilliance by Daniel Ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb," *ParOr* 19 [1994], 379–387), as well
as another work covering similar grounds and incorporating much material from
the *Candelabrum* (*Kitāb Uṣūl ad-dīn*; see Graf, *GCAL* 2:282f., and Sepmeijer, "Book
of the Principles of Faith Attributed to Daniel Ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb," *ParOr* 22 [1997],
405–413).

   [42] There is some confusion over the titles of the two Arabic works. Although I
retain here the titles under which the works were published by Cheikho and Sbath,

well as in the *Candelabrum* (Base VIII) and the *Book of Rays* (Book VI).[43] In addition to these we have two treatises in Arabic on the soul which have come down to us under Barhebraeus' name.[44] One of these, published under the title *Maqāla muḫtaṣara fī n-nafs al-bašarīya* by L. Cheikho,[45] appears largely to be an abridgement of a Syriac work on the soul by Moses bar Kepha.[46] The other, first published under the title *Muḫtaṣar fī ʿilm an-nafs al-insānīya* by P. Sbath,[47] may be considered an abridged translation of the corresponding part (Base VIII) of the *Candelabrum*.[48]

III. *Cream of Wisdom and Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ*

As an illustration of how Barhebraeus uses Ibn Sīnā, we shall examine here the manner in which he uses the *Šifāʾ* in his *Cream of Wisdom*.

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it is to be noted that the proem of the work edited by Cheikho states that *this* work is called "muḫtaṣar fī ʿilm an-nafs al-insānīva" (ed. Cheikho, *Nubḏa . . .* 1898 [as in n. 45 below], 45.3: هذا مختصرٌ فى علم النفس الانسانية وبعدُ فانَّ . . .; also MS Berlin, Staatsbibl., Preußischer Kulturbesitz, or. quart. 887 [59 Aßfalg], 409.3f.). Furthermore, Sbath calls the work published by Cheikho "Maqāla fī ḫilqat an-nafs/Traité sur la création de l'âme" (P. Sbath, *Bibliothèque de manuscrits Paul Sbath, Prêtre syrien d'Alep: catalogue* [Cairo: H. Friedrich et Co., 1928–34], 1:3), while in MS Berol. or. quart. 887, the title of the work is given as "Maqāla muḫtaṣara fī ḫilqat an-nafs." At the same time it is the other treatise, the one published by Sbath, which ends: تمت هذه المقالة النفيسة فى خلقة النفس الناطقة وخواصها (ed. P. Sbath in *Muḫtaṣar fī ʿilm an-nafs al-insānīya li-Ġrīġūriyūs Abī l-Faraǧ al-maʿrūf bi-Ibn al-ʿIbrī /Traité sur l'âme par Bar-Hebraeus, Mort en 1286* [Cairo: H. Friedrich, 1928], 61.3f.; ed. Iġnāṭiyūs Afrām Barṣaum, *Risāla fī ʿilm an-nafs li-l-ʿallāma Mār Ġrīġūriyūs Ibn al-ʿIbrī mafriyān al-mašriq* [Jerusalem: Dayr Mār Marqūs, 1938], 84.ult.) [Barṣaum's edition is also published in *al-Maǧalla al-Baṭriyarkīya as-Suryānīya* 5 [1938], 79–97, 113–137, 168–192, 225–243.]

[43] See also n. 10 above.

[44] The two treatises are not mentioned in the usual lists of Barhebraeus' works (see n. 5 above), although it may be that one of these two treatises should be identified with the *Mêmrā šennāyā* mentioned in the list found in MS Laur. or. 298 (see Takahashi, "Simeon," n. 96).

[45] In *Machriq* 1 (1898) 745–9, 828–33, 934–8, 1084–7, 1113–20. Published separately as appendix to L. Cheikho, *Nubḏa fī tarǧama wa-taʾālīf al-ʿallāma Ġrīġūriyūs Abī l-Faraǧ ibn Ahrūn aṭ-ṭabīb al-Malaṭī al-maʿrūf bi-Ibn al-ʿIbrī* (Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kāṯūlīkīya, 1898), 44–70; later also in id., *Onze traités philosophiques d'anciens auteurs arabes . . .* (Beirut, 1908) [non vidi], and L. Malouf, C. Eddé, and L. Cheikho, *Traités inédits d'anciens philosophes arabes . . .* (Beirut, 1911), 76–112.

[46] See Graf, *GCAL* II:273f.

[47] P. Sbath, *Muḫtaṣar*, op. cit.; ed. Barṣaum, op. cit.

[48] See G. Furlani, "Barhebreo sull' anima razionale (Dal *Libro del Candelabro del Santuario*)," *Or.* NS 1 (1932), 115. Graf was inclined for this reason to attribute the work to a later translator (Graf, *GCAL* II:276f.; see also his review of Sbath's edition, *OC* 25/26 [1928/9] 130f.).

The resemblance of the overall structure of the *Cream of Wisdom* and much of its contents to those of Ibn Sīnā's *aš-Šifāʾ* has long been known and D.S. Margoliouth, who edited the Book of Poetics over a century ago, aptly talks of the *Cream of Wisdom* as being drawn from the "milk" that is the *Šifāʾ*.[49] At the same time, as Margoliouth was aware, the *Cream of Wisdom* is not simply a translation or summary of the *Šifāʾ*, and this is obvious even from a cursory look at the major divisions of the two works.

Aš-Šifāʾ	*Cream of Wisdom*
Part 1: Logic (*manṭiq*)	Logic (*mlīlūtā*)
Part 2: Natural sciences (*tabīʿīyāt*)	Natural sciences (*kyānāyātā*)
Part 3: Mathematics (*riyāḍāt*)	Metaphysics (*bātar kyānāyātā*)
Part 4: Metaphysics (*mā baʿda ṭ-ṭabīʿīyāt*)	Practical philosophy (*pīlōsōp̄iya praqṭīqāytā*)

In the *Cream of Wisdom*, Barhebraeus has suppressed the section on the mathematical sciences (geometry, algebra, music and astronomy)[50] and has added at the end a section on practical philosophy (ethics, economics and politics), which, as M. Zonta has recently shown, has as its principal source Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī's *Aḫlāq-i Nāṣirī*.[51] It may be noted that the alteration made here by Barhebraeus, in fact, brings the *Cream of Wisdom* more in line with the contents of the Aristotelian corpus.

It has been shown by H.J. Drossaart Lulofs that in the section of the *Cream of Wisdom* on the natural sciences Barhebraeus has made extensive use of the Syriac version of the compendium of Aristotelian philosophy (Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας) composed by Nicolaus

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[49] Margoliouth, *Analecta*, op. cit., 43: ". . . equidem scire gerens utrum totum illud butyrum lacte Avicennaeo expressum esset, . . ."

[50] See Barhebraeus' own note on the matter, found at the end of the part on metaphysics, MS Laur. or. 83, 191v a 5–10: ܫܠܡ ܟܬܒܐ ܕܬܐܘܠܘܓܝܐ ܘܒܫܘܡܠܝܗ ("Here ends the Book of Theology. With its completion comes to end the theoretical part of philosophy in the book of Cream of Wisdom, except for the mathematical [parts] which belong to another treatise."). Cf. with this Ibn Sīnā's note concerning the omission of the practical sciences in his work, *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Madḫal*, ed. I. Madkour et al. [Cairo: Wizārat aṭ-Ṯaqāfa, 1952], 11.12f. (see also ibid., intro., 13).

[51] Zonta, *Fonti greche*, op. cit.; also id., "Structure and Sources of Bar-Hebraeus' 'Practical Philosophy' in *The Cream of Science*," in *Symposium Syriacum VII*, OCA 256, ed. R. Lavenant (Rome: Pont. Istituto Orientale, 1998), 279–292.

Damascenus, a first-century B.C. Peripatetic philosopher, historian
and adviser to Herod the Great [= Nic. syr.].[52] When we now com-
pare the order of the books in the parts of the *Cream of Wisdom* and
the *Šifā'* dealing with the natural sciences and in Nicolaus' *Compendium*,
we obtain the following results.

Cream of Wisdom	*Aš-Šifā'*	Nic. syr.
I. Auscultatio physica	I. Auscultatio physica	I. Auscultatio physica
		II.–III. Metaphysica
II. De caelo	II. De caelo	IV. De caelo
III. De gen. et corr.	III. De gen. et corr.	V. De caelo (contd.), De gen. et corr.
	IV. De action. et passion.	
IV. De mineralibus	V/1. De mineralibus	VI. Meteorologica I–III
V. Meteorologica	V/2. Meteorologica	VII. De mineralibus, De plantis?
VI. De plantis	VI. De anima	
VII. De animalibus	VII. De plantis	VIII.–IX. De animalibus
		(*Hist.* & *Part. an.*)
VIII. De anima	VIII. De animalibus	X. De anima
		XI. (*De sensu*; *De somno*; *De insomn.*)
		XII. (*Gen. an.* I–IV)
		XIII. (*Gen. an.* V).

It may be seen that in suppressing the book on "actions and pas-
sions" (*al-af'āl wa-l-infi'ālāt*) and placing the De plantis and De ani-
malibus before the De anima, Barhebraeus is in agreement with
Nicolaus against Ibn Sīnā and, more generally, with the traditional
order of the Aristotelian corpus. On the other hand, in placing min-
eralogy before meteorology, Barhebraeus follows Ibn Sīnā, and the
materials from Ibn Sīnā's book on "actions and passions," in fact,
survive in the *Cream of Wisdom* by being incorporated into Books III,
De generatione et corruptione and IV, De mineralibus.

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[52] H.J. Drossaart Lulofs, "Aristotle, Bar Hebraeus and Nicolaus Damascenus on
Animals," in *Aristotle on Nature and Living Things, Philosophical and Historical Studies
Presented to David M. Balme on his Seventieth Birthday*, ed. A. Gotthelf (Pittsburgh:
Mathesis Publications, 1985), 345–357; H.J. Drossaart Lulofs and E.L.J. Poortman,
Nicolaus Damascenus. De plantis, op. cit.; see also H.J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Nicolaus Damascenus
on the Philosophy of Aristotle, Fragments of the first five books translated from the Syriac*, Philoso-
phia Antiqua, 13 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965); Takahashi, "Syriac Fragments of Theo-
phrastean Meteorology and Mineralogy, Fragments in the Syriac version of Nicolaus
Damascenus, *Compendium of Aristotelian Philosophy* and the accompanying scholia," in
On the Opuscula of Theophrastus, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and G. Wöhrle, Philosophie
der Antike, 14 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001), 189–225. The Syriac version of Nicolaus
is preserved in a unique manuscript, Cantab. Gg 2.14. For the page numbers used
here in referring to the text in this manuscript, see Takahashi, ib., 190.

The two books of the *Cream of Wisdom* dealing with mineralogy [= Min.] and meteorology [= Mete.] correspond largely to the fifth *fann* of the *Ṭabīʿīyāt* in the *Šifāʾ*, which is divided into two "treatises" (*maqāla*) dealing, respectively, with minerals (V/1, *al-maʿādin*) and meteorology (V/2, *al-āṯār al-ʿulwīya*). At one further remove, most of the themes treated in these two books go back to Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, although some of the subjects treated, especially in the Book of Minerals, are only briefly touched upon in the *Meteorologica* and the subject treated in Min. IV. (mathematical geography), for example, is one that is more readily associated with Ptolemy than with Aristotle.

The correspondences of the chapters in the *Cream of Wisdom* to the *Šifāʾ* and *Meteorologica* may be summarized as follows.

Cream of Wisdom	*Aš-Šifāʾ*	Arist. *Mete.*
Min. I. Rocks, water sources and mountains	V/1.1–3	[I.13]
Min. II. Earthquakes	V/1.4	II.7–8
Min. III. Minerals	V/1.5	[III.6B, IV]
Min. IV. Habitable world	V/1.6	[II.5]
Min. V. Sea	[IV.2]	[I.13], II.1–3
Mete. I. Cloud, rain, etc.	V/2.1	I.9–12
Mete. II. Illusions (rainbows, etc.)	V/2.2–3	III.2–6
Mete. III. Winds	V/2.4	II.4–6
Mete. IV. Thunder, lightning, etc.	V/2.5	II.9–III.1, I.4–8
Mete. V. Natural disasters	V/2.6	[I.14]

It will be seen that the order of the material in the *Cream of Wisdom* is essentially the same as that in the *Šifāʾ*, which, in turn, differs considerably from that of *Meteorologica* (and Nicolaus' *Compendium*, where the order in Aristotle is generally followed). On two occasions, however, Barhebraeus has reduced two or three chapters (*fuṣūl*) of the *Šifāʾ* into one chapter (*qeppālēʾōn*) in the *Cream of Wisdom* and, on one occasion—in Min. I.—he has added a chapter which has no counterpart in the fifth *fann* of the *Šifāʾ*, incorporating into it some of the material from the preceding fourth *fann*.

When we then turn to the actual text of the *Cream of Wisdom*, we find that there are indeed numerous passages which may be judged to be paraphrases of passages out of the *Šifāʾ*. A number of these

passages typifying the manner in which Barhebraeus paraphrases and alters the source passages are given below.

[In the translations below, continuous underlines indicate word-for-word matches between the two passages compared, while dotted undelines indicate less exact but still recognisable correspondences in meaning.]

Example 1: The following passage, found near the beginning of the 'book of minerals', is based almost entirely on the *Šifāʾ*. Here we see how Barhebraeus succeeds in shortening his source passage without omitting any of the essential points.

> *Cream of Wisdom*, De mineralibus, chapter I, section 1, theory 2, MS Laur. or. 83, 51v b10–52r a 11.

[Syriac text, 7 lines]

The opening sentence, [ܐ], is a paraphrase of the following sentence of the *Šifāʾ*.

> *Cream of Wisdom* [ܐ]: "Pure earth does not usually turn into stone, because the abundance of its dryness imparts not cohesion but crumbling to its parts."
> *Šifāʾ*, al-Maʿādin, *faṣl* 1, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Muntaṣir et al. (Cairo: Wizārat aṯ-Ṯaqāfa, 1965, = "Cairo edition"), 3.9–10:

ونقول أمّا فى الأكثر فإن الأرض الخالصة لا تتحجر لأن استسلاء اليبس عليها لا يفيدها استمساكا، بل تفتتا

> We say: In most cases, unadulterated earth is not petrified, because the mastery of dryness over (the earth) does not favor its cohesion, but rather its crumbling.

The first part of [ܒ] may be considered a summary of the first of the two passages of the *Šifāʾ* quoted below, into which a phrase taken from the second (a passage in the part summing up the discussion on the formation of stones) has been inserted.

> *Cream of Wisdom* [ܒ]: "Stones are formed in two ways: [1] Firstly, by way of baking of glutinous clay in the sun—as we see in the case of soft stones, which are intermediate between stone and clay at first, and later become hard."
> *Šifāʾ*, ibid., 3.10–15:

وإنما تتكون الحجارة فى الأكثر على وجهين من التكون: أحدهما على سبيل التفخير، والثانى على سبيل الجمود. فإن كثيرا من الأحجار يتكون من الجوهر الغالب فيه الأرضية، وكثير منها يتكون من الجوهر الغالب فيه المائية. فكثير من الطين يجف ويستحيل أولا شيئا بين الحجر والطين، وهو حجر رخو، ثم يستحيل حجرا. وأولى الطينات بذلك ما كان لزجا، فإن لم يكن لزجا فإنه يتفتت فى أكثر الأمر قبل أن يتحجر.

Stones are formed, usually, in two ways: (i) through baking[53] and (ii) through congelation. Many stones are formed from a substance in which earthiness predominates, while many of them are formed from a substance in which wateriness predominates. Clay often dries and is transformed first into something [intermediate] between stone and clay, i.e., a soft stone; then, it is transformed into stone. The most suitable (type of) clay for that (purpose) is that which is glutinous. For if it is not glutinous it usually crumbles before it is petrified.
Šifāʾ, ibid., 4.18–9:

فتكون الأحجار إذن إما لتفخير الطين اللزج فى الشمس، وإما لانعقاد المائية من طبيعة ميبسة أرضية، أو سبب مجفف حار.

Stones are formed, therefore, either by baking of glutinous clay in the sun, or by the solidification of wateriness by a drying, earthy nature, or a hot, desiccating cause.

In the second part of [ⲃ], the opening phrase "secondly by way of congelation" takes up the phrase at *Šifāʾ* 3.11 (see above). The rest of the passage summarises *Šifāʾ* 4.1–13. The reader will, I believe, agree that Barhebraeus succeeds here in summarising fairly accurately and succinctly a passage of Ibn Sīnā which is long-winded and often difficult to follow.

Cream of Wisdom [ⲃ/2]: "Secondly, by way of congelation of water, as it drips or pours down. Water congeals either through the mineralising power of the earth on which it falls, or through an earthy nature in which heat predominates—this being how salt congeals—or [in which] coldness [predominates], or a property which is unknown to us."
Šifāʾ, ibid., 4.1–13:

وقد تتكون الحجارة من الماء السيال على وجهين: أحدهما أن يجمد الماء كما يقطر أو كما يسيل برمته. والثانى منه فى سيلانه شىء يلزم وجه مسيله وتتحجر. وقد شوهدت مياه تسيل، فما يقطر منها على موضع معلوم ينعقد حجرا أو حصى مختلفة الألوان. وقد شوهد ماء قاطر، إذا أخذ لم يجمد وإذا انصب على أرض حجرية تقرب من مسيله انعقد فى الحال حجرا. فعلمنا أيضا أن لتلك الأرض قوة معدنية، تحيل السيال إلى الجمود. فمبادئ تكوّن الحجارة، إما جوهر طينى لزج، وإما جوهر تغلب فيه المائية. وهذا القسم يجوز أن يكون جموده من قوة معدنية مجمدة، ويجوز أن يكون قد غلبت عليه الأرضية على الوجه الذى ينعقد به الملح، بأن غلبت الأرضية فيه بالقوة دون المقدار؛ وإن لم يكن على نحو كيفية الأرض التى فى الملح، بل على كيفية أخرى، ولكن مشاركة لها فى أنها تنفعل بمعاونة الحرارة، فلما يصيبها الحر يعقده، أو قوة أخرى مجهولة عندنا. ويجوز أن يكون بالضد، فتكون أرضيته تتغلب بقوة باردة يابسة تعينه.

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[53] التفخير:التفجر ed. Cairo, v. infra, sect. IV.2.

A stone may be formed from running water in two ways. (i) <u>Water congeals</u> in its entirety <u>as it drips or flows</u>. (ii) There is deposited from (the water) as it flows something which adheres to the surface of its channel and petrifies. It has been observed how a portion of running water, dripping on to a certain place, solidifies into stone or pebbles of different colours. Dripping water has been seen which, when extracted, does not congeal but when <u>poured</u> on stony <u>earth</u> near its channel immediately solidifies into stone. We then also know that that <u>earth</u> has a <u>mineralising power</u>, which turns what is liquid into a solid. The bases for the formation of stones are either a glutinous clayey substance or a substance in which wateriness predominates. The <u>congelation</u> of the latter category may occur [i] because of a <u>mineralising</u>, solidifying <u>power</u>; [ii] it may occur (when) <u>earthiness</u> has come to predominate over it in the (same) way as that in which <u>salt is solidified</u>, (namely) in that the earthiness predominates in it by (its) power and not by (its) quantity. Even if it is not in the manner of the quality of the earth which is in salt, but of a different quality, nevertheless they are similar in that (earthiness) gains mastery through the help of (a) <u>heat</u>, so that when heat comes upon it it solidifies them; (b) <u>or another power</u> <u>unknown</u> to <u>us</u>; (c) it may occur through the opposite [of heat], so that earthiness predominates through a <u>cold</u>, dry power which helps it."

In part [ܐ], Barhebraeus reproduces the following passage of the *Šifāʾ*, which occurs *between* the passages corresponding to [ܒ/1] and [ܒ/2] in the *Šifāʾ*, and adds to this, in [ܓ], an observation of his own.

Cream of Wisdom [ܐ]: "The princely doctor [*sābā rēšānā* = Arab. *aš-šayḫ ar-raʾīs*, i.e., Ibn Sīnā] has recounted how, <u>when</u> [<u>he was</u>] <u>a child</u>, he saw on the banks of the [river] <u>Gihon</u> <u>clay</u> [used for] <u>washing the head</u>. <u>Twenty-three years</u> later he found it in the form of <u>stone</u>, <u>though porous</u>." [ܓ] "I [too] in my childhood went with my parents to a new monastery which was being built beside Melitene, and saw in front of the builders a single block of hard stone in which (pieces of) pottery and coal were mixed."

Šifāʾ, ibid., 3.15–17:

وقد شاهدنا فى طفولتنا مواضع كان فيها الطين الذى يغسل به الرأس، وذلك فى شط جيحون. ثم شاهدناه قد تحجر تحجرا رخوا، والمدة قريبة من ثلاث وعشرين سنة....

I saw, <u>in my childhood</u>, places in which there was <u>clay with which head was washed</u>. That was on the river <u>Ǧayḫūn</u>. Later I saw that (the clay) had petrified into <u>soft stone</u>. The interval was approximately <u>twenty-three years</u>.

Example 2: Barhebraeus frequently combines materials taken from different sources in a single passage, as he does below with materials taken from the *Šifāʾ* and the Syriac version of Nicolaus (underline: agreement with Nicolaus; italics: agreement with *Šifāʾ*).

Cream of Wisdom, Min. II.3.1, Laur. or. 83, 55v a8–15:

ܘܛܠܩ ܡܟܝܟܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܐܪܥܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܣܓܝܐܐ ܡܢ ܗܘܐ ܕܒܠܠܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܘܐ . ܟܕ ܡܨܥܪ ܡܕܢܚܐ ܐܦܝܗ ܠܪܥܐ .
ܐܦ ܗܟܝܠ ܒܨܦܪܐ . ܟܕ ܡܙܝܥܐ ܒܝ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܪܘܚܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܟܝܠܐ ܕܢܫܪܐ . ܟܕ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܫܪܐ .
ܐܝܡܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܨܥܬ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܗܘܝܢ . ܟܕ ܒܗܝ ܕܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܪܘܚܐ .

(1) <u>Movements of the earth are frequent and great at night</u> *because of the condensation by coldness of (the earth's) surface;*[54] (2) and *also <u>at dawn</u>, because* <u>the sun causes the wind to move, but is unable to dissipate (it)</u>. (3) <u>During the day</u>, the movements <u>occur</u> most at <u>noon</u>, *because* [at noon] *the heat attracts the exhalation with vigor,* [and at the same time] *causes* [fem., subject: 'heat'] <u>the surface of the earth to contract and dry up</u>,[55] and [so] <u>does not allow</u> [fem.] (the exhalation) to escape.

Nic. syr. 37 [367r].25–29:

ܗܟܢ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܡܨܥܬ ܡܟܝܟܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܐܪܥܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ /26 . ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܕܟܒܝܘܡܬܐ . ܒܗܝ ܕܡܨܥܪ ܗܘܐ ܡܛܠ ܟܠܠܝܬ ܪܘܚܬ ܕܚܠܦܬ .
ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܕܟܒܝܘܡܬܐ . ܟܕ/{ܒܝܘܡܐ} /27 ܕܝܢ ܗܘܐ ܟܝܠܐ . ܡܨܥܪ ܟܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܟܝܠܐ ܕܟܝܠ ܪܘܚܐ ܕܚܠܦܬ . ܐܝܡܡܐ ܟܒܐ ܣܒ/{--}/28 ܡܙܝܥ ܟܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܡܨܥܕ ܠܕܝܘܡܝܐ ܕܟܝܒܟܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܟܢ ܕܟܝܠ ܗܘܐ ܟܒܐ ܠܕܘܟܟ ܗܝܢܟܐ {ܐܝܡ}/29 ܠܟܠ ܣܒܐ . ܟܒܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܝܫܟ ܐܝܟ ܗܘܐ ܟܝܟܟܐ . ܟܒܐ ܢܫܪ ܒܢܣܟ ܣܬ/{ܒ}/30 ܟܝܠ ܪܘܚܐ ܕܢܙܝܥܐ ܟܝܠܐ ܕܚܠܦܬ . ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܫܪܐ .

[27 ᒧ: fort. ܟܒܐ, cf. *But. sap.* loc. cit. supra ‖ 29 ܐܝܡ : fort. ܟܝܠ legend., cf. Olympiodori *In Arist. Mete. commentarii* versionem arabicum, ed. Badawī [1971, ut n. 56 infra], 136.12 [تحل]

(1) Furthermore, <u>movements of the earth are frequent and great at night</u>, more [so] than during the day, because the absence of wind occurs more at night than during the day. (3) <u>During the day, they occur at noon</u>; for then the absence of wind occurs more; for the sun then <u>causes</u> [masc., subject: 'sun'] <u>the outside of the earth to dry up and contract</u> {. . .}; and therefore <u>does not allow</u> [masc.] the smoky <u>exhalation</u> to rise upwards. (2) Movements of the earth also occur <u>at dawn</u>, <u>because</u> at this time the <u>sun</u> sheds [?] and <u>causes wind to move</u>, <u>but is unable to dissipate (it)</u>.

Šifāʾ, al-Maʿādin, ed. cit. 18.6–8:

وذلك يكون فى الأكثر ليلا لتخصيف البرد وجه الأرض، وبالغدوات أيضا وقد يكون فى أنصاف النهار بسبب شدة جذب الحر للبخار، مع تجفيف وجه الأرض وإعادة البرد إلى داخلها على سبيل التعاقب.

(1) That occurs mostly <u>at night</u> because of <u>the closure</u> [*taḫṣīf*] by the <u>coldness of the surface of the earth</u>, (2) and <u>also in early morning</u>; (3) it sometimes occurs <u>at noon due to the severity of the attraction by the heat</u> of <u>vapour</u>, along with the <u>desiccation of the surface of the earth</u> and the return of the coldness towards its interior by way of succession [*taʿāqub*].

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[54] *b-yaḏ mraṣpānūṯ qurrā appēh.* The Arabicising construction of the phrase mirrors that of Ibn Sīnā's *li-taḫṣīfi l-bardi* (subjective gen.) *waǧha* (acc.) *l-arḍi.* In Syriac one might have expected *l-appēh.*

[55] *qāp̄dā wa-myabbšā.* Nic. syr.: *myabbeš w-qāp̄eḏ.* The more logical order of Nic. syr. is retained by Barhebraeus in his *Candelabrum*, base II, ed. J. Bakoš (*Le Candélabre des sanctuaires de Grégoire Aboulfaradj dit Barhebraeus*, PO 22/4, 24/3, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1930–33), 130.1.

It may be seen that the order of the three parts in the *Cream of Wisdom* follows that of the *Šifāʾ*,[56] but the wording at the beginning of each part is closer to that of Nicolaus. In (1), Barhebraeus follows the explanation of Ibn Sīnā, while in (2), where Ibn Sīnā gives no explanation, he follows Nicolaus and in (3), the explanations of Nicolaus and Ibn Sīnā have been combined.

Example 3: In the following passage Barhebraeus inserts a phrase taken from Ibn Sīnā in a sentence which is otherwise copied almost verbatim from Nicolaus (underline: agreement with Nicolaus; italics: agreement with *Šifāʾ*).

   Cream of Wisdom, Min. II.2.3, Laur. or. 83, 55r a10–16:

ܕܬܠܬ . ܟܝܬ. ܡܢ ܩܠܐ ܕܚܝܠܐ ܐܘܟܝܬܐ ܘܟܣܝܟܐ ܩܕܡܝ ܠܢܘܕܐ . ܐܦ ܟܚܕܐ ܥܡܗ . ܟܝܬ. ܐܝܟ ܩܠܐ ܕܠ ܐܟܣܢܘܬܐ . ܟܝܬ. ܐܦ ܐܝܟ ܓܥܝܬܐ ܕܬܘܪܐ . ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬ ܕܡܘܬܐ ܕܦܘܡ̈ܐ ܕܐܪܥܐ.

Third [theory]: Sometimes *terrifying sounds* and weak[57] *drones* <u>precede</u> <u>or</u> <u>occur</u> <u>with</u> <u>the</u> <u>earthquake</u>, <u>sometimes</u> <u>like</u> <u>the</u> <u>sound</u> <u>of</u> <u>piping</u>, <u>and</u> <u>sometimes</u> <u>also</u> <u>like</u> <u>the</u> <u>bellowing</u> <u>of</u> <u>a</u> <u>bull</u>. <u>This</u> <u>occurs</u> <u>because</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>variation</u> <u>in</u> <u>the</u> <u>shapes</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>openings</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>earth</u>.
Nic. syr. 40 [368v].7–8, 9–11:

ܐܠܐ ܡܠܦ ܐܦ ܩܠ̈ܐ ܡܫܚܠܦܐ ܩܕܡܝܢ ܠܙܘܥ̈ܐ ܕܐܪܥܐ 8/ ܐܘ ܗܘܝܢ ܥܡܗܘܢ 9// ܟܝܬ. ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܩܠܐ ܡܠ 10/ ܕܐܟܣܢܘܬܐ . ܟܝܬ. ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܓܥܝܬܐ ܕܬܘܪܐ . ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬ 11/ ܐܟܣܢܘܬܐ ܕܦܘܡ̈ܐ ܕܐܪܥܐ.

[9 ܟܠܐ: ܟܝܬ. cod.]
But different <u>sounds</u> also <u>precede</u> <u>the</u> <u>movements</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>earth</u> <u>or</u> <u>occur</u> <u>with</u> <u>them</u> [pl.]; <u>sometimes</u> <u>like</u> <u>the</u> <u>sound</u> <u>of</u> <u>piping</u>, <u>sometimes</u> <u>like</u> <u>the</u> <u>bellowing</u> <u>of</u> <u>a</u> <u>bull</u>. <u>This</u> <u>occurs</u> <u>because</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>variation</u> <u>in</u> <u>the</u> <u>shape</u> [sg.] <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>openings</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>earth</u>.
Šifāʾ, al-Maʿādin, ed. cit. 17.14–15: وربما حدث أصوات هائلة ودوي يدل على شدة الريح
Sometimes there occur <u>terrifying</u> <u>sounds</u> <u>and</u> <u>a</u> <u>drone</u> [*dawīy*] which indicates the severity of the wind.

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[56] The order "night-noon-dawn" of Nicolaus is in agreement with Arist. *Mete.* 366a13–23, and Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Meteorologicorum libros commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG 3/3 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899), 117.9–22. The more "chronological" order "night-dawn-noon" is adopted, besides in the *Šifāʾ* and *Cream of Wisdom*, also in the Arabic version of Olympiodorus' commentary on Arist. *Mete.*, ed. ʿA.R. Badawī in *Šurūḥ ʿalá Arisṭū mafqūda fī l-yūnānīya wa-rasāʾil uḥrá* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1971), 136.8–15. There is no mention of earthquakes at dawn in the corresponding passage in *Candelabrum* II, ed. Bakoš, op. cit., 129.10–130.2, a passage otherwise based on Nicolaus.

[57] Perhaps to be understood in the sense of "low-pitched." The addition of the adjective, which has no counterpart in the *Šifāʾ*, may have been prompted by a desire to produce an onomatopaeic effect through the assonance of "*dḥīlē . . . mḥīlē*".

The examples given above suffice to show that the *Cream of Wisdom* is not simply a paraphrase or a summary of the *Šifāʾ*. What Barhebraeus frequently does in composing his works is to take a particular work—usually an Arabic work—as his model and the framework around which to build his work. He takes much of his material from the work he has chosen as his principal model and usually also follows the order of the material in his model. He then inserts into the framework thus provided materials taken from other sources.[58] This is precisely what he has done with the *Šifāʾ* in his *Cream of Wisdom*.

The source most extensively used after the *Šifāʾ* in the part of the *Cream of Wisdom* on the natural sciences is the Syriac version of Nicolaus' *Compendium*. That Barhebraeus also made use of Greco-Syriac sources other than the *Compendium*, we may infer, for example, from the quotation from Theo of Alexandria's *Small Commentary* on Ptolemy's *Handy Tables* (Εἰς τοὺς προχείρους κανόνας) found in the passage on the precession of the fixed stars in Min. IV.1.2.[59]

Another source which is frequently used in those parts of the *Cream of Wisdom* examined so far is *Kitāb al-Muʿtabar* of Abū l-Barakāt Hibat Allāh ibn Malkā al-Baġdādī (c. 470–after 560/c. 1077–after 1164).[60]

To provide an overview of the manner in which Barhebraeus combines his sources, I list below the sources identified so far for chapters 2 and 3 of the Book of Minerals, dealing respectively with earthquakes, and classification and formation of minerals.

Šif.: *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *Ṭabīʿīyāt*, *fann* V, ed. Muntaṣir et al. ("Cairo edition").
AB: Abū l-Barakāt, *K. al-Muʿtabar*, ed. Hyderabad [Şerefettin Yaltkaya], 3 parts (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṯmānīya, 1357–8/1938–9).

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[58] See Takahashi, "Islamische Quellen," op. cit., section I fin.; id., "Greco-Syriac," op. cit., nn. 38–42.

[59] Laur. or. 83, 57v–58r. Cf. Theo, *Small Commentary*, chap. 12, ed. A. Tihon (*Le "Petit commentaire" de Théon d'Alexandrie aux Tables faciles de Ptolémée*, StT 282, Vatican City: Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, 1978), 236.4–237.2. Although the passage (or at least its contents) is one which was also well-known to Arabic astronomers, the proximity of Barhebraeus' wording to the Greek and the use in particular of transliterated Greek terms ἀποτελεσματικοί, ἔφοδος (ﻮﻘﻄﻌﺳﺮ. ﺪﻪﺗﻠﻳﻼﺳﺑﻮﺗﻨ) indicate that Barhebraeus must have used a Syriac, not Arabic, source here.

[60] Besides in the books Min. and Mete., Barhebraeus closely follows Abū l-Barakāt, for example, in his refutations of astrology and alchemy at *Cream of Wisdom*, De gen. et corr. II.5 (Laur. or. 83, 44v) and IV.3 (ibid. 50r-51r), where he reproduces, largely verbatim, *al-Muʿtabar*, ed. cit., 2:232f., 231f.

BK: Moses bar Kepha, *Hexaemeron Commentary*, MS Paris syr. 241.[61]

DM: Syriac version of Ps.-Arist. *De mundo*, ed. Paul de Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca* (Leipzig, 1858; repr. Osnabrück: Zeller, 1967), 134–158.

Nic.: Syriac version of Nicolaus, *Compendium of Aristotelian Philosophy* (see n. 52 above).

II.1.1: *Šif.* 15.4f.: Nic. 35.12f. & *Šif.* 17.1; Nic. 35.20–23; Nic. 35.26–31.

II.1.2: Nic. 36.13–16; Nic. 36.16–19.

II.1.3: Nic. 36.21–23, 30.

II.1.4: Nic. 35.31–36.7, 11–13; Nic. 36.20–21; 36.30–37.4.

II.2.1: Nic. 37.4f.; 37.5–10; *Šif.* 15.6f.; *Šif.* 16.1–4 & Nic. 37.11f., 16–19; *Šif.* 15.8f.; Nic. 39.6–8, 16.

II.2.2: *Šif.* 17.7f.; *Šif.* 17.8–10 (& BK 192v b ult.-193r a25?, & DM 146.13f.); *Šif.* 17.10–14 (& DM 145.17–20?); Nic. 38.22f.

II.2.3: Nic. 40.7f., 9–12; *Šif.* 17.15f. (& DM 146.18–22?); Nic. 40.13–17& *Šif.* 19.11–14.

II.2.4: *Šif.* 17.17–19; Nic. 41.14–17.

II.3.1: Nic. 37.19f.; Nic. 37.20–24 & Nic. 39.16f., 22–27; *Šif.* 18.3f. & Nic. 38.25–39.2; Nic. 35.27–29 & *Šif.* 18.6–8.

II.3.2: Nic. 37.30–38.1 & *Šif.* 18.9–11; *Šif.* 18.14–18 & Nic. 38.6–10; Nic. 38.1f., 5f.

II.3.3: *Šif.* 18.19–19.2 (& Nic. 39.27–30, 39.32–40.3).

II.3.4: Nic. 40.3–7 (& Nic. 37.10–12); *Šif.* 19.14f. & BK 192r b5–7, 192r b18–v a12?

III.1.1: *Šif.* 20.4–5; AB II.229.21; *Šif.* 20.15–18.

III.1.2: *Šif.* 20.10–12; Nic. 60.5–7; *Šif.* 20.12–14.

III.1.3: *Šif.* 21.3–4; *Šif.* 21.1–2.

III.1.4: *Šif.* 21.5–6; *Šif.* 21.6–9.

III.1.5: *Šif.* 20.5–9 & AB II.230.1–3; -.

III.2.1: AB II.230.17 & *Šif.* 21.10; AB II.230.17f.; AB II.230.19 & *Šif.* 21.13f.; AB II.230.18f. (& 230.4); AB II.230.19f. (& *Šif.* 21.14f., 17).

III.2.2: *Šif.* 21.15f.; *Šif.* 21.16–18; *Šif.* 21.18f.; *Šif.* 21.19–22.2.

III.2.3: *Šif.* 22.2f.; *Šif.* 22.3–5; *Šif.* 22.5f.; *Šif.* 22.6f.; *Šif.* 22.8f. & AB II.231.8–10; *Šif.* 22.9–11.

III.3.1: *Šif.* 22.11–15; *Šif.* 22.16–23.4 (& 23.5–7).

III.3.2: *Šif.* 23.2–4 & 23.7–10; *Šif.* 23.5 & 23.10–11; *Šif.* 23.7–9.

III.3.3: AB II.230.24–231.3; AB II.231.3f.; AB II.231.12–17; AB II.231.17f.

IV. *The Significance of Barhebraeus for Avicennan Studies*

1. *As a thirteenth-century commentator on Ibn Sīnā's works*

It will be clear by now that for Barhebraeus, as for his Islamic contemporaries, philosophy meant, essentially, the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, the man whom he calls, following the Arabic tradition, *sābā*

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[61] Cf. the German translation of L. Schlimme, *Der Hexaemeronkommentar des Moses bar Kepha*, GOF.S 14, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1977), where the folio numbers of this MS are given in the margin.

rēšānā (= *aš-šayḫ ar-raʾīs*)[62] and "the best of the moderns" (*myattrā da-ḥrāyē = afḍal al-mutaʾaḫḫirīn*).[63]

The question as to whether Barhebraeus himself endorses the philo-sophical views of Ibn Sīnā is one which cannot be entered into in great detail here.[64] Leaving aside the few instances where Barhebraeus contradicts Ibn Sīnā on matters of detail in his purely philosophical works, it has been noted that there is a clear dichotomy between the views taken in his philosophical works and in his theological works, as exemplified by his acceptance of the philosophers' view concerning the eternity of the world in his *Discourse of Wisdom* and *Cream of Wisdom* on the one hand and his rejection of it in his *Candelabrum* on the other.[65] To say with G. Furlani that Barhebraeus' philosophical and theological works were written for differerent pur-poses with different audiences in mind[66] does not solve the question as to what views Barhebraeus himself held on such matters and on philosophy in general. H. Janssens suggested that the contradictions in Barhebraeus' works were due to real doubts and wavering opin-ions on the author's part and that it was to overcome these uncer-tainties that Barhebraeus, like Ġazālī, came to reject philosophy and to embrace mysticism towards the end of his life,[67] but in pursuing

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[62] So in his *Chronicon*, ed. Bedjan, op. cit., 219.15 and *Cream of Wisdom*, passim. "*Aš-šayḫ ar-raʾīs*" in his Arabic history, *Muḫtaṣar taʾrīḫ ad-duwal*, ed. Ṣālḥānī, op. cit., 77.12, 187.1f., 189.25.

[63] Aristotle, the best of the "Ancients," is referred to by Barhebraeus simply as "the master" (*rabban*) in the *Cream of Wisdom*.

[64] It is hoped that I shall have the opportunity to deal a little more closely with this matter in the introduction to the partial edition of the *Cream of Wisdom* now under preparation. It has to be noted at the same time that a satisfactory answer to the question raised here will have to await a careful study of those parts of Barhebraeus' philosophical output which have yet to be edited.

[65] See H. Janssens, *Entretien*, 9f.; for the *Cream of Wisdom*, see Mete. V.1.3, V.3.1–2.

[66] Furlani, "Di tre scritti in lingua siriaca di Barhebreo sull' anima," *RSO* 14 (1934), 307.

[67] Janssens, *Entretien*, 12–15. This view finds its support in an "autobiographical" passage in Barhebraeus' mystical-ascetical work, the *Book of the Dove* (*K. d-Yawnā*, *L. Columbae*), which is in itself reminiscent of the autobiographical account in Ġazālī's *al-Munqiḏ min aḍ-ḍalāl* and in which Barhebraeus describes how he had at one time dedicated himself to the study of the "Greek" sciences, but failing to find satisfac-tion in these had turned to the writings of the mystics. In connection with Barhebraeus' relationship to Ġazālī, it should be mentioned that, whereas he is very much an Avicennan in his philosophical works, his major work on moral-mystical theology, the *Ethicon*, is modelled on Ġazālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn* (see Teule, *Ethicon*, versio xxx–xxxii, 112–145). In view of the contrast that has sometimes been drawn between the approaches of Ibn Sīnā and Ġazālī as being those, respectively, of a physician and a jurist, it is also worth noting that, while Barhebraeus was a physician by

this line we encounter the difficulty that the last major work Barhebraeus wrote was not one of his mystical works, but his longest exposition of Aristotelian-Avicennan philosophy, the *Cream of Wisdom*.

Whatever his real attitude to philosophy, the philosophical works of Barhebraeus that we have been discussing leave us little doubt that he had an interest in and a good understanding of philosophy. While these philosophical works were not written specifically as commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's works, they contain numerous passages which are translations and summaries of Ibn Sīnā's works and because any form of translation or summarization involves a degree of interpretation, we see reflected in these works how a scholar of high calibre in the thirteenth century understood Ibn Sīnā. Barhebraeus may not be an "original" thinker and his interpretations of Ibn Sīnā usually do no more than reflect the interpretations current in the Orient in his time. Nevertheless, his clear prose style and his skills in summarizing and in presenting difficult ideas in simple language[68] mean that his works can often be used as an aid in elucidating obscure passages of Ibn Sīnā.[69]

One advantage Barhebraeus had over his Islamic contemporaries was his ability to use Syriac sources and in particular the Syriac versions of Greek philosophical works. We have had the occasion to

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training, as a bishop and a leader of a *dhimmi* nation he had also to be competent in jurisprudence and has left us a work in that field, the *Nomocanon* (*K. d-huddāyē*), the parts of which dealing with civil and criminal law have been found to depend largely on Ġazālī's *Kitāb al-Waǧīz*; see C.A. Nallino, "Il diritto musulmano nel Nomocanone siriaco cristiano di Barhebreo," *RSO* 9 (1922–3), 512–580; repr. with corrections in id., *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti* (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1942), 4:214–290.

[68] R. Duval, *La littérature syriaque*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1907; repr. Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1970), 408: "Barhebraeus est avant tout un vulgarisateur, mais c'est en même temps un savant encyclopédiste qui a, à son service, une méthode claire et précise, une critique sagace." Janssens, *Entretien*, 22: "Les sections III, 18 et 19 [of the *Discourse of Wisdom*] fournissent un exemple de cette concision: Bar Hebraeus y développe en une seule page la thèse avicennienne de l'émanation.... L'exposé présente, il est vrai, d'importantes lacunes; il n'en est pas moins remarquable que l'auteur ait réussi à faire connaître en si peu de mots les points essentiels de cette théorie assez abstruse, et à rester clair tout en étant le plus bref possible."

[69] This at any rate is the experience of the present writer, in whose case the apparent obscurities in Ibn Sīnā may be due more to his own inadequacies than to real obscurities on Ibn Sīnā's part. Cf. Janssens, *Entretien*, 23: "La clarté qui caractérise le style de Bar Hebraeus apparaît surtout quand on compare ses oeuvres philosophiques avec celles d'autres écrivains syriens ou arabes: il arrive à notre auteur d'être plus clair qu'Avicenne, même dans le développement des idées qu'il lui emprunte...."

note his use of the Syriac versions of the Ps.-Aristotelian *De mundo* and of Nicolaus Damascenus' *Compendium*. Because these Syriac versions are usually more faithful to the Greek originals than the Arabic versions, their use frequently allows Barhebraeus to produce and to insert into his paraphrase of Ibn Sīnā passages where he stands closer than Ibn Sīnā, both in content and terminology, to the original texts of Aristotle and other Greek authors.

   With the exception of his use of Syriac sources, Barhebraeus' Christianity does not play any significant role in his purely philosophical works. It is, of course, of prime importance in those theological works, where an attempt is made to combine Aristotelian-Avicennan philosophy with Christian theology, such as the *Candelabrum* and the *Rays*, the first of which has, with some justification, been compared to Aquinas' *Summa theologica*.[70] Despite the possibility of the contacts with the Franks during his time of study in the Crusader states of Antioch and Tripoli and perhaps also later on in Cilicia and at the Il-Ḥānid court,[71] there are no positive indications in Barhebraeus' works (philosophical-theological and historical) that he had any awareness of the developments of Latin Scholastic philosophy.[72] It is all the more interesting, therefore, that the convergence of the same Christian and Aristotelian-Avicennan influences should have led Barhebraeus and Aquinas to compose these two comparable works almost exactly at the same time,[73] even if Barhebraeus does not break new ground in his work in the way that the Angelic Doctor does.[74]

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[70] The comparison goes back at least to E. Boré, "Analyse de l'ouvrage de Bar-Hebraeus intitulé ܡܢܪܬ ܩܘܕܫܐ *le Flambeau des saints*," *JA* 2e sér. 14 (1834), 486; see also Koffler, *Lehre*, op. cit., 26, n. 5, 199; Khoury, "Candélabre," op. cit., 12; P. Kawerau, *Das Christenheit des Ostens*, Die Religionen der Menschheit, 30 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1972), 63.

[71] See Koffler, *Lehre*, 207–9 (also Poirier, op. cit., 23, n. 4); and Zonta, "Structure," 927.

[72] Nor, it would seem, was he aware of intellectual developments in the Byzantine world (see Janssens, *Entretien*, 34).

[73] See Furlani, "Tre scritti," 307; Janssens, *Entretien*, 34. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) and Barhebraeus (1225/6–1286) are almost exact contemporaries and the date of composition of the *Summa*—1267–73—too, is very close to that of the *Candelabrum*, the two dates we have for the composition of the latter being ca. 1267 (Base II) and ca. 1272 (Base IV); see n. 36 above.

[74] This is, at any rate, the judgment of Antoine Torbey in his study of the angelologies of Barhebraeus and Thomas Aquinas, "Fī l-malāʾika, Muqārana bayna l-qaddīs Tūmā wa-Ibn al-ʿIbrī," *Machriq* 49 (1955), 724–735. That Barhebraeus himself thought he was producing something novel in the *Candelabrum*, if not in its

2. *As a textual witness*

Another use of Barhebraeus' works for Avicennan scholarship arises out of the fact that he wrote his works in Syriac, a language which has no tradition of accepting loanwords from Arabic (as opposed, it might be mentioned, to loanwords from Greek, in which Syriac abounds). This meant that, unlike commentators and paraphrasts writing in Arabic, Persian or Turkish, Barhebraeus could not leave the Arabic technical terms untranslated but had to find (or invent) the Syriac counterparts for these terms. Even though, with the exception of the translation of the *Išarāt*, what we have in Barhebraeus' works are paraphrases rather than straightforward translations of Ibn Sīnā's works, a judicious use of these paraphrases often allows us to correct (or confirm) the readings in the accepted texts of Ibn Sīnā's works in a way analogous to the Latin translations. Indeed the Syriac texts of Barhebraeus are often better witnesses than the Latin translations, firstly because he had a better knowledge of the Arabic language and the Arabic philosophical tradition than most Latin translators and secondly because Syriac, as a Semitic language, is capable of reflecting the Arabic original more accurately. I give two examples here.

Example 1

> *Šifā*ʾ, *al-Maʿādin*, *faṣl* 1, ed. Muntaṣir et al. ("Cairo edition"), 3.10f.
>
> وإنما تتكون الحجارة فى الأكثر على وجهين من التكوّن أحدهما على سبيل التفجر، والثانى على سبيل الجمود.
>
> [التفجر—ed. Cairensis: التفجير codd. س.د.ب, et ed. Teheranensis sec. Muntaṣir et al., sed reapse التفخير ed. Tehranensis 248.2 (et, ut suspicor, codd.); التفخير Holmyard-Mandeville[75] 71.12, et Bahmanyār, *K. at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. M. Muṭahharī[76] 718.6; "conglutinatio" versio latina, Holmyard-Mandeville 45.5]
>
> Stones are formed, in most cases, in [one of] two ways: (a) by way of eruption [*tafaǧǧur?*] and (b) by way of congelation.

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contents at least in its genre, we may gather from the fear he expresses in the introduction to this work that someone coming across the work for the first time might judge it to be something foreign to the "priestly enclosures" (*ḍarāṯā kāhnāyāṯā*); *Candelabrum*, Proem, ed. Bakoš, 25.1f.

[75] E.J. Holmyard and D.C. Mandeville, *Avicennae De congelatione et conglutinatione lapidum, being Sections of the Kitâb al-Shifâ* (Paris: Geuthner, 1927).

[76] *Kitāb at-Taḥṣīl* (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-yi Tihrān, 1375Š/1996).

Cream of Wisdom, Min. I.1.2, Laur. or. 83, 51v b 14–20

ܩܦܣ ܡܢ ܟܐܦܐ̈ ܟܬܡ̈ ܐܝܬ . ܣܘ ܡܢ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܦܚܐ̈ ܦܠܝܢ ܕܦܘܚܪܐ ܦܠܝܢܐ . . . ܐܝܬܝܗ ܡܢ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܡܝܐ̈ ܘܬܡܐ̈ . . .

Stones are formed in two ways: (a) by way of baking [*puḥḥārā*] of viscous clay in the sun . . . (b) by way of congelation of water. . . .

Here, even without turning to the *Cream of Wisdom*, the evidence available is generally in favor of the reading *tafḫīr* (perhaps a coinage by Ibn Sīnā, from *faḫḫār*, "earthenware, pottery")[77] against the reading *tafaǧǧur* of the Cairo edition, but it is reassuring to have a thirteenth-century witness for the former reading in a language where there is no ambiguity caused by the similarity of the letters *ḫā'* and *ǧīm*. The Syriac *puḥḥārā*, itself probably a coinage by Barhebraeus in this sense,[78] mirrors exactly the Arabic *tafḫīr* in a way that the Latin "conglutinatio" does not and cannot (Syr. √pḥr = Arab. √fḫr; Syr. CuCCāCā, verbal noun of the intensive form Pael = Arab. taCCīC).

Example 2

Šifā', *al-Maʿādin*, *faṣl* 1, ed. cit., 22.9–11:

وأمّا الآنك فيشبه أن يكون ردئ الزئبق، ثقيلة طينته، ويكون كبريته رديئا منتنا ضعيفا، فلذلك لم يستحكم انعقاده.

ed. ثقيلة طينية[79] (ب:[80] منتنة in loco ثقيلة .cod ثقيلة طينته] ed. Cairensis[79] Teheranensis 255.5 et Holmyard-Mandeville 85.4;[81] ثقيلا طينيّا Garbers-

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[77] Holmyard-Mandeville, 18, n. 4: "تفخير" This word, rendered in the Latin version by *conglutinatio*, is unknown to the dictionaries. It appears to mean the conversion of clay into the hard form which it assumes when baked."

[78] See R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus syriacus* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1879–1901), col. 3085. The Pael verb *paḥḥar* occurs in the relevant sense in Moses b. Kepha, *Hexaemeron Commentary*, MS Paris syr. 242, 162r, Paris syr. 311, 37v a (quoted at Bakoš, op. cit., 84 footnote); see also Job of Edessa, *Bk. of Treasures*, ed. A. Mingana (*An Encyclopaedia of Philosophical and Natural Sciences as Taught in Baghdad about A.D. 817 or Book of Treasures by Job of Edessa*, Woodbrooke Scientific Publications, 1 (Cambridge: Heffner, 1935), 405a 5f.; J. Payne Smith, *A Compendious Syriac Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1903), 441b.

[79] Followed by G.C. Anawati, "Arabic Alchemy," in *Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science*, R. Rashed and R. Morelon (London: Routledge, 1996), 3:877: "having heavy clay (*ṯaqīlatun ṭīnatuhū*)".

[80] Cf. Abū l-Barakāt, *Muʿtabar*, 2:231.10f.: وردئ الزئبق ومنتنه مع ردئ الكبــريت يكون منــه الاســرب ("From bad and fetid mercury, [mixed] with bad sulphur, lead is formed.")

[81] Followed by C. Baffioni, "La tradizione araba del IV libro dei 'Meteorologica' di Aristotele," AION.S 23 (Naples: Istituto Orientali, 1980), 96.6: "mercurio impuro, pesante, argilloso".

Weyer[82]; "luteum", "ponderosum et luteum" versio latina[83]; malim تقتله طينية (v. infra)]

As for lead, it seems that it is bad in [its] mercury—its clay being heavy [?]—while its sulphur is bad, fetid and weak; and for this reason its solidification is not firm.

It may be seen from the apparatus above that the phrase which appears as *ṭaqīlatun ṭīnatuhū* in the Cairo edition has caused problems for the editors of the passage. The sentence quoted is a part of a passage discussing how different metals are formed through the combination of mercury and sulphur of different qualities. The problem with the reading of the Cairo edition lies in the fact that clay is not otherwise known to be a component of mercury, while with the reading of the Tehran edition we have the problem that *ziʾbaq* is not feminine (hence the unwarranted emendation of Garbers-Weyer). The corresponding passage of the *Cream of Wisdom* allows us to propose a solution which is rather different from those proposed so far.

Cream of Wisdom, Min. III.2.3, 57r a19f.: ܡܗܘܐ ܐܝܟ ... ܗ̇ܝ ܕܒܐܒܪܐ

The mercury in lead is bad and has been killed [*qṭīl*, corr. Arab. *maqtūl*] by a clayey substance [*ṭīnāyūṭā*, corr. Arab. *ṭīnīya*]. . . .

Barhebraeus evidently read the phrase in question as *taqtuluhū ṭīnīyatun*. How mercury can be "killed" will be understood if we remember the use of the word "alive" (Arab. *ḥayy*, cf. Eng. "quicksilver," Fr. "argent vive") with reference to its fluidity.[84]

3. *As an intermediary for transmission of Avicennan thought to Oriental Christians*

The decline in the fortunes of the Syrian Christians in the centuries following that of Barhebraeus means that we look in vain among

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[82] K. Garbers and J. Weyer, *Quellengeschichtliches Lesebuch zur Chemie und Alchemie der Araber im Mittelalter*, Quellengeschichtliche Lesebücher zu den Naturwissenschaften der Araber im Mittelalter, 1 (Hamburg: Buske, 1980), 39.13.

[83] Holmyard-Mandeville, 53.11.

[84] For the use of the words "kill" and "dead" with reference to mercury, see, e.g., Abū Bakr Muḥammad ar-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Asrār*, ed. M.T. Dānišpažūh (Tehran: UNESCO, 1343Š/1964), 16.19 (tr. J. Ruska, *Al-Rāzī's Buch Geheimnis der Geheimnisse* [Berlin: Springer, 1937], 105.16): تأخذ آبقا حيا فتقتله بموقشيشا بوزنه ("Take live mercury and 'kill' it with marcassite of the same weight"); ibid., 18.21 (Ruska 108.8): حتى يبيض ويصعد ميتا ونشفا ... ("[Take a *raṭl* of the mercury to be reddened and the same amount of vitriol. Let it rise] until it becomes white and rises 'dead' and dry."); ibid. 16.5 (Ruska 104.24); Abū l-Barakāt, *Muʿtabar*, 2:230.6.

them for those who may be said to have made major contributions
to the development, as opposed to the mere preservation, of the her-
itage left by Barhebraeus. Nevertheless intellectual life did not quite
come to a standstill among these Christian communities, and for
those among them who had the lesiure to indulge in intellectual
activities Barhebraeus remained an authority in all kinds of fields.
When, for example, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Ernest
Renan asked a Chaldean priest about the books used for the study
of philosophy by his people, the two works mentioned by his respon-
dent were the *Isagoge* and Barhebraeus' *Cream of Wisdom*.[85] Ample evi-
dence for the popularity and prestige enjoyed by Barhebraeus'
philosophical and philosophico-theological works among the Christians
of the Syriac traditions is provided by the great numbers of manu-
scripts containing these works, copied and read not only by West
Syrians (Syriac Orthodox and Syrian Catholic) but also by East
Syrians ("Nestorians" and Chaldeans), by Maronites[86] and, in Arabic
translation, by Copts.[87]

At the same time, it might be remembered that Barhebraeus, like
most medieval writers, was not always so scrupulous in acknowl-

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[85] E. Renan, *De philosophia peripatetica apud Syros commentatio historica* (Paris: Durand,
1852), 71: "quumque percontarer a presbytero quodam hujus sectae [sc. Chaldaeorum]
Parisiis hospitante, quinam libri praecipue in scholis popularium ejus usui essent,
primus quem memoravit fuit *Isagogi*, quem profundissimum difficillimumque affirmabat,
dein *Butyrum sapientiae*" (see also Drossaart Lulofs/Poortman [see n. 11 above], 38).
The identity of the "Isagogi" mentioned here will probably have to remain a mat-
ter of conjecture, but assuming that a Syriac text is meant, the likely candidates
are the commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* by Probus (6th c. A.D.?) and *K. d-Īsāġōġī*
by the Chaldean patriarch Joseph II (1077–1124/1667–1712), the latter a work
reportedly translated into Syriac from Arabic (there are several nineteenth-century
copies of the former in the Chaldean monastery of Mar Antonius near Baghdad,
see Buṭrus Ḥaddād and Ǧāk Isḥāq, *al-Maḫṭūṭāt as-suryānīya wa-l-ʿarabīya fī ḫizānat ar-
rahbānīya al-kaldānīya fī Baġdād* [Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-Maǧmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿIrāqī,
1988], 1:82–84, nos. 169–171 [= olim Alqosh, Notre-Dame de Semences 51–53
Vosté], and 172; for the latter, see Mingana, *Catalogue*, op. cit., 767, no. 433B-C;
more generally on the tradition of Aristotelian logic in Syriac, see S. Brock, "The
Syriac Commentary Tradition," in *Glosses and Commentaries*, op. cit., 3–18).
[86] One might note, for example, the two manuscripts of the Arabic-Syriac *Išārāt*,
Paris syr. 249 and Vat. Borg. syr. 54 (see n. 29 above), copied by the Maronite
scholar Abraham Ecchellensis (Ibrāhīm al-Ḥāqilānī, 1013–1074/1605–1664).
[87] Three manuscripts of the Arabic version of the *Candelabrum* are found in the
library at the Coptic Patriarchate, even if the copyists of these manuscripts man-
aged to confuse Barhebraeus with Yaḥyá Ibn ʿAdī (G. Graf, *Catalogue de manuscrits
arabes chrétiens conservés au Caire*, StT 63 [Vatican City: Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, 1934],
212, no. 567, 228, no. 628; id. *GCAL* 2:276; see also Khalil Samir, "Bar Hebraeus,"
in *The Coptic Encyclopedia* [New York: Macmillan etc., 1991], 345f.).

edging his sources. This meant that the Avicennan materials contained in his writings now often carried for their Christian readers the weight of a revered bishop. The literature (both Syriac and Arabic) of the Syrian Christians subsequent to the age of Barhebraeus remains a largely unexplored territory, but it may be expected that an examination of works from that period dealing with philosophical matters in some way will reveal instances where the influence of Ibn Sīnā has entered them through the works of Barhebraeus.[88]

V. *Conclusion*

The main aim of the foregoing discussion has been to remind scholars of Avicenna that there was a not negligible Syriac strand to the reception of Ibn Sīnā. The most important representative of this reception is Barhebraeus, the author discussed at some length here, and it is my hope that I have been able to show that there is much in the writings of the learned maphrian which will be of interest not only to Syriacists but also to students of Ibn Sīnā.

Barhebraeus was not, however, an isolated case, and it is worth mentioning here two Syriac Orthodox authors who worked in the period immediately preceding that of Barhebraeus and who may in some respects be considered precursors of Barhebraeus.

Patriarch John XII Aaron bar Maʿdanī (maphrian 628/9–650 [1231/2–52], patriarch 650–661 [1252–63]) is known to have studied Arabic in Baghdad[89] and has left us a collection of poems, many of which have little in common with traditional Syriac poetry but are—like many of Barhebraeus' poems—clearly inspired by Arabic models.[90] Among these poems there is a piece on the soul which is entitled "on the noble origin of the soul and on its debasement through the transgression of the commandment" and which begins: "there descended to you from that height of holiness a comely

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[88] As examples one might remember here the two works of Daniel of Mardin mentioned in n. 41 above.

[89] Barhebraeus, *Chron. eccl.*, ed. Abbeloos-Lamy, op. cit., 1:407.15–17, 411.16–413.5.

[90] On Bar Maʿdanī and his works in general, see Baumstark, *GSL* 307f.; Graf, *GCAL*, 2:267–269; Barṣaum, *Luʾluʾ*, 409f.; Abūnā, *ALA*, 490–493; Takahashi, "Islamischen Quelle," n. 7.

dove. . . ." The piece, though not simply a paraphrase of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Qaṣīda al-ʿaynīya*, was clearly inspired by it.[91]

The Syriac Orthodox monk Severus Jacob bar Shakkō (d. 638–9/1240–1])[92] began his study of philosophy under the East Syrian ("Nestorian") John bar Zōʿbī,[93] continued his studies under Kamāl ad-Dīn Mūsá ibn Yūnus (551–639/1156–1242), and worked in the monastery of Mar Mattai near Mosul.[94] In his study of Bar Shakko's major work devoted to the secular sciences, the *Book of Dialogues* (*K. d-diyalōḡō*), J. Ruska found a passage dealing with the seven metals which agreed almost word for word with a passage in the *ʿAǧāʾib al-maḫlūqāt* of Zakarīyāʾ ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Qazwīnī (c. 600–682/1203–1283).[95] An examination of a larger section of the *Dialogues* dealing with meteorology and mineralogy reveals that the agreement extends to most parts of that section. Since Bar Shakko died before Qazwīnī is likely to have written his works, Qazwīnī cannot be the source of Bar Shakko. For those passages where the two agree, we can, in fact, almost invariably find closely parallel passages in Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *Kitāb al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqīya*, which, in turn, is based to a large extent in the passages in question on Ibn Sīnā's *aš-Šifāʾ*, so that these (and no doubt many other) passages of the *Book of Dialogues* may be considered a further instance of the reception of Ibn Sīnā in Syriac.[96]

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[91] Bar Maʿdanī, *Poems*, ed. Ph. Y. Dōlabānī in *Mêmrē w-mušḥaṯā d-sīmīn l-Mār Yōḥannān ibn Maʿdanī paṭriyarkā d-Anṭiyōḵiya* (Jerusalem: Dayr Mār Marqūs, 1929; repr. Hengelo: Mar Yuhanun Kilisesi, 1980), 6–19, no. 2.3; cf. Mingana, *Catalogue*, 115 (on MS Ming. syr. 44I); G.B. Behnam (tr. G. Akyüz), *Şiir ile felsefe kucaklaşıyor Süryaniler'de felsefik şiirler, Şair filozof Bar Madeni* (Mardin: Mardin Kırklar Kilisesi, 1998), 14, n. 1.

[92] On Bar Shakko in general, see Baumstark, *GSL* 311f.; Graf, *GCAL* 2:269; Barṣaum, *Luʾluʾ*, 404–407; Abūnā, *ALA*, 488–490; O.J. Schrier, "Name and Function of Jacob bar Shakko, Notes on the History of the Monastery of Mar Mattai," in *V Symposium Syriacum 1988*, ed. R. Lavenant, OCA 236 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1990), 215–228; Takahashi, "Islamische Quellen," n. 6.

[93] On whom, Baumstark, *GSL* 310f.; Abūnā, *ALA* 432–434; see also H. Daiber, "Ein vergessener syrischer Text: Bar Zoʿbi über die Teile der Philosophie," *OC* 69 (1985), 73–80; T. Mannooramparampil, *John bar Zoʿbi, Explanation of the Divine Mysteries*, OIRSI 157 (Kottayam, 1992).

[94] Barhebraeus, *Chron. eccl.*, ed. Abbeloos-Lamy, 2:409.14–411.15; J. Ruska, "Studien zu Severus bar Šakkû's 'Buch der Dialoge'," *ZA* 12 (1897), 23–32.

[95] Ruska, "Studien," 157–161.

[96] A closer comparison of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Bar Shakko and Qazwīnī, reveals passages where the wording in Bar Shakko and Qazwīnī agree with each other against ar-Rāzī, so that we must, in fact, posit one more step in the line of transmission, a common (lost?) source of Bar Shakko and Qazwīnī which, in turn, is

These are just two examples and it may be expected that similar cases will be unearthed with the progress of research on the Syriac (and Christian Arabic) literature of the periods both preceding and following that of Barhebraeus. The Syrian Christians saw and treated the works of Ibn Sīnā largely in the same way as the Islamic majority among whom they lived, but there are certain peculiarities in their reception of Ibn Sīnā which arise out of the fact that they professed a different religion and employed a different language from those of their Islamic contemporaries and these factors render the instances of reception in their works a certain fascination. It is my hope that I shall have the opportunity again in future to report on further instances of such reception and that I may perhaps have interested some others in joining me in explorations in this field of study.

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immediately dependent on *al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqīya*. See Takahashi, "Greco-Syriac," nn. 18–19. In his other major work, the *Book of Treasures* (*K. d-sīmāṯā*), Bar Shakko seems to depend, even when treating the same subjects as in the *Dialogues*, almost exclusively on earlier Syriac writers, such as Moses bar Kepha and Jacob of Edessa; see F. Nau, "Notice sur le Livre des Trésors de Jacques de Bartela, Évêque de Tagrit," *JA* 9e sér. 7 (1896), 286–331.

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