UMUT AZAK

I.B.TAURIS

ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY

KEMALISM, RELIGION AND THE NATION STATE

Umut Azak graduated in Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul and completed her PhD in the Department of Turkish Studies at Leiden University. She has taught and researched at Sabancı University, Leiden University, Utrecht University and the Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden. She was 2008/09 fellow of the Berlin-based research program "Europe in the Middle East – The Middle East in Europe" (EUME).

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY

Series ISBN: 978-1-84885-227-3

See www.ibtauris.com/ILTCH for a full list of titles

17. *Serbia in the Shadow of Milosevic: The Legacy of Conflict in the Balkans*
Janine N. Clark
978 1 84511 767 2

18. *Diplomacy Between the Wars: Five Diplomats and the Shaping of the Modern World*
George W. Liebmann
978 1 84511 637 8

19. *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy*
Roby C Barrett
978 1 84511 393 3

20. *The Greek Revolution and the Making of Modern Europe: Independence, State-building and the Problem of National Identity*
Dean J Kostantaras
978 1 84511 709 2

21. *Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations*
James Callanan
978 1 84511 882 2

22. *Negotiating History: Resolving the Cyprus Conflict*
Michalis S. Michael
978 1 84511 174 8

23. *In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe*
Rebecca Haynes (ed.)
978 1 84511 697 2

24. *Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question*
Hilde Katrine Haug
978 1 84885 051 4

25. *The Making of the German Post-War Economy: Political Communication and Public Reception of the Social Market Economy after World War Two*
Christian L. Glossner
978 1 84885 264 8

26. *The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan*
Chrysostomos Pericleous
978 1 84885 021 7

27. *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*
Umut Azak
978 1 84885 263 1

28. *From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO and European Integration*
William Mallinson
978 1 84885 344 7

29. *Britain and the Weimar Republic: The History of a Cultural Relationship*
Colin Storer
978 1 84885 140 5

30. *Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean*
Anastasia Yiangou
978 1 84885 436 9

ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY

Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State

UMUT AZAK

I.B. TAURIS
LONDON · NEW YORK

Published in 2010 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

International Library of Twentieth Century History: 27

ISBN: 978 1 84885 263 1

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Printed and bound in in India by Thomson Press India Ltd from camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

Contents

Illustrations

Acknowledgments

This book is based on my PhD thesis which is written in the framework of the research project "Recycling the past: the use of history in the construction of modernity in Turkey" funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). I thank the NWO for providing me with the financial means to conduct my research, and also the staff of the Research School for Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies (CNWS) and the Department of Turkish Studies of Leiden University for offering me a supportive working environment. Above all, however, I am grateful to my supervisors, Professor Erik Jan Zürcher and Professor Martin van Bruinessen, as this book would not be written at all without their endless support and encouragement.

My thanks are also due to the staff of the Leiden University Library (OLG), the libraries of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Ankara, as well as the Atatürk Library, Sermet Çifter Library and the ISAM Library in Istanbul, who all made the research easier.

Özgür Mutlu Ulus, İsmail Hakkı Kadı, Melody Lu, Seda Altuğ, Arzu Meral and especially Annemarike Stremmelaar and Yüksel Taşkın who generously gave their time for reading several drafts of these chapters and encouraged me to continue my research throughout years. Lucas Lelieveld, Aurélien Nicolet and Gözde Yazıcı in the Netherlands, and my extended family in Turkey (Didem Danış, Başak Tuğ, Cherie Taraghi and all *Uzaktakiler*) have given me strength to survive the most difficult times. Ceren Sezer, Zeynep Altok and Seda Altuğ gave vital support in the last days of finalizing the thesis in Spring 2007. Likewise, I owe my thanks to Devrim and Sevinç İnce Azak.

I finalized this book during the academic year 2008/09 in Berlin while I was a fellow of "Europe in the Middle East – The Middle East in Europe" (EUME), a Research Program of the Berlin-Brandenburger Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, and the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. I am grateful to these institutions and particularly to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation that provided me with a scholarship that enabled me to work on and publish my own project. The

discussons during seminars and workshops of EUME and the exchanges with my colleagues from Berlin helped me to develop my ideas. In particular I would like to thank to Katharina Bodirski for her meticulous reading and editing of the book, enabling me to clarify my ideas. I am also thankful to Juliette Daniels for her editorial work and to Ümit Kıvanç who gave all his support while I was dealing with the technical difficulties of publishing.

Lastly, my deepest gratitude is due to Sabahat and Erdoğan Azak. I have been privileged to have parents like mine, who were as excited about my research as I was and who supported me in every sense at every stage of my studies. I do hope that I deserve their unconditional love, support, tolerance and trust in me. I dedicate this book to the memory of my father, from whom I inherited the joy of imagining, learning and sharing.

Preface

Are you aware of the danger? [1]

Fear is the underlying characteristic of secularism in Turkey. This is the fear of "reactionary Islam" (*irtica*) or, put differently, the fear of either a creeping or violent radical Islamism. If secularism has been transformed into a discourse which is internalized by large segments of society, this is because of the successful reproduction of this fear. The political and intellectual elite of Turkey have been generating it on the basis of a specific discourse on Islam which polarizes society into opposing groups of "bad Muslims" and "good Muslims" (Mamdani 2004). In public debates, this discourse is being reproduced through a particular use of the past, which fosters a state of permanent battle with and fear of "bad Muslims". This fear often leads secularist citizens of all professions, including university professors and top judges, to join forces with the top commanders of the army to protect the secular regime by gathering in Anıtkabir, the Mausoleum of the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) in Ankara. One of such gatherings was on 18 May 2006. Tens of thousands of people assembled at the Mausoleum on that day – one day after an unprecedented shooting in the Second Department of the Council of State (*Danıştay*), the country's highest administrative court.[2] The *Turkish Daily News* reported the gathering at the Mausoleum as follows:

> Chanting slogans and clapping their hands, some 25,000 people marched to the mausoleum in protest of the attack, which saw a lone gunman burst into a room at the Council of State, killing a senior judge and wounding four others. The demonstrators – from academics to municipal workers, from high school students to doctors – brandished portraits of Atatürk and placed flowers at the mausoleum, a building overlooking Ankara from a hill in the heart of the city. Some kissed the granite stones covering the tomb, while others prayed and wept as elementary school children sang national hymns. "Turkey is secular, it will remain secular", the crowd shouted, their chants and claps echoing around Anıtkabir.[3]

The mass protest against the violent attack took a secularist form because the event was reported by the media as a revenge action against the judges of the Council of State who had taken a decision supporting the ban on the use of the Islamic headscarf by state employees. The gunman, a lawyer, had fired at the judges – and had killed one of them – in order to punish them (as he was to say after his arrest) for their confirmation of a ruling that a teacher wearing a headscarf to and from school could not be the director of a state-owned kindergarten. The attack was reported by mainstream newspapers under headings such as "Bullet at Secularism" or referred to as "the September 11 of the Republic."[4] The Islamist newspaper, *Anadolu'da Vakit*, was accused of identifying targets for the gunman by publishing photos of the judges earlier in February 2006. Islamist intellectuals and journalists, on the other hand, denied these accusations and condemned the attack as a provocation.

The incident also led to harsh accusations against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), which had earlier criticized the court ruling which upheld the headscarf ban.[5] The use of Islamic headscarves in state institutions, as well as universities, had been framed by several court rulings as a statement against the constitutional principle of secularism and hence banned. Erdoğan's Government, however, rejected the association of the Islamic headscarf with anti-secularism. Hence the mass protests following the attack against the Council of State were also directed against the Government.

Since April 2009, the attack at the Council of State has been linked to the so called "Ergenokon" trial, which was launched in 2007, charging more than 200 suspects with forming an illegal organization to provoke a series of events in order to instigate a military coup. The Council of State attack gunman turned out to be in contact with some of the suspects of the Ergenekon trial.[6] It is not yet clear whether the attack in 2006 was a radical Islamist action or a provocation intended to create unrest and in this way to pave the way for overthrowing the government. However, it was certainly an event which led to increasing social polarization on the issue of secularism and to an even deeper fear of Islamic fanaticism.

At the Mausoleum, the symbolic center of the capital city Ankara, the fear and anger incited by the attack were transformed into an assertion of solidarity and commitment to protect the secular Republic of Atatürk from radical Islam. This spontaneous and emotional manifestation showed that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk continued to be seen as the embodiment of secularism almost seventy years after his death. Indeed, in the context of market-based modernity of the last two decades, "the privatization of the production, circulation, and consumption of Atatürk's image" (Özyürek 2006: 94) intensified. The emotional and metaphysical aspects of such

secularist manifestations, which are centered on the veneration of Atatürk at his Mausoleum, can be seen as an unintended parallel between Islam and republican secularism (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 190–1, 201; van Bruinessen 2005; Tapper and Tapper 1987). As a matter of fact, secularism in Turkey was institutionalized along with the sacralization of state authority in the person of Atatürk and the reproduction of a ritualistic devotion to him. One can even argue, as Rustow did as early as 1957, that the "popular devotion to the charismatic figure of Mustafa Kemal" was to fill "the emotional void left by the surrender of so much of the Muslim heritage" (Rustow 1957: 80–1).

Nonetheless, a deeper motivation behind the voluntary and active participation of the masses in the sacralization of the image of Atatürk as the embodiment of the secular regime remains unexplained. This book suggests that this motivation, which was also manifested at the Mausoleum of Atatürk in June 2006, is the fear of Islamic fanaticism. It argues that the state-imposed ideology of Kemalist secularism was gradually transformed into a civil ideology[7] as a result of the reproduction and popularization of this fear by the political and intellectual elite.

This book is about the reproduction of the fear of Islamic fanaticism, which is crucial for understanding Kemalist secularism. The latter has generated this fear since the early republican period, based on a specific discourse on Islam which opposes the Islam of "bad Muslims" to the Islam of "good Muslims" (Mamdani 2004). The following chapters explore the evolution of this Kemalist discourse on Islam and its attempts to differentiate fanatical Islam of "bad Muslims" from what is idealized as secular, Turkish Islam.

This study approaches the analysis of secularism through a focus on its continuous reconstruction in public debates led by political leaders as well as intellectuals. It examines how political and intellectual leaders, the negotiators of the meaning of secularism, shaped secularism during the single-party regime (1923–46) and refashioned it in the first decades of the multi-party period (1946–66).

The introductory chapter of the book provides the background to this analysis in outlining the history and particularity of secularism in Turkey. The main body of the book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the single-party period and includes two chapters analyzing the Kemalist discourse on Islam. Chapter 1 explores the initial crystallization of the Kemalist discourse on reactionary Islam (*irtica*). To this end, it examines the "Menemen Incident" of 1930, which was a local Islamic uprising againt the secular government. The exploration of the event shows how the threat of reactionary Islam was exaggerated and used for creating an emotional bond with the secular Republic. The chapter also shows the Kemalist regime's attempt to mobilize popular support by institutionalizing the

commemoration of Kubilay, a young officer beheaded by the leaders of the rebellion, as the "Martyr of the Revolution". Chapter 2 examines the Kemalist discourse on Turkish, or vernacular Islam, and its construction as an antidote to reactionary Islam. It explores this theme in relation to a forgotten reform of the Kemalist Government, which imposed the recitation of the Turkish translation of the call to prayer (*ezan*) and banned its original Arabic version in 1932.

The second part of the book explores secularism in the first two decades of the multi-party period when the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was challenged by two right-wing political parties, the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) and its successor, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*). These center-right parties revised Kemalist secularism and adopted an alternative discourse on secularism.

In the context of relative democratization of the political sphere after 1946, the official ideology of Kemalist secularism began its true struggle for hegemony at the level of civil society. I contend that a specific politics of memory, conducted through the politically motivated and selective use, sacralization or oblivion of the past, has been a crucial tool in this struggle for hegemony. This politics of memory can be seen as the most important impediment to critical thinking and rational debate on the issue of secularism to this day.

Both Kemalist and alternative discourses of secularism were developed during public debates conducted via the printed press. The empirical raw material of the case studies which are presented in each chapter therefore consists of public debates in selected episodes of crisis, as they were reflected in daily newspapers, weekly magazines and journals of the period. Each chapter shows how selected figures and events from the past have been invoked and contested during these public debates on secularism. The common assertion of all chapters is that the Kemalist discourse on Islam remained unchanged in the multi-party period, although actors (alleged "bad" or "good" Muslims) who were made to fill the two moulds of fanatical Islam and Turkish Islam varied in concrete historical settings.

Chapter 3 discusses the public debate before and after the first regulation of the Democratic Party government – the removal of the ban on the recital of the Arabic call to prayer. It illustrates how different interpretations of this ban, either as restriction or guarantee of freedom of conscience, were reflections of two competing interpretations of secularism (Kemalist versus alternative). The following chapter focuses on the public debate triggered by the assassination attempt against the liberal, secularist journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888–1972) in 1952. It explores the secularist perception of *irtica* and points to the politics of memory, constructing a parallel between this incident and earlier violent reactionary events such as the Menemen Incident.

This chapter illustrates how the fear of violent Islamic reactionism was both responsible for and further stimulated by the emerging civil Kemalist secularism. It shows how the latter was articulated through the ideological wave of anti-communism, depicting reactionary Islam as a destructive tool of expansionist Soviet communism.

Chapter 5 is also devoted to the analysis of the Kemalist discourse on reactionary Islam. Its focus is on the Kemalist perception of a creeping threat of Islamic movements gradually and secretly manipulating masses against the secular regime, as manifested in Kemalist intellectuals' representation of Said Nursî (1873–1960), the founder of one of the largest Islamic movements in the Republican period. The Kemalist demonization of Said Nursî and his followers (*Nurcu*s) was, as shown in this chapter, part of the political propaganda of the Republican People's Party against the government of the Democratic Party, which accused the latter of undermining secularism by tolerating *Nurcu*s. Lastly, Chapter 6 illustrates how Alevism, a heterodox form of Islam in Turkey, began to be seen as a religion suitable for the secular republic vis-à-vis the *Nurcu* movement. This last chapter explores the first emergence of the still-effective discourse on Alevis as the guardians of secularism and the carriers of the true Turkish Islam, and hence as an antidote to the perceived threat of Islamic fanaticism in the mid-1960s. In brief, each chapter explores the historical contexts and public debates in which the Kemalist discourse on Islam was produced and reproduced and in this way presents a genealogy of Kemalist secularism. The book is thus written in the hope that it will not only contribute to the study of the evolution of secularism in Turkey but also provide clues to surpassing its fears and formulating a new and more rational discourse of secularism.

Introduction

The universality of the secularization paradigm and its applicability in non-Christian and non-European societies has been a debated issue. The application of secularization theory in Muslim settings has often been questioned on the basis of assumed contrasts between Christian and Muslim history. The weakness of and resistance to secularism in Muslim societies is explained with the argument that secularization is an alien concept for the Muslim world. What is omitted in such debates is the difference between the concepts of secularization, a sociologial process, and secularism, an ideology. Bernard Lewis, a prominent academic contributor to Orientalist discourse (Said 1978)[1] which constructs the identity of "the West" by othering "the East" or "the Islamic world", expounds this popular argument as follows:

> The reasons why Muslims developed no secularist movement of their own, and reacted sharply against attempts to introduce one from abroad, will thus be clear from the contrasts between Christian and Muslim history and experience. From the beginning, Christians were taught both by precept and practice to distinguish between God and Caesar and between the different duties owed to each of the two. Muslims received no such instruction. (2002: 103)

Lewis' overgeneralizing and homogenizing discourse neglects the fact that secularization as a sociological process has also affected the Muslim world. Assuming an essential difference between the West and the Islamic world, he reproduces the opposition of secularism versus Islam which dominates the debate on secularism in the Islamic context (Filali-Ansary 1999: 6). Lewis employs this dichotomy in showing "what went wrong" in Islam, as if the latter were a monolithic cultural unit, immune to social change.

Such an essentialist perspective is also appropriated by opponents of secularism in Muslim contexts. For instance, ideologues of Islamism marginalize contemporary secularism in such contexts as inauthentic. This Islamist critique, however, reflects an Orientalism in reverse, or Occidentalism, portraying the West as the alien other of an authentic Muslim world.[2] The Islamist search for authenticity echoes what Boroujerdi depicts as nativism, describing the call for native or indigenous cultural and

intellectual traditions and for regaining one's true identity in response to Eurocentrism and colonialism.

The depiction of secularism in Muslim-majority societies as an inauthentic, unrooted concept is, however, as baseless as the delineation of secularization as a process unique to the European/Christian context. The Ottoman/Turkish experience proves that the Muslim world was not immune to the forces of modernity and secularization. Moreover, religious vitality confirms the reality of secularization in the Muslim world (and specifically in the Ottoman/Turkish context) rather than demonstrating its absence (Al-Azm 2004).[3] Besides, the fact that secularism is "imported" from the West – like many other ideologies which have resisted national borders and taken root in settings very different from their original source – does not negate the fact that a secularist intellectual tradition emerged in the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century onwards.

The Ottoman state promoted an orthodox, Sunni Islam against the Shi'a branch of Islam, which was adopted by the Safavid dynasty as the state religion of Iran in the sixteenth century, via two institutions: the Caliphate and the *ulema* (doctors of Islamic law). From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, the Ottoman sultan had not only been the sultan of the Ottoman state but also, at least symbolically, the Caliph of all Muslims. The title of the Caliph was claimed by the Ottoman sultan in 1539, during the reign of Sultan Süleyman (Kanunî, r. 1520–66), when the last Abbasid Caliph el-Mütevekkil died in Egypt. From then on, the Ottoman sultan began to be referred to as the leader and the protector of the entire Islamic community (Buzpınar 2004: 115–16). Still, the title of the Caliph (*Hilâfet-i Kübra*) was nothing more than a label to emphasize this self-proclaimed role and a source of legitimacy (İnalcık 1968–70). The Ottoman state also built a religious elite or *ulema* who, as the learned in Islamic sciences, were vested with the authority to express and apply the Islamic law (*şeriat*). The *ulema* functioned as officials, acting as agents of the state in the fields of education and jurisprudence. The *Şeyhülislam* (Sheikh ul-Islam), the chief religious official and the head of the *ulema*, was the highest authority in formulating opinions on points concerning the Islamic law (İnalcık 1964: 43–4).

In the Ottoman period, the preservation of the state was the most important objective for a group of secular officials who were empirically-minded, pragmatic bureaucrats. This tradition of realpolitik, along with the so called "Ottoman state tradition", has often been seen at the root of the dynamics which started off processes of modernization and secularization in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire (Ibid; Heper 1985; Mardin 1986; Zürcher and van der Linden 2004: 96–7). This state tradition has been referred to by historians as the tradition of *din-u-devlet*, that is a dual system of political legitimacy in which both Islam and the state were sources of

legislation. İnalcık, for instance, argued that besides the Islamic law (*şeriat*) there existed a second source of law, namely *örf* or *kanunnâme*, which were imperial laws, derived directly from the will of the ruler (İnalcık 1964: 57; İnalcık 2005: 69, 76, 78. See also İnalcık 1975). This *örfî* law applied to the state elite and to administrative matters (public law, state finances, taxation, etc.) and remained side by side with Islamic law. Hence it was defined by Barkan, another prominent historian, as secular law (*layik hukuk*) (1975: 53).[4]

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize here that even secular laws were justified as being "necessary for the well-being of the Islamic community" (İnalcık 1964: 57). Besides, major secularizing reforms, such as the declaration in 1839 of the imperial edict known as the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of Gülhane, which guaranteed Ottoman subjects' life, honor and property regardless of their religion, continued to be framed in an Islamic language. In other words, Islam continued to be the legitimizing framework even for modernizing reforms. The process of secularization in the Ottoman Empire was further developed by the Reform Edict of 1856 (*Tanzimat*), which stressed the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire in the fields of public employment, taxation and military service. While the state attempted to define an Ottoman citizenship for all people living in its territories regardless of religion and ethnicity, it also gave rise to an oppositionary intellectual movement which attempted to bridge the gap between modernization and Islam (Gülalp 2002: 24–5). The members of this intellectual movement, i.e. the Young Ottomans, were not against the modernizing reforms of the *Tanzimat* statesmen, but wanted to legitimize these reforms within an Islamic framework. Their political project was implemented by Sultan Abdülhamid II, who used Islam to legitimize westernist modernization (Ibid.: 26; Deringil 1991).

Historiography influenced by the twentieth century modernization paradigm omitted to note that Islam was so embedded in the reform movement of the nineteenth century. The history of Ottoman secularization was depicted in this modernization paradigm as a dialectical process marked by "the struggle of an enlightened elite, which is open to the ideas of the West (the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats, the Young Ottomans, Young Turks and Kemalists) with representatives of traditional, mostly religious, values" culminating in the secular Republic (Zürcher 1998).

Berkes defines the history of Ottoman secularization as the history of the "basic conflict between the forces of change and progress and the forces of tradition [which] … tend to promote the domination of religion and sacred law" (Berkes 1964: 6). This perspective, which is based on the dichotomies of modern-secular-progressive-enlightened versus traditional-religious-backward-obscurantist, characterizes the work of Niyazi Berkes on secularism in Turkey. This dichotomous approach of the modernization

paradigm has recently been revised by scholars who pointed out the interrelatedness of Islam and the process of secularization. These scholars focused especially on the era of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909).[5]

According to Berkes, the era under Sultan Abdülhamid II, i.e. the Hamidian regime, was an obscurantist period in contrast to the previous *Tanzimat* reform era (1839–76). The Hamidian regime replaced the *Tanzimat* doctrine of including all religious communities under Ottoman citizenship and promoted pan-Islamism as a state ideology. It glorified the Arab-Muslim civilization instead of the West, and reinvented the Caliphate as the leader of Muslims worldwide who had suffered because of Western imperialism. Again, according to Berkes, the Hamidian period was a dark era, because of increased oppression and censorship as well as the network of spies employed to suppress the opposition.

Recent revisionist historiography of the Hamidian period has corrected this picture by challenging the dichotomy of Islam versus modernity (Deringil 1991; Fortna 2002). Deringil, for instance, showed that Abdülhamid's pan-Islamic policies were a part of the palace's search for legitimacy in order to prevent the disintegration of the empire. Fortna in turn explained the increased importance given to Islam in school curriculums during the Hamidian era as a policy which was congruent with accelerated modernization. The use of Islam for strengthening the state was thus not contradictory to modernization and secularization. In fact, an instrumental approach to Islam was made possible by secularization at the conceptual level. It was such a conceptual shift that enabled the perception of Islam as a factor of social cohesion. This view of Islam as social cement was a nineteenth century development which had begun with the Young Ottomans (Mardin 1984).

The modernization of Ottoman state institutions and the army in the nineteenth century, which was based on European models, and the consequent institutional secularization – in the fields of law, education and state bureaucracy – meant that the role of the *ulema* in administration, the judiciary, and the educational system was gradually undermined. Graduates of the secular state-sponsored middle schools of the *Tanzimat* began to replace the *ulema* who thus lost their monopoly on interpreting Islam. A new intelligentsia, no longer educated in religious seminaries (*medrese*), "began to discuss Islam as a fundamental social issue" (Mardin 2005: 151). This development was a crucial aspect of the process of secularization.

This new Ottoman intelligentsia, educated in the new westernized schools of the Military Medical Academy, Civil Service Academy and the War Academy, were under the influence of eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas, such as respect for the laws of nature, the liberal and constitutional ideas of nineteenth century Europe, and the Ottoman patriotism of the

previous generation of intellectuals referred to as Young Ottomans, among whom Namık Kemal (1840–88) especially was a source of inspiration. However, the influence of materialist and positivist ideas distinguished this generation from the former. As explained by Mardin:

> The fundamental substructure of the political thought of such men as Namık Kemal had consisted in the belief of natural law as an emanation of God. Now natural law both in the form of religious law and as a precept of right reason were displaced by the concept of an invariable relation between "things" (1969: 6).

The materialism of Büchner and the cult of positive sciences (*müspet ilim*) as preached by Auguste Comte led this generation to put science before divine revelation as the source of knowledge. These ideas were propagated for instance in Beşir Fuad's (1852–87) periodical *Beşer*, which popularized the advances made in physiology, and in translations such as Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff*, translated by Baha Tevfik (1884–1914). Attempts were also made to reconcile Islam with science. Celal Nuri (İleri, 1881–1938) propagated in his book *Tarih-i İstikbal* the idea that Islamic tenets amounted to an acceptance of the laws of nature. Similar use of Islamic rhetoric for propagating a scientific worldview was also found in leading members of the Young Turk movement,[6] such as Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet.

Ahmet Rıza (1859–1930), a member of the Ottoman civilian administration exiled to Paris in 1889, became the leader of the Young Turk movement and its political organization, the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), 1895–1908. As a committed positivist, Ahmet Rıza propagated respect for the laws of nature and the cult of positive sciences in his journal *Meşveret* (Consultation). However, his materialism did not lead him to reject religion; instead he saw religion as a principle of order, as framed by Comte. He acknowledged the importance of Islam as social cement and used Islamic rhetoric as a way to appeal to the Muslim readership. He rejected the view that Islam was intolerant and the cause of the decline of Islamic civilization and instead depicted Islam as a tolerant religion which recognized the need for a national assembly, even claiming that Islam's weakness was in fact its excessive tolerance (Mardin 1969: 10–11).

Ahmet Rıza was not the only Young Turk who tried to reconcile Islam with modern ideas. Other Westernist Young Turks also dreamed of a society in which their version of Islam would help them mould the "new Muslims" (Hanioğlu 1997: 143). In their effort to reach the public, they defined a "true" Islam, compatible with science and materialism, in contrast to the Islam of the "obscurantist imams (prayer leaders) and sheikhs" (Hanioğlu 1995: 200–3; Zürcher 2002). Theirs was an anti-clerical struggle to refashion

Islam as a private matter and as a rational belief compatible with modernization. According to them, this was the true Islam which was obstructed by intermediaries who were abusing people's ignorance.

Even Abdullah Cevdet (1889–1932), one of the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the Royal Medical Academy, a materialist who was a great admirer of Anglo-Saxon culture, advocated that modern and materialist concepts had to be promoted as Islamic concepts, because Muslims would reject any idea coming from the Christian West. In his journal *İçtihad*, he promoted a scientific religion, free of dogma, myth, supernatural command, rites, and rituals, as well as religion as an individual matter (Hanioğlu 1997: 147–8). Abdullah Cevdet also translated the Dutch scholar Reinhard Dozy's *Essai sur l'histoire de l'Islamisme* into Ottoman Turkish; in the preface of the book he depicted Dozy as being "a thousand times more Muslim than vagabond Hamids" because, he argued, "every learned and virtuous person [was] a Muslim". He supported his argument with the prophet's saying "Religion is *mu'amala,* social relations" and claimed that true Islam could not coexist with ignorance and oppression (Abdullah Cevdet 2002: 172–4).[7]

Westernist Young Turks such as Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet, as well as Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the leading ideologue of Turkish nationalism, who pursued the same positivist ideas, believed that a change of social mentality was necessary for progress. For instance, they saw the dominance of superstitious beliefs (*hurafe*) as the cause of backwardness in Muslim societies. That is why they insisted on the need to reform Islam. In this sense, they shared a disdain for folk religion with reformist Islamists at the time (Mardin 1969: 23 and 1992: 147–8; Arai 1992: 88, 93–4).

In their belief in the essentially rational character of Islam, the Young Turks at least partially echoed the ideas of the modernist Islamists of the nineteenth century, such as Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Jalal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1838–97). What they had in common was their claim concerning the compatibility of Islam with modernity. The Young Turks assumed an authentic spirit of Islam, which was rational and had to be revived in order to prevent the cultural decay of the Islamic world. Both Abduh and Afghani sought to "unite and strengthen Muslim communities through a reform of Islamic belief and society" (Esposito 1984: 45) by calling for a return to the spirit of early Islam and for a reinterpretation of the Koran and the tradition of the prophet Muhammed in the light of modern times.

Yet, unlike these pious modernist Islamists, the Young Turks were materialists who attempted to place an Islamic jacket around scientific notions (Hanioğlu 1997). They were not pious Muslims, but rather, as Mardin puts it, "deists" who could "praise Islam as the most excellent and

advanced of all religions while engaging in positivistic reforms of society" (Mardin 1989: 142). They wanted to use religion as an instrument of social control and cohesion, because Islam for them had an important function as the cement of society, creating a sentiment of solidarity (Mardin 1969: 23). Thus their emphasis on solidarity and their will to unity prevented these positivists from declaring a full-scale war on Islam for the sake of progress. Nevertheless, they nurtured a hostility towards the conservative *ulema*, because they saw the latter as an obstacle on the way to a scientific and rational Islam. Ziya Gökalp, for instance, incorporated Westernist and reformist ideas into Turkish nationalism in his work *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Principles of Turkism, 1924). While modernist Islamists wanted to revitalize the Islamic community by replacing superstition and tradition with the Islam of the prophet's time, the concern of Turkish nationalism was to vitalize the Turkish nation, not the Islamic community (*ümmet*) as a whole. In other words, the significant unit for Gökalp (and later nationalists) was the nation and not the *ümmet*. According to him, the nation would be vitalized only if the "true" Islam could replace superstitious beliefs which, they thought, were caused by external factors, such as the influence of Arab culture or corrupt clergy. Gökalp and Turkish nationalists even published a magazine, *İslâm Mecmuası* (Islam Magazine) in 1914, in which they tried to prove that nationalism did not contradict Islam and promoted the reform of Islam.[8] However, unlike Islamists, these reformists subordinated Islam to national identity by redefining and instrumentalizing it for the sake of nation-building.

The Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Government accomplished several reforms of secularization, inspired by the reformist current and following the advice of Ziya Gökalp. For instance, religious courts were brought under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and were forced to admit the authority of the secular appeals court (*mahkeme-i temyiz*). Religious seminaries (*medrese*s) were brought under state-control via the Ministry of Education. Moreover, a Council of Sheikhs (*Meclis-i Meşayih*) was established in order to supervise the Sufi orders and their lodges (Arai 1992: 93–4).

The ideas of the Westernist group of Young Turks, and of the nationalists led by Ziya Gökalp, largely shaped the Kemalist approach towards religion. Some members of the Westernist group, such as Kılıçzâde Hakkı (1872–1960) and Celâl Nuri, became deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the republican period (Hanioğlu 1997: 147–8). Many of their ideas, which appeared utopian in the 1910s, were implemented as secularist reforms in the following decade.

Early articulations of secularism in Turkey were influenced by French thought and imported the term "*laïque*" – which meant "of the people" or lay members of the church as distinguished from "the clergy". The first Turkish

term used by Gökalp in the 1910s to refer to "laïque" was *lâ-dînî*, literally meaning nonreligious or secular (*dindışı*). Because it was understood as meaning atheism by the Sheikh ul-Islam, as well as Islamist intellectuals writing in the magazine *Sırat-ı Müstakim* (later *Sebilürreşad*), this word was replaced with the word *laik* (Adıvar 1947: 277). Since then, this word has been used in Turkey for referring to the doctrine of secularism.

While the word *laik* and *laiklik* has been used in Turkish-written sources, English-written texts use either "secularism" or "laicism" to refer to Turkish secularism. Berkes argued, for instance, that the concept of "secularism" rather than "laicism" had to be used in understanding the secularization process of Turkey. Laicism, he maintained, referred to the distinction of the laity (the Greek words *laos*, the people, and *laikos*, the lay) from the clergy, and hence was a Christian characteristic, where the organization of the church was a major issue, unlike in Islam or Ottoman tradition (Berkes 1964: 3–4). According to a more recent account of secularism in Turkey written by Davison, however, the concept of laicism is more congruent with the specificity of the Turkish experience, which is marked by the control of religion by the state, although "the relations of control were partly understood by actors as relations of separation, in the sense of separating religion from its previous interrelation in certain spheres" (1998: 180). Davison argued that the Turkish experience can be defined not as secularism, which assumes a non-religious, religion–free state, but as laicism, which connotes the transfer of some fields, such as education and governance, to lay control. *Laiklik*, according to Davison, "did not entail ending state interest in religion", as it was based on religious policy which reflected a specific interpretation of Islam (Ibid.: 153–4; Davison 2003: 337).

Although I follow Davison's perspective in this book, I do not agree with his insistance on not using the term "secularism". In this book, I use the latter term for referring to the doctrine that morality, national education, and the state itself should not be based on religious principles,[9] a doctrine which can gain specific meanings in different political and historical contexts. As Asad states, laicism is the alternative word for French secularism which "draws on the Jacobin experience, one that authorizes a stronger, more aggressive secularism … than the British equivalent does" (2003: 208). Similarly, the Turkish *laiklik* has been viewed as a specific version of secularism inspired by the French Jacobin tradition. As a political doctrine which promoted secularization, it ultimately aimed to limit religion to the private sphere by redefining religion as a matter of individual conscience (*vicdan*), a personal affair (Mardin 1977: 588; Mert 1994: 87; Ayata 1996: 41). In other words, Turkish *laiklik* is a form of secularism, although it has its own peculiarities. Thus, I prefer to use the more general term of "secularism" over the particularly French concept of "laicism".

Secularism has been the central tenet of Kemalism, the official ideology[10] of the modernizing political elite in the Republican period.[11] The Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, one year after the abolition of the sultanate on 1 November 1922. With this, the earlier subjects of the Ottoman Empire became equal and free citizens of the Turkish Republic, regardless of their religion.[12] Ankara, where the Grand National Assembly was held, was chosen as the capital of the new Republic. In contrast to Istanbul, which had been the seat of the Ottoman dynasty and the Caliphate, the new capital symbolized the renaissance of the Turkish nation and the new secular republic (Şenol Cantek 2003). The Kemalist commitment to secularism was officially proclaimed in 1928 with the removal of the second article of the 1924 Constitution, which declared Islam the official religion of the state. Finally, the principle of secularism has been a non-amendable article of the Constitution since February 1937.

Mustafa Kemal and the political cadres of the single-party regime, which lasted 1923–40, were heirs to the ideology of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century Ottoman reformers and Westernist Young Turks. Like their predecessors, Kemalists were influenced by the values of the Enlightenment, Comtean positivism and solidarism of Durkheim (Dumont 1984; Zürcher 2002). Kemalists differed, however, in their radical implementation of westernizing and secularizing reforms. They devoted themselves to what they called *İnkılâb* (Revolution), which implied a "radical change executed with order and method", aiming at a "complete transformation of society".[13] The Kemalist Revolution included several radical reforms which had both political and cultural implications.

Kemalists aimed to form a secular and strong nation-state. They rejected maintaining national unity on the basis of Islamic solidarity, which had secured the alliance of different ethnic groups in Anatolia against the "infidel" occupying powers (Zürcher 1999). Thus, the elimination of Islamic sources of power and legitimacy was seen as essential for strengthening political authority in Ankara. A major institutional step in this secularization process was taken by the enactment of Law No. 431 (*Hilafetin İlgasına ve Hanedanı Osmaninin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılmasına Dair Kanun*), which abolished the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.[14] The same law also abolished the function of Sheikh ul-Islam[15] and the Ministries of Religious Affairs (*Şeriye*) and Pious Foundations (*Evkaf*). Instead, a Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyânet İşleri Reisliği*) was charged with the administration of the mosques (Tarhanlı 1993; Kaya 1998; Kara 2000a; Gözaydın 2006). As Gözaydın states:

> The new legislation preferred to place the management of religious affairs in the hands of an administrative bureau, not to a ministry in the cabinet. This was a key part of the overall policy of the founding political decision-making

> elite of Turkey who wanted to establish a strictly secular state and to transform society into a modern one. They did not want to have a unit within the cabinet dealing with religious affairs. Instead, by assigning religious affairs to an administrative unit, the ruling elite both took religion under their control and at the same time managed to break the potentially sacred significance of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. (2006: 1)

For Kemalists, secularism did not contradict the continuing control over religion and the existence of a religious apparatus within the state mechanism.

Furthermore, the state wanted to curb the power of the *ulema* by fully secularizing the field of education. The Law of the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*), which was enacted on the same day as the law which abolished the Caliphate, closed the religious seminaries and standardized the institutions of education under a secular curriculum.

A further major step taken by the single-party government to keep religious activity under control was the outlawing of Sufi orders (*tarikat*). On 30 September 1925, Law No. 677 dissolved the orders and closed all local and central dervish lodges (*tekke ve zaviyeler*). This law prohibited the use of mystical names, titles and costumes pertaining to these titles, impounded the assets of the orders, banned their ceremonies and meetings, and provided sentences for those who tried to re-establish them. Besides this, tombs which were the centers of veneration for visitations and pilgrimages were also closed by the same law.

The Kemalist Revolution rendered the utopia of the Westernist Young Turks real.[16] The process of westernization in all fields of life, such as art, law, education, dress and food habits, which began in the nineteenth century, was accelerated by the Kemalist regime. The changes were so stark that, in the eyes of many pro-regime intellectuals of the time, the Kemalist Revolution was the peak of the process of westernization and represented a real civilizational change. For instance, educational and legal institutions were totally secularized by the Republican state. The standardization of education under a secular curriculum and the abolishment of religious education was followed by radical steps which secularized the law. The secularization in the legal field that had begun in the nineteenth century was completed with the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code in 1926. With the abolishment of Islamic law and the adoption of the new secular Civil Code (*Medenî Kanun*), the equality of women in law was recognized. According to Mahmut Esat [Bozkurt] (1892–1943), the Minister of Justice at the time who had studied law in Switzerland, this new civil law would close the doors of old civilization and open those of contemporary civilization (Duben and Behar 1996: 229). In the new civil code, polygamy was banned (although it could be continued in places out of reach of the state),[17] women

gained equal rights in inheritance law, could apply for divorce and be a part of public life.

Moreover, the Kemalist state undertook even more direct interventions in the everyday life of the people in its attempt to secularize the public sphere and adopt Western civilization. The dress code, which imposed the compulsory use of the western brimmed hat in 1925 and outlawed the *fez*, the traditional headgear for men, reflected the Kemalist urge to break with the past and to change even the daily habits of people for the sake of westernization.[18] The replacement of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin one in 1928 was also a reform which created a symbolic rupture with traditional daily habits. Besides this, the adoption of the European clock and calendar in 1926, of European numerals in 1928, and of European measures and weights in 1931 were other reforms which limited the future generations' links with the Islamic world and their access to the immediate Ottoman past (Zürcher 1997: 196). The elimination of the influences of Islamic/Arab culture by adopting Europe as a model was the primary goal of Kemalist nationalism. In the words of Falih Rıfkı Atay (1893–1971), the editor of the official newspaper *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty), "to be Westernized meant at the same time to escape from being Arabicized; it meant being Turkified" (Atay 1980: 446; also quoted in Ahıska 2003: 378, fn. 74).

These cultural reforms were intended to make the new Turkish nation a part of the civilized Western world as soon as possible. "Catching the train of civilization" (Ahıska 2003: 354–5) was the main motive of Kemalists, who were positivists believing in the idea of progress. Hence, secularism was understood as the civilizing mission of the Kemalist elite. In other words, the Kemalist elite internalized Eurocentric Orientalist discourse by appropriating its basic assumptions, especially its acceptance of a hierarchical dichotomy between the East and the West and the normative and teleological view of history, in which Western modernity represented the latest and superior stage. While traditional culture was pushed back in time and degraded as the cause of failure vis-à-vis the Western powers, Western civilization was accepted as a "telos", a stage which the Turkish nation still had to reach. As a result, the new Turkish citizen was also caught between his two selves: the Western/modern self which s/he opted for and the Oriental/traditional self which s/he tried to suppress. The Oriental self, seen through Orientalist eyes, had to be concealed or eradicated in order to be part of the universal civilization equated with the Western one. The inability to replace it with the modern self has been a source of pain for many intellectuals of the period. Here is how one of the staunch Kemalists of the early republican period, Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939), expressed this pain:

> Oh, what an endless drama is this incompleteness! It is an internal drama, a spiritual tragedy! I can never feel complete and full. And do you know what a

> perdition is this feeling of incompleteness! I like both European music and oriental music. At the same time, I see and feel that I sense neither the former completely and fully like an European does, nor the latter as an Oriental (Ağaoğlu 1940: 90).[19]

Women particularly were at the center of such a duality of Oriental and Western identities. Elite women benefited from the new educational and legal reforms of the Republican state, through having equal access to public institutions. These women became the marker of the nation's modernity. Western-style clothing and accompaniment of men in public arenas of entertainment were seen as the requirements of modernity as well as the proof of their emancipation from tradition. They signified a shift from an Islamic to a secular, modern way of life (Göle 1996: 55–63; Arat 1998: 15). Kemalists, who were inspired by Gökalp's depiction of feminism in pre-Islamic Turkish society, saw the emancipation of women as a national mission (Durakbaşa 1998). However, this emancipation, besides being limited to elite women who had access to education, was also short of being a true liberation. Kemalism, through the construction of the image of the new woman, tried to establish a Western style of gender relation in Turkey, while maintaining traditional norms of female modesty (Ibid.: 147–8).[20]

In the Republican period, Islam no longer served as a legitimating ideology, and its legal, educational, and constitutional status has been radically changed. Still, secularism in the sense of divorcing religion and politics has not occurred in Turkey. Despite its radicalism in secularizing legal, political and cultural fields, the Republican regime did not have a neutral position regarding different Islamic and non-Islamic faiths. The Kemalist state not only wanted to control religion, but also promoted a national and Sunni Islam rendered compatible with the modern nation-state. In this respect, Kemalists were heirs to the Young Turks' instrumentalist and reformist approach to Islam. They adopted the Young Turks' dream of a pure, Turkish Islam, which was redefined as a matter of individual conscience (*vicdan*) and hence made congruous with the westernization project (Davison 1998: 134–88; Parla and Davison 2004: 108). The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was the main administrative instrument for disseminating this official Islam throughout the country. As an organization under direct supervision of the Prime Minister, it appointed imams, preachers and supervised *müftü*s, as well as distributing the Friday sermons to the mosques throughout the country. In brief, the aim of secularism was "to remove religion as a rationale from certain spheres of governance without fully separating its institutions and personnel from the state" (Parla and Davison 2004: 104).

A total separation between state and religion was impeded primarily by the ideological background of the nationalist movement preceding the

foundation of the Republic. At least to its contemporaries, the nationalist resistance to the occupying powers had been as much a religious movement as a national one (Rustow 1957: 71). As the poem of the national anthem written by Mehmet Âkif (Ersoy) shows, the ideological vocabulary of the resistance movement reflected what could be called a "Muslim nationalism" (Zürcher 1999). Although this Muslim nationalism was suppressed by the secular nationalism of Kemalism after the foundation of the republic, Islam effectively remained an important criterion for affiliation to the nation.

Kemalist nationalism, which can be seen as a modernist nationalism having both ethnic and civic characteristics (Akman 2004: 23–51), was based on a vague definition of "Turk". Acccording to the 1924 Constitution, Turkish citizenship was defined without reference to racial and religious differences (Article 88). Nevertheless, Kemalists imagined "the nation" as "ethnic Turks" who also included Muslim groups such as Kurds, the Laz, and Circassian if they could be Turkified (van Bruinessen 1997; Yıldız 2001). These Muslim groups could, however, be deemed "others" or internal enemies, a threat to unity, if they, like the Kurds, resisted Turkification or emphasized their cultural difference. The Kurdish insurgencies have been seen either as reactionary movements resisting modernization, the expression of economic and social discontent, the action of a radical group, or the outcome of external incitement (Kushner 1997: 224; see also Yeğen 1999). Various Kurdish uprisings in 1925, and the 1930s, resulted in forced migrations of Kurdish groups to the Western parts of the country.

Furthermore, non-Muslim minorities such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians too could be perceived as threats to national unity. The proportion of these non-Muslim groups within the population had dropped significantly after World War I, mainly due to the deportation and massacres of Armenians in 1915 and the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1924.[21] These groups have been the only groups in Turkey officially recognized as minorities, because the Treaty of Lausanne, which formed the legal basis for the international recognition of Turkey as an independent state, employed the term minority only in relation to non-Muslim peoples living in Turkey and contained clauses to protect the minorities of the new state.[22] The use of religion as the only criterion for the definition of a minority group having linguistic and cultural rights reflected a contradiction with the Kemalist discourse of secularism and a continuity with the Ottoman *millet* (religious community) system. The experiences of these religious minorities under the Republican regime showed that Turkishness continued to be defined on the basis of Sunni Muslim heritage (Bali 2000; Aktar 2000).[23] Likewise, immigration policies of the early Turkish Republic favoring Muslim Turks as opposed to ethnic Turks proved that Turkish citizenship was defined to an important extent on the basis of religion (Kirişçi 2000; Yıldız 2001: 137). In

other words, the major defining factor of Turkishness in practice was religion, rather than ethnicity.[24]

The Kemalist state's control over and instrumentalization of religion did not mean that religion was its primary source of legitimacy. The state rather aimed to determine the limits of the religious sphere as part of its modernizing project of increasing its control over society. The Kemalist elite imagined and promoted a "pure" Islam compatible with reason and away from politics, as reflected clearly in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal, such as the one he gave in İzmir in January 1923:

> Our religion is a most reasonable and most natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last religion. In order for a religion to be natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion is totally compatible with these. ("İzmir'de Halk ile Konuşma" 1923, in Atatürk [1989: 83–91]; quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 110)

Or for instance when he explained the rationale for the abolition of the Caliphate in his Speech in 1927:

> The faith of Islam should be purified and raised from the political situation in which it has been put for centuries. (Atatürk [1962: 684]; quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 108)

As shown by Parla and Davison, the "distinction made between 'pure' Islam and impure Islam tainted by its entanglement in political affairs" was crucial for Kemalist secularism (Ibid.: 109).

The control of Islam also served as a tool of the regime to eliminate political adversaries. The positivist rhetoric of secularism that presented religion as a part of tradition and therefore as an obstacle to progress and modernization was used by the state to eliminate its political opposition, which was often condemned as being anti-revolutionary and reactionary. As Cizre-Sakallıoğlu indicates:

> The manner in which the state elite employed Islam to fend off opposition – and, in fact, to reinforce the regime – went beyond the meaning of secularism in the West. Rather than being banished from the public political sphere, Islam came to rest at the center stage of politics, and secularism became a politically charged concept. (1996: 236)

The concept of *irtica* (reactionary Islam) was crucial in this process of politicization of Islam. As stated in 1923 by Velid Ebu'z-Ziyâ (1884–1945), a journalist who was then slandered as reactionary (*mürteci*), the term *irtica* had become a weapon used against opposition in the early Republican period.[25]

The Kemalist attitude towards the opposition in this regard continued the tradition of earlier Ottoman reformers (Zürcher 2001: 209–22; Mert 1998). The term *irtica* was first used to refer to the March 31 Incident (*31 Mart Vak'ası*), a mutiny by soldiers which has since been known as an Islamic revolt against the Young Turk government (Akşin 1970; Farhi 1971; Mert 1998; Zürcher 2001). On 13 April 1909 (31 March according to the Ottoman Rumî calendar) soldiers of the First Corps, aided by soldiers of the Light Infantry Battalions of the Third Corps (*avcı taburları*), revolted and arrested their officers, killing many of them and uttering the cry "We want *şeriat!*" (Farhi 1971: 275). The rebels, accompanied by the students of religious colleges, wanted the dismissal of the leading statesmen of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the dismissal of the young officers who had graduated from the Military Academies (*mektebli*), the reinstatement of those who had risen from the ranks (*alaylı*) and the full implementation of the *şeriat* (Ibid.). The uprising lasted until the arrival of a Unionist-controlled task force, called *Hareket Ordusu*, the Action Amy, made up of a corps from Salonica, which marched on the capital and suppressed the rebellion, executing its leaders and deporting Sultan Abdülhamid II to Salonica. Although the slogan of *şeriat* was widely used during the revolt, at the time "any kind of a backward move to a Islamic order was hardly one of the possibilities" and religion was just used as a tool for facilitating a mainly military revolt (Akşin 1970: 290–2). Derviş Vahdetî (1870–1909), his Society for Muhammedan Union (*İttihad-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti*), and its newspaper *Volkan* had played an important role in the organization of the uprising. Nevertheless, the revolt was a result of a coalition of opposition forces, largely organized by the opposition party *Ahrar* (Ibid.), rather than a merely religious uprising.[26] Yet, the CUP leadership denounced the rebels as *erbab-ı irtica* (lords of Islamic reactionism), and from then on the term *irtica* has become a pejorative epithet used against opposition (2001b: 216–17).

"March 31" has since been referred to by the ruling political elite and presented in the official Turkish historiography as an example of Islamic reactionism. The event retained its traumatic effect on most of the leaders of the Republic such as İsmet İnönü (1884–1973), the second President of the Republic after Atatürk. İnönü was to write in his memoirs, published in the weekly magazine *Akis* as late as 1959, that he always recalled "the catastrophe of March 31" as "the collapse of a big building", a reaction to the young constitutional regime which created "an ever-lasting atmosphere of insecurity."[27] The feeling of insecurity was crucial here because, in the minds of the Republican leaders, the suppression of the uprising, the dissolution of the Society of Mohammedan Union and the execution of Vahdetî, had only "swept that stratum under the carpet" in İnönü's words. *İrtica* (Islamic reactionism) according to them, had not been entirely

destroyed and had continued to exist in the guise of various bodies and parties, collaborating with others against the modernizing state (Farhi 1971: 294).

Thus, in the early republican era, March 31 was used by the political and intellectual elite as the specter of *irtica* (reactionary Islam). The memory of the traumatic events of 1909 played an important role in the way the political elite perceived the Kurdish rebellion (Sheikh Said Rebellion) in February 1925. The Sheikh Said Rebellion, which had both a nationalist and religious nature, was constructed by the state's discourse as the last outbreak of *irtica* against progress, a tribal issue, a relic of the old order, and as a recurrence of March 31 (Zürcher 2001b: 216–17; Albayrak 1990b: 12; Yeğen 1999: 133). The government charged the rebels with the political use of religion and sacred religious notions (*din ve mukaddesat-ı diniye*). The opposition, Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which was accused of encouraging religious reactionaries, was closed down (Zürcher 2001b: 215).

The specter of *irtica* continued to haunt the Kemalist regime which, after 1925, claimed dictatorial powers and silenced the opposition. Opposition of all sorts, including resistance to the secularizing reforms, was suppressed and depicted as *irtica* caused by the deep ignorance (*koyu cahillik*) of the people, which was abused by the defenders of the old order who betrayed the national ideal of modernization.[28]

As Bozarslan states, Kemalists were no different from other political leaders in the Middle East who tried to tame Islam through nationalizing it and using it as a tool of legitimacy and social control. In this process, they often neglected the fact that the Islamic opposition also was national, unlike the way they wanted to see it. The inescapable result of the state's attempt to monopolize the field of religion was the perception that Islamic activity independent of the state was a threat (Bozarslan 2000b). While national religion was seen as essential to the development of peace and stability, religious activities in public which were outside of the state's control were perceived as reactionary movements and relics of the old order opposing the modernizing national state (Ibid.: p. 63). In other words, the state not only needed Islam as a tool for legitimization and enhancing stability, but also reactionary Islam or Islamism (depicted as *irtica*) as an enemy (Ibid.: p. 66).

Secularism in Turkey, with its peculiar characteristics as previously described, was imposed from above by an authoritarian regime. Whether the dominance of this ideology was transformed into hegemony, i.e. an ideological dominance with consent of the masses in the Gramscian sense of the term, is debatable (Gramsci 1971: 12).[29] The following pages attempt to depict the political strategies used in Kemalism's struggle for hegemony instead of judging it in terms of its failure or success in this regard.

Kemalism owed its dominance, if not to hegemony, to its success in inculcating in citizens that the values of the secular nation-state were sacred. As Part I demonstrates, the way in which the elite conveyed secularist ideas to the masses was hardly secular. It is not surprising that Kemalism, which had its roots in the earlier realm of religion as do all nationalist ideologies,[30] carried ritualistic parallels with religion. In its search for hegemony, Kemalism built myths around historical personalities, events and concepts, reiterating narrative forms of religion. Kemalists adopted the concepts of religion and refashioned them for their secular project. The fact that they adopted the tools – or mythical narratives – also used by religion does not mean that their secularism became a religion or replaced it. As Asad argues, "[m]odern nationalism draws on pre-existing languages and practices. … Yet it does not follow from this that religion forms nationalism" (Asad 2003: 194).

A crucial aspect of Kemalism has been the importance given to the concept of a charismatic leader. In the Kemalist discourse, the national past took the form of a myth centered on the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The latter represented the personification of the Revolution, i.e. the national ideal (*mefkûre* or *ülkü*) of westernization/modernization. The nation was defined as "a nation gathered around her Father who represented the crystallization of the Turkish genius" (Köker 1993: 160–1). Having adopted the surname of Atatürk, "the Father Turk", in 1934, Mustafa Kemal has been at the center of republican iconography (Seufert and Weyland 1994: 80–1; Daldal 1998; Ünder 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002: 187–203; Zürcher 2005). Atatürk, who was also declared the Eternal Chief (*Ebedî Şef*), National Chief (*Büyük Şef*), Commander in Chief (*Başkumandan*), Teacher in Chief (*Başöğretmen*), became an icon representing the embodiment of national independence and revolutions. This cult of the leader, with its specific rituals and ceremonies, has been the expression of a "republican metaphysics", in stark contradiction with the positivist rhetoric of Kemalists (İnsel 2000).

The metaphysical characteristic of Kemalism was further enhanced by its narrative of the past. Mythical narratives of the past have been constitutive of the official historiography which aimed to create a new national consciousness based on a new vision of the past and a new rhetoric of change and continuity.[31] As Alonso contends, "the hegemony of modern nation-states, and the legitimacy which accrues to the groups and classes that control their apparatuses, are critically constituted by representations of a national past" (Alonso 1988). The Kemalist single-party regime also needed to create a national consciousness on which it could base its legitimacy. To this end, Mustafa Kemal's own narrative, which was introduced in his Speech (*Nutuk*) overviewing the years 1919–26, has been the main basis of the official historiography (Zürcher 1984; Adak 2003). Besides, an official

Turkish history thesis was formed under the supervision of Mustafa Kemal between 1929 and 1937. This official history, which was "scientifically" presented during the Turkish History Congresses in 1932 and 1937 and shaped history education throughout the republican period, emphasized the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic past of the Turks going back to the "motherland" of Central Asia (Ersanlı Behar 1996: 89). Besides the Turkish History Foundation, which became the factory of official history, a Turkish Language Institute was set up with the aim of purging the Turkish language of foreign – Arabic and Persian – words. In a nutshell, by founding such institutions, the Kemalist state searched for a nation with its own history, language and culture (Kadıoğlu 1995).

The Turkish experience confirms the definition of a nation made by Ernest Renan: "Nations are among other things, communities of shared memory and shared forgetting" (1990: 8–22). In Kemalist historiography, the immediate Ottoman past was depicted as a catastrophic period and a dark age for the nation. The Ottoman dynasty and the Caliphate were portrayed as responsible for the catastrophe at the end of World War I, which was seen as the inevitable result of the failure to catch up with Western civilization, which was based on science and reason. The Ottoman past was also neglected because the old institutions of Islam, such as the traditional *ulema*, high-ranking religious functionaries, and *tarikat*s were seen as relics of the past and obstacles to progress. This neglect of the Islamic legacy, and the downplaying of the continuity with the Ottoman past, were in fact in line with Republican leaders' secularization policies, which were aimed at decreasing the role of Islam in public life and realizing the shift from Eastern to Western civilization.

The Kemalist regime not only attempted to make the nation forget the imperial symbolism of the recent past, but also tried to construct a historical conscience in order to shape the psychological reflexes of the citizens. This "national pedagogy" was made possible by recalling certain events in such a way as to remind the citizens of the dangers of the past and the future (Açıkel 1996: 134–5). This use of the past has been essential for secularist discourse. This study thus analyzes how the selective use and mythical narration of the past played a role in the mediation of secularism to the masses.

This book contends that the key to understanding the dominant secularist discourse in Turkey is the politics of memory, or "mnemonic battles" in the words of Zerubavel.[32] Especially in the multi-party period, Kemalist secularism was contested by those who claimed alternative pasts and counter-memories.[33] Kemalists thus lost the monopoly over shaping the national memory that they used to have in the single-party period.[34]

The following chapters analyze how the Kemalist memory was recycled, sustained, transformed and challenged during the public debates on secularism in the multi-party period. It was through this politics of memory that secularism was able to uphold its dominance and to struggle for hegemony in the enlarged public sphere of the democratic period. Politicians and intellectuals were crucial actors in this process.

Secularism in Turkey has been mediated to the masses via education and the mass media by politicians and intellectuals. It was the ultimate aim of the Kemalist regime to transform secularism from an official doctrine into a worldview internalized by the masses at large. The printed press, as a key mediator between the elite and the masses, provided the political leaders and intellectuals with a platform where they could convey, negotiate and fix the meaning of secularism. Politicians and intellectuals, as the authors of political discourses, attempted to shape public opinion about events and conducted public debates on secularism in the form of editorials and articles published in daily newspapers and periodicals.

Especially in the multi-party period, the discourse of Kemalist secularism began to be reproduced by the political and intellectual elite, who represented a greater variety compared to the single-party period. In this period, the pluralization of the political sphere was paralleled by an increased activity in civil society. The community of intellectuals included groups composed of writers, journalists, artists, scholars, students, and members of liberal professions. They intervened in the political debate via the printed press, although they themselves were not professional politicians (Charle 2001: 7627).[35]

All of these public interventions were made possible by concrete legal measures taken by the state. A critical change in the Press Law, ratified by the Grand National Assembly on 1 June 1946, gave more freedom to journalists. The new law amended the 50th article of the Press Law (*Matbuat Kanunu*, dated 1931), which gave the government the power to temporarily close daily newspapers and periodicals that opposed the general policies of the country (*memleketin genel politikasına dokunacak yayın*) (Topuz 1996: 100). For the first time in Turkey's history, the daily circulation of newspapers reached seventy to eighty thousand for each newspaper (Gevgilili 1983: 220). Elite journalists, as "representatives" of civil society, "competed with political elites in their claims to the true expression of popular aspirations" (Heper and Demirel 1996: 109–23) and were read more widely as levels of literacy increased.[36]

The proliferated printed media largely supported the new opposition, Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*), which was founded on 7 January 1946 (Topuz 1996: 105). Owing its popularity largely to this support, the Democratic Party, which took power in 1950, paid its debt by issuing the

Press Law of 15 July 1950. This was a further liberal move which decreased the government's control over the press (Topuz 1996: 105).

The press thus played a crucial role in the enlargement of the public sphere of civil society. This was a sphere where the meanings of religion and secularism were widely debated, especially in the first decades of the multi-party period (Kaçmazoğlu 1988; Sitembölükbaşı 1995; Taşyürek 2001). The explosion of media in this period was marked by the emergence of a new Islamic discourse which, as suggested by Mardin, closed the gap between the elite and the ordinary people (Mardin 2005: 157). A new group of conservative nationalist intellectuals claimed to represent the voice of Muslims and to bring Islam back to the public. These intellectuals took a critical attitude towards the authoritarian regime of the single-party era by conveying an alternative collective memory, that of Muslims repressed by the single-party government. The secularist discourse and its evolution in the first two decades of the multi-party period can be understood in the context of this clash of collective memories, which is explored in Part II. Part I in turn investigates secularism as practiced in the preceding period of the single-party regime.

1

Reactionary Islam: The Menemen Incident (1930)

Düştü Kubilay'ın başsız gövdesi
Bir zeytin dalı gibi yere.
Düştü cebinden bir kitap, açıldı,
Göklere.[1]

Şeyh Mehmet, bir işarettir, bir gölgedir.[2]

"This is a second Kubilay incident!" These were the words from the speech of the spokesman of the opposition party, who blamed the Government for the allegedly Islamist attack on 17 May 2006 against the Council of State which had upheld the ban on Islamic headscarf for state employees (See Preface).[3] In this speech made in the Grand National Assembly on the day after the attack, the murdered judge of the Council of State was likened to Kubilay, a young teacher and reserve officer who had been beheaded by the leader of an Islamic rebellion against the secularist regime in 1930. In the eyes of the speaker, both the victims of 1930 and of 2006 were attacked by the same enemy: *irtica* or "reactionary Islam". But what had happened in 1930? Who was Kubilay? How could his memory be evoked even 76 years after his death?

Turkish textbooks for secondary schools, covering the history of the modernization of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s and teaching the principles of Kemalism, refer to the story of Kubilay under the subtitle of "The Menemen Incident". The rebellion during which Kubilay was beheaded is framed here as one of the most important "movements of reactionism" or "reactionary uprisings" (*irticai hareket* or *gerici ayaklanma*) against the republican regime, and is narrated as follows:

> Those who were against the Republic wanted to overthrow it and to re-establish the old order. However, they were prevented at their every attempt as

> the great majority was determined to protect the Republic. The Menemen Incident was one of these attempts. Derviş Mehmed, a person affiliated with the Naqshbandi order, and ignorant people who gathered around him, came to Menemen on December 23, 1930. They began an uprising for the sake of religion. They martyred Kubilay, a teacher and second-lieutenant who tried to stop the uprising, by cutting his head off. Soldiers were sent to the town as soon as the event was heard of. The uprising was appeased. Rebels were caught, tried in military court and punished. (Şenünver et al. 2005: 126)

This narrative has been adopted also by several, mostly Kemalist, amateur historians and journalists who studied the Menemen Incident.[4] In this narrative, which brings the martyrdom of Kubilay into focus, the event is depicted as a conspiracy of the Naqshbandi Sufi order,[5] and the fact that the latter was effectively suppressed is emphasized.

The Menemen Incident is not a mere "historical event" which is chronicled and recorded; it is a "commemorated event"[6] for which annual ceremonies are held in Menemen every year on 23 December. Especially since the early 1990s, this annual commemoration ceremony has been attended by thousands of Kemalist civil activists and transformed into a secularist demonstration. The above narration of the event has been repeated since the 1930s in commemorative statements and ceremonies. The event in this narrative form has functioned as a model illustrating "the perpetual conflict between conservative Islamists and secular Kemalists" (Brockett 1999: 48). Accordingly, the beheaded officer Kubilay, the heroic victim of the incident, has become an icon[7] of Kemalist secularism.

This chapter aims to elucidate why and how the Menemen Incident has become a commemorated event, unlike others linked to reactionary movements against the early Republican state. The main contention of the chapter is that the icon of Kubilay has been a prominent constituent of the Kemalist memory because the story of beheading revived the fear of reactionary Islam (*irtica*) and served to create an emotional bond with the secular regime. The Kemalist regime used this event in the service of its fight against *irtica* as well as for supressing the opposition. The following account of the Menemen Incident will focus on its social and political context, the motivations and actions of the rebels, the state's use of the event to mobilize citizens and to delegitimize the opposition, and finally the resistance to this mobilization. This account of the rebellion, its context and its aftermath deviates from both Kemalist and Islamist historical accounts of the event centered around their respective victims and heros. It aims to illuminate one of the main moments of the formation of the concept of *irtica* during the single-party period.

The single-party regime, opposition and reactionaries

The Menemen Incident occurred in December 1930, seven years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, which was then ruled by the party-government of the Republican People's Party (RPP), except during short attempts at democracy in November 1924–June 1925 and in August 1930–January 1930. After the outbreak of the Kurdish Rebellion (Sheikh Said Rebellion) of 1925, the single-party regime was consolidated with the proclamation of martial law in the eastern provinces and the adoption of the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*), which remained in force from 3 March 1925 to 4 March 1929 and gave the government dictatorial powers. Besides suppressing the Kurdish rebellion, the Law also silenced all opposition, including the opposition political party (Progressive Republican Party) and the press (Zürcher 1997: 178–80; van Bruinessen 2000: 144).

During this period of silenced opposition the Kemalist state implemented radical secularizing reforms, such as the outlawing of the Sufi orders (*tarikat*), including the Naqshbandi order, which had played an important role in the Kurdish rebellion. The ban on Sufi activity did not result in an armed reaction against the regime, but rather in partially passive resistance or accommodation to the new regime (Küçük 2007). Like the opposition to the abolition of the Caliphate, the potential opposition to the outlawing of Sufi orders was suppressed by the Independence Tribunals (*İstiklâl Mahkemeleri*), the revolutionary courts, which were founded to implement the High Treason Law (*Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu*) against the opponents of the nationalist government in Ankara in 1920.

Until 1930, the radical westernization program of the Republican People's Party (RPP) was accompanied by a general lack of civil liberties as well as the party's widespread corruption at the local level. The Kemalist political elite were not totally unaware of an increasing unpopularity of the regime. For instance, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was the editor of *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* (the official newspaper) and a university professor, and who supported the state-led westernization program, was among those who were worried by this situation. In a report which he presented to Mustafa Kemal in 1926, he criticized the irresponsible behavior of the RPP leaders and warned the President of the Republic of signs of a decrease in the prestige of the party in the eyes of the common people. Their silence, according to him, did not mean the absence of opposition.[8]

The latent public discontent with the RPP rule, which was observed by Ağaoğlu as early as 1926, could be expressed for a short period via legal channels in 1930. The removal of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in 1929 had initiated a new atmosphere of tolerance towards the opposition. Three political parties were founded in 1930, the Free Republican Party

(*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) (FRP) being one of them.[9] The FRP was established on 12 August with the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal, under the leadership of Fethi [Okyar] (1880–1943).[10] Ahmet Ağaoğlu was also among the founders of this party.

The FRP won considerable support shortly after its foundation. Two Istanbul-based daily newspapers, Arif Oruç's (1895–1950) *Yarın* (Tomorrow) and Mehmet Zekeriya's (Sertel, 1890–1980) *Son Posta* (The Last Mail), began to criticize the government of İsmet [İnönü] and supported the new opposition party. The party was successful, especially in western Anatolia where the export-oriented agricultural region of İzmir and its hinterland had been hit by the Economic Depression of 1929.[11] Peasants and merchants in this region, as well as the urban and educated groups who resented the RPP's authoritarian rule, expressed their discontent via the new party (Emrence 1999 and 2000). The latter followed a strategy of criticizing the RPP's economic policies and, in the absence of any other channel, attracted all anti-regime groups including those who opposed the government's secularist policies (Sencer 1971: 142). The discontent of the masses and the support they gave to the FRP surfaced, particularly during anti-government demonstrations held in İzmir on the occasion of the visit of the FRP leaders to the city (Weiker 1973: 88–91, 135). The grassroots movement against the government, especially in western Anatolia, alarmed the RPP leadership, who blamed the new party for being used by reactionaries and enemies of the regime.[12] Yet, the autobiographical accounts of the two leaders of the FRP, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Fethi [Okyar], show that at least the leadership of the FRP did not have any intention of appealing to the religious feelings of the masses (Ağaoğlu 1994; Okyar and Seyitdanlıoğlu 1997).

After the municipal elections in October 1930, the RPP leaders increased their attacks against the opposition party. Despite the electoral fraud of the RPP bureaucracy, the FRP had won the majority of votes in these local elections in about 40 of the 502 constituencies.[13] Most of these were in the provinces of Aydın and İzmir, and among them was the small town of Menemen, situated 30 kilometers away from the city of İzmir, where the notorious uprising would take place in December of the same year.

The fact that the reactionary uprising of Menemen occurred in a town where the opposition party had won popular support led the RPP leaders and later commentators to infer that there was a link between the uprising and the FRP. Although the latter was dissolved on 16 November 1930 by its leaders, who were no longer supported by Mustafa Kemal (Emrence 2000; Ağaoğlu 1994: 109–15; Okyar and Seyitdanlıoğlu 1997), the link between the FRP and the Menemen Incident is still stressed by official historiography. History textbooks for Turkish secondary schools categorize the Menemen Incident in a subsection of the part titled "Attempts to initiate the multi-

party system and reactions against the Revolution" (Şenünver et al. 2005; Su and Duru 1982: 292–6; Kara 1994). The selected "reactionary rebellions", the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 and the Menemen Incident of 1930, are covered in these textbooks in conjunction with the opposition political parties, the Progressive Republican Party and the FRP. Both rebellions are associated with the formation of these parties, with the implication that their leaders abused the freer atmosphere and Mustafa Kemal's search for democracy (Ersanlı Behar 1996: 229–30). Kemalist historiography, which is reflected in these textbooks, not only echoes the RPP leaders who felt threatened by the popular support of the FRP in the autumn of 1930, but also legitimizes the continuation of the single-party regime.[14] In this discourse, democracy should be delayed in order to protect it from fanatics or enemies of the regime who use religion for political ends.

However, there is no proof of a connection between the FRP and the participants of the Menemen uprising. We can only suggest, following Rustow and Weiker, that the rebels might have been inspired by the general expression of social and economic dissatisfaction and the consequent support that the masses extended to the opposition party in their region (Weiker 1973: 138; Rustow 1957: 88).

Reactionary rebels: deeds and words

The following account of the rebels' actions is largely based on the speeches they made during court trials held in Menemen.[15] The protagonists of the uprising were seven men from Manisa, a city situated 50 kilometers away from Menemen. The leader of the group was Mehmed, who was known as Giritli Mehmed (Mehmed from Crete, implying that he was an immigrant from Crete) and who was also referred to in the press as Derviş Mehmed. He was said to be a disciple of a Naqshbandi sheikh (Sheikh Ahmet Muhtar Efendi from Alaşehir) and the one who introduced other members of the group to this illegal Sufi order. These were mosty illiterate young men from Manisa with names referring to their occupations: Sütçü (milkman) Mehmed, Şamdan Mehmed, Mehmed Emin, Nalıncı (wooden shoe maker) Hasan, Küçük (young) or Giritli (Cretan) Hasan, and Çoban (shepherd) Ramazan.[16]

This group, which led the Menemen uprising, had been already active in the nearby city of Manisa. There, they had met Derviş Mehmed, who interpreted their dreams and continuously told them to perform the *zikir*, i.e. to cite the name of God (TBMM 1931: 8–9).[17] The group began to grow beards (Ibid.: 11) and met for *zikir* in the coffeehouse of a certain Çırak (Apprentice) Mustafa. After the coffeehouse was closed down by the government, which had learned of these illegal gatherings, they began to meet in the house of a certain Hüseyin. In these meetings, Derviş Mehmed was said to have indoctrinated them against the government and to have told

them that all state officials who let their wives and daughters wear inappropriate clothes were infidels (Ibid.: 9).

During one of these meetings, held on 6 December 1930, Derviş Mehmed told the group that they would perform *zikir* in a cave outside town for 15 days, at the end of which he would receive divine inspiration, as had happened to the prophet. He told them that he would go as far as China and then Europe to call people to religion, and that he would reopen the dervish lodges in the country – which were closed by the state in 1925 (Ibid.: 74). At that stage, he did not mention any plans concerning Menemen.

Firstly, Derviş Mehmed, Sütçü Mehmed and Şamdan Mehmed left Manisa (Ibid.: 11). They met with the others in the village of Paşa Köy, where they stayed in the houses of Derviş Mehmed's mother-in-law and brother-in-law. Here, Derviş Mehmed, who had already armed himself in Manisa, obtained two more weapons. He also took a dog into his company, which he symbolically named *Kıtmir*, after the Koranic story of *Eshab-ı Kehf* (those of the cave).[18] According to the story, *Kıtmir* is the name of the dog which accompanied the *Eshab-ı Kehf*, a group of seven youths who were to be the helpers of the *Mehdi*.[19] Even the number of Derviş Mehmed's own group, seven, was not arbitrary, showing that he wanted to enact the Koranic story of *Eshab-ı Kehf* with his disciples. However, the group continued as a group of six, after Ramazan deserted them on the way to the nearby village, Bozalan. In Bozalan, they first stayed in the house of Mustafa, a relative of Sütçü Mehmed, and told the people in the village that they had come to hunt. They moved to a hut that the villagers had built for them in a wood outside the village after about seven to ten days. During their 15-day stay in Bozalan, they spent their time smoking hashish and performing *zikir*. Here, Derviş Mehmed declared himself the *Mehdi* and said that his companions were *the Eshab-ı Kehf* (TBMM 1931: 14). According to Mehmed Emin and Nalıncı Hasan, some villagers believed him, while others did not but did not interfere.

According to Goloğlu, a scholar who wrote a book on reactions against the Kemalist reforms during the early republican period, the village of Bozalan was populated with immigrants who came from the Balkans in 1924. Although they were Muslim, they did not have any knowledge of Islam; hence it was easy for Derviş Mehmed to proclaim himself the *Mehdi* without being challenged (Goloğlu 1972: 303–4). It seems, however, more reasonable to argue that even if the villagers believed in the *Mehdi*, they did so because of their familiarity with a common Islamic vocabulary rather than their ignorance. A messianic expectation, i.e. the belief in the *Mehdi* who will come to redeem the world and render it just, as the prophet Muhammed once did, has been part and parcel of both Shiite and Sunni traditions in Islam (Sarıtoprak 2002). The messianic characteristic of the event should, however,

be considered in the context of people's social and economic situation in the region at the time.

This messianic character of the event needs to be understood in the context of people's difficult social and economic situation in the region at the time. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı (1902–71), a leading communist thinker who analyzed the rebellion from the perspective of its protagonists, interpreted the villagers' support for the rebels as resulting from their total lack of allegiance to the Kemalist state (Kıvılcımlı 1980: 226–7). Besides criticizing the Kemalist elite's inability to see the material conditions that led to the rebellion (Ibid.: 218), he argued that people had not just been deceived by the reactionary sheikhs who claimed that religion was in danger, but in fact needed to be deceived (Ibid.: 233–4) as the only way to express their protest against "the oppression and robbery of the Kemalist bourgeoisie" (Ibid.: 205). Kıvılcımlı's explanation concerning the motivations of peasants is, however, no more than speculation, albeit a rather convincing one given the economic conditions of the period. Hamit Bozarslan drew attention to Kıvılcımlı's approach and focused on the event as a "millenarian movement" which can be understood within its religious, economic and political context (Bozarslan 1991: 83).[20]

The people's resentment of the state because of their worsened socio-economic condition, which was also reflected in the results of the local elections, might have provided an atmosphere prone to a rebellion. Furthermore, if some villagers helped – if not recognized – Derviş Mehmed as the *Mehdi*, it is possible that they at least believed in the need to restore Islam for bettering their situation. The peasants' support can also be explained by the mere fact that the villages where the rebellious group camped were the villages of their close relatives.[21] In any case, the real motive of those who hosted the rebels is difficult to discern. On the whole, however, the details of the rebels' actions preceding their arrival in Menemen show that they were not simply vicious outcasts who appeared suddenly in Menemen as narrated in the official historiography.

Derviş Mehmed's plan to go to Menemen was made known to the group during their stay in the village of Bozalan. According to the plan, they would stay one night in the house of Saffet Hoca,[22] an official preacher in Menemen. From there they would send telegrams to Sheikh Esad in Istanbul and other sheikhs, and after invading Manisa, Ankara and other towns, they would take over the government, restore the Caliphate, reopen the dervish lodges and appoint sheikhs in every town (TBMM 1931: 10). Yet, it is not clear whether the villagers knew of this plan or not, nor is there any proof that Sheikh Esad in Istanbul or Saffet Hoca in Menemen knew about the *Mehdi* and his *Eshab-ı Kehf*. The link between the group of Derviş Mehmed and sheikhs in the upper echelons of the Naqshbandi order remains obscure.

Figure 1. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay (1906–30)

Figure 2. Giritli Mehmed (1913–?)

Figure 3. Mehmed Emin (1902–31)

Figure 4. Nalıncı Hasan (1910–?)

Source of the Figures 1–4: Photo album prepared right after the event in Menemen, recording the investigations of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, and the army inspector, Fahrettin [Altay] Paşa ("*Menemen'de Kubilay Hadisesi"*, n.d.).

Figure 5. Sheikh Esad (1848–1931)
Source: Digital archive of the Timaş Publishing House.

Figure 6. Cover page of the satirical magazine *Akbaba*, 5 January 1931.
"Reactionaries are crushed under the head they cut off!"

Similarly, the reason for the choice of Menemen as the place to initiate the rebellion is unknown. Neither the court speeches of the three companions of Derviş Mehmed nor the final indictment of the prosecutor include any substantial detail which could explain these points.

The group arrived in Menemen on the morning of 23 December. They first stopped at a mosque in the center of the town. After Nalıncı Hasan took the green banner of the mosque, Derviş Mehmed announced to the people there for morning prayer that he was the *Mehdi* and would restore the religion. He showed them the dog, *Kıtmir*, as proof, and told them that an army of the Caliphate with seventy thousand soldiers was on its way to the town. Later, Küçük Hasan and *Mehdi* or Derviş Mehmed began a tour of the town, calling on the locals to join their revolt against the infidel state. While declaring rebellion in the streets of the town, Derviş Mehmed at one point talked to Saffet Hoca, but the latter did not join the rebellious group (Üstün 1990: 13). The rebels came to the square in front of the government office (*Hükümet Konağı*) and began to perform *zikir*, together with a crowd of around a hundred people.

As the group was reciting *zikir* in the town square and waiting for more people to join them under the green banner, one gendarme, Ali Efendi, and later the commander of the gendarmerie, Fahri Bey, asked Derviş Mehmed to disperse the crowd. Mehmed repeated that he was the *Mehdi* (TBMM 1931: 15), that he would declare the *şeriat* (Islamic law) and that no one could stop him. Gendarmes attempted to disperse the crowd, but they were ineffective, because their weapons were not armed with real bullets (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar 1924–1938*, 1972: 363). Unable to stop the rebels, the commander left the square and asked for reinforcements from the military barracks, which was on a hill close to the town center. People in the square began to applaud the *Mehdi*, who had proved at least for a while that no bullet could kill him.

On the request of the commander, a reserve officer, Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, was put in charge of ending the disturbance. Kubilay arrived at the town square with his squad of ten soldiers (Kan Demir 1931: 33). He tried to intervene alone and unarmed, leaving his soldiers behind. He pulled at Derviş Mehmed's collar and told him to surrender.[23] Mehmed refused, and shot him in the leg. The wounded officer tried to walk away towards a mosque adjacent to the government office, but after a while fell down. Derviş Mehmed found the officer in front of the mosque, cut his head off with a saw, and displayed the head on top of the green banner.[24] The crowd watched and even applauded the rebels who continued to perform *zikir* (TBMM 1931: 15). The terror and shock of the rebels' act of defiance had a paralyzing effect on the squad and the commander of the gendarmerie who was waiting at the government office. It was only after the arrival of

reinforcements that the uprising could be stopped. During the skirmish, two village guards, Hasan and Şevki, were killed while trying to stop the rebels. Among the rebels, Derviş Mehmed, Sütçü Mehmed and Şamdan Mehmed were shot dead, while Mehmed Emin was wounded. Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan managed to escape, although they were arrested in Manisa three days later.

As will be shown in the following section, official historiography selectively reconstructed the Menemen event, centering it around Kubilay's death. In order to do so, it omitted and misconstrued historical details, highlighted in my own reconstruction of the event, namely:

1) that the protagonists of the rebellion were not from Menemen but from Manisa;
2) that the whole event in Menemen lasted only a few hours;
3) that the casualties were largely caused by the inefficiency of the security forces;
4) that there is no evidence that Derviş Mehmed planned the rebellion in collaboration with larger Sufi networks.

An awareness of these facts sets the stage for a better evaluation of the exaggerated measures taken by the government to restore its authority.

Restoration of authority and the specter of *irtica*

The rebellion in Menemen was transformed into a national issue and a tool of official propaganda by the political elite in Ankara. Apparently shaken by the violence of the rebels and the people's alleged collaboration with them, the government aimed to restore its authority. It was the alleged collaboration of the people that most disturbed the political leadership. On 28 December, Mustafa Kemal's message to the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, was published on the front page of the newspapers. The message condemned the townspeople who had applauded the brutality of the reactionaries as disgraceful and continued as follows:

> The nation will certainly regard this attack against the young and heroic officer, in a region which had the bitter experience of occupation, as a conspiracy against the Republic itself, and will pursue the perpetrators accordingly.[25]

The Prime Minister, İsmet [İnönü], also expressed his disappointment, which was caused by the fact that this reactionary movement had taken place not in the eastern regions – as had the Kurdish Rebellion of 1925, the protests against the "Hat Revolution" and the violent outbursts of the June 1930 rebellion of the Kurds in the province of Ağrı – but in western Anatolia, the most modern and developed region of the country which had recently been freed from Greek occupation.[26] This expression of disappointment was, on

the one hand, an acceptance of the nation-state's weakness in the eastern part of the country populated by Kurds. On the other hand, it reflected how the people's support of the regime in western Anatolia was seen as taken for granted due to the memory of the resistance against the Greek occupation of 1919–22. The opposition to the secular state was seen as a betrayal of this national memory. Thus, both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet, who had not long ago "saved" the region from the Greek army, did not expect any revolt there.

A few days after the event (on 28 December 1930), the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, and the army inspector, Fahrettin [Altay] Paşa, departed for Menemen to investigate the event. Şükrü Kaya said, during the speech he gave at the cemetery of Menemen, that "this crime, committed against the martyrs, the Revolution and the fatherland" would be punished.[27] After their investigation, Şükrü Kaya and Fahrettin Paşa went directly to Istanbul in order to inform the President of the Republic Mustafa Kemal about the incident.[28] Special meetings were held by Mustafa Kemal in Istanbul and in the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, where official measures to be taken were discussed. Mustafa Kemal was so furious that during a meeting held in Ankara on 7 January 1930 he wanted to declare Menemen a *vilmodit* (from the French expression *ville maudite*) by imposing a forced relocation of the townspeople, a measure which had been applied against rebellious Kurdish populations in the east. According to the memoirs of Fahrettin Altay and Kazım Özalp, Mustafa Kemal's idea of forced relocation of Menemen's population could not be realized, owing to the opposition of other RPP leaders (İsmet, Kazım and Şükrü Kaya) in the meeting.[29]

Martial law was announced in Menemen and the provinces of Manisa and Balıkesir on 31 December, on the basis of the 86th article of the Constitution (Akyaz 1996: 345). Army inspector Fahrettin Paşa was appointed as the commander of the martial district, and Muğlalı Mustafa Paşa, as the chief of the court martial.[30] During the investigations, around 2,200 persons were taken into custody (Özek 1968: 159) and approximately 600 of those were tried (Akyaz 1996: 353). Many people arrested in Menemen were accused of acts such as applauding or helping the rebels, or just watching and not preventing the beheading of the officer. Nevertheless, hundreds of persons from Menemen and nearby villages were tried not only because of their alleged collaboration with the rebels, but also for having links to illegal Sufi orders, i.e. for participating in *tarikat* activities banned by the state.

Investigations were not limited to the Menemen region. The Office of the Public Prosecutor (*Cumhuriyet Savcılığı*) in Ankara sent telegrams to all local attorneys demanding them to investigate the Sufi orders or convents in their regions (Ibid.: 344). As a result, many people in the provinces of Kayseri, Adana, İzmit, Yozgat, Konya, İzmir and Istanbul were indicted for breaking

the laws protecting the secularizing reforms and were sent to the court martial in Menemen after their first interrogations (Ibid.: 350).[31] Most of these suspects were religious functionaries, sheikhs and dervishes allegedly connected with the Naqshbandi order.

At the end of the trials, 37 suspects were found guilty of breaking the 64th and 146th articles of the Penal Code, which prescribed capital punishment for those who attempted high treason against the state by being involved in movements aimed at changing the constitutional law. Among those who were sentenced to death were Sheikh Esad and his son Mehmed Ali from Istanbul, Laz İbrahim from Manisa, as well as several sheikhs, villagers and townspeople who had allegedly collaborated with the rebels, such as Josef Hayim, a Jewish resident of Menemen, who was accused of applauding the rebels.[32] Six of the original 37 sentences were commuted to 24 years' imprisonment on grounds of youth or old age, for instance Sheikh Esad, who, as an old man, had already fallen ill and later died in hospital (TBMM 1931: 2).[33] A further 41 suspects were found guilty of breaking the articles 163 and 151 of the Penal Code, which carried sentences of imprisonment of 1–15 years for those involved in Sufi orders or who did not inform on the rebels to the Government (Ibid.: 1–4). Nalıncı Hasan, Küçük Hasan and Çoban Ramazan also avoided capital punishment because of their youth. Mehmed Emin, however, was hanged along with 27 others on 4 February 1931, on gallows set up in the streets of Menemen (Saraçoğlu 1966).

The Menemen Incident and its aftermath were covered fully in the national and local press. From the beginning, the press framed the rebels as pawns of a bigger setup (*tertip*), or larger network (*şebeke*).[34] It was even claimed that the rebels had links with Çerkes Ethem, the leader of the Green Army, an anti-Kemalist guerrilla force active during the national struggle against the Greeks, and the chief symbol of treason.[35] After the first interrogations, however, the mysterious illegal network began to be referred to as that of the Naqshbandi order.

The rebellion in Menemen was framed by the political elite as a reactionary attack against the revolutionary state, as a repetition of history, a new March 31, and as the latest evidence of the continuing threat of *irtica*. For instance, Yunus Nadi [Abalıoğlu] (1879–1945), the owner and the editor of the Istanbul-based pro-government newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (Republic),[36] affirmed that the event was "a recurrence of the March 31 Incident, prepared by those who, encouraged by the abusers of the freedom of the press, yearned for the restoration of the *şeriat* in order to resist change".[37] As in the case of the Kurdish rebellion of 1925, the memory of the mutiny of March 31 was recalled in a way which warned the public against reactionism (*irtica*) which threatened the regime. Like Yunus Nadi, Prime Minister İsmet too condemned the incident as a reactionary movement during his speech to the

Grand National Assembly on 1 January 1931, and stated that the incident was "a repetition of all those movements that have, for hundreds of years, used religion for political ends".[38] Thus, although the two rebellions were incomparable in terms of scale, they were considered by the political elite and these pro-regime intellectuals as having the same root: the abuse of freedom by corrupt clergy who provoked ignorant masses to violent rebellion.

The RPP leadership emphasized the "abuse of freedom" in order to attack the opposition. During parliamentary sessions, former leaders of the opposition party FRP, which had already been closed down, as well as opposition newspapers like *Yarın* (Tomorrow) were held responsible for inciting the uprising in Menemen.[39] The editors of pro-government daily newspapers such as *Vakit* (Time), *Akşam* (Evening) and *Cumhuriyet* blamed the leaders of the opposition party and the opposition press for encouraging religious reactionism. Yusuf Ziya [Ortaç], the editor of the weekly satirical magazine *Akbaba*, even claimed that the incident in Menemen was the consequence of the freedom of the press and "the Revolution (*İnkılâb*) was suffering from its own tolerance".[40]

Faced with these accusations of collaboration with reactionaries, the opposition journalists and political leaders needed to assert themselves as republican and secular. Former leaders of the FRP, like Ahmet Ağaoğlu, were put in a similar position of having to assert their allegiance to the regime. Ağaoğlu argued in the Grand National Assembly that "Turkish masses had remained in this primitive and savage situation because of the intellectuals of the Republic who were busy with their own individual interests rather than enlightening them."[41] However, his words were misinterpreted by some RPP members and were seen as a confession by Ağaoğlu concerning his party's role in the Menemen Incident. Ağaoğlu, as well as denying any connection with the incident, protested against these accusations and criticized the RPP's attempt to delegitimize the opposition by associating it with *irtica*.[42] Ağaoğlu's courageous stance against the RPP leaders was a critique of the latter's use of the alleged threat of *irtica* as a pretext for sacrificing freedom, as had happened in the period after the Kurdish rebellion of 1925. Nevertheless, it did not prevent the government from using the specter of *irtica* to reassert its authority. The words of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, quoted in Ağaoğlu's memoirs, summarize the opinion of the RPP leadership on freedom: "We cannot sacrifice the state authority for the sake of freedom" (Ağaoğlu 1994: 115).

The state's will to reassert its power and its determination to protect the secularist regime, especially against the Naqshbandi order, resulted in the hanging of 28 people after only a one-month trial in Menemen. In the minds of the ruling elite, the Naqshbandi order in particular was associated with

"backwardness" and an "unrelenting drive against secularization" (Mardin 1993: 206). This was a result of the traumatic effects of earlier uprisings such as the Kurdish Rebellion and several protest movements against the Hat Revolution in 1925, which were all led or supported by Naqshbandi sheikhs. The public prosecutor's indictment and the extensive nature of the investigations reflected the state's political motive of ending the influence of this Sufi order (*tarikat*) which continued to survive underground despite the ban of 1925. The political elite began to express their frustration with the continuing presence of the *tarikat*, particularly after the Menemen Incident. For instance, Mahmut Esat [Bozkurt], the deputy of Siirt and the former Minister of Justice, wrote in the official newspaper *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* that "dervish convents had been closed but the dervishes were still alive" and claimed that the real murderers of Kubilay were not simply Mehmed and his associates (quoted in İslamoğlu 1998: 78). Similarly, an article by another prominent Kemalist intellectual, Yakup Kadri, published in the same newspaper, reflected the disappointment of the Kemalist elite with the achievements of the Revolution. The rebellion in Menemen proved, according to Yakup Kadri, that nothing had changed since the Revolution: "It is as if nothing had changed in all these years. As if – let alone the *fez* – none of the quilted turbans (*kavuk*) were overthrown. The revolution did not then change anything in the country…"[43]

The political leadership saw the still vibrant social network of the *tarikat*, despite the formal ban on them since 1925,[44] as a major threat to the state's authority, and was convinced that the rebellion was planned by Naqshbandi sheikhs who used Derviş Mehmed as a pawn. The link between the Naqshbandi order and the Menemen Incident was stressed in order to initiate a general campaign against underground *tarikat* activities. Accordingly, in the meeting on 7 January, not only Mustafa Kemal but also Kazım and İsmet stressed the danger of the Naqshbandi order and the need to demolish this through the court martial (Altay 1970: 435–7). Likewise, the speeches of Muğlalı Mustafa Paşa, the chief of the court martial, reflected the ruling elite's disdain for this order. During the trials, he scolded one of the Naqshbandi sheikhs, Laz İbrahim, the retired imam of the Military Hospital in Manisa, and explained to him that "the nation had always suffered from the damage and disorder caused by the Naqshbandi", which "poisoned and used the poor and naive nation under the guise of religion and *tarikat*" (TBMM 1931: 63). He also instructed the sheikh that the Government was "not against religion as long as nobody interfered in the relation between the individual and God". Moreover, when some suspects sought to be cleared by arguing that they did not even perform daily prayers, he said that this kind of defense was not acceptable and tried to correct their understanding of secularism: "Individual prayer is a holy duty; what is wrong is to do it

together with those who poisoned the minds of naive people!" (Ibid.: 62, 63, 70). These speeches made the court martial into a stage on which Kemalist secularism, aiming to control and delimit religion as a private affair, clashed with the popular perception of secularism as irreligion.

The records of the court martial reveal the existence of only a vague relation between one of the rebels and Sheikh Esad, a prominent sheikh of the Naqshbandi order, based in Istanbul.[45] The latter had moved to a house in the Istanbul suburb of Erenköy after the outlawing of Sufi orders in 1925, where he continued to receive guests. The police were aware of these visits but could not detect any illegal practice such as *zikir* (Saraçoğlu 1966: 2294). Nalıncı Hasan, one of the protagonists of the rebellion, told the court about a visit he made to Sheikh Esad. The latter was thus known and respected by the rebels. Yet, the prosecutor's claim that he was directly involved in the rebellion is not proven. Nevertheless, Sheikh Esad was convicted of being the leader of the rebellion in Menemen.

Later Islamist accounts of the event, which depicted the alleged link between the rebels and Sheikh Esad as totally fictive, referred to a hearsay evidence, in order to prove that the incident was planned earlier in the same year by some prominent members of the RPP. According to this story, Şükrü Kaya, the former Minister of Defense Mahmut Esat [Bozkurt] and the former Minister of Education Vasıf [Çınar], were struck by the large number of people going in and out of the hotel opposite to the one they were staying in during their visit to Bursa. When they asked about this unusual crowd in the city, they were told that Sheikh Esad, the famous Naqshbandi sheikh, was staying in that hotel and that all the people had come from nearby villages to visit him. Thus, the hearsay was that the Menemen plot was planned in that evening in Bursa by this group of RPP leaders with the purpose of both eliminating the Naqshbandi order and punishing the Menemen population who supported the opposition party (Kısakürek 1998: 137–8; Müftüoğlu 1988: 292–4; İslamoğlu 1998: 85–6). Hence, according to this account, Sheikh Esad was convicted although he had no link with the incident, and he was finally poisoned and killed in the town hospital (İslamoğlu 1998: 115–16). In this narrative of the event, put forth by Islamist intellectuals, the Menemen Incident was merely a plot of the RPP leaders to execute the respected Naqshbandi sheikh. The account, which is centred on Sheikh Esad, dismisses other actors of the rebellion as mere pawns not worthy of condsideration.

Neither Sheikh Esad nor Laz İbrahim denied that they were Naqshbandis during their trial in the court martial. Sheikh Esad said that he obeyed the state and had stopped *tarikat* activities such as collective *zikir* (TBMM 1931: 60, 72). He admitted that he received guests in his house and gave counsel, but he defended this as not being against the law (Ibid.). Laz İbrahim too

said that he had participated in the *zikir* ceremonies in the lodge of Sheikh Esad, but before the closing of the lodges (Ibid.: 37). He asserted that he did invite people to cite the name of God, but did not preach to them to become Naqshbandi dervishes (Ibid.: 58.).[46]

Nalıncı Hasan, who had personally met Sheikh Esad in Istanbul during his visit to the sheikh's house in Erenköy, told the court that when he was there he heard Sheikh Laz İbrahim and other sheikhs speaking against the Government, planning to bring the *fez* back, to reopen dervish lodges and to restore the Caliphate. Mehmed Emin too referred to many sheikhs from the Manisa region, especially to Sheikh Laz İbrahim, as "enemies of the Republic", and to Sheikh Esad as the one to whom all other sheikhs were linked. Both Mehmed Emin and Nalıncı Hasan insisted that suspects who denied their links to the *tarikat* were lying and that their aim was to overthrow the Government. At one point Mehmed Emin even said that this "poisonous" order had to be eliminated in order to secure the peace of the Republic (Ibid.: 10, 12, 18, 31–2). He often interrupted speeches of other suspects who denied the prosecutor's accusations and claimed that they were lying. He claimed that these sheikhs had preached and advised them to perform *zikir* all the time. Among these sheikhs, he continued, Laz İbrahim was "an enemy of the Republic" and "a powerful figure in the Naqshbandi network" who wanted to spread the order's influence by distributing books and who preached during his sermons in the mosque that those who wore hats were infidels (*gavur*) (Ibid.: 9). On the whole, during the trials, Derviş Mehmed's companions tried to prove their obedience to the state and presented themselves as ignorant persons who had been deceived by Naqshbandi sheikhs.[47] Their speeches were very much in line with the prosecutor's indictment, which accused Sheikh Esad, his eldest son, Mehmed Ali and some other sheikhs from Manisa, such as Laz İbrahim, of hatching the plot. One should not forget, however, that these speeches were made by suspects who were charged with high treason against the state and who would be subject to capital punishment if they were found guilty. It was very probable that the rebels wanted to clear themselves by blaming these sheikhs.

In contrast to what the official Kemalist historiography suggests, the court documents include no substantial proof of a larger Naqshbandi involvement in the rebellion. Again, in contrast to pro-Naqshbandi Islamist accounts of the event, rebels were somehow involved in the underground Naqshbandi order, as Derviş Mehmed and at least one of his companions (Nalıncı Hasan) had contact with Naqshbandi sheikhs of higher ranks. However, as argued by Bozarslan, even if the protagonists of the rebellion were local disciples of this order, this was a local event rather than a rebellion organized by the larger Naqshbandi network (1991: 79).[48] As also pointed out by Tunçay, a

direct involvement of the latter in the rebellion in Menemen was very unlikely, because sheikhs like Esad would not have taken their minor disciples, such as Derviş Mehmed, seriously (Tunçay 1999: 304).

In short, the Menemen Incident was neither a plot of Sheikh Esad in Istanbul to overthrow the secular government nor a plot of the latter to oppress the Naqshbandis. It was an attempt at local rebellion conducted by minor and local members of the Naqhbandi order. Their call to restore the Islamic order appealed only to a limited number of people in Menemen, who mostly watched the event as a spectacle. Nonetheless, the rebellion in Menemen and its aftermath gave an opportunity to the RPP government to restore its authority by reviving the fear of *irtica* and using harsh measures against the Sufi orders which allegedly undermined the secular regime. The following section shows how the incident was used by the government as a mobilizational tool for its fight against *irtica*.

Mobilization for secularism and resistance

"Kubilay's pure blood will refresh and strengthen the vitality of the Republic." These were the words of Mustafa Kemal, who depicted Kubilay's martyrdom as a "regeneration" rather than a loss at the end of his message to the Chief of the General Staff.[49] As a matter of fact, the Republican leaders turned the defeat in Menemen into a "strategic advantage" (Sluka 1996: 39), by depicting Kubilay as a heroic victim, a source of inspiration for the struggle against the enemies of the Republic. In other words, Kubilay's martyrdom (*şehâdet*) was used by the state to mobilize popular support to the regime.

The martyrdom of Kubilay was recounted to the people by the pro-government press, portraying the rebels as seditious (*şerir*) reactionaries (*mürteciler*), traitors (*hainler*), and savages (*vahşiler*), who even drank the blood of the martyred officer (*şehit subay*).[50] The rebels' violence was stressed by giving detailed accounts of their actions: how Kubilay's head was cut off with a saw, how his head was placed on top of the green banner with the help of a rope, etc.[51] The brutal actions of the rebels were emphasized to such an extent that it caused a mild trauma among the newspaper-reading public. The childhood memoirs of the poet Ceyhun Atuf Kansu illustrate this trauma and the consequent self-identification with Kubilay:

> More than the political aspect of this bloody event, its frightening nature had struck me. Mosque courtyards, bearded dervishes, blooded stone in the courtyard of the mosque, green banners, the head, all were in my dreams. I woke up with fear after such nightmares. … At the tensest moment of the event, my soul was unified with Kubilay. I was united, identified with him. (Kansu 1973: 78–9)

Kubilay, with whom many young citizens of the Republic identified, was a teacher who had begun his military service as a reserve officer (second lieutenant) in the town. He was born in Aydın in 1906, but his parents settled in İzmir after migrating from Crete and moving around between several cities (Üstün 1990: 9). His real name was Mustafa Fehmi, but while studying at the Teachers' School in İzmir, he had chosen the name of Kubilay (inspired by Kubilay Khan, the thirteenth century Turkic emperor who conquered China), following the fashion of the time to adopt the names of important Turks in pre-Islamic history as an alternative name (Ibid.).[52] According to his close circle of friends and his wife, he was a nationalist and idealist teacher committed to the Kemalist Revolution and its reforms (Ibid.).[53]

Kubilay's death, which could also have been interpreted as the result of a courageous but naive act (he was unarmed), was portrayed instead as martyrdom, or as an honorable, altruistic self-sacrifice for the sake of protecting the Republic against its enemies. Besides Kubilay, two village guards, Hasan and Şevki, were also killed while fighting the rebels. However, it was not the killing of these village guards, but that of Kubilay (a teacher and an officer) that became central to the narration of the rebellion. Representing the two most important institutions of the secular state, namely national education and the army, he was the embodiment of the national ideal.

In their public speeches and newspaper articles, intellectual and political leaders called the nation to follow the path of Kubilay and to fight the enemies of the Republic. Ironically, Necip Fazıl [Kısakürek], later a pioneer of the writers who argued that Kubilay was a fake hero fabricated by the government, was at the time of the incident among those who participated in the collective damnation of *irtica*. As a young and ambitious intellectual committed to the Kemalist Revolution he wrote an article which was published in the official newspaper, where he recapitulated the reason why Kubilay's martyrdom was so significant:

> None of the earlier reactionary events can be compared to the Menemen Incident, because the latter has shown the resentment and the hatred towards youth, the educators, the soldiers, i.e. the whole ideal, which is represented in the person of Kubilay.[54]

Kubilay was commemorated as the symbol of the Republic in several ceremonies and demonstrations organized against *irtica* by local RPP branches all over the country as well as by the local branches of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths), the nation-wide social and cultural organizations that were used to spread nationalism and secularism in the country. His beheading by the rebels proved the cruelty of the enemy who sabotaged the

nation's struggle for modernization. He became recognized as a martyr in this struggle: "the martyr of Revolution".

This use of the concept of martyrdom (*şehâdet*), which referred to death in the service of Islam, showed how the Kemalist elite successfully adopted Islamic concepts in order to use them in the service of the new national community, redefined as a secular nation (Mardin 1989: 3–4). It was significant that Mustafa Kemal was also referred to as "*Gazi*" (Ar. *ghāzī*), a term that is "used for someone who has scored an impressive success on the battlefield" (Ibid.). As stated by Mardin, the term which was originally used in the Ottoman context to refer to "the fighters for the faith who laid the foundations of the Ottoman Empire", continued to have its force during the republican era, this time referring to Mustafa Kemal, who was seen by the people as the savior of the Muslims of Anatolia. The continuity in the use of the term *gazi* shows that in their attempt to gain the consent of the masses, the Kemalist elite did not refrain from using terms from the vocabulary of Islam, although reframing them as secular concepts. Rather than a mere antagonism with Islam, they adopted Islamic concepts and used them in the service of the new national community redefined as a secular nation. The martyrdom of Kubilay was framed by the early Republican elite not as a martyrdom for the sake of the Islamic faith, as in its Koranic meaning, but for the sake of the struggle for modernity against the old, degenerate religion. In other words, the Republican use of the term martyrdom reflected the conversion of the Islamic concept of martyrdom into a secular one in the context of the new secular nation-state. Thus Kubilay, who had defended the secular state against reactionaries, could become a "martyr" for the cause of secularism.

In a nutshell, the Menemen Incident became a propaganda tool of the Kemalist regime which institutionalized its commemoration and made its hero, Kubilay the Martyr, part of the Kemalist iconography (Aydın 2003: 82).[55] Hundreds of poems, leaflets, and issues of magazines were dedicated to the memory of Kubilay, the epic hero of the Revolution.[56] Commemoration ceremonies for him were held in Menemen, Manisa and İzmir in the following years on 23 December.[57]

The Kemalist elite were committed to turn him into a long-lasting symbol in the national memory. In 1931, the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* invited all citizens, and especially teachers, to contribute 10 per cent of their wages to the building of a Kubilay Monument in Menemen.[58] The idea of building a Kubilay Monument was suggested by Nadir Nadi [Abalıoğlu] (1908–91), who was the son of Yunus Nadi, the editor of *Cumhuriyet*. Nadir Nadi explained the advantages of organizing a nationwide campaign for the building of a Kubilay monument in a letter to his father from Vienna, where he was studying. According to the younger Nadi, such a campaign would

strengthen people's emotional attachment to the Revolution and, thanks to the monument, Kubilay would be remembered as a legendary figure in national history. When sufficient funds could be accumulated in 1933, a committee also attended by Nadir Nadi initiated and supervised the building of the monument designed and made by the sculptor Ratip Aşir Acudoğlu.[59] The sculptor Ratip did not accept placing the monument in the location near the station designated by the townspeople, preferring a spot that overlooked the town and which could be seen even from İzmir when lit up (Gonca 2005: 98). The foundation of the monument was laid on top of a hill in the military base in Menemen on the tenth anniversary of the Republic, on 23 October 1933, with a ceremony led by the provincial party leaders of İzmir who stated that "the monument was to be the Kaabe of the revolution for Turks and the Republic" (Ibid.: 99). One year later, in December 1934, the monument was opened with an official ceremony.

This monument, which was dedicated to the memory of the "martyrs" of the Menemen Incident (Kubilay and the two village guards), was exceptional, because at least during the lifetime of Atatürk, i.e. until 1938, these were the only persons, besides Atatürk himself, in whose name a monumental statue was erected (Gür 2001: 152–3).[60] The following statement was engraved on the pedestal of the the monument: "*İnandılar, döğüştüler, öldüler, bıraktıkları emanetin bekçisiyiz*" (They believed, fought, and died; we are the guardians of the trust they left behind). Emotional ceremonies were held during the official opening of the monument, while twenty thousand people gathered in Menemen and listened to the speech made by the General Secretary of the RPP, Recep Peker (Gonca 2005: 99–100).[61]

While official public ceremonies condemning the reactionary event in Menemen took place all over the country right after the event and in the following years, there were also some sections of society that kept a distant position vis-à-vis this national campaign. For instance, the Menemen population found itself in an awkward situation because their town had become notorious all over the country as the embodiment of *irtica*. On 2 January 1931 thousands of students, scouts and civil servants rushed to Menemen for a ceremony organized by the RPP (Kan Demir 1931: 43–5; Üstün 1990: 27). According to a witness who was a boy scout from İzmir, "the town of Menemen had never seen such a big crowd; the ceremony at the graveyard was touching with hundreds of people crying in the rain and taking an oath to take revenge on the reactionaries" (Yazman 1973: 13). However, the townspeople preferred to watch the ceremonies from their windows. Some young members of the İzmir branch of the RPP tried in vain to persuade them to join the ceremony.[62] The townspeople had chosen – as pointed out also by Bozarslan (1991: 84) – to boycott the ceremonies of commemoration instead of joining in the collective damnation of their own

town. The local press of İzmir wrote that the identification of Menemen with *irtica* was "an injustice towards the Republicans of Menemen", and affirmed that "the event was exaggerated and that the Turkish people's allegiance to the Revolution was beyond doubt" (Acar 1998: 140–2; Tabak 1995).

After the event, opposition journalists and political leaders also distanced themselves from the official campaign against *irtica*. Opposition newspapers such as *Yarın* (Tomorrow) and *Hür Adam* (Free Man) criticized the government's tendency to overstate the threat of *irtica*, its lack of trust in the opposition, and its blindness to the people's real problems.[63] Mehmed Fuat in *Hür Adam*, for instance, defended "the need to trust the people's capacity to appreciate the republican reforms" and suggested "looking at the socio-economic causes of the *irtica*".[64] Furthermore, Arif Oruç, in *Yarın*, stated that "the Republic should win the hearts of the people instead of appearing behind bayonets".[65] Some other nonconformist interpretations of the event were brought forward by intellectuals in exile. For instance, *La République Enchainé* (*Zincire Vurulmuş Cumhuriyet*), a newspaper published in Paris by an anti-Kemalist political exile, Mehmed Ali Bey, criticized the Turkish state for portraying the incident as a Naqshbandi conspiracy and claimed that the incident was exploited as a pretext for creating terror and eliminating the political opposition.[66] Likewise, Rıza Nur (1879–1942), a former member of the Grand National Assembly and an anti-Kemalist exile in Paris, wrote in his journal, which would be published in Turkey after 1964 and then immediately banned, that this revolt was probably encouraged by the government in order to create terror and to eliminate those figures who were detrimental to their own interests. Rıza Nur claimed that Mustafa Kemal had wanted to punish the people who were against the government. He also interpreted the townspeople's non-participation in the funeral ceremony as proof of the people's opposition to the regime (Rıza Nur 1992: 479–82).

In brief, the state's use of the Menemen Incident for mobilizing masses also created dissidence, as reflected in the townspeople's resistance to participate in the commemoration ceremonies as well as in critiques by oppositional intellectuals of the government's exaggeration of the threat of *irtica* in order to delegitimize the opposition.

The dissident voices of the 1930s remained unheard for a long time, because the authoritarian regime was further consolidated after the Menemen Incident and no opposition party was tolerated in Turkey until the transition to a multi-party system in 1946. Only in the late 1960s could the official account of the event be challenged, mainly by Islamist writers who claimed that the event was in fact a fake rebellion, planned and staged by the Kemalist regime for eliminating the opposition and oppressing the Naqshbandi order (Kısakürek 1998).[67] These writers questioned the

glorification of Kubilay as a heroic martyr; instead they portrayed and highlighted Sheikh Esad as the real victim of the event. By describing the rebels as stereotypical vulgar fanatics (Ibid.: 130) or as pawns, vagrants (*serseri*), or hashish addicts (*esrarkeş*) (İslamoğlu 1998: 71), they wanted to disassociate Naqshbandis and even Muslims as a whole from the incident. They claimed that the Derviş Mehmed and his companions were not true Muslims or that Muslims were not responsible for the incident, on the basis of the argument that no foresighted Muslim would have had anything to do with this madness (Müftüoğlu 1988: 302). Ironically, this Islamist account is no different from the Kemalist one in its attempt to draw a line between the right and wrong belief, or, to put it differently, between true Muslims and fanatics.

In summary, the Menemen Incident and its aftermath was an episode in which the authoritarian regime was challenged and resisted by the opposition, which was in turn slandered by the regime as enemies of the secular Republic. In the words of the American ambassador, who in 1931 reported the event to Washington, the Menemen Incident was a "golden opportunity for the regime to reassert its prestige" (Küçük 1985: 236–40). And as the Marxist writer Yalçın Küçük, who years later quoted the American ambassador, argued, Kubilay's martyrdom was used by the state to consolidate the Kemalist regime (Ibid.).

Right from the beginning, the Kemalist regime institutionalized the memory of the Menemen Incident and used the martyrdom of Kubilay as a tool of national mobilization and reinstatement of its authority vis-à-vis the continuing popularity of *tarikat*s. Thus this local event has since been highlighted by official history and commemorated in order to remind citizens of the need to protect the secular Republic against its internal enemies, i.e. religious fanatics and the remains of the old order such as the Naqshbandis who resisted the secularizing reforms. Every year during commemorative ceremonies, official narrators and commemorators shortly recounted the event in a formalized manner, which stressed the beheading of Kubilay. This brutal attack reminded the audience of the danger posed by the internal enemy in a most stark way. While the memory of this wild attack reproduced the fear of *irtica*, Kubilay symbolized the commitment to go against this fear and to fight reactionary "bad Muslims". The latter, which is embodied by Derviş Mehmed, are opposed in this discourse to "good Muslims" obedient to the secular nationalist government. The following chapter explores how the Kemalist regime imagined and promoted a reformed Islam for these good Muslims.

2

Turkish Islam: The Reform of Turkish *Ezan* (1932–33)

Benim çocukluğumda ezan Türkçe okunurdu. Evimizin yanı başındaki camiden duygulu güzel bir ses yükselirdi: "Haydin namaza." Anlardık. Ne zaman ki dinle oyu birbirine karıştıran kafalar işbaşına geldi. Anladıklarımızı anlamaz hale geldik.[1]

Çanlar sustu ve fakat
binlerce yılın yabancısı bir ses
değdi minarelere:
Tanrı uludur Tanrı uludur
Polistir babam
Cumhuriyetin bir kuludur
bense
anlamış değilim böyle maceralardan[2]

This chapter is about a nearly-forgotten reform of the Kemalist single-party period: *Türkçe ezan* (call to prayer in Turkish). The call to prayer (*ezan* or, in Arabic, *adhān*), the standard announcement for the service on Friday and for the five daily ritual prayers – *namaz*, or *salât* – has always been recited in Turkey and everywhere in the world in Arabic (Juynboll 1987). However, the Kemalist regime in Turkey imposed the recital of its Turkish translation in the 1930s and 1940s. On 16 June 1950, the Grand National Assembly amended the law which banned its recital in Arabic. With this amendment, the Turkish *ezan* ceased to be compulsory and the recital of the original Arabic one was no more subject to legal penalty. This chapter will focus on those years (1932–3) during which the recital of the Turkish *ezan* was made compulsory by the Kemalist Government.

Unlike the Menemen Incident, this episode of the Kemalist Revolution is not included today in the curriculum of secondary school textbooks. Likewise, in public debates, the end of the ban in 1950, rather than the reform itself, is framed by Kemalist intellectuals as a turning point in the history of the republic, i.e. as the beginning of a period of regression and betrayal of the Kemalist principle of secularism. For instance, in 1996, the Society of Kemalist Thought issued a press release to commemorate the 66th anniversary of the termination of the recital of the Turkish *ezan,* stating that it was "the first reform which became the victim of reactionism and fanaticism" (*gericiliğe ve yobazlığa kurban edilen ilk örnek*).[3] More recently, the Commander of the Naval Forces mourned for this enforced practice of the single-party period during a speech he gave in September 2006: "Turkish *ezan* was a concession given to counter-revolutionaries after the transition to multi-party democracy".[4] It is difficult not only for an outside observer but also for an ordinary citizen in today's Turkey to grasp the relationship between the language of the call to prayer and the secular regime. Moreover, it is also hard to imagine the recital of the *ezan* in Turkish for contemporary citizens of Turkey, unless they are old enough to remember the years before 1950.[5] This chapter will shed light on the significance of this reform for Kemalist secularism and explore which ideological influences and justifications led to its realization. In analyzing debates and reforms concerning the institutionalization of the Turkish *ezan*, it illuminates the particular discourse of secularism instituted in the early Republican period, which imagined a Turkish Islam vis-à-vis *irtica* (reactionary Islam), as well as its conditions of emergence. It thus provides the backdrop against which we can understand why the abolishment of the Turkish *ezan* became interpreted as a sign of *irtica*, a theme whose repercussions will be discussed in Chapter 3.

The pre-republican background of worship in Turkish

The issue of the Turkish *ezan* needs to be understood in the context of the earlier and larger debate on the language of worship in Islam. There was no parallel in Islamic countries to the reformation movements in Europe which led to the replacement of Latin by vernacular languages. The language of worship in Islam is generally Arabic, which is the unifying language of the Islamic community (*ümmet*). There have been exceptions to this, as in the case of heterodox groups such as Turkish and Kurdish Alevi communities in Anatolia (van Bruinessen 1997). Among most Muslim Turks, who adhered to the Sunni school of thought, however, the original Arabic text of the Koran has been used during ritual worship. The use of Turkish was limited to *Mevlid*, which is a famous poem by the poet Süleyman Çelebi (1351–1422) on the Prophet's birth and life, recited especially on the birthday of the

Prophet, as well as on other festive days such as circumcisions, marriages and during memorial ceremonies.

This did not mean that the Koran was inaccessible to Turks who could not read Arabic. The first translation of the Koran was made in the first half of the eleventh century in Western Turkistan (İnan 1961: 8). The Koran was translated into Turkish in the form of exegesis (*tefsir*) or commentaries (*meâl*), though not as a substitute for the original text.[6] After 1908, two commentaries on the Koran were published by Sheikh ul-Islam Musa Kâzım (1858–1920) and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1869–1946).[7] *İslâm Mecmuası* (Islam Magazine), an Islamic magazine funded by the Young Turk (CUP) government from 1914 onwards for promoting the reform of Islam, published translations of the Koran at the top of the first page of every issue (Arai 1992: 82, 90). Furthermore, Mehmet Âkif (1873–1936) interpreted some verses of the Koran (Düzdağ 1987: 278) in the magazine *Sebilürreşad* (Fountain of the Right Path).

However, the use of the Turkish translation of *ezan* in worship was another issue. As Islam began to be seen as essential for social cohesion, which became a major concern from the mid-nineteenth century onwards (Mardin 1962), the language used during worship gained special significance. The demands for using Turkish in worship began to be expressed already in the nineteenth century. Ali Suavi (1839–78), a *Tanzimat* intellectual whose ideas can be described as proto-nationalism imbued with Islamism, was the first person to publicly defend the use of Turkish in worship.[8] In his journal *Ulûm*, which aimed to popularize science, literature and art, he defended the idea that the ritual prayer (*namaz*) and the Friday sermon (*hutbe*) could be recited in Turkish. During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II, who had appointed Suavi as the director of the High School of Galatasaray (*Mekteb-i Sultânî*), he even gave sermons in Turkish in the Ayasofya and Beyazıt Mosques (Akgün 1980: 106).

The issue of worship in Turkish was also raised by Ziya Gökalp, the leading ideologue of Turkish nationalism in the 1910s. Gökalp defended nationalizing Islam by replacing Arabic with Turkish as the language of ritual. He made the motto *Dinî Türkçülük* (nationalism in religion) part of the program of nationalism that he depicted in his book *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Principles of Turkism). Gökalp defined nationalism in religion as having "the books of religion and sermons in Turkish". He stated that the Koran and prayers (*dua*) during every worship and ceremony had to be in Turkish, so that the nation could understand the real essence of its religion and obtain greater spiritual pleasure and relief. He supported his program also by referring to Abu Hanifah (c.700–767), the founder of the Hanafi school of Islamic law, who had permitted the conduct of the ritual prayer in national languages. Gökalp believed in the need to recite all ritual prayers as well as all

kinds of prayers and sermons in Turkish (Gökalp 1963: 118–19). His poem entitled *Vatan* (Fatherland, written in 1918), quoted below, was the expression of his program in nationalism in religion:

> A country where the Turkish call to prayer is recited in its mosques,
> And peasants understand the meaning of the prayer…
> A country where Turkish Koran is recited in its schools,
> And everybody knows the orders of the Lord…
> Oh Turk! That is your fatherland![9]

Besides Ziya Gökalp, there were other Young Turks such as Ubeydullah Efendi (1858–1937) who defended the idea that Muslims needed to read the Koran in their own language in order to understand its meaning as early as 1921 (Akpınar 2003; Alkan 1989). Ubeydullah Efendi insisted on the vernacularization of Islam as a means of "knowing" Islam in order to become better Muslims. For Gökalp, however, this had to be done in order to be a "Turk". This nationalist reformism was shared also by Ismayıl Hakkı [Baltacıoğlu] (1886–1978) and Dr. Reşit Galip (1897–1934), who both followed Ziya Gökalp in using the mottoes *İslam'ı Türkleştirmek* (Turkifying Islam) and *Millî Müslümanlık* (National Islam) (Cündioğlu 1998a: 97).[10] The vernacularization of Islam was seen by these nationalist intellectuals as crucial for refashioning a Turkish culture distinct from the rest of the Islamic world.

This endeavor to "nationalize" religion was not welcomed by Islamists.[11] The debate was deadlocked from the beginning, as the latter never believed that nationalists were sincere in their approach to Islam. Islamists did not oppose the translation of the Koran per se, as long as it was entitled *tefsir* or *meâl* and was not considered a substitute for the original text. For instance, Mustafa Sabri (1869–1954)[12] criticized the project of Gökalp in his book *Dinî Müceddidler* (Religious Reformers, 1922), arguing that it was not the translation of the Koran into Turkish but the recital of the translated text during the ritual prayer (*namaz*) that was inadmissible (*caiz olmayan*) (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1924). In the same book, he criticized reformist demands for changing the language of sermons to Turkish as an attempt to gradually remove Arabic (Kara 1997: 410–11). He argued that his aim was not to Arabicize the Turks, as he was often accused of by nationalists, but to keep the Arabic language as the common language uniting the *ümmet*.

Unlike Islamists who accepted Arabic as a holy and superior language uniting the different groups within the *ümmet*, nationalists perceived it as a threat to the supremacy of the Turkish language. The use of Turkish in worship would, according to nationalists, render the word of God more accessible to Turks, lead to the elimination of superstitious beliefs which obstructed the progress of the society, and unveil the rational essence of

Islam. In other words, the pre-republican nationalist project of Turkish Islam was based on the assumption of a pure Islam whose rational essence was inaccessible to Turks because of the language barrier. The nationalists' support for a Turkish Islam was, however, suspicious to Islamists not because of this assumption, but because they were also supporters of secularization and westernization in the fields of law, education and politics.

Kemalism and reform in religion

The discussion so far has shown the historical roots of Kemalist secularism, which provided the ideological package behind the 1932 ban on the Arabic call to prayer. Kemalists inherited the Young Turks' motive to reform Islam, and to refashion a Turkish Islam as part of their nationalist project. The attempt to Turkify rituals was part of this project, as documented in detail by Cündioğlu (1998a and 1999). The following section examines the attempts to realize this reformist project and the resistance they encountered. It shows how the Kemalist regime incorporated Islam in its secularist discourse and promoted a national, vernacular Islam. That discourse was articulated in a state-secular project of controlling and steering religious practice, thus fostering "good Muslims" praying in Turkish and understanding the "rational" essence of Islam. The first step of the project was the Turkification of *hutbe* (the Friday sermon).

Hutbe *(the Friday sermon) in Turkish*

During the Ottoman period, sermons preceding the Friday ritual prayers in the mosque were in Arabic and intoned melodiously by an orator (*hatip*), who was preferably talented in music and chanting (Manaz 1995: 206–7). The *hatip* was appointed by the state, and, in some mosques, he was accompanied by a functionary named *kürsü şeyhi* (sheikh of the pulpit), who was charged with translating the Arabic sermon into Turkish (Ergin, vol. 1, 1977: 219). The use of the Friday sermon as a tool of mobilization began during the Independence War of 1921–2, if we do not count Ali Suavi's marginal efforts.

According to a recent study, the first sermon in Turkish was read on the occasion of the initiation of Abdulmecid as the Caliph, by Müfid Efendi, the deputy of Kırşehir, on 22 November 1922 in the Fatih Mosque (Akgün 1980: 107). It is also known that during the Independence War, sermons began to be used for mobilizing popular support for the national government (Erdican 1974). While the first part of the sermon, mentioning the prophet, his companions and the caliphs, continued to be in Arabic, the part in Turkish dealt with issues that related to daily activities and included subjects such as the "exultation of the new government, the Grand National Assembly, and the principle of the integral sovereignty of the nation. Thus it

gave the national movement a religious consecration in the eyes of the believing population" (Ibid.: 18).

As a matter of fact, Mustafa Kemal personally advocated the recital of the *hutbe* in Turkish as early as 1922. In his speech on the occasion of the opening of the Grand National Assembly on 1 March 1922, he referred to mosques as centers of spiritual nourishment for the people, and he stressed the importance of reciting sermons in a language comprehensible to the people (Atatürk 1989: 295; Manaz 1995: 207). In 1923, Mustafa Kemal once again expressed the need to introduce Turkish into the mosque when he addressed the congregation following the Friday ritual prayer in the Zağanos Paşa Mosque in Balıkesir. His sermon (*hutbe*) was published in the newspapers on 8 February 1923, and also in a book which was published in the same year (*Gazi M. Kemal Paşa Hazretleri İzmir Yolunda*, 1339/1923).[13] Mustafa Kemal said to the congregation:

> Gentlemen, mosques are not made for spending time without looking at each other's faces. Mosques are made for thinking what has to be done for religion and the world, in other words for consultation, along with submission and worship. … (T)he style of current sermons does not fit our nation's feelings, ideas and language as well as the needs of the civilization. In case you read the sermons of our Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs, you will see that all these are about daily matters related to military, administrative, fiscal and political issues. … Sermons were recited in a language which was not understood by the people and their contents had nothing to do with our current necessities and needs. This was so in order to force them to obey the despots, who were named caliph or sultan, as slaves. Sermons are meant to enlighten and guide the people, and nothing else. To recite sermons of a hundred, two hundred, or even one thousand years ago is to leave the people in a state of ignorance and negligence. … Therefore, sermons should and will be totally in Turkish and suitable to the requirements of the day.

This sermon has been cited in later periods as the proof of his belief in the liberating potential of worship in one's own language. It reflects the instrumentalist approach of Mustafa Kemal to Islam, which appeared to be in contradiction with the secularist principle of separating religious and political spheres. This instrumentalism was essential for Kemalist secularism, which in practice meant the control of the public practice of Islam via its official religious organ, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). Mustafa Kemal's emphasis on the enlightenment function of the sermon was to be one of the duties of the DRA.

Some concrete changes were made in the content of the sermons in 1924. The first change made by the Government was to remove the prayer for the Caliph, whose position was abolished in that year. In the new version, the prayer (*dua*) would be devoted not to the "peace and happiness" (*selâmet ve*

saadet) of the Caliph, but to the "nation and the Republic".[14] Later, on 23 February 1925, deputies demanded the translation of sermons into Turkish (Manaz 1995: 208). In the same year, because of the changes in the content of the sermons, and the deputies' demand for translating the sermon, the DRA began to prepare a "sermon journal" (*hutbe mecmuası*).[15] A book, which was published in 1927 under the title *Türkçe Hutbe* (Turkish Sermon) was prepared by the vice-chair of the DRA, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki (1887–1951).[16] Copies of this book, which contained 51 sermons, were dispatched to the *müftü*s (local administrators of the DRA) all over the country.[17] However, these sermons did not include prayers in Turkish. The chair of the DRA, Mehmet Rifat [Börekçi] (1860–1941), had stated in the preface that only the "admonition" (*mev'iẓa ve nasihat*) part of the sermon could be in Turkish (Cündioğlu 1999: 236, fn. 1; see also Usta 2005: 17).

The Turkification of the admonition parts of Friday sermons in the mosques was critical in the transmission of the republican state's messages to the people. The official imams of the DRA used these Friday sermons to convey messages such as emphasizing the importance of national service as a holy duty or making calls for donating alms (*zekat*) to the Aviation Society (*Tayyare Cemiyeti*) (Usta 2005: 30). In short, the content of these sermons reflected the Kemalist regime's use of Islam in the service of the nation-state.

The Koran and the ritual prayer in Turkish

At least seven translations of the Koran were published[18] under the titles *Kur'an-ı Kerim Tercümesi* or *Terceme-i Şerife* from 1924 to 1927. Nevertheless, none of these translations was officially recognized by the DRA.[19] To remedy the lack of an appropriate translation of the Koran, the Government commissioned Mehmet Âkif, the poet of the national anthem, to prepare a new translation. Mehmet Âkif wrote it in Egypt where he resided as a voluntary exile in reaction to the secularist policies of the Kemalist regime. Mehmet Âkif was chosen for the translation project because his knowledge of both languages, as well as that of Islam, was trusted. However, Mehmet Âkif withdrew from this project in 1926, suspecting that his translation would be used during the rituals, and returned the amount he was paid in advance (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1933–4). As a pious man who was living in voluntary exile because he dissented from the secularist policies of the Kemalist regime, he considered the Turkification of worship as a process which furthered "de-Islamization". The Government, which could not obtain this translation project, had to be content with an exegesis (*tefsir*) prepared by Elmalılı M. Hamdi Yazır (1877–1942), a teacher of Islamic law (Ibid.: 1931). It was published in 1935 under the title of *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili* (Yazır 1935/1938).[20]

Mehmet Âkif's fear that his translation could be used for worship was not without basis. Ziya Gökalp had died in 1924, but his intellectual legacy marked the public debates in the first years of the Republic. Several articles defending the ritual prayer in Turkish were published in newspapers in 1925 and 1926, especially after an event which occurred in Istanbul in 1926 (Cündioğlu 1999: 195–8, 204–10). On 19 March 1926, a certain Cemaleddin Efendi, who served as the preacher of the Göztepe Mosque in Istanbul, led one of the ritual prayers with Turkish translations of verses. However, he was dismissed from his post after complaints were made to the representatives of the DRA in Istanbul (*İstanbul Müessesât-ı Diniyye Müdiriyeti and Üsküdar Müftülüğü*).[21] The DRA's decision to dismiss Cemaleddin Efendi was explained in a pamphlet (*risale*) by Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, stating that translation of the Koran was only interpretation or exegesis (*tefsir*), and that hence their recital as ritual prayers was not permissible (*caiz*).[22]

Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the deputy of Kars, supported Cemaleddin Efendi's initiative in an article he wrote in the daily newspaper *Milliyet*.[23] For Ağaoğlu, to pray in Turkish in a country where Turkish was the official language was the most natural thing to do. According to him, Cemaleddin Efendi had served the principles of the Revolution, which aimed to enhance the dominance of the Turkish language in all spheres, by leading the ritual prayer in Turkish. He stated that "the spiritual and material power of Islam was dependent on Turks, who could be powerful only with a conscious (*şuurlu*) religion." And he continued: "for religion to be conscious, Turks had to have direct access to the Koran" (Cündioğlu 1999: 230).

The DRA's position was at this stage not at all in line with Ağaoğlu's nationalist approach to Islam, which was inspired by Gökalp. The Chair of the DRA, Mehmet Rifat [Börekçi], said in an interview published in the newspaper *Vakit* on 3 May 1926 that even though it was permissable to read one or two verses in Turkish during the sermon, it was impermissable to read Turkish during ritual prayers (*namaz*).[24] Despite his condemnation of this novelty, the Chair of the DRA made statements which were in line with the official secularist discourse. He stated that the DRA eliminated superstition, got rid of the fanatics and bigots (*softa ve yobazlar*), and kept only those *âlim* (learned) who understood the real meaning of Islam (Ibid.: 232–4). Therefore, although the religious functionaries of the DRA agreed with the nationalist political elite in their war against superstition, they took a clear position against the practice of ritual prayer in Turkish.

An unrealized reform project

The Government's will to reform religion was shown in the preparation of a reform program in 1928, which, however, didn't materialize at this stage. The program was commissioned to a committee of experts from the Theological

Faculty at the University of Istanbul,[25] which was chaired by Fuat Köprülü,[26] a prominent historian and student of Ziya Gökalp.[27] The committee published a report in the newspaper *Vakit* on 20 June 1928, which also included a clause on the need to conduct worship in Turkish.[28] The report suggested to also introduce contemporary and instrumental music into the places of worship, to put chairs in the mosques, and to let people into the mosques with their shoes on.[29] Nevertheless, the report did not get backing from Mustafa Kemal and its suggestions were never realized. According to Şerafettin Yaltkaya, quoted by Osman Ergin, the fact that the report was published without the unanimous decision of the committee had disturbed Mustafa Kemal (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1964), or, Ergin went on to say, Mustafa Kemal "was not in a hurry in this reform (*din inkılâbı*) and did not clearly express his intentions" (Ibid.: 1938). Other sources are also based on speculations about the possible causes of the failure of this attempt at reform. For instance, Uriel Heyd claimed that this project could not be realized because of Mustafa Kemal's anti-religious attitude (Heyd 1979: 122). Likewise, according to Rustow, the suggested reforms were not implemented because Mustafa Kemal "had no intention of reforming the clerical organization since he recognized that a revitalized hierarchy would quickly and inevitably have posed a powerful challenge to his authority" (Rustow 1957: 79). Tunçay agrees with Rustow and states that the reform in religion was given up by the Government out of the fear that men of religion would form a rival center of power (Tunçay 1999: 22–3). In my opinion, however, the idea of a reform in religion, which was inspired by nationalist fervor and which included the introduction of worship in Turkish, was never given up but only postponed by the Government. This is shown not only by the promotion of ritual in Turkish by introducing the Turkish *ezan* a few years later, but also by the textbook "Civic Guidelines for Citizens", written by Mustafa Kemal's adopted daughter and historian Âfet İnan (1908–85) and supervised by him in 1930. One of the paragraphs added in the text by Mustafa Kemal in the section entitled "The Nation" reflects his contempt for the use of Arabic in worship. He stated that the "religion of Arabs" (in later editions of the book this was replaced by "religion of Islam") had diminished the national sentiments of Turks who learnt to worship not in their own language but in Arabic, without knowing what they said to God (Âfetinan 2000: 448–50). Thus, Ziya Gökalp's legacy was apparently still shaping Mustafa Kemal's approach to Islam. As a matter of fact, the 1932–3 reform of Turkish *ezan* proved Mustafa Kemal's nationalist urge to vernacularize and hence reform Islam in Turkey.

The birth of the Turkish *ezan*

The project of the Turkification of Islamic ritual gained impetus in 1932, this time with the direct initiative of Mustafa Kemal. Neither the officials of the DRA had changed nor, probably, had their ideas about the unacceptability of prayer in Turkish. What was different in the 1930s was the Kemalist leadership's belief in and decisiveness on reforming Islamic practice by Turkifying the ritual. This illustrated the nationalist urge of the time to make Turkish the dominant language in the country.[30] The Turkification of the *ezan* was part of the Kemalist project of making Turkish dominant in all cultural fields including that of religion. In other words, the developments of 1932–3 stemmed from Mustafa Kemal's will to extend Turkification from the fields of history and language to the field of religion.

The first congress of the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language, which later became the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*, later *Türk Dil Kurumu*), met in July 1932. The society was founded with the initiative of Mustafa Kemal in order to boost the language revolution aiming to remove Arabic and Persian words and thus create a pure Turkish (Zürcher 1997: 197–8). The Minister of Education, Reşit Galip, played a major role in this revolution and was also actively involved in the *ezan* project.

Memoirs of persons who prepared and recited the call to prayer in Turkish reveal that the project of the Turkish *ezan* was initiated directly by Mustafa Kemal. Hafız Yaşar [Okur] (1885–1966), who was the chief musician of the official music company of the President of the Republic (*Riyaset-i Cumhur İncesaz Heyeti Şefi*) until 1930, was one of them. Hafız Yaşar describes in his memoirs the details of the preparations for the Turkish *ezan* in the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul under the command of Mustafa Kemal (Okur 1963). On the second day of the month of *Ramazan* in 1932, Mustafa Kemal wanted Hafız Yaşar to prepare a list of distinguished *hafız* (reciters of the Koran) in Istanbul who had some knowledge of music. Hafız Yaşar prepared a list of eight *hafız* who were all invited to the Palace the following day.[31] The deputy of Bolu, Cemil, and Reşit Galip welcomed these hafız in the palace and wanted them to recite the *tekbir* (the name for the phrase *Allahu ekber* [God is great]) in Turkish, as *Allah büyüktür*. Hafız Ali Rıza [Sağman], however, objected to this translation and claimed that using the word *Tanrı* instead of *Allah* would be more appropriate (Ibid.: 12).[32] While none of the *hafız* were convinced of this argument, Mustafa Kemal preferred the version that Hafız Ali Rıza suggested: "*Tanrı uludur*" (Ibid.: 14; Sağman 1950: 101–5).[33]


PAZAR 31 KANUNUSANİ 1932

yet

ABONE ŞERAİTİ

MÜDDET	TÜRKİYE İÇİN	HARİÇ İÇİN
Senelİği	1400 Kr.	2700 Kr.
6 Aylığı	750 Kr.	1450 Kr.
3 Aylığı	400 Kr.	800 Kr.
1 Aylığı	150 Kr.	

Nüshası her yerde
= 5 Kuruştur =

: Harp Başlıyor! =

İlk türkçe ezan
Dün Fatih'te okundu

Ezan Fatih meydanını dolduran halk tarafından alâka ile dinlendi

Dün iki camide de
Türkçe Kur'an okundu

Türkçe ezan

Allah büyüktür


Cumhuriyet

70 Bin Kisinin İştirak Ettiği Dinî Merasim

Dün gece Ayasofya Camii şimdiye kadar tarihin kaydetmediği emsalsiz dini tezahüratla sahne oldu

Ayasofya'da 40 bin kişi vardı

Camiye sığamıyan 30 bin kişilik bir halk kütlesi meydanları doldurmuştu

Devletler Japonya ve Çin'e sulh teklif ettiler

İnhisarların nakli

Abdülhak Hamit

Figure 7. *Cumhuriyet*'s lead on the first recital of the call to prayer in Turkish. "The first *ezan* in Turkish was recited yesterday in Fatih", *Cumhuriyet*, 31 January 1932.

Figure 8. *Cumhuriyet*'s lead on the recital of the Koran in Turkish in the Ayasofya Mosque. "Religious Ceremony Attended by 70 thousands people", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1932.

The following evening, the same group gathered again in the palace and read the opening verses (*Fatiha suresi*) from the Turkish Koran, the translation by Cemil Said. Mustafa Kemal told the group that it was important that people understand what they listen to and wanted them to read the Turkish translation of the final prayers that they were going to recite during the service in the mosque (Okur 1963: 14). He also ordered Reşit Galip and Kılıç Ali (1888–1971, deputy of Antep) to announce to the press that the following day Hafız Yaşar would read the translation of the Koran in the Yerebatan Mosque in Istanbul, and he ordered them to organize this ceremony in several other mosques from 22 January onwards.[34] The Istanbul-based newspaper *Cumhuriyet* announced and reported these ceremonies, which attracted many people who wanted to listen to the Koran in Turkish and who "were all – both men and women – deeply delighted to have understood the meaning of what was recited".[35] The same reports also published the texts of those parts of the Koran which were recited in these ceremonies.

Mustafa Kemal ordered the recital of the Turkish Koran this time by a group of ten *hafız*s at the Sultan Ahmet Mosque on Friday, 29 January, and later at the Ayasofya Mosque on Thursday on the night of the 27th day of *Ramazan* (*Kadir Gecesi*), traditionally celebrated as the night when the Koran began to be revealed (Okur 1963: 19–20).[36] Among these ceremonies, which were all coordinated by the DRA (Cündioğlu 1998a: 152), the one at the Ayasofya Mosque (on 3 February 1932) was especially important because the *mevlid* and the Turkish Koran recited during the ceremony were broadcast on radio. While the *mevlid* was recited by Hafız Saadettin (Kaynak, 1895–1961), the Turkish Koran was read by a group of 25 *hafiz* after the ritual prayer in the evening. Seventy thousand people attended the ceremony, most of them unable to enter the mosque. Because of the great interest from the people, the recital of the part of the Turkish Koran began to be repeated in almost all mosques of Istanbul after all ritual prayers.[37]

Furthermore, the *hutbe* was for the first time officially read entirely in Turkish, including the prayers, on 5 February 1932 by Hafız Saadeddin in the Süleymaniye Mosque (Jäschke 1972: 44; Cündioğlu 1998a: 157). Nevertheless, neither the recital of the Turkish Koran nor that of the Turkish *hutbe* were repeated in later years.[38] Only the recital of *ezan* in Turkish became a permanent practice which was imposed by the state. The *ezan* was recited for the first time in Turkish by Hafız Rıfat from the minaret of the Fatih Mosque on 30 January 1932.[39] The state promoted the Turkish *ezan* and its nation-wide recital in the following months. The Directorate of Religious Affairs sent an edict to all mosques in the country on 18 July 1932, determining the obligatory Turkish version of the call to prayer.[40] The final version read as below:[41]

Tanrı uludur	(x4)
Şüphesiz bilirim, bildiririm	
Tanrıdan başka yoktur tapacak	(x2)
Şüphesiz bilirim, bildiririm	
Tanrının elçisidir Muhammed	(x2)
Haydin namaza	(x2)
Haydin felâha	(x2)
Namaz uykudan hayırlıdır	(x2) (only for the morning *ezan*)
Tanrı uludur	(x2)
Tanrıdan başka yoktur tapacak	

Upon the request of the DRA, the *müftü* of Istanbul appealed to the academy of music to compose the Turkish call to prayer. The committee in the academy decided to use different tunes at five different times of the *ezan*.[42] From 27 November 1932 onwards, *müezzin*s (reciters of the *ezan*) in Istanbul were given courses on the recital of the new *ezan* (Ocak Gez 1996–7: 161).

The aim was to initiate the compulsory recital of the Turkish translation of *ezan* and *kamet* (*ezan* which is recited in the mosque before the ritual prayer) in all mosques during the month of *Ramazan* which would begin on 29 December 1932. It was reported on 2 January 1933 by the newspaper *Milliyet* that almost half of the 1,200 *müezzin*s in Istanbul had been successful in the courses of the Turkish *ezan*.[43] The chair of the DRA announced on 4 February 1933, that *müezzin*s who hesitated in reciting the Turkish *ezan* would be penalized,[44] and the DRA announced on 6 March 1933, that the *salâtüselâm*, usually recited before the Friday ritual prayer and in order to announce someone's death, had to be in Turkish (Jäschke 1972: 45–6; Cündioğlu 1998a: 100–1; Ocak Gez 1996–7: 162).[45] The public recitation of the *tekbir* after funeral (ritual) prayers had also to be done in Turkish. Those who did not read these Turkish versions would be punished according to Article 526 of the Penal Law. The Turkish versions of the *tekbir* and three possible versions of the Turkish *salâtüselâm*, which were determined by the DRA, were also published in the newspapers.[46] The Turkish *tekbir* read as follows:

Tanrı Uludur Tanrı Uludur.
Tanrıdan başka Tanrı yoktur.
Tanrı Uludur Tanrı Uludur.
Hamd ona mahsustur.

The newspaper *Cumhuriyet* reported in March 1933 that from February 1933 onwards the Turkish *ezan* had begun to be recited all over the country.[47] However, whether it was really so is not known.

In 1933–4, at least two books which included the Turkish *ezan* as well as the transcriptions of some important prayers used during the ritual prayer were published in Istanbul in Latin script (Selâmi Münir 1933; *Amme ve Salâvâtı Şerife, Ettehıyatü ve Kunut Duâsı. Türkçe Ezan ve Kamet*, 1934). The Minister of Education, Hikmet Bayur (1881–1980),[48] who replaced Reşit Galip in 1933, also wanted Şerafettin Yaltkaya and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı to write a report on the possibility of reciting the Turkish translation of the Koran during the ritual prayers in 1934.[49] The report argued that the expression of the Koran's meaning was possible in any language, on the basis of the opinion of *İmam-ı Âzam*, Abu Hanifah of the Hanafi school of Islamic law, who had permitted the conduct of ritual prayer in one's own language. According to *İmam-ı Âzam,* the meaning of the Koran was essential rather than its wording, hence it could be expressed in any language. The Government, however, neither stressed this theological justification nor extended the use of Turkish into the ritual prayer. It enforced only the Turkish *ezan* by law.

The Turkish *ezan* continued to be compulsory after the death of Atatürk in 1938. Yet until 1941, it was enforced only indirectly with Article 526 of the Penal Code, which penalized those who violated the orders of the government agencies in general. This article was amended with the enactment of Law No. 4055 in June 1941, which specifically stated that those who recited the *ezan* and *kamet* in Arabic would be punished with up to three months of imprisonment in a low-security prison or a small fine (Jäschke 1972: 46; Cündioğlu 1998a: 113).[50] The reason for this amendment was identified as the need "to rescue the people from the influence of the Arabic language attaching them to old mentalities and old traditions".[51] The insistance on the Turkish *ezan* was legitimized here as a nationalist and modernist necessity. Indeed, İsmet İnönü, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's successor, was determined to cleanse Turkish culture from the influences of the Arabic language, which was associated with the Ottoman/Islamic past. This was also shown by his attempt to revive the language reform, which had lost momentum after the death of Atatürk (Heyd 1954: 36–7). Thus, during his presidency, the ban on the Arabic *ezan* was imposed more strictly and at the same time the campaign for the excision of Arabic and Persian language elements was revived, culminating in the translation of the Constitution into a pure Turkish idiom in 1945 (Rustow 1957: 90).[52]

Although İnönü's role in maintaining and consolidating the reform of Turkish *ezan* was crucial, further reform in religion was not realized by the RPP Government. A project of reform in religion was again discussed within the RPP in 1945 when a group suggested the rearrangement of Islamic worship in Turkish, along with other reforms such as the reorganization of places of worship on the model of People's Houses, the resetting of rules and times of worship, the total outlawing of all kinds of special clothing used by the clergy during worship, and the total separation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs from the state by giving it autonomy (Tunaya 2003: 171–2). However, the "Independent Group" (*Müstakil Grup*) of the party – which functioned as an opposition group within the party since 1939 – did not support the idea of taking an official initiative to bring about such reforms. This would be the very last initiative to reform Islam to be taken by the RPP when in power. From then on this reform project has been taken up by Kemalist secularists in opposition.

Resistance to the Turkish *ezan*

The political elite around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was enthusiastic about the Turkish *ezan*. Nonetheless, there were also signs of resistance to this new innovation. Two public protests were recorded in the 1930s. On 16 November 1932, a certain Sadık preached against the Turkish *ezan* at the Ulu Mosque in the center of Bursa (Jäschke 1972: 45). On 1 February 1933,

another public protest occurred again in the same city (Ibid.; Özek 1968: 160; Cündioğlu 1998a: 106; Yücer 1947: 5–6). On the day of the incident, known as the "Bursa Incident", when the *müezzin* of the Ulu Mosque was absent, both the *ezan* and the *kamet* were recited in Arabic by two men from the mosque congregation. The one who recited the Arabic *ezan* from the minaret (Topal Halil) was interrogated by a policeman whose action led to a debate within the congregation. One of them shouted: "What is this! Why do they unlawfully oppress us, while Jews can worship freely in their synagogues and Christians in their churches? Let's go and explain our problem."[53] The group, 80–90 people according to the news agency reporting the event, led by a certain Kazanlı İbrahim,[54] who recited the Arabic *kamet*, walked from the mosque to the local Directorate of Pious Foundations (*Evkaf Müdürlüğü*)[55] and demanded that the recital of the call to prayer be made in Arabic. The Director of the Pious Foundations sent the group to the office of the Governor, but because the Governor was not there the group waited for him on the stairs of the building. The police reported this event to Ankara by telegram indicating that "there was some reactionary activity (*irtica*) in Bursa". Mustafa Kemal learned about the event on his way to İzmir and immediately went to Bursa. In the notification he gave to the news agency, *Anadolu Ajansı*, he stated that the incident was based on an issue of language, not of religion. He also added: "The national language and the national personality of the Turkish nation is sovereign and essential in all its life." In this way, Mustafa Kemal, who stayed in Bursa only one night,[56] rejected to interpret the event as an instance of Islamic reactionism. However, as the investigations continued, the incident in Bursa was soon framed as a reactionary event against the Turkish *ezan*. Telegrams from mayors all around Turkey to the President of the Republic, protesting against the reactionaries in Bursa and expressing their support for the Turkish *ezan*, began to be published in newspapers.[57] Investigations resulted in the arrest of several persons, including the *müftü* of Bursa, who was accused of claiming that the Turkish *ezan* was not permissible according to Islamic law.[58]

Besides these events in Bursa there were other cases of resistance. For instance, the news agency, *Anadolu Ajansı*, reported another case of two *müezzin*s who were arrested immediately after they had recited the Arabic *ezan*.[59] In the following week, this time in the town of Biga, another *müezzin* guilty of reciting the Arabic *ezan* and an imam who provoked a *müezzin* into doing the same were arrested.[60] There are also a few documents in the state archives in Ankara such as official correspondence or circulars between the police, the Secretary-General of the Republican People's Party, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the DRA. For instance, according to a report of the Governor of Istanbul presented to the Ministry, four persons were prosecuted for reciting Arabic *ezan* in two mosques in Istanbul (*Erenköy*

Camii and *Beyoğlu Ağa Camii*) in the month of *Ramazan* in 1936.[61] Furthermore, in April 1936, the chairman of the RPP branch in Yozgat wrote in a private letter to the RPP General Secretary that a certain Raif Hoca was accused of reciting the Arabic *ezan* during the lunar eclipse in his village and that he was imprisoned for quite a while.[62] This letter indicates that the way in which those who violated the ban were dealt with was arbitrary, depending on the will of the RPP authority in that locality. Another event reported to the Ministry occurred in 1937 in a village (Belevi) of İzmir-Kuşadası where this time a drunken man was arrested for violating the ban.[63] Besides these violations of the ban, there were other strategies used to avoid the Turkish *ezan*. The memoirs of a village preacher in Güneyce in the Black Sea Region, Hafız Mehmet Kara, for instance – who during his childhood was asked by elder men to recite the Turkish *ezan* because none of them had wanted to learn and recite it – also hint at popular antipathy towards the compulsory Turkish *ezan* (Kara 2000b: 92).[64]

The Turkish *ezan* was the result of a nationalist urge to Turkify all fields including religion, as was formulated in Gökalp's Turkification program. The aim was to reform Islam in order to create a national Islam unaffected by the Arab language and cultural traditions. The Kemalist urge to reform Islam by vernacularizing it was to a great extent inspired by the history of vernacularization in Western Christianity. Kemalist secularism was then not only aiming to remove Islam from the public space and to limit it to individuals' private lives, but also to nationalize and rationalize Islamic practice. Once the DRA was kept under the Government's control, in order to promote a harmless and apolitical Islam that was compatible with the modernizing reforms, the next task was to make this Islam accessible to Turks in their own language. The policy of the Turkish *ezan* was a first step step in this direction, i.e. the promotion of a vernacular Islam.

However, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, this policy could be applied only until 1950 when the RPP Government was replaced by the Democratic Party (DP) Government. Hence for the contemporary defenders of Kemalist secularism, who see the single-party period as an incontestable golden age of secularism, the return of the Arabic *ezan* symbolizes the return of the specter of *irtica*. Conversely, for most of the supporters of the DP in 1950 the return of the Arabic *ezan* was identified with the beginning of an era of freedom. The following chapter will explore how the issue of the Turkish *ezan* began to be a controversial issue in public debates and led to the formulation of an alternative discourse of secularism in the first years of multi-party democracy.

3

Turkish Islam Contested: The *Ezan* Debate and Secularism (1950)

On 19 May 2006, just two days after the murder at the Council of State, the then President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer[1] said in the statement which he released in honor of the 19 May Youth Day, that the allegedly Islamist attack was "aimed at the secular Republic, and that no one would be able to cause the country to deviate from its path to enlightenment". As a staunch secularist who has often clashed with the governing Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) and has blocked a series of government bills he deemed anti-secular, Sezer warned the Government in the following words: "Those responsible for the attack need to reconsider their behavior. No one is strong enough to redefine secularism and in turn harm democracy."[2] With these words, Sezer blamed the Government for encouraging, if not instigating, Islamic fanaticism by attempting to "redefine secularism" among others by aiming to lift the ban on *türban* (Islamic headscarf which is associated with Islamism by secularists). According to the President, the formulation of secularism mattered and could not be revised.

Sezer opposed the definiton of secularism as merely constituting "the guarantor of the freedom of conscience", a definition often used by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While Erdoğan saw the ban on the use of the headscarf in state institutions as an anti-democratic practice, Sezer defended the ban as a restrictive measure to protect democracy and secularism on a larger scale. When commemorating the seventh anniversary of the inclusion of the principle of secularism in the Constitution in February 2007, Sezer stated that it was unconstitutional to try to redefine secularism when the Constitutional Court decisions and the constitution itself had clearly defined the concept. He also added: "Secularism is not the freedom of religion and conscience. Secularism is the guarantor of all freedoms, and in this context, of the freedom of religion and conscience."[3] This definition implied that some religious freedoms – in this case the freedom to wear a

türban – could harm the general freedom of conscience and democracy and hence could be restricted on the basis of the principle of secularism.

This question concerning the formulation of secularism and the meaning of freedom of conscience had already begun to be a matter of public debate in the very first years of the multi-party period. At the time, the main theme around which the dilemma between Kemalist secularism and democratic freedoms crystallized was not the *türban* but the *ezan*. Like the debate on the *türban*, the issue of the *ezan* caused a divergence of opinion over the meaning of freedom of conscience and secularism. Likewise, in similar manner to the ban on the *türban*, the enforcement of the Turkish *ezan* was legitimized on the basis of a differentiation made by Kemalist secularism between Turkish Islam and reactionary Islam. Both Arabic *ezan* and the *türban* were seen by Kemalists as symbols of reactionary Islam and incompatible with what they considered Turkish Islam. The critique of the ban in each case was accordingly associated with reactionary Islam.

The following chapter will shed light on the debate on the *ezan* on the eve of the 1950 elections, which has ever since been determining the terms of debate between Kemalist secularism and alternative secularism. As this chapter will show, this still unresolved conceptual debate began in the initial years of democracy. In opposition to the popular Kemalist view, this chapter highlights that the transition to democracy did not lead to a period of decay for secularism, but that it initiated a pluralist setting where secularism began to be redefined, a redefinition which challenged the assumptions of Kemalist secularism about "Turkish" and "reactionary" Islams.

Early debates on secularism

Turkey became a multi-party democracy in the period after World War II. In July 1945, the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*) was founded by an Istanbul industrialist, Nuri Demirağ, who called for the liberalization of the economy (Karpat 1959: 147; Tunaya 1952: 638–45). However, the real challenge to the RPP was the foundation of the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) on 6 January 1946 by the former Prime Minister Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü, who had submitted a memorandum (known as *Dörtlü Takrir*) to the Grand National Assembly on 7 June demanding the full implementation of democracy. The Democratic Party (DP) received considerable support from the people, despite the fraudulent activities of the RPP bureaucrats, who held elections (in July 1946) one year earlier than its normal timing as a measure against a possible DP success. Although the widespread popular support for the DP could not be translated into an election victory, the corruption of the governing party further undermined the latter's popularity. The challenge of

the DP led to the emergence of debates within the RPP concerning future government policies, including those on religion.

Hence the debate on secularism in the multi-party period first began within the RPP. On 24 December 1946, the reintroduction of religious instruction in public schools was debated in the Grand National Assembly upon the proposition of two prominent deputies, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver (deputy from Istanbul) and Hakkı Baha Pars (deputy from Bursa), who defended the idea that religious instruction was needed in order to strengthen moral resistance against the growing threat of communism promoted by the Soviet Union (Rustow 1957: 93). The same issue was discussed during the ninth session of the Seventh Congress of the RPP on 2 December 1947 (*CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı*, 1948: 448–70). The inclusion of religious instruction in primary schools was suggested by by a number of delegates[4] who criticized the party government's understanding of secularism. They argued that religious instruction in primary schools and the opening of a theology faculty for educating enlightened instructors were two necessary steps to remedy a current neglect of the religious sphere. Stressing the importance of religion as the basis of national solidarity, they complained about general moral decay, widespread ignorance of Islam, and a lack of qualified men for religious service (Ibid.: 450). The delegate Sinan Tekelioğlu even suggested the rearrangement of the DRA as an autonomous institution. These suggestions for changing the section of the party program on secularism were strictly rejected by other party members[5] and finally not accepted by the congress (Tunaya 2003: 172–5).

These debates on secularism within the RPP were seen by many secularist intellectuals as a betrayal of the republican legacy and as concessions to the reactionary forces. The accusation that the RPP was undermining the secularist principle came especially from left-wing dissident intellectuals, who portrayed the RPP leaders as hypocrites. Mehmet Ali Aybar (1908–95), for example, blamed the RPP for encouraging *irtica* in all spheres of life including religion (Ünlü 2002: 128–35). He depicted the RPP leaders as infidels who converted to Islam on their deathbeds.[6] Similarly, Hıfzı Topuz (b. 1923), a young journalist, argued that the introduction of religious instruction to public schools contradicted Kemalist principles and would rouse the still-existing danger of *irtica*.[7] Such warnings about the threat of rising *irtica* was frequently combined with the representation of the single-party period as a golden age of secularism and freedom. Aziz Nesin (1915–95), the publisher of a series of socialist periodicals during the late 1940s, for instance, depicted the time of Atatürk as a period of maximum freedom of thought and religion, and claimed that the RPP's concessions to Islam limited this freedom:

> *İrtica* has descended upon us with all its force. The situation during the time of Atatürk, whom many unfortunate persons attempted to accuse of dictatorship, was like this: … Freedom of thought has never been as strong as during that time. … Religion was not suppressed, because everybody could go to the mosque and worship; the Koran was being translated; the Turkish call to prayer was being recited; and Islamic sciences were being instructed at the university. … Turkey is now going backward, because the freedom of thought is limited! … To defend revolutionism, secularism, and maybe even statism will one day be a sin and forbidden.[8]

Despite the secularist opposition within and outside of the party, the suggestions for remedying the neglect of religion made in the 1947 RPP congress were put into effect under the new government formed by Şemsettin Günaltay (1883–1961), a liberal theologian who had published several articles in the Islamist periodicals of the pre-republican years. The new government introduced elective religious instruction in the curriculum of elementary schools in May 1948.[9] Another step was the opening of colleges for preachers and prayer leaders (*imam-hatip kursları*) in January 1949 in order to train enlightened men of religion (Reed 1956; Yeşilkağıt 2001: 7–8). Furthermore, on 1 March 1950, a new law was issued to allow some twenty tombs of a number of the Ottoman Sultans and other religious and political heroes of the past to be opened (Tunaya 2003: 191, fn. 107, 196; Jäschke 1972: 104–5; Yıldırmaz 2004).

The vice-premier of the time, Nihat Erim (1912–80), later defended these religious policies of the RPP by claiming that they were precautions against the danger that people's religious beliefs were exploited by reactionary forces.[10] According to the secularist opposition, however, the RPP's new political strategies concerning religion in the context of competitive multi-party politics had contradicted its own commitment to secularism. For instance, Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet* accused the RPP of sacrificing its ideological principles, especially that of secularism, by appealing to the religious feelings of the masses, and he claimed that these concessions showed the party's weakness.[11] The RPP's allegiance to secularism began to be distrusted in a context where competitive politics brought more benefits to those politicians who appealed to the religious feelings of the electorate than to those who did not. The RPP Government wanted to sustain popular support by enlarging the scope of the legitimate religious sphere under its control. This is why it was accused of betraying Kemalist secularism, which in the new political context of democracy was increasingly appropriated ideologically by the opposition targeting the Government. The secularist principle was thus no longer confined to government as a tool for suppressing the opposition.

As stated by Binnaz Toprak, Islam served as a means of political mass mobilization in the new competitive multi-party politics (Toprak 1981: 124). Most of the political parties which were founded in the first years of democracy had explicit references to Islamic themes in their programs. Among these, the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*), which was established in 1948 by a group which split off from the DP, was the only one which remained active after 1950 along with other short-lived parties, which all stressed the need to restore national and sacred values in their programs (Tunaya 2003: 169–70; Toprak 1981: 75).[12] The program of the Nation Party stated in its 7th Article that the Party "[recognized] the great importance of beliefs, morals, traditions and customs for the social order", whilst the 8th Article expressed the Party's respect for "religious institutions and national traditions" (*Parti din müesseselerine ve millî ananelere hürmetkârdır*) (Ibid.; Rustow 1957: 92–3; Tunaya 1952: 712–33). Besides this, the 12th Article of the party program defended the need to establish an autonomous organization responsible for the regulation and administration of religious affairs and pious endowments and to include courses of religion in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools. This last demand of the Party, which implied an increase in the state's involvement in religion, was in contradiction, however, with its will to establish a religious organization autonomous from the state's control.

Besides political parties, the printed press too was a sphere where Islam was increasingly emphasized. *Büyük Doğu* (The Great East) was the first of such publications in the period of transition to democracy. Its publisher, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905–83), was a famous bohemian poet and a committed Kemalist of the 1920s and early 1930s, who later in the mid-1930s came under the influence of a Naqshbandi sheikh in Istanbul, Sheikh Abdülhakîm Arvâsî (Kısakürek 1974). Thirty issues of the magazine were published between September 1943 and May 1944, when it was banned.[13] Kısakürek published his series titled *The Plexus of Ideology/Great East* (*İdeolocya Örgüsü/Büyük Doğu*) from 19 July 1946 in which he explained his political program. In this project, what he called "The Assembly of Exalted" (*Başyücelik Devleti*), composed of individuals with superior qualities, would function as the parliament, while sovereignty would pertain to God. This Assembly would choose the leader, "the Exalted" (*Başyüce*), from its own ranks, with almost limitless powers (Ibid.: 57; Cantek 2003).[14] Since then, the *Büyük Doğu* has been a militant publication organ, aimed at initiating a political movement under this name in June 1949.

Another influential Islamic periodical of the period was *Sebilürreşad*, whose first issue was published in 1948. The weekly was owned by Eşref Edip Fergan (1882–1971), who had been the publisher of a magazine with the same name during the Second Constitutional period (1908–19).[15] Among

other Islamic magazines were weeklies such as *Selâmet* (Safety) by Ömer Rıza Doğrul (1893–1952), which was published in 1945–49, *Millet* (Nation) published by Cemal Kutay (1909–2006) in 1946-50, *İslâm Dünyası* (World of Islam), published by M. Raif Ogan (d. 1976) in 1952–54, *Serdengeçti* (voluntary raider in the Ottoman army) published by Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti (1917–83) in 1946–60, and *İslâm*, published by Salih Özcan (1929–) in 1950 and later in 1956–76. These Islamic publications became platforms where the single-party regime's neglect of religion was criticized. During the 1945–50 period, writers of these magazines demanded that the government respond to the spiritual needs of the people in order to prevent social and moral crisis and to stop the wave of communism (Tunaya 2003: 176–89). While they did not proclaim an explicit Islamism, they promoted what they called "conservative nationalism", that is a Muslim-Turkish nationalism, in opposition to the secular nationalism of the RPP. As a matter of fact, in their obsessive concern with moral decay in society due to the neglect of Islam and in their strong anti-communism, they were in line with the group within the RPP who had voiced a similar demand during the 1947 party congress. Yet, the Nation Party with its explicit appeal to Islam became the main translator of their ideas into the political arena.

Youth and intellectuals with nationalist, racist and staunchly anti-communist inclinations also began to organize around several associations from 1946 onwards.[16] These nationalist organizations came together under the name of the Federation of Nationalists (*Milliyetçiler Federasyonu*) in 1950. The aim of the federation, which took the name "Turkish Society of Nationalists" (*Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği*) in April 1951, was stated in Article 2 of its statute as follows:

> To pursue a nationalism which is based on the sacred principles of the nation, God, fatherland, lineage, history, language, customs, art, family, morality, liberty; to conserve the elements which created the Turkish nation and to organize all nationalists. (Onur 2001: 310–11; Darendelioğlu 1975: 267-86)[17]

The Turkish Society of Nationalists stressed the importance of religion in national identity and strove to highlight the glories of not only the pre-Islamic Turks but also their Ottoman/Islamic ancestors a constitutive role in national history (Okutan 2004: 103–4; Onur 2001: 310–11). The first president of the society was Haluk Karamağralı, who was followed by Said Bilgiç (1920–88), the Isparta deputy for the DP.[18] The nationalism of the Society of Nationalists was both a reaction against and an alternative to Kemalist nationalism, which adopted an instrumentalist approach towards Islam in order to pursue its aims of secularization, westernization and control of the religious sphere at the same time as it discredited the Ottoman past as a dark age. Put differently, the Society's nationalism was a

conservative reaction to Kemalist westernism and to the cultural break brought about by the Republic (Bora 1998: 84–85). It claimed an alternative national memory, which accentuated the Islamic legacy and the past glories of the Ottoman Empire, and thus challenged the official Kemalist history's construction of a break with the Ottoman past.

This conservative nationalism differed also from a parallel nationalist current which was marked by racism and a Turanist ideal of unifying all Turkic peoples. For instance, the racist Turanist nationalism of Nihâl Atsız (1905–75) had completely different definitions of who was a Turk compared to conservative nationalism. While ethnic diversity did not matter for the latter, racial purity was essential for Atsız. The Turkist members of these associations did not share the same emphasis on religion.[19] What brought them together in the Turkish Society of Nationalists was their anti-communism and their opposition to official history, i.e. their claim to an alternative national memory. While the circle of Atsız wanted to base their national pride on the distant past of the pagan Turks from Central Asia, conservative nationalists emphasized the more recent past of the Ottomans spreading Islam through conquests. In the 1950s, those who began to find the racist and paganist Turkism of Atsız too narrow stressed Islam as an important component of national legacy.[20]

The "Ottomanism" of conservative nationalists was not a political movement demanding the restoration of the Ottoman dynasty.[21] Theirs was a historical nostalgia for the golden age of the Ottoman period. This nostalgic Ottomanism attracted especially young people, mostly of provincial background and educated in the schools of the Republic, who began to consider themselves the descendants of the glorious Ottomans, although they "could not possibly have any organic ties to the Ottoman Empire" (Mert 2000: 69; Taşkın 2003). This reclaiming of the Ottoman past and the nostalgia for the Ottoman golden age was to a great extent based on the search of this educated youth with a provincial background for a rooted, native elite culture.[22] Their conservative nationalism claimed a counter-memory, providing them with a sense of historical continuity with the Ottoman past and with a national identity inclusive of Islam. As Mert argues, because the Kemalist elite had rejected the Ottoman past, it was easier for this new elite "to claim the heritage and to identify with rich and all-powerful ancestors" (Mert 2000: 69).

The glorification of the Ottoman past also meant the depiction of the last 25 years, i.e. the Kemalist Republic, as a decadent period of superficial westernization beginning with the *Tanzimat*. One of the cover pages of the *Büyük Doğu* in 1949, for instance, illustrated Kısakürek's alternative understanding of history. Acccording to the picture the current period was the continuation of the period of decay which began after the golden age of

Kanunî (Sultan Süleyman).[23] The years of the single-party rule of the RPP were, according to Necip Fazıl, the most decadent period, because of its superficial imitation of the West, i.e. its materialism and hedonism, and its neglect of spiritual values.[24] Necip Fazıl also wrote against the negative depiction by Kemalists of Ottoman sultans, such as Abdulhamid II and Vahdettin, as traitors.[25]

The veneration of the Ottoman period and attempts to reclaim the Ottoman past as a period when Islam and Turkish culture reached a superior synthesis were interpreted by Kemalist intellectuals and youth organizations as anti-secularist reactionism and a betrayal of the Kemalist Revolution. On the other hand, the Kemalist neglect of the Islamic legacy, as well as the playing down of the continuity with the Ottoman past, were seen by conservative nationalists as part of secularization policies aimed at decreasing the role of Islam in public life. In other words, the debate on how to frame the Ottoman past was at the same time a debate on secularism.

The famous poet Yahya Kemal (Beyatlı, 1884–1958), whose romantic nationalism glorified Istanbul as the icon of conservative Ottomanist nationalism in the 1950s, had written in an article in 1922 that the Turkish state had two spiritual foundations:

> One was the call to prayer (*ezan*) recited from the minarets of Ayasofya [the Ottoman imperial mosque] and the other was the Koran recited incessantly at the Topkapı Palace since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror. The Independence War was fought for these two foundations.[26]

Although this Muslim/Ottoman nationalism as expressed by Yahya Kemal was the real motor behind the Independence War against the occupying power, the Republic brought an end to the empire and replaced this Muslim nationalism with secular nationalism. The Republican state actually turned these Ottoman monuments into museums and even changed the centuries-old formulaic form of the call to prayer. Conservative nationalism was a reaction to this rupture in the national memory. It was an ideological movement to re-bridge the Ottoman/Islamic past with the Republic. The *ezan* in its original form symbolized the spiritual continuity with the Ottoman/Islamic past for conservative nationalists, while its imposed Turkish version symbolized the break of this continuity. Hence the Turkish *ezan* became an issue which stirred up a debate between Kemalist secularists and conservative nationalists in the first year of the multi-party period.

Debate on the Turkish *ezan* (1947–50)

The latent unease concerning the single-party regime's policy on the Turkish *ezan* surfaced in the first years of the multi-party period. The most interesting protest against the Turkish *ezan* was organized by the members of the

Ticaniye, a Sufi order of North-African origin, which was founded in Turkey by Kemal Pilavoğlu (d. 1976) (Tunaya 2003: 191–3, 203).[27] Pilavoğlu brought the order to Turkey in 1930 after he had an authorization (*icazet*) from a certain Ahmet Medenî, allowing him to instruct others in the order. Adherents of this order, *Ticani*s, travelled throughout the 1940s to several towns just to recite the Arabic call to prayer, as a way of conducting a holy war (*cihad*) against the regime by spreading the word of God across the country.[28] Many of them were arrested for breaking the ban on the Arabic *ezan*, for which Article 526 of the Penal Code stipulated three months' imprisonment.[29] According to the declaration of the Minister of Justice, Fuat Sirmen, 41 people were arrested for this reason in 1946 and a further 29 in 1947.[30] The order gradually vanished after Pilavoğlu and about 40 of his followers were arrested.[31]

The debate on the issue started in the magazines *Selâmet* (Safety) and *İslâm-Türk Ansiklopedisi Mecmuası* (Magazine of Turkish-Islamic Encyclopedia). Ömer Rıza Doğrul (1893–1952) and Eşref Edip [Fergan], the respective publishers of these magazines, criticized the compulsory recital of call to prayer in Turkish. Their articles were addressed to Hasan Feyzi Akıncı, a military *müftü*, who wrote in the magazine *Selâmet* on the falsity of the translations of the *ezan* and *kâmet*.[32] Akıncı had argued that the current translation did not fit the Turkish language, Turkish feeling, and national traditions. Doğrul and Eşref Edip, on the other hand, asserted that the mistake was beyond being a mere problem of expression or translation. According to Doğrul, the recital of the Turkish *ezan* should be stopped by the government, because the original language of *ezan* was a shared heritage of the Muslim community:

> We are not against the recital of the *ezan* in Turkish. Nevertheless, we believe that it is an unnecessary trouble and a useless initiative. The *ezan* of Mohammed, which is known and adopted by the Turk, is not in Arabic, but in the language of Islam. Because it is in the language of Islam, it is in Turkish, in Persian, and even Hindu and Chinese. It is a shared language which is understood by all who belong to this community. Maybe they cannot comprehend its words, but their spirits grasp the real truth of the words. … This issue [of the *ezan*] has been kept alive for centuries by history, tradition, the blood of martyrs. According to us, the government should pull its intervention in this issue back and leave this to the conscience of the nation.[33]

Eşref Edip's tone was even more confrontational. He argued that a secular (*laik*) government could not interfere in such religious matters.

> It is now time to be able to talk about the need to remove treatments against religion which have been conducted for long years under the guise of secularism. Therefore, it should also be natural to talk about the issue of the

> *ezan*. … If the government is secular, it should not interfere in affairs of religion neither positively not negatively… How can a secular government intervene in the nation's recital of the *ezan*, which is a totally religious affair?[34]

The contradiction between secularism and the interference of the state in the language of worship was protested several times not only by Eşref Edip but also by Ali Fuat Başgil (1893–1967) in 1948.[35] Both writers criticized the single-party period for its anti-religious practices under the guise of secularism.

There was a minor sign of softening of official measures concerning the Arabic *ezan* in 1948. On 22 September, the DRA issued a circular stating that the the ban on the Arabic *tekbir* (*Allahu ekber*) would not be operative if they were part of *mevlid* ceremonies, recitals of the Koran (*hatim*) or ritual prayers during religious holidays (*bayram namazları*).[36] However, those who violated the ban on the Arabic *ezan* or just recited the *tekbir* inside and outside of the mosques on all other occasions were still subject to penal sanction.

On 4 February 1949, two adherents of the *Ticani* order protested against this ban in the gallery of the Grand National Assembly during a legislative session.[37] The protesters began to recite the Arabic *ezan* in the middle of a session until they were caught by the police.[38] Both protestors had been arrested earlier for reciting the Arabic *ezan* in several towns such as Afyon, Eskişehir and Kütahya.[39]

This event in the Grand National Assembly was followed by a public debate on the Turkish *ezan*. Hikmet Bayur, who had left the RPP in 1946 and who was the chair of the Nation Party[40] since July 1948 as well as the editor of the newspaper *Kudret*, claimed that the ban on the Arabic call to prayer was an intervention of the state in religious affairs and that a truly secularist state would not impose such a ban. The program of the Nation Party had also included a clause on its respect for religious institutions and national tradition in addition to the freedom to worship in all forms or languages (Rustow 1957: 92–3). Claiming that the ban was in fact not introduced by Atatürk himself, but later by the İnönü government,[41] Bayur defended the removal of the ban in the name of a secularism while avoiding criticizing Atatürk. However, Falih Rıfkı Atay, the editor of *Ulus* (*Nation*), the official newspaper of the RPP, argued in his reply to Bayur that Atatürk was directly involved in the project of the Turkish *ezan* and that, if he had lived longer, his project of Turkifying the Koran would have been realized.[42] Bayur in turn objected to Atay and wrote in his column in *Kudret* that Atatürk's ideal was not to intervene in the affairs of worship.[43] Interestingly, as this controversy between Atay and Bayur illustrated, both opponents and defenders of the Turkish *ezan* blamed the successors of Atatürk, specifically İnönü. They accused the latter of contradicting secularism by increasing the state's

intervention in religious practices (Bayur's critique) or by undermining and slowing down secularist reforms (Atay's critique).

Several newspapers reported on this polemical debate between Atay and Bayur on the Turkish *ezan* and on Atatürk's role in initiating this reform.[44] Eşrep Edip, the publisher of *Sebilürreşad*, followed a similar strategy as Bayur in trying to disassociate Atatürk from the issue of Turkish *ezan* in order to avoid the accusation of challenging Kemalist reforms. He even claimed that Atatürk had never opposed the worship in Arabic and that he wanted to let the people be free to recite the Koran in Arabic and to pray in Arabic.[45] What was striking in this polemic was that both sides speculated on "Atatürk's real intentions" in order to defend their position. What was striking in this polemic was that both sides speculated about "Atatürk's real intentions" in order to defend their position. In doing so, they were involved in the construction of collective memory, which Zerubavel describes as "a process of reconstructing the past [which] entails a highly selective attitude toward the available historical knowledge" (1995: 214). Both sides of the debate on the *ezan* were in fact conducting a "politics of memory" by attempting to "reconstruct" the past according to their political agenda in the present, through manipulating or suppressing its elements – in this case, the role of of Atatürk in the *ezan* project.

These debates also had repercussions in the Grand National Assembly. During a parliamentary session on 23 February 1949, Ahmet Hâmit Selgil, Ankara deputy of the RPP, wanted the DRA to take an initiative for translating the Koran into Turkish so that Turkish people could understand the holy book in their own language.[46] Selgil's speech led to a heated debate in the Assembly. While some deputies applauded Selgil, others like İbrahim Arvas, the deputy for Van, blamed him for offending the belief of Muslims. Likewise, the deputy of Muğla, Necati Erdem, stated that the secular (*laik*) government could not intervene in the holy book and that any translation would diminish its value as "the word of God" (*Allah'ın kelamı*). Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay tried to put an end to the discussion by objecting to deal with such issues related to the principles of religion in a secular Grand National Assembly of a secular state (Cündioğlu 1999: 296).

After this discussion in the Assembly, which was also reported in newspapers, the public debate on the worship in Turkish continued. This time, the debate became theological. M. Raif Ogan of *Sebilürreşad* published several articles defending the impossibility of using the Turkish translation in worship.[47] Besim Atalay (1882–1965), a prominent linguist, argued that Turks had to worship in their own language in order to understand religion. According to Atalay, superstitions (*hurafeler*) would disappear only when Turks could read God's book in their own language.[48]

The 1949 debate on the Turkish ritual led to the recycling of the documents and arguments produced during the debate on the Koran in Turkish that took place earlier in the 1920s. Raif Ogan argued in his answer to Atalay that translating the Koran was permissible (*caiz*) but the use of the translation in worship was impossible.[49] Eşref Edip backed this argument by publishing a pamphlet (*risale*) written in 1926 by Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, the vice-director of DRA, which had not been published at the time. The pamphlet entitled *Namaz ve Kur'an* (Ritual Prayer and Koran) stated that the ritual prayer in Turkish translation was not permissible.[50]

The issue of the *ezan* was brought forward a second time in the Grand National Assembly on 8 June 1949. During the debates on the articles of the penal code concerning secularism, Osman Nuri Köni, an Istanbul deputy for the Nation Party, said that the legal imposition of the Turkish *ezan* conflicted with the principle of secularism, the constitution and democracy, as it was an intervention in the form of worship and hence against the freedom of conscience.[51]

The last event related to the Turkish *ezan* occurred on 12 April 1950, one month before the general elections, during the funeral ceremony of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (1876–1950), one of the leading commanders of the Independence War. Çakmak had been the Chief of Staff from 3 March 1924 until his dismissal by İnönü on 12 January 1944. As a pious man resenting İnönü, he joined the DP opposition and later in 1948 became one of the founders of the Nation Party. After his death, a group of conservative nationalist youth who venerated Çakmak as a national hero were frustrated by the state radio, because it continued its music broadcast on the day Çakmak died (10 April). Thousands of these frustrated youth attending the official funeral on 12 April protested against the Government's lack of respect by disrupting the ceremony, chanting the *tekbir* (*Allahu Ekber*) (Karpat 1959: 283–5; Darendelioğlu 1975: 259–64). Consequently, several people were arrested because they had violated the law banning the public chanting of the Arabic *tekbir*.[52] All these protests against the Turkish *ezan* and the events in the funeral were, in the eyes of several Kemalist intellectuals, signs of the revival of *irtica*. For instance, Mustafa Baydar (1920–76), a teacher of literature, journalist, and columnist in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, interpreted protests in the Assembly and during the funeral ceremony of Çakmak as "the awakening of the enemies of the Revolution (*İnkılâp*)".[53] The participants in this protest were, however, not necessarily old reactionaries or relics of the past; among them there were the members of a new intellectual elite attracted to conservative nationalism.[54]

As this recountal of the developments related to the ban of the Arabic *ezan* and of public debates which followed them has shown, the *ezan* in the first years of democracy had become a symbol in which had led to a political

polarization on the issue of secularism, just as the *türban* from the 1990s onwards. Unlike in the single-party period, the opponenets of the ban could express their opinions due to increased freedom of press and expression. Nevertheless, they avoided critiquing Atatürk directly, who had – as was shown in Chapter 2 – pioneered the imposition of the Turkish *ezan*, in order not to lose the ground of legitimate political action defined by the commitment to protect his legacy. What they did was either to downplay Atatürk's role in initiating the reform or to blame İnönü, Atatürk's successor, for enforcing it. This was also the strategy followed by the Democratic Party government in May 1950.

The ending of the Turkish *ezan* in May 1950

The Democratic Party won the majority of votes in the general elections on 14 May 1950. The first action of the DP-majority parliament was the lifting of the ban on the recital of the *ezan* in Arabic on 16 June 1950. The draft of the law was prepared by two deputies, Ahmet Gürkan (deputy for Tokat, 1950–7) and İsmail Berkok (deputy for Kayseri, 1950–4), who suggested ending this practice because it violated the freedom of conscience and contradicted the principle of secularism. The new law (no. 5665) amended Article 526 of the Penal Code by removing the statement "those who recite the Arabic *ezan* and *kamet*" (Toprak 1981: 79; Jäschke 1972: 46-47; Eroğul 1990: 58).[55] At that time, 45 persons were being investigated because they had violated the law.[56] With the amendment of Article 526, those who were accused of breaking the law before that date were to be released.

This issue had been a major theme for the DP during its four years of opposition. The issue was raised for the first time by Fuat Köprülü, one of the founders of the DP, in a speech he made in Çubuk, Ankara, before the elections of 1946. Köprülü's promise to return to the Arabic *ezan* had created popular sympathy while causing anxiety in the Grand National Assembly and within the RPP (Kara 1998: 108). Local congresses of the party had repeatedly expressed the people's resentment of the compulsory recital of the Turkish *ezan*. Candidates had promised their electorate to bring back the *ezan* in Arabic (Bozdağ 1997: 97).

The Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes (1899–1961) explained during the speech he delivered to the Grand National Assembly announcing his government's program how his government understood secularism. Menderes expressed the need to amend the law banning the Arabic *ezan* on the basis of the following definition of secularism:

> While never permitting any reactionary [*irticai*] provocation, we will respect the necessities of the freedom of religion and conscience. This is how we understand the meaning of true secularism. As it is also expressed clearly in our program, we understand that true secularism requires the lack of any

> relation between religion and state politics and the absence of influence of any religious idea on legal arrangements and practices.[57]

During an interview on 4 June 1950, published in the DP newspaper *Zafer* (Victory), Adnan Menderes further clarified the view of his government on the issue of the *ezan*:

> Great Atatürk had felt the need to fight against the mentality of fanaticism, while he was beginning to implement some preliminary preparatory reforms. The compulsion to recite the *ezan* in Turkish should be seen as a result of such a necessity. This compulsion and precaution, which was much needed at the time, has prepared, along with other precautions, the ground for today's free Turkey. It seems like the recital of *ezan* in Turkish is a strange contrast to the fact that worship and prayers inside the mosque are done in the language of religion. … The insistence on this practice after all these years when there is no need anymore for this precaution which was once seen as necessary will be a fanaticism against the freedom of conscience. Now it is time to consider the issue from the perspective of secularism and the freedom of conscience. … Like our other reforms, the protection of the principle of secularism is today possible only if we remain attached to principles. However, the continuation of the ban on the issue of the *ezan*, which is not in incongruity with the customs in general and the public order, will be damaging the principle of secularism.[58]

Distinguishing between those Kemalist reforms that had been adopted by the nation (*millete malolmuş inkılâplar*) and those that had not, Menderes implied that it would be possible to reconsider the necessity of those reforms, which were implemented by Atatürk for urgent reasons of the day but had not taken root because they were not needed in the long run (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 56–7). He claimed that the ban was a precaution against reactionary or fanatic mentality which used to be a danger in earlier periods; however, because this danger did not exist anymore, insisting on such a precaution would limit freedom of conscience. In this and other speeches defending the amendment of the law banning the Arabic *ezan*, Menderes thus tried not to question the necessity of this Kemalist reform in the past. What he questioned was the continuation of this precaution although it was no more needed, as the threat of reactionary Islam (*irtica*) did not exist anymore.

Interestingly, the draft law removing the ban on the Arabic *ezan* was accepted unanimously in the Grand National Assembly (GNA), with the RPP group supporting the amendment. The strong opposition and propaganda of the RPP against the draft law which was conducted via the newspaper *Ulus* was thus attempered in the GNA.[59] The Trabzon deputy for the RPP, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, spoke as the representative of his party not

"against" the draft law but "about" it.[60] He said that the RPP had considered the issue a matter of language and national consciousness (*millî şuur*). "The RPP", he continued, "had wanted the *ezan* to be in Turkish, because the politics of National State had required us to use Turkish wherever possible". After this defense and explanation of the logic of the ban as a nationalist measure, Eyüboğlu took a step back and said that the RPP, trusting the capacity of the national consciousness to solve this issue, would not oppose the proposal to lift the ban on the Arabic *ezan* (Eroğul 1990: 58).[61] The unexpected neutral speech of the RPP spokesperson was followed by the speeches of the DP deputies who talked in favor of the draft law.

The removal of the ban was celebrated by conservative nationalist groups and intellectuals as the beginning of a new era in Repulican history. Several articles in the June issue of the magazine *Sebilürreşad*, for instance, described this new era as a happy epoch of freedom of religion ending the long years of the encroachment of rights:

> Now the whole country enjoys great pleasure and happiness as it has regained its usurped rights. Sounds of joy and bliss were heard everywhere. The nation, who reached the morning after a long night of pitch-black tortures, celebrated this festival which brought the freedom of religion in an amazing excitement.[62]

Adnan Menderes, the new Prime Minister, was seen as the heroic figure of this new era. For conservative nationalist intellectuals, such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who promoted a nationalism rooted in Islam, the return to the Arabic *ezan* symbolized the continuity with the Islamic past and the reinstatement of one of the spiritual foundations of the Turkish state. Kısakürek was later to depict Menderes in his first years – especially after Menderes stressed the Muslim character of the nation during his speech in İzmir – as a true Muslim and Turk who was attached to the spiritual roots of the country.[63]

Unlike its conservative nationalist supporters, the DP Government portrayed itself not as the liberator of Islam but as instuting a "truer" secularism by ending the ban. The DP Government never gave up presenting itself as a defender of Kemalism and secularism (Zürcher 1997: 220–2; Mert 1998: 93–4). First of all, the party leaders could not risk leaving the RPP alone in claiming Atatürk's political legacy. Secondly, the President of the Republic, Celâl Bayar (1883–5), who was former Prime Minister and a member of the core political elite of the single-party period as well as one of the founders of the DP, was staunchly committed to Kemalist secularism, and therefore tried to check and control the party's religious policies.[64] The party not only subscribed to the Kemalist principle of secularism but also projected itself as the second and final stage of the Kemalist Revolution, which initiated an era of freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, the DP was

severely criticized by its Kemalist opponents as making concessions to anti-secularist reactionary movements. The promulgation of the 1950 law especially was contested as the betrayal of the Kemalist reforms (*Kemalist inkılâplara ihanet*), a step backward (*geriye bir adım*), or as the sign of reactionaries rising from the grave (*hortlayan irtica*).[65] Yavuz Abadan (1905–67), a professor of law, for instance, blamed the government in his article in *Ulus* for making concessions to anti-secularist reactionary movements. Abadan opposed the new law because, he argued, the fact that the resistance to the Turkish *ezan* had been recently expressed by the adherents of the *Ticani* order proved that it was directed against the principle of secularism.[66] Obviously, the government and its critics had different understandings of secularism. The following section will demonstrate how the debate on the *ezan* enabled the formulation of these different discourses of secularism.

Kemalist secularism versus alternative secularism

The issue of *ezan* enabled the crystallization of an alternative version of secularism formulated by conservative nationalist circles.[67] This alternative secularism differed from Kemalist secularism in its interpretation of the ban on the Arabic *ezan* as an oppressive – and not an emancipatory – policy of the single-party regime. For instance, the DP leadership and its supporters could defend the abolition of the policy of Turkish *ezan* on the basis of this alternative – and, according to them, *true* – secularism which was in their words respectful of freedom of conscience. Those who opposed the removal of the ban in 1950, however, saw this policy as an essential element of Kemalist secularism and defended it also in the name of freedom of conscience.

As has been shown above, the ban on the Arabic call to prayer was criticized from 1947 onwards as a violation of the freedom of worship by politicians like Hikmet Bayur and other members of the Nation Party, as well as by writers of magazines such as *Sebilürreşad*. These intellectuals and politicians defended their cause by demanding a true secularism respecting the freedom of conscience. In this new formulation of secularism, theorized mainly by Ali Fuat Başgil, the problem was not secularism per se but its application in Turkey until 1950 (Mert 2001: 207).

Ali Fuat Başgil was accepted by conservative nationalist groups as the authority on the issue of secularism and freedom of religion. His articles were often published in journals such as *İslamın Nuru*, *Sebilürreşad*, and *Büyük Doğu*. Başgil was a professor of law who had got his degree in France and taught during the 1930s at the University of Istanbul.[68] He founded a society named the Society for Spreading Free Thought (*Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti*) in 1947, aiming to promote a democratic republic which was against totalitarian communism.[69] He was known for his criticism of, and strong

opposition to, the state-led purification of the language, which had resulted in changing the language of the Constitution in 1945. He supported the Democratic Party until 1950 and assisted the party on legal issues. Başgil defined himself as nationalist, spiritualist (*maneviyatçı*) and a progressivist-conservative.[70] He would be also described by later commentators as a liberal conservative or a liberal nationalist because of his defense of freedoms (Bora 1998: 92-94; Önder 2003; Akyol 2002: 740–2). His liberalism was, in the words of Bora, a liberalism based on moral grounds, which considered religion to be the foundation of a good social order.

Başgil's articles on the freedom of religion, which were published in the first days of the new government in May–June 1950 in the newspaper *Yeni Sabah*, attracted considerable attention.[71] Başgil's widely-read book, entitled *Din ve Laiklik* (Religion and Secularism, 1954) was the first systematic and critical evaluation of Kemalist secularism (Bora 1998: 94). The book was a collection of his articles published in *Yeni Sabah* and other writings, which dealt with the freedom of worship as a holy right of an individual and argued that a secular (*laik*) state had no right to interfere with worship and prayer, their form, style and language (Başgil 1998: 116–17, 140).[72] Başgil interpreted the ban on the Arabic *ezan* as a cruel offense against the freedom of worship (Ibid.: 117, fn. 61). Furthermore, he argued that in Turkey religion was attached to the state unlike in truly secular states, which were totally separate from religion (Ibid.: 192), and that the DRA had to be autonomous from the state for a real secularism to exist in Turkey (Ibid.: 219-21). In brief, Başgil proposed the revision of secularism and stressed the importance of freedom of religion as the basis of an alternative, true secularism.

Başgil's formulation of true secularism as opposed to the allegedly wrong secularism of the early republican state provided dissenters of Kemalist secularism with an opportunity to escape from legal charges. In a context where the principle of secularism could not be directly challenged because it was constitutionally protected and continued to be a common frame of reference and legitimacy for almost all political ideologies, the dissatisfaction with secularist policies led to the adoption of different understandings of secularism, rather than to its rejection as a principle (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 52). Magazines like *Sebilürreşad* and *Büyük Doğu*, following Başgil, praised the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism as a model that was respectful of religion as opposed to the RPP's oppressive secularism.

Başgil's alternative secularism was also adopted by the Democratic Party. His emphasis on freedom of conscience became the motto of the DP leaders' discourse on secularism. It was also a legitimizing tool for their policies that relaxed official secularism, such as, first of all, the return to the Arabic *ezan*, and later, the broadcasting of Koran recitations and sermons on the state-owned radio station,[73] the building and restoration of numerous

mosques, and the extension of religious education to primary and secondary schools, as well as the opening of a large number of colleges for training preachers and prayer leaders (*imam-hatip okulları*). Meanwhile, the DP never wanted to relinquish its control over religious institutions and religious education in the schools. The control and protection of the state of institutionalized Islam continued under DP rule between 1950 and 1960 (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 106).

Secularism – in the sense of a radical separation of religion from the state and the granting of full autonomy to religious institutions – was defended by only a minority.[74] Unlike Ali Fuat Başgil, the DP leadership never questioned the status of the DRA, and defenders of alternative secularism did not have any problem with the official promotion of Sunni Islam and benefitted from the opportunities offered by the state (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 37–8, 71–2). In other words, the alternative discourse of secularism adopted by the DP took up the Kemalist will to keep Islam under control via the DRA. What was new was its emphasis on freedom of religion and its will to be more at peace with and hence respectful of existing Islam. In this way, the alternative secularism aimed according to Mert to restore the people's loyalty to the state (Mert 2001: 208).

While the concept of freedom of conscience was an important element of the discourse of Kemalist secularism, it meant something different for Kemalists than it did for Başgil as a promoter of an alternative secularism. For instance, according to Nadir Nadi, the editor of *Cumhuriyet*, the recital of the *ezan* in Turkish aimed at establishing real freedom of conscience and thought.[75] In a later article by him, in which he criticized the policies of the RPP concerning religion in the period 1945–50, we find a typical example of the Kemalist usage of the concept:

> We could certainly not pass into a regime of great tolerance immediately after we abolished the caliphate. Atatürk separated the affairs of religion from those of the state and gave citizens the full freedom of belief and freedom to their customs. During his lifetime, no creed was imposed in schools; no one's worship could be intervened in. However, at the same time, dervish lodges, tombs, religious seminaries which looked like symbols of the middle ages were closed. Fortune-telling, the practice of curing by breathing (*üfürükçülük*), along with secret rites were banned. If these precautions had not been taken, there would have been no possibility to realize freedom of conscience in our country.[76]

Thus, according to Nadi, official bans on some religious practices were necessary for enhancing freedom of conscience. Liberty could be possible only when society was freed from religious institutions of the past, symbols

of the Middle Ages, such as dervish lodges, tombs, religious seminaries, fortune-telling, and secret rites.

Although he was elected as a deputy for the DP, Nadir Nadi opposed the removal of the ban on the Arabic *ezan* and argued that Kemalist reforms should be seen as an indivisible whole of which the Turkification of the *ezan* was an indispensable part:

> Unless the affairs of religion are separated in practice from those of the world, we will have difficulty in preventing some stumbles which now and then disturb our society. However, if we doubt that we have really reached the level of a secular society, we should not claim any right to interfere in any of Atatürk's bans. Only thanks to those bans will a real freedom of conscience be able to take root in this country.[77]

Because society had not reached the necessary level of secularity yet, Nadi believed that the "bans of Atatürk" had to be preserved. Prohibitions were necessary for securing the true freedom of conscience.

Yaşar Nabi Nayır (1908–81), the publisher of the literary magazine *Varlık*, was another intellectual who expressed this Kemalist understanding of the concept of freedom of conscience. According to Yaşar Nabi, freedom of conscience in Turkey was enhanced thanks to the legal bans and restrictions imposed on the abusers of religion.

> Sufi orders, schools training with Arabic letters, religious seminaries which are banned by law, are everywhere; clothes banned by law are freely worn in our main streets. They are cursing our reforms and the civilization under the shadow of the freedom of conscience; they want to destroy our schools, our theaters, sculptures. … What have all these movements to do with the freedom of conscience? If the freedom of conscience means believing what you like as you want and the right to free worship, no one has intervened in this right during the time of Atatürk. … Atatürk, by closing the shops of these brokers of creed, had established for the first time in this country the real freedom of conscience; by freeing consciences from the great pressure, he had set the consciences free in their search for salvation using their own manners and knowledge.[78]

According to Kemalist intellectuals, then, secularism had to reform religion through the elimination of superstitions in order to secure freedom of conscience. Accordingly, the only way to liberate religion from superstition was to enhance the people's direct access to the holy book by translating it into Turkish. According to Yaşar Nabi again, "because men of religion had not followed the motto of Ziya Gökalp, people had been unable to learn their religion and hence they had kept their superstitious beliefs".[79] Nabi argued that "superstition was dangerous, because its increasing presence

widened the gap between the people and intellectuals even more". The only solution to fill this gap was, Nabi continued, to bring religion back to its purity under the guidance of enlightened men of religion who would bring the light of science and reason to religion. In Yaşar Nabi's words, Atatürk's attempt to do this had failed because he did not have any religious authority.

Thus, Kemalist intellectuals defended the Kemalist reforms of secularization as necessary steps for securing the freedom of conscience. In this definition of the concept, secularism liberated the individual from the theocratic order and enhanced his/her freedom by ending religion's dominance over political and legal spheres.[80] Freedom of conscience in turn meant the individuals' liberty from superstition (*hurafe*) and from the abuse of clerics who prevented the direct access of the people to the real meaning of religion. This liberation in their view had happened in the West because religion was reformed. Hence Abadan defended the Turkification of the *ezan* as a necessary policy, which initiated the Reformation Age from above in order to eliminate fanaticism and superstition, in the absence of a Luther-figure in Islam:

> In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, degenerate religious superstitions were the most destructive factor which was abused for political purposes. The principle of secularism in Atatürk's revolution was the expression of the will to save religion from this destructive force and to give it its real and genuine value back. … If the Turkish nation had had a religious reformer like Luther before the revolution, there is no doubt that there would be no need for political and legal precaution to prevent fanaticism and for imposing the recital of the call to prayer in Turkish to establish secularism.[81]

According to this point of view, it was the state's duty to reform and nationalize Islam in Turkey, because unlike Christianity, Islam had not gone through a Reformation Age. However, as commentator Dr. Erdoğan Meto, wrote in 1955 in the popular weekly *Akis*, the partial translation of the Koran and the Turkish *ezan* were unique attempts to reform Islam:

> While the religion of Christianity was continuously reformed, for example, by Luther and Calvin, and the New Testament was translated into several languages, Islam remained as a whole, and it was even from time to time pushed into a deep fanaticism by its several abusers. In our Turkey, where the problem of religion appears more and more explicitly, the unique steps taken in the direction of a [religious] reform in the thirty years of the Republican period were the partial translations of the Koran into Turkish and the recital of the call to prayer in Turkish. … On the part of large masses, however, there has emerged a feeling as if there was an incongruity between Atatürk's reforms [*inkılâp*] and religion. Still in villages, religious education, which is esteemed [by people], is being given with the Arabic alphabet by the most dangerous and

> unqualified persons. Importance is only attached to forms, without any understanding of the true spirit of the Koran.[82]

Many Kemalist intellectuals, like Meto, thus saw the attempts to Turkify Islamic ritual and the *ezan* as the counterpart of the Reformation in Europe. They believed that these reforms would let the people learn the real spirit of the Koran, whose teaching had been monopolized by dangerous and unqualified persons. Willing to reform Islam, they wanted to convey that their secularism was not against Islam, but that – just the opposite – it aimed to save religion from the corrupting influences of clerics who prevented people from understanding the Koran in their own language. The project of Kemalist secularism, according to them, would be accomplished only when Islam was cleansed from its irrational aspects, which were seen to stem from the dominance of Arabic culture and language.

For Kemalist secularists, the Turkish *ezan* was just an initial step of a reform which would reveal the true essence of Islam. In other words, intellectuals who opposed the new 1950 amendment and defended the ban on the Arabic *ezan* were the heirs to the early republican Kemalist discourse marked by the will to reform Islam. These reformist secularists saw the 1932 reform as a necessary step in the secularization process. They enthusiastically wanted a reformed Islam in order to catch up with the West. Hence, for these intellectuals, the Turkish *ezan* became a symbol of the unfinished project of enlightenment initiated by Kemalism, while its removal was seen as a move backward, a victory of darkness over enlightenment. However, the lack of any popular support for the Turkish *ezan* left these secularists in an awkward position.

The debate about secularism was in fact about the meaning of freedom of conscience. Kemalist secularists depicted the existing practice of Islam – and the use of Arabic as the language of worship – as superstitious and backward. They did not see any problem in demanding the restriction of the present practices for the sake of a more free and enlightened future. The defenders of alternative secularism, on the other hand, did not share this Kemalist belief in the applicability of the Western/Christian path of reformation to Islam. They rejected the Kemalist plans to reform Islam as plans to restrict Muslims' freedom of conscience.

Thus, two different interpretations of freedom of conscience during the debates on the ban on the Arabic *ezan* in 1950 crystallized the difference between Kemalist and alternative discourses of secularism. While the defenders of either discourse blamed the other for being "fake" secularist and "fake" defenders of freedom, their different formulations of secularism continued to be adhered to by later generations.

Nostalgia for the Turkish *ezan* after 1950

Unlike the Menemen Incident, neither the Turkish *ezan* nor its removal found its place in official history textbooks. This Kemalist reform has been a marginal issue for the masses at large, but it has become an icon for the intellectual ideologues of Kemalist secularism in opposition. No government after 1950, including the coup leaders of 1960, 1971 and 1980, took the risk of bringing back the ban on the Arabic *ezan*. The unpopularity of the Turkish *ezan* made it impossible for politicians to defend it in the long run. As happened in the meeting of the Grand National Assembly on 14 June 1950, Kemalist secularists, although unwillingly, approved the removal of the ban.

Furthermore, only a few intellectuals continued to defend the reform in Islam in an anti-Arab discourse in the period after 1950. Among the most outspoken defenders of reformist ideas were Halil Nimetullah Öztürk, the chair of the Society for Development of the Turkish Language (*Türk Dilini Geliştirme Derneği*) and a professor of logic at Istanbul University who was dismissed during the university purges of 1933 and was known for his anti-Ottomanism (Arslan 2001a). Öztürk defended a Turkish Islam in which the Turkish language had to be used as the langauge of worship (1954: 3–15). Likewise, Arın Engin (or M. Saffet Engin), a staunch Kemalist and defender of purification of language, argued in his book *Atatürkçülükte Dil ve Din* (*Language and Religion in Ataturkism*, 1955) that secularism (*din özgenliği* in his words) required worshipping in Turkish (Arslan 2001b; Engin 1955: 54–5).

A more radical project of reform in religion was defended by Osman Nuri Çerman (a retired teacher, dentist and active member of the RPP in Karagümrük), who called for a reform of religion. He suggested not only the Turkification of worship but also the preparation by Kemalist scholars (*bilgin*) of a new Turkish Koran, which would exclude those verses of the Koran which "contradicted reason and logic, those which dealt with the gossip among the Arab tribes as well as those verses which contradicted our Civil Code". The new Koran had to include, in Çerman's project, important articles of the Civil and Penal Codes as well as important passages from the speeches of Atatürk (Çerman 1956: 8–9). Although Çerman's ideas were notorious among conservative nationalists, his project remained marginal even among Kemalist intellectuals.

An active defender of the reform in Islam in the 1950s was Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who was a student of Köprülü and the writer of the report of the 1928 reform committee. In his magazines *Yeni Adam* (New Man, 1934–45, 1950–78) and *Din Yolu* (The Path of Religion) and in his book *Türke Doğru* (Towards the Turk), which was published in 1942, he expressed his general understanding of nationalism and religion and continued to call attention to the need to reform religion. According to Baltacıoğlu, the teachings and ceremonies of Turkish Sufi orders (*Türk tarikatları*) such as

Bektaşilik, *Alevilik* and *Tahtacılık*, reflected the fusion of Islam with Turkish culture and civilization. Baltacıoğlu described Alevism, which is in fact not a Sufi order but a syncretic Islamic belief unrecognized by the Sunni religious establishment, as "a cultural self-defense of the Turks facing the imposition of Arab traditions through Islam". According to Baltacıoğlu, the "Alevization" of Turks was a survival strategy against the Arab culture that "was based on the inequality between men and women, male despotism, slavery and mysticism", which contradicted Turkish customs such as "the special place given to free thought, fine arts, literature and music, respect towards the elderly, mutual trust, solidarity and tolerance" (Baltacıoğlu 1972: 181). Hence Baltacıoğlu translated the Koran himself in order to:

> … liberate the Turkish language from the traditions of the Arabic language, to enhance our language revolution, to make our holy book intelligible, and to liberate Turks from the Arab worldview and its captivity so that they realize their national Renaissance.[83]

The reformist campaigns of Baltacıoğlu and Çerman were devoid of any official support. The DRA was opposed not only to the use of Turkish in worship but also to the transcription of the verses of the Koran in the Turkish-Latin alphabet. In 1958, the Chair of the DRA, Eyüp Sabri Hayırlıoğlu (1886–1960), when commenting on the question of a newspaper (*Sebat*) being published in Western Thrace in Arabic script, stated that the transcription of the Koran in the Turkish alphabet was not possible, because the words and letters of the Koran had been miraculously designed by God.[84] As well as the DRA, conservative nationalist intellectuals also rejected the transliteration of the Koran into the Latin alphabet as well as the recital of the Koran in Turkish during the rituals. A booklet entitled *The Koran cannot be recited in Turkish* (*Türkçe Kur'an Okunmaz*) was published in 1956. In this booklet, the chair of the DRA, Eyüp Sabri Hayırlıoğlu, as well as leading theologians, Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen (1882–1971), Hasan Basri Çantay (1887–1964), Ali Fuat Başgil and İsmail Hami Danişmend wrote against attempts to Turkify the ritual.[85] According to these intellectuals, such a reformist attitude in Islam was wrong. In a survey on whether there was a need for a reform in Islam conducted by the journal *Türk Düşüncesi*, all professors and thinkers, such as Ali Fuat Başgil, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Mümtaz Turhan, defended the idea that the term reform was not an appropriate term for Islam.[86] Furthermore, both Çerman and Baltacıoğlu were heavily attacked by magazines such as *Sebilürreşad*, and accused of blasphemy or of attempting to liken Islam to Christianity.

After the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, there were minor attempts at reintroducing the Turkish *ezan* without any outcome. Since 1950, the

Turkish *ezan* has continued to be a controversial topic, either framed by conservative nationalists and Islamists as a proof of the single-party period's pressure on Islam[87] or used by civil and military defenders of Kemalist secularism as an emblem of the golden age of Kemalism. In the Kemalist historiography on the multi-party period, the DP's removal of the ban marks the prelude to the counter-revolution and the first divergence from Kemalist secularism.[88]

However, what happened in 1950 cannot be understood as the beginning of a period of decay for Kemalist secularism or as the victory of *irtica* over the Kemalist regime. Instead it needs to be seen as an episode when secularism was redefined by conservative nationalists. In these first years of the multi-party period, the alternative secularism of conservative nationalist intellectuals like Ali Fuat Başgil challenged Kemalist secularism. They defended the need for true secularism which emphasized a different interpretation of the concept of freedom of conscience. This was the first attempt in the Republican history to redefine secularism. Their alternative secularism was appropriated by all the right-wing political parties which ruled the country – although with short breaks in between – up until today. Those who insisted on keeping Kemalist secularism unchanged, on the other hand, saw no contradiction in the interference of the state in religious practices as long as this limitation of freedom was imposed for the sake of modernization and nationalism. Secularism, according to them, could partially restrict freedom of religion in order to promote Turkish Islam.

4

Reactionary Islam as Violent Threat: The Malatya Incident (1952)

Bir kurşun attık, 43 yıldır hâlâ yere düşmedi.[1]

In May 2006, when thousands of secularists were protesting against the attack on the judges of the Council of State, they were not only condemning the gunman who had shot at the judges. Their protest was directed at the radical Islamists and their newspaper *Anadolu'da Vakit* as well as the Justice and Development Party (JDP) Government, which had criticized the judges' approval of the ban of the headscarf. The causes and real perpetrators of the attack are – as of July 2009 – still unknown. Whether it was a radical Islamist protest or not,[2] it was in any case an event which revived the fear of violent reactionay Islam (*irtica*) and mobilized large numbers of people into support of secularism. It was one of the most recent violent events in Republican history which led to a public outburst in civil activism for secularism. Yet, it was not the first one. This chapter is about the very first instance of an attack driven by an Islamic cause and targeting a symbol of secularism. It explores the repercussions of the Malatya Incident of 1952 which triggered an intense public debate on secularism in the multi-party period.

The term "Malatya Incident" is used to refer to a failed assassination attempt on Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888–1973), who was a famous liberal journalist and the editor of the daily newspaper *Vatan*. The attack took place in the city of Malatya in the south-east of Turkey on 22 November 1952. Several links were found during the interrogations between the suspects and organizations such as *Büyük Doğu* of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and various Islamic publications. These links were seen by the Kemalist intellectual and political elite, who were either faithful to the RPP or cautious supporters of the DP, as the proof of the resurgence of *irtica*. They portrayed conservative nationalists with differing Islamic tendencies as the reincarnation of the

protagonists of the earlier so called "reactionary" uprisings. In this sense, the public debate instigated by the Malatya Incident reflected a continuity in the use of the Kemalist concept of *irtica*.

However, this chapter will not only show the continuity in the discourse on *irtica,* which is based on a politics of memory equating actors of the past and of the present. Different sections of the chapter will be devoted to the exploration of changes in the use and the framing of the concept. The shifts in the discourse on *irtica* entailed changes in its context, participants, and content, and can be summarized in three main themes:

1) In the context of relative democratization, the concept of *irtica* began to be contested publicly by conservative nationalist intellectuals and by the DP leaders, while such critiques had existed, but were suppressed during the single-party period.
2) The Malatya Incident led to the emergence of an increased civil, i.e. non-governmental, Kemalist activism against the rise of conservative nationalism. Kemalist intellectuals, feeling both victimized by Islamic fanatics who were allegedly tolerated by the DP government and proud of representing themselves as the legitimate elite of the Republic and guardians of the official ideology, became increasingly involved in public debates on secularism in the 1950s.
3) The context of the Cold War and the wave of anti-communism led Kemalist intellectuals to characterize *irtica* as a destructive tool of communism. In other words, anti-communism and secularism were interlinked in the construction of danger and the enemy.

The following pages will illustrate these changes in the discourse on *irtica*, focusing on the Malatya Incident of 1952. The last two sections of the chapter will explore the shift in the DP's discourse on *irtica* and contextualize the Kemalist fear of the latter in relation to intensified rural-urban migration during the 1950s.

***İrtica*: a contested concept**

As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the concept of *irtica*, i.e. reactionary Islam or religious fanaticism, has been crucial for Kemalism. The concept was used by the Kemalist regime in order to delegitimize not only Islamic but all political opposition. Persons and organizations who were considered reactionary and threatening to the secular character of the Republic were restricted by law. Article 163 of the Penal Code of 1926 was designed to protect the constitutional principle of secularism. This article, to which even more severe measures were added with a 1949 amendment, imposed prison sentences for the founding of associations which aimed at applying religious principles to the social, political, or judicial systems. It also spelled out sanctions for abusing religion as a means of political propaganda

(Toprak 1981: 154, fn. 81; Dönmezer 1951). Articles 241 and 242 of the Turkish Penal Code also dealt with prohibitions on the use of religion for political purposes. Furthermore, Article 9 of the Law of Associations (*Cemiyetler Kanunu*), enacted in 1938, outlawed all associations formed on "principles of religion, creed, and religious orders".

The epithets of reactionary (*mürteci*) or fanatic (*yobaz*) have been widely used by Kemalist intellectuals to refer to religious obscurantism. The fanatic represented the "bad Muslim" or "fake" Islam as opposed to the "good Muslim" or "true" Islam which is apolitical and limited to the individuals' private lives. For example, those who chanted the *tekbir* in the streets during the funeral ceremony of Fevzi Çakmak, the members of the *Ticani* order who protested the Turkish *ezan* in the Grand National Assembly, or those who destroyed Atatürk's statues as symbols of idolatry were depicted as reactionaries (*mürteci*).[3]

While the concept of *irtica* was widely used for referring to fanatical religious belief, it was also linked to resistance against anything that was new, modern, scientific, egalitarian, etc. Here is an example of how reactionism was defined in a special issue of a youth magazine in reference to the Menemen Incident:

> [*İrtica*] is the enemy of positive sciences; it is racist. It is against the distribution of land to the peasantry; it is for the monopolization of all means of production by a minority; it does not recognize equal rights of men and women; it is against secularism; in art, it is for the principle of 'art is for art'… And finally, *irtica* is imperialist or the friend of imperialism. … This is the true meaning of *irtica*. *İrtica* is not, as reflected in our current newspapers, only events in the field of religion such as the recital of the Arabic call to prayer, the wearing of the outlawed turban [*sarık*], or the recital of the *tekbir*…[4]

This quotation is obviously an extreme example of how the meaning of the term *irtica* can be extended to signify any negative thing or development from a modernist, leftist and Kemalist point of view. Nevertheless, the term has more often been used in reference to Islamic reactionism against the secularist regime.

The Kemalist use of the term had already been criticized during the single-party period, as shown in the last section of Chapter 1. Such critiques were, however, suppressed under the authoritarian regime. In the multi-party period, the concept began to be criticized freely by conservative nationalist intellectuals. Ali Fuat Başgil was one of the most prominent of these. His often-quoted articles denied the existence of *irtica* and claimed that it was just the clamor (*yaygara*) of a few journalists:

> No, gentlemen, there is no *irtica*! There is only the noise of a few self-seeking journalists who are a big trouble for the country. If one day *irtica* explodes in

> these lands, I tell you now in advance, it will be because of them and their incitement.[5]

Conservative nationalist intellectuals depicted those who in their view exaggerated the threat of obscurantism as enemies of Turks and Islam. İsmet Tümtürk and other writers in the nationalist periodical *Orkun*, for instance, referred to such secularists as "bigots of Revolution" (*inkılâp yobazları*) who were, according to them, racially non-Turk, communists, and enemies of Islam.[6] Similarly, writers such as Eşref Edip used the term for referring to Westernists who, under the influence of Zionists, communists and Freemasons, wanted to imitate the West in all its aspects.[7]

Although Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not share in such racist and anti-Zionist critiques of Westernism, his speeches were, overall, in line with the arguments of conservative nationalist intellectuals such as Ali Fuat Başgil. He rejected the existence of the threat of *irtica* and claimed that the nation had reached a sufficient level of maturity to protect secularism. This was also how he had explained the removal of the ban on the Arabic *ezan* on the basis of the same argument.

The Democratic Party's popularity among conservative nationalists largely stemmed from Menderes' radical critique of Kemalist elitism and of its authoritarian narrative centered on the threat of *irtica*. Menderes' speech in Kayseri on 21 November 1952 was prototypical in this regard. In his speech, Menderes complained about the elitism of a small group of intellectuals who accused the masses of being reactionary. His strategy was to emphasize the gap between the elite and the people and to situate himself and his party on the side of the people:

> To say that there is *irtica* in this country is to claim that you are a mass which is backward, fanatical and under the threat of deep ignorance, and that you are not inclined towards the future but on the contrary towards the darkness of the middle ages. If one considers the fear that the opposition circles are trying to inculcate in the minds of the people, Turkish society is a society which is always ready to begin a reactionary (*irtica*) movement but prevented from doing so with the threat of arms and bayonets. To claim this is to insult Turkish society. I scream in your name to defend you. The Turkish nation is not fanatical. Do not be scared. The danger of *irtica* has always been put forward in order to usurp the political rights of the Turkish nation. According to them, there is only a small group of people in this country. This small group of intellectuals are for progress and they are revolutionary persons. As opposed to this, all of you are fanatical; you are the enemy of any advancement and of progressive movements. This is slandering the Turkish nation. If you were not an advanced society, nobody would find in himself the courage to succeed in initiating those things which are called revolution [*inkılâp*]. The Turkish nation is an advanced society which has adopted the good and the

> correct. It has a great past of founding many empires. You, who carry in your spirits the cultural treasure of past centuries, are, of course, a society inclined towards the good, the beautiful and progress. And from the perspective of intuition and comprehension, you are situated in the middle of Western civilization.[8]

Through such speeches, attacking Kemalist elitism and its enlightened despotism, Menderes echoed the arguments of conservative nationalist intellectuals who criticized the obsession of Kemalist intellectuals with the fear of *irtica* and their distrust in the people's capacity to resist it. Not surprisingly, the pro-RPP opposition press, *Dünya* and *Ulus*, accused Menderes' speech of further promoting *irtica* and of having opened the path for the reactionary event in Malatya.

In brief, the Kemalist concept of *irtica* and its elitist assumptions were contested by those who were blamed for inciting *irtica*. In this sense, there was a continuity with the single-party era, when for instance the members of the opposition party FRP were accused of the same, as shown in Chapter 1. A crucial difference in the democratic period was that the accused – i.e. the DP – were government rather than opposition. Hence, both the leader of the DP and conservative nationalists, who hoped that the latter would end the RPP's "oppression of Islam", were able to criticize the Kemalist use of *irtica* without any restriction. At the same time, the Malatya Incident led to a renewed consensus on the use of the concept of *irtica* among Kemalists, who saw it as instigated by the ideologues of convervative nationalism. The following section recounts the event in Malatya as well as examines the ideological background of the alleged instigators, as a backdrop to the formation of a civil Kemalist secularism.

Conservative nationalism and the Malatya Incident

The Malatya Incident took place two and a half years after the DP Government came to power. Ahmet Emin Yalman and his team of reporters had been traveling through the country to record local developments. Malatya was the 49th province on their tour. Coincidentally, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also arrived in Malatya around the same time to address the annual local convention of his party. In the evening of 22 November, after attending a dinner given by the Mayor for the Prime Minister, Yalman went to the post office to pass on his editorial to the headquarters of his newspaper in Istanbul. When he finished his telephone call and was walking towards his hotel just before midnight, he was shot in the street (Yalman 1956: 255). He was found to have been hit by five bullets, although, luckily, none of the bullets had damaged any vital organ.

The Government showed great sympathy for Yalman after the attack. Besides Adnan Menderes himself, Ethem Menderes, the Minister of the

Interior, and Hayri Üstündağ, the Minister of Health, visited him several times in the hospital in Malatya. Leading medical experts, the Minister of Justice, and the Director of General Security came to Malatya by special plane, while another special plane brought Yalman's wife and son from Istanbul. This special attention paid by the government was partly due to the fact that Yalman was a prestigious journalist who had been a strong supporter of the DP. However, like many other journalists and intellectuals who had earlier supported the DP in its struggle against the RPP, Yalman had begun to disassociate himself from the DP, interpreting the DP's increasing emphasis on Islam as an encouragement of anti-secularist groups. Yalman later explained the shift Menderes went through in the early 1950s in his memoirs published in 1956:

> I took the lead in attacking both the entire reactionary camp and the people in the government with whom I had closely co-operated for years in the struggle for democracy, but who were now neglecting their duty of enforcing the laws to protect the secular regime against *irtica.* (Ibid.: 249)

Yalman's alienation from the DP was paralleled by his being depicted as, in his words, the "Enemy No. 1" by members of "reactionary movements which were organized as a result of Communist infiltration" (Ibid.: 250–1). According to Yalman, the members of these movements[9] despised Yalman's commitment to secularism and portrayed him as an unbeliever, traitor, American agent, or communist. The attack in Malatya was thus the result of their campaign of slander against him.

After the first investigations, a bicycle found nearby the telephone box that Yalman had used before the attack helped the police in tracing the suspects. The bicycle belonged to a certain Şerif Dursun, who surrendered to the police on 25 November. Dursun was a member of the then closed Islam Democratic Party and a reader of magazines such as *Büyük Doğu* and *Serdengeçti*. Fifteen people who were also arrested told the police that they were involved in the plot under the influence of the magazine *Büyük Doğu*.[10] According to the report in *Vatan*, most of these suspects were members of the *Büyük Doğu* Society, the Islam Democratic Party, as well as the Society of Nationalists, which immediately expelled two of its members, Musa Çağıl and İlhan Civelek, who were among the suspects.[11]

The investigation was extended beyond the borders of Malatya to Istanbul, İzmir and Bursa, in order to uncover reactionary circles. The Society of Nationalists in Bursa was closed down when it became known that some of its members were planning to propose the compulsory veiling of women (*çarşaf* and *peçe*). A new organization with the name of *Mukaddesatçı Gençlik* (Youth for the Sacred), which was composed of students and young people but was not yet officially founded, was also discovered.[12] *Nurculer*, the

followers of Said Nursî (1876–1960), were referred to by *Cumhuriyet* as the third reactionary group having links with the plot.[13] The network (*şebeke*) which planned the plot was thought to have links to Said Nursî, because he was mentioned under the name of *Hazreti Üstad* (His Highness, the Master) in letters found in some suspects' houses.[14] Investigation of the Malatya event continued up until February 1953 when houses of some sheikhs of the Naqshbandi order (a certain Kâzım Baba was mentioned) in Elazığ were searched.[15]

During the interrogations just after the incident, one of the suspects, Musa Çağıl, told the police after his arrest that they decided to punish Yalman because he had cursed Islam but the law had not penalized him. Yalman, Çağıl continued, "had suggested the American mandate during critical times; he had published pictures of naked women and organized beauty contests; he ridiculed the beards and turbans of imams and offended our women; he wrote that there was *irtica* in the country".[16]

It was discovered, however, that the person who had shot Yalman in the name of the group was a high school student, Hüseyin Üzmez. Yalman depicted him in his memoirs as follows: "[t]he son of a poor working woman, a gifted but unbalanced and overzealous boy who was a member of several religious-chauvinistic underground organizations. Expelled from his school, he was paid regularly by "believers" to study in another school in a neighboring town (Elazığ)" (Yalman 1956: 257). Üzmez had surrendered to the police in Elazığ and confessed his crime. He told the police that he decided to kill Yalman because he published articles which offended his religious belief.[17] During his trial Üzmez did not deny that he was a follower of Kısakürek, but he rejected the accusation that the assassination was inspired by him. However, as he would later write in his memoirs, that this was in fact the case (Üzmez 1999: 85, 270–1).

Üzmez's major inspiration had come from the publications of Kısakürek in *Büyük Doğu*. One sentence written by Kısakürek, who encouraged activism in the service of the cause of Islam, had deeply affected Üzmez. The words which had so shaken Üzmez were: "The greatness of an idea is measured in terms of the greatness of the traces of blood on the soil" (Ibid.: 85).[18] Üzmez and his friends in Malatya had wanted to punish Ahmet Emin Yalman because of his offenses against Islam after reading articles that attacked him, written by Necip Fazıl and Osman Serdengeçti. Üzmez learned from these articles that Yalman was supposed to be a "*dönme*" (a "crypto-Jew")[19] and Freemason, as well as being the organizer of a national beauty contest, and hence "an enemy of Islam and the Turkish nation". Üzmez states in his memoirs that he had of course not explained all of this in court (Ibid.).



Figure 9. "The RPP Revolution". The cover page of *Büyük Doğu*, 16 February 1951.



Figure 10. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Hüseyin Üzmez during their trial on the Malatya Incident. *Vatan*, 1 October 1953.

Nevertheless, Kısakürek was tried in court under the charges of inciting the plot against Yalman. During his defense in court, Kısakürek rejected this charge and claimed that the incident was instead a plot planned by the RPP in order to create a pretext to oppress Islam (Kısakürek 1998: 77–9, 143). He also wrote an article to the Ankara-based newspaper *İstiklâl* (Independence) on 11 December 1952 defending himself. He accepted that Malatya was a place where his *Büyük Doğu* Society was very influential, but denied that Üzmez and most of his friends had any connection with it.[20] He claimed that Üzmez was a nervous, untamed, guideless, and violent kid (Ibid.: 75–6). Likewise, he claimed during his defense speech to the court that Üzmez had "an abnormal psychological constitution" (*anormal bir ruh bünyesine sahip*) and denied any personal link with him (Ibid.: 172–3).

The suspects of the assassination attempt were tried in the First Criminal Court of Ankara on 3 August 1953 on the charge of resorting to terrorist methods to overthrow the secular regime in Turkey. The public prosecutor asked for the death sentence for 14 of them. Eight collaborators were sentenced to 12 years, seven others to five years and four of them to one year, while Üzmez was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment (Yalman 1970: 313).[21] Although they were thus condemned for challenging the secular regime, they had in fact not attacked a direct symbol or representative of the secular state. Their victim was a journalist who in their view constituted an enemy of Islam and Turkism. Their choice of attacking Ahmet Emin Yalman was not arbitrary but inspired by a series of ideological currents, namely anti-Semitism, anti-cosmopolitanism, anti-communism and the critique of westernism. These ideological currents, which predated the 1950s, constituted the intellectual repertoire of conservative nationalism in these years. Even a short summary of this repertoire, as offered below, helps to explain how the rubric of *irtica*, used by Kemalists to refer to conservative nationalists in the aftermath of the Malatya Incident, was only a shallow depiction.

Anti-Semitic tendencies began to emerge in Turkey especially after the Nazis took power in Germany on 20 January 1933. Racist Turkists such as Nihâl Atsız and Cevat Rifat Atilhan (1892–1967), inspired by the Nazi ideology, stressed the importance of "pure blood", "pure lineage" and being a "pure Turk", and referred to minorities as potential traitors (Bali 2000: 244–5). Atilhan published an anti-Semitic magazine entitled *İnkılâp* (Revolution) in İzmir in April 1933, and from 1934 onwards one in Istanbul, entitled *Millî İnkılâp* (National Revolution). Atsız, in his magazine *Orhun*, and Atilhan, in his *Millî İnkılâp*, accused Jews of dominating commercial life, of not speaking in Turkish, or of degenerating the Turkish nation by passing as Turkish. Their anti-Semitic propaganda helped to instigate the "Incident of Thrace" of 1934, when Jewish neighborhoods in the towns of Edirne,

Kırıkkale, Çanakkale, Uzunköprü and Kırklareli were pillaged (Akar 2001: 30; Bali 2000: 246–7, 522–3).

The conspiracy theory concerning the *dönme* was put forward by Nihâl Atsız who, in his Turkist publications before 1933, had believed that the cause of the decay of the Ottoman Empire was the diffusion of the Turkish race through intermarriage and the multi-ethnic composition of the Ottoman bureaucracy. According to Atsız, the inclusion of foreign, non-Turk elements, such as non-Muslims and Muslims (Albanians) from the Balkans, into the state system had proved to be wrong. The rulers of the Turkish state, he defended, had to be pure Turks. The *dönme*, or "the secret community of Jewish converts" (*gizli Yahudi dönmesi cemaati*), was one of the foreign destructive groups in Atsız's conspiracy theory. He had also written about Ahmet Emin Yalman as a prominent *dönme* who was neither Turk nor Muslim but a racist Jew (Özdoğan 2001: 197).[22] The anti-Semitism of Atilhan and Atsız began to be mingled with protests against the newly founded Jewish state in Palestine from 1948 onwards. Atilhan had openly stated his anti-Semitism in the program of his short-lived Islam Democratic Party (Tunaya 2003: 204; Rustow 1957: 99).

Kısakürek's anti-Semitism was a follow-up to Atsız's ultra-nationalist theory. While Atsız's hatred of *dönme* stemmed from his racist obsession with pure Turkish blood, Kısakürek's anti-Semitism concentrated more on a conspiracy theory depicting the Jews as the source of cultural degeneration. Kısakürek too referred to Yalman as *dönme* or *avdeti*, the last son of Sabetay Sevi, and to *Vatan*, Yalman's newspaper, as an agent of cosmopolitanism and *dönmelik*. Defining the latter as a branch of Jewry, he argued that the campaign against *irtica* was in fact part of the Jewish plan to attack Islam by means of the media largely dominated by the Jews.[23] Kısakürek and other *Büyük Doğu* writers associated Jewishness with materialism, selfishness (*menfaatçilik*) and degeneration (*yozlaşma*) (Cantek 2003: 654). They saw superficial westernization as a Jewish plan to destroy the Turkish-Islamic culture from within. The anti-Semitism of Kısakürek and his circle was hence also an ideological position against cultural westernization promoted by the secularist state.

Freemasonry was another issue which united conservative nationalist groups in displeasure. The Freemason Society, whose first lodge in Istanbul was opened in 1863 by the Ottoman elite (Dumont 1990: 401–3), was closed on 13 October 1935 for having "external links", i.e. for forming part of an international network beyond the state's control. According to *Cumhuriyet*, which reported the news of the closure, the Society had denied the accusations and stated that Freemasonry in Turkey was free, autonomous and nationalist. According to the reporter of *Cumhuriyet*, the Freemasons had been blamed for having neither religion (*dinsizlik*) nor nationality, because of

their commitment to secularism and their opposition to fanaticism (Koloğlu 2003: 89). The Freemason Society was reopened in 1948. This decision of the Government was welcomed by several intellectuals, such as Ahmet Emin Yalman who was also a member of the Society, as a necessity of the democratic right of freedom of association. However, there were also those who protested against the legalization of the Freemason Society, such as Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Raif Ogan and Yılanlıoğlu İsmail Hakkı. Atilhan, for example, combined his anti-Zionism in a series of articles he published in *Sebilürreşad* (starting in the eighth issue) with his disdain for Freemasonry and depicted the latter as a Jewish invention as dangerous as Zionism and communism.

Anti-communism in the post-World War II period was also a unifiying factor for all versions of Turkish nationalism, which interpreted communism as a new version of Russian expansionism. The attempts of long-suppressed socialist groups to organize in the new context of multi-party democracy were prevented by a law which prohibited the formation of class-based political parties. The Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*), founded by Esat Âdil Müstecapoğlu on 14 May 1946, and the Socialist Laborer and Peasant Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*), founded by Şefik Hüsnü Değmer on 19 June 1946, were closed down in the same year on 16 December and their members were given prison sentences. In the post-World War II context, anti-communism was increasingly propagated by the United States in the countries in its sphere of influence, including Turkey. As anti-communism was backed by the Truman doctrine, which secured American economic and military aid to prevent a possible Soviet expansion, purges of communists from state institutions accelerated, especially after Turkey's involvement in the Korean War (Eroğul 1990: 61).

In this period, anti-communism was an umbrella ideology, with all political parties blaming each other for being communist and Soviet agents (Kaçmazoğlu 1988: 181). Although it was the RPP government which had consolidated Turkey's place in the new bipolar world within the club of Western democracies against the Soviet threat, it could never monopolize the anti-communist rhetoric. This was largely due to the fact that religion was conceived as the bulwark against the infiltration of communism, perceived as mere atheism and immorality. Thus, even within the RPP, the relaxation of secularist regulations by introducing religious education in the curriculum of primary schools was defended as a measure against the threat of communism. Nevertheless, conservative nationalists accused the RPP of having propagated communism through its militant secularist policies and its Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*), which were used to train village youth as primary school teachers. In their narratives, as well as in those of the DP

leadership, cultural and spiritual values were the most important shield against the dangers of atheism and communism (Mango 1995: 138).

Interestingly, Ahmet Emin Yalman was a strong advocate of the alliance with the United States and a staunch anti-communist, although he was being accused of being a communist.[24] In his eyes, any movement which endangered the status-quo and the stability of the country served communism. Hence, according to him, *irtica* was an internal source of anarchy which was in fact "steered by the external communist power".[25] This association of *irtica* with communism was an important characteristic of the discourse of Kemalist secularism in this period (which will be dealt with in an ensuing section).

In the eyes of conservative nationalists, however, the anti-communism of Yalman was not convincing because of his strong secularism. Yalman's participation in the intellectuals' campaign for the release of the famous communist poet Nâzım Hikmet was further seen as a proof of his adherence to communism.[26] According to them, he – as well as other secularist anti-communist intellectuals such as Falih Rıfkı Atay – abused the anti-communist feelings of the people in order to attack Islam.[27]

The critique of westernism was also an important ideological motive behind the attack against Yalman. Cultural westernization, defended by Kemalist secularism, was seen from this perspective as an attack on Islam, as a suicidal adoption of a "decadent", "immoral" civilization. While westernism idealized the West as a source of only positive values, the its critique adopted by conservative nationalist intellectuals reversed this image and depicted it as the source of all evils.

The centrality of women in the Kemalist westernization project, which was whole-heartedly defended by Yalman, was the main line of conflict in this respect. The Kemalist will to open the door to the civilized West by rendering Turkish women visible and active in the public sphere even extended to the field of beauty contests, which were organized between 1929 and 1933 by the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*.[28] Beauty contests were revived in the early 1950s, this time on the initiative of Yalman's newspaper *Vatan*. The Miss Universe contest of 1952, sponsored by Pan-American Airways and the Universal-International film company, had offered to put *Vatan* in charge of the contest in Turkey. This nation-wide private initiative, which was not directly backed by the Government, triggered a reaction by Kısakürek and others. Several Islamic magazines protested against the beauty contest, which they saw as an attack on Turkish and Islamic culture.

As Bora pointed out, themes concerning the role of women were central to the ideology of conservative nationalist intellectuals (Bora 2005). Their rhetoric marked women and their sexual liberty as the source of cultural degeneration (*yozlaşma*) (Ibid.: 262–3). Their critique of modernizing reforms

was thus centered on the (negative) image of the modern, Westernized woman who transgressed traditional boundaries. The beauty contest was furthermore seen by conservative nationalists as the total destruction of traditional and moral values as well as of the national honor. They saw the contest as "an attempt to lead Turkish girls into prostitution and to sell them to 'American Jews'" (Yalman 1956: 252). Osman Yüksel, in his magazine *Serdengeçti*, and Necip Fazıl in his *Büyük Doğu*, attacked the organization for exhibiting women's bodies in contravention of the national and spiritual values of the country.[29] Kısakürek depicted the beauty contest as new prostitution (*yeni fuhuş*) and a trap for the Muslim-Turkish family, and called on the Turkish youth to revolt against this plot against national honor (*milli namusa suikast*). *Büyük Doğu* published protest letters from all over Turkey. Yalman received threat letters from the readers of these magazines. Üzmez, in his memoirs, referred to this beauty contest as an important factor in his decision to kill Yalman:

> There came the day when they undressed not only intellectually; they began to undress their wives and daughters. They put them as beauty queens in the beds of Americans. This put the lid on it (Üzmez 1999: 56).

This summary of the ideological background of the protagonists of the Malatya Incident, which is crystallized especially in the magazine *Büyük Doğu* of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, demonstrates the thin line between violent Islamic reactionism and conservative nationalism. The latter did not aim to overthrow the secularist state but challenged its foundational principles, such as cultural Westernism and its insistence on discontinuity with a discredited Ottoman past. Furthermore, conservative nationalism had strong fascistic and xenophobic tendencies, as expressed in publications against cosmopolitanism, *dönme*, and Freemasonry. All of these ideological dimensions of conservative nationalism were seen as the current characteristics of *irtica* by Kemalists, who felt threatened by them especially after the incident in Malatya. The fact that "the last victim" of *irtica* was a journalist, not a direct representative of the secular state but a symbolic figure representing the latter's values, made Kemalist intellectuals even more anxious. This anxiety incited a new "civil Kemalism", that is, a Kemalist civil society activism led by intellectuals – as opposed to the Kemalist state secularism of the single-party period. The subsequent section will explore the emergence of this civil Kemalism in the aftermath of the Malatya Incident.

Civil Kemalism and the specter of *irtica*

The assassination attempt of the group of Hüseyin Üzmez, inspired by anti-Westernist, anti-Semitist, and anti-communist ideas of leading conservative

nationalist intellectuals such as Kısakürek and Serdengeçti, was the first violent action associated with Islamic reaction in the multi-party period. The public debate instigated by the event was centered on the "revival" of *irtica*. However, this time the Kemalist critique of the latter could not only be reduced to support for the RPP. The attack against Yalman, who was himself representing a Kemalist secularist stance critical of the RPP, fostered rather a civil, i.e. non-governmental, and not necessarily pro-RPP Kemalist secularism.[30] This civil Kemalist secularism is the subject of the following examination of the public response to the attack on Yalman.

The breaking news of the plot against Yalman in Malatya caused a general uproar in the country. Newspapers dedicated columns to the developments concerning the plot and the investigations for several weeks, and published editorials against *irtica*.[31] Conspirators were referred to as reactionaries (*mürteci*) and Yalman as a victim of black fanaticism (*kara taassup*).[32]

The official daily newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*, blamed the conservative nationalist press for provoking the assassination attempt and criticized the DP Government for giving financial support to such publications in exchange for votes:

> The attitude of the governing party leaders, who gives room to reactionary figures abusing holy feelings of citizens for the sake of vote hunting in the party's upper ranks and who make them benefit from the national treasury by assigning them official advertisements, began to cause worrisome results. The Malatya Incident is an example to take a lesson from.[33]

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1874–1957), the editor of *Ulus* since 1948, stated that the "normal *irtica*" of the DP "chose its first victim" and that those responsible for it were the Democrats:

> The *irtica* that we have sensed for long and which we witnessed going out of control, the dear "normal *irtica*" of the chief of the Democratic Party, is now armed and chose its first victim. In our eyes, those who are responsible for this are the Democrat leaders. … Thanks to whose protection could the *Büyük Doğu* Society gain wealth? Everything should be clarified and the nation should learn the truth.[34]

The Assembly of the RPP published a written notice (*tebliğ*) accusing the DP Government of supporting reactionary forces by opening the party to them and by publishing official advertisements in their publications.[35] The DP's financial support to Islamic magazines, including *Büyük Doğu*, was also in the form of direct payment from the budget of the Prime Minister, as Kısakürek confirmed years later. The political alliance with figures such as Kısakürek, which had financial benefits for the latter, was interpreted by the opposition as support of reactionism exploiting the religious feelings of the people, and

hence as undermining secularism. The substance of the debate was not too different from the one between the current JDP Government and the Kemalist opposition mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Like the JDP, the DP had formed political alliances with different Islamic circles, which made their commitment to secularism less convincing in the eyes of the Kemalist oppositon.

The attack against Yalman was seen by the editors of mainstream newspapers as another proof of the still existing danger of religious reactionism in Turkey, which in their view had already become apparent in the demonstrations of the *Ticani* order and during the funeral ceremony of Fevzi Çakmak in 1950. This last event in Malatya, targeting a journalist, was seen as an attack against both freedom of thought and the secular regime. Falih Rıfkı Atay of *Dünya*, Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet*, and M. Nermi of *Yeni İstanbul* stressed in their editorials the need to take action against those who abused freedom of conscience and who understood it as "the freedom of religious reactionism" (*irtica hürriyeti*).[36] These writers' critique of the DP targeted the latter's discourse of alternative secularism, which emphasized above all freedom of conscience – as discussed in the previous chapter. The Malatya Incident had confirmed in their view that an unlimited and misused freedom of conscience could harm the more general principle of freedom of thought and secularism.

Ironically, but not coincidentally, the measure which was suggested to be taken by the Government in order to prevent the abuse of freedom of conscience was the prohibition of publications such as *Büyük Doğu* or *Sebilürreşad*. The new reactionaries to fight against were, according to Kemalist intellectuals, the writers and readers of these publications. For instance, Şemsi Belli, a poet and journalist who commented on the Malatya Incident, pointed out the difference of this last reactionary event from earlier ones as the crux of the matter. According to Belli, while *Ticani*s were members of the ignorant and illiterate peasant stratum (*cahil tabakadan ve okur-yazar olmayan bir köylü kütlesi*), the heroes of the last event were famous intellectuals.[37] In other words, this last attack was committed by an educated, urban youth, who was supposed to support the secularist regime. This youth was the proof of the negative effect of conservative nationalist publications on educated minds. Hence, those really responsible for this fanatic outburst, namely these publications, had to be banned. M. Nermi, from *Yeni İstanbul*, similarly called upon the Government to prevent religious incitements made under the cover of freedom of conscience (*vicdan hürriyeti maskesi altında türlü türlü din kışkırtmalarının yapılması*) in order to protect democracy:

> The Turkish press thinks that the attack against Yalman is a serious crime committed against the freedom of thought. That it is. … However, the framework of this crime is, according to us, much larger, even larger than we

> would want to think. We are facing not only a matter of the freedom of thought, but also a matter of whether the young state which was born out of a revolutionary ideology is being denied or not. If we are really attached to our democracy, we should, before everything else, try to wither the sources which create crimes. As Adnan Menderes said, … if the magazines which cause disorder are closed and verdicts are made more violent, a good step will be taken on the road to freedom.[38]

In short, after the Malatya Incident, an intense campaign was conducted by Kemalist intellectuals against Islamic publications of conservative nationalist intellectuals, i.e. the new reactionaries. Only the newspaper *Yeni Sabah* objected to the campaign to prohibit these publications, defending the freedom of the press. The publishers of the Islamic magazines on the other hand depicted themselves as victims of an anti-democratic campaign. The magazine *İslam Dünyası* published several articles protesting against the accusation that publications were the instigators of the conspiracy. The magazine quoted two articles in its December issue by Şükrü Baban of *Yeni Sabah*, who defended the idea that the freedom of press had to be protected, as it was impossible to predict the effect of publications on the minds of people:

> To estimate the effect of the newspaper and magazine articles on the minds and to blame this or that journalist for being responsible for such effects is a method full of dangers and damages. … The freedom of writing, free thought and the protection of consciences should be kept intact at all cost.[39]

Nevertheless, in the eyes of Kemalists, the public appeal to Islam made by Islamic publications strengthened reactionary Islam, i.e. *irtica*. Therefore, these publications' "abuse of freedom" had to be restricted to prevent the overthrow of the secular regime, understood as the untouchable legacy of Atatürk, independent of the ruling government.

İrtica was perceived by the defenders of Kemalist secularism as a haunting past. The imagined figure of reactionary appeared in different guises, although it was always a "remnant of March 31" – i.e. of the mutiny of 1908 which was partially instigated by the Society for Muhammedan Union (*İttihad-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti*) and its newspaper *Volkan*, published by Derviş Vehdetî. For instance, the mass demonstrations on 12 April 1950 during the funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak were seen as the return of the specter of *irtica* (Karpat 1959: 283–5).[40] The use of *tekbir* as slogans in this protest reminded Kemalist intellectuals of the March 31 Incident. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın of *Ulus*, a witness to the latter, condemned the demonstration during the funeral in these words:

> While reading in the newspapers about the last demonstrations in Istanbul, which took place just on the eve of the forty-first anniversary of the despotism of March 31, 1909, I heard the *tekbir* sounds of Derviş Vahdetî [the leader of the uprising] and the mixed hoi polloi who revolted. This was not imagination. The streets of Istanbul were clinking with the furious and destructive perversions of forty-one years ago; the spirit of rebellion and destruction was rising.[41]

Thus, the trauma of March 31 still shaped the Kemalist perception of the events in 1950. March 31 continued to carry its symbolic meaning for Kemalist secularism, although its memory began to be disputed and rejected in the multi-party period.[42]

The Malatya Incident was also conceived by several writers of the mainstream press, including Ahmet Emin Yalman himself, as the revival of *irtica*. Yalman and many other writers assumed a historical continuity of the assassination attempt in Malatya with the earlier so called reactionary events, such as the March 31 Incident of 1908 and the Menemen Incident of 1930. According to Yalman, he had become the victim of a larger, treacherous setup. Accordingly, the plotters of his assassination were "enemies of the people", "relics of March 31", who took advantage of a "current lack of peace and stability to destroy the regime".

> How could the enemies of the nation who are the remains of March 31 ever succeed in building a network of disorder aiming to eradicate the country? The answer to this question should be looked for in the ongoing lack of peace and stability in our political life.[43]

> In the first moment of heedlessness, destructive powers benefited from the existing vacuum. They exploited religious feelings of our people for the sake of their personal greed and foreign-led arson. They began to alienate a segment of the people from the regime, to create an atmosphere of March 31, and to use the idea of an Islamic state (*şeriat devleti*) as a means of seizing the power. [44]

In brief, the shock of violence in Malatya animated the trauma of March 31 and the fear that an unlimited freedom of press could lead to an Islamic uprising. Hence, a direct parallel was drawn between the contemporary conservative nationalist writers and their publications and the Islamist Derviş Vahdetî, who had allegedly abused an "excess of freedom" by intending to eradicate freedom his magazine, *Volkan*.[45]

Besides March 31, the more recent reactionary event in Menemen was further used as a model with which to explain the event in Malatya. During the years immediately after the Menemen Incident, the Kemalist elite was determined to keep the memory of Kubilay alive. Nevertheless, from 1936 onwards commemorations aiming at reviving dedication to the Kemalist

revolution began to be given less importance. Even *Cumhuriyet*, which had played a major role in the institutionalization of the commemoration ceremonies and in the erection of the monument in Menemen, did not report on Kubilay the Martyr Day on its front page in 1936 and in the following 15 years.[46] However, in the political atmosphere against *irtica* created by the Malatya Incident, the Menemen Incident was remembered and was commemorated with greater enthusiasm than in previous years. On 23 December, one month after the Malatya Incident, Kubilay was commemorated by *Cumhuriyet* on its front page right next to the headline about the last development in the Malatya case. In highlighting the commemoration news, *Cumhuriyet* editors wanted to warn the public of the continuing threat of anti-secular reactionary forces for democracy. Not only in *Cumhuriyet*, but also in other dailies and weeklies as well as in several ceremonies, Kubilay the Martyr was commemorated for calling the youth to defend the Revolution and to fight against religious fanaticism, which, as the last reactionary event had proven, could be awakened by the enemies of the Republic.[47] The Malatya Event was seen as a proof of this still living threat of *irtica* which had this time chosen Yalman as its victim.

Nurettin Artam of *Ulus* claimed that the DP's negation of the existence of *irtica* encouraged reactionaries, and he stated that the reactionaries should beware of the youth who were present at the ceremony commemorating the martyrdom of Kubilay:

> Both Sheikh Sait's and Derviş Mehmet's, who are steered by power that we know, can rise again from their graves even today as happened in the past. The fatwa which says "there is no *irtica* in the country" can encourage them. We can warn against all these: let them be frightened of Kubilay the Martyr and of the youth who organize ceremonies at his cemetery![48]

Ahmet Emin Yalman, in a speech he gave in a meeting organized by the Atatürk Society on the occasion of the Kubilay Day, commemorated Kubilay as a hero, martyr of Revolution, and expression of the national determination to protect the revolution and progress against retrogression and ignorance.[49]

Several other events were organized besides the annual commemoration ceremony in Menemen. The week of 23–30 December was declared "Week of Secularism".[50] The Turkish Hearths of Revolution (*Türk Devrim Ocakları*) organized commemoration ceremonies in Ankara, Istanbul and İzmir. The branch in İzmir declared that they shared the same Kemalist ideal with Kubilay and that they would not hesitate to die for this cause:

> The Turkish Hearths of Revolution published the following declaration in İzmir: "As we are commemorating beloved Kubilay who was viciously martyred by bigots twenty-two years ago on this day, we find in his patriotism,

> nationalism and revolutionism all the qualities of Kemalism. The ideal for which beloved Kubilay the Martyr gave his life is the biggest sacred goal for which we also would willingly sacrifice our lives. The Turkish Hearths of Revolution will pursue Kemalism with enthusiasm and determination which are legacies of beloved Atatürk and will always carry our reforms (*devrimlerimiz*) forward".[51]

There was no official participation either from the Governor or any other official in the ceremony in the People's House in İzmir. The participants in these ceremonies were mainly university students (*İzmir Yüksek Tahsil Gençliği*) and teachers. The ceremony at the Kubilay Monument in Menemen was attended by the Teachers' Association of İzmir (*İzmir Öğretmen Derneği*) and of Menemen. The national martyr Kubilay was referred to as the last victim of "black *irtica*" and fanaticism in several ceremonies and was commemorated in order to condemn the recent reactionary movements. For instance, the speech made by the president of the Students' Association for the ceremony in İzmir accused the Islamic press of pursuing the same aim as the fanatics who had beheaded Kubilay 22 years ago:

> There are today those who want to destroy the same ideal, as there were in the past those who did not recognize Kubilay's right to live. Yesterday, there were those who cut Kubilay's head off; today there are those who say 'I would hang a Kemalist at every tree in the country if it were possible'. They also express these ideas in practice in every occasion. Yesterday, there were those bigots who were stomping around the corpse of Kubilay; today there are alleged scholars and gurus who practice partisanship of ideas, newspapers and magazines.[52]

The commemoration ceremony could not find popular support in Menemen. According to a report in *Hürriyet*, the fact that local people had not participated in the ceremony had caused sorrow and gossip among journalists and members of student organizations who perceived themselves as the guardians of secularism.[53] As in the early 1930s (see Chapter 1), the townspeople of Menemen were probably disturbed by the identification of their town with *irtica* even 22 years after the event.

That the Menemen Incident in the 1950s was drawn upon as a model event explaining the present problem of *irtica* demonstrates how the discourse of Kemalist secularism was based on the use of collective memory. Olick and Levy's distinction between types of collective memory which "operate 'mythically' (often associated with the power of the past over the present) and those which operate 'instrumentally' (often associated with the power of the present over the past)" is useful for understanding the operation of collective memory in the case Kemalist secularism (1997: 922). The memory of the Menemen Incident of 1930 operated both mythically

and intrumentally. Its mythical capacity shaped the way the present events and actors were perceived by Kemalist intellectuals, if not for example by the local people in Menemen. It also operated instrumentally because its recalling was used by present political actors in their fight against what they saw as the enemies of the secular regime.

Nevertheless, the Kemalist politics of memory was not uncontested. What Zerubavel calls a "mnemonic battle" or a "[fight] over the 'correct' way to interpret the past" (1996: 296) was conducted between the defenders of Kemalist secularism and conservative nationalism. The latter contested both the depictions of the past events and the way the term *irtica* was used by Kemalists. For instance, Ogan argued that the comparison between March 31 and the recent attack was wrong, because the latter, he continued, was a criminal act of some aimless vagrants, rather than being a reactionary revolt like the event of March 31:

> The March 31 Incident is an *irtica*, because it aimed at the replacement of the constitutional monarchy with absolutism. The shooting of Ahmet Emin … is an attack against the inviolability of freedom and of the individual. But it is not an *irtica*. It is an ordinary crime.

Ogan also wrote ironically that there was in fact a parallel between the Menemen Incident and the Malatya Incident, because none of these events were general uprisings in the name of Islam, as claimed by the secularist media. In both incidents, he argued, there was just one victim, who was a defender of the secularist regime.[54]

In brief, the Malatya Incident urged the regeneration of the Kemalist politics of memory which constructed – albeit under the challenge of conservative nationalist critique – continuities with selected past events, i.e. the earlier "outbursts of reactionary Islam". The mythical and instrumental operation of Kemalist memory served an increased civil activism for the cause of protecting the secular regime vis-à-vis the perceived threat of *irtica*.

One of the Non-Governmental Organizations for promoting secularism was the Turkish Hearths of Revolution (*Türk Devrim Ocakları*), which was organizing conferences on secularism. At the beginning of a conference organized by the Istanbul branch of the society on the occasion of the Week of Secularism, the President of the society (R. Serhatoğlu) explained that their aim was "to defend and to spread Atatürk's reforms". He stated that the youth had to work hard for this, because nobody else could protect the reforms anymore.[55] With these words, the President in fact revealed the essence of civil Kemalism: the assumption that the government (suspected of having ties with *irtica*) could not be the trustee of secularism anymore, so that the secular regime had to be guarded by the people themselves.

Another intellectual initiative for defending secularism and fighting *irtica* was the League of National Solidarity (*Millî Tesânüt Birliği*). The latter was founded on 11 February 1953 by several editors-in-chief, editorial writers, and columnists of daily papers. These had met at the Press Club and agreed during the meeting to protect secularism against *irtica* and to educate the public accordingly. They chose a representative committee, composed of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın of *Ulus*, representing the RPP, Mümtaz Faik Fenik of *Zafer*, representing the DP, Falih Rıfkı Atay of *Dünya*, a pro-opposition paper, Nadir Nadi of the independent *Cumhuriyet*, Ali Naci Karacan of the pro-government *Milliyet*, and Ahmet Emin Yalman of the independent *Vatan* (Yalman 1956: 264). They invited 38 institutions and societies – trade unions, student and youth organizations, associations of war veterans, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc. – to send representatives to a general meeting. The League was eventually formed as a confederation of non-political organizations. In Yalman's words, the League was "an excellent example of public benefit inaugurated by the will and co-operation of newspaper editors" aiming to "check extreme tendencies that … revive dogma-ridden dictatorial power" (Ibid.: 265).

The League, presided by Professor Ekrem Şerif Egeli, had branches opened in Bursa, Manisa, Edirne, Samsun, Ankara (Yalman 1970: 305). The first meeting of the League was held in Istanbul with the participation of student organizations, teachers' organizations, professional organizations, the Turkish Hearths of Revolution (*Türk Devrim Ocakları*), trade unions, the Atatürk Society, etc. It was declared that the aim of the movement was the struggle against "reactionary and illegal actions and opinions", and that it did not have any "political" agenda.[56] This emphasis on the lack of a political agenda was probably to ensure that the League was perceived as an intellectual and independent organization.[57]

In brief, the fear of *irtica*, revived with the Malatya Incident and based on a perception that saw the present problem through the lenses of the past, fostered a civil Kemalist secularism trying to take over the role of protecting the secular regime. Intellectuals not necessarily associated with the DP Government or the RPP considered themselves guardians of the official ideology and increasingly involved in public debates on secularism in the 1950s. Nevertheless, their involvement in the debate as autonomous intellectuals did not change the content and discursive strategies of Kemalist secularism. As we have seen in the debates on the Malatya Incident, the protaganists of the event, who were instigated by the fascistic and anti-Semitic facets of conservative nationalism, were either associated with the reactionaries of the past, disregarding their present specificities, or associated with vicious foreign powers wishing to destroy the country. Thus, the emerging civil Kemalist secularism missed the chance of coming to terms

with the potentially violent ideological dimensions of conservative nationalism in Turkey.

However, there was a new dimension in the Kemalist discourse on *irtica* which also marked the debates about secularism in the early 1950s: anti-communism. In the context of the Cold War, *irtica* took on an additional meaning and was now framed as a tool of communism. Kemalist secularists coincided with those anti-communist conservative nationalists that they identified with *irtica*. This needs to be seen in the context of the tendency in Kemalist discourse on *irtica* to associate it with foreign enemies. The reactionary movements were conceived as having "external roots", hence, as not springing from the national body itself. The event of March 31, as paradigmatic example of foreign provocation or a "tumult created by English imperialists", was thus discussed as follows by Yalman:

> Nevertheless, if we examine the times since the *Tanzimat* era, we will reach the truth that the destructive reactionary inclinations have never been created by our own national body. In this business, there is always this or that foreigner who plays a role.[58]

Likewise, the Malatya Incident too was interpreted by many intellectuals of the time, including Yalman himself, as a part of the Soviet plan to create anarchy in Turkey. According to a report in *Cumhuriyet*, the suspects had links beyond national boundaries: letters found in one of the houses searched were said to strengthen the suspicion that the plot was caused by communist incitement.[59] Such claims were never proven. Still, Yalman who warned the public of the danger of *irtica* in several articles he wrote after the incident, pointed at the danger of communism. He stated that the "black power", i.e. reactionary Islam, was used by the "red power", i.e. communism, although the former was not aware of it. The current "communist plan" was, according to Yalman, to create a puppet state ruled by Islamists. [60]

As Yalman wrote in his memoirs, published in 1956, that "red" agents or "the agents of Moscow were using every sort of intrigue to undermine public authority in Turkey and to spread dissent; thus, they were assuming the roles of reactionary and ultra-nationalistic agitators" (Yalman 1956: 250). This time, he was chosen as a target because he had been consistently struggling against "religious fanaticism, which had provided Soviet imperialism with a mask behind which it could hide":

> Why had those ill-fated and malicious forces especially chosen me as their victim? Because I had begun to conduct an insistent and heavy struggle against the front of backwardness and fanaticism which provided the imperialism of Moscow with a shelter and camouflage. Because I was the founder and administrator of several organizations which enlighten the free humanity on the curses of Moscow (quoted in Kısakürek 1970: 276).

Hence Yalman referred to Hüseyin Üzmez as an unbalanced Turkish youth, indirectly inspired by communism (Yalman 1956: 4).

This conspiracy theory about the threat of *irtica* was shared by other leading intellectuals of the time. Nadir Nadi, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Falih Rıfkı Atay, prominent journalists and the editors of the newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Ulus* and *Dünya*, respectively, were likewise convinced that the Islamic movements in the Middle East and their representatives in Turkey were under the influence of the Cominform.[61] In other words, in the minds of these columnists, communism and Islamism were two faces of the same danger, because the Soviet state was, they thought, in alliance with the Islamist movements in the Middle East. They saw the revival of *irtica* as a conspiracy planned by the communist world power for destabilizing free democracy in Turkey. Even Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, a strong anti-communist, announced during a press conference in 1953 that communists used religious reactionaries as their tools (Ahmad et al. 1976: 107). In short, the perceived threat of communism in the Cold War context was amalgamated in this period with the perceived threat of *irtica*. Interestingly, those who were blamed for instigating *irtica*, i.e. conservative nationalist intellectuals, were also staunch supporters of anti-communism – a true umbrella ideology. As we have seen above, one of the reasons why Üzmez shot Yalman was the latter's alleged communism.

Despite its new dimension of anti-communism and its increasing civil/non-governmental characteristic, Kemalist secularism remained a discourse about reactionaries or "bad" Muslims perceived as the enemies of the nation. The reactionaries in the present were associated with those of the past and hence given continuity in time. This politics of memory apparently precluded an actual engagement with their arguments, beliefs and social background. Their marginalization was seen as the only way to protect the secular regime. This Kemalist discourse marginalizing reactioary Islam (*irtica*), as the following section will show, was also adopted by the DP Government.

Disassociating the Democratic Party from *irtica*

While civil Kemalist secularism frequently disassociated the secular regime from the DP Government at the time, the latter attempted to clean itself of the association with *irtica*. This was done through an intraparty struggle. There were two different tendencies within the DP leadership on the issue of secularism, which were represented respectively by Tevfik İleri and Celal Bayar. The group of Tevfik İleri (Minister of Transportation; Education; Vice-Prime Minister) included several deputies who were in favor of a more relaxed secularism,[62] as opposed to the President of the Republic, Celâl Bayar, who insisted on the party's allegiance to Kemalist secularism. The

influence of the former was felt in provincial organizations of the party, if not in the central organization. However, this Islamic front of the party was checked and controlled by the central leadership, especially after the Malatya Incident. The DP leadership was as dedicated to the secularist principle as the RPP and repeatedly stressed its determination not to politicize religion or encourage a religious reactionism (Toprak 1981: 72–3).

The Malatya Incident was a turning point for the DP's relationship with conservative nationalist circles. From then on, Menderes began to be more cautious on the issue of *irtica*. His speech in Adana on 6 December 1952, two weeks after the Malatya Incident, reflected his new sensibilities:

> Within the framework of the principle of freedom of conscience, religion as a sacred and respectable concept should be protected from any kind of offense. To understand secularism as enmity of religion or opposing religion does not match our government's understanding of freedom of conscience. Besides our decision to protect religion from all kinds of offenses, our decision to prevent religion from becoming a tool for suppressing citizens having other beliefs and personal ideas is definite too. This country has no tolerance to the abuse of a sacred concept like religion by certain social debris and self-seeking politicians.[63]

With this speech, he reiterated his party's understanding of secularism, which stressed the importance of freedom of conscience. But he also added a new concern, stating the possibility that religion could be a means of oppression. This new emphasis brought Menderes' alternative secularism closer to Kemalist secularism. Thus, Menderes gave a press conference in Ankara on 20 December to which he invited the editors of all daily newspapers, regardless of their political position. His aim was to declare that the DP would not tolerate the use of religion for political aims and would never attempt bribing fanaticism while in power.[64] Nevertheless, while declaring his party's commitment to secularism, Menderes continued to distinguish between the people and *irtica*, in order to differentiate himself from Kemalist critiques of the latter. He emphasized that the Malatya incident did not have roots in the people. He criticized the opposition for exaggerating the danger of *irtica* and generalizing it as a nation-wide problem, although the last event in Malatya was just "an unfortunate attempt by a small group of people not representing society as a whole".[65]

Menderes probably wanted to continue to appeal to the religious sensibilities of the people while simultaneously asserting his party's commitment to secularism and disassociating it from *irtica*. To do that, extreme Islamic tendencies within the party had to be curbed. The DP leadership had taken several measures along those lines already before the Malatya Incident, because some of its members and local branches had

announced Islamist demands and thus shown that the party included opponents of Kemalist reforms. For instance, Hasan Fehmi Ustaoğlu, the DP's deputy for Samsun, had caused a scandal by writing an article entitled "It is not at all true that the nation is indebted to the Atatürk Revolution" and was consequently expelled from the party.[66] The DP leaders had also to suppress the demands of some local branches for radical revision of the Kemalist reforms, such as bringing back the Arabic alphabet and the *fez* or forbidding women to work.[67]

After the Malatya Incident, the DP leadership increased its measures against reactionary tendencies within the party and aimed to redraw the borders of the legitimate use of Islam in the political sphere (Eroğul 1990: 81). This also required an intra-party purge, the first of which was carried out immediately after the Malatya Incident in December 1952. The party leadership in Ankara sent a circular order (*genelge*) to provincial party organizations stating that speeches about polygamy, the opening of religious orders and shrines and the inequality of inheritance were contradictory to the principles of the Turkish revolution and to the party program. The Chairs of the local congresses were asked to refuse reactionary (*gerici*) propositions against the Turkish reforms (*Türk inkılâpları*) and not to give permission to talk to those delegates who wanted to give such speeches (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 32).[68] Still, similar propositions continued. According to a report of *Cumhuriyet*, at the local congress of the DP in Kahramanmaraş a member called Dursun Çalışır criticized the arrest of many Muslims after the Malatya Incident and the special treatment of Yalman by the Government, which sent doctors to Malatya in private planes to treat him. Legal action was taken against Çalışır because of this speech.[69]

Besides trying to silence anti-Kemalist elements within the party, Menderes also wanted to warn the Islamist circles outside of his party. He spoke about the necessity to protect liberties from fanaticism in a speech in the city of Antep. He said that no one could claim monopoly over nationalism. Referring to March 31 Incident, he stated that recent Islamic publications had a destructive role just as they had during the days preceding this mutiny instigated by Islamist publications in 1908. He accused the writers of these publications of keeping silent during the times when the freedom of conscience was under oppression and threat, and of abusing the atmosphere of liberty and democracy created by his party.[70] In other words, the experience of the Malatya Incident made Menderes accept the danger of the "abuse of freedom" and even made him invoke the memory of March 31 in order to defy the political use of Islam.

The Society of Nationalists was one of the political organizations that the Menderes Government perceived as a hotbed of *irtica*. In his speech in Antep, Menderes quoted from an article published in the periodical

Serdengeçti, written by its owner Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, who was also a member of the Society of Nationalists, as an example of divisive literature (Darendelioğlu 1975: 282). Said Bilgiç, the president of the Society of Nationalists, who was at the time also the deputy for the DP from Isparta, had to give a press conference in Istanbul in order to deny the accusations concerning the alleged links between his organization and the circle of *Büyük Doğu*.[71] However, the public prosecutor of Ankara sued the Society of Nationalists for violating the Law of Associations (Article 33, which banned associations based on principles of race and religion). All branches of the Society were closed down on 22 January 1953.[72] Moreover, two deputies of the DP from Isparta, Said Bilgiç and Tahsin Tola (member of the board of the Society of Nationalists), were ousted from the Party by a decision taken by the Party's disciplinary committee.[73]

The Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*), the third largest party in 1953, was another organization blamed by both the opposition and the Government for promoting *irtica* (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 39–40). The party was even abandoned by its founder, Hikmet Bayur, because an Islamist tendency had gradually begun to dominate the party. However, the Nation Party had actually been a serious adversary to the DP because it appealed to the same supporters. The party was eventually accused of being based on religious principles and hiding its real goals. The Ankara prosecutor (*Ankara Cumhuriyet Savcısı*) began investigating the party and its members after the party's 4th General Congress in June 1953 where "a mentality against reformism (*inkılâpçılık*), secularism and republicanism had been dominant".[74] From 26 June 1953 onwards, 19 members of the party were tried and were finally acquitted or sentenced to one day's imprisonment. The party, whose activities were stopped in October 1953, was closed down in January 1954 just before the general elections, on the basis of the 526th article of the Penal Code and the Law of Associations, which banned associations based on principles of religion, *mezhep* (Islamic school) and *tarikat*.[75]

Another move made by the DP Government to fight *irtica* was Law no. 6187, *Vicdan ve Toplanma Hürriyetinin Koruması Kanunu* (the Law for Protecting the Freedom of Conscience and of Gathering), which was passed by the Grand National Assembly on 23 July 1953. This legislation introduced further penalties for the abuse of religion by individuals and associations to obtain political and personal benefits (Tarhanlı 1993: 28).[76]

Conservative nationalists were disappointed by the shift in the DP's discourse on *irtica* (Üzmez 1999: 223–4). The need to limit the freedom of conscience was defended now not only by the RPP but also by the DP Government. In one sense, the happy period for conservative nationalism following the elections of 1950 had come to an end with the Malatya Incident (Sunar and Sayarı 1986: 172; Rustow 1966). The opposition's

accusations of tolerating *irtica* and the calls of civil Kemalist activism for fighting it apparently led the governing party to endeavor to prove its commitment to Kemalist secularism. It did so by either purging radical Islamic elements from the Party or by supporting the closure of organizations such as the Society of Nationalists or the Nation Party which appealed to Islamic values more than the DP did. Thus, the specter of *irtica* haunted not only the RPP or the Kemalist intellectuals laying claim to protect secularism via their civil activism, but also the DP.

As the following section suggests, this specter of *irtica* was not only risen by the publications of conservative nationalist intellectuals or by the news of the local branches of the DP expressing their will to revoke Kemalist reforms, but found further nourishment in the anxiety sparked by rural–urban migration flows. The urban educated elite – to which the politicians and intellectuals concerned about *irtica* belonged – were anxious about the resulting increased visibility of traditional Islam in the city centers, which were supposed to be the proof of Turkey's modernity.

İrtica as a threat in everyday life

The notion of *irtica*, central to Kemalist secularism, was often articulated through the epithets of *mürteci*, *gerici* or *yobaz* (bigot). The reactionary was portrayed as a dangerous provocateur of innocent Muslims in the name of "wrong" Islam, as opposed to the "true" Islam which had to be limited to the individuals' private lives. Below is a typical representation of the "bigot" or *yobaz* by Jale Candan, the writer of the Women's Pages in the weekly magazine *Akis*:

> The word "bigot" reminds us of the horrific picture of someone with treacherous looks, having a face as dark as his ideas. … What he wants is to once again darken women's lives and to imprison them in a cage. … [T]he bigot thinks of himself as an idealist, thinks that he serves religion and he is often the victim of an understanding of religion which is often expressed as enmity towards the civil code. According to the bigot, religion consists mainly of forms. … We all know that religion is above all morals, virtue and internal beauty.[77]

What was also typical here the opposition of the ideal Islam understood as "all morals, virtue and internal beauty" against the Islam of the bigot.

The visual depiction of fanatics in the cartoons of the time as ugly, dark-faced, bearded men with prayer beads or as women veiled in *çarşaf*, a baggy outer garment, complemented such narratives. The photographs of women with *çarşaf* and peasant men with their baggy trousers (*şalvar*) walking in the city centers were published in periodicals or dailies as the alarming proofs of rising fanaticism. Such verbal and visual images were in fact expressions of

the urban elite's trauma caused by the increasing visibility of traditional symbols of Islam in the big city centers. Especially disturbing for the urban elite were women with *çarşaf* in modern cities. The fight with the *çarşaf* was conceived as a very important duty of female citizens.[78] Nazlı Tlabar, for instance, a female deputy for the DP, actively campaigned against the *çarşaf* (Aktaş 1989: 219–23), which she saw as "the symbol of dark ignorance, having nothing to do with religion" but which made it necessary to "first save our big cities from this backward scenery."[79] The appearance of women with the *çarşaf* in the cities was seen as contradictory to the image of the new Turkish woman as the marker of the nation's modernity (Göle 1996; Durakbaşa 1998). Women wearing the *çarşaf* were perceived as a haunting past, distant from the present. Moreover, they were also excluded from what was considered to be truly Islamic:

> Yet, the nuisance of the *çarşaf* in our country is one of the superstitions which are peculiar to primitive societies and dominate individuals' ideas. … it is clear that there is no place for the *çarşaf* in pure Islamic belief.[80]

These lines demonstrate how a fantasy about an Islam untainted by "superstition" was still influential in the 1950s. Kemalist secularism was still dedicated to cleansing Islam from such symbols of "backwardness" in order to replace *irtica* with "pure Islamic belief".

The gap between reality and the Kemalist ideal however was huge and extremely disappointing for the already westernized urban elite. Thus, Kemalist intellectuals, such as the writers of the magazine *Akis*, were not in peace with the democratic notion of "national will", because those who were supposed to represent it were far from the Kemalist ideal:

> Ankara is a city of idleness, disarray, untidiness, sauciness. … Women with the *çarşaf*, peasants on donkeys, and men with traditional trousers are all tolerated as they represent "the national will." In those beautiful public gardens, workers lie down and have their siesta. … Bigots have transformed Ankara into an open air mosque… Poor Ankara! Poor Ankara![81]

Such a lament for modern Ankara, the new capital of the secular Republic, was the response of the urban middle and upper-middle classes to the new city dwellers who were migrating in masses from villages to cities in the 1950s. In the 1930s and 1940s, local people of Ankara and peasants were not allowed to hang around in the new city center. The republican elite had imposed its civilized taste and consumption habits onto the people and had excluded those who did not fit these standards (Şenol Cantek 2003: 223, 252). This changed, however, in the 1950s; Ankara became a city of immigrants as well as of the westernized elite. The urban elite, having "the

mastery of 'Westernized' ways of life" (Göle 1997: 52), felt disappointed and even betrayed when they faced the gap between the Kemalist ideal of civilization and the reality of the people. Their discourse on *irtica* reflected what Ahıska called "the Occidentalist fantasy [which] evoked a 'lack' in 'the people' upon which it organized the 'desire' to fill it" (Ahıska 2003: 364–5).

Furthermore, besides this antipathy against the symbols of traditional Islam, which they framed as "*irtica*", many secularist intellectuals of the 1950s idealized a "true" Islam which did not threaten their way of life.[82] As Lindisfarne contends, they in fact constructed their own secular Muslim identities on the basis of a specific discourse on Islam which opposed their own "harmless" Islam to the Islam of obscurantists. They described their beliefs and practices as personal and private, and thus as fundamentally different from those of Islamists. This discourse demonized all forms of Islamic practice not officially organized or controlled by the state and looked at them as incomprehensible and threatening (Lindisfarne 2002: 71–3).

The Kemalist paranoia about the manifestations of religiosity was also a mixture of a demeaning attitude towards the lower classes and an inferiority complex regarding the West (Mert 1998: 72). As Mert maintains, the dimension of social class is the inevitable result of the fact that cultural westernization in Turkey was experienced as, and/or associated with, an upward mobility. In the eyes of the masses, the symbols of western culture were those of the privileged elite, while the unprivileged became the cause of disgrace vis-à-vis the idealized West (Ibid.: 14–15). Göle, too, has shown how in Kemalist modernization, conformity to the civilized way of life became the requirement for social status and prestige (1996: 65). The urban upper classes, who were faced with the reality that the lower classes are not so easy to enlighten and transform, began to perceive the latter as a threat. As İsmail Cem wrote in 1970, the labeling of the defenders of the symbols of westernization as progressivist (*ilerici*) and of those who are against them as reactionary (*gerici*) created a barren and artificial duality in the 1950s, which veiled the real socio-economic contradictions of westernization (1971: 307, 319). Thus, the urban elite's discourse on *irtica* was hiding the main clash between lower and upper classes. The paranoia of *irtica* prevented Kemalist secularists from coming to terms not only with this socio-economic problem but also with the sociological reality of religion (Mert 1999: 207–14). It led instead to a support for authoritarian measures to eradicate the threat.

The Kemalist ideal of modernization was a total program of social and cultural westernization, which also entailed democratization. Nevertheless, in order to prevent that traditional Islamic beliefs hinder the national ideal of westernization, the Jacobin despotism of the single-party period was seen as a necessary measure. Göle called this "the potential conflict of interest between democracy and secularism" (1997: 48). The Kemalist tradition of

sacrificing the ideal of democracy for the sake of "enlightenment of the ignorant masses" was combined with the fear that the latter would be manipulated by fanatical Islam. This elitist fear led, however, to a further politicization of Islam (Toprak 1981: 123).

The Malatya Incident was experienced as the first violent reactionary incident of the multi-party period. Its immediate effect was the crystallization of the fear of *irtica,* which in turn accelerated the emergence of a civil Kemalist secularist movement in the early 1950s. Students, journalists and intellectuals, who were either faithful to the RPP or supporters of the DP, defended Kemalist secularism vis-à-vis the *irtica* allegedly instigated by conservative nationalism. These Kemalist intellectuals, who saw themselves as guardians of the secular regime, resorted to a politics of memory by assuming a direct parallel between the protagonists of the Malatya Incident and those of March 31 and Menemen. They depicted conservative nationalist intellectuals of the 1950s as the heir of old reactionaries. This time, however, reactionaries and their intellectual leaders – i.e. conservative nationalist writers who allegedly influenced them – were perceived by Kemalists as agents and tools of the Soviet Union, aiming to create anarchy and export communism.

Kemalist civil activism aimed to mobilize secularist support and to prevent the DP Government from tolerating *irtica* provoked by conservative nationalist intellectuals. Violence in the name of Islam, as in the case of the Malatya Incident, and attacks against the symbols of secularism, such as vandalism against the busts of Atatürk during the early 1950s, contributed to the regeneration of the fear of *irtica* and a sense of victimhood on the part of Kemalist intellectuals. The anxiety of the Kemalist elite was further linked to the general context of migration from villages to the cities, which exposed the huge gap between the life-styles of new migrants and the Kemalist ideal of the westernized, secular citizen.

What Kemalists however perceived as even more threatening than violent reactionary events or the "invasion" of cities by migrants with traditional dress was an alleged long-term and gradual penetration of *irtica* into the state apparatus. The following chapter is about the fabrication of fear of this "creeping" *irtica* as symbolized by the *Nurcu* activity during and subsequent to the 1950s.

5

Reactionary Islam as Creeping Threat: Said Nursî and his Disciples (1959–60)

The fear of creeping *irtica* appears similar to the fear of an approaching iceberg. The outbreak of violent reactionary events was seen as only the tip of the iceberg – the visible part of what was below the surface, namely, the increasing influence of Islamic networks within society and the state. The *Ticani* order, for example, which led attacks against the busts of Atatürk, was pacified with the arrest of its leader Kemal Pilavoğlu. There was, however, yet another movement which was also suspected to be one of the anti-Kemalist currents seen as ultimately responsible for the Malatya Incident; this was the *Nurcu* movement of Said Nursî. The followers of Said Nursî (*Nurcu*s) became the main actors epitomizing *irtica* from the 1950s onwards. Although Said Nursî had been arrested after the Malatya Incident, he enjoyed relative freedom during the DP rule. This led to several polemics between the RPP and the DP leadership, the former accusing the latter of having organic links with the *Nurcu* movement. The debate Nursî caused between Menderes and İnönü and their respective supporters in the printed press reached its peak in the months before his death in Urfa in April 1960. This chapter analyzes the representations and perceptions of Said Nursî and *Nurculuk*, both in the press and the academic works of the period, with a special focus on the public debate on secularism triggered by the visits of Said Nursî to the cities of Ankara, Konya and Istanbul in December 1959 and January 1960. I aim to show through this analysis that Kemalist secularism was characterized not only by a fear of Islam-driven violence against the symbols of secularism, but by a more general anxiety about a creeping *irtica* allegedly aiming to gradually get hold of the state. Said Nursî's enlarging network of disciples were the source of this deeper fear in the late 1950s. The DP's links with the *Nurcu* circle and its tolerance for Said Nursî's travels in the country were framed by the pro-RPP Kemalist political and intellectual elite as a sign of crisis of secularism. Depictions and discussions

about Said Nursî in the printed press and protest activities against him, organized by civil Kemalist organizations and students, all condemned him as a relic of reactionary events in the past. The consequent polemic between the RPP and DP leaders, which centered around the figure of Said Nursî, highlighted once more the difference between the secularist discourses of the respective party leaders (and their supporters). What follows first is a short exposition of Said Nursî's life, his movement and his relationship with the DP, which will provide the background against which the debate in question is examined.

Said Nursî, the *Nurcu* movement and the DP in the 1950s

Although the *Nurcu* movement did not have a *tarikat* structure, the disciples of Nur (*Nur talebeleri*), as they called themselves, formed a network dispersed all over the country. According to a claim made by a public prosecutor in Afyon, their number had reached 600,000, a figure probably deliberately exaggerated to serve as a warning of the increasing influence of Said Nursî. A new generation of young students was organizing the printing and publishing of Said Nursî's writings in Ankara, Istanbul, and other centers. Some of them became his voluntary assistants in his daily life. As a result of their involvement with the movement, some of the students also served terms in Afyon Prison. This generation was to form the nucleus of the *Nurcu* movement in the following decades (Vahide 1999). The Nur disciples made themselves known through letters or messages addressed to politicians or to the press.

As the popularity of Said Nursî and the visibility of *Nurcu*s increased in the 1950s, *Nurculuk* began to be an important theme in discussions of secularism. Throughout the 1950s, Said Nursî and his disciples were occasionally pointed out by the media as the proof of the existence of reactionary Islam. Several journalistic reports represented Said Nursî as a dark figure, a relic of the past and a threat to the secular regime. The question of who he really was remained unanswered.[1] Below is thus a short account of his life as well as an evaluation of his movement and political influence.[2]

Said Nursî was born in 1873 in the village of Nurs, in the province of Bitlis in eastern Anatolia, from where he took his name. He was under the tutelage of different Naqshbandi *ulema* in the Kurdish region and at an early age he earned a reputation as a knowledgeable religious scholar. He went to Istanbul in 1907 with a plan to establish a university (*Medresetü'z-Zehra*) in Urfa and to ask permission from the Sultan for this. He supported the constitutional movement of July 1908 while in Istanbul, but later lost confidence in the Society of Union and Progress because of its anti-religious policies. He was actively involved in Islamic and Kurdish circles and

associations in Istanbul during the Second Constitutional period and was known as Said Kürdî (Kurdish Said) (van Bruinessen 2003: 383). This name was replaced with Said Nursî in later periods to de-emphasize the Kurdish background. However, those who wanted to stress his Kurdish background kept on using the former name.

In Istanbul Said also published articles in *Volkan*, the journal of the Muhammedan Union group led by Derviş Vahdetî, who was to be accused of leading the March 31 uprising. Said Nursî was brought to trial along with other members of the *İttihad-ı Muhammedî*, but the court found him innocent and he was acquitted (Algar 1979: 316). In his biography, *Tarihçe-i Hayat* (first published in 1958), it was emphasized that he had no part in the insurrection and even urged the soldiers to abandon their mutiny. His insistence on disassociating himself from the latter was in response to Kemalist attempts to link him with this reactionary event.

Later, Said took an active part in the War of Independence, fighting and publishing nationalistic pamphlets. When he went to Ankara after the victory in November 1922, he delivered an address to the assembly in which he called on the deputies to adhere to Islam and to perfom their ritual prayers regularly. However, as he was not welcomed by Mustafa Kemal, he left Ankara disappointed after a stay of eight months (Nursî 2006: 81–103).

Said Nursî spent much of his subsequent life in prison or in various places of enforced residence in Turkey. Although he had no clear connection with the Kurdish Revolt of 1925, he was exiled from Van to Burdur in Western Anatolia (van Bruinessen 2003: 383). There he wrote his first work, *Nurun İlk Kapıları* (The First Doors of Light). Later, he moved to Barla and began to write his main work, *Risale-i Nur* (Message of Light). Although his writings were banned by the Kemalist regime, Said Nursî maintained his reputation as a religious leader. He began to attract a group of followers who copied his writings by hand and distributed them all over Anatolia. His writings began to be mechanically reproduced in Isparta and İnebolu in 1946, using the first imported copiers in Turkey (Risale-i Nur Enstitüsü 2000: 206). The copies of his writings, which were illegally written in Arabic script, were distributed secretly all over the country. The sections of the *Risale-i Nur* were copied and read in Arabic script until Said Nursî eventually permitted their printing in Latin script in 1956. This underground circulation of Said's writings also led to a sense of solidarity and attachment among his followers. Hence the *Nurcu*s emerged from the beginning as a text-based movement, i.e. a movement centered on Said Nursî's writings (Yavuz 2003: 151).

The success of Said Nursî in reaching the people has so far only been explored by a few scholars. According to Mardin, Said Nursî filled a gap left by the Republican regime which neglected the importance of religion in the everyday life of the people. He provided his followers with a map that

directed them in their daily lives by reviving a religious idiom (Mardin 1989: 227). The *Risale-i Nur*, which consisted mainly of Said Nursî's commentaries on and interpretations of the Koran, became a book through which the Book – the Koran – could be understood (Ibid.: 228). The reason why Said Nursî's message reached increasing numbers of people was probably the very combination of the allegorical narrative style with commentaries trying to explain the novelties of the modern age and technological inventions such as radio, electricity etc. on the basis of the Koran (Algar 1979: 326–7). As Mardin argues, the *Nurcu* movement was a faith-based movement which attempted to bridge the gap between the past and the present, shaped by the new age of industrial civilization and its base of rationalist philosophy (Mardin 1992: 12–16).

Furthermore, Yavuz argues that Said Nursî offered a conceptual framework for a people undergoing a transformation from a confessional community (*Gemeinschaft*) to a secular national society (*Gesellschaft*) (Yavuz 2003: 151). Said Nursî's struggle in his early years to create an alternative religious community, linked to the household and formed through face-to-face relationships, was the key to his success (Ibid.: 155). It was in these "textual communities" that Said Nursî spread his own version of science, which, unlike positivism, reconciled faith and science and approached scientific discoveries as the realizations of revelations found in the Koran (Ibid.: 159–60, 163–4).

The increasing influence of Said Nursî did not go unnoticed by the Republican government, which wanted to keep religious activity in the country under its own control. Said Nursî was brought to trial in Eskişehir in 1934 and accused of establishing a secret religious society that aimed to subvert the foundations of the Republic. When he was tried in Eskişehir, 120 people who had been found in possession of his writings were tried along with him. He and 15 others were sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Said Nursî took up residence in Kastamonu after his release. He was brought to trial again in 1943, in Denizli, charged with forming a secret society against the regime. This time, however, a committee of professors of law at Ankara University concluded that *Risale-i Nur* was a purely religious work containing nothing against the law. Thus, on 16 June 1944, Said Nursî and his followers were proclaimed innocent and released. However, he was forced to reside in Emirdağ near Afyon. Said Nursî and 15 of his associates were again arrested on 17 January 1948 and brought to trial for the third time, now in Afyon. This time, he was sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment. Yet, the Supreme Court decided to acquit him on 20 September 1949. After three months of police supervision in Afyon, he returned to Emirdağ on 28 December.

Despite repression by the state, the systematic copying and distribution of his writings continued in different cities of Anatolia, and later in the 1950s also among university students in Ankara and Istanbul (Algar 1979: 322). This movement did not take the form of an organized political party and never took on the formal organizational structures of a Sufi order. Instead, it was a "faith movement" that involved publishing organizations and groups of people inspired by Said Nursî's writings (Mardin 1995: 256). In that sense, as stated earlier, it was the first and unique text-based Islamic movement in Turkey (Yavuz 1999: 643).

Throughout the 1950s, Said Nursî supported the DP as opposed to the RPP, as he considered Menderes' "respect for Islam" a bulwark against atheism and moral decay. Nevertheless, the end of RPP rule did not put an end to judicial control of his movement. Like the *Ticani*s, Said Nursî and his followers too were severely dealt with in the 1950s (Dâver 1967: 59). During the 1950s, the number of arrests and charges also increased in parallel with the increase in the number of his followers. During the rule of the DP, 37 cases were brought against the *Risale-i Nur* and its readers, which nevertheless ended with acquittal in each of the cases. For instance, in 1951, Said Nursî was brought to trial for breaking the Law of Dress Code (Nursî 2006: 828–9). He was again arrested and tried in Istanbul in 1952, because of the publication and distribution of a section of the *Risale-i Nur* entitled *Gençlik Rehberi* (A Guide for Youth) by some students at Istanbul University. He was acquitted and again took up residence in Emirdağ.[3] In December 1952, just after the assassination attempt against Ahmet Emin Yalman, he was tried in Samsun because of an article in a magazine (Nursî 2006: 824–5).[4] Accused of forming an illegal organization against the secularist regime, Said Nursî and his followers were eventually released in all cases, mostly on the basis of expert reports of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) which found no legal ground for such charges.

However, despite the continuing judicial control of the *Nurcu*s, the atmosphere in the 1950s can be considered as relatively free compared to the earlier period. The circulation of the *Risale-i Nur* rose significantly in the 1950s leading to a further growth of the *Nurcu* movement. The movement gained new momentum, especially after the printing of the *Risale-i Nur* in book format in 1956. Said Nursî and some of his disciples explained the support they gave to the DP as the result of the latter's tolerant attitude towards their publishing activities (Nursî 2004: 188). There were even disciples of Said Nursî among the members and the deputies of the DP, such as Tahsin Tola, the Isparta deputy for the DP in 1950–7 (Mardin 1989: 98). Besides Tola, some other members of the Democratic Party also had close contacts with Said Nursî.[5]

Until 1956, the *Risale-i Nur* was reproduced by hand and informally circulated in the form of leaflets. Some weeklies, such as Eşref Edip's *Sebilürreşad* and Sinan Omur's *Hür Adam*, also published excerpts from it. Its publication in book format from 1956 onwards was made possible due to an initiative of Tahsin Tola. According to Tola himself, Said Nursî had assigned him the task of requesting from Adnan Menderes to facilitate the publication of the *Risale-i Nur*, and Menderes had immediately accepted his request (Şahiner 1980: 157–8). The paper necessary for printing was found with the help of the Government, despite the lack of paper in the market during the time (Şahiner 2001: 415).[6]

Said Nursî gave the DP his support, because he saw its rule as the only means of preventing the return to power of the RPP which, he thought, had "nurtured atheistic currents and caused moral and spiritual damage to society". The fact that the DP presented itself as respectful of Islam, and especially their first policy of lifting the ban on the Arabic *ezan*, were also sufficient reasons for Said Nursî to give his support to the DP. In turn, the RPP's neglect of religion was, according to Nursî, the main danger for the country because it would lead to "its invasion by communists" (Nursî 2004: 181). Hence, in his letters to the government, he advised the DP leaders to take measures that would "strengthen religion" (Ibid.: 182-83). He applauded the Government's decision to sign the Baghdad Pact with Iraq in 1955 and sent a letter of support to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, in which he emphasized the danger of racism (*ırkçılık*) as a divisive ideology and the importance of Muslim brotherhood (Vahide 1999; Şahiner 2001: 411–12; Nursî 2004: 195). In this way, he supported the Government's policy of going against the Soviet bloc by allying with Arab countries as a positive step away from anti-Arab Turkish nationalism which undermined the unity of Muslims.

The DP's attitude towards the *Nurcu* circle can be depicted as a cooperation with ups and downs, which characterized the party's general approach towards Islamic circles. The Malatya Incident in 1952 and the consequent media-led campaign against the threat of *irtica* had led the DP Government to take measures against more radical Islamic tendencies outside and within party ranks. The DP's cautious attitude concerning religion and secularism ended, however, in October 1956, when Adnan Menderes made his speech in Konya. This speech was the first sign of an increasing use of religious symbols, idioms and practices by the DP as part of its populist political discourse (Ayata 1996: 43–7; Ahmad 1988: 756). Menderes stated in Konya that secularism meant not only the separation of religion from the state, but also freedom of conscience:

> On the issue of the freedom of conscience: the Turkish nation is Muslim, and will remain Muslim. The inculcation of religion first in itself and in future

> generations and the instruction of the principles and rules of religion are indispensable conditions for it to remain forever Muslim.[7]

In this speech, Menderes' emphasis on freedom of conscience – referring to that of the "Muslim nation", understood as a homogeneous unit – aimed to legitimize the introduction of religion courses to secondary schools (*ortaokullar*). While these words led to the re-glorification of Menderes as "Muslim Prime Minister" by conservative nationalist intellectuals, the alleged "abuse of religion" for political purposes was a major issue for the opposition, especially after 1957. Among the DP Government policies, the broadcasting of programs on religion and recitals of the Koran on the state-owned radio during the month of *Ramazan* in 1958 were seen as proof of such a populist abuse of religion (Toker 1966: 55). The use of the state-owned radio for religious purposes was severely criticized by Kemalist intellectuals, although the radio, as we have seen in Chapter 2 on the Turkish *ezan*, was used for a similar purpose in the *Ramazan* of 1932 on the initiative of Atatürk himself.[8] Aydın Yalçın (1920–94) of the bimonthly journal *Forum* was one of the intellectuals who wrote against the radio broadcast of Koran. The journal criticized the Government for the broadcast as well as for other concessions to religion, such as increased expenses incurred for the building of mosques and colleges for preachers and prayer leaders (*imam-hatip okulları*).[9]

The general election of October 1957 was a turning point for the political competition between the opposition and the Government. The Government was continuously accused by the opposition of cooperating with reactionary forces in this period. The DP leaders were increasingly blamed for tolerating the *Nurcu* movement as part of their populist policies. There were rumors that the Government had provided Said Nursî with a car during the election campaign (Özek 1968: 189). This car was in fact bought not by Menderes, but by Said's own disciples. Nevertheless, it was true that Said Nursî supported the DP and encouraged his followers to vote for it; and the Democrats knew this (Şahiner 2001: 415–16).

According to DP deputy Celal Yardımcı, his party was not trying to support Said Nursî, but was simply respecting his belief, philosophy and freedom of thought (Şahiner 1977: 51–2). Nevertheless, from the perspective of the opposition, this was more than enough to contradict secularist principles. For example, Menderes' visit to Emirdağ, where he was allegedly welcomed by *Nurcu*s with green flags on 19 October 1958, was seen by the opposition as a sign of a *Nurcu*-DP alliance (Sencer 1968: 152; Tunaya 1960: 233; Çağatay 1972: 47; Özturanlı 1995: 61). The "green flag", which invoked the memory of the Kubilay Incident of 1930, symbolized the Islamic alternative to the red flag of the secular Republic and was perceived as an open repudiation of secularism. Thus, Menderes' cheerful welcome by

*Nurcu*s with such a symbol of Islamic revolt was seen as the proof of the Government's undermining of secularism.

Such accusations increased especially in the period following Menderes' miraculous survival of a plane accident in 17 February 1959. Subsequent to the accident, Menderes was welcomed exuberantly by supporters of the DP, who sacrificed thousands of sheep in the streets of Ankara and all over the country (Toker 1966: 148–9; Yalman 1970: 349; Eroğul 1990: 147). Menderes' visit to the Eyüp Sultan Tomb just after the accident signaled the beginning of a new era when visits to mosques and tombs became influential political propaganda tools. Even the *Vatan Cephesi Ocaklar*ı (Hearths of the Fatherland Front), which the DP began to organize in October 1958 to mobilize support of the masses for the party, were opened with prayers led by religious functionaries.[10] While Menderes was praised by conservative nationalist circles as Muslim Prime Minister, the opposition was getting more and more furious about this religious propaganda, which in their eyes encouraged reactionary fanatics.[11] The fight between the Government and the opposition over the political use of religion reached a climax when Said Nursî visited the cities of Isparta, Ankara, Konya and İstanbul in December 1959 and January 1960. The following section will analyze the public debate triggered by these visits.

The specter of *irtica*: December 1959–January 1960

In the 1950s, Said Nursî resided mainly in Emirdağ, Afyon. When he travelled in 1959 to the cities of Isparta, Ankara, Konya as well as to Istanbul, where he had lastly been in 1953,[12] he aroused the interest of the media. Newspapers immediately began to draw their readers' attention to these travels. Said Nursî visited Ankara on 2 December and Konya on 29 December. Later, on 30 December 1959, he made another visit to Ankara, where he was followed by the press, step-by-step. According to the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, Said Nursî had accepted visits from five deputies of the DP during his stay in a hotel in Ankara (Ibid.: 428). Tahsin Tola was one of them; he met with Said Nursî five times. According to the newspaper *Dünya*, Said Nursî had accepted visits from two DP deputies while he had refused to meet a RPP deputy.[13] Said Nursî himself explained that he visited Ankara to demand that the Ayasofya Mosque be re-opened to worship (Nursî 2004: 207).

Said Nursî arrived in Istanbul on 1 January 1960. A large number of journalists were still following him, trying to understand the reasons behind these trips. Journalists attempted to take pictures of Said Nursî or to interview him. Instead of interviews however, they were given speeches by his disciples who were accompanying him during his trips. Some reporters later described these speeches as "propagation" of *Nurculuk*.[14] Because his

companions were trying to prevent journalists taking pictures of him, Said Nursî was accused of pretending to be a prophet and of trying to create a myth around himself.[15] In fact, it was the extreme interest of the press which created or at least contributed to the creation of the myth of Said Nursî.

Said Nursî left Istanbul in the company of his followers on January 2.[16] He continued to travel under close surveillance of the press, going from Istanbul again to Ankara, where he gave his last lecture to his disciples (Şahiner 2001: 431–5; Risale-i Nur Enstitüsü 2000: 208; Nursî 2004: 213–18). Finally, on 6 January 1960, he went to Konya to visit his brother. While all these travels of Said Nursî were covered widely by the press, especially in opposition newspapers such as *Dünya*, the whole story was framed as a daring and scandalous revival of *irtica* in the person of Said Nursî and as a political scandal proving the tolerance shown by the government towards *irtica*. The consequent stigmatization of Said Nursî as a reactionary figure was paralleled and in fact fuelled further by a political polemic between Menderes and İnönü over the link between the DP and Said Nursî.

İnönü gave a speech in Bursa on 4 January 1960, accusing the DP of exploiting religion for political purposes. He claimed that the DP had already begun the election campaign by using Said Nursî as a propaganda tool. According to İnönü, the main reason for Said Nursî's visits to the big cities was to give support to Menderes, as he had done during the 1957 election campaign (Toker 1966: 205). Menderes strongly denied İnönü's claim that the Government had tasked Said Nursî with campaigning for the DP in the coming elections.[17]

İnönü, insisting on his claim, wanted the Prime Minister to explain his party's relationship with Said Nursî.[18] İnönü's strongest proof of the connection between the DP and Said Nursî was a letter sent by the latter to the governors of the eastern Anatolian cities. In this letter, addressed to the deputies of the DP, Nursî had stated that "communism was prevented in the eastern provinces of Turkey thanks to his works which were read by his 60,000 disciples". He also demanded the free circulation of his *Risale-i Nur*, which according to him contributed to the fight against communism and Freemasonry. He added that he trusted the help of Muslim Democrats on this issue, especially of Adnan Menderes, Tevfik İleri (Minister of Education) and Namık Gedik (Minister of Internal Affairs).[19]

Menderes did not give any explanation concerning this letter but stated that "the Democratic Party did not need the 93-year-old man's *Risale-i Nur* in order to get the people's vote of confidence".[20] While he rejected the association of Said Nursî with the DP, he defended his Government's non-interference with Said Nursî's visits by stating that everybody's freedom of travel was guaranteed by the Constitution. He had in fact repeated the words of the City Governor of Istanbul, Ethem Yetkiner, who had also referred to

the Constitution when the opposition had complained about the tolerance of the police forces towards Said Nursî in Istanbul. Yetkiner had made a statement to the press saying that it would be illegal to prevent Said Nursî's freedom of travel, that his activities were under the strict surveillance of the police force, and that necessary measures would have been taken if he had done anything against the law.[21]

According to the opposition, the Government protected Said Nursî under the pretext of freedom of travel. According to Falih Rıfkı Atay, for instance, the Government tolerated the followers of Said Nursî because it saw them as an important pool of votes.[22] Similarly, Bedii Faik of the same newspaper (*Dünya*) stated that "Said-i Kürdî" suited the interests of the Government and expressed his doubts about the Governor's belief in freedoms, given the prohibition of hundreds of meetings organized by the opposition and the youth.[23] The bimonthly journal *Forum* also disagreed with the Governor's claim that Said Nursî had simply used his freedom of travel.[24] According to the Editor of the journal (Aydın Yalçın), Said Nursî was not supposed to have that freedom as the leader of an organization which made religious propaganda and which had unknown purposes. Yalçın pointed out that it was inconsistent to leave Said Nursî free while many of his followers were being arrested and tried in the courts.

In those days, *Nurcu*s were in fact arrested in many parts of the country for publicly reading parts of the *Risale-i Nur*. For instance, in Konya, three *Nurcu*s were seized while reading from the pamphlets entitled "*Sözler*" (The Words) to the mosque congregation following the Friday prayers. One of them was kept under arrest for holding a letter with the signature *Kargı Nur Talebeleri* (Disciples of Nur in Kargı – a district of Çorum province).[25] In Diyarbakır, there were quarrels between the *Nurcu*s who wanted to read the *Risale-i Nur* in the mosque and those who tried to prevent them.[26] Meanwhile, a court case was opened against the former DP deputy Tahsin Tola as well as against two other *Nurcu* disciples, Sait Özdemir and Mustafa Sungur, who published the biography of Said Nursî.[27]

Nevertheless, the DP leadership avoided depicting the travels of Said Nursî as the revival of *irtica* and of *Nurculuk* as an illegal activity, although the steps they took had conflicting implications. On the one hand, the DP did not want to frame the *Nurcu* group as a reactionary formation. For instance, the DP deputy for Konya, Fahri Ağaoğlu, talked about the situation of *Nurcu*s during a press conference in Konya and argued that the Penal Code did not mention any crime named *Nurculuk*.[28] On the other hand, the leader of the DP, Menderes, was also careful to not be seen as openly supporting Said Nursî. Thus, he dismissed the party's local administrative committee in Emirdağ, which had sent messages to the party center and to its different branches indicating its support for reactionary activities in general.[29] Later,

the Government suggested to Said Nursî that he should stop his travels and stay in Emirdağ.[30] On 11 January 1960, when he left Isparta for Ankara, the police prevented him from entering the city (Şahiner 2001: 429). Hence Said Nursî had to cancel his trip.

On 18 January a letter written by Said Nursî was published in the newspapers. In this letter, he affirmed that, as he had been away from politics for the last 40 years, his visits had no political purpose.[31] He explained his trips as the result of many invitations he had received from people who read his works all over the country. However, although he was invited to 20 different cities, he could go only to Konya, Ankara and Istanbul where the *Risale-i Nur* was published. He also wrote that his *Risale-i Nur*, as a commentary on the Koran, was preventing destructive and anarchist currents and hence was in the service of the fatherland, the nation and the public order. He asked the Government for permission to be able to reside partially in Isparta, where he had an apartment, as well as in Emirdağ.

Said Nursî was on the front pages of newspapers throughout this process. He was portrayed as a mysterious (*esrarengiz*), oddly dressed (*acip kılıklı*) old man, his unusual outfit of traditional Kurdish clothing (*şal û şapik and koloz*) being a major attraction.[32] Falih Rıfkı Atay, the editor of *Dünya*, found Said Nursî's clothes to be "more backward than those of the sheikhs of Yemen".[33] These clothes were seen as a statement against the secular dress code. Although, with the exception of Said Nursî himself, none of the *Nurcu*s wore traditional outfit or clothes which were against the law (*Kıyafet Kanunu*), they were depicted in cartoons as stereotypical reactionaries with baggy trousers and long black beards with spider webs around them.[34]

Said Nursî was represented in the media as an awkward old figure with a dark past and as a reincarnation of the specter of *irtica* which had its roots in the March 31 Incident. In most of the news, the fact that he had written articles in the journal *Volkan*, which was behind the March 31 uprising, was treated as a proof of his being involved in this insurgence in 1909, without any mentioning of his acquittal by the Court.[35] Falih Rıfkı Atay, reminding the readers that Said had been writing in *Volkan* under the penname of "Said-i Kürdî" on the eve of March 31, stated that Said Nursî had "a mentality which was backward even for the Turkey of fifty years ago".[36] Bedii Faik, in the same newspaper, claimed that Said-i Kürdî, since his activities during March 31, "had never been as audacious and respected". He protested against the DP for respecting this person who was associated with reactionary movements against the regime. Bedii Faik, besides linking Said Nursî with March 31, also claimed that "those who had severed the head of Kubilay had showed their respect only to Said Nursî during the Menemen Incident in 1930".[37] In brief, the figure of Said Nursî was for these writers an eponym for Islamic reactionism.

Figure 11. Said Nursî and his disciples in Ankara in front of the hotel where they were hosted in 1959.

Source: Nursî (2006: 844).

The association of Said Nursî with earlier reactionary events was repeated by student organizations which protested against the latest travels of Said Nursî. The president of the Turkish National Student Union (*Millî Türk Talebe Birliği*), for instance, which was at the time a Kemalist youth organization, stated during a press conference that Said Nursî, who was earlier involved in the uprising of March 31, should give up acting against the unity of the nation.[38] The Union decided to organize a mass meeting to protest against the latest reactionary movements.[39] However, the City Governor did not give permission for the meeting and announced that he would prevent action taken without permission. The students then held a spontaneous demonstration in front of the Atatürk Monument on the Istanbul University campus, despite the ban proclaimed by the Governor, but were dispersed later by the police.[40]

In Izmir as well, university students condemned the latest reactionary movements against the [Kemalist] Revolution.[41] The Student Union of the Aegean University in İzmir declared its sorrow about recent reactionary events and the readiness of its members to sacrifice their lives to protect the revolution, just as Kubilay had done in 1930.[42] The students' request for permission to place a wreath on the monument to Kubilay in Menemen was rejected by the Governor of İzmir. However, youth organizations still took an oath to fight against obscurantism (*gericilikle savaşmaya ant içtiler*) in front of the Kubilay Monument.[43]

In a nutshell, the portrayal of Said Nursî in the mainstream press as well as the protests of civil Kemalist organizations against him showed how Kemalist secularism was regenerating the fear of *irtica* by associating Said Nursî with the reactionaries of the past. Once more, the past was in the service of generating a specific psychological reflex – fear – in view of the "bad" Muslim in the present. What was different in this case was the absence of violence in the present. As the embodiment of *irtica*, Said Nursî was not the leader of a violent uprising but of a group of followers who read his Koran commentaries, which allegedly contained anti-secularist propaganda. Hence the fear he caused was a fear of creeping *irtica*, infiltrating the state cadres and violent only in the long run.

The public debate on the danger of Said Nursî continued. University professors were also involved in the debate. Thus, Prof. Yavuz Abadan pointed to the irrationality of Said Nursî's writings and of those who read them. Prof. Dr. Bahri Savcı, on the other hand, complained about abuse of the extreme conservative inclination in the country, which was turning into a reactionary movement against Atatürk and the West.[44] Similarly, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, an associate professor of law and Chairman of the *Devrim Ocağı* (Hearth of Revolution) in Ankara, wrote in the magazine *Akis* that the Turkish Revolution was not against the people but against those superstitious forces, like the ideas of Said Nursî, which kept the people backward.[45]

Said Nursî's trips made headlines also in the pro-Government press. Short biographies were published in the newspapers as well as explanations on the meaning of *Nurculuk*,[46] where his Kurdish and Naqshbandi background was emphasized. Newspaper articles referred to him as Said-i Kürdî, or, like the weekly *Akis*, as *Kürt* Said (Kurdish Said).[47] He was also referred to as *Nurcubaşı*, as the leader of *Nurcu*s, mostly represented as members of an illegal Sufi order (*tarikat*). Even when it was accepted that the *Nurcu* group did not constitute a Sufi order, it was seen as a divisive formation.[48]

Among the daily newspapers, only *Havadis* resisted this campaign against Said Nursî and the depiction of *Nurcu*s as fanatical reactionaries. Unlike the opposition press, it supported the Governor's decision not to give

permission to the mass meeting which was organized by the student unions in Istanbul.[49] Peyami Safa, in *Tercüman*, was also on the side of the Government and argued that the noise which was created around a 93-year-old, sick man like Said Nursî was not only a political maneuver planned to overshadow the successful performance of the government, but also a typical example of the abuse of religion for political purposes.[50] Negative depictions of Said Nursî in the opposition press were also severely criticized in the weekly journals *Hilâl* and *Sebilürreşad*. The former especially attempted to counter the arguments that Said Nursî was a Kurdish nationalist or that he had taken part in the uprising of March 31. The journal referred to him as "Said-i Türkî" and portrayed him as "a Turk whose heart was full of love for the Turkish nation."[51] The magazine's insistence on the Turkishness of Said Nursî aimed to counter the Kemalist attempt to exclude him from the national norm by stressing his Kurdish background. In fact, from the 1950s onwards, the more the *Nurcu* movement gained popularity and increased its public activities, the less its leader's Kurdishness was emphasized (Alakom 1998: 318; Özgen 2003).[52] To sum up, Said Nursî's past was politically manipulated and used by both his opponents and supporters. While Kemalists epitomized him as the symbol of Islamic fanaticism and as a Kurd, i.e. a threat to national unity, conservative nationalists depicted him both as an ideal Muslim and a true Turk. The contestation over the concept of *irtica* was in fact reinforcing an exclusionary ethnic nationalism on both sides.

The Kemalist campaign against *irtica* targeting Said Nursî and his disciples resulted also in a polemic between the leaders of the governing DP and the opposition RPP, in which they expressed their respective understandings of secularism (see Chapter 3). The following section examines this crystallization of different secularist discourses.

Secularism for or against Said Nursî

The public debate on Said Nursî in December 1959 and January 1960 was to a great extent fuelled by the opposition party, RPP. The latter decided during a party assembly in the spring of 1958 to insist more strongly than before on the increasing danger of *irtica* and on the need to take measures against the *Nurcu* movement as an alleged instance of *irtica* (Toker 1966: 61). Some party members in the assembly opposed this decision, arguing that increasing party propaganda against *irtica* was not politically correct and that the party would be accused of hostility towards religion (Ibid.). These members were persuaded by İnönü and others with the argument that *Nurculuk* was in fact contrary to religious beliefs of the Turkish nation and that *irtica* had nothing to do with true Islam (Ibid.). Thus, in their view, secularism had to be defended against so-called *irtica*, depicted this time as *Nurculuk*, in the name

of a true Turkish Islam. The polemic about Said Nursî led by İnönü and Menderes in January 1960 was a result of this party decision.

While Said Nursî's visits were being covered by the press in detail as the proof of the resurgence of *irtica*, the duel between Menderes and İnönü over Said Nursî also took the form of a polemic over the meaning of secularism. Their polemic was followed by the public via the press and the radio, the latter being used in fact only by Menderes. Menderes prepared his speeches with the help of the editor of the newspaper *Zafer*, Burhan Belge, and then read them on the radio. İnönü's replies to these speeches could be read in the newspapers of the following day (Toker 1966: 206, 210). This discussion about secularism was covered widely by the press, while being reported in detail by the journals such as *Forum* and *Sebilürreşad*, which supported opposite sides.[53] In other words, the polemic about the identity of Said Nursî and his past led to the crystallization of the basic difference between the two understandings of secularism: the RPP's Kemalist secularism, with its stress on the threat of *irtica*, versus the DP's alternative secularism which emphasized the freedom of conscience.

İnönü first blamed Menderes for using Said Nursî as a propaganda tool in the DP's campaign for the possible new elections. Later, during the speech he made in Bilecik, he said that Said Nursî, as an old politician, overtly supported the DP and opposed the RPP. He warned the DP Government of the dangers of exploiting religion, referring to the history of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century. The first example he gave was the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War under the guise of a holy war, which had led to the decline of the Empire. The second example was the Caliphate's fatwa against the nation during the Independence War, which almost led to the loss of the fatherland.[54] İnönü attempted to whip up emotions through these examples and position himself as an authentic national hero of the War of Independence (Harris 1970: 449). He argued that Said Nursî's past dated back to the Ottoman Empire when several attempts to use religion for political aims had caused catastrophic results that he himself had experienced personally. He wanted to alert Menderes in this way to Said Nursî's potential power to manipulate masses, which could easily target the republican regime. Said Nursî was in the eyes of İnönü, a ghost of the past, an extension of an unknown sphere of influence outside the reach of the state, but threatening the Republic unless it was suppressed for the sake of secularism.

Menderes reacted quickly and argued that İnönü was slandering the Democratic Party which had nothing to do with an old man like Said Nursî. He portrayed Said Nursî as a *pîri fâni*, a poor, old man who had been abused by the single-party-regime as if he were the representative of *irtica*.[55] He asked of İnönü that instead of spreading fear by reminding of some events

of the past, he should provide more solid proof for his claim that the Government exploited religion. In other words, Menderes talked about the past in a very different way from İnönü's. Firstly, instead of demonizing Said Nursî as a mysterious relic of the past, he framed him as a harmless old man. Secondly, rather than depicting the pre-Republican period as a dark past, he purposefully referred to the early Republican regime as a dark era, as a time of oppression. Hence, he argued that the speech given by İnönü in Bilecik reflected the mentality of the single-party regime before 1950, which divided the nation into progressive and backward citizens and legitimized the oppressive regime by associating the majority of the nation with *irtica*. This critique of the concept of *irtica* as a symptom of the RPP's elitism was a repetition of Menderes' stance on the issue before the Malatya Incident. He was even more assertive in his critique of the RPP's secularism. While stating that secularism had in fact been made into a tool of a tyrannical regime by the RPP, Menderes repeated his claim that secularism in Turkey was misunderstood and applied as if it meant hostility towards religion. He criticized the RPP for creating an artificial fear of *irtica*, which in fact, according to him, did not exist in Turkey. Finally he emphasized once more that the Democratic Party understood secularism as freedom of conscience:

> The domination of a single-party regime was sustained longer than necessary with the pretext of 'there is *irtica*' while secularism was made a tool of such a domination and oppression. Secularism is not even interventionist. It is the principle which eradicates oppression and prevents all kind of interferences in our consciences. That is why the Democratic Party accepted the freedom of conscience as the most essential principle during its founding period and made it one of the most important clauses of its program. [56]

İnönü in turn defended himself saying that complaining about the exploitation of religion did not mean complaining about the religiosity of the citizens. He also stated that the main thrust of the republican reforms was a trust in the progressiveness and greatness of the nation, and the will to protect it from those politicians who kept it from modern civilization by exploiting religion for their own benefits.[57]

The course of the polemic, although quite repetitive, had become very tense in the form of a partisan contest. It became even tenser when the editors of important newspapers joined in. For instance, the editors of two important opposition newspapers, Nadir Nadi and Falih Rıfkı Atay, sided with İnönü and criticized Menderes for misusing the concept of freedom of conscience and using it to favor the reactionaries and pursue his own political interests.[58] Similarly, Ahmet Emin Yalman accused Menderes of underestimating what Said Nursî represented. In his view, the issue was not about some travels of an old man who was a relic or keepsake of March 31

(*31 Mart'ın yadigârı*). The *Nurcu* movement, according to him, represented a danger to the nation because it was based on an underground network which had no legal status and which could potentially provide shelter for all kinds of destructive agents:

> The *Nurcu* movement has a character of a national trouble and danger, because it has developed and it has been spread in opposition to our laws and national interests and has become an underground force. *Nurcu*s do not deny that there is such a power. On the contrary, they are proud; they say "we are six hundred thousand persons;" and they send representatives and instigators to everywhere. … They do not hide that they look like an organized Sufi order. … Thus, we are facing an underground power which has its arms everywhere. This is such a power that it does not have any legal existence; it is unclear who are responsible for it. We should accept that the existence of an underground organization is an utmost danger and we should consider the possibility that all kinds of destructive agents can take shelter in this organization.[59]

To sum up, the different attitudes taken by the RPP and the DP towards Said Nursî reflected the deep-seated differences in their understanding of secularism. As shown in the previous chapters, the RPP's secularism was centered on the fear of Islamic fanaticism, while the DP's secularism stressed freedom of religion. The debates of late 1959 and early 1960 showed that the RPP refashioned the same discourse, this time by stressing Said Nursî as the epitome of the threat against secularism. Said Nursî's portrayal as a mysterious reactionary leader menacing the secular regime was crucial for regenerating fear of *irtica*. Menderes in turn not only rejected associating Said Nursî with Islamic fanaticism, but also used the opportunity to repeat his critique of the RPP's understanding of secularism. The polemic between the leaders and supporters of these two parties focused on the identity and the past of Said Nursî. Both groups manipulated the past either to prove Said Nursî's links with earlier reactionary events and his underground network in order to delegitimize him or to vindicate him as a poor old man and a real Turk. It was this politics of memory which shaped their different discourses of secularism.

The *Nurcu* movement in the 1960s

There was no more news about Said Nursî in the press after January 1960, until the military coup of 27 May, except in the days following his death on 23 March 1960 in Urfa. The issue of *Nurculuk* and secularism appeared forgotten, although it was an issue which had caused a clear clash between the Government and the opposition.

The sequence of events which prepared the coup was mainly centered on the Government's increasing anti-democratic measures against the opposition.[60] The political tension reached a climax on 18 April 1960, when

the DP Government established a commission of investigation (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) to investigate the RPP's activities and its connections with the army. This commission was given extraordinary powers to check the opposition. The consequent mass demonstrations of university students in late April were followed by the announcement of martial law in Istanbul and Ankara. The Government's increased censorship of the opposition press and the partisan violence against İnönü during his visits to the cities of Western Anatolia had shocked not only the educated elite, but also the army which had sided with the opposition (Harris 1970: 450).[61]

Cemal Gürsel, the then Commanding General of Land Forces, had already sent a memorandum to the Minister of Defense, Ethem Menderes, on 3 May 1960, demanding the resignation of the President of the Republic and a change of government. While the long list of steps he wanted the government to take involved ending the "exploitation of religion" (Sağıroğlu et al. 1961: 65–6), the defense of secularism was not stated as one of the main reasons for the military coup (Demirci 1997: 147–62). The first announcements and the speeches of the military leaders contained no specific reference to secularism (Sağıroğlu et al. 1961: 103–6). On the day after the coup, the law professors' committee, which was given the task of drawing up a new constitution, issued a declaration justifying the intervention on the grounds that the DP Government had acted unconstitutionally (this referred mainly to the last law concerning the investigatory commission) (Zürcher 1997: 254). The National Union Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*), the group of military officers who ruled the country until 20 November 1961 under the leadership of Cemal Gürsel, announced (announcement no: 35) two months later, on 26 July 1960, that there would be no intervention in the religious beliefs and worship of citizens either by law or by force.[62] This declaration was made to assure the public that the new military government would not reintroduce the ban on the Arabic *ezan* as demanded by the members of the Turkish Linguistic Society.[63] Thus, the coup was not framed by its leaders as an intervention to restore Kemalist secularism of the single-party regime.

For the *Nurcu* movement, however, the military rule turned out to be a return to the period before 1950; many of them were frequently arrested.[64] Even before the announcement of the National Union Committee (NUC) in July 1960, approximately four months after the funeral ceremony of Said Nursî in Urfa, the coup leaders exhumed the remains of his body from his grave and buried him in secret in an unknown place in the mountains of Isparta, allegedly in response to his brother's request. In fact, this posthumous exile of Said Nursî was aimed at preventing his grave from becoming a place of pilgrimage for his followers (Rohat [Alakom] 1991: 83).[65] Athough the junta thus attempted to prevent the *Nurcu*s from

venerating their spiritual leader and transforming his grave into a holy center,[66] the expansion of *Nurcu* circles continued even after his death. This last operation against Said Nursî was followed by arrests of his followers in Ankara.[67]

Despite all official measures against the *Nurcu* movement, Said Nursî's writings became known to an ever broader public through the continuing activities of the *Nurcu* network and the Islamic press that sprang up in the 1960s.[68] *Nurcu*s had several periodicals[69] and in 1971 they began to publish a daily newspaper, *İttihad* (Union), which was later to be succeeded by the widely-read *Yeni Asya* (New Asia) (Algar 1979: 325; Çakır 1993: 89). The circle around this latter newspaper constituted the mainstream of the movement which had split into different groups at different stages.[70]

In the 1960s, *Nurculuk* was again at the center of public debates on secularism. Gradually, the military coup began to be seen and framed by Kemalist intellectuals as a movement to restore secularism, which had allegedly been abused by the DP. The DP Government was overthrown, Said Nursi had died, but the *Nurcu* movement continued, as did the fear of *irtica*. Hence several official and academic publications about *Nurculuk* were published in this period. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) published a report in 1964, trying to show the divisive nature (*bölücülük*, *zümrecilik*) of *Nurculuk* and to prove the incompatibility of the *Risale-i Nur* with Islam (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1964). The book referred to the negative reports of the DRA experts' committees on the *Risale-i Nur* in 1948 and in the period after May 1960, totally omitting the reports which were published in favor of Said Nursî's work in the 1950s (Ibid.: 7–8). This anti-*Nurcu* book, which was actually written by Sadettin Evrin, a retired major general (*tümgeneral*), caused the resignation of Hasan Hüsnü Erdem, the Chair of the DRA, who had opposed the publication of the book bearing his signature (Kara 2000a: 47–8). As a response to this book, an alternative publication was made in İzmir in the same year, which included the reports prepared by a committee of the DRA (*Diyanet İşleri Reisliği Muşavere ve Dini Eserler İnceleme Heyeti*) on the works of Said Nursî. In this book, it was shown that in the period between April 1944 and March 1960, the experts committees of the DRA had been asked to investigate different works of Said Nursî 23 times, and each time they had concluded that an illegal Sufi order (*tarikat*) named *Nurculuk*, did not exist and that these works did not contain anything against the law (*Diyanet İşleri Reisliği Nurculuk Hakkında Ne Diyor?*, 1964).

Besides, there were quite a few books published in the 1960s dealing fully or partially with the *Nurcu* movement (Tunaya 1960; Güventürk 1964; Kadıoğlu 1965; Armaner 1964; Sencer 1968; Dursun 1997; Çağatay 1972). Interestingly, almost all of these "scientific" publications repeated the very

depictions of and comments on Said Nursî made by the opposition press in January 1960. In all of these books, Said Nursî was framed as a dangerous reactionary Naqshbandi (Kadıoğlu 1965: 164–5), as a leader of the March 31 revolt (Armaner 1964; Kadıoğlu 1965: 65–6; Çağatay 1972: 46) as a Kurdish nationalist (Tunaya 1960: 190; Berkes 1964: 341; Kadıoğlu 1965: 65; Sencer 1968: 151; Çağatay 1972: 46), or an enemy of the state, hence a tool of communist powers (Güventürk 1964: 11; Kadıoğlu 1965: 101). *Nurculuk* was depicted either as a fake Islamic movement (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 1964: 22; Kadıoğlu 1965: 83; Armaner 1964; Dursun 1997), or as the most dangerous Islamist movement which was uncompromisingly against the secularist regime (Özek 1968: 183; Sencer 1968: 151), but in any case as a movement supported by the DP Government (Tunaya 1960: 194; Çağatay 1972: 45, 47) and its political successor, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*).

*Nurcu*s supported the Justice Party since its establishment on 11 February 1961 as the heir to the DP (Ongun 1997: 62–3). The leader of the Justice Party (JP), Süleyman Demirel (b. 1924), had himself grown up in a religious family in the province of Isparta and had visited Said Nursî a few times in his childhood in the company of his father (Fincancıoğlu 2000: 68). Being loyal to his roots, Demirel went to his hometown Isparta after his election as the president of the JP in the Congress of 1964 and once again visited Said Nursî's house and prayed for his soul (Ibid.: 88). Thus, the discussion about the influence of *Nurcu*s in politics re-emerged in the mid-1960s. Demirel replaced Menderes in the political polemic about Said Nursî. On 1 June 1966, İnönü wanted Demirel to publicly announce his condemnation of *Nurcu*s and of Said Nursî, and on 7 June he attributed the JP's electoral success to the increasing influence of the *Nurcu* movement in the country (Ahmad et al. 1976: 313). Four days later, on 11 June 1966, the Chief of Staff declared that the army was against *Nurculuk* (Ibid.), which had already been condemned as illegal by the Supreme Court (*Yargıtay Ceza Daireleri Genel Kurulu*) on 20 September 1965 (Toker 1971: 148).

The verdict was actually issued upon appeal by the Office of Public Prosecution concerning the judgment of the Burdur High Criminal Court about two *Nurcu* disciples. The text of the verdict was based on recent books written on *Nurculuk* as a reactionary movement.[71] It was concluded that Said Nursî, the founder of the Nurcu movement, had aimed to destroy the unity of the nation by rejecting Turkish nationalism, announcing his Kurdishness and claiming the existence of a Kurdish community separate from the Turks, and that Said Nursî opposed the independence of the Turkish state by promoting the foundation of an Islamic state with its center in Mecca, that he compared Atatürk to the *Deccal* (the monstrous person who diverts people from Islam before the apocalypse – the Antichrist in Christian tradition), and

to *Ebu Süfyan* (Abu Sufyan ibn Harb, an opponent of the Prophet Muhammed from the Quraish of Mecca).

The year 1966 was a period when the perceived threat of *irtica* had increased, especially due to the political propaganda methods of the RPP against the JP. Since the JP took power after the election of 10 October 1965, the RPP had been looking for new strategies as the opposition party. The partial Senate election on 5 June 1966 gave the RPP the opportunity to test its power. During the election campaign which began on 15 May, the RPP followed the strategy of emphasizing the threat of *irtica*, namely that of *Nurcu*s, just as in 1960. *Ulus* was again the main tool of propaganda. Hence *Nurculuk* was once again portrayed by the RPP leaders and the press such as *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam* as a reactionary movement which was most detrimental to the secularist Republic.

İnönü's campaign became harsher and harsher as the elections approached. In Diyarbakır he declared that Demirel's silence on the issue of *Nurculuk* made it clear that he was considering secularism as irreligion (*dinsizlik*) and that *Nurcu*s were voting machines for him. "*Nurcu* activities in Diyarbakır were", İnönü stated, "not less important than the internal rebellions against the War of National Liberation, like the Delibaş rebellion" (referring to the rebellion in Konya against the Kemalist movement on 2 October 1920) or "Derviş Mehmet from İzmir" (referring to the Menemen Incident on 23 December 1930), because "*Nurcu*s did not want the Turkish state, but a Turkey connected to the Arab state".[72]

According to İnönü, the proof of the Government's link with the *Nurcu*s was the DRA and its recently appointed director İbrahim Elmalı (1903–84). Elmalı, who was appointed the eighth chair of the DRA on 17 December 1965, was a graduate of the Theology Faculty in Istanbul (1928) and had worked as the *müftü* of Üsküdar (1953–61) and of Istanbul (1961–5). Elmalı had been suggested by Mehmet Altınsoy, a deputy of the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*), for the position at the DRA, but the Prime Minister of the time, S. Hayri Ürgüplü, had opposed his appointment. Only after the Justice Party took power was Elmalı appointed the new chair of the DRA by the state minister Refet Sezgin. This appointment was allegedly made under the pressure of the Federation of Employees of Religion (*Din Görevlileri Federasyonu*) and the Federation of Preachers' Schools (*İmam-Hatip Okulları Federasyonu*).[73]

From his very first day in office Elmalı had been an active director, wanting to have greater influence than his predecessors. He sent a letter to the Directorate of the Turkish Television and Radio Institution in January 1966, complaining about a broadcast on Brahmanism which had described Islamic civilization as the civilization of the Middle Ages. He argued not only that such a description was baseless, because Islamic civilization had nothing

to do with the conservative domination of the Church, but also demanded the cessation of such broadcasts that offended the people.[74] Elmalı was warned by State Minister Refet Sezgin for this attempt to interfere with the state's broadcasting.[75]

On 4 January 1966, during the first press conference after his appointment, he had answered questions from journalists on some issues of symbolic importance for both secularist and conservative circles. Concerning the issue of the *ezan*, he said that both forms, Turkish and Arabic, consisted of a call (*çağrı*) and added that dealing with this issue would create conflict at a time when the country needed peace.[76] Elmalı also answered a question concerning *Nurcu*s and instead of condemning *Nurculuk* as a deviant Islamic practice, he stated only that all the suspects were acquitted following their trials. These statements pleased conservative groups and *Nurcu*s, but not Kemalist intellectuals.

Newspapers such as *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* criticized Elmalı's statements and the Government for appointing Elmalı to the position. However, conservative newspapers such as *Tercüman*, *Yeni İstanbul*, *Son Havadis* and *Yeni İstiklâl* and organizations such as *Türkiye Din Görevlileri Yardımlaşma Dernekleri Federasyonu* (Federation of Mutual Aid Societies of Religious Functionaries) sided with Elmalı. They not only praised him as a respectable religious scholar, but also questioned the dominance of the Government in the institution and defended the autonomy of the DRA. They claimed that Elmalı was misunderstood and his statement was purposefully manipulated in order to create an artificial crisis.

Elmalı's speech and his alleged links with the *Nurcu* circles incited secularist dissidence against the Government and the DRA. His appointment was seen by this group as the infiltration of reactionaries, i.e. *Nurcu*s, into the state. According to *Ulus*, the appointment of Elmalı as Chair of the DRA reflected the tolerant attitude of the Government towards *irtica*. Fikret Ekinci, for instance, claimed in his column in *Ulus* that the Chair of the DRA was in close contact with *Nurcu*s and had supposedly appointed seven thousand *Nurcu*s as imams and preachers.[77] In a later article, Fikret Ekinci described Elmalı as the protector or master (*ağababası*) of *Nurcu*s and asked why no investigation was opened concerning Elmalı's speeches.[78]

However, the anti-*Nurcu* propaganda did not help the RPP: in the election the JP won 35 seats out of 52, the RPP 13, while four other smaller parties won one seat each.[79] Despite this electoral defeat, the campaign against *Nurculuk* did not stop. According to İnönü, the JP was supported by newspapers such as *Dünya* (World), *Hüryol* (Free Way) and *Adalet* (Justice) as well as by *Nurcu*s. The elections, İnönü stated, had shown the reality of the danger of *irtica*, namely *Nurcu*s who were determined to support the Government.[80]

Ulus also continued its anti-*Nurcu* publications after the elections. On 9–11 June, it published the verdict of the Supreme Court about *Nurculuk* as a document proving the latter's illegality.[81] This decision of the Supreme Court had provided Kemalist intellectuals with a legal basis on which they could condemn the *Nurcu* movement. Nadir Nadi, for instance, pointed at this verdict and criticized those who were not respecting the Supreme Court's decision.[82] The Chief of Staff, General Cemal Tural, sent a circular to the army stating the need to fight this movement and to see the verdict of the Supreme Court as a guide which should be read by the personnel of the Armed Forces.[83]

Besides this verdict, *Ulus* also published a series on *Nurculuk* written by Çetin Özek, entitled "*Büyük Tehlike: Nurculuk ve İçyüzü*" (Big Danger: *Nurculuk* and its Inside Story), 12–19 June 1966.[84] Özek claimed that, despite the denials of its disciples, *Nurcu* groups showed all the characteristics of a Sufi order (*tarikat*). Hence *Nurculuk* was a big danger for the country and the regime, and readers had to be gathered around civilization and Kemalism against this danger.[85]

While the deputies for the JP were criticized because they referred to Said Nursî as *Said Nursî Hazretleri* (his Excellency) and for praising him,[86] the Zonguldak deputy for the RPP, Kenan Esengin, asked the Prime Minister for measures to be taken by the Government and the DRA against *Nurculuk* and the related publications which aimed to destroy national unity.[87] While this anti-*Nurcu* campaign continued and the JP Government was accused of having links with the *Nurcu* movement, *Nurcu*s were arrested in several cities such as Burdur and Diyarbakır and tried in the courts.[88]

The *Nurcu* movement has gone through important phases since the 1960s. In the early 1970s, some *Nurcu* groups began to side with the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selâmet Partisi*), which was founded with the support of the Naqshbandi order (Çakır 1993: 89). Another important split occurred in the aftermath of the military coup of 1980 between those who supported the coup (the group around Mehmet Kırkıncı, Mustafa Sungur and Bayram Yüksel) and those who positioned themselves against it (the *Yeni Asya* group around Mehmet Emin Birinci, M. Nuri Güleç [Fırıncı] and Mehmet Kutlular) (Ongun 1997: 64). A group under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen, associated with the newspaper *Zaman* (Time), increased its influence especially in the 1990s by accommodating with the secularist military and bureaucratic elite and adopting a Turkish nationalist position (van Bruinessen 1999).[89]

While the *Nurcu*s have been more and more dispersed and split into factions, they chose to forget and keep silent about Said Nursî's Kurdish origins. This silence was challenged in the 1990s by *Nurcu* groups, such as the circle of the journal *Dava* (Atacan 2001), who began emphasizing the

Kurdish part of Said Nursî's biography that had remained hidden for so long (Alakom 1998: 318).[90]

Said Nursî has been such an iconic figure for the Republic that the way he has been perceived and represented, either as an enemy of the Republic or as a spiritual Master, delineated an important line of tension within the discussions on secularism in Turkey. More than 40 years after his death, Said Nursî still continues to be the spiritual leader of different *Nurcu* groups who have been trying to frame him according to their own political agenda. As stated by Bruinessen, Said Nursî could be all things at the same time: a Sufi leader for those interested in Sufism; a Kurdish molla for Kurdish nationalists; a strong anti-communist for right-wing politicians; a reformist with a positive approach to modern sciences for Muslim intellectuals (van Bruinessen 2003: 385). It was maybe this multiplicity of meanings that could be associated with Said Nursî that made him an important figure and *Nurculuk* a very influential religious movement in Turkey.

All these intricacies of the *Nurcu* movement and the significance of Said Nursî for large sections of the population, however, remained omitted by the Kemalist secularist intellectuals and politicians. They kept on reiterating the images and the fears related to the figure of Said Nursî and *Nurculuk* as they were expressed in January 1960 in the context of the partisan fight between the DP and the RPP. Said Nursî has since become an icon of *irtica* in the discourse of Kemalist secularism, just like Derviş Vahdetî of the Incident of March 31 or Derviş Mehmed of the Menemen Incident. He is seen to represent the dark forces, which refer in Kemalist discourse to an illegal source of power that takes its legitimacy from Islam and is thus capable of inciting the uneducated masses against the secularist regime. Likewise, the *Nurcu* groups who organized at the level of civil society and increased their influence over state institutions were perceived by Kemalist intellectuals as a threat to the secular regime in the long run. *Nurcu*s epitomized the creeping *irtica* in the eyes of Kemalist secularist political and intellectual leaders. This perception of threat and the related fear of *Nurcu*s only served to reproduce the Kemalist category of the "reactionary" as the enemy of the nation. Kemalists looked for an authentic and Turkish Islam to counter these "bad Muslims", and they found it in Alevism. The following chapter is about the discovery of these "good Muslims", the Alevis.

6

Turkish Islam Reappropriated: Alevism in Alliance with Kemalism (1966)

In the mid-1960s the perceived threat of *irtica* was epitomized by the figure of Said Nursî in the context of electoral competition between the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party Government. The RPP's opposition strategy of associating the JP with *Nurculuk* was combined with the Kemalist intellectuals' struggle to unveil the Islamist agenda of *Nurcu*s in their publications and have their reactionary activities banned. It was against this background that Alevism – a syncretic heterodox branch of Islam – began to be debated in public.

Alevism is characterized by a great devotion to the fourth Caliph Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammed, which survived within endogamous and isolated communities in Anatolia for centuries despite the dominance of the Sunni political center.[1] Alevis, who are mostly ethnically and linguistically Turkish – while some 20 per cent are Kurds – traditionally inhabited rural Central and Eastern Anatolian provinces of Sivas, Çorum, and the south-eastern Anatolian provinces of Tunceli, Elazığ and Muş. From the 1960s onwards many Alevis have migrated to the large industrialized cities of Western Turkey as well as to Western Europe, mainly Germany (Andrews 1989: 48, 57). A parallel development was the emergence of an urban, educated Alevi elite who began to break the silence on the taboo issue of discrimation against Alevism.

While *Nurcu*s were represented as the archetypal "bad" Muslims, Alevi intellectuals began to be more and more vocal, claiming to represent the "good" and "true" Islam of the Turkish nation, suitable to the secularist Republic. The new young elite of Alevi origin began to organize and raise their voice vis-à-vis dominant Sunni belief, which had been promoted by the state via the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). This chapter will try to shed light on the increasing political and intellectual activity of this Alevi elite

as well as analyze several publications by both Alevi and non-Alevi writers which aimed to inform the public about Alevism in this period.

The previous chapters of the book have aready shown that Kemalist secularism has gradually developed in the multi-party period into a civil ideology. It was now defended not merely by the government or a specific political party but by politicians and intellectuals who were autonomous from the government but saw themselves as the trustee of the Kemalist regime. With the following analysis of the Alevi revival in the mid-1960s, I will demonstrate how the discourse of Kemalist secularism went through a related shift when it was articulated with Alevi identity combined with a perceived increase in the threat of *irtica*. My focus on the debates triggered by a clash between two villages in south-western Anatolia, which was framed as a Alevi–Sunni conflict in the media, examines how Alevis began to be seen as the new victims of *irtica* and hence as natural allies of Kemalist secularism. Through a content analysis of the Alevi publication *Cem*, I will further illustrate how Alevis were framed as "good" Muslims and "true" Turks compared with the "bad" Muslims who were associated with reactionary Islam (*irtica*), as epitomized by the *Nurcu* movement discussed in the previous chapter. This magazine was in fact the nucleus of an Alevi and Kemalist discourse that is still dominant today, which considers Alevism the true national and enlightened religion compatible with the ideal of modernization and secularism.

Alevism began to be debated especially in 1966, after a statement made by İbrahim Elmalı, the Chair of the DRA. Elmalı, who (as was shown in the preceding chapter) was strongly supported by conservative nationalist circles and religious functionaries within the DRA, was often blamed for having close links with the *Nurcu* movement. During a press conference, in a reply to a question concerning DRA recognition of Alevi belief, Elmalı said that "the Alevi–Sunni issue had already faded away". He claimed that Alevism "faded away" because it had been, in his view, historically a "political view" rather than a "religious view".[2] Thus, Elmalı did not consider Alevism a separate belief to be recognized and claimed that it constituted an old but no longer relevant political problem. Elmalı's statement was reported and interpreted by newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet*, *Ulus* and *Akşam* as if he had simply said "Alevism faded away", in the sense of rejecting an Alevi reality in the present. Hence, the speech of Elmalı caused major outrage among Kemalist intellectuals and politicians who interpreted this statement as a continuation of the historical oppression of Alevis, which for them had been ended by the Kemalist Revolution.

An outbreak of communal violence between Alevi and Sunni villages in the district of Ortaca, south-western Turkey, in June 1966 further intensified the public debate on the Alevi issue. This event in Ortaca was seen as the

proof of existing tension between Sunni and Alevi communities, which was denied by Elmalı and which was assumed by Kemalists to have been surpassed in the Republican period. Consequently, issues like the current social and political status of Alevis, freedom of conscience, the neutrality of the state towards different Islamic creeds, and the position of the DRA with regard to the Government began to be discussed through the printed press. The following pages shed light on these debates in this little-known episode in the evolution of the Kemalist-secularist discourse. We begin with a section which explores the history of Alevism in Turkey and its relationship with the state as well as the historical roots of its representation as Turkish Islam by non-Alevi intellectuals before the 1966, the date of publication of the magazine *Cem*.

Alevism in Turkey

Throughout the chapter, two terms will be used for referring to Alevism: *Alevilik* (Alevism) and *Bektaşilik* (Bektashism), because these terms have been used interchangeably in most of the existing literature and in everyday usage. However, a short look at the meanings of these terms provides a good initial insight into the intricacies of Alevism. Although the two terms have been used and studied together, they have important differences as well as similarities. While Bektashism is the name of a Sufi order, which is an order open to outsiders, Alevism is an ethno-religious term because it is based on lineage. Due to strict endogamy, Alevis have become not only a religious but also a quasi-ethnic group, unlike Bektashis. Nevertheless, Bektashism and Alevism have common characteristics and are related in many ways. Alevis and Bektashis do not differ in their deviation from the central practices of Sunni Islam, such as the non-observance of the five daily prayers, not fasting during the month of *Ramazan*, the Haj, and non-attendance at mosques. Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, a semi-legendary person who lived at the turn of the fourteenth century, has been accepted by most Alevis and all Bektashis as their patron saint (Vorhoff 1998: 237). Besides, Alevis, who mostly lived in the countryside, were often termed "country Bektashis" (*köy Bektaşileri*), because both Alevi and Bektashi doctrines adopted the Shiite worship of the 12 Imams and Ali, and have the same ceremony called *Ayin-i Cem*, which is held in a *meydan* (ritual space) under the leadership of a *mürşid* (guide) (Küçük 2002: 26–7, 31–2). Moreover, while traditional leaders of the Alevi communities are called *dede*, those of Bektashis are named *çelebi* or *baba*. *Dede*s, who are seen as *ocakzade* (sons of the hearth, i.e. of the family line) claim descent from the prophet through his son-in-law, Ali, his second grandson, Hüseyin, or others of the 12 Imams, or from Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (Vorhoff 1998: 237).[3]

During the Ottoman period, the Bektashi order was one of the most important Sufi brotherhoods due to its close relationship with the Janissary corps until the latter was abolished in 1826 (Birge 1937; Küçük 2002). Alevis, on the other hand, who mostly lived in rural areas of Anatolia, have been perceived by the Ottoman state as a threat, because the Alevi tribes could shift their loyalty to the Safavid Empire, which had Shi'ism as its official religion. As a heterodox group, they were given different names, all with derogatory meanings, such as *râfizi* (rejectionist), *mülhid* (irreligious), *zındık* (unbeliever) and especially *Kızılbaş* (red head), which referred to partisans of the Safavids who used to wear red hats (Ibid.: 28). The term *Kızılbaş* has been associated with incest, promiscuity and impurity by the Sunni majority, because unlike Sunni women, Alevi women could move freely among men. Although the term Alevi replaced these pejorative terms in the nineteenth century, it again gained a pejorative meaning in the twentieth century due to deeply-rooted prejudices (Mélikoff 1982 : 144). The widespread Sunni contempt for Alevism continued in the Republican period as Sunni Islam remained the only officially recognized Islamic belief under the secular regime.

As discussion in Chapter 2 on the Turkish *ezan* has shown, Kemalist secularism was based on a strong will to reform Islam by decreasing the influences of traditional authority figures and of foreign (namely, Arab) cultures, in order to rescue an allegedly authentic, liberal, Turkish Islam. Ziya Gökalp's project of Turkism in religion was however only partially and symbolically adopted by the Kemalist state with the Turkification of the *ezan* in 1932. The larger project of Turkifying all ritual prayer was never attempted. A vernacular Islam has remained an unrealized Kemalist dream since then.

In the 1960s, however, Alevism was discovered by Kemalist intellectuals as the authentic source of such a vernacular Islam. The Kemalist discourse which identified Alevism as the "true Turkish religion" had its roots in the works of Ziya Gökalp and his students, Fuat Köprülü, Hamid Sa'di (1914–49) and Baha Said (1882–1939), who were the first intellectuals to identify Turkish national religion with the Alevi-Bektashi communities (Ocak 1991). In their works, they (for the first time) aligned Alevism with Turkish ethnic and cultural identity. Under the guidance of Gökalp, in 1916 the Committee of Union and Progress had sent Baha Said to "long-neglected" Anatolia in order to study Alevis (Şapolyo 1964: 2–3). Baha Said detected the continuation of Turkish tribal traditions in Islam in the life-style and religious practices of Alevis, that is, he thought to have found authentic Turkish culture untouched by the influences of Arab culture. He published the results of his research in *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), the official magazine of

the nationalist organization of Turkish Hearths in 1926 and 1927. In one of this articles, Baha Said claimed:

> … the Turkish national ideal was never able to find its expression in the Arab internationalism, but did find it in tekkes or lodge rooms of the Alevi orders of which Bektashis and village groups related to them are chief examples. In the secret practices of those religious groups alone was "national freedom" to be found. … The very aim of the founders of these groups, was to preserve the Turkish tongue and race and blood. (Quoted in Birge 1937: 16)

He also rejected the slander about promiscuous relations within the Alevi-Bektashi communities by arguing that these communities were "pure Turks who had never been a community of prostitution" (Baha Said 2000: 202).

In this period of emerging Turkish nationalism, the search for a pure Turkish culture was also an important motive in the formation of the Turkish literary canon. Bektashi literature, in which original Turkish language and Turkish literary forms were used, attracted the special attention of scholars (Birge 1937: 17).[4] The discovery of Alevi-Bektashi communities as a source of national culture in the early twentieth century was paralleled with a continuing suspicion against them, as well as with a great curiosity about the rituals and beliefs of the Bektashi order, which were held in secrecy (Birge 1937: 20). Ahmet Rıfkı's *Bektaşi Sırrı* (The Bektashi Secret, 1909–11), and Yakup Kadri's novel *Nur Baba* (first published in series in the columns of the newspaper *Akşam* and then as a book in 1922) appealed to this curiosity.[5] Similarly, Besim Atalay (1882–1965) argued in his work on Bektashis that the order had gone beyond the tolerable limits of Islam and Turkish culture and was in need of major reform.[6] Publications about the Alevi-Bektashi belief and communities continued even after the closure of the dervish lodges in 1925.[7] For instance, in 1931, Ziya Bey's articles entitled "Bektashism" were published in the newspaper *Yeni Gün* (New Day).[8] Ziya Bey, a Bektashi himself, stated that there was no need for the continuation of the order because the Republic had accomplished what the Bektashis long stood for – abolition of the Caliphate, freedom of women from the veil and social restraints, and putting an end to the fanaticism of religious leaders (quoted in Birge 1937: 20). According to Ziya Bey, the Bektashi ritual, with the presence of equally respected men and women mingling together, was a continuation of the old Turkish national rites, which could be kept secretly in *tekke*s despite the Sunni religious leaders. The Republic had made this lifestyle possible for all. He wrote: "What difference is there between the *Ayinicem* of the Bektashis and the family gatherings which constitute society everywhere in the world, and which are accepted as the right and necessity for every civilized man?" (quoted in ibid.: 85). Thus, according to Ziya Bey, the principle of secularism of the Republican regime was in line with the

Bektashi teachings. This submissive and optimistic attitude which marked the writings of Ziya Bey was a typical strategy of survival during the single-party regime. Once the state was accepted as the only agent for generating modernity and progress, state-imposed secularization could be framed as an incorporation of progressive Bektashi values by the state. However, one should ask to what extent this incorporation had been realized? Had the Kemalist state favored an Alevi-Bektashi version of Islam?

In what was long the standard text on the Bektashi order, John Kingsley Birge maintained:

> … for a time there was the hope on the part of some that the Bektashis would be exempted from any general prohibition of dervish orders. There were many who felt that the Bektashi Order in its literary tradition, in its secret ritual, and in its more liberal attitude towards social and religious problems had preserved down through history such traces of the original Turkish culture as still persisted. The point was argued therefore that, far from abolishing the order, Bektashiism should be made the religion of the whole Turkish people. (Ibid.: 84)

Some later scholars, such as Bilici, also argued that the steps to reform Islam were inspired by the Alevi version of Islam. Bilici stated that in the 1920s, there was even a discussion over whether Bektashism should be the official religion of the new Republic, because Kemalist reforms were in line with the Bektashi-Alevi doctrine (1996: 286). However, neither Bilici nor Birge substantiated their arguments.

It is true that the abolition of the Caliphate and other secularizing reforms in the fields of education and law were to the advantage of the Alevi-Bektashi community. Nevertheless, the Bektashi order was not exempt from the general ban on the dervish lodges and the effects of other secularizing reforms. For instance, Salih Niyazi Baba, the leader of the *Babağan* Bektashis in Hacı Bektaş, continued his activities, but only clandestinely, until 1927. He left with other *baba*s to go to Tirana, Albania to continue his *tekke* life on 17 January 1930. Another Bektashi leader, Selman Cemali Baba, left Istanbul for Albania earlier, after the hat reform, because he did not want to wear a hat (Küçük 2002: 240). In any case, the Kemalist state's restriction and control of Sunni Islam did not necessarily mean promotion of Alevism. On the practical level, the state conceived Sunnism as the par defaut religion of the nation and fought reactionary Islam by the means of the nationalization of Sunnism (Bozarslan 2003: 8–9). Furthermore, the DRA has never recognized the Alevi as a separate religious group (Ibid.; Çamuroğlu 1998: 114). Like all religious activities, Alevi *cem* rituals too were strictly controlled by the gendarmerie.

It is true that in the early years of the Republic, the nationalist construction of Alevism as the national religion of Turks had an effect on the official attempts to nationalize Islamic practices by removing Arabic influences. Thus, a committee, composed of members of the Theology Faculty in Istanbul charged with the task of preparing a reform on religion, suggested measures that took their inspiration from Alevi/Bektashi practices, such as the introduction of contemporary and instrumental music into places of worship, i.e. mosques, as well as making the language of worship Turkish, characteristics which they had seen in the Alevi/Bektashi culture (Jäschke 1972: 40–1; Albayrak 1991: 34–5).[9] However, one could also say that not only the Bektashi order but also Mevlevism was a possible source of inspiration for the reformist professors of the Theology Faculty, especially concerning the introduction of music in the mosque. It can even be argued that for these professors as well as for Mustafa Kemal, it was Mevlevism, a more urban and elite Sufi order, that represented Turkish Islam (Küçük 2002: 263–4). Although the Mevlevi order and its central lodge in Konya were also closed in 1925, the lodge in Konya was immediately transformed into a museum, while the Bektashi lodge in Hacıbektaş was used for several unrelated purposes (Bardakçı 1989: 58–65).

As was discussed in Chapter 2, the fact that a reform committee could be formed under the presidency of Fuat Köprülü, the student of Ziya Gökalp – who had stressed the need to Turkify ritual since the 1910s – was an important sign that the single-party state had a tendency to promote a national, Turkish Islam, if not necessarily Alevi-Bektashi belief per se. Official attempts to have the Koran translated into Turkish, the Turkification of the admonition parts of Friday sermons and of the call to prayer, carried no motivation for promoting the Alevi teachings on a national scale. The main motive of these Turkification attempts was to reform the existing mainstream orthodox Sunni rituals.

The existence of an alliance between the Alevi-Bektashi and Kemalism has been claimed by many writers who based their argument on the Alevi support for the National Liberation Struggle. These writers interpreted a visit made by Mustafa Kemal on 22 December 1919 to Cemaleddin Çelebi, the *postnişin* of Hacı Bektaş, the spiritual leader of the *Çelebiyan* Bektashis and Alevis in Anatolia, as a defining moment for future links between Alevis and the RPP (Bardakçı 1950: 58–9; Şapolyo 1964: 331–2; Öz 1989: 58–65). Mustafa Kemal had in fact made that visit in order to win the support of Alevis for the national liberation struggle. Cemaleddin Çelebi mediated between the nationalists and the Bektashi and Alevi groups allied to his order in Anatolia. He traveled to many Alevi-populated regions to gather support for the national struggle. According to the former head official (*mutasarrıf*) of the Çorum province, Cemal Bardakçı, Cemaleddin Çelebi decided to spread

the idea among the Alevi community that Mustafa Kemal was the *Mehdi*, the savior who would end their centuries-old sufferings; hence the Alevis supported the Kemalist movement.[10] In turn, Cemaleddin Çelebi was elected as the deputy for Kırşehir province and appointed as the vice-president of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, although he retired soon because of illness (Şapolyo 1964: 331). Cemaleddin Çelebi's membership of the Grand National Assembly was not annulled until he died in January 1922 and his position was filled by another deputy (Küçük 2002: 220). After his death, his brother Veliyuddin Çelebi (Ulusoy) (1876–1940) became a deputy until the end of his life (Bilici 1996: 287). Veliyuddin Çelebi too supported Mustafa Kemal and sent declarations in favor of Mustafa Kemal to Alevis all around the country in May 1922 (Küçük 2002: 220) and during the election for the Second National Assembly (Şapolyo 1964: 284–5).

Despite this evidence pointing to an alliance between the Republican state and Alevis, recent studies have shown that their relation was not one of total harmony (Çamuroğlu 1998: 112–16; Schüler 2000: 197–250; Küçük 2002; Bozarslan 2003). First of all, during the national liberation struggle, Mustafa Kemal forged similar alliances with the Sunni Sufi brotherhoods (Schüler 2000: 221) in order to create "a broad front, including all non-Christian communities under his banner" (Bozarslan 2003: 8). Besides, as Küçük shows, the Bektashi support for the National Liberation Struggle was a complicated process. Bektashis, like any other Sufi order, neither fully supported nor opposed the national struggle (2002: 271). While some leaders of the *Babağan* branch of Bektashis legitimized and mobilized for the nationalist (Kemalist) movement, some others supported the anti-nationalist movement backed by the Ottoman palace. The support of the *Çelebi* branch, to which most of the rural Alevis were connected, was even more complex (Ibid.: 219). There were also Kurdish groups among the Alevi who revolted against the Kemalist movement, such as the Alevis in Koçgiri in 1921. Thus, Cemaleddin Çelebi was recognized as a leader only by the Alevis who considered themselves "Turks" (Ibid.: 220); he was not influential among the Kurdish Alevis who rebelled against the Ankara-based national movement of Mustafa Kemal.

The Kurdish Alevi revolts of Dersim and Koçgiri proved that the relation between the Alevi and the Kemalist movement was not entirely harmonious. Mustafa Kemal had managed to get the support of some Dersim chieftains and made them deputies. However, most of the Alevi Kurds in the provinces of Dersim, Erzincan, Malatya, Maraş, and Sivas had an attitude of suspicion towards Mustafa Kemal (Çem 1999: 36). Another instance of a clash between the Kurdish Alevi and the Republican state was the Dersim revolt of 1937–8, which the Kemalist state suppressed harshly (Kieser 1993; van Bruinessen 1997; Çamuroğlu 1998: 114; Bozarslan 2003: 9).[11] According to

Çem, the fact that Dersim was the last place in Turkey where the state's authority was established showed the weakness of the link between the Kurdish Alevis and the Republican state (1999: 43). Van Bruinessen notes:

> … until the 1930s, Dersim had never been completely brought under control by the central government, and it was the major target of the Kemalist government's efforts to pacify the eastern provinces and assimilate the non-Turkish population. The great Dersim rebellion of 1937–8 was in fact little more than some low-intensity resistance to the pacification program but it was suppressed with a great excess of violence, resulting in the massacre of at least 10 per cent of the population. (1997)[12]

Hence we cannot talk about a complete alliance, but also not of a continuous opposition between the state and the Alevi. Despite the clashes between the Kurdish Alevi and the Kemalist state, both Kurdish and Turkish Alevis were also allied with the state rather than allying with each other. For instance, Kurdish Alevis did not – at least until the 1990s – join forces with Sunni Kurds against the Kemalist regime. *Dede*s, religious leaders of Alevi communities, mediated between the state and their communities, and some of them sided with the state during the Sheikh Said Rebellion led by Sunni Kurds and during the Dersim Rebelllion of the Kurdish Alevis.

Besides, although the Alevi, of both Turkish and Kurdish origin, had improved access to the national system with increasing urbanization and expanding secular education, the state favored Sunnism through its DRA and never officially recognized Alevism as a non-Sunni Islamic belief. In this context, the anti-Alevi prejudice continued among the Sunni.

Nevetheless, after the single-party period, there was a renewed interest in Alevism which was reflected in several publications. These were to a large extent based on the arguments of the Ziya Gökalp school, eager to define a pure Turkish Islam[13] and attempting to deal with the inherent dilemma in framing the Alevis as Turks: how could one explain the situation of those Alevi who did not speak Turkish, but Kurdish or Zaza, and who did not consider themselves Turks, but Kurd, Zaza, or just Alevi?[14] This dilemma provoked several attempts to "unveil the inherent Turkishness" of these citizens for the sake of national unity. M. Şerif Fırat (1884–1949), for instance, stated that "the Alevi tribes living in eastern provinces had been speaking Turkish until 300 years ago and were in fact not *Kızılbaş*, Kurds or infidels, but pure Turks" (Fırat 1970: 32).[15] These tribes, Fırat claimed, were Alevi and Bektashi Turks who had lost their language and their national sentiments under the oppression of the Ottoman state. Therefore the regions where these Turks lived were an indivisible part of Anatolia, and not Kurdistan. Similarly, Hasan Basri Erk, a retired judge, published a book entitled *Tarih Boyunca Alevîlik* (Alevism in History) in 1954. He dealt with

Kurdish Alevis in a way similar to M. Şerif Fırat, arguing that citizens in the eastern provinces who thought of themselves as Alevis were in fact Turks and Muslims. His aim was to prove that Alevism was not a separate religion or nation in order "to eliminate factionism, to reconcile, to compromise, to teach that Alevism is nothing else than Islam" (Erk 1954: 8–9). In short, both Fırat and Erk attempted to prove that Kurdish Alevis were in fact pure Turks and within the sphere of Islam, and hence not threats to national unity.

In the 1950s, Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, a scholar and educationist who had been a member of the 1928 reform committee, was the most vociferous intellectual continuing the tradition of the Köprülü school. He insisted on the need for a reform in religion in his magazine *Yeni Adam* (1934–45, 1950–78) where he wrote several articles on Alevism. He described Alevism as a cultural self-defense of Turks facing the imposition of Arab traditions through Islam. According to Baltacıoğlu, the Alevization of Turks was a survival strategy against Arab culture, described as based on the inequality between men and women, male despotism, slavery and mysticism. These traditions, he claimed, were totally opposite to Turkish traditions, and Alevi culture consisted of "Turkish traditions based on equality of human beings". Overall, Baltacıoğlu stressed the "Turkishness of Alevis" and their "love for Turkishness".[16]

Baltacıoğlu's ideas concerning Alevis also found support in the political and intellectual arena, especially when they were contested by the writers of the Islamic periodicals *Sebilürreşad* and *Selâmet*. The position of *Sebilürreşad* and other conservative nationalist publications on the issue of Alevism was a simple denial rejecting the existence of differences of beliefs within Islam, as these were seen as undermining the unity of Muslims. Alevism was considered within the framework of Shi'ism, which allegedly destroyed both Islamic and the Turkish unity for political rather than religious reasons.[17]

One of the articles of Baltacıoğlu on a new law which introduced religious courses to the schools led to a debate between him and *Sebilürreşad*. Baltacıoğlu argued in this article that such an imposition would hurt and offend the Alevi population. This argument was severely criticized in an article in *Sebilürreşad*. The writer of the article accused Baltacıoğlu of being a "tool of the *Kızılbaş*".[18] This article, which associated Alevism with communism, led to a larger debate on the Alevi–Sunni issue. In response to it, Fahrettin Erdoğan, a former deputy for the province of Kars in the First National Assembly, published a brochure defending Alevis. In this brochure, Erdoğan stated that Alevism was not a religion or *mezhep* (Islamic school), but a union of Turks who loved Ali and whose belief was *Ehlibeyt* (the House of the Prophet which includes his daughter Fatma, his nephew Ali and Ali's sons Hasan and Hüseyin). Like Baltacıoğlu, he claimed that Alevis aimed "to

rescue Turkishness (*Türklük*) from Arab culture and the Persian literature". He depicted Alevi Turks as "the Özbek and Teke Turks from among the Turkmen tribes", and Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli as the hero who "had spread secularism to Anatolia" (Erdoğan 1950: 3, 4, 9, 12). The debate further shows that Alevis began to be represented and legitimized as real Turks and pioneers of secularism in the early 1950s.[19]

Sebilürreşad's anti-Alevi attitude was also protested against by the national student organization (*Türk Milli Talebe Federasyonu*) and journalists such as H. Cahit Yalçın, who saw *Sebilürreşad*'s attitude as an indication of the rising danger of *irtica*. Yalçın argued that reactionaries who wanted freedom of conscience for themselves were in fact enemies of this freedom, because they were against the freedom of Alevis. The rights of Alevis were also defended in the name of freedom of conscience by writers such as Nurettin Artam, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Ahmet Emin Yalman and M. Nermi. However, these writers were, in turn, blamed by *Sebilürreşad* writers such as Raif Ogan for inciting conflict within Islam (*mezhep çatışması*).[20] The debate between *Sebilürreşad* and Kemalist secularist intellectuals about Alevism showed that both sides, having different ideas about the legitimate form of Islam, tried to promote their own vision of Islam as the basis of national culture. Both attempted to delegitimize the other by pushing it outside the sphere of "good" Islam, condemning it as "reactionary" or "*Kızılbaş*" respectively.

In fact, even the word Alevi continued to be a taboo word and there was also major confusion about its meaning. This confusion was reflected in both the scholarly and amateur publications which were published in the 1960s. For instance, Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı distinguished in his book entitled *Alevi-Bektaşi Nefesleri* (Alevi-Bektashi Poems, 1963) between Alevism and the Bektashi order, arguing that Alevism was not a *tarikat* unlike the latter, and that it was not even a full-fledged school of law or a doctrine (*mezhep*) because its methods were never determined. It was rather a primitive *mezhep* or a primitive religion (1963: 4). These arguments offended some Alevi writers such as Karaman and Dehmen who blamed Gölpınarlı for slandering Alevis in the same way as bigots (*yobaz güruhu*) had done for years (1966: 112).

Other sympathizers of Alevism were İbrahim Kâmil Karaman and Abdülvahap Dehmen who claimed in their book *Alevilikte Hacıbektaş Veli ve İlkeleri* (Hacıbektaş Veli and his Principles in Alevism) that a better knowledge of Alevis would enhance national unity (Ibid.: 4). Alevis, they wrote, were Turks who always fought for progress, in the way of Atatürk, against reactionary and fanatic forces (Ibid.: 6–7). Alevis were heir to Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli who had protected and defended the Turkish language and culture against Arab propaganda, unlike those who had forgotten their own national identity (Ibid.: 106). Alevis had also for centuries kept traditional

Turkish customs concerning women, unlike other Turks who imitated the Arab attitude towards women based on segregation (Ibid.: 88). In short, Alevis were totally committed to Atatürk's principles (Ibid.: 114).

Another scholar who dealt with the Alevi-Bektashi issue was Enver Behnan Şapolyo, who published his *Mezheplер ve Tarikatlar Tarihi* (The History of Mezheps and Sufi Orders) in 1964. He treated Alevism as a Sufi order (*tarikat*), while defining Bektashism and *Kızılbaşlık* as two subdivisions within this order (Şapolyo 1964: 255–6). Şapolyo explained his academic interest in this subject as inspired by his concern for national unity and the secular order. According to Şapolyo, although the Sufi orders had been banned in 1925 and although there were no deviant sects or functioning *tarikat* left in Turkey, the history of these institutions had to be studied in order to protect national unity against possible dangers (Ibid.: 2, 332–3). Interestingly, while he claimed that his book was a historical study and that Sufi orders were not supposed to survive in a secular (*lâik*) Turkey, what he wrote on the Alevi was in fact partially based on his personal observations in villages where Alevi traditions were still alive.

Şapolyo represented Alevism as a *tarikat* peculiar to Turks (Ibid.: 257) who resisted the Ummayyads' cruelties (Ibid.: 255–7). He also explained that *Kızılbaş* people were slandered because women danced with bare faces together with men during their religious ceremonies (Ibid.: 267).[21] Şapolyo explained the existence of Kurdish Alevis like earlier writers such as Fırat and Erk: Kurdish and Zaza-speaking Alevis living in the Eastern provinces like Dersim were originally Turks who had come from Horasan. They had been speaking Turkish 300 years ago, but they had changed their language and had called themselves Alevis when they were exposed to insults during the Ottoman period (Şapolyo 1964: 284–6).

Most of these works on the Alevi were thus motivated by a need to exonerate themselves by proving their Turkishness and commitment to the Kemalist regime. Along with this scholarly interest in Alevism, there was also an emerging will to be vocal about Alevism among the Alevi themselves. The following section demonstrates this period of rising Alevi consciousness. It highlights the latter's encounter with the dominant Sunni prejudice reflected in Islamic publications as well as within the state apparatus.

Alevis and the secular state in the 1950s and 1960s

Alevis themselves – besides Baltacıoğlu and other non-Alevi sympathizers – began to publish in the period in order to educate an increasingly urbanized and hence gradually disintegrating Alevi community on the Alevi-Bektashi belief. Many of the publications of the multi-party period entailed written versions of the legends, stories and teachings of Ali, which used to be orally

transmitted from generation to generation, while others were historical studies on the emergence of Alevism (see Yaman 1998).

One of the writers of these books, Halil Öztoprak (1890–1967), an Alevi *dede*, became very popular among the Alevi community while being equally detested by Sunni religious functionaries (Şener 1991: 163). His book entitled *Kuranda Hikmet, Tarihte Hakikat: Alevilerde Namaz* (Wisdom in the Koran, Reality in History: Ritual Worship in Alevism) was first published in 1951 (also in 1953, 1955 and 1959) and sold all over the country. In the book, he argued that Alevis were "the genuine children of this country" (*öz ve hakiki evlâdları*). Alevis too, he wrote, followed the orders of the Koran and the Prophet Muhammed; the only difference between Sunnism and Alevism was not in essence but in the form of worship (quoted in ibid.: 163–4). According to Öztoprak, daily prayers, going to the mosque and pilgrimage were not obligatory for Muslims.[22] He claimed that praying five times a day was invented during the Abbasid rule and not practiced during the time of the Prophet, that the mosque was not the only place of worship, and that praying in private was preferred. His general argument was that true Islam was to believe in God in one's heart and continuous worship without the mosque (Öztoprak 1951: 23). Öztoprak's aim was to show that Alevi practices were in fact based on the Koran and that the current Sunni practice was based on an incorrect understanding of it. These arguments were welcomed enthusiastically by Alevis, but they disturbed pious Sunnis and religious functionaries.

Sebilürreşad published an article about this book, alleging that it assaulted the basic principles of Islam and propagated Alevism. The author of the article asked the DRA to take immediate measures against it.[23] The magazine also published an announcement by the *müftü*s of 67 provinces all around the country who wanted Öztoprak to be punished with the death penalty and all the copies of his book to be burned.[24] Öztoprak was tried in court on the initiative of a prosecutor in Gaziantep, but he was acquitted and the ban on his book was removed.[25]

These developments concerning Öztoprak's book show that the DRA was seen by *Sebilürreşad* writers as the highest Islamic authority in the country, which should take measures against the propagation of Alevism. It is also clear that the magazine had not only access to, but also mobilizing power over the employees of the DRA, which secured the dominance of Sunnism as the legitimate form of Islam vis-à-vis Alevism.

The DRA's position concerning Alevism did not change under the DP Government, despite the fact that Alevis increasingly supported the DP. Alevis were never officially recognized and the DRA continued to be a Sunni institution. As a matter of fact, the DRA published a declaration in 1958 condemning the publication of a book, entitled *Hüsniye*, which was

critical of the orthodox Sunni religious authorities.[26] The DRA's declaration stated that the book lacked any scientific value and aimed to pervert Alevi citizens.[27] Besides preventing any anti-Sunni propaganda, the DRA also wanted to assimilate the Alevi into Sunnism. Hence it was careful to provide the Alevi with services through DRA-appointed imams. In the late 1950s, the DRA intervened in a debate on the permissibility of carrying out funeral praying services for Alevis in the mosques according to Sunni rulings. Upon claims that this was not permissible, as Alevis did not follow Sunni principles in other fields, the DRA took a clear position and in this way expressed its stance on Alevism. It declared that *not* holding the funeral praying service according to Sunni rulings for Alevis, who belonged to an opposing *mezhep*, was against Islamic rules and created division (*ikilik*).[28] Thus, although the DRA defined Alevism as an "opposing" (*muhalif*) belief, it attempted, at least officially, to incorporate Alevi citizens within the Sunni realm whenever possible, instead of adopting an exclusionary attitude. This declaration of the DRA can be interpreted as a recognition of Alevism, though in negative terms, as well as a will to integrate Alevis into the supposed unity of Muslims.

During the transition to the multi-party system, most Alevis had shifted their support to the Democratic Party. Hüseyin Doğan Dede (1902–83), the head of a tribal federation and the spiritual leader of the Alevi *Ağuçan Ocağı* in Malatya, was one of the Alevi leaders who supported the DP (Bozarslan 2003: 8–9).[29] Nevertheless, while Alevis initially voted mostly for the DP after long years of single-party rule of the RPP, they redefined their loyalties as voters again at the end of the 1950s. The 1960 military coup against the DP was welcomed especially by the leaders of the Alevi community. In the period after the 1960 coup, there was increased public interest in Alevism, which was reflected in the printed press and scholarly works, as well as increased Alevi activism in the political sphere.

It was just after the 1960 coup that a group of Alevi leaders and intellectuals voiced their demands publicly in the name of the Alevi community for the first time. Halil Öztoprak, Cemal Özbey, Sefer Aytekin, Kazım Kızılca and Niyazi Düzgünoğlu were among these Alevi leaders who, in their petition to the new government, demanded the representation of Alevis in the DRA. Intellectuals such as Yakup Kadri, Hasan Âli Yücel, Burhan Felek and Cihad Baban also supported this demand.[30]

General Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the junta Government and the President of the Republic from 26 October 1961 to 26 March 1966, was sympathetic to the Alevi demands. Gürsel believed in the need to reform Islam and supported the idea of the representation of the Alevis in the DRA.[31] The new government tried to take some steps to reform the state's relation to religion.[32] State minister Hayri Mumcuoğlu announced on 17

December 1960 that a new Law on the Organization of the DRA (*Diyanet İşleri Teşkilat Kanunu*) would include a clause which would allow representation of Alevis and that several *mezhep*s would be represented in the new High Consultation Committee (*Yüksek Müşavere Heyeti*).[33] Çelebi Feyzullah Ulusoy, the heir of Cemaleddin Çelebi, i.e. the leader of the Turkish Alevi community, was even proposed a post in the DRA as the representative of the Alevi. Ulusoy refused the proposal – he considered himself not qualified for the post, as the latter required knowledge of Arabic (Sezgin 2002: 70–3). The proposed representation of the Alevi *mezhep* in the DRA was never realized. According to Sezgin, the step was taken by the new government probably in order to please the Alevi leaders and to gain the support of the Alevi population before the referendum on the constitution in 1961 (Ibid.).

The official recognition of the Alevis, which did not occur at the level of the DRA, was however partially realized under the pretext of protecting the national cultural heritage. The lodge of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli was reopened to the public as a museum by a decision of the DP cabinet on 2 April 1960 (Küçük 2002: 246). After the Mevlevi lodge and the Mausoleum of Mevlâna (Celâleddin Rûmi, d. 1273) in Konya, which was kept open as a museum since 1926 (Kara 1990: 292–4),[34] this was the second – and the last – dervish lodge in the Republican period which was opened to the public, although as a museum devoid of its original content. Besides, the first Alevi association was founded under the name of Association for Tourism and Promotion of Hacı Bektaş (*Hacı Bektaş Turizm ve Tanıtma Derneği*) in 1963 by Ali Cemaleddin Ulusoy (1922–90) and other Alevi leaders. This association organized a public *cem* ceremony in Ankara in a cinema hall in December of the same year.[35] Moreover, an annual festival has been organized in Hacı Bektaş from 1964 onwards.[36]

In the period after 1960, several attempts were made by Alevi and non-Alevi writers to unveil the mysterious world of the Alevi and to counter the negative stereotypes about Alevis, but especially to convince the reader of the loyalty of the Alevi people to the Kemalist Republic.[37] In 1963, *Cumhuriyet* published a journalist's (Fikret Otyam) report entitled *Hu Dost*, which was based on interviews made with members of the Alevi and Bektashi communities in rural areas.[38] In his serialized reports, Otyam emphasized "the love of Alevis for Atatürk and their attachment to his principles". He reported that there was a picture of Atatürk on the wall in every single Alevi house and that especially old Alevis believed him to be the Twelfth Imam, Muhammed Mehdi. One of the interviewees from Sivas, who had said that Atatürk was the *Mehdi*, believed that Atatürk had closed down the Sufi orders and convents to ensure unity, which was now lost because his path was not followed:

> Hasan Özel (64-year-old) from the village Karaçayır in the province of Sivas stated: "I do not go too far; the *Mehdi* that we have been waiting for according to our belief has arrived, did what the people expected and passed away as all mortals; now he is reposing at the Mausoleum in Ankara. … He closed the dervish convents, lodges, and he did it for good. We are not hurt, on the contrary we are content. This was necessary to put an end to separation and duality, for unity and order. May his grave be in peace … – But we have wandered around, have seen and heard that this separation continues. What would you say about this? – It does, it does for sure. If you diverge from the true path, it will of course continue. If you diverge from the path of Atatürk, it will of course rise from its grave. What is the fault of Atatürk here?" (Otyam 1994: 76–7)

Thus, Otyam's interview showed that Alevis identified themselves with Kemalism to such an extent that Atatürk had been adopted and included within the Alevi iconography.[39] However, the story of the publication of Otyam's report proved that Alevism was still a taboo issue. Otyam had put a picture from a Bektashi ritual ceremony (*cem*) in the fourth installment of his report in *Cumhuriyet*, but he had covered the eyes of the people in the picture with black strips. His idea was to protect the participants of the *cem*, because although the *mezhep* was legal, *tarikat* gatherings were banned (Otyam 1994: 4). After the publication of this picture, the report was stopped by the Istanbul Martial Law Commander for allegedly causing divisiveness in the country (Ibid.). The report began to be republished after having been banned for 4–5 months. However, this time the Ankara Radio Station refused to broadcast the advertisement for its republication because the text of the announcement had included the word Alevi (Ibid.: 7). In brief, Alevism was still a taboo issue, despite the existance of a few non-Alevi sympathizers who saw them as "good" Muslims and hence at peace with secularism. In the context of the 1960s, however, the Alevi elite appropriated this discourse and articulated it in the form of Kemalist secularism. This discursive shift occurred in the new ideological spectrum of the 1960s, which witnessed the rise of socialism among the urban elite. The following section will illuminate these transitions which had crucial impact on the discourse of Kemalist secularism.

Alevism and Kemalist secularism in the 1960s

The alliance of Alevism with Kemalist secularism in the 1960s was preceded by a shift in the discourse of Kemalist secularism. This was its articulation with socialism. While anti-communism was part and parcel of the Kemalist secularist discourse in the 1950s, this situation began to change in the 1960s. As the 1961 Constitution made it possible for the socialist movement to organize legally, politics gradually began to be polarized along a left- and

right-wing axis. Hence, from the early 1960s onwards, socialism emerged as a major current of thought and as a distinctive ideology, promoting economic development based on statism, social justice and workers' rights, as well as rejecting the Islamic/racist/Ottomanist facets of conservative nationalism (Karpat 1973: 341). In this changing political environment, Kemalist secularism began to be defended eagerly against conservative nationalist intellectuals and politicians by socialist intellectuals who incorporated Kemalism into their socialist ideology. The conservatives, on the other hand, who continued to elaborate a nationalist discourse which emphasized Islam's centrality for national identity, accused socialist intellectuals and students of promoting atheism.

The leftist Kemalist discourse was crystallized in the socialist journal *Yön* (Direction), published by Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926–83) and Mümtaz Soysal (b. 1929), who refashioned Kemalism as an anti-imperialist and developmentalist ideology (Avcıoğlu 1968; Küçük 1983: 143. See also: Lipovsky 1992; Özdemir 1986). The principles of Kemalism, such as populism, reformism and statism, were reinterpreted as socialism (Karpat 1973: 341). Their discourse, combining Kemalist nationalism with socialism, was very influential among the left-wing circles in the 1960s, who could in this period also legally organize in a political party. The Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which was founded on 13 February 1961 in Istanbul by 12 trade unionists, gradually increased its influence especially among young intellectuals. Even before the party program was written the President of the party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, in his speech in Gaziantep on 12 May 1963, had touched on the major issue of "the East" where millions of citizens who spoke Kurdish and Arabic and were of the Alevi belief lived (Aren 1993: 119). Accordingly, the program of the party included a section entitled "The Development of the East" (*Doğu Kalkınması*), which stated that Alevis, along with those citizens who spoke Kurdish and Arabic, were discriminated against among the people of the eastern and south-eastern provinces (Ibid.: 70–1).[40]

In this context, Alevism was discovered as a local resource for the opposition, in its Kemalist and/or socialist forms. According to Bozarslan, the neo-Kemalism of the 1960s needed a local or native source of legitimacy and found an authentic source of resistance in Alevism (2003: 7). For socialist intellectuals, Alevism represented an opposing ethos to those of right-wing nationalists and Sunni Islamists (Livni 2002). Seen through the socialist political vocabulary, Alevis became proletarians and Alevism secular materialism (Ibid.). Hence historical figures important for the Alevis – such as Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and especially the sixteenth century Alevi poet Pir Sultan Abdal, who had resisted the unjust Ottoman ruler – became the new icons of Turkish socialism. Pir Sultan Abdal and his poems became the flag

of a socialist order for the new generation of socialists (Başgöz 1977: 56–9). The pioneers of this new interpretation of Pir Sultan Abdal were Alevi socialists within the ranks of the Workers' Party of Turkey, who had founded the *Aşıklar Derneği* (Bards' Society) in Ankara in 1962. This new interpretation was appropriated by Alevi *aşık*s, (bards or poets), with socialist inclinations, who reinterpreted the Alevi tradition and represented the centuries-long Alevi struggle against the hegemonic Sunni state as a struggle to gain political and economic rights for the oppressed Turkish people (Ibid.; Başgöz 1983: 21). The articulation of Alevism as socialism gradually increased its influence among the new generation of Alevis. The Workers' Party of Turkey, which was founded in 1961, actually found support in towns and villages populated by Alevis (Okan 2004: 99).

Even for those groups who were not part of the socialist movement, Alevism began to be represented as a belief and culture which had resisted Sunni supremacy and oppression, and therefore as the natural defender of secularism against *irtica* or an anti-Kemalist counter-revolution (Bozarslan 2003: 7). For instance, the RPP, which began to redefine its political stance under the slogan of "left of center" with regard to the Justice Party, targeted Alevi votes by stressing its commitment to secularism. A group of Alevi intellectuals too, as we will see below, wholeheartedly appropriated this Kemalist discourse.

In a nutshell, in the 1960s, despite the continuing Sunni prejudices against the Alevi, the socialist movement began to perceive the Alevi population as a pillar of support, while a group of Alevi and non-Alevi intellectuals began to stress the Alevis' inherent Turkishness, their loyalty to the Kemalist Republic and their intrinsic secularism. Theirs was, in fact, a discourse of Kemalist secularism which defined Alevism as an antidote to reactionary Islam and emphasized freedom of conscience in the name of Alevis. This opposition of Alevism to reactionary Islam crystallized in particular in an intense public debate following a supposed Alevi–Sunni conflict in 1966. The following section will recount this public debate.

A debate on Alevi–Sunni conflict in 1966

In 1966, several developments led to the crystallization of a pro-Alevi Kemalist discourse. The polarization between the Government and the opposition over the issue of secularism had increased, especially after the appointment of İbrahim Elmalı as the new chair of the DRA. The statement of Elmalı in January 1966, which denied the existence of an Alevi issue, was criticized by the opposition which wanted to appeal to the Alevis. İnönü, who was again the opposition leader, made a radio speech on 22 May 1966, in which he protested against fanatics who exploited religion in the guise of

religious functionaries and accused both the DRA and the minister responsible for the DRA of offending the nation.[41]

A clash between Alevi and Sunni villages, which took place in the town of Ortaca in June 1966, was the last straw. A dispute occurred between two villages, one populated by Sunni and the other by Alevi on 5 June 1966, in the sub-district of Ortaca, in Muğla. On 9 June, *Cumhuriyet* reported that the conflict, which was first interpreted as caused by a dispute over land, turned out to be a conflict of *mezhep* (*mezhep çatışması*) between the two villages.[42]

Ulus also referred to the events in Ortaca as an instance of Alevi–Sunni conflict. On 12 and 13 June, it was reported that the conflict was continuing despite the peace-making attempts of the Governor and the security forces. Alevis, under the threat of being raided, had armed themselves, could not open their shops and were excluded from some coffee houses. Sunnis were preventing Alevis from going out of their village by demolishing a bridge, and were not selling food to them.[43] On 14 June, *Cumhuriyet* reported that a person who had been wounded (on 5 June) died in the hospital, while Sunnis (from Kızılyurt village) had kidnapped an Alevi woman from another village (Feyziye) and raped her. The pictures of Alevi women and men keeping watch at night with their guns in their hands were on the front pages of the newspaper.[44]

The Government, however, denied that the conflict in Ortaca was a *mezhep* problem. The Governor of Muğla declared that such claims were false and that the issue was only a conflict over land.[45] The Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel also stated that there could not be any conflict of *mezhep* in the country and that no one would be able to destroy national unity by exaggerating such conflicts over land.[46] In a later speech, he blamed the press for creating an artificial atmosphere of disquiet by inventing illusionary conflicts.[47] The Minister of the Interior, Faruk Sükan, made a similar pronouncement.[48] The President of the Republic, Cevdet Sunay, also emphasized the necessity of unity and stated that "Turkey is a secular (*laik*) state and there is no *mezhep* divide within the nation".[49] Likewise, the pro-Government press accused other publications of exaggerating the problem and creating an artificial clash. A Kemalist higher education student organization (*Türkiye Yüksek Öğrenim Gençliği Atatürkçüler Derneği*) also protested against the press because the latter had allegedly betrayed the Kemalist regime by representing the recent events as a dispute between Alevis and Sunnis.[50] Mümtaz Faik Fenik of the newspaper *Son Havadis* argued that the RPP, the WPT, and the press supportive of these two parties were seeking political gains by presenting themselves as protectors of the Alevi community. According to Fenik, this was an exploitation of religion in the real sense of the word.[51] Similarly, Faruk Timurtaş, a professor of Turkish language and literature, writing in the same newspaper, criticized the

leftist discourse on Alevism and pointed to the contradictory position of Kemalists who praised Bektashism, which for him was a *tarikat*, i.e. an illegal formation since the Kemalist reform of 1925.[52]

On the other hand, the Government's attitude of denial and Demirel's comment on the Ortaca events were criticized by the party group of the RPP. Zeki Tolunay, the RPP senator for Malatya, posed a question to the Prime Minister concerning the events in Ortaca.[53] Another action against the Government was initiated by Hüseyin Balan, the Ankara deputy from the Republican Peasant Nation Party, who presented a motion of non-confidence to the Grand National Assembly concerning the actions of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior during the Alevi–Sunni conflict. Balan, himself of Alevi origin, accused the latter of denying the violence against the Alevis of the Feyziye village and of not preventing it. According to Balan's motion, Sunni villagers had used the land dispute as a pretext in order to attack Alevis in the Feyziye village. During their raid on the cinema in Ortaca and in later cases of violence, many Alevis and the head of the subdistrict (*bucak müdürü*) were wounded. The telegram from the Mayor of Ortaca demanding an increase in official security precautions against a potential conflict was neglected by the Government. Hence, Sunni villagers were encouraged to besiege the Alevi village, destroy its roads and its bridge, and rape an Alevi woman who had been working in her field. Besides the Ortaca issue, Balan also mentioned other cases of maltreatment of Alevi citizens in his motion. These were the cases of: first, an Alevi student who was severely beaten by his teacher of religion when he opposed his teacher's argument that Alevis were irreligious (*dinsiz*); second, a conversation in the popular film *Turist Ömer* where the police asked a person who had sexual relationship with his sister whether he was a *Kızılbaş*; third, a newly-married woman who was killed by her husband when he realized that she was an Alevi; and fourth, some imams and preachers who propagated discrimination against Alevis in Sunni villages.[54] Balan's motion was, however, retracted in response to an intervention by Osman Bölükbaşı, the leader of his party.

Besides these repercussions, the events of Ortaca led the Alevi intellectual elite to raise their voice and express their resentment to the Government. Both the Ortaca events and the Government's attitude triggered heated public debates, which in turn led to a rising consciousness of Alevis concerning their identities.[55] Many Alevi intellectuals and university students complained about discrimination against Alevis. Abbas Önen, the Chair of the Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Association in Malatya, for instance, invited the leading Alevis of the town to a meeting where the Ortaca events were discussed and a decision was taken to send two representatives to Ortaca to investigate the event (Kaleli 2000: 98–9). Lütfi Kaleli – the owner of the local

newspaper (*Sebat*) in Malatya – and Rıza Aydın, who were chosen for this task, reported after their three-day stay in Ortaca that it was *Nurcu* Sunnis who were behind the brutal attacks against Alevis.[56]

University students too expressed their opinions on the events. Two hundred university students from Ankara University made an announcement calling on the Government to prevent the conflict of *mezhep*. These university students interpreted the events as an attack by the *Nurcu*, reactionary and fanatic mentality against the Kemalist, progressivist and revolutionary groups. Thus in their view, the clash was an expression of the same old conflict between the *Nurcu*s and reactionaries – the two terms were used interchangeably – and the Kemalists. They stated that reactionary and fanatic groups who were encouraged by the speech of Elmalı had been trying to divide the Turkish nation along *mezhep* lines. Demirel and his government's negligence of these events, the announcement continued, had attracted the attention of the 13 million Alevis towards Ortaca:

> This deed committed against a Kemalist, progressivist and revolutionary community is nothing else than an assault of a handful *Nurcu*, reactionary and fanatic minds on progressivist forces in our country. After the fatwa of a chair of the DRA who does not know constitutional rules in secular Turkey was broadcast on radio, fanatical and reactionary minds were encouraged to become wild and to demolish our nation via *mezhep* fights. This serious and important problem is neglected by Mr. Demirel and his government whose inaction attracted the attention of thirteen million Alevis to Ortaca.[57]

Furthermore, 129 Alevis from Sivas sent Demirel a telegram in which they defined themselves "as persons who had always wanted the unity of the nation and followed the path of Atatürk" and asked him to put an end to the situation in Ortaca.[58] As reported in *Ulus*, repercussions of the events continued in Sivas where almost 200,000 Alevis lived, while Alevis in İzmir believed that *Nurcu*s played an important role in these inter-*mezhep* conflicts.[59] *Ulus* also published a declaration by the villagers of Urla-Bademler from İzmir with the title "We Are Alevis". This village, it was reported, was famous for its enlightened, educated inhabitants. The declaration stated that "the villagers had been educated at the institutions of the Republic, and had grown up with the reforms of Atatürk, while their ancestors extended as far back as Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and Mevlana who had found the truth in goodness and love". The declaration ended with the proclamation that they were Alevis, and not infidels.[60]

The Ortaca events were emphasized by the columnists in the newspapers *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. Ecvet Güresin's editorial for Cumhuriyet interpreted the events as "the result of the developments in the last two–three years when currents like *Nurculuk* and *Süleymancılık* had developed". According to

Güresin, "*Nurcu*s who had been invading the landmarks in the political sphere after 1961 (*siyasal nirengi noktalarını ele geçirmeye başlayan nurcular*) were mobilized to incite naïve citizens against the Alevis and had used issues like land, water etc. for this purpose". "The DRA", he argued, "had become an organization which protected and maintained *Nurcu*s who in turn interpreted Elmalı's speech as a declaration of war against the Alevis".[61] *Ulus*' editorial also accused Elmalı, and the Government which had appointed him as the Chair of the DRA, of causing this conflict by denying and despising a *mezhep* with millions of affiliates.[62]

Elmalı, the chair of the DRA, kept silent on the accusations and did not want to answer the journalists' questions.[63] However, although Elmalı remained silent on the issue, the periodical of the DRA published in its July issue an article by Mustafa Maden, the Chair of the Federation of Mutual Aid Societies of Religious Functionaries (*Türkiye Din Görevlileri Yardımlaşma Dernekleri Federasyonu*). In this article, Maden condemned those who framed the Ortaca events in a tragic form in order to incite a fight between brothers, and referred to them as anarchists. Maden repeated Elmalı's argument that the Sunni–Alevi issue had lost it importance centuries ago, and defended Elmalı as the symbol of religious unity.[64]

There were also socialist interpretations of the events in Ortaca. For example, İlhan Selçuk, the columnist of *Cumhuriyet*, which had situated itself on the left side of the political spectrum since he had been writing in it, claimed that the conflict between Sunni and Alevi citizens was caused by the exploitation of religion by politicians, compradors and notables in the last 20 years. According to Selçuk, "the poor and naive people of Muğla, instead of thinking about their economic situation, were encouraged by these politicians to fight with Alevi citizens". Although he hinted at a class-based approach, Selçuk did not carry on in defining Sunni and Alevi citizens on the basis of class or in calling for a unity based on class solidarity. İlhan Selçuk's solution for the Sunni–Alevi conflict was nationalism. According to him, "Turkishness (*Türklük*) had to be given priority over religious beliefs in order to prevent the internal conflict between *mezhep*s and the external threat of *ümmetçilik* (pan-Islamism); this was not only the unifying factor, but also the meaning of Kemalism".[65] In a later article, Selçuk too accused Elmalı of joining those politicians who revived the Alevi–Sunni conflict by exploiting religion especially in the last few years:

> When a chair of the DRA says "Alevism died", he expresses that he has understood neither the main principles of the Republic nor the Constitution of May 27. The salary he is entitled to by the secular Republic is not given to him for this. In that salary, the efforts of citizens, as well as the taxes of Alevi citizens are included. The statements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs on the "absence of the Alevi–Sunni divide" in Turkey is

> senseless. The issue of Alevism–Sunnism is a problem which is rooted in history and finally solved by Atatürk. … It has risen from its grave by exploiting politicians, incited by the chair of the DRA … The exploitation of religion gives rise to the exploitation of *mezhep*s. The more religion will increase its influence on the governance of the state, the more those in power will willy-nilly move towards using *mezhep* divides. … The events in Ortaca are the results of this process.[66]

In other words, in 1966, the debate on the Alevi–Sunni issue was superimposed by Kemalist intellectuals of the opposition onto the critique of the infiltration of the state, through the DRA, by what they saw as Sunni fanaticism. These Kemalist intellectuals depicted the single-party rule as a period when Sunni fanaticism was suppressed and hence Alevism was liberated. Moreover, they accused the Government at the time of betraying Kemalism and tolerating the *Nurcu* movement, as the new version of Sunni fanaticism. Hence Kemalist secularism was articulated with the demand for an Alevi emancipation from Sunni supremacy. In this way, it was once more constructed through an opposition between the "good" and "bad" Muslims. Alevis represented in this picture the former, and the fact that they were historically suppressed by the Sunni polical center, i.e. the Ottoman state, reinforced the Kemalist politics of memory of tracing the struggle against reactionary Islam back in history. It was assumed here that the secular republic bringing an end to the Ottoman state and to the political supremacy of Sunnism had ended the dicrimination against the Alevi – a claim which neglected the fact that the DRA had been promoting a Sunni version of Islam right from the beginning in the single-party period.

In the context of this unprecedented intellectual and political activism by Alevis, the periodical *Cem*[67] – the pioneer of similar Alevi magazines that mushroomed in the 1990s – was published and the first Alevi party, the Union Party (*Birlik Partisi*) was founded. The writers of *Cem*, some of whom were also founding members of the Union Party, represented Alevism as an authentically Turkish Islam and Alevis as the guardians of secularism. Alevism was framed by the writers of the magazine as the true national and enlightened religion suitable to the secularist Republic as opposed to *irtica*, which was epitomized by the *Nurcu* movement.

This convergence of the Alevi identity and Kemalist secularism was the result of several developments, the first of which was the increasing levels of urbanization and education of the Alevis. The Kemalist-Alevi alliance was also an attempt to outweigh the socialist mobilization of the Alevi youth in the early 1960s by socialist political organizations legalized by the new Constitution of 1961. The centuries-long confrontation between the Alevis and the hegemonic Sunni state began to be depicted in this period as an economic and political struggle of the oppressed Turkish people. As shown

in the following, a newly emerging Alevi elite were disturbed by the incorporation of the Alevi opposition into a socialist framework. Among them were the founders of the magazine, *Cem*, who tried to channel Alevi activism towards their independent organization. In other words, the first Alevi political activism was born as a backlash of the socialist mobilization of Alevi youth. What follows is firstly an introduction to *Cem* and then a content analysis of its themes, which shows how a particular self-representation of Alevism builds on the dichotomy of "good" versus "bad" Muslims that is central to Kemalist secularism.

A magazine for Alevis: *Cem*

The first issue of *Cem* (the name given to the Alevi ritual ceremony) was printed in July 1966, just one month after the events in Ortaca. The magazine was published by Abidin Özgünay, the owner of a printing house in Istanbul. The logo of the magazine was a figure of a woman and a man dancing the *semah*, while the motto which followed the name of the magazine was "*Eline-Diline-Beline*", which referred to the Alevi moral principle of controlling one's hand, tongue and loins. The magazine announced in its first issue that its aim was "to remedy the problems of the millions of Alevi Turks who were forgotten, oppressed and victims of slander".[68] The Alevi community was referred to as an oppressed, injured and offended group, while *Cem*'s mission would be to unveil the injustices done to them. In fact, *Cem* became a platform for non-Alevi writers like Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who had been defending Alevis for a long time, scholars like Çetin Özek, who consistently defended secularism against the threats of *irtica*, and the new generation of the Alevi intellectual elite, such as İzzettin Doğan and Lütfi Kaleli. These writers aspired to fight wide-spread prejudices against Alevis and to increase Alevi self-esteem.

Accordingly, the events of Ortaca and the earlier speech of Elmalı were the major issues that *Cem* writers dealt with. The Editor of the magazine, Özgünay, wrote that the Ortaca events could not have been just a dispute over land because "many Sunni villagers who had nothing to do with the land issue had joined in blockading the Alevi village and in rejecting commercial interaction with the Alevis". He pointed to many other instances of discrimination against Alevis, who constituted one third of the nation, such as several cases of violence in state schools against Alevi students, and discrimination in law courts against Alevi witnesses.[69] According to Özgünay, the Sunni–Alevi clash in Ortaca was part of a general problem of discrimination against Alevism. Hence, the magazine conducted a survey which asked leading intellectuals of the day about their knowledge of Alevism and Alevis, and aksed about their ideas on the statement made by İbrahim Elmalı that Alevism was an old political issue rather than a religious

view. Most of the respondents criticized Elmalı's statement, except the *müftü* of Istanbul, Bekir Hakkı Yener, who refused to answer the questions. Many respondents – such as Sadi Irmak, Hüseyin Korkmazgil, journalist in the weekly *Akis*, and Doğan Özgüden, the publication director of *Akşam* – saw Elmalı as the inciter of the Sunni–Alevi conflict in Ortaca. Elmalı's argument was also opposed by the respondents. For instance, Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu defined Alevism as a national view and stated that Alevis were the real representatives of Turkishness and had been the bearers of the Turkish culture and traditions.[70] The law professor Tarık Zafer Tunaya also saw Alevis as a secular-minded (*laik anlayışlı*) people who kept old Turkish traditions alive.[71] Likewise, Professor Sadi Irmak stated that Alevism was the response of the Turkish spirit against fanaticism (*taassup*) which was reflected in several examples of Alevi literature.

In short, the leading intellectuals of the day praised the Turkishness and secularism of Alevis. The results of the survey were published in the first five issues of the magazine and in the end were summarized by the editor as follows:

1) Alevis are genuine children of the country.
2) They are the ones who claimed and protected Turkish nationalism and Turkish traditions against Arab traditionalism and pan-Islamism (İslam ümmetçiliği).
3) Those who slandered Alevis were traitors to the nation and the fatherland.
4) Although it was not possible to give an exact number, a minimum of ten million Alevi lived in Turkey.
5) Alevis have succeeded centuries ago in realizing a life-style which is yearned for by the whole of humanity. In this social system, unity, peace, progressivism, and solidarity are important, besides the strong family ties and respect for women.
6) Alevis' progressivism and rationalism constituted the foundation of the social structure necessary for Atatürk's Republic and reforms (*inkılaplar*).[72]

These statements were also the themes of most of the articles published in the magazine, which became a platform for the adoption of early nationalist formulation of Alevism by both Alevi and non-Alevi secularist intellectuals. According to most of these intellectuals, the ideal of Turkish Islam, as dreamt up by Ziya Gökalp and later by Kemalists, was already materialized by the Alevi. The following pages illustrate how different aspects of this ideal Turkish Islam were formulated by the writers of the magazine.

Figures 12 & 13. The cover pages of the 1st (July 1966) and the 7th (December 1966) issues of the magazine *Cem*.

Alevism as the national religion of the Turks

The Editor of *Cem*, Abidin Özgünay, argued from the first issue onwards that "Alevis, constituting one third of the nation, were genuine Turks in their language, literature, culture, sentiments and ideas". Hence he invited Alevis "to be proud of humanist Alevi thought and to stop behaving like guilty people".[73] Özgünay stated in another article that Alevism was not just a religious belief; it also had national, social and philosophical dimensions. Alevis, on the basis of their Turkish characteristic of admiring freedom and justice, had rejected the Umayyads' despotism, which had ended the democratic rule of the Prophet Muhammed. Hence they had become the symbol of national hegemony. According to this account, Sunnis were also Turkish, but they had been formalist and conservative under the influence of Arab traditionalism. In short, Özgünay contrasted Alevis, who remained purely Turkish despite the Arab influence, with Sunnis, who adopted Arab traditions based on personal political rule and theocratic order.[74]

Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who had for a long time defended Alevism as the continuation of Turkish tribal traditions in Islam, was also among the writers in the magazine. Baltacıoğlu also maintained that Alevism was the genuine Turkish (*öztürk*) response to Arab customs. He stated:

> Alevi groups were Turks who had no choice but to be Alevis because their Turkish customs were totally opposite to the Arab ones which consisted of inequality, male despotism, and a despising attitude towards women, slavery, and indolence.[75]

Other writers of the magazine made similar arguments. Thus, İzzettin Doğan, the son of Hüseyin Doğan Dede and a teaching assistant at Istanbul University Law Faculty at the time,[76] stated that the Alevi religion was the real religion of Turks who resisted the Islam of Arabs:

> Alevism was born as a result of the clash between two state traditions: the state tradition of Islam, based on Caliph-Sultan, and that of Turks, based only on the Sultan. … Turks tried to secularize (*lâisize etmeye*) Islam and ended up in Alevism which became the name of the liberal Turkish religion based on the love of the Prophet and Ali.[77]

Hence, in the eyes of Doğan and other *Cem* writers, Alevism was a form of Islam which was reformed and made adaptable to a secular and liberal order thanks to the Turkish intervention in Islam. This theme – Alevis as genuine Turks who had kept their authentic identity instead of absobring Arab culture – was the one stressed most often in the magazine. Throughout the magazine's different issues, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli was not only referred to as an Alevi saint, but portrayed as a national hero and a great humanist; his life was represented as a nationalist struggle for the Turks.[78] By emphasizing the Turkishness of the Alevi belief, writers in *Cem* not only attempted to legitimize the Alevi, and to increase their self-esteem, but also voiced their demands for a reformed, Turkish Islam, cleansed from Arab influences.

Alevis as true Kemalists

The image of Atatürk as the savior of the Alevis was a further major theme which was unanimously accepted by both Alevi and non-Alevi writers in the magazine. Çetin Özek, for instance, stated in his articles that Alevis who had long been exploited by the Ottoman order were liberated with the transition to the epoch of the nation with Atatürk.[79] According to an article by a lawyer, Muharrem Naci Orhan, Alevis were able to realize their own life-style (*özyaşantılarına kavuştular*) thanks to the reforms of Atatürk. Hence in every Alevi house, he stated, one could see a picture of Atatürk hanging in the most important place of the house, because he was considered as the twelfth imam, Muhammed Mehdi (or *Sahibi Zaman*).[80]

Writers for the magazine emphasized the Alevis' commitment to the Atatürk Revolution (*Atatürk İhtilâli*). İlhan Selçuk wrote that Alevis had proved that they were strong supporters of Atatürkism both during the Independence War and under Republican rule when he answered the

magazine's the survey on Alevism.[81] Baltacıoğlu claimed that there had not been a single Alevi person or Alevi village which had opposed the principles of Atatürk or attacked the busts of Atatürk.[82] Bedri Noyan, claiming to be the *Dedebaba*, the head of the Bektashi order,[83] stated that Alevis were patriotic and Atatürkist people.[84] According to Özgünay, Alevis loved Atatürk without abusing his name.[85] All these writers emphasized the Alevis' admiration of Atatürk and their loyalty to his reforms, in an attempt to declare them as ideal citizens.

Throughout the magazine, the Alevis' relationship to the Kemalist state was interpreted as a harmonious one. While the Alevi support for the Independence War and for the Kemalist reforms was stressed, the revolt of the Dersim Alevis was almost totally ignored. There was a general silence on this last matter throughout the 16 issues of the magazine except for one article by Özgünay addressing the issue. Özgünay asserted that the Dersim event was not a revolt against the state, but the Alevi people's defense of their honor against the gendarmerie who had abused Alevi women.[86] This was the only instance when one of the *Cem* writers wrote about Dersim Alevis, albeit without mentioning the word Kurd. The rebellion was accepted as an Alevi rebellion but explained as a defensive action rather than a challenge to the state.

The association of Alevism with Kemalism was so powerful that Muzaffer Karan, a deputy who responded to the survey of the magazine, stated that "Alevism was a social organization and a progressivist social outlook (*anlayış*) which was based on the principles of nationalism, populism, statism, reformism and secularism; in short, it was Atatürkism itself". A trade-unionist's (Tahsin Tosun Sevinç) idea about Alevism was even more revolutionary. Alevis, according to him, by nature had a socialist world view. He also stated that Alevis were just, tolerant and progressive people and that Kemalist principles would not have been realized without the 13 million Alevis in Turkey.[87] So, for this trade-unionist socialism, Kemalism and Alevism did not contradict each other at all.

According to İzzettin Doğan,[88] recent incitements against Alevis were signs of a counter-revolution against the Atatürk Revolution.[89] Likewise, as Kemal Karsu stated, "one of the causes of the Alevi–Sunni conflict was the fact that Alevis were Atatürkists willing to have a school in their village, to erect Atatürk busts, and to recognize the rights of women and not force them to wear the veil (*çarşaf*)"; and "it was because they embraced the reforms of Atatürk that they were accused of communism or incest (*mum söndü*)".[90] So, in the eyes of these writers, the conflict between Alevis and Sunnis was in fact a conflict between Kemalism and *irtica*.

Cem writers assumed a natural alliance between Alevism and Kemalist secularism. According to Özgünay, for instance, Alevis were the safest and

the most reliable assurance against current religious threats. Alevis had to voice that they were Alevi because this expression of the Alevi identity was not only declaration of a religious belief, but also the indication of readiness to serve Atatürk's Turkey together with enlightened Sunni brothers.[91] In other words, for Özgünay, being an Alevi meant commitment to the secular Republic.

Alevism versus Nurculuk

Cem writers saw the progressive, liberal Turkish Islam in Alevism and contrasted it with what they saw as reactionary, backward and conservative forms of Islam, i.e. the Islam of Arabs and the *Nurcu*s. The latter was seen as a bigoted Sunni movement that modelled itself on Arabic Islam. Nadir Nadi, for instance, columnist in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, stated in his answer to the *Cem* survey that Alevis were strong defenders of progressivism, equality, freedom and civilization against reactionary attitudes and behavior.[92] This perception of Alevism as a liberal and modern religion was shared by many writers in the magazine. Alevism was portrayed by Çetin Özek, for example, as a religion which can adapt itself to the necessities of the age, hence it was the expression of revolution. Özek contrasted Alevism as a liberal religion supporting and benefiting from the reforms of Atatürk with religious currents such as *Nurculuk*, *Süleymancılık* etc., which he said were based on dogmatic and fatalistic interpretations of Islam.[93] According to Özek, the Sunni–Alevi division would occur naturally because *Nurcu*s recognized Arabs as superior race, turned their face towards the Islamic community (*ümmet*), and accepted the most dogmatic and rigid version of Islam.[94]

The ever-increasing threat of *irtica* was a major issue in *Cem*, and it was increasingly identified with *Nurculuk*. Alevis were portrayed as an egalitarian, progressivist group who were against all reactionary movements. The graduates of colleges for preachers and prayer leaders (*imam-hatip okulları*) were seen as a growing army of reactionaries[95] while the "Black Reactionism" (*Kara İrtica*) and fanaticism were said to be spreading under the name of Koran schools.[96] The armies of fanatics were viewed as the remnants of March 31, or the followers of Said Nursî, who were the remains of the Middle Ages, enemies of the *Ehlibeyt* (the house of the Prophet) and humanity, and remnants of Muaviye, the Umayyad caliph who fought against and massacred the army of Ali and his son.[97] Similarly, it was argued that since the death of Atatürk the state had lost its neutrality regarding religion. State and religion had been merged, while only the Hanafi school, and in practice *Nurculuk* was considered within the scope of religion.[98]

In short, the writers in *Cem* were to a great extent under the influence of a Manichean worldview based on the opposing principles of Good and Evil (Vorhoff 1998: 247). In this worldview, Atatürk was interpreted as the savior

of the Alevis and the incarnation of Good, whose era of enlightenment was ended in the 1950s when intolerant, fanatic orthodox Sunnis such as the *Nurcu*s once again gained a foothold in the Turkish state and society" (Ibid.). This Manichean view of Alevi victims versus Sunni oppressors was superimposed on the Kemalist dichotomy of Turkish versus reactionary Islam. Since the late 1950s, the reactionary Muslims were equated with *Nurcu*s, as shown in the previous chapter. This time, Alevis were added to this picture as the representatives of the ideal of Turkish Islam.

Approaches to the DRA

The DRA's bias towards Sunni Islam was also criticized in the magazine. It was argued that the DRA was organized according to the principles of only one *mezhep*, and that functionaries of the DRA had continuously made offending allusions about Alevis, forgetting that they were paid by the taxes of not only Sunni but also Alevi citizens.[99] The DRA was accused of not only neglecting Alevis, but also of promoting *Nurculuk* and betraying secularism from within the state.[100] *Cem* therefore made a public statement questioning the representativeness of the DRA and its bias towards Sunnism.

According to one of the respondents to the survey, Doğan Özgüden, a journalist (and later the publisher of the left-wing magazine *Ant* in 1967–70), the centuries-old policy of oppression against Alevis had arisen because of the DRA, although it had been forgotten with the revolutions of Atatürk.[101]

Cem published two proclamations about the DRA made by Alevi university students, who used the names of the Higher Education Alevi Youth (*Yüksek Öğrenim Alevi Gençleri*) and the Istanbul Higher Education Alevi Youth (*İstanbul Yüksek Tahsil Alevi Gençliği*). Both proclamations protested against the speech made by the DRA's director, Elmalı, and the Government, which tolerated such speeches. They emphasized that the DRA had to be rearranged so as to include the Alevi belief, because it was funded by the taxes of the Alevi citizens too.[102]

Emphasis on national unity

A common concern of the *Cem* writers was to avoid accusations of divisiveness and hence illegality, while still expressing the demands and complaints of the Alevi community. In order to avoid such accusations, on every possible occasion they stressed the importance of national unity, and their commitment to the Republican state and Turkish nationalism. In fact, *Cem*, as an Alevi magazine, was not totally welcomed by all Kemalist intellectuals. For example, Cihad Baban from *Ulus* interpreted the publication of *Cem* as a backlash against Islamist publications and the incitement of the chair of the DRA. He considered such developments as

divisive and called for an end to both in the name of secularism and Turkish unity, before any bloody event was caused.[103]

For the army, the recent public appearance of Alevism and the unveiling of the Alevi–Sunni conflict were part of a communist conspiracy to destroy national unity. The Chief of Staff General Tural's circular about fighting destructive activities and dangerous currents (*zararlı cereyanlarla mücadele*), which was published in newspapers on 22 January 1967, referred to Alevism as a factor which could be used by communists trying to initiate a revolution.[104] Tural's circular, which blamed communism for dividing the Turkish nation along ethnic and religious lines, demonstrated how the Kemalist alliance with Alevis did not find any positive resonance in the upper ranks of the military, for whom the main concern was to protect the assumed national unity, defined mainly by Sunni Islam besides Turkishness. Abidin Özgünay, who criticized Tural's circular, assured him that Alevis were strong anti-communists and real patriots who did not constitute a dangerous factor.[105] Çetin Özek also criticized the circular because it was a typical example of linking all forms of social action to communism. He argued that the conflict was not caused by communist incitements but by the attitude of the ex-Chair of the DRA, and that it was Western imperialism rather than communism which endeavored to destroy national unity in underdeveloped countries.[106] However, despite their emphasis on national unity and Kemalism, Alevis could not escape accusations of factionism. These accusations increased especially after the foundation of an Alevi Party, the Union Party (*Birlik Partisi*) in October 1966.

A political party of Alevis?

Cem, at least at the beginning, was not associated with any of the political parties.[107] In fact, the magazine reflected the disappointment of a section of the educated Alevi groups with the opposition parties such as the RPP and the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT) which saw the Alevi population as a pool of potential votes. Opposition parties, it was argued, had approached Alevis during the election campaigns, although they had in the last instance excluded the Alevi candidates from their lists. According to Özgünay, the WPT politicians especially had misunderstood Alevis, because they had thought that the only cure for Alevis was to organize traditional music evenings and insert the word Alevi into their speeches.[108] The WPT was also criticized because of its "introvertedness", i.e. its confinement to the Grand National Assembly especially after the 1965 elections, and its neglect of its party organization.[109]

Cem, until its closure in 1967, reported on the formation of a political party which for the first time articulated the distinct concerns of the Alevi population.[110] Cemal Özbey, a lawyer, had announced to the newspapers

Akşam and *Cumhuriyet* that a new party would be founded that would appeal to Alevis who were against all kinds of reactionary movements including *Nurculuk*. Following this press release, *Cem* published an article about the preparations for a new party in its second issue in August 1966.[111] It was noted that Alevi intellectuals had begun to organize themselves in order to act against the rise of *Nurculuk* and the recent developments disturbing peace and unity. It was also stated that the party would even be able to form a parliamentary group, because there were already 32 deputies and senators in the Grand National Assembly.

In one sense, the events in Ortaca had prepared the ground for the foundation of an Alevi party (Bayrak 1997: 77). This party was established under the name of *Birlik Partisi* (Union Party) by a group of Alevi politicians on 17 October 1966. The founding members of the party were members of wealthy Alevi families, who were able to gain access to higher education after migrating from rural to urban areas.[112] The first chairman was Hasan Tahsin Berkman (b. 1904), a retired colonel.[113] Abidin Özgünay, the editor of *Cem*, became an active member of the party in Istanbul. Besides Istanbul, the party was organized initially in Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Erzincan, Tunceli, Mersin, İskenderun, Çorum, and Yozgat.[114]

Although there was no statement about religious affiliation in the speeches of the party chairman and in the party program, the party emblem – which was 12 stars encircling a lion, symbolizing Ali and the 12 imams – and several formulations in the party manifesto showed that the Union Party (UP) was aimed at Alevis (Schüler 2000: 223). Hence, the party was accused of being based on a single *mezhep* and abusing it (*mezhepçilik*). For instance, *Akis* referred to the party as a divisive organization, a divisive, *mezhepçi*, party trying to gain Alevi votes with its choice of emblem and by filling its ranks with Alevis and using the symbol of the lion with 12 stars. The secularist order was under threat, according to *Akis*, because this party abused the innocent and offended Alevi masses.[115]

To counter such accusations, *Cem* published an article where it was stated that Alevism meant something beyond its dictionary meaning as a religion. According to *Cem*, 12 million Alevis were not gathered around religious ideas but realist and humanist ideas.[116] In another article in *Cem*, the accusation of *mezhepçilik* was countered with the question whether it was not then logical to claim the same for the RPP and JP because all of their deputies were Sunnis.[117] Lütfi Kaleli also criticized those who called the party "Alevi party" and claimed that the party was against divisiveness, unlike the *Nurcu*s.[118] Similarly, in a meeting of the Istanbul branch on 16 January 1967, the Chair of the Party, Berkman, said that the Party was not a party of Alevis and that its doors were open to people of all religions. Berkman explained the Party's emblem by arguing that the lion symbolized the party's will to gain power.[119]

Berkman also avoided defining the political position of the party in the right–left spectrum. He declared that the party's position was aligned to Kemalist principles and that it was open to all reformist and progressivist citizens.[120] Likewise, the program of the new party made no direct reference to Alevism, while it emphasized religious freedom and the freedom of conscience. The party program included an article stating the party's commitment to rendering the Turkish language dominant in all spheres in Turkey (*Türkçeyi Türkiye'de her sahada hakim kılmak*) (Topkaya 1969: 475). The program dating 1969 stated that religious education was to be in Turkish and not under the monopoly of one religion or *mezhep* (*BP Tüzük ve Program*, 1969; Topkaya 1969: 477–8). In the party's election manifesto in 1969, the need for a reform in the sphere of religious education as well as in the representation of religious and belief groups (*inanç grupları*) in the DRA and the High Council of Religion (*Yüksek Din Şurası*) were accentuated as a measure to ensure the equality between different religious and belief groups and for preventing pressure (*Birlik Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi*, 1969: 4).

The UP did not succeed in uniting the Alevi vote behind itself. The maximum vote it managed to win up until it was dispanded in 1980 was 2.8 per cent in the 1969 general elections. After 1969, the party's program has been transformed into a socialist political party, framing its continuing party emblem as the sign of its "humanism".[121] The experience of the UP showed that a mere Kemalist discourse, emphasizing the use of Turkish in religious education and the need for religious plurality, was not sufficient to unify the Alevi population under its banner as the influence of socialism became stronger among the new generation of Alevis. Hence the party could survive only by adopting a socialist agenda. In other words, the Alevis' adoption of Kemalist rhetoric in opposition to reactionary Islam was incorporated into a socialist discourse until the 1980s.

The most important shift in the discourse of Kemalist secularism in the first years of multi-party democracy was its reformulation as a discourse of the political opposition vis-à-vis the Government. In other words, Kemalist secularism was transformed from an official ideology of the single-party regime into a civil ideology defended by politicians and intellectuals who were autonomous from the Government but identified themselves with the Kemalist regime. This chapter has focused on the mid-1960s, when Kemalist secularism went through another major transformation with the discovery of Alevis as "good Muslims". Kemalist secularism was this time defended in the name of the Alevi religious community against a Sunni-biased (and according to the opposition a *Nurcu*-biased) government.

This discursive shift in the discourse of Kemalist secularism – that is, its articulation with the newly emerging Alevi identity – occurred in a context

where the perceived threat of *irtica* increased. In the mid-1960s, on the one hand, the leaders of the Republican People's Party and secularist intellectuals in the opposition attacked the Justice Party Government because of its alleged tolerance towards *Nurcu*s, who epitomized *irtica*. On the other hand, Alevi intellectuals represented themselves as the guardians of secularism and true inheritors of Turkish Islam. In other words, Alevism began to be presented as the true national and enlightened religion which was suitable to the secularist Republic vis-à-vis reactionary Islam, as epitomized by the *Nurcu* movement.

During the public debates on Alevism, Alevi and non-Alevi Kemalist intellectuals and university students expressed their complaints about discrimination against Alevism within the framework of Kemalist secularism. Alevis used the Kemalist discourse also as a strategy against possible accusations of divisionism based on religious doctrines (*mezhepçilik*). By emphasizing their commitment to Kemalism, they could prove that their intention was not to divide, but to contribute to national unity by ending the discrimination against Alevi citizens. In other words, Kemalist secularism provided them with the legitimacy that they needed in order to express themselves in the public arena.

The alliance between Kemalism and Alevism gained further importance in later years when Alevi groups who were associated with left-wing ideologies fell victim to violent attacks by right-wing extremist nationalist groups who combined their deep-rooted Sunni prejudices about the Alevis with anti-communism. The most serious of such attacks occurred in the city of Kahramanmaraş in 1978. On 23 December 1978, the events that began during the funeral ceremony for two Alevi teachers from the left-wing Turkish Teachers' Union (*TÖB-DER*) resulted in the brutal killing of the Alevi population of the town by right-wing Sunni gangs. The attackers used the slogans of Muslim Turkey (*Müslüman Türkiye*) and targeted the buildings of the RPP and left-wing organizations. Within two days, the areas inhabited by Alevis were ruined, 111 people were killed and hundreds were injured.

Interpretations of the Kahramanmaraş Events in 1978 and the issue of Alevi–Sunni clashes shaped, and were shaped by, the Kemalist memory. *Cumhuriyet* columnists, for instance, saw the Kahramanmaraş Events of December 1978 as the recurrence of the Menemen Incident but on a much larger scale. They set up a parallel between the events in Kahramanmaraş and the Menemen Incident. The popular columnist Uğur Mumcu expressed his abhorrence of the planned massacre in Kahramanmaraş by depicting Derviş Mehmed as an angel compared to the murderers of Kahramanmaraş (yanında zemzemle yıkanmış kadar temiz kalır).[122] Another columnist stated that the mentality which beheaded Kubilay was the same mentality which was behind the genocide in Kahramanmaraş.[123] The events were depicted as

the rise of *irtica* and primitiveness and a new March 31, which had been fuelled by the exploitation of religion since 1945 under the guise of democracy.[124] In short, by associating the victims of the Kahramanmaraş Events with Kubilay, left-wing Kemalist writers of the late 1970s projected Alevis as natural allies of Kemalist secularism as opposed to Sunni fanatics and reactionaries. Interestingly, the memory of the Menemen Incident and March 31 continued to influence and to be influenced by the way the present conflict between the dark forces of reactionary Islam and enlightened secularist forces was perceived. The memory of these events linked the past and present victims of reactionary Islam.

The incorporation of Alevis into the Kemalist secularist narrative of victimization by the dark forces of *irtica* was further crystallized after the Sivas Event of 2 July 1993. This time, the participants of an Alevi cultural festival in the city of Sivas were attacked by an organized crowd of Sunni fanatics using slogans such as "Damn Secularism!" and "Muslim Turkey!" The arson of the hotel, where Alevi and non-Alevi artists and intellectuals (including Aziz Nesin, the famous novelist, who had earned the hatred of radical Islamists with his unconcealed atheism) were staying, resulted in the death of 37 of them. The Sivas Event and the assassination of several secularist intellectuals – including Uğur Mumcu – in a context of rising popularity of the Islamist movement in the 1990s revived the Kemalist fear of violent religious reactionism and the urge to resist it. Hence, Kemalist secularism in the 1990s emerged as a civil movement driven by a victim psychology, but, paradoxically, defending the founding ideology of the Republic (Erdoğan 2001: 246).

The alliance between Kemalism and Alevism gained further importance in later years, especially in the 1990s. As stated by several scholars, the representation of Alevism as a liberal, progressive religion and worldview, and the stress on an assumed natural alliance between secularism and Alevis reached a peak in the 1990s (Ocak 1991; Çamuroğlu 1998; Vorhoff 1998; Livni 2002; Bozarslan 2003; Okan 2004). However, the emergence of this "myth of the Alevis as the guardians of secularism" (Çamuroğlu 1998: 114–15) has often been seen by scholars as a new phenomenon which replaced the leftist paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s, when Alevi identity and socialist ideologies were intertwined. However, as stressed by Bozarslan and Okan, and as the previous pages have illustrated in detail, what might be called the "pro-Alevi Kemalist secularism" of today is a discourse which has its roots back in the 1960s (Okan 2004: 128; Bozarslan 2003).

Conclusion

Kemalist secularism redefined Islam on the basis of an opposition between Turkish Islam (personal, enlightened, rational, national) and reactionary Islam (political, backward, superstitious, Arab). This conception of Islam has been the most important legacy of the Kemalist elite of the early Republican period to the later period of multi-party democracy in Turkey. The transition to democracy after the end of the single-party rule of the Republican People's Party (RPP) in 1946, and the transfer of power to the Democratic Party following its landslide victory in the general elections of 1950, marked the beginning of a new phase for secularism.

With the development of political parties and their different articulations of national identity and the state, Kemalists were no longer alone in their claim to represent the nation and the secular state. Kemalist nationalism, which framed the Ottoman past as a decadent period and radical changes under the single party rule as the peak of Turkish history, was challenged by the new ideological wave of conservative nationalism. The latter considered Islam to be a crucial constituent of national identity and based national pride on the counter-memory of pre-Republican/Ottoman/Islamic glories. Ideologues of this conservative nationalism formulated an alternative secularism which clashed with Kemalist conception of Islam.

Although Kemalist secularism remained a state-imposed ideology and the dominant official discourse, it could no longer be identified with the ruling government. In the context of relative democratization of the political sphere, Kemalists began their struggle for hegemony, aiming to fight "reactionary Islam" (*irtica*) through other (civil society) means, now that the state was no longer a possible tool or rather suspected of being in alliance with creeping *irtica*.

The Kemalist political and intellectual elite, searching to build hegemony under the challenge of alternative reconstructions of the past, had recourse to a specific politics of memory. The latter was marked by a politically motivated and selective use of the past which sacralized and mythified the secularist policies of the single-party period, reproducing the fear of *irtica* through the use of the memory of past "reactionary" events. This politics of memory, based on standardized and formulaic narrativization, manipulation

or oblivion of selected past events, was crucial for the reproduction of the Kemalist conception of Islam. The past and present were linked in such a way in these narratives that present social events or actors appeared as mere repetitions or replicas of those of the past. Formulaic and conventionalized memories of "bad Muslims" (for instance Derviş Mehmed) and of "good Muslims" (for instance Alevis) linked the past, present and future. The consequent mythical narratives of continuity not only erased the reality of historical events from memory but also neglected the specificity of the present (Bora 2004).[1] In other words, the remembered past and the present mutually shaped and constrained each other in these mythical narratives (Olick and Levy 1997: 922).

This politics of memory reproduced a specific perception of Islam, centered on the distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims, which has been at the very root of Kemalist secularism. Different chapters of the book have thus shown how the "good" (apolitical/peaceful/ harmless/Turkish) and "bad" (reactionary/political/dangerous/foreign) Muslims were constructed in opposition to each other by leading political and intellectual actors in the printed press. This Manichean discourse of Kemalist secularism shaped not only public debates but also the actions of civil society groups, political parties and the state although it was no longer necessarily adopted by the political leaders of the respective governments. While Kemalist secularism went through major shifts with the involvement of new actors raising their voices in the public debates on secularism in the 1950s and 1960s, it continued to build on this Manichean discourse on Islam up to today.

Postscript

The Kemalist politics of memory continues with the increasing influence of Kemalist secularism in the form of Non-Governmental Organizations since the early 1990s. These organizations are marked by their identification with the state and their regeneration of state ideology through "nonstate and market-related concepts such as voluntarism, enthusiasm, and mass participation" (Özyürek 2006: 149; Erdoğan 2000; Navaro-Yashin 2002). This "neo-Kemalism" is more than ever stressing the threat of *irtica* and the need to suppress it with authoritarian measures as in the single-party period. It also attempts to counter *irtica* and to strengthen the masses' attachment to Kemalist secularism by framing the latter as a sacred heritage. The sacralization of Kemalist secularism occurs not only through the glorification of Atatürk as the symbol of secularism by means of an obsessive use of his image and sayings on all occasions (Ibid.). As this book has demonstrated, Kemalist secularism is also based on the use of selective memory which aims to keep the fear of *irtica* alive, which in turn reproduces its Manichean view

of Islam. Today's Kemalists see the current government of the Justice and Development Party as the infiltration of *irtica* into the state. Hence the editorial of *Cumhuriyet* on 18 May 2006 – written after the attack against the Council of State which had upheld the ban on the headscarf (described in the preface) – reads as follows:

> This power which is devoid of civilization, that is *irtica*, has entered in a process of empowerment at the beginning of the 21st century and has made its first steps in transforming itself into a state. Unless the Kemalist secularist forces of this country awaken, and they unite and end their indifferent and insensible attitude, it will be too late for penitence.[2]

The fear of surrendering the state to *irtica* expressed the feelings of those thousands of people who protested against the attack on the Council of State by flooding into the Mausoleum of Atatürk on 17 May 2006. The question thus arises whether a secularist discourse that is free of a perception of threat will ever be possible in Turkey. This book is written in the hope that it will contribute to the emergence of such a fear-free secularist discourse.

Notes

Preface

1 In the original prints of the advertisment, green letters were written in reverse and likened to Arabic script. The small note at the bottom of the advertisement read: "Reclaim/Protect your Republic" (here the word "Republic" refers both to the newspaper and the regime). This slogan had been fashionable among secularist activists since the mid-1990s. The newspaper's advertisement inspired in turn a new slogan, "We are aware of the danger" (*Tehlikenin farkındayız*), which was to be used during several mass demonstrations held in the following weeks.

2 *Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 2006; *Turkish Daily News*, 19 May 2006.

3 *Turkish Daily News*, 19 May 2006.

4 "Laikliğe Kurşun", *Milliyet,* 18 May 2006; Ertuğrul Özkök, "Cumhuriyet'in 11 Eylül'ü", *Hürriyet*, 18 May 2006.

5 For the Government's reaction against this decision, see the newspapers of 12 February 2006.

6 According to the prosecutor of the Ergenekon trial, the attack at the Council of the State was one of the plots of the Ergenekon "terror organisation (…) aiming to create an atmosphere of serious crisis, chaos, anarchy and terror and finally instigate a military coup". BBC News, 23 October 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/ europe/7684578.stm

7 Although its civil characteristic has been limited by its upholders' identification with the state (Erdoğan 2000; Navaro-Yashin 2002), Kemalist secularism is now "civil" ideology so far as it has been appropriated by non-governmental actors who can mobilize masses to protect the secular regime.

Introduction

1 In this seminal work, Said focused on the Anglo-French experience of colonialism and showed that the unequal relationship between the colonial world and the colonized world was reflected in and in turn reproduced by the way non-Western societies were represented and studied by Western scholars. According to Said, Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the imagined "Orient" and "Occident". These are, however, not real geographical places but historical and discursive fictions, which projected Western fears, fantasies and desires, creating an Other, against which, opposing Western identities were constructed.

2 Boroujerdi defines "Orientalism in reverse" as a discourse used by "oriental" intellectuals and political elites to claim to, recapture, and finally impropriate their "true" and "authentic" identity, "as a counterknowledge to Europe's oriental narrative". Besides uncritically embracing Orientalism's assumption of a fundamental ontological difference between Orient and Occident, Orientalism in reverse essentializes the West, and its

particularity, and nurtures nativist and nationalist sentiments (1991: 11–14). See also Al-Azm 2000; Al-Azmeh 1996; Ahıska 2003.

3 According to Al-Azm, except in the field of family law, nothing is administered in the Muslim world along the lines of the Islamic law, because the role of Islam has receded in all spheres of public life, such as the market place, the university, the court, etc. It is this everyday reality of secularization in the sense of Islam's isolation from public life that created a Muslim fundamentalist reaction.

4 This state tradition, which has often been emphasized by historians in order to establish historical roots for secularization in Turkey, has recently been criticized for retrospectively reconstructing the Ottoman past as "secular" (Mert 1992: 53–5; Çitak 2004: 9).

5 For an account of the literature on the Hamidian era, see Özbek 2004.

6 In 1889, some students of the Military Medical Academy founded a secret constitutionalist organization under the name of *İttihad-i Osmanî Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Unity Society). Exiled to Paris under the pressure of the Hamidian regime, they organized this time under the name *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) and called themselves "Young Turks" (as *Jeunes Turcs* in French) (Zürcher 1997: 91).

7 The sale of this translation was prohibited by the Young Turk cabinet of İbrahim Hakkı Paşa in 1910, because both the book and Cevdet's preface were found to be "anti-Islamic" (Mardin 1969: 14).

8 The writers of this magazine, which was funded by the Young Turk (CUP) Government, were trained in both traditional and modern schools. Among its other writers were Besim [Atalay] (1882–1965), M. Şemsettin [Günaltay] (1883–1961), Şerafettin [Yaltkaya] (1879–1949) and Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (Fuat Köprülü, 1890–1966), who were eager defenders of reform in Islam (Berkes 1964: 377–84; Arai 1992: 83–95).

9 The definition of "secularism" in Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary: "the doctrine that ethical standards and conduct should be determined exclusively with reference to the present life and social well-being without reference to religion" (2003).

10 Official ideology refers to "an action-oriented belief system supported by a particular group or class [which] is embedded in official-legal documents and institutions of a state; [which] incorporates a vision of the ideal state, and belief in which is compulsory, furthermore unorthodoxy is punishable" (Friedrich et al., *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd ed. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965] pp. 21–2; quoted in Bağçe 2001: 14).

11 Kemalism here refers to an ideology, in the sense of "a wider and long-term framework for directing the social and political world" and not "just a practical 'action plan' in a narrow sense" (Parla 1992: 22). Kemalism's principles, including secularism, are declared in the programs of the Republican People's Party, which appropriated the ideas of its founder and the first President of the Republic Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as its institutional ideology.

12 As a result of dramatic changes in the ethnic and religious composition of the population during the First World War, the proportion of Muslims living within the boundaries of Turkey increased even more. While Muslims constituted 80 per cent of the population before the war, this percentage was 87.5 per cent after the war (Aktar 2003: 81).

13 Although the Ottoman word *inkılâb* is translated into English as "revolution" here, it should be noted that it implies a "radical change" which is "executed with order and method", in contrast to the Ottoman words *ihtilâl* conveying "the idea of a sudden and violent change in the political and social order", and *ıslâhat*, meaning "reform" or "partial improvements in certain limited sectors of social life" (Dumont 1984: 34).

14 Announced in the 63rd issue of the official newspaper on 6 March 1924.

15 The Sheikh ul-Islam had already been removed from the Council of Ministers in 1917 and his ministry was transformed into a department. However, because Sheikh ul-Islam Dürrizade Abdullah had issued a *fatwa* denouncing the nationalist movement in Ankara

during the Independence War, the Ankara Government perceived this institution as a major threat to its sovereignty and an obstacle for its secularizing reforms.

16 See for example, Kılıçzâde Hakkı's draft westernization plan written in 1913 which included reforms, such as providing equal opportunities for women in education, banning of religious clothing and the *fez*, closing down of religious seminaries, the abolition of Sufi orders, the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one, the adoption of European civil law, as well as reforming religion according to the tenets of positive sciences. His inventions like introducing a 6th tenet of Islam – carrying of rifle or convening on Fridays at shooting ranges – were fortunately not implemented in the Republican period ("Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku", *İçtihad* 4, no. 55 [21 February, 1328/1913], pp. 1226–58. For the transliterated version of the article into Latin script, see Cündioğlu [1999: 161–72]).

17 Polygamy was not widespread, at least in Istanbul. According to the census of 1885, only 2.7 per cent of all married men in Istanbul were married to more than one woman. In 1927, this proportion would drop to 2.16 per cent (Duben and Behar 1996: 161).

18 The *fez* was first adopted in 1829 by Sultan Mahmud II, and had gained a religious value only in the late nineteenth century "as a mark of religious nationalism among the Muslims and a sign of loyalty to the Khalifa" (Berkes 1964: 125). In 1925, the *fez* symbolized the Ottoman and Islamic past which Mustafa Kemal wanted to disregard for the sake of westernization. Among several reforms which secularized the political, legal, educational and cultural spheres, one of the most resisted was this so-called "Hat Revolution" of 28 October 1925. Seen as a symbol of infidelity, the new European-style hat was protested against in several provinces, such as Kayseri (22 November), Erzurum (24 November), Rize (25 November) and Maraş (26 November), and resulted in several death sentences (Sencer 1968: 134; Özek 1968: 155; Tunaya 2003: 176–8).

19 This and all of the translations of the original texts in Turkish into English are made by the author.

20 According to Durakbaşa (1998), this "new woman" was "socially active", "biologically functioning" to fulfil her duties as a mother and wife and "feminine" in order to accompany men in public entertainment. Göle also shows the formation of the Kemalist female identity as "a woman serving the nation by undertaking 'motherly' occupations" such as teacher, nurse etc. (1996: 70). See also Kandiyoti (1987: 317–38).

21 While the population within the borders of present-day Turkey was 15 million according to the Ottoman population census of 1906, the population of the country in 1927 was 13.6 million. The percentage of non-Muslims within this population on the other hand had dropped from 20 per cent to 2.5 per cent (Aktar 2003: 81).

22 Minority communities were entitled by the (42nd article) Lausanne Treaty to practice their own conventional rules jointly with the Turkish legislation in the field of family law. However, with the enforcement of the Civil Code on all citizens in 1926, Jewish, Armenian and Greek communities declared that they renounced that privilege (Akar 2001: 28).

23 Non-Muslim minorities were exposed to several discriminatory practices which aimed at the creation of an urban Muslim class. Such policies and and practices included restriction of employment in state services to non-Muslim citizens between 1926 and 1958 (Öktem 2004); resolutions enforcing the use of the Turkish language in foreign companies in the 1920s (Akar 2001: 28–9); restriction of some occupations (for example, musician, photographer, hairdresser, industrial worker, etc.) only to Turks in 1932 (Akar 2001: 30); the 1934 campaign against the Jewish population in Thrace, whose houses and shops were pillaged and burned down during four days without state intervention (Ibid.: 30; Bali 2000: 246–7, 522–3); the Wealth Tax of 1942–4 which was imposed on non-Muslims (Aktar 2000).

24 The fact that religion played an important role in the definition of a national identity and that it continued to be administered by the state contradicts with the constitutional principle of secularism. One can even argue, like Dâver (1955) and Toprak (1981), that the Republican state, although it rejected Islam as the basis of its legitimacy, is only a "semi-secular" state because of its control over instead of separation from religion. This "lack in secularity" was due to the redefinition and instrumentalization of religion by secular nationalism. As Bozarslan (2000b) maintained, secularism in Turkey has been in continuity with the Ottoman tradition of integrating and subordinating Islam to the requirements of state. Kemalists accommodated Islam in their nationalist ideology instead of replacing it, a process also experienced by other majority-Muslim nations of the Middle East (Ibid.).

25 Velid Ebu'z-Ziyâ, "İrtica Hezeyanı", *Tevhid-i Efkâr*, 28 Teşrinievvel 1339/1923 (quoted in Albayrak 1990a: 41).

26 As Zürcher (2001a) had also pointed out, it is interesting that Sina Akşin's work, entitled *31 Mart Olayı* (1970), was published in its later editions under the title *Şeriatçı Bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayı*" (1994), reflecting a change in the political emphasis of the writer.

27 İsmet İnönü, "İnönü'nün Hatıraları: İstibdattan Demokrasiye; İstanbul'daki İrtica Vak'ası", *Akis*, 7 March 1959, pp. 14–15.

28 For further explorations of the concept of *irtica*, see Özipek (2004) and Brocket (2006).

29 For two different views on this, see Yeğen (2001) and Çelik (2001).

30 This was argued by Anderson who stated that "nationalism has to be understood by aligning it ... with the large cultural systems (in this case religion) that preceded it, out of which as well as against which it came into being" (1991: 19).

31 Several studies have so far shown how Kemalist myths were created during the authoritarian single-party regime, as a part of its attempt to create a national consciousness. See Ersanlı Behar 1996; Copeaux 2006; Aydın 2003.

32 Within the literature on "collective memory", inspired by Maurice Halbwachs who emphasized the *social contextualization* of all individual memories, the studies of "politics of memory" examine "the ways in which collective memory creates a particular periodization and evaluation of the past and turns certain events into political myths" (Zerubavel 1995: xviii). See Halbwachs 1980 [1950]); Halbwachs, 1992 [1925]. What Zerubavel calls mnemonic battles, are "fought over the 'correct' way to interpret the past and involve not just individuals but entire communities … fought in the public arena (in newspaper editorials or, in radio talk shows)" (1996: 296).

33 Olick and Robbins, in their review article on collective memory, refer to Michel Foucault as the originator of the concept of "counter-memory": "In order to resist the disciplinary power of nationalist historiography, Foucault articulates this notion of 'counter-memory', referring to memories that differ from, and often challenge, dominant discourses" (1998: 126). The concept of counter-memory calls attention to the "residual or resistant strains [of memory] that withstand official versions of historical continuity" (Davis and Starn 1989: 2).

34 For a similar use of the concept of "politics of memory" in the Turkish context and different examples of the subversion of the Republican past, see Özyürek (2007).

35 For a review article on sociology of intellectuals see Kurzman and Owens 2002: 63–90.

36 The literacy rate doubled in the decade 1935–45, from 15.58 per cent to 30.22 per cent. Turkish Statistical Institute (http://www.tuik.gov.tr). The present thesis is a study of the elite, as far as it is limited to intellectuals and the reading public who had access to the printed media. The reception of the secularist discourse at a wider societal level will be covered, only to the extent that it was reflected in the printed media.

Chapter 1

1 Excerpt from an epic poem written about the Menemen Incident by the poet Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca: *Kubilay Destanı* (1968). Also published in *Üç Şehitler Destanı* (1999). (Kubilay's headless body fell onto the floor/ Like the branch of an olive tree/ A book fell from his pocket and flew away towards the sky)

2 Excerpt from an article written by Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), a prominent Kemalist intellectual, diplomat and novelist. "Fehmi Kubilay'ın Canhıraş Şehadeti", *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, 31 December 1930. (Derviş Mehmet is a sign, a shadow.)

3 *Akşam*, *Hürriyet, Turkish Daily News* etc., 18 May 2006. The speaker was Kemal Anadol, deputy leader of the Republican People's Party group in the Grand National Assembly.

4 The most referred to and comprehensive source on the event: Üstün 1990. Kemalist account of the event can also be seen in Baydar 1954; Kırhan 1963; Saraçoğlu 1966; Karahan 1981; Çetinkaya 1995; Tunaya 1962: 186; Lewis 1968: 411; Özek 1968: 158–9; Goloğlu 1972: 303–9; Sencer 1968: 137–8; Çağatay 1972: 33–4; Kili 1982: 177–8.

5 The Naqshbandi order, which took its name from Sheikh Baha ud-Din Naqshband of Bukhara (d. 1390), was introduced in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century. The order is characterized by "its concern for the integrity of the *Shari'a*" and "for the replacement of *adat* – customary law – by ordinances of the *Shari'a* in several places" (Algar 1990: 14–15).

6 For the separation between "historical" and "commemorated" events see Schwartz (1982: 377).

7 "Icon" is used here in the wider sense of the term, i.e. as an "enduring symbol" *American Heritage Dictionary* (1997). Barry Schwartz's definition of the term as "any graven image of an event or human being society deems worthy of commemoration" is useful for our purposes (1982: 377).

8 Ağaoğlu explained this silence with "the introverted and sly nature of the Oriental milieus" which is a legacy of despotic rule (Ağaoğlu 1994: 147).

9 One of these political parties was the Workers and Farmers Party (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi*), which was founded in Edirne on 29 August 1930, and immediately closed down under charges of communism. The other was the Popular Republican Party (*Ahali Cumhuriyet Partisi*), which was founded in Adana on 29 September and dissolved on 21 January 1931 by the decision of the Council of Ministers (Tunaya 1952: 635–8).

10 Fethi Okyar was he former Prime Minister (1924–5) and the ambassador to Paris since 1925 (Ibid.: 622–35). For the history of this short-lived opposition party, also see Ağaoğlu 1994; Okyar and Seyitdanlıoğlu 1997; Weiker 1973; Yetkin 1997; Emrence 2000 and 2006; Koçak 2006.

11 The export-oriented agricultural sector was severely hit in this period by the reduction in the prices of crops such as grapes, olives, etc. by up to 50 per cent. Producers' conditions were also worsened by new taxes imposed on this sector (Pamuk and Owen 1998: 16; Keyder 1987: 95–6, 101; Tekeli and İlkin 1977: 86–7; Bozarslan 1991: 77). Besides this, state monopolization in sectors such as tobacco, alcohol and sugar had worsened the economic condition of the commercial bourgeoisie (Sencer 1971: 142).

12 The visits of the FRP leaders to other cities in the region, such as Balıkesir, where they were welcomed by groups carrying green banners inscribed with the Arabic inscription "There is no god other than Allah", might have frightened the RPP leaders (Karaosmanoğlu 1999: 102).

13 The number of these constituencies according to Weiker is around 30 (1973: 115), 42 according to Emrence (2000), and 40 according to Koçak (2006: 340).

14 Some writers could even argue that the FRP had to be closed "*because* it incited the Menemen Incident" [emphasis is by the author], ignoring the fact that the FRP was closed one month before the incident (Kili 1982: 169; Orga 1958: 177).

15 The records of the court martial, which tried the suspects of the incident between 15 January 1931 and 16 February 1931, were published as an appendix to the written proceedings of the Grand National Assembly in 1931: "Menemen hadisesini ika ve teşkilâtı esasiye kanununu cebren tağyire teşebbüs edenlerden 37 şahsın ölüm cezasına çarptırılması hakkında 3/564 numaralı Başvekâlet tezkeresi ve Adliye Encümeni mazbatası", 31 January 1931, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, 25 (3), no. 4. These court records – which will be referred to as "TBMM 1931" in the following pages – were used also in earlier accounts of the event, such as that of Üstün (1990), Kan Demir (1931), Saraçoğlu (1966) and Özek (1968).

16 There is limited information on the protagonists of the rebellion. According to the court records, Derviş Mehmed worked as an official in the Municipal Marriage Office and later as a village guard for seven years in Manisa province, where he married a woman from the village of Paşa Köy (TBMM 1931: 16, 47, 51). He was killed during the skirmish at the end of the uprising, as were his two companions, Sütçü Mehmed and Şamdan Mehmed. Other members of the group, namely Mehmed Emin (b. 1902, literate, married, with one child), Nalıncı Hasan (b. 1910, illiterate, single), Küçük (Giritli) Hasan (b. 1913, single), and Çoban Ramazan (b. 1909, illiterate, married) were tried in the court martial (Ibid.: 5). See Figures 5–7 for the portraits of the first three, published in 1931 in a photo album about the Menemen Incident. *"Menemen'de Kubilay Hadisesi." Hadise'den sonra mahalli vak'aya giden Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya beyle Ordu Müfettişi Fahrettin Paşa Menemen'de tahkikat yaparlarken şehit edilen mülazim Kubilay ve hadiseyi ika edenler* (Foto Etem). İstanbul: Eski Milliyet Fotografı.

17 Although the Naqshbandi order is characterized by its choice of silent *zikir* (Ar. *dhikr*, recital of the name of God), this was abandoned in Turkey and replaced by vocal *zikir* (Algar 1990: 14–15).

18 The Surat al-Kahf in the Koran tells the story of *Eshab-ı Kehf* (Ar. *Ashab al-Kahf*, 18: 9–26), the seven (or three or five) youths, who in the Christian tradition are usually called the "Seven Sleepers of Ephesus", a group who fled into a cave to be able to remain true to the belief in one God and slept miraculously for 309 years, which appeared to them as one day (Paret 2003). See also *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. III (1991: 466).

19 The *Mehdi* is the name given in the Islamic belief to the messianic figure that, as "the restorer of religion and justice", "will rule before the end of the world" (Madelung 2003).

20 For a later article of the same author on the event see Bozarslan (2000). See also Öz (2007) for a more recent account focusing on the event as a messianic movement.

21 As also pointed at by Öz, this place where the rebels had camped is today called "Mehdi Çamlığı" (Pine Grove of the Mehdi) (2007: 36).

22 Mehmet Emin said during his interrogation that Mehdi Mehmet was a disciple of Hoca Saffet Efendi (TBMM 1931: 8). During his trial in the court martial, Saffet Efendi said that he was a faithful official of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and did not have any relation with the rebels (Ibid.: 21–2). He was then acquitted by the court.

23 According to a witness, Mehmed Yetimoğlu, who had a barber shop during the event, "nothing would have happened if Kubilay had not held the rebels by their collar". Yetimoğlu had told the court that he had not seen the rebels, although he had in fact seen them, as those, who said they had, were hanged. "İşte Menemen Olayının İçyüzü", (Interview by Sadullah Amasyalı, Şirin Kabakçı, Mehmed Deniz), *Zaman*, 23–9 December 1988.

24 According to the report of *Cumhuriyet* (25 December 1930) and the accounts by Özek and Üstün, Mehdi Mehmed also drank the blood of Kubilay (Özek 1968: 159; Üstün 1990: 24).

25 "Gazi Hz.'nin mektubu", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 December 1930. The original message contained the following fragments: "... Kubilay Beyin şehadetinde mürtecilerin gösterdiği vahşet karşısında Menemen'deki ahaliden bazılarının alkışla tasvipkar bulunmaları bütün

Cumhuriyetçi ve vatanperverler için utanılacak bir hadisedir. ... İstilanın acılığını tatmış bir muhitte genç ve kahraman zabit vekilinin uğradığı tecavüzü milletin bizzat Cumhuriyete karşı bir sui kast telakki ettiği ve mütecavizler ile müşevvikleri ona göre takip edeceği muhakkaktır. ... Büyük ordunun kahraman genç zabiti ve Cumhuriyetin mefkureci muallim heyetinin kıymetli uzvu Kubilay B. temiz kanı ile Cumhuriyetin hayatiyetini tazelemiş ve kuvetlendirmiş olacaktır."

26 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* 24 (3), no. 4, 1 (January 1931), p. 3. (Menemen gibi memleketin gerek umran bilhassa irfan itibarile ileri olan bir mıntıkasında bu teşekküller nasıl işleyebiliyor: insana hüzün veren şey budur.)

27 *Yarın*, 30 December 1930, pp. 1, 3.

28 *Yarın*, 4 January 1931.

29 This meeting was attended by the Prime Minister İsmet, President of the Grand National Assembly Kazım [Özalp] Paşa, Minister of Internal Affairs Şükrü Kaya, Defense Minister Zekai Bey, and army inspector Fahrettin Paşa. Kazım Özalp's memoirs were published in the newspaper *Milliyet* in 1969: "Özalp, Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor: Kubilay Şehit Ediliyor", *Milliyet*, 22 November 1969. For Fahrettin Altay's notes of this meeting, see his memoirs: *Görüp Geçirdiklerim, 10 Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası* (1970: 433–40).

30 Martial law, which introduced a restriction on traveling and communication and applied censorship in the press, remained in force until 8 March 1931. Meanwhile the court martial, which was temporarily based in the town's school, worked 15 January–16 February 1931. General Mustafa Muğlalı, the chief of the court martial, was also tried by the court martial in 1950 under the accusation of having illegally executed 32 persons in Van-Özalp in 1943. Condemned to 20 years of imprisonment (on 2 March 1950), he died in hospital in December 1951. As pointed by Özgen, Muğlalı's destiny would be interpreted by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Suat Akgül and Kenan Esengin as the revenge of the Naqshbandis (Tunçay 1999: 304; Akgül and Esengin 2001: 32; Özgen 2003: 61–3).

31 For instance, some Mevlevi sheikhs were arrested in Konya (*Yarın*, 8 January 1931). An old woman was caught by the police while she was lighting a candle on the tomb of Laleli Baba, in the quarter of Laleli in Istanbul (*Son Posta*, 6 January 1931); and in Çanakkale, a group around a Kadiri sheikh, Ali Ulvi, was accused of forming a secret society to depose the Government. *Son Posta*, 16 February 1931; quoted in Kıvılcımlı (1980: 206).

32 Josef Hayim denied the allegations against him in the court (TBMM 1931: 23, 26). His sister, Raşel Biton, in vain wrote a letter to the head of the court martial, about his innocence and his being a member of the Jewish community obedient to the fatherland (Ibid.: 84). When the chief of the court martial Mustafa Muğlalı was later interviewed by Celal Kırhan, the author of a booklet on Kubilay, about his decision to hang a Jew, his answer was: "I would not hesitate to burn down all Anatolia in the case of even the smallest anti-revolutionary incident" (quoted in Barlas 1966; Akgül and Esengin 2001: 33).

33 Islamist accounts of the event claim that Sheikh Esad was poisoned in the hospital. For instance see İslamoğlu (1998: 117).

34 For instance, Yunus Nadi, "Mürettep bir irtica karşısındayız", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 December 1930.

35 *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1930. The association of the rebellion with Çerkes Ethem was in line with the trend in the period to relate every anti-state movement to him (Tunçay 1999: 304, fn: 13). For a recent study on Çerkes Ethem, see Cilasun (2004).

36 *Cumhuriyet* was founded in Istanbul on 7 May 1924, by Yunus Nadi. Nadi was a journalist and a veteran fighter in the War of Independence, as well as being a friend of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a member of the parliament. His newspaper was considered a representative of the Kemalist principles (Şapolyo 1971: 228; Weiker 1973: 82). For a study on *Cumhuriyet*, see Ertem and Doğan (2001).

37 Yunus Nadi, "Menemen'deki İrticai Hareket", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1930.

38 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* 24 (3), no. 4, (1 January 1931), p. 4.

39 For the discussion between Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Saip Bey, the deputy of Urfa, during the session in the Grand National Assembly, see ibid.: 9.
40 Yusuf Ziya, "İrtica", *Akbaba*, 29 December 1930.
41 *TBMM. Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol 24 (3), no. 4, 1 January 1931, pp. 7–9. Also in Ağaoğlu (1994: 109 f.).
42 Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Vicdan Azabı Duymayanlara", *Son Posta*, 12 January 1931.
43 Yakup Kadri, "Fehmi Kubilay'ın Canhıraş Şehadeti", *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, 31 December 1930.
44 According to a report in the daily newspaper *Son Posta*, there were 52 lodges of the Naqshbandi order in Istanbul alone at that time. *Son Posta*, 2 January 1931.
45 Sheikh (Muhammed) Esad (b. Irbil, Northern Iraq, 1848), was a Halidî/Kadirî sheikh and the postnişin at the the Kelami lodge in Kocamustafapaşa, Istanbul in 1888 (Algar 1990: 34–5). He was exiled to Irbil by Sultan Abdulhamid II until 1909. Later in 1914, he was appointed by Sultan Reşad as the *Şeyhü'l-Meşayih*, the head of all Sufi orders in the country (İslamoğlu 1998: 109). For an account of the life at his *tekke*, see the memoirs of Carl Vett, a Swiss theologist and anthropologist, who stayed in the *tekke* for 14 days, before its closure (*Seltsame Erlebnisse in einem Derwischkloster*, 1931; translated into Turkish by Asil and Koç, under the title of *Tekke Günlüğü*, 2004). Among the spiritual followers of Sheikh Esad were Halil Efendi of Düzce, Nuri Efendi of Sarıyer, Hulusi Efendi of Beykoz, Muhyiddin Efendi of Bolu and Sami Ramazanoğlu (Algar 1990: 35). The latter who lived until 1984 would be one of the most important Naqshbandi sheikhs of the Republican period.
46 Laz İbrahim had resided in Horos Köy since 1928, a village populated by immigrants from the Balkans who knew little about Islamic practices. He therefore taught these people basic practices, such as how to pray (TBMM 1931: 37).
47 According to the reporter of *Cumhuriyet*, just after their arrest, they had accused the prosecutor of infidelity and claimed that their leader Mehmed was the *Mehdi* and who would be resurrected (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1930, quoted in Kıvılcımlı 1980: 230).
48 Brocket too contends that the event was not a "Naqshbandi plot", because if it were so, it would be set somewhere more remote and would receive much larger popular support (1999: 56).
49 "Gazi Hz.'nin mektubu", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 December 1930.
50 *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1930.
51 Although there is no direct reference to the old legends of *kesik baş* (severed head) in these accounts, one can find a parallel between the narration of the beheading of Kubilay and the old Islamic/Turkish legends and epics, such as *Dasitan-ı Kesik-baş* or several local legends about the conquest of Anatolian towns. For a historical study on the widespread legends and the cult of *kesik baş* in Anatolia and Balkans, see Ocak (1989).
52 According to Kan Demir, Kubilay had once told his friends about his dream of changing everybody's name to a pure Turkish name (1931: 50).
53 In the words of Kubilay's wife, Fatma Vedide, who was interviewed by the journalist Çetinkaya in 1983, he was not religious and was committed to the Kemalist regime. In her words again, both Kubilay and herself had "adopted the reforms of Atatürk, the great savior" and they were proud of being the first couple in Aydın to have a civil marriage under the Civil Code adopted in 1926 (Çetinkaya 1995: 11–12).
54 *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 January 1931, quoted in Kara 2002: 187–8. Necip Fazıl (Kısakürek, 1905–83) "converted" to Islam under the spiritual influence of a Naqshbandi sheikh from Istanbul who was also among those who were arrested after the Menemen Incident. See his autobiography *O ve Ben* (1974).
55 Aydın shows in detail that the regime aimed to create a "revolutionary religion" and "to convert people from their traditional religious ties to the new revolutionary faith" (2003: 263).

56 For early examples of the mythification of Kubilay, see Kan Demir 1931; Enver Behnan [Şapolyo] 1934: 95–100.
57 *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1931, 23–24 December 1932.
58 *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1931. Üstün 1990, pp. 116–17.
59 Ratip Aşir Acudoğlu (1898–1957) had studied in the Academy Fine Arts in Munich in 1920 and later in Paris. He was at the time a teacher of painting in Edirne (Gezer 1984: 92).
60 This monument was the oldest of the three monuments in the country which used an allegorical narrative. The bronze statue of a nude muscular figure of a young man holding a spear symbolized the Turkish youth's dedication to protect the Republic. Others were the *Güven Anıtı* (Turst Monument, 1935) in Ankara and the *Zafer Anıtı* (Victory Monument, 1936) in Afyon (Osma 2003: 143, 83–6). In all these monuments, naked and muscular male figures were used as metaphors for those who guard the nation from its enemies (Gür 2001: 163).
61 *Cumhuriyet*, 26–27 December 1934.
62 "Menemen'de Bazılarının Çekingen Duruşları Nazarı Dikkati Celbetti", *Son Posta*, 4 January 1931.
63 *Hür Adam*, "Menemen'daki İrtica", 27 December 1930; *Yarın*, "Biraz da Bizi Dinleyin", 28 December 1930; "Cumhuriyetin Hainleri Kimlerdir?" 29 December 1930.
64 Mehmed Fuat, "Değişmek Meselesi", *Hür Adam*, 31 December 1930.
65 "Derinleri Görelim", *Yarın*, 31 December 1930.
66 Mehmed Ali, "La Revolution / La Terreur"; Nedjati Rifaat, "L'Assassinat", *La République Enchaînée*, 15 February 1931, quoted in Tunçay 1991: 6, 19. Necati Rıfat asked ironically in his article who these Naqshbandis were: "*On traita en bloc de Nakchibendis tous ceux dont on tenait a se débarrasser, qu'ils fussent musulmans, israélites, libres-penseurs ou libéraux. Nakchibendi, sans doute, ces chefs du parti libéral qui ont battu les kémalistes aux dernieres éléctions de Menemen? Nakchibendi, peut-être, ce Joseph Haim, juif d'origine, franc-maçon de conviction et libéral comme idées politiques?*"
67 The incident could even be described as a "Zionist conspiracy" by an ultra-nationalist anti-Semitic writer, on the basis of the fact that one of the suspects, Josef Hayim, was a Jewish resident of Menemen (Atilhan 1972). Other Islamist accounts which reiterated Kısakürek's account are Müftüoğlu (1988), Ceylan (1991: 159–85), İslamoğlu (1998) and Bursalı (1996: 138–62).

Chapter 2

1 Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1998. (In my childhood, the call to prayer was recited in Turkish. A nice and emotive voice was heard from the mosque nearby our house: "Come and do the ritual prayer." We understood it. When those who mixed up religion and the electoral vote took charge, we began not to understand what we had understood before.)
2 Özel (1998: 181–2). (Bells became silent, but/ a voice, unknown for thousands of years/ touched on minarets:/ The God is almighty, the God is almighty/ My father is a policeman,/ a servant of the state/ while I/ have not understood such adventures.)
3 ADD Gen. Merk. Yön. Kurulunun Ezanın Arapça Okunmasını Yasaklayan ve Türkçe okunmasını sağlayan düzenlemenin 66. yılı nedeni ile basın açıklaması, 18 July 1996 (quoted in Erdoğan 2001: 256).
4 The report on this speech made by the Commander Vice Admiral Yener Karahanoğlu was published in *Milliyet,* 29 September 2006.
5 Recently, old and new recordings of the Turkish *ezan* have been broadcast online on YouTube. The various clips have at the time of writing already been viewed more than 500,000 times and led to several online debates on the website as well in other internet fora.

6 At least two commentaries on the Koran, namely *Mevakip* and *Tibyan*, were known and read before 1908 (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1927).
7 These commentaries (Musa Kâzım's *Saffetülbeyan* and İsmail Hakkı's *Envarül Kuran*) could be published only in parts (Ibid.).
8 According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Ali Suavi was also the first Ottoman intellectual to defend the separation of worldly affairs from religion, i.e. secularism (1999: 79–80). Mardin stated that Ali Suavi was the second person after Mustafa Fazıl Paşa to suggest secularism (1962: 374). However, recent studies showed that Suavi, although he suggested the translation of the sermons of prayers into Turkish, did not defend secularism. Instead he argued that politics and the Islamic law were inseparable from each other (Çelik 1994: 586–7, 596, 640–1; Abbaslı 2002: 86).
9 Bir ülke ki camiinde Türkçe ezan okunur/ Köylü anlar mânâsını namazdaki duânın…/ Bir ülke ki mektebinde Türkçe Kur'an okunur./ Küçük, büyük herkes bilir buyruğunu Hudâ'nın…/ Ey Türkoğlu, işte senin orasıdır vatanın!
10 Ismayıl Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) was a professor of pedagogy at the *Darülfünun* (the University in Istanbul) until the purges of 1933, after which which he began to publish the cultural weekly periodical *Yeni Adam*. In 1939, he was appointed at the University of Ankara and was elected in 1942, and in 1946 as a deputy in the National Assembly. Reşit Galip was a medical doctor, deputy of Aydın in 1925 and the Minister of Education in 1932–3.
11 Islamism was one of the three competing ideologies of the Second Constitutional Period (1908–18) along with Ottomanism and Turkism, which all sought to safeguard the unity and continuity of the Ottoman state. While Ottomanism was based on the ideal of a union of all different communities under the Ottoman citizenship and Turkism, on the ideal of a unity of Turkic peoples, Islamism emphasized Islamic solidarity as the basis of the Ottoman unity (Zürcher 2004: 127–8).
12 Mustafa Sabri served as the last Sheikh ul-Islam in the cabinet of Damat Ferit Paşa in 1919–20 and because of his opposition to the Nationalist Struggle had to leave the country in 1922.
13 Part of the sermon can be found in Atatürk (1989: 98). Both the original and simplified versions of the whole sermon can be found in Zülfikar (1998: 179–93).
14 "Halifenin durumu ve halifelik makamının kaldırılması dolayısıyla hutbelerde millet ve cumhuriyetin selamet ve saadetine dair dua edilmesi." 7 March 1924. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.1..30.
15 "Hutbelerin tarzında yapılan tadilat ile hutbe mecmuası yazılması kararı." 6 June 1925. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.13..5.
16 Akseki was one of the writers of the *Sebilürreşad*, an Islamist magazine that was closed by the single-party regime. He served as *kürsü şeyhi*, a functionary explaining the content of the Friday sermon to the congregation in the mosques between 1916 and 1918. He was to be the Vice-Chairman of the DRA in 1941–7, when Yaltkaya was the Chair (Vakkasoğlu 1987). Usta, who translated this sermon book to contemporary Turkish, claimed in the preface of the tranlation that these sermons were prepared by the Chair of the DRA Mehmet Rifat [Börekçi] (2000: 9).
17 "Müftülüklere gönderilen hutbe kitaplarının hatiplere dağıtılması, yetmemesi halinde ihtiyaç kadar başkanlıktan istenmesi." 3 October 1928. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.7..13.
18 For detailed information on the translations, see Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1927–31; Altuntaş 2005.
19 One of these translations, that of Colonel Cemil Said (Dikel), was translated into Turkish from the French translation made by M. Kasimirski: Cemil Said, *Kur'an-ı Kerim Tercümesi*, 1924, republished in 1926; translated from *Le Koran*. Traduction nouvelle faite sur le texte

arabe par M. Kasimirski. Nouvelle édition avec notes, commentaires et préface du traducteur (Paris, 1847). Cemil Said was the grandson of the earlier Minister of Education Kâmil Paşa, and a former military attaché in Paris and Tehran (Cündioğlu 1998b: 46–7). Altuntaş shows some of the mistakes in Said's unreliable translation (Altuntaş 2005: 76–84). This translation was later to be used in 1932 and 1933 during the public recitals of the Koran in Turkish upon the order of Mustafa Kemal. A commentary (*meâl*) on the Koran, published in 1924 by the statesman and writer Hüseyin Kâzım Kadri (1870–1934) under the title of *Nûru'l-Beyân*, *Kur'ân-ı Kerim'in Türkçe Tercümesi* (1924), gave rise to a debate between the DRA and Ubeydullah Efendi (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1928). The chair of the DRA made an official announcement warning the public against this translation, because he found it to be wrong and confusing Muslim minds. Ubeydullah Efendi in turn wrote an article in the newspaper *Vatan* (Fatherland) criticizing the DRA's intervention. He argued that the DRA, which was only an administrative authority and not a religious one, had no right to comment on the translations of the Koran (quoted in Akpınar 2003).

20 Elmalılı had noted in the preface of his book that the exegesis was not a substitute for the real book, but he had to take this out of the published version (Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1934; Cündioğlu 1999: 95–6).

21 The decision of the DRA (Diyanet İşleri Reisliği Müşavere Heyeti) was dated 23 March 1926.

22 This pamphlet (*risale*) was published for the first time in *Sebilürreşad* in 1949. Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, *Namazda Kur'an Okumak Meselesi: Meselenin Esası Hakkında Dinî ve İlmî Tahkikât*, *Sebilürreşad* 2, no. 34 (1949), pp. 134–5; no. 36), pp. 165–7; no. 37, pp. 180–1; no. 38, pp. 197–8; no. 39, pp. 215–16; no. 40, pp. 229–30; no. 41, p. 244; no. 42, pp. 263–4, no. 44, pp. 390–2 (Cündioğlu 1999: 363–5).

23 Ağaoğlu Ahmed, "Türkçe Haram Bir Lisan mıdır?" *Milliyet*, 11 April 1926. For the article, see Ergin vol. 5, 1977: 1932–3, or Cündioğlu 1999: 229–31.

24 The part of the interview on the impossibility of using translation during the prayer was also published on the same day in other daily newspapers under the title of "The Announcement of the Director of DRA. Rifat Börekçi, "Türkçe Namaz Meselesi" (Mülâkat), *Vakit*, 20 Şevval 1344/3 May 1926 (Ibid.: 232–4).

25 This Theological Faculty was the only surviving one from among the 479 medreses in existence in 1924. It was converted into an Institute for Islamic Research within the Faculty of Letters in 1933, and it was closed altogether in 1941 (Rustow 1957: 83).

26 M. Fuat Köprülü was a descendant of Vizier Mehmet Pasha of the seventeenth century, and son of Faiz Köprülü, a high government official. He served as the President of the Istanbul University in 1931–41, and he became a deputy in the Grand National Assembly in 1933. He was to be one of the founders of the Democratic Party in 1946 (Erdican 1974: 1–5).

27 Besides Köprülü, Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan, d. 1954), Ismayıl Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), M. Şekip (Tunç, 1886–1958), İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1869–1946), Halil Halit, Halil Nimetullah (Öztürk, 1880–1957), M. Ali Aynî (1869–1945), Şerafettin (Yaltkaya), Şevket, Arapkirli Hüseyin Avni (Karamehmetoğlu, b. 1863) and Hilmi Ömer (1898–1961) were also members of the committee. According to Mısırlıoğlu's account, Babanzâde Naim Bey (1872–1934) and Ferit Kam (1864–1944), who were in the committee first of all, later resigned because they refused to sign the report (Tunçay 1999: 22–3).

28 The report, titled "İlahiyat Fakültesinde Hazırlanan Lâhiya Etrafında", with the new alphabet can be found in Jäschke 1972: 40–2; Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1958–61; Albayrak 1991: 34–5.

29 Halide Edip interpreted this reform project as an attempt which contradicted secularism in an article published in 1929 (1929: 38). According to Ergin, the report was written by Ismayıl Hakkı [Baltacıoğlu], whose answer to a survey on the opinions of intellectuals on the reform in religion in a journal reflected wording and arguments similar to those of the

report ("Münevverlerin din inkılâbı hakkındaki fikirleri", *Milli Mecmua*, no: 110, 15 May 1928 [Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1961–3]). Ergin supports this view by quoting Şerafettin Yaltkaya, another member of the committee, who told him that a draft of the report was written by Ismayıl Hakkı and was published in the press even before members of the committee had read and discussed it (Ibid.). Cündioğlu further substantiated this argument (1999: 79–92).

30 Even the Jewish residents of İzmir decided later in April 1934 to pray in Turkish instead of in Hebrew in synagogues under the pressure of this nationalist wave (Bali 2000: 244).

31 The list he prepared included Hafız Saadettin (Kaynak), Sultan Selimli Ali Rıza (Sağman), Beşiktaşlı Hafız Rıza, Süleymaniye Camii Başmüezzini Kemal, Beylerbeyli Fahri, Darüttalim-i Musiki azasından Büyük Zeki, Muallim Nuri and Hafız Burhan Bey (Okur 1963: 12; see also Ergin, vol. 5, 1977: 1939–43, quoting from Sağman's memoirs).

32 The word *Tanrı* or *Teñri* was used in all religions of Turks, including in the first translations of the Koran into Turkish, to refer to the word *Allah* (İnan 1961: 13).

33 Sağman stated in a book he wrote in 1950, where he celebrated the victory of the DP and the removal of the ban on the Arabic call to prayer, that he was in fact against the recital of the call to prayer in a language other than Arabic, although he could not express his opinion at the time (1950: 83, 90, 103–5, 116–17).

34 The newspapers of the following days wrote that Hafız Yaşar would recite the Turkish Koran. However, what Hafız Yaşar did was to recite the Koran (*Yasin Suresi*) in Arabic and afterwards read the translation of Cemil Said (Okur 1963: 15; *Cumhuriyet*, 21–22 January 1932).

35 *Cumhuriyet*, 25–8 January 1932.

36 See a letter written by Hasan Cemil Çambel, a witness to the recital of the call to prayer at the Ayasofya Mosque in Kaplan (1987: 36–9, 97) and Ceylan (1996a: 33–4).

37 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 February 1932.

38 The reason why these trials did not continue is not known. There are only speculations about possible reasons. For example, Hafız Ali Rıza Sağman, who was interviewed later in 1958 by the reporter of the newspaper *Tercüman*, argued that the ending of this practice proved that Atatürk had not found it appropriate ("Ali Rıza Sağman Atatürk'e dair bir hatırasını anlattı", *Tercüman*, 10 October 1958). However, it is more plausible to argue that the difficulties of supervision of such a practice was the main problem here. The controversy on the reliability of existing Turkish translations of the Koran might have been another reason why this practice was not institutionalized. The strict control of the DRA over the *hafız*s who were permitted to recite the Turkish Koran supports this argument.

39 *Cumhuriyet*, 31 January 1932. Cündioğlu 1998a: 148. Lewis and Jäschke state that the first Turkish *ezan* was recited from the minarets of the Ayasofya Mosque (Lewis 1968: 416; Jäschke 1972: 45). Başak Ocak Gez, in her article, states with reference to a local newspaper (*Anadolu* in İzmir) that the Turkish call to prayer was recited for the first time in İzmir-Kuşadası by a certain Hafız Sadık on 29 January 1932 (1996–7: 160).

40 Ocak Gez 1996–7: 161.

41 This translation was published later in an Istanbul newspaper, *Milliyet*, 23 October 1932; *Vakit*, 23 November 1932.

42 *Vakit*, 20 October 1932; *Milliyet*, 20 October 1932; *Milliyet*, 23 October 1932. The committee appointed the *tanbur* player Dürri Bey as the composer. See the interview with him on the issue *Milliyet*, 30 November 1932.

43 "Türkçe Kuran. Müezzinlerin imtihanı bitti", *Milliyet*, 2 January 1933.

44 The text of the circular can be found in Ceylan (1996b: 102).

45 There is another related document in the State Archives which is from a later date, the DRA's circular (*tamim*) about the Turkish version of the call to prayer to the *müftü*s in January 1934: "Selatü Selam'ın Türkçesi hakkında Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nca bütün

müftülüklere yazılmış olan tamim." 27 January 1934. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Dosya: 2242, Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü Fonu, Fon Kodu: 30..10.0.0, Yer No: 26.150..21.

46 "Salât ve selâm türkçe!" *Milliyet*, 15 March 1933.

47 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1933. Ocak Gez 1996–7: 162.

48 Bayur was the deputy of Manisa in 1933 and the Minister of Education between October 1933 and July 1934. After 1933, he was charged with preparing courses on the history of the Turkish Revolution (*İnkılâp Tarihi*) at the university level.

49 The original text entitled "Kur'an'ın Türkçe Tercümesiyle Namazda Okunması" (written on 5 March 1934) was published in 1958 by Hikmet Bayur (1958: 599–605; also in Cündioğlu 1999: 263–8).

50 The amended law also penalized those who broke the laws on wearing a hat and the use of the alphabet.

51 "Arapça lisanının eski zihniyete ve eski ananelere bağlıyan tesirinden halkı kurtarmak için…" The legal ground of Law 4055 is also mentioned in: Ek: Kanun teklifi, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 16 June 1950, Period 9, vol. 1.

52 The Grand National Assembly decided on 24 December 1952 to reintroduce the old text of 1924 without any change in language (Heyd 1954: 51).

53 "Gazi Hz. Bursa'da", *Vakit*, 6 February 1933.

54 This person, who had recited the Arabic *kamet*, was a Naqshbandi disciple according to Özek (1968: 160).

55 This Directorate, namely Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü, was responsible for the direct administration of religious and the supervision of private *vakıfs* as well as for the physical upkeep of mosques and (since 1931) the renumeration of clerics (Rustow 1957: 83).

56 Mehmet Asım, "Gazi'nin İzahı" *Vakit*, 8 February 1933. According to the account of Yücer, which does not indicate the source, Mustafa Kemal delivered a speech, which was later to be referred to as the "Bursa Speech" (*Bursa Nutku*) during this visit to Bursa (Yücer 1947: 5–6). This speech was republished on 19 May 1958 in *Ulus* on the occasion of the Youth Day, in order to remind the youth of its mission to protect the Revolution and the regime.

57 *Vakit*, 9 February 1933. Also see *Vakit*, 11 and 12 February 1933.

58 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 March 1933.

59 *Vakit*, 11 February 1933.

60 *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1933.

61 "Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya'dan CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'e, İstanbul Valisi H. Karabatan'ın 12.27.1935 tarihli şifresini ilişik olarak gönderdiği dilekçe." 11 January 1936. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Başbakanlık Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü fonu, Dosya: D4, Fon Kodu: 30..1.0.0.

62 "Yozgat CHP İl Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı'ndan CHP Genel Sekreterliğine özel mektup." 22 April 1936. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi.

63 "Arapça selâ veren Reşat Hakkında", 1 April 1937. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, (Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya'dan CHP Genel Sekreterliğine). During his trial in the criminal court for major crimes in İzmir, he defended himself by saying that he recited the *ezan* in Turkish, but he did not know that he had to recite the following *salâ* also in Turkish. *Kurun*, 14 January 1937.

64 Hafız Mehmet Kara was the father of Prof. İsmail Kara, who recounted this story.

Chapter 3

1 Sezer (b. 1941) served in the 1980s as a member of the Supreme Court and later as a member and the chair of the Constitutional Court, before he was chosen by the Grand National Assembly as the President of the Republic in May 2000.

2 *Turkish Daily News*, 20 May 2006.

3 *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 2007.
4 These were Vehbi Dayıbaş, the delegate from Sinop, Abdülkadir Güney, the delegate from Çorum, Şükrü Nayman, the delegate from Kayseri, Sinan Tekelioğlu, the deputy from Seyhan, and Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the deputy from Istanbul.
5 Among those who rejected the revision of secularism and who eventually determined the view of the congress were Ali Rıza Esen, the deputy from Siirt, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, the deputy from Erzincan, Cemil Sait Barlas, the deputy from Gaziantep, and Tahsin Banguoğlu, the deputy from Bingöl.
6 Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Apaçık Diktatör Olsunlar..." *Hür*, no. 1 (1 February 1947), p. 1. Aybar was a strong critic of the RPP Government's pro-American policies, which, according to him, made Turkey a semi-colony of the USA through the means of the Marshall Aid.
7 Hıfzı Topuz, "Türkiye'de Din Tedrisatı Olamaz: Bugün din tedrisatının kabulü şeklinde karşımıza çıkan irtica, bütün Atatürk inkılaplarını yıkmak gayesi güdüyor", *Hür Gençlik*, no. 3, (9 May 1947), pp. 1, 8.
8 "Atatürk İnkılabı Ne Halde?" *Başdan*, 14 September 1948, p. 1.
9 The decision was taken in the meeting of the parliamentary group on 15–19 February 1948 (Bilâ 1999: 233).
10 Nihat Erim, "Bir siyasi ahlak meselesi" *Ulus*, 21 June 1950. The quoted text is taken from one of his later articles "İlahiyat Fakültesi etrafında", *Ulus*, 3 October 1952.
11 Nadir Nadi, "Başlarken", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 January 1950 (quoted in Yıldırmaz 2004: 146).
12 The first of these parties was the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*, 1945) which defended basing education on morals and national traditions (*ahlâk ve millî anane*), and the formation of an Islamic Union in the field of international politics. The Social Justice Party (*Sosyal Adalet Partisi*, 1946) too supported the idea of uniting Muslims around the world. The Farmer and Peasant Party (*Çiftçi ve Köylü Partisi*, 1946) was another party which stressed its members' attachment to traditions. Two parties, the Purification and Protection Party (*Arıtma Koruma Partisi*, 1946), and the Turkish Conservative Party (*Türk Muhafazakar Partisi*, 1947), had direct references to Islam in their programs. The program of another party, the Protection of Islam Party (*İslâm Koruma Partisi*, 1946), stated its members' detachment from political matters and their dedication to promoting Islam. The Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*, 1948), and the Land, Real Estate, and Free Enterprise Party (*Toprak, Emlâk ve Serbest Teşebbüs Partisi*, 1949) were other parties which stated their commitment to ensuring the freedom of religious organizations. On these and other short-lived political parties such as the Labor Party (*Çalışma Partisi*, 1950), the Islam Democratic Party (*İslam Demokrat Partisi*, 1951) and the Turkish Peasant Party (*Türkiye Köylü Partisi*, 1952) which were founded in this period see Tunaya (1952: 693–748).
13 *Büyük Doğu* was banned between 10 May 1944 and 2 November 1945, during the trials of the racist Turanist group led by Nihâl Atsız (1905–75), although Kısakürek had distanced himself from such irredentist and racist nationalism (Koçak 1989: 60, fn. 2). In 1944, Atsız and his 22 racist Turkist friends were arrested and tried after the speech of the President of Republic İsmet İnönü on 19 May 1944 which depicted this movement as a danger to the nation in the context of the war. However, the decision of the Court was quashed on 31 October 1945 by the Military Supreme Court (*Askeri Yargıtay*) (Özdoğan 2001: 268; Darendelioğlu 1975: 167–74; Koçak 1996: 228–30).
14 The magazine was published in the following periods: 2 November 1945–2 April 1948 (87 issues); 14 October 1949–29 June 1952 (75 issues), 16–21 November, 1951 (daily), 1954–56 (weekly and daily), 6 March–14 October 1959.
15 The re-emergence of *Sebilürreşad*, 23 years after its closure by the state, led Tarık Zafer Tunaya to argue in his book published in 1962 that the Islamism of the Second Constitutional period revived in the multi-party period (Tunaya 2003: 168).

16 The earliest of these associatons were Istanbul-based *Türk Kültür Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth of Culture, founded in April 1946) and *Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği* (Society for Studies of Turkish Culture, founded in September 1946). *Türk Gençik Teşkilatı* (Organization of Turkish Youth, founded in 1947), which was mainly organized in the Aegean region, published the widely-read Turkist periodical *Tanrıdağ*, the originator of the slogan "*Tanrı Türk'ü Korusun*" (May God Protect the Turk) (Darendelioğlu 1975: 176–7). There were two more active associations – *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* (Society for Struggle against Communism), which was founded in 1950 in Zonguldak by Necdet Sançar and Ziya Özkaynak who were teachers of literature and history, and *Türkçüler Yardımlaşma Derneği* (Society for Mutual Aid for Turkists), which was founded in the same year by Nihâl Atsız, İsmet Tümtürk, Necdet Sançar, Hikmet Tanyu and Zeki Sofuoğlu, publishing the magazine *Orhun* (October 1950–January 1952).

17 (Allah, vatan, soy, tarih, dil, anane, sanat, aile, ahlak, hürriyet ve millî mukaddesat esaslarına dayanan Türk milliyetçiliğini işlemek, Türk milletini meydana getiren unsurları muhafaza etmek ve bütün milliyetçileri teşkilâtlandırmaktır.)

18 Said Bilgiç became the Isparta Deputy for the DP in 1950 until 1953 when he was expelled from his party – together with Tahsin Tola – after the Turkish Society of Nationalists was closed down on 22 January 1953, under the charges of "being based on racist and anti-secularist principles". The society was reorganized under the name of Society of Nationalists (*Milliyetçiler Derneği*) in April 1954. Bilgiç later became the chair of the Union of Nationalists (*Milliyetçiler Birliği*) which was founded in 1963. He was one of the founders of the Hearth of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) in 1969. After having been the Isparta deputy for the Justice Party in the 1960s, he was transferred to the Nationalist Action Party of Alparslan Türkeş (Özdoğan 2001: 269, fn. 79).

19 A group around Nihâl Atsız founded another society in September 1962 called *Türkçüler Derneği* (Society of Turkists) in İstanbul. The society moved to Ankara in 1964 under the name of *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği* and the leadership of Necdet Sançar. Meanwhile Atsız, who stayed in İstanbul, published the magazine *Ötüken* until 1975 (Darendelioğlu 1975: 328–30; Özdoğan 2001: 278).

20 For instance, a nationalist magazine *Tanrıdağı* began to be published in 1950, with the subtitle "*Tanrıdağı kadar Türk; Hıradağı kadar Müslüman*" (Turk as the Mountain of Tanrı – allegedly a mountain in Central Asia – Muslim as the Mountain of Hıra – the hill near Mecca where Prophet Mohammed received his first revelations). Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, Fethi Tevetoğlu and Mustafa Müftüoğlu were among the writers of the magazine (Ibid.: 282, fn.103).

21 Çetinsaya argues that among Ottomanist nationalists almost no one wanted the restoration of Ottoman rule due to the laws prohibiting it. He refers only to Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısî (b. 1922) as the unique exception (2003: 361–2). Also see Bora 1998: 84–5.

22 This cultural aristocracy, which conservative nationalists respected, gained its legitimacy not through its knowledge of the Western culture, but from its continuity and link with the Turkish-Islamic culture. For instance, figures like Münevver Ayaşlı and Samiha Ayverdi, who had witnessed the last period of the Ottoman high culture (*yüksek medeniyet*), inspired the youth from provincial origins who were searching for roots in a glorious past. Çetinsaya, pp. 361–2.

23 "Cumhuriyet'in 26ıncı Yıldönümünde Hakikat", *Büyük Doğu*, year 5, no. 3, 28 October 1949.

24 "CHP İnkılabı", *Büyük Doğu*, year 7, no. 48, 16 February 1951.

25 Necip Fazıl, "Müdafaa", *Büyük Doğu*, year 2, vol. 3, no. 67, 27 September 1947. Kısakürek later developed his ideas about the history of the Ottoman Empire and claimed that the decline of the empire was not caused by these rulers but by the infiltration of the Jews into the Palace and the hegemony of the Freemason figures in politics. Necip Fazıl,

"Dünyayı Yahudi Güdüyor!", *Büyük Doğu*, year 24, period 13, no. 15, 25 October 1967, p. 3.

26 "Ezan ve Kur'an", *Tevhîd-i Efkâr*, 14 February 1922; quoted in Ayvazoğoğlu 2001: 358. Also quoted in Kaplan (1987: 18).

27 The Ticaniye order was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani (1737–1815) in the south-west of Algeria and since then had spread mostly in North Africa. In 1897, an Algerian called Sidi Muhammed al-Ubaidi arrived in Istanbul to establish a lodge (*zaviye*) of the order in this city (Abun-Nasr 1965: 161).

28 For interviews conducted by Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan in 1987 with these protestors of the *ezan*, see Ceylan (1991: 370–400).

29 For instance, "Arapça ezan okuyan Mehmet İyibildiren hakkında yapılan işlem." 28 June 1945. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 12.103..44.

30 *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1949.

31 *Tican*is were organized mainly in Çubuk (in Ankara) and in Şabanözü (in Çorum) and demonstrated against secularism also by systematically smashing Atatürk's busts, especially in 1951. They rejected the secularist regime as irreligion and idolatry, and they dedicated themselves to fighting against idolatry by destroying the statues of Atatürk, which were located usually in the city centers and served as the main loci for state ceremonies. Pilavoğlu was sentenced to ten year's imprisonment in July 1952, on the basis of the Atatürk Law which was enacted on 25 July 1951 by the Grand National Assembly to protect Atatürk's memory from such attacks (Thomas 1952: 22–3).

32 Hasan Feyzi Akıncı, "Okuttuğumuz Ezanlar Yanlış mı?" *Selâmet*, vol. 1, no. 24 (October 1947), 3. The corrected version read according to him: "Tanrı en uludur!/ Şüphesiz bilirim başka Tanrı olamaz. Allah birdir./ Şüphesiz bilirim Tanrı'nın Elçisi'dir Muhammed!/ Hazır olun namaza!/ Hazır olun felâha!/ Tanrı en uludur!" (quoted in Cündioğlu 1999: 307–9).

33 Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Ezan ve Kâmet Hakkında", *Selâmet*, vol 1, no. 25, November 1947, pp. 2, 7, 16. Also in Cündioğlu (1999: 310–11).

34 Eşref Edip, "Ezan Meselesi", *İslâm-Türk Ansiklopedisi Mecmuası*, vol. 2, no. 86, November 1947, pp. 8–10. Also in Cündioğlu 1999: 312–16.

35 Eşref Edip, "İbadetlere Kanun Müdahale Edebilir mi?", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 1, no. 4, June 1948, p. 60; "Davamız İslâm'ın İzzet ve Şeref Davasıdır", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 1, no. 5, July 1948, p. 66; "Artık Yeter Efendiler", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 1, no. 17, November 1948, p. 262; Ali Fuat Başgil, "Memleket Tefekkür Hayatına İndirilen Ağır Darbe", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 1, no. 15, September 1948, pp. 238–9 (Tunaya 2003: 181).

36 The specific circular that I saw was sent by the DRA's chair, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, to the *Müftü* of Anamur. "Arapça Ezan ve kamet yasağı hakkındaki kanun hükmünün, hatim, mevlit ve bayram namazlarındaki tekbirleri kapsamadığının görevlilere tebliğ edilmesi." 22 September 1948, Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0; Yer No: 4.31..3.

37 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1949. *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 4 February 1949, Period 8, Meeting 3, vol. 16, p. 37.

38 These two *Tican*is were Muhiddin Ertuğrul, a retired official of the State Railways in Ankara who had been retained in the mental hospital of Bakırköy in Istanbul after one of his earlier attempts to recite the Arabic *ezan*, and Osman Yaz from the village of Solfasol in Çubuk. They had received the permits needed for entering the Assembly through a certain Abdurrahman Balcı. Balcı, according to the report of *Cumhuriyet*, was the predecessor of Kemal Pilavoğlu and had received the entrance tickets from the deputy of Kütahya, Şerif Özgen. "Millet Meclisindeki ezan hâdisesi, tertib eseri!", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1949.

39 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1949.

40 Bayur left the Nation Party in 1952, before the party was closed down in 1953. He was elected as the Independent (Manisa) Deputy for the DP in the elections of 1954 and 1957.
41 Hikmet Bayur, "Kamutayda Ezan", *Kudret*, 7 February 1949. Also in Cündioğlu (1998a: 114–17).
42 Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Bay Hikmet Bayur'a Cevap", *Ulus*, 8 February 1949. Falih Rıfkı Atay was to repeat this argument in his biography of Atatürk, *Çankaya*, and state that Turkification of the daily prayer was postponed because of İnönü, and problems related to the translation of the Koranic text (1980: 394; and quoted by Cündioğlu 1999: 319).
43 Hikmet Bayur, "Atatürk ve İnönü Devirleri", *Kudret*, 9 February 1949. Quoted in "Atatürk devrine aid önemli bir tartışma", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1949. Also in Cündioğlu (1999: 319–20).
44 *Yeni Sabah*, 7–9 February, 1949; *Vakit*, February 9–10, 1949; *Vatan*, 10 February 1949; *Son Posta*, 10 February 1949; *Tasvir*, 10 February 1949. Cündioğlu, *Türkçe İbadet*, p. 298. See Hasan Cemil Çambel's (the RPP deputy from Bolu) article in *Ulus* where Çambel testified Atatürk's initiative of Turkifiying the *ezan* and the *tekbir*. Çambel had replaced Reşit Galip as the supervisor of the official recitals of the Turkish Koran in 1932 (*Ulus*, 9 September 1949).
45 Eşref Edip, "Dinsizliği Siyasete Alet Yapanlar", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 2, no. 31, February 1949, pp. 82–4 (Cündioğlu 1999: 311–16).
46 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1949. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, 23 February 1949, Period 8, Meeting 3, vol. 16, pp. 450–2. Also in Cündioğlu (1999: 296).
47 M. Raif Ogan, "Kur'an Tercümesi Kur'an'ın Yerini Alabilir mi?", *Sebilürreşad*, vol 2, no. 32, February 1949, pp. 109–12; "Din Karaborsası", *Yeni Sabah (Günün Meseleleri)*, 8 March 1949 (Cündioğlu 1999: 329–34, 335–8).
48 Besim Atalay, "Kur'an Türkçe'ye Çevrilemez mi?", *Ulus*, 18 March 1949. Quoted in Cündioğlu 1999: 358–62. Atalay, a committed reformist since the Second Constitutional period, would later publish a book entitled *Türk Dili ile İbadet* (Worship in the Turkish Language).
49 Raif Ogan, "Türkçe Kur'an yine Gündemde", *Yeni Sabah* (Günün Meseleleri), 22 March 1949 (quoted in Cündioğlu 1999: 363–5).
50 Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, "Namazda Kur'an Okumak Meselesi: Meselenin Esası Hakkında Dinî ve İlmî Tahkikât", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 2, March 1949 (no. 34, pp. 134–5; no. 36; pp. 165–7; no 37, pp. 180–1); April 1949 (no. 38, pp. 197–8; no. 39, pp. 215–16; no. 40, pp. 229–30; no. 41, p. 244); May 1949 (no. 42, pp. 263–4; no. 44, pp. 390–2) (Cündioğlu 1999: 363–5).
51 *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, 8 June 1949, Period 8, Meeting 3, vol. 20, p. 574.
52 *Hürriyet*, 14 April 1950.
53 Mustafa Baydar, "İrtica Pusuda mı Bekliyor?" *Varlık*, no. 359, 1 June 1950, p. 4.
54 The eighth President of the Republic, Turgut Özal (1927–93), was at the time a university student from Malatya province who was also in the big crowd which gathered for the funeral of Çakmak (Taşkın 2001: 104).
55 The amended article read: "Şapka iktisası hakkında 671 sayılı Kanunla Türk harflerinin kabul ve tatbikine dair 1353 sayılı Kanunun koyduğu memnuiyet veya mecburiyetlere muhalif hareket edenler üç aya kadar hafif hapis veya 30 liradan 600 liraya kadar hafif para cezasiyle cezalandırılır." *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 16 June 1950, Period 9, vol. 1, pp. 181–7, Appendix: Kanun teklifi.
56 *Hürriyet*, 17 June 1960. "Arapça ezan kamet okuyanlar hakkında uygulanan cezai hükümlerin kaldırıldığı." 16 June 1950, Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Başbakanlık Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü, Dosya: D4, Fon Kodu: 30..1.0.0, Yer No: 51.306..2.
57 "İstanbul Milletvekili Adnan Menderes'in Kurduğu Hükümetin Programı", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 29 May 1950, Period 9, vol. 1, p. 31.

58 *Cumhuriyet*, 5 June 1950. Also quoted in Eşref Edip, "Hükümetin Programı ve Ezan Meselesi", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 80, June 1950, p. 71.
59 An RPP deputy from Ankara, Mümtaz Ökmen and Sinan Tekelioğlu, who as the deputy from Adana had recently resigned from the RPP, defended the recital of the *ezan* in Arabic.
60 *Cumhuriyet*, 17 June 1950.
61 "CHP Meclis Grupu sözcüsü, Grupun türkçe ezan arapça ezan mevzuu üzerinde bir politika münakaşası açmağa taraftar olmadığını bildirdi." (*Ulus*, 17 June 1950, p. 1, 5; *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, June 16, 1950, Period 9, vol. 1, pp. 182–3).
62 Eşref Edib, "Yere Serilen Kara ve Kızıl Taassup", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 82, June 1950, pp. 104–7. Also see his other articles: Eşref Edib, "Hükümetin Programı ve Ezan Meselesi", *Sebilürreşad*, 4 (80), June 1950, pp. 71-75; M. Raif Ogan, "Kur'an Diliyle Ezan", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 81, June 1950, p. 82; "Ezan'ı Muhammediyi İstiyoruz", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 81, June 1950, p. 96.
63 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "Başbakana Hitap!" *Büyük Doğu*, year 7, no. 48, 16 February 1951, p. 2.
64 Bayar's sensitivity on the issue of secularism also led him to clash with Menderes during the passing of the enactment of the law of *ezan*. Bayar had not fully supported the amendment of the law, however, he had to comply with the will of Menderes in the end (Şenşekerci n.d.: 244). Bayar, according to Cihad Baban, opposed this law and even thought of resigning (quoted in Müftüoğlu 1988: 181–5 and Bozdağ 1997: 98). In his memoirs, which were edited by Bozdağ, Bayar retrospectively backed the 1950 law by claiming that the reform of the Turkish *ezan* was an "experiment" and "the first step of a reform whose extension was not found appropriate" by Atatürk (Bayar n.d.: 110–11). What Bayar was hesitant about was changing one of Atatürk's reforms as the first action of the new government (Bozdağ 1997: 99–100). Another instance of a Bayar–Menderes clash on the issue of freedom of conscience and secularism occurred when Menderes ordered the State Radio to broadcast the recital of *mevlid* – a poem celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed. The new government went through its first crisis when Bayar protested. Menderes insisted on the formation of a new government, as the crisis, he defended, was not a simple issue but the sign of a divergence in a fundamental principle, i.e. the principle of freedom of conscience. Nevertheless, a consensus could be reached between the two leaders on the issue of taking measures against the disciples of the *Ticaniye* order who smashed the statues of Atatürk. A "Protection of Atatürk" Law (*"Atatürk'ü Koruma" Kanunu*, no: 5816, 25 July 1951) was passed in the Assembly in 1951 to protect his memory from insults (with a penalty of one to three year's imprisonment) and to punish those who damaged his statues, busts and monuments (with a penalty of one to five years' imprisonment) (Toprak 1981: 83). Menderes had defended the law during his speech in the Grand National Assembly as a precaution not to limit the freedom of thought but the freedom of offense. For the speech in the Grand National Assembly see Menderes (1990: 50). Lastly, the construction of Atatürk's mausoleum, which had begun much earlier, was speeded up after 1950 on the initiative of President Bayar, and completed in 1953 (Eroğul 1990: 79; Şenşekerci n.d.: 244; Bayar n.d.: 122–4; Dâver 1955: 86).
65 Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, 7 June 1950; Vâ-Nû, *Akşam*, 9 June 1950; Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Ulus*, 11 June 1950; Orhan Veli Kanık, *Yaprak*, 15 June 1950. See Cündioğlu 1998a: 119–20.
66 Yavuz Abadan, "Kabine Programı etrafında: İnkılaplarımızın korunması", *Ulus*, 6 June 1950, p. 2.
67 What I call "alternative secularism" is named differently by other scholars who also attempted to formulate the difference between the two discourses of secularism. Nevertheless, they generally offered normative terminologies, such as "laicism versus

national secularism" (Hocaoğlu 1995) or "assertive versus passive" (Kuru 2006). I prefer to use the more neutral term "alternative".

68 Bibliographical information is taken from Binark (2000: vii-xxxii).

69 The aims of the society were explained in a declaration written by Başgil. See Gökalp (1963: 114–19).

70 He had written this self-description in a letter he sent to H. Veldet (Başgil 1990: 119–20).

71 *Yeni Sabah*, 17, 20, 24 and 27 May and 3 June 1950.

72 "Türkiye'de Din Hürriyeti ve Laiklik", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 June 1950; "Din Hürriyeti ve Layiklik Mevzuu Üzerine", *Yeni Sabah*, 17 May 1950; "Din Mevhumunun Unsurları ve Din Hürriyeti", *Yeni Sabah*, 24 May 1950; "Din Hürriyeti Fikrinden Doğan Haklar", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 May 1950.

73 The recitals of the Koran were recorded under the supervision of the President of the DRA at the radio building and broadcast three days a week (*Hürriyet*, 6 July 1950).

74 Osman Nuri Köni, the deputy of the Nation Party and Osman Bölükbaşı of the same party expressed this need to give religious communities autonomy from the state in the Grand National Assembly in 1949 and 1951. Only a few politicians and journalists such as Sinan Tekelioğlu, the RPP deputy for Seyhan (1939–43), Feyzi Boztepe, the DP deputy for Boztepe, Haşim Nahid Erbil, from the newspaper *Yeni Sabah* defended publicly the autonomy of the DRA. Rustow 1957: 103. Intellectuals such as S. Sami Onar, Süheyl Derbil, Enver Ziya Karal and Adnan Adıvar also defended the autonomy of the DRA (Taplamacıoğlu 1963: 49).

75 Nadir Nadi, "Atatürk Yasaları", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 June 1950.

76 Nadir Nadi, "Politika ve Din", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 October 1952. Also in *Ayın Tarihi* (October 1952), pp. 76–7.

77 Nadir Nadi, "Atatürk Yasaları", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 June 1950.

78 Yaşar Nabi, "Nereye Gidiyoruz?" *Varlık*, no. 380, 1 March 1952, p. 3.

79 Yaşar Nabi, "Atatürk ve Din", *Varlık*, no. 388, 1 November 1952, p. 3.

80 For example, see Batuhan 1954: 53–4.

81 Yavuz Abadan, "Kabine Programı etrafında: İnkılaplarımızın korunması", *Ulus*, 6 June 1950, p. 2.

82 Dr. Erdoğan Meto, "El Fâtiha", *Akis*, 3 September 1955, p. 11.

83 Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Kur'an Nasıl Bir Eserdir?" Baltacıoğlu defended the idea that Alevism was the continuation of Turkish tribal traditions in Islam and the genuine Turkish (*öztürk*) reaction to Arab customs. This aspect of his thinking is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7.

84 *Cumhuriyet,* 2 October 1958. Yaşar Nabi, "Geçmiş Olsun", *Varlık*, no. 488, 15 October 1958, p. 3.

85 Among these anti-reform writers were also Şeref Güzelyazıcı, Fikri Aksay, Ahmet Aydınlı and Fikri Yavuz (Tunaya 2003: 211, fn. 35).

86 Anket, "Müslümanlıkta Reform Lâzım mıdır?" *Türk Düşüncesi*, vol. 10, no. 52, 15 December 1958, pp. 45–60; 10, no. 53, 1 February 1959, 15–25. Professors who answered the survey were Sadi Irmak, Ali Fuat Başgil, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Ali Nihat Tarlan, Mehmet Kaplan, Nurettin Topçu, İsmail Hâmi Danişmend, Mümtaz Turhan, M. Râif Oğan and Ahmet Ateş. For an evaluation of this survey see Nevzat Yalçıntaş ve Mehmet Galip Erdem, "İslâmiyet ve Reform", *Türk Yurdu*, no. 271, March 1959, pp. 13–14.

87 See for instance the statement of the famous Kemalist intellectual Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, who was assassinated in 1999, where he depicts the ending of the Turkish *ezan* policy as a concession given to conservative, anti-Kemalist forces (1993: 49).

Chapter 4

1 Üzmez 1999: 7. (I shot a bullet; it has not fallen down yet for forty-three years.)

2 See pp. 11–2 above.

3 See p. 69 above for more on these incidents.
4 Hür Gençlik, "Kubilay ve İrticanın Gerçek Manası", *Hür Gençlik*, 9 January 1951, Kubilay Özel Sayısı, pp. 3, 7.
5 Ali Fuat Başgil, "İrtica Yok Efendiler", *Her Kalem* [also published in, *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 95, February 1951, pp. 306–7.] See also "İnkılâp irticaa dair: Söz Sırası bizde baylar!" *Son Posta*, 2 April 1951, pp. 1, 7. Also published as a booklet: *İrtica Yaygarası* (1951).
6 İsmet Tümtürk, "İnkılâp-İrtica", *Orkun*, no. 17, 26 January 1951, p. 3–5.
7 "Devrim Yobazları", *Hür Adam*, no. 30, 30 May 1958, p. 15; Atilhan, "Sömürgeci Garp", *Hür Adam*, no. 29, 31 January 1958), quoted in Tunaya 2003: 211. The critique of the Westernist elite would be popularized in later years especially by Peyami Safa who called those who adopt a superficial understanding of the Western civilization "bigots of revolution" (*devrim yobazları*) (Safa 1976: 109–11).
8 *Zafer*, 22 November 1952; *Dünya*, 23 November 1952; *Ulus*, 22 November 1952.
9 These movements consisted of the *Büyük Doğu* of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, the *İslam Demokrat Partisi* (Islam Democratic Party) which was founded by anti-Semitic veteran general Cevat Rifat Atilhan, the Society of Nationalists (*Milliyetçiler Derneği*) and *Nurcu*s (disciples of Said Nursî [1873–1960], known as *Bediüzzaman* [the Wonder of the Times]).
10 *Vatan*, 27 November 1952; *Hürriyet*, 3 December 1952.
11 *Vatan*, 28 November 1952.
12 *Hürriyet*, 4 December 1952; *Hürriyet*, 6 December 1952.
13 *Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1953 and 1 March 1953.
14 "Şebeke Hakkında Geniş Ölçüde Takibata Başlandı", *Hürriyet*, 3 December 1952. Ahmet Emin Yalman referred to Said Nursî in his memoirs as "an old agitator for Kurdish separatism who became known first by the name of Saidi Kurdi, when he was one of the promoters of a reactionary counter-revolution against the Young Turks in 1909. He changed his name to Saidi Nursî to make people forget his former identity" (Yalman 1956: 250).
15 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 February 1953.
16 *Vatan*, 28 November 1952.
17 *Vatan*, 27 November 1952, pp. 1, 5; see also Üzmez (1999: 158–9).
18 His memoirs were first published by Serdengeçti in 1955 under the title of "*Malatya Faciası… Hüseyin Üzmez'in Alın Yazısı*" (The Catastrophe of Malatya... The Destiny of Hüseyin Üzmez).
19 *Dönme* ("turned" or "convert") is a derogatory term used to characterize the followers of messianic rabbi Shabbatai Tzevi (1626–76), the leader of the messianic movement known as Sabbateanism, which had quite a big following among the Jews in İzmir and Salonika. Sabbateans had followed their leaders who converted from Judaism to Islam in 1666, but kept on pursuing Jewish/Sabbatean beliefs and practices secretly in private. Unlike Jews, the *Dönme* ostensibly followed the requirements of Islam, including fasting at *Ramazan* and praying in mosques. Unlike Muslims, the *Dönme* maintained a belief that Shabbatai Tzevi was the messiah, recited prayers in Hebrew and Judeo-Spanish, and kept their separate identity (Baer 2004: 682). For a bibliography on Sabbateanism, see Bali (2002).
20 Malatya was one of the three places where the first branches of the *Büyük Doğu* Society were founded along with Kayseri and Tavşanlı (Kısakürek 1970: 116). Kısakürek stated that only three persons among the 15 suspects were members of the Society in Malatya and that Şerif Dursun and Osman Dursun, who were reported in newspapers as members of *Büyük Doğu* Society, were not among the 246 registered members (Ibid.: 74, 79–80).
21 As an ambitious young man, Üzmez learned English in prison; he wrote letters for improving his English and sent them to Yalman, who even demanded amnesty for him. In 1964, 12 years after his imprisonment, Üzmez was released due to an amnesty law, settled in Ankara and studied law in the University of Ankara (Yalman 1970: 314).

Currently, Üzmez is a columnist in the Islamist daily *Anadolu'da Vakit*, and since September 2008, he has been charged with sexual abuse of a 14-year-old girl.

22 The father of Ahmet Emin Yalman, Osman Tevfik Yalman, was in fact of Sabbatean origin. He had been Atatürk's teacher of history and calligraphy (*hat*) and had lived the life of a Muslim, writing Koranic scripts in the traditional Islamic art of calligraphy (Koloğlu 2002: 50–61). However, Ahmet Emin never referred to his ethnic/religious origin and ignored accusations related to it. In his memoirs and elsewhere, he presented himself as a Muslim Turk, coming from a Muslim family, and contrasted his progressive father with his conservative uncle who adopted him when he was a child (Yalman 1956: 11–13).

23 "Tahrik", *Büyük Doğu,* 5 January 1951; "Hakkımızdaki Tahrikin Ocağını İfşa Ediyoruz", *Büyük Doğu*, 19 January 1951; Kısakürek (1998: 63–9).

24 "Tahrik", *Büyük Doğu*, 5 January 1951; also in Kısakürek 1998: 63–6.

25 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Kara ile Kızıl", *Vatan*, 28 November 1952, pp. 1, 7.

26 The Society of Nationalists had gathered in Ankara on 28 July 1952, to protest against this campaign and intellectuals such as Ahmet Emin Yalman (Darendelioğlu 1975: 274–5).

27 Some examples of such arguments can be found in these articles: M. Raif Ogan, "İnkılâp Bendesinde Mezhep", *Büyük Doğu*, year 6, no. 32, 27 October 1950, pp. 6–7; Be.De., "Tahrik", *Büyük Doğu*, year 7, no. 42, 5 January 1951, p. 8–9; M. Raif Ogan, "Dehşet-İbret!" *İslam Dünyası*, no. 2, 4 April 1952, p. 15.

28 In 1929, the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* initiated the organization of a nation-wide beauty contest (Aktaş 1989: 175–6; Köktener 2004: 35–9; Alkan ve Kahraman 2004: 68–71). Although the newspaper framed the organization as an event serving the nation, its editorial on 14 February 1932 highlighted the defensive attitude of the organizers. Nadi, the writer of the editorial, tried to reassure its readers that the contests were in no way unethical and that everything was to take place openly in public (Köktener 2004: 36). Three years later, the Miss Turkey of 1932, Keriman Halis, was even elected the Miss World in Belgium and was praised by Mustafa Kemal for showing the world the beauty of the Turkish race. The beauty contests became platforms on which the new Turkey could prove itself as a modern nation whose women were liberated. Nevertheless, because the national contest of 1933 had involved rigging the organization of contests was to stop after this date.

29 *Büyük Doğu*, 5, 11 and 14 June 1952 and 25 August 1952; *Serdengeçti*, September 1952.

30 Such a Kemalist secularist stance, independent of the RPP, had emerged already in the period between 1946 and 1950, as shown in Chapter 3.

31 *Vatan*, 23 November 1952; *Vatan*, 24 November 1952; *Vatan*, 26 November 1952, p. 2.

32 *Vatan*, 30 November 1952.

33 *Ulus*, 26 November 1952.

34 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Çok şükür siyasi emniyet yerinde!" *Ulus*, 26 November 1952 (*Vatan*, 27 November 1952, p. 5).

35 *Vatan*, 30 November 1952.

36 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Dünya*, 25 November 1952; Nadir Nadi, "İrtica tahriki yapanlara karşı tedbir alınmalıdır", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 November 1952; M. Nermi, *Yeni İstanbul*, 26 November 1952.

37 Şemsi Belli, "Son İrtica Hadisesi ve Malatya", *Vatan*, 15 December 1952.

38 Quoted in *Vatan*, 27 November 1952, p. 5.

39 "Fikir ve Vicdan Hürriyetine Gem Vurulamaz", *İslam Dünyası*, vol. 2, no. 38, 12 December 1952, p. 7.

40 See p. 72 above.

41 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Kırk bir sene sonra", *Ulus*, 25 June 1950, pp. 1, 3.

42 Alternative accounts of March 31 began to be written in the 1950s. Writers such as Ogan and Atilhan reinterpreted the event as the result of an international conspiracy of imperialism and claimed that the revolt was not led by Islamists but was designed by the

Committee of Union and Progress, which in turn was portrayed as merely a puppet of Zionism and the Freemasons, the sources of all the evil in the world. This alternative history or conspiracy theory challenged but never eradicated the dominance of the Kemalist perception of the past. M. Raif Ogan, "Hikmet Bayur'un İnkılâp Tarihi", *İslam Dünyası*, no. 24, 5 September 1952, pp. 13–16 (and *İslam Dünyası*, no. 25, 12 September 1952, pp. 10–12). Cevat Rifat Atilhan, *İlim Işığında ve Tarih Önünde 31 Mart Faciası* (İstanbul: Aykurt Neşriyatı, 1956).

43 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "En Evvel Ana Hedef", *Vatan*, 7 December 1952.

44 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Önümüzdeki Boşluk", *Vatan*, 17 December 1952.

45 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Zehirlenen Gençler", *Vatan*, 27 December 1952, pp. 1, 5. Also Abidin Daver, "Tarihten İbret Almak Lazımdır", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1952.

46 The only news about Kubilay was a circular from the Ministry of Education demanding that teachers of history and the Turkish language instruct students about his life and the role he played in the Revolution (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1936, p. 2).

47 *Vatan*, 24 December 1952; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Kubilay'ın Yolu", *Vatan*, 24 December 1952; Mustafa Baydar, "Kubilay'ı Anarken", *Vatan*, 24 December 1952; Nurettin Artam, "Kubilay Töreni…" *Ulus*, 25 December 1952.

48 Nurettin Artam, "Kubilay Töreni…" *Ulus*, 25 December 1952, p. 2.

49 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Kubilay'ın Yolu", *Vatan*, 24 December 1952.

50 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1952.

51 *Dünya*, 24 December 1952; *Vatan*, 24 December 1952.

52 *Cumhuriyet*, 24 December 1952; *Hürriyet*, 24 December 1952.

53 *Hürriyet*, 25 December 1952.

54 R. Ogan, "İrtica ve Politika", *İslam Dünyası*, vol. 2, no. 39, 19 December 1952, pp. 2–3.

55 *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1952.

56 "Milli Tesanüt Cephesi'nin büyük komitesi toplandı", *Cumhuriyet*, 17 February 1953.

57 The League published a volume in 1954 which collected articles on secularism written by prominent scholars and intellectuals (Türk Devrim Ocakları, 1954).

58 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Uyanınız ve Uyandırınız", *Vatan*, 4 December 1952.

59 *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1952. Other baseless news stories were published in order to prove that the suspects had relations with secret communist organizations in Syria or that the provocateurs were part of a network of communist agents led by Nâzım Hikmet. *Dünya*, 12 December 1952, p. 5; *Dünya*, 25 December 1952, pp. 1, 7.

60 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Kara ile Kızıl", *Vatan*, 28 November 1952, pp. 1, 7; "İrticaın İçyüzü. Her Türk irticaa karşı cephe almalıdır", 30 November 1952; "Uyanınız ve Uyandırınız", 4 December 1952.

61 Cominform is the acronym for Communist Information Bureau, the information agency active between 1947 and 1956, which attempted to re-establish information exchanges among the European Communist parties that had lapsed since the dissolution (1943) of the Comintern. Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1952. See also Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Çok şükür siyasi emniyet yerinde!" *Ulus*, 26 November 1952; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Mesulleri aramağa ne lüzum var?" *Dünya*, 5 December 1952, pp. 1, 5.

62 Among these deputies were Mustafa Runyun (deputy for Konya, 1957), Ahmet Gürkan (deputy for Tokat, 1950–7, who prepared the draft of the law repealing the law banning the Arabic call to prayer), Ömer Bilen (deputy for Ankara, 1950–7, the preacher at the Hacı Bayram Mosque in Ankara and an inspector for the DRA), Münip H. Ürgüplü (deputy for Nevşehir, 1957–60), Hasan Fehmi Ustaoğlu (deputy for Samsun, 1950–2, who published the periodical *Büyük Cihad* [Great Holy War] in Samsun), A. Fahri Ağaoğlu (deputy for Konya, 1950–60), and Tahsin Tola (deputy for Isparta, 1950–7). This group was called "*Beyaz Kanat*" (White Wing) or "*Beyaz Cephe*" (White Front) by Necip Fazıl , or "*Milli İman Cephesi*" (The Front of National Faith) by the periodical *Hür Adam* in the late

1950s (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 32–3). For more on Celal Bayar's position on the issue of *ezan* and secularism in general, see p. 196, n. 64

63 *Vatan*, 7 December 1952; *Cumhuriyet*, 7 December 1952.

64 *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1952.

65 *Zafer*, 26 December 1952; *Vatan*, 28 December 1952; *Cumhuriyet*, 28 December 1952; *Hürriyet*, 28 December 1952.

66 "Milletin Atatürk İnkılabına Medyun Bulunduğu İddiası Asla Doğru Değildir", *Büyük Cihad*, 3 October 1952. For more on this event and the magazine, see Brockett 2009.

67 For example, on 11 March 1951, at the party congress of the Konya branch of the DP, some members wanted to bring back the Arabic alphabet and the *fez* and *çarşaf* (Denk n.d.: 253; Ahmad et al. 1976: 41–2; *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1951). Some of the speakers at the annual DP congress in Çorum, which was held on 15 September 1952, had expressed their demands for compulsory courses on the Koran, the banning of beauty contests and dance parties (*balolar*), and forbidding women to work (Menter Şahinler, "Fransız Belgelerinde Menderes Dönemi", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 1995, p. 10). Furthermore, during the general party congress in 1952, the Ankara branch proposed the dismissal of all female state employees and the reopening of the Ayasofya Museum as a mosque (Sitembölükbaşı 1995: 32).

68 *Dünya*, 25 December 1952.

69 At the same congress, other party members proposed reform in the laws regulating marriage and divorce, the dismissal of female officials, putting an end to young girls participating in the Youth Day ceremonies, the closing of city clubs where officials gambled and drank alcohol, and the enactment of a law to prevent offenses against religion. *Cumhuriyet*, 29 January 1953.

70 *Cumhuriyet*, 18–19 January 1953.

71 *Cumhuriyet*, 18 January 1953.

72 *Cumhuriyet*, 23 January 1953.

73 *Cumhuriyet*, 1 February 1953.

74 "Ankara 4. Ceza Hâkimliğinin 26 Ocak 1954 tarihli kararı ile 'din, mezhep ve tarikat esaslarına dayanan bir dernek' olarak nitelendirilmiş…" (Tikveş 1973: 262–4).

75 The prosecutor, Cemil Bengü, was to be elected in the 1954 general elections as a deputy for the DP and was immediately given a position as Minister of the State. After the 1957 elections, he became the President of the Istanbul branch of the DP! (Ibid.: 262, fn. 1).

76 Proceedings of the Grand National Assembly sessions on this law: *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 23 July 1953, Period 9, Volume: 24, Meeting: 3, pp. 1041–1119.

77 Jale Candan, "Şekil ve Ruh", *Akis*, 7 April 1956, p. 25.

78 Jale Candan, "Çarşafı yeniden yırtalım", *Akis*, 15 January 1955, p. 30.

79 Jale Candan, "Cemiyet" "Nazlı Tlabar ve çarşaf", *Akis*, Kadın sayfaları, 15 January 1955, p. 23.

80 Forum (Aydın Yalçın), "Onbeş Günün Notları: Çarşaf", *Forum*, vol. 5, no. 51, 1 May 1956, p. 5.

81 Akis, "Vaktile Ankara Diye Mâmur bir Başkent Vardı", *Akis*, 12 June 1954, p. 8.

82 In this respect, Mert's discussion on the recent use of the notion of "cultural Islam" as opposed to "political Islam" is remarkable. She argues that the use of the latter for differentiating the good/local/Turkish Islam and the political Islam as the dangerous/foreign Islam, so common in the secularist narratives, is in fact the proof that secularists can tolerate Islam as long as it is not challenging and is outside of their living space (Mert 2001: 238–41). See also Ahmet Yaşar Ocak on "Kemalist Islam" (*Kemalist Müslümanlık*) and Kemalist secularism's uneasy relationship with democracy (1999: 123).

Chapter 5

1 For instance, in 1953, just after the assassination attempt against Yalman, the newspaper *Vatan* published a report about Said Nursî, by Yılmaz Çetiner who had mingled with *Nurcu*s in the environs of Eskişehir, Afyon, Emirdağ and Sandıklı, pretending to be willing to become a disciple of Said Nursî. *Vatan*, 23 January 1953 and later. This report was later published as a book by the Varlık publishing house in 1964 (Çetiner 1964). Later in 1957, İlhami Soysal and Tarık Dursun Kakınç did exactly the same, trying to discover the "mysterious" world of Said Nursî in Isparta. They interviewed Said Nursî in the guise of students willing to become his disciples and published their report in the weekly *Akis* in December 1957. The interview was published in the 189th issue of *Akis* in December 1957 and republished in 1960 ("Röportaj: Bediüzzamana Bir Oyun", *Akis*, 6 January 1960, pp.16–17).
2 Three important sources on Said Nursî's life story are used in this chapter (Nursî 2006; Şahiner 2001; Mardin 1989).
3 *Dünya*, 2 December 1952, p. 1, 5.
4 Said Nursî's arrest was reported by the newspaper *Dünya* as "the reappearance of the Said Kürdî of March 31". *Dünya*, 2 December 1952.
5 According to one of his close disciples, Zübeyir Gündüzalp, Said Nursî had met Tevfik İleri (Samsun deputy) and Celal Yardımcı (deputy for Ağrı in 1950–54 and 1957–60) in Eğridir, on their trip from Isparta to Ankara in 1958 (Şahiner 1977: 51–2).
6 Publishing of the *Risale-i Nur* began in Ankara and Istanbul, and later also in Samsun and Antalya (Şahiner 2001: 415).
7 "Başvekilin Konya Nutku", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 9, no. 212, October 1956, pp. 179–82.
8 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 February 1932.
9 The journal in turn received negative responses from a group of readers who signed their letter as "the disciples of *Risale-i Nur* from Küçük Bursa". Küçük Bursa Risale-i Nur Talebeleri ve 302 arkadaşı namına Nizamettin Bilir, "Risale-i Nur Talebeleri Mektubu", *Forum*, 15 October 1958, pp. 22–3.
10 The number of members of the Fatherland Front had reached 973,000 one year after its foundation. There were 134 hearths just in Istanbul in March 1960 (Uyar 2001: 42–5).
11 "Türbeli Siyaset", *Forum*, vol. 10, no. 120, 15 March 1959, pp. 1–2; "Arena ve Forum", "Bakanın Görmedikleri", "Din ve Siyaset", *Forum*, no. 121, 1 April 1959, pp. 1–4.
12 Said Nursî had spent the spring of 1953 in Istanbul and participated in the official ceremonies celebrating the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul in May 1953 (Şahiner 2001: 405).
13 The DP deputies who could see Saıd Nursî were Fethullah Taşkesen (Erzurum) and Gıyasettin Emre (Muş). The one who could not was Seyit Abdülvahap Altınkaynak, the RPP deputy for Van (1957–60). *Dünya*, 1 January 1960.
14 *Dünya*, 3 January 1960.
15 *Dünya*, 2 January 1960.
16 *Yeni Sabah*, 3 January 1960.
17 *Havadis*, 9 January 1960; *Tercüman*, 9 January 1960.
18 *Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1960.
19 *Yeni Sabah*, 12 January 1960; *Dünya*, 12 January 1960.
20 *Havadis*, 10 January 1960.
21 *Tercüman*, 4 January 1960.
22 Falif Rıfkı Atay, "Atom Çağında Nursî", *Dünya*, 5 January 1960.
23 Bedii Faik, "Gözler Önünde..." *Dünya*, 5 January 1960.
24 "Saîd-i Nursî Meselesi", *Forum*, vol. 12, no. 140, 15 January 1960, pp. 1–2.
25 *Cumhuriyet*, 3 January 1960; *Yeni Sabah*, 3 January 1960.
26 *Yeni Sabah*, 13 January 1960; *Dünya*, 13 January 1960.

27 *Cumhuriyet*, 12 January 1960.
28 "Risalei Nur Talebesi" *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 13, no. 302, January 1960, p. 29.
29 *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 January 1960.
30 *Havadis*, 11 January 1960; *Tercüman*, 11 January 1960; Nursî 2004: 211.
31 *Vatan*, 18 January 1960. The whole text of the letter was published in the journal *Hilâl* 2, no. 13 (February-Marc 1960), p. 11 and in Nursî 2004: 211.
32 *Cumhuriyet*, 2 January 1960.
33 F. Atay, "Gidişat", *Dünya*, 2 January 1960. Such reactions continued: The Technical University Student Union in Istanbul protested a few days later against the odd headgear Said Nursî was wearing despite the law banning it and suggested sending him a felt hat instead, as used by civilized people. *Tercüman*, 7 January 1960. A few days earlier, the same student union had protested against the "tolerance shown to the last events which were acting boldly against secularism" (*pervasızca laiklik aleyhine çalışanlara gösterdikleri hüsnü kabul*). *Yeni Sabah*, 4 January 1960.
34 Cartoon, "Nurlu İstikbâl", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 January 1960.
35 *Dünya*, 2 January 1960.
36 F. Atay, "Gidişat", *Dünya*, 2 January 1960.
37 Bedii Faik, "İçişleri Bakanı Yine Susacak mı?" *Dünya*, 3 January 1960.
38 *Yeni Sabah*, 6 January 1960.
39 *Dünya*, 7 January 1960.
40 *Yeni İstanbul*, 10 January 1960.
41 *Dünya*, 6 January 1960.
42 "Binlerce Kubilay Var", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 January 1960, p. 5. Also: "İrtica Karşısında Gençlik", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 January 1960.
43 *Dünya*, 7 January 1960. *Dünya*, 7 January 1960. This demonstration in Menemen disturbed the Menemen population who did not want their town to be associated with religious fanaticism. The representative of Menemen in the city Council of İzmir stated that he found the youth's action untimely and inappropriate (*yersiz ve zamansız*) and expressed the Menemen people's complaint about the annual ceremonies performed in their town as if it were a center of *irtica*. *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 January 1960.
44 *Yeni İstanbul*, 9 January 1960.
45 "Bir Mülâkat: Bir İlim Adamı Gözüyle Devrimlerimiz, Doçent Tarık Z. Tunaya", *Akis*, 20 January 1960, pp. 16–17.
46 "Said-i Nursî Kimdir?" *Tercüman*, 2 January 1960; "Nurculuk Nedir?" *Yeni İstanbul*, 3 January 1960.
47 "Röportaj: Bediüzzamana Bir Oyun", *Akis*, 6 January 1960, p. 16–17.
48 Kadircan Kaflı, "Nurculuk Nedir?" *Tercüman*, 9 January 1960.
49 Başyazı, "İrtica'ın reklamını yapanlar", *Havadis*, 11 January 1960.
50 Peyami Safa, "Menderes'in Cevabı", *Tercüman*, 11 January 1960.
51 Salih Özcan, "Bir Bardak Suda Koparılan Fırtına. Muhterem Bediüzzaman Saidi Nursî hakkında sorulan suallere cevap veriyoruz", *Hilâl*, vol. 2, no. 12, January 1960, pp. 20–1; and later after his death, Mehmet Süleyman Teymuroğlu, "Muhterem Bediüzzaman Saidi Nursî'nin Doldurduğu Boşluk", *Hilâl*, vol. 2, no. 13, February–March 1960, pp. 20–2.
52 Some aspects of Said Nursî's early life when he was "an activist better known as *Sa'id-i Kurdi* and was actively involved in the Kurdish nationalist associations and a Kurdish school in Istanbul of the 1900s and 1910s" have been suppressed by the *Nurcu* groups (van Bruinessen 1999).
53 "Bir Tartışmanın Muhasebesi", *Forum*, 1 February 1960, 12 (141), pp. 1–2; "Laiklik Mevzuunda Menderes–İnönü Münakaşası", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 13, no. 301, January 1960, pp. 3–16.
54 *Yeni Sabah*, 12 January 1960; *Tercüman*, 12 January 1960.

55 "Laiklik Mevzuunda Menderes–İnönü Münakaşası", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 13, no. 301, January 1960, pp. 3–16.
56 *Havadis*, 13 January 1960.
57 *Dünya*, 14 January 1960.
58 Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Tuhaf Tuhaf Şeyler" *Dünya*, 23 January 1960; Nadir Nadi, "Vicdan Hürriyeti", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 January 1960.
59 Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Bir Yeraltı Hareketi", *Vatan*, 19 January 1960.
60 For a chronology of events leading to the coup, see Talay 1999: 26–9.
61 For instance, *Cumhuriyet* could not report about the large crowd that had welcomed İsmet İnönü in İzmir on 2 May 1959. Instead of the news report, the newspaper published blank columns on its front page. Köktener, *Cumhuriyet*, p. 91.
62 "Laiklik", *Akis*, 24 August 1960, pp. 14–16; *Cumhuriyet*, 20 July 1960.
63 The Congress of the Turkish Linguistic Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*), which gathered on 14 July 1960, decided to promote an initiative for restoring the ban on the Arabic *ezan* and to apply to the DRA for the translation of the Koran into Turkish. After this congress, the Turkish Linguistic Society applied to the National Unity Committee inviting the coup leaders to Turkify the *ezan* in order to liberate the Turkish language (Behçet Kemal Çağlar, "Türkçenin de Mutlu Günleri", *Türk Dili*, 1 July 1960).
64 *Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 1960, 16 July 1960, 7 December 1960. Demirci, "27 Mayısçıların Din Siyaseti", p. 150.
65 For research on this issue see Şahiner 1998.
66 On 24 February 1993 the Grand National Assembly's Human Rights Committee accepted a proposal, which was put forward by three members of the committee, namely Hasan Mezarcı and İbrahim Çelik from the Welfare Party and Mahmut Orhun from the Motherland Party. As members of the subcommittee on Human Rights, these deputies proposed the restoration of respect, *iade-i itibar*, to Bediüzzaman Said Nursî who, they thought, "had been seen by the state as a suspect, due to the many unjust treatments he was exposed to during his life time". Also included in the proposal was a demand for an investigation of his burial place (*Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı (1923–1997)* 1998: 1037).
67 In August 1960, the house of Tahsin Tolga – the former DP deputy for Isparta – and a house which was called "Aşağı Medrese" (Lower School) by Nurcus, and named "factories of *nurculuk*" ("nurculuk fabrikaları") by the journal *Akis*, were raided by the police in Ankara. Zübeyir Gündüzalp, Mustafa Sungur and Ekrem Göker were among those arrested. Again in Ankara, a Nurcu women's gathering led by Ulviye Sümer was raided, as well as the *Hilâl* Printing House, owned by Salih Özcan. "Laiklik", *Akis*, 24 August 1960, pp. 14–16).
68 Said Nursî was commemorated by numerous journals such as the monthly *Hilâl* (Crescent) edited by Salih Özcan, and the daily *Bugün* (Today) edited by M. Şevket Eygi (Algar 1979: 324). In 1964, the weekly *Hareket* (Movement) published in Erzurum entailed extracts from the *Risale-i Nur*. Among other *Nurcu* publications after the military coup were weeklies such as *İrşad* (published in Ankara in 1962 by Sait Özdemir), *İhlas* (published in Ankara in November 1963 by İhsan Gemalmaz), *Zülfikar* (published in İzmir in July 1964 by İsmail Anbarlı, which later changed its name to *Uhuvvet*), *Hareket* (published in June 1964 in Erzurum by N. Mustafa Polat) and *Vahdet* (published in September 1964 by Müslim Selçuk). Information available from http://www.risalei nurenstitusu.org/index.asp?Section=Enstitu&SubSection=EnstituSayfasi&Date=20.02.2004&TextID=712
69 Many of these periodicals were short-lived and were superseded on 24 October 1967 by the nationally distributed weekly *İttihad* printed in Istanbul, by Zübeyir Gündüzalp and his friends Sait Özdemir, Tahir Mutlu, Mehmet Kayalar.
70 For a general overview of the emergence of different Nurcu groups following the death of Said Nursî, see Ongun (1997) and Çakır (1993: 77–109).

71 Among these books were Tarık Zafer Tunaya's *İslamcılık Cereyanı* (The Current of Islamism, 1962), Faruk Güventürk's *Nurculuğun İçyüzü* (The Inside Story of Nurculuk, 1964), Çetin Özek's *Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İç Yüzü* (Reactionary Currents and the Inside Story of Nurculuk, 1964), Neda Armaner's *Nurculuğun İç Yüzü* (The Inside Story of Nurculuk, 1964), and the DRA's *Nurculuk Hakkında* (About Nurculuk, 1964).
72 *Ulus*, 4 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 4 June 1966.
73 "Durum: Hazret Elmalı ve Basında İkili Oynayanlar", *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 12–22.
74 "Bir Radyo Yayını Üzerine Başkanlığımızın Açıklaması", *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Dergisi*, vol. 5, no. 1–2, January–February 1966, pp. 30–1.
75 The JP Deputy for Kayseri, Mehmet Ateşoğlu, wanted the minister to resign, considering the latter's action as disrespectful of Islam (Tarhanlı 1993: 128–9).
76 Elmalı also told the journalists that, like all Muslims, his personal wish was also to see the Ayasofya Museum as a mosque again, under the name of the Fatih Mosque, because it was the place where Mehmet the Conqueror had prayed following the conquest of Istanbul. (A.Y., "Yeni D.İ. Başkanımız Sayın İbrahim Elmalı", *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Dergisi*, vol. 5, no. 1–2, January–February 1966, pp. 3–6).
77 Fikret Ekinci, "Nursuzların Nuru", *Ulus*, 29 May 1966, p. 3.
78 Fikret Ekinci, "Talebesin Talebe", *Ulus*, 4 June 1966.
79 *Ulus*, 9 June 1966. The JP and the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) improved their positions to 56.29 and 3.92 per cent of the vote respectively (Ahmad et al. 1976: 196).
80 *Ulus*, 8 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1966.
81 "Yargıtay İlâmı", *Ulus*, 9–11 June 1966.
82 Nadir Nadi, "Devekuşu Politikası", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1966.
83 *Ulus*, 12 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1966.
84 "Büyük Tehlike: Nurculuk ve İçyüzü: Said Nursî kimdir? Nurculuk bir tarikat mıdır?" *Ulus*, 12–19 June 1966.
85 *Ulus*, 19 June 1966, pp. 1, 7.
86 Başyazı, "Hükümet Susuyor!" *Ulus*, 13 June 1966.
87 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966; *Ulus*, 15 June 1966.
88 *Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1966 (about the trial in Burdur of eight Nurcus, among whom Süleyman Cemil, Mehmet Yurdakul, Hüseyin Çil, Hüseyin Eroğlu and Abdurrahman Altındal were sentenced to one year imprisonment and exile for four months); *Ulus*, 30 June 1966 (about the arrest of the retired colonel Mehmet Kayalar and the police commissar (*emniyet başkatibi*) Abdullah Başdan, who were accused of propagating *Nurculuk*, in Diyarbakır).
89 The newspaper *Zaman* has the biggest circulation in Turkey today.
90 The publishing company *Yeni Asya*, which published the writings and the biography of Said Nursî, erased most of the references to the Kurds (Ibid.: 318, 321; see also Rohat [Alakom] 1991). The Nurcu group led by Sıddık Dursun, *Med-Zehra*, and their journal *Dava* compared these published texts with the originals texts of Nursî while their publishing company *Tenvir Neşriyat* published Nursî's works in their original form (Beki 1995: 29).

Chapter 6

1 There is a big controversy over the definition of Alevism as to whether it should be regarded as being within or outside of Islam, as a religion, or a secular worldview and philosophy. Here I define Alevism as a syncretistic and heterodox branch of Islam, characterized by a great devotion to the fourth Caliph Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammed.
2 *Yeni İstanbul*, 5 January 1966. See also Kaleli (2000: 104).

3 The terms *çelebi* and *baba* refer to the two branches of the Bektashi order. *Çelebi*s, who claim descent from Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (hence were called *bel oğulları* or *bel evladı*, who are contrasted to the *yol evladı*, the branch that is not hereditary but based on initiation), were recognized as the rightful head of the Bektashi order by some Bektashis, and were especially the recognized leaders of the Alevi tribes (Birge 1937: 82; Küçük 2002: 25). In other words, most Alevi communities are affiliated with the *Çelebiyan* of the Bektashi order (Ibid.: 27). The *Baba* or *Babağan*, unlike the *Çelebi*, have no claims to be descendants of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, as they believe that the latter was never married.

4 The works of Fuat Köprülü (*Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar* [The First Mystics in Turkish Literature], 1918), Besim Atalay (*Bektaşilik ve Edebiyatı* [Bektashism and its Literature], 1924), and Sadeddin Nüzhet (Ergun) (*Bektaşi Şairleri* [The Bektashi Poets], 1930) were among the first ones to seek authentic Turkish national customs and worldview in Bektashi poems dating back to the fourteenth century.

5 Yakup Kadri, who himself frequented some Bektashi lodges, wanted to illustrate in his novel the degenerate state of the Bektashi order, by narrating a love affair between a sheikh and a married young woman (Karaosmaoğlu 2000: 23). Birge refers to two other publications attacking the Bektashi order: "Bir Bektaşi Babasının Hatırası", a series of anonymous articles in *Büyük Gazete*, no: 3–23, 11 November 1926 to 31 March 1927, İstanbul, and a short story on a girl's experiences among Bektashis, written by Peyami Safa under his pen name for popular works, Server Bedi (*Bir Genç Kız*, İstanbul, 1927) (Birge 1937: 278).

6 Atalay's book *Bektaşilik ve Edebiyatı* was first published in a series of articles in the official newspaper *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, from 24 February 1924 (1340) onwards (Küçük 2002: 236–7).

7 Prof. Yusuf Ziya [Yörükan] Bey published his observations made during his visits among the Alevi villages around Eskişehir and Tahtacı villages near İzmir in the *İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, the journal of the Theological Department of Istanbul University and in the magazine *Hayat* (Birge 1937: 19).

8 Ziya Bey, "Bektaşilik", *Yeni Gün*, 26 January–8 March 1931 (40 installments).

9 Among the members of the Theology Faculty Committee, which was charged with the preparation of a report for reforming religion, were Fuat Köprülü, Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan) and Ismayıl Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) who conceived Alevism as an authentic Turkish religion (Tunçay 1999: 22–3). See the consideration of this unrealized reform project, in Chapter 2, pp. 52–3.

10 According to Bardakçı, Cemalettin Çelebi had spread that rumor after being fascinated and enlightened by Bardakçı's explanations on the Bektashi order and Alevism during his visit to Hacı Bektaş. Bardakçı had told him that Bektashis and Alevis were real Turks who had protected the authentic Turkish customs and language against the outside forces which wanted to destroy national unity, and who had revolted against the unjust rule of the Ottoman state (1989: 59).

11 Faik Bulut probably refers to the Dersim Rebellion when he states that "Alevis were even accused of being an enemy of the state" (Bulut 1991: 129).

12 For more on the suppression of the Dersim rebellion see Can (1975), Beşikçi (1990) and Kieser (1993).

13 These publications were Bardakçı 1989; Şapolyo 1964; Türkmani 1948; Fırat 1970; Erk 1954 and several articles of Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu: "Alevilik ve Türklük", *Yeni Adam* 17, no. 640, 1950, p. 2; "Türklük Bakımından Aleviler", *Türk Düşüncesi* 3, no. 13, 1954, pp. 1–5; "Kültür ve Milliyet Sosyolojisi Bakımından Alevilik Nedir", *Yeni Adam*, no. 773, 1961, p. 7; "Alevilik Nedir, Ne Değildir" (1–4), *Yeni Adam*, no. 779, 1966, pp. 14–15; no. 780, 1966, pp. 7–8; no. 781, 1966, p. 7; no. 790, 1966, p. 7.

14 As van Bruinessen states, both Kurdish and Turkish Alevis supported the secularist regime, while many Kurdish Alevis voluntarily assimilated to Turkish culture and came to

identify themselves as Turks rather than as Kurds (1997). This voluntary Turkification has to be understood in the context of the official denial policy of a Kurdish identity, which was also reflected in several publications made on Alevism in the multi-party period.

15 Fırat's book *Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi* (Eastern Provinces and the History of Varto) was published in 1948 and later in 1961 by the Ministry of National Education.

16 Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Alevîlik ve Türklük", *Yeni Adam*, no. 640, 9 March 1950, p. 2.

17 For example, see Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "İslâm Birliği ve Türk Birliğini Bozmaya Uğraşan Neşriyata Karşı", *Selâmet*, no. 34, 9 January 1948, pp. 6–7.

18 Davut Batur, "Aleviler, Kızılbaşlar komünist midir? Çocuklarına din dersi verilmesini istemiyorlar mı? Baltacıoğlu İsmail Hakkı Kızılbaş organı mıdır?" *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 4, no. 90, November 1950, p. 237.

19 Interestingly, the *Makâlat*, which was published in 1954 as the work of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, has often been seen by Sunni theologians as the proof that Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli was a shari'a-abiding scholar.

20 Ogan referred here to the Alevis of İskenderun who had demonstrated against Turkey in 1938. Raif Ogan, "Alevilik Propagandası ve İslâmın Temellerine Taarruz", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 5, no. 107, January 1951, pp. 104–5.

21 Similar arguments were found in a booklet written by Haydar Özdemir in 1967. Özdemir tried to show that both Sunni and Alevi Turks were "brother Turks coming from Central Asia" (Özdemir 1967: 39). He argued that it was historically "Umayyads" and later "Zionists" who had created enemity within Turks by slandering Alevi Turks, and he explained why those slanders were wrong. For example, the slander concerning the extinguishing of candles was totally wrong, because Alevis had extinguished their candles in order to escape from the Umayyads who raided their secret gathering (Ibid.: 20).

22 Quoted in *Sebilürreşad*, June 1957.

23 "Alevilik Propagandası ve İslâmın Temellerine Taarruz", *Sebilürreşad*, vol. 10, no. 247, June 1957, pp. 348–50.

24 *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 67 il müftüsü adına İsmail Hatip Erzen, Malatya Müftüsü* (quoted in http://alevi.cancom.de/temp/tarih/arastir1.htm)

25 His son, Haydar Öztoprak, gives these details in his article published in the magazine *Kervan* (quoted in http://alevi.cancom.de/temp/tarih/arastir1.htm). See also Kaygusuz (1996: 162).

26 *Hüsniye* was "a book purporting to be a theological debate before the court of Harun Reşit between a slave girl trained under Cafer Sadık and orthodox religious leaders of the day. ... In 1878 (1295), a reply to the *Hüsniye* entitled *Tezkiyei Ehli Beyt*, 'The Purifying of the People of the House', written by İshak Efendi, was lithographed" (Birge 1937: 81, fn. 2). The book was republished in the 1950s by Sefer Aytekin.

27 DİB Arşivi, Alaşehir, Böl. 20 Mayıs 1958 gün ve 11521 sayılı Başkanlık yazısı (quoted in Sezgin 2002: 126).

28 "Ehli sünnet itikadine muhalif İslam mezhepleri saliklerinin tekfir olunamayacakları... Alevi vatandaşlarımızın cenaze namazlarını kılmamak İslami hükümlere muhalif ve … ikilik yaratmaya sebebiyet verecek...." DİB Bafra ve Alaşehir Böl. 18 Nisan 1959 gün 7728 sayılı genelge (quoted in Sezgin 2002: 126).

29 Hüseyin Doğan had fought against the rebels on the side of the government forces during the Kurdish Rebellion in 1925 (Şahhüseyinoğlu 1991: 85) and he had again given his support to the state during the Dersim Rebellion in 1938 (Bayrak 1997: 88). He was an independent candidate in the general election of 1946, but was not elected because of the indirect electoral system. In the 1950 election, before which İsmet İnönü contacted him during his visit to Malatya and wanted him to be a candidate, he was elected as an RPP deputy. However, in 1951 he left the RPP for the DP (Şahhüseyinoğlu 1991: 86). In the 1954 election his son Doğan Doğan was to be a candidate for the DP. Hüseyin Doğan was the director of the DP's Malatya branch. In 1960 he was arrested and sent to Sivas

where he had to stay for six months. In the 1965 election he was elected as the Deputy for the Justice Party. After 1969, he resigned from politics and settled in Istanbul (Şahhüseyinoğlu 1991: 86).

30 H. Çiçek, S. Yalçın, "Devlet Alevileri Böldü", *2000'e Doğru Dergisi*, 3 May 1992, p. 18 (quoted in Sezgin 2002: 122).

31 "Gürsel Alevi'lere Haklarını Vermek İçin Çok Çalışmıştı", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 October 1966, p. 12.

32 For the CNU's reform plans on religion, see Yeşilkağıt (2001: 57–8).

33 *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1960. The minister also announced that the DRA would publish a new periodical where *hutbe*s, weekly Friday sermons, would be circulated. Another new project which was announced was the translation of the Koran. Dr. Hüseyin Atay and Dr. Yaşar Kutluay were charged with the task of tranlation on 1 November 1960. The translation was published in 1961 (Keskioğlu 1990: xxiii).

34 From 1953 onwards, official Mevlevi ceremonies have been held in Konya every December for the anniversary of the death of Mevlana.

35 *32. Gün*, documentary prepared by Banu Acun, "Türkiye'nin Alevileri", 2 October 2003.

36 For more on the evolution of this festival, see Bilici (1996: 288), van Bruinessen (1996), Norton (1995), Sinclair-Webb (1999) and Massicard (2003). This festival gradually became a left-wing cultural festival, especially in the 1970s, when posters were produced proclaiming Hacı Bektaş as "a champion in the fight against fascism" and "a socialist revolutionary thinker and leader" beyond being a religious leader, a saint (Norton 1995: 193). After the military coup of 12 September 1980, the festival was depoliticized until it received government patronage in the 1990s (van Bruinessen 1996).

37 We can cite the following from among the publications on Alevi-Bektashi belief in the press: Bedri Noyan's "İstiklal Savaşı'nda Bektaşiler" was published in a series in the newspaper *Yeni Gazete*, from 2 July 1966 onwards. Later publications on the same issue, such as Ulusoy (1986: 99–104); Öz (1989); Noyan (1990) and (1999); Şener (1991) repeated the same arguments. In August 1966, *Son Havadis* published a series on "Alevilik-Bektaşilik" written by Yusuf Fatih Ataer, a Bektashi *baba*. The report was based on the author's interviews in the village of Hasan Dede in Kırıkkale. In 1967, *Akşam* published Yahya Benekay's news report, titled "Yaşayan Alevilik: Kızılbaşlar Arasında" during 40 days. This news report was also published as a book (Benekay 1967).

38 A village that Otyam had written his observations on was the Alevi *dede*, Halil Öztoprak's village. This report was later published in 1964 as a book by *Ankara Gazeteciler Cemiyeti*.

39 For a similar observation by Baki Öz, pointing at the perception of Atatürk by the Alevi-Bektashis as the reincarnation of Hacı Bektaş, see Öz (2004: 174–5).

40 The party was later closed down in 1971 because of this sentence which contravened the 89th clause of the Law of Political Parties which banned the mentioning of the existence of national and cultural minorities.

41 Cem, "Durum", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 21–4.

42 *Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1966.

43 *Ulus*, 12 June 1966; *Ulus*, 13 June 1966.

44 "Muğla'daki Alevi-Sünni Çekişmesi: Bir Sünni Öldürüldü, Alevi Evli bir Kadın Kaçırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1966; "Baş sorumlu Demirel ve AP Hükümetidir: Alevi-Sünni çatışması kan davası halini aldı", *Ulus*, 14 June 1966.

45 *Ulus*, 16 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1966. The Governor's disclaimer (*tekzip*) was later published in *Cumhuriyet* after the conflict had ended: *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1966.

46 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966, pp. 1, 7.

47 *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1966.

48 Ibid.: 7.

49 *Ulus*, 16 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1966.

50 *Son Havadis*, 20 June 1966.

51 Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Asıl din sömürücüleri kendileridir", *Son Havadis*, 23 June 1966.
52 Faruk Timurtaş, "Bölücü Davranışlar", *Son Havadis*, 9 July 1966.
53 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966.
54 *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1966; *Ulus*, 18 June 1966.
55 Alper Öktem (b. 1954) in his study on Alevis in Senirkent, his hometown, based on interviews with the old members of his family, notes that the only time he heard his father saying "We are Alevis" was during the events of Ortaca and as a reaction to the speech of Elmalı (2000: 43–9).
56 For reports on Ortaca events in the weekly Alevi newspaper *Ehlibeyt* by Kaleli see 27 February 1966 and other reports on 16 June 1966, 29 June 1966 and 20 July 1966. For other reports on Elmalı in the same newspaper, see articles by Doğan Kılıç Şeyhhasanlı on 10 August 1966 and 26 October 1966, and by Ali Gali on 29 June 1966.
57 *Ulus*, 15 June 1966; *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966, p. 7.
58 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966, p. 7.
59 *Ulus*, 17 June 1966.
60 It was noted in the report that the village of Bademler was the first village in Turkey with a theater and that it had been a setting for several movies, besides being the hometown of many intellectuals (*Ulus*, 19 June 1966, pp. 1, 7).
61 Ecvet Güresin, "Sünni-Alevi Çatışması", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 June 1966.
62 "Ekilen Tohumlar", *Ulus*, 16 June 1966. Also, "Diyanet İşleri Başkanının istifası istendi", *Ulus*, 17 June 1966.
63 *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1966.
64 Mustafa Maden, "Büyük Türk Milleti", *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Dergisi* 5, no. 7 (July 1966), back cover.
65 İlhan Selçuk, "Türk'ü Türk'e Düşman Edenler", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1966, p. 2.
66 İlhan Selçuk, "Alevilik, Sünnilik ve Cumhuriyet", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 June 1966, p. 2.
67 From the mid-1960s onwards, Alevis began to publish other periodicals besides *Cem*, mostly short-lived due to financial difficulties: the monthly periodical *Karahöyük*, published in 1964 by Hüsrev Şir Ulusoy in the name of the *Hacı Bektaş Kültür, Kalkınma ve Yardım Derneği*; the weekly *Ehlibeyt*, published in 1966 by Doğan Kılıç Şeyhhasanlı; and the biweekly periodical *Gerçekler*, published by Mehmet Yaman in 1970 (until the 34th issue) and in 1973 (10 issue) (Kaleli 2000: 96–8, 106).
68 *Cem (Eline, Diline, Beline) Kültür Ahlak ve Ülkü Dergisi*. July 1966. Sahibi: Abidin Özgünay; Neşriyat Müdürü: Sadık Göksu. (... Cem, yirminci asır Türkiye'sinde üvey evlat gibi kenara atılmış, bir yana itilmiş, türlü iftiralara uğratılmış milyonlarca Alevî Türk'ün derdlerine derman olacaktır...) *Cem* suspended publication after its 16th issue, but it resumed publication from 1969 until 1980, and later again after 1991. Here only the first period of the magazine will be analyzed. For an analysis of the later period of the magazine, from 1991 onwards, see Okan 2004: 129–43.
69 A.Ö., "Bu Millet Kendi Kendini Tanımıyor..." *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 4–8.
70 "Büyük Anketimiz", *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 12–16.
71 Anket II, *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, pp. 8–10.
72 "Anket'in Sonucunu Veriyoruz", *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 10–11.
73 A.Ö., "Alevi Olmak Onuru", *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, p. 5.
74 Abidin Özgünay, "Alevi'ler ve Alevilik Sünnilik", *Cem*, no. 9, 1 January 1967, pp. 4–6.
75 İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Alevilik-Aleviler Nedir Ne Değildir?" *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 6–7.
76 İzzettin Doğan (b. 1940) was later to be the founder and the director of the *Miliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* founded during the post-1980 coup junta Government (Şahhüseyinoğlu 1991: 86). He is currently the Chair of one of major Alevi accociations, *Cem Vakfı*.
77 İzzettin Doğan, "Aleviliğin Doğuşu", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 October 1966, pp. 2–3.

78 Hasan İpçi, "Büyük Türk Mütefekkiri Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli ve Bektaşilik Hakkında", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 18–20. Cahit Öztelli, the director of the National Folklore Institute, in his response to the survey referred to Hacı Bektaş as "a great Turkish nationalist" ["Anket III", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 October 1966, p. 8].
79 Çetin Özek, "Anayasamıza Göre Dini İnanç Özgürlüğü ve Alevîlik", *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, pp. 2–3, 24.
80 Av. Muharrem Naci Orhan, "Alevi Düşüncesine Göre Atatürk", *Cem*, no. 14, 15 May 1967, pp. 7–8. The perception of Atatürk as the *Mehdi* was earlier illustrated by the interviews of Fikrat Otyam. See pp. 153–4 above.
81 Anket II, *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, pp. 8–10.
82 Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Atatürk ve Alevilik", *Cem*, no. 6, 15 November 1966, pp. 3, 24.
83 Ali Naci Baba was left as vice-Dedebaba by Salih Niyazi Baba. After Salih Niyazi died in 1942, he became the Sertarik Dedebaba (Head of Bektashi culture). After him, Bedri Noyan (d. 1997) claimed that he was entitled to this rank, in 1960. For his biography see Türkdoğan 1995: 45–6; Noyan 1999: 350–66; Küçük 2002: 242).
84 "Anket III", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 September 1966, p. 8.
85 A.Ö., 1966, "Alevi Olmak Onuru", *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, p. 5.
86 A.Ö., "Her Gün Kanayan Yara", *Cem*, no. 6, 15 November 1966, pp. 4–5.
87 "Büyük Anketimiz", *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 12–16.
88 The Doğan family was also behind the transfer of six deputies from the TBP to the JP (Bayrak 1997: 77, 88).
89 İzzettin Doğan, "Eskiciler İhtilali mi?" *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, p. 4.
90 Kemal Karsu, "Atatürk ve Baltalı Zihniyet", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 9, 24.
91 A.Ö., "Gerici Akımlara Karşı Atatürk Türkiye'sinin Teminatı Alevî'lerdir", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 October 1966, pp. 4–5.
92 Anket II, *Cem*, no. 3, 20 September 1966, pp. 8–10. Nadir Nadi stated that the Alevi *mezheb*, unlike the Sunni *mezhep* which was based on rigid and narrow laws preventing progress, was based on a more free life style and order.
93 Çetin Özek, "Bir Genelge ve Alevilik", *Cem*, no. 12, 15 February 1967, pp. 2–3.
94 Çetin Özek, "Nurculuk Etrafında Kopan Bir Yaygara" *Cem*, no. 7, 1 December 1966, pp. 5–7.
95 Cahit Tanyol, "Aydın Din Adamı Sorunu", *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 10–11.
96 Muzaffer Karan, "Birlik", *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 8–10.
97 Ibid.
98 İzzettin Doğan, "Türkiye'de Lâik Bir İdare Var mıdır?" *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 2–3. Also, Çetin Özek, "Nurculuk Etrafında Kopan Bir Yaygara", *Cem*, no. 7, 1 December 1966, pp. 5–7.
99 Cem, "Durum", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 21–4.
100 "Durum: Hazret Elmalı ve Basında İkili Oynayanlar", *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 12–22.
101 "Büyük Anketimiz", *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 12–16.
102 Cem, "Durum", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 21–4.
103 Cihad Baban, "Memleketin Bütünlüğü Tehlikeye Giriyor", *Ulus*, 25 September 1966 [Cem, no. 4, 5 October 1966, pp. 21–2].
104 "Tural'ın Emri", *Cem*, no. 11, 1 February 1967, p. 23. The circular was written on 21 November 1966, but was reported in the press on 22 January 1967.
105 Abidin Özgünay, "Tural Endişe Etmesin!" *Cem*, no. 11, 1 February 1967, pp. 4–5.
106 Çetin Özek, "Bir Genelge ve Alevilik", *Cem*, no. 12, 15 February 1967, pp. 2–3.
107 İzzettin Doğan also criticized the RPP and the DP, accusing the former of using big landowners (*ağalar*) and the latter of using sheikhs and hodjas for their political aims.

İzzettin Doğan, "Türkiye'de Lâik Bir İdare Var mıdır?" *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, pp. 2–3.

108 Cem, "Durum", *Cem*, no. 1, July 1966, pp. 21–4.

109 "Ayın Olayları: Yeni Bir Parti!" *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 6–7.

110 Ibid.; "Yeni Parti Hazırlığı", *Cem*, no. 4, 5 October 1966, pp. 15–16; "Birlik Partisi Kuruldu", *Cem*, no. 5, 1 November 1966, p. 13; "Durum: Birlik Partisi", *Cem*, no. 6, 15 November 1966, pp. 13–16; "Durum: Birlik Partisi Çalışmaları", *Cem*, no. 7, 1 December 1966, pp. 16–18; "Durum: Birlik Partisi Gelişiyor", *Cem*, no. 8, 15 December 1966, pp. 15–17; "Durum: Birlik Partisi Hızla Gelişiyor", *Cem*, no. 9, 1 January 1967, pp. 4–6.

111 "Ayın Olayları: Yeni Bir Parti!" *Cem*, no. 2, August 1966, pp. 6–7.

112 The founding members were Hasan Tahsin Berkman (retired colonel), Cemal Özbey (lawyer), Hüseyin Günel (building contractor), Tahsin Tosun Sevinç (trade unionist), Mustafa Geygel (building contractor), Feyzullah Ulusoy, (lawyer, farmer), Salim Delikanlı (retired colonel), Mehmet Güner (economist), Mehmet Ali Egeli (economist), İbrahim Zerze (worker), Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu (printing house operator), Mustafa Topal (doctor), Hüseyin Eren (retired colonel), Arif Kemal Eroğlu (worker), Hüseyin Erkanlı (lawyer), and Faruk Ergünsoy (lawyer) (Topkaya 1969: 473; Teziç 1976: 336; Güler 2007: 67).

113 "Birlik Partisi Başkanı Berkman kimdir?" *Cem*, no. 6, 15 November 1966, p. 14. Later, Berkman's apparent Americanism created the first tension within the party. Berkman had warned against the danger of "Russian games" and praised NATO and American military aid to Turkey. Abidin Özgünay and Erdoğan Keskin criticized this pro-American statement and expressed the necessity of an independent Turkey. Because of this pro-American speech, Berkman's presidency was ended by the Party Council on 19 March 1967 (*Genel Yönetim Kurulu*) (Topkaya 1969: 473).

114 *Cem*, no. 10, 15 January 1967, pp. 16–18.

115 *Akis*, "Kapak: Türkiye'de Bir Mezhep Partisi Kuruluyor: Birlik Partisi", 15 April 1967, Sayı: 669. Kutluğ Altuğ, "Kendi Aramızda", *Akis*, 15 April 1967, Sayı: 669, p. 3. "BP. Oyun İçinde Oyun", *Akis*, no. 669, 15 April 1967, pp. 6–10.

116 "Türkiye Birlik Partisi'nin Şansı", *Cem*, no. 7, 1 December 1966, pp. 4, 24.

117 "Durum: Etekler Tutuşuyor", *Cem*, no. 14, 15 May 1967, pp. 12–16.

118 Lütfi Kaleli, "Siyaset Üstüne", *Cem*, no. 11, 1 February 1967, p. 7.

119 "Durum: BP'sinde Bir Toplantı", *Cem*, no. 11, 1 February 1967, pp. 17–23.

120 "Durum: Berkman Konuştu", *Cem*, no. 10, 15 January 1967, pp. 16–18.

121 The party won eight seats in the Grand National Assembly in the 1969 general election, getting 2.8 per cent of the votes. Later, two other deputies from the Nation Party also joined the UP. However, in 1970 six deputies transferred to the Justice Party under the influence of Hüseyin Doğan (Bayrak 1997: 77, 88). These were expelled from the party, but this defection seriously harmed the party's prestige. In 1973, the party, with its new name *Türkiye Birlik Partisi*, could win only one seat, while its share of the vote fell to 1.1 per cent in 1973, dropping further to 0.4 per cent in 1977 (Schüler 2000: 223). In November 1969, Mustafa Timisi (1936–) was chosen as the new chairman of the party and remained so until the closure of the party in 1980. From 1969 onwards, the party began to characterize itself as a revolutionary, anti-fascist, anti-imperialist party of the working class, positioning itself left of the RPP, in competition with the Workers' Party of Turkey (Schüler 2000: 224). In the 1972 program, the party was defined as not a mass party but as an organization bringing together oppressed, despised peasants, workers, low-income tradesmen and craftsmen and intellectuals (*Birlik Partisi Tüzük ve Proğramı*, 1972: 54). The party defended socialism (*toplumculuk*), positioning itself against wage slavery (*ücret köleliği*), fascism and communism (Ibid.: 54–5). This time a clear position was taken vis-à-vis the DRA, claiming that it had no place in a secular (*laik*) Republic (Ibid.: 57). The only vague reference to Alevism was the section at the end of the program, which stated

that a path which began 1,300 years ago and which was enlightened by the 12 stars takes one to the love of humanity (*insan sevgisi*) (Ibid.: 72).

122 Uğur Mumcu, "Katliam", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1978.

123 Mustafa Ekmekçi, "Menemen'den Maraş'a" *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1978.

124 Oktay Akbal, "Var Olmak, Yok Olmak…" *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1978.

Conclusion

1 Bora makes this point in his criticique of the mythical invocation of 1 May 1977, as a "bloody May 1" and the consequent oblivion of the reality of the event.

2 *Cumhuriyet*, 18 May 2006.

Bibliography

Abalı, Emin. *Kubilây'ın Mezarında ve Yanmayan Şehrin Hikayesi*. İzmir: Meşher Basımevi, 1937.

Abbaslı, Nazile. *Ali Suavi'nin Düşünce Yapısı*. İstanbul: Bilge Karınca, 2002.

Abdullah, Cevdet. "Preface by the Translator [in Reinhard Dozy, *Tarih-i İslamiyet*, (Cairo: Matbaa-ı İçtihad, 1908)]." In *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook*, edited by Charles Kurzman, 172–4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Abu-Rabi', Ibrahim M. *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History*. London: Pluto Press, 2004.

Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. *The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Acar, Bahriye. "İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı." *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 8 (1998): 137–46.

Açıkel, Fethi. "Kutsal Mazlumluğun Psikopatolojisi." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 70 (1996): 153–98.

Adak, Hülya. "National Myths and Self-Na(rra)tions: Mustafa Kemal's Nutuk and Halide Edib's Memoirs and the Turkish Ordeal." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2/3 (2003): 509–27.

Adıvar, Adnan. "Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 1, no. 3 (1947): 270–80.

Âfetinan, A. *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*. Edited by Azmi Süslü Ali Sevim, M. Akif Tural. Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.

Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim, 1994.

Ahıska, Meltem. "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2–3 (2003): 351–79.

Ahmad, Feroz. "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey." *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): 750–69.

Ahmad, Feroz and Bedia Turgay Ahmad. *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945–1971*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976.

Akar, Rıdvan. "Minority Policies in the Republican Era." In *Modernleşme ve Çokkültürlülük / Modernity and Multiculturalism*, 26–37. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Akgül, Suat and Kenan Esengin. *Orgeneral Mustafa Muğlalı ve Van-Özalp Olaylarının İçyüzü*. Ankara: Berikam, 2001.

Akgün, Seçil. "Türkçe Ezan." *DTCF Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13, no. 24 (1980): 105–13.

Akgündüz, Ahmet. "A Genius They Tried to Misrepresent." Paper presented at the 1st International Symposium. The Ideas of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi in the Thirtieth Year since His Death and Their Place in Islamic Thought, İstanbul 1991, (available from http://www.saidnursi.com/symposium/1991.html).

Akman, Ayhan. "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey." *Nationalities Papers* 32, no. 1 (2004): 23–51.

Akpınar, Ali. "Mehmed Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Laiklik ve Kur'ân'ın Doğru Anlaşılmasıyla İlgili Görüşleri." *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 7, no. 2 (2003): 31–41.

Akşin, Sina. *31 Mart Olayı*. Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1970, (3rd ed. *Şeriatçı Bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayı*. İstanbul: İmge, 1994).

Aktar, Ayhan. *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2000.

———. "Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The Turkish Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered." In *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, edited by Renée Hirschon, 79–96. New York, London: Berghahn Books, 2003.

Aktaş, Cihan. *Tanzimattan Günümüze Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar*. İstanbul: Nehir, 1989.

Akyaz, Doğan. "Menemen Olayı Üzerine İlân Edilen Sıkıyönetim." *5. Askerî Tarih Semineri Bildirileri (I)* (1996): 341–55.

Akyol, Taha. "Liberalizm ve Milliyetçilik." In Tanıl Bora, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce, Milliyetçilik*, vol. 4, 740–2. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.

Al-Azm, Sadiq. "Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse." In *Orientalism: A Reader*, edited by A.L. Macfie, 217–38. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.

———. "Secularism in the Muslim World." Paper presented at the Research School CNWS, Leiden University, Leiden, 3 December 2004.

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso, 1996.

Alakom, Rohat. *Unutulmuşluğun Bir Öyküsü: Said-i Kürdi*. İstanbul: Fırat, 1991.

———. "Said Nursi entre l'Identité Kurde et l'Identité Musulmane." *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, no. 5 (1998): 317–31.

Albayrak, Sadık. *Cumhuriyete Doğru Hilafetin Sonu*, *İrtica'ın Tarihçesi 3*. İstanbul: Araştırma, 1990a.

———. *Devrimler ve Gerici Tepkiler*. 2nd ed, *İrtica'ın Tarihçesi 4*. İstanbul: Araştırma, 1990b.

———. *Türkiye'de Din Kavgası*. 5th ed. İstanbul: Araştırma, 1991.

Algar, Hamid. "Said Nursi and the Risala-i Nur: An Aspect of Islam in Contemporary Turkey." In *Islamic Perspectives, Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi*, edited by Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, 313–33. Jeddah: Saudi Publishing House, 1979.

———. "A Brief History of the Naqshbandi Order." In *Naqshbandis, Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order*, edited by Marc Gaborieau et al., 3–44. İstanbul, 1990.

Ali Kırca ile Siyaset Meydanı, Türkçe İbadet. İstanbul: Sabah, 1998.

Alkan, Ahmet Turan. *Sıra Dışı Bir Jön Türk. Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Amerika Hatıraları*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1989.

Alkan, Mehmet Ö. and Cengiz Kahraman. "İlk Pop Star Yarışmaları ve Güzellik Kraliçaları." *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 124 (Nisan 2004): 68–71.

Alonso, Ana Maria. "The Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and the Imagining of Community." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 33–57.

Altay, Fahrettin. *Görüp Geçirdiklerim, 10 Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası*. İstanbul: İnsel, 1970.

Altuntaş, Halil. *Kur'an'ın Tercümesi ve Tercüme ile Namaz Meselesi*. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005.

Amme ve Salâvâtı Şerife, Ettehiyatü ve Kunut Duâsı. Türkçe Ezan ve Kamet. İstanbul: Beyazıt Güneş Matbaası, 1934.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Andrews, Peter A. *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989.

Arai, Masami. *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992.

Arat, Zehra F. "Introduction: Politics of Presentation and Identity." In *Deconstructing Images of 'the Turkish Woman'*, edited by Zehra F. Arat, 1–36. London: MacMillan Press, 1998.

Aren, Sadun. *TİP Olayı 1961–1971*. İstanbul: Cem, 1993.

Armaner, Neda. *İslam Dininden Ayrılan Cereyanlar: Nurculuk*. (1st ed. Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1964), 2nd ed. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1998.

Arslan, Cumhur. "Halil Nimetullah Öztürk." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 200–5. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001a.

———. "M. Saffet Engin." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 350–7. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001b.

Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Atacan, Fulya. "A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37 (2001): 111–44.

Ataer, Yusuf Fatih. "Alevilik-Bektaşilik." *Son Havadis*, 17 Ağustos 1966.

Atalay, Besim. *Bektaşilik ve Edebiyatı*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Ant, 1991, (Originally published in *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, 24 February, 1924/1340 onwards).

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Nutuk, 1920–27*. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1962.

———. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989.

Atay, Falih Rıfkı. *Çankaya. Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar*. İstanbul: Sena Matbaası, 1980, (1st ed. 1968).

Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat. *Bütün Çıplaklığıyla 31 Mart Faciası*. (1st ed. *İlim Işığında ve Tarih Önünde 31 Mart Faciası*, İstanbul: Aykurt Neşriyatı, 1956), 2nd ed. İstanbul: Aykurt Neşriyatı, 1959.

———. *Menemen Hadisesinin İç Yüzü*. 3rd ed. İzmir: Aykurt Neşriyatı, 1972.

Avcıoğlu, Doğan. *Türkiye'nin Düzeni, Dün Bugün Yarın*. Ankara: Bilgi, 1968.

Ayata, Sencer. "Patronage, Party, and the State: The Politicisation of Islam in Turkey." *The Middle East Journal* 50, no. 1 (1996): 40–56.

Aydın, Ertan. "The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The *Ülkü* Version of Kemalism, 1933–1936." Ph.D. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2003.

Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Türkiye'de Sağcı Olmak." *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 16 (1991): 32–43.

———. *Bozgunda Fetih Rüyası*. İstanbul: Kabalcı, 2001.

Baer, Marc. "The Double Bind of Race and Religion: The Conversion of the Dönme to Turkish Secular Nationalism." *Comparative Study of Society and History* 46, no. 4 (2004): 682–708.

Bağçe, Hüseyin Emre. "Official State Ideology of the Turkish Republic as Formulated in the Speeches and Writings of the Chief Political Leaders (1927–1938)." Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001.

Baha Said Bey. *Türkiye'de Alevî-Bektaşi, Ahî ve Nusayrî Zümreleri*. Edited by İsmail Görkem. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2000.

Balcıoğlu, Rahim. *Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti*. 4th ed. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat, 2002.

Bali, Rıfat. *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2000.

———. "Sabetaycılık Konusunda Bir Bibliyografya Denemesi." *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 223 (2002): 63–8.

Baltacıoğlu, Ismayıl Hakkı. *Türke Doğru*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1972.

Bardakçı, Cemal. *Alevilik, Ahilik, Bektaşilik*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950 (1st ed. *Kızılbaşlık*, İstanbul: Işık, 1945).

Barkan, Ömer Lütfi. "Türkiye'de Din ve Devlet İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Gelişimi." In *Cumhuriyet'in 50. Yıldönümü Semineri*, 49–97. Ankara: TTK, 1975.

Başgil, Ali Fuat. *İrtica Yaygarası*. İstanbul: Komünizme Karşı Mücadele Yayınları, 1951.

———. *Din ve Lâiklik: Din Nedir? Din Hürriyeti ve Lâiklik Ne Demektir?* İstanbul: Yağmur, 1954.

———. *Ali Fuat Başgil'in Hatıraları*, 2nd ed. İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1990.

———. *Din ve Laiklik*. İstanbul: Kubbealtı Neşriyatı, 1998.

Başgöz, İhan. "Pir Sultan Abdal ve Pir Sultan Abdal Geleneği." In *Pir Sultan Abdal*, edited by Sabahattin Eyüboğlu. İstanbul: Cem, 1983.

Başgöz, İlhan. "Pir Sultan Abdal Yorumları." *Özgür İnsan*, no. 40 (1977): 56–9.

Batuhan, Hüseyin. "Lâiklik ve Dinî Taassup." In *Lâiklik*, edited by Türk Devrim Ocakları, 53–61. İstanbul: Milli Tesânüt Birliği Yayını 4, 1954.
Bayar, Celâl. *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*. Edited by İsmet Bozdağ. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, n.d.
Baydar, Mustafa. *Kubilây*, *Türk Kahramanları Serisi: 20*. İstanbul: Üstünel, 1954.
Bayrak, Mehmet. *Alevilik ve Kürtler: İnceleme-Araştırma ve Belgeler*. Wuppertal: Özge, 1997.
Bayur, Hikmet. "Kur'an Dili Üzerinde Bir İnceleme." *Belleten* 22, no. 88 (October 1958): 599–605.
Beki, M. Akif. *Türkiye'de Nurculuk*. İstanbul: Yeniyüzyıl Kitaplığı, 1995.
Benekay, Yahya. *Yaşayan Alevilik: Kızılbaşlar Arasında (Röportaj)*. İstanbul: Varlık, 1967.
Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
Bertaux, Sandrine. *Ulusu Tasarlamak: 1920'ler ve 1930'larda Avrupa Devletleri*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Araştırma Merkezi, 2006.
Beşikçi, İsmail. *Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi*. İstanbul: Belge, 1990.
Bilâ, Hikmet. *CHP Tarihi 1919–1999*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999.
Bilici, Faruk. "Alévisme et Bektachisme: Alliés Naturels de la Laïcité en Turquie." In *Islam et Laïcité: Approches Globales et Régionales*, edited by Michel Bozdemir, 281–98. Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996.
Binark, İsmet. "Ord. Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil, Bibliyografyadan Biyografiye." In Arif Aşçı, *Ord. Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil Bibliyografyası*, vıı-xxxıı. İstanbul: Kubbealtı Neşriyatı, 2000.
Birge, John Kingsley. *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*. London: Luzac&Co, 1937.
Birlik Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi. 1969.
Birlik Partisi Tüzük ve Proğram. İstanbul: TİPO Neşriyat ve Basımevi, 1969.
Bora, Tanıl. "Fatih'in İstanbul'u: 'İslâm Şehri' ile 'Dünya Şehri' Arasında İslâmcıların İstanbul Rüyası." *Birikim* (Ağustos 1995): 44–53.
———. "İnşa Döneminde Türk Millî Kimliği." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 71 (1996): 168–92.
———. *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslâmcılık*. İstanbul: Birikim, 1998.
———. "12 Eylül Öncesi Mitleri ve 1 Mayıs Mahallesi." (available from http://birgun.net on 9 September 2004).
———. "Analar, Bacılar, Orospular: Türk Milliyetçi-Muhafazakâr Söyleminde Kadın." In *Şerif Mardin'e Armağan*, 241–81. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.
Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
Bozarslan, Hamit. "Messianism et Mouvement Social: l'Evénement de Menemen en Turquie (Décembre 1930)." *C.E.M.O.T.I.* 11 (January 1991): 73–89.
———. "Le Mahdisme en Turquie: 'l'Incident de Menemen' en 1930." *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, no. 91–4 (2000a): 297–320.
———. "Ortadoğu ve Türkiye'de 'Millî Din' İslâm ve İslâmcılık." *Birikim*, no. 129 (2000b): 61–73.
———. "Alevism and the Myths of Research: The Need for a New Research Agenda." In *Turkey's Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview*, edited by Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, 3–16. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
Bozdağ, İsmet. *Menderes Menderes*. İstanbul: Emre, 1997.
Brockett, Gavin D. "Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923–38." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 4 (1999): 44–66.
———. "Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923–1938: Secular Reform and Religious 'Reaction'." *History Compass* 4/6 (2006): 1060–72.
———. "Provincial Newspapers as a Historical Source: Büyük Cihad and the Great Struggle for the Muslim Turkish Nation (1951–3)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (2009): 437–55.

Bruinessen, Martin van. "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival." 1996, (available from http://www.let.uu.nl/martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Alevi_revival.htm. The extended version of the article in *Middle East Reports*, 200, Summer 1996: 7–10).

———. "'Aslını İnkar Eden Haramzadedir!', the Debate on the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevi." In *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the near East*, edited by Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Anke Otter-Beaujean, 1–23. Leiden: Brill, 1997.

———. "Race, Culture, Nation and Identity Politics in Turkey: Some Comments." In *Mica Ertegün Annual Turkish Studies Workshop on Continuity and Change: "Shifting State Ideologies from Late Ottoman to Early Republican Turkey, 1890–1930."* Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 1997, (available from http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Identity_politics_in_Turkey.pdf).

———. "The Kurds and Islam." In *Islamic Area Studies Project*. Tokyo: (revised version of the article in Islam des Kurdes, Les Annales de l'Autre Islam, no.5 [Paris: INALCO, 1998], pp. 13–35) 1999, (available from http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications.htm).

———. "Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism and Rural Revolt: The Rebellion of Sheikh Said in Turkey." In *Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society, Collected Articles*, 143–56. Istanbul: ISIS, 2000.

———. *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

———. "Les pratiques religieuses dans le monde turco-iranien: changements et continuités." *Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien*, no. 39–40 (2005): 101–21.

Bulut, Faik. *Belgelerle Dersim Raporları*. İstanbul: Yön, 1991.

Bursalı, Necati. *Yakın Tarihin Din Mazlumları*. İstanbul: Beyda, 1996.

Buzpınar, Ş. Tufan. "Osmanlı Hilafeti Meselesi: Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi." *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2004): 113–31.

Calhoun, Craig, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996.

Can, Rıza. *Dersim 1937 Yalanı ve Gerçekler*. Ankara: Karaca, 1975.

Cantek, Levent "Büyük Doğu." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Muhafazakârlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem, 645–55. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

Cem, İsmail. *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Cem, 1971.

Ceylan, Hasan Hüseyin. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Din-Devlet İlişkileri*. 9th ed. Vol. 3. (1st ed. 1989) Ankara: Rehber, 1991.

———. *Ayasofya İhaneti*. Ankara: Rehber, 1996a.

———. *Tanrı Uludur'dan Allahüekber'e Giden Yol*. Ankara: Rehber, 1996b.

Charle, C. "Intellectuals: History of the Concept." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 7627–31: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2001.

CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı. Ankara, 1948.

Cilasun, Emrah. *"Bâki İlk Selam." Çerkes Ethem*. İstanbul: Belge, 2004.

Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ümit. "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996): 231–51.

Copeaux, Etienne. *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (1931–1993)*. Translated by Ali Berktay. (1st ed. 2000), 2nd ed. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006.

Coser, Lewis A., ed. *Maurice Halbwachs on Collective Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı (1923–1997). Vol. 3. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1998.

Cündioğlu, Dücane. *Türkçe Kur'an ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1998a.

———. "Bir Kur'an Mütercimi: C. Said'in Kendi Kaleminden Özgeçmişi." *Dergâh* 9, no. 100 (1998b): 46–7.
———. *Bir Siyasi Proje Olarak Türkçe İbadet I, Türkçe Namaz (1923–1950)*. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1999.
Çağatay, Neşet. *Türkiye'de Gerici Eylemler (1923'ten Bu Yana)*. Ankara: A.Ü. İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1972.
Çakır, Ruşen. *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar*. (1st ed. 1990), 6th ed. İstanbul: Metis, 1993.
Çalışkan, Abdullah Mehmed. *Ayasofya Camii Meselesinin Etrafındaki Gerçek ve Kariye, Mesih Paşa, Fethiye Camilerinin Maruz Kaldığı Muameleler*. İstanbul: TÜRDAV, 1976.
Çamuroğlu, Reha. "Resmî İdeoloji ve Aleviler." *Birikim*, no. 105–6 (1998): 112–16.
Çelik, Hüseyin. *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1994.
Çelik, Nur Betül. "Kemalizm: Hegemonik Bir Söylem." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 75–91. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
Çem, Munzur. *Dersim'de Alevilik*. İstanbul: Pêrî, 1999.
Çerman, Osman Nuri. *Kemalizm Reformuna Göre Dinimizin 54 Farzı*, 1956.
Çetiner, Yılmaz. *İnanç Sömürücüleri: Nurcular Arasında Bir Ay*. İstanbul: Varlık, 1964.
Çetinkaya, Hikmet. *Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1995.
Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde 'Osmanlıcılık'." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Muhafazakârlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem, 361–2. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.
Çitak, Zana. "Nationalism and Religion: A Comparative Study of the Development of Secularism in France and Turkey." Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 2004.
Dağlarca, Fazıl Hüsnü. "Kubilây Destanı." In *Üç Şehitler Destanı*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999.
Daldal, Aslı. "Mustafa Kemal Kültünün Toplumsal ve Ruhbilimsel Temelleri Üzerine Ön Çalışma." *Birikim*, no. 105–6 (1998): 36–49.
Darendelioğlu, İlhan. *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Toker, 1975.
Dâver, Bülent. *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Lâiklik*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1955.
———. "Secularism in Turkey: A Dilemma in Turkish Politics." *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 22 (March 1967): 55–66.
Davis, Natalie Zemon, and Randolph Starn. "Introduction." *Representations*, no. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter Memory (1989): 1–6.
Davison, Andrew. *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
———. "Turkey, a 'Secular' State?: The Challenge of Description." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2/3 (2003): 333–50.
Demirci, H. Aliyar. "27 Mayısçıların Din Siyaseti." *Türkiye Günlüğü* 45 (Mart-Nisan 1997): 147–62.
Denk, Cemil. *Atatürk, Laiklik ve Cumhuriyet*. Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999.
Deringil, Selim. "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991): 345–59.
Dirlik, Arif. "Civil Society / Public Sphere in Modern China: As Critical Concepts Versus Heralds of Bourgeois Modernity." *Chinese Social Science Quarterly* 3, no. 93 (1993): 10–22.
Diyanet İşleri Reisliği Nurculuk Hakkında Ne Diyor? İzmir: Uhuvvet Yayınları, 1964.
Doğan, Yalçın. *Siyasi İslâm*. İstanbul: Şehir, 2000.
Dole, Christopher. "The Urbanization of Charisma: Healing and Identity in a Turkish Migrant Community." Paper presented at the MEHAT Conference, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 11–12 May 2001.
Dönmezer, Sulhi. "Dinî Cemiyet Teşkili ve Din Propagandası (Ceza Kanunun 163. Maddesinin Analizi)." *İ.Ü. Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* 17, no. 1–2 (1951): 24–43.

Duben, Alan, and Cem Behar. *İstanbul Haneleri: Evlilik, Aile ve Doğurganlık 1880–1940*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1996.

Dumont, Paul. "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, edited by Jacob M. Landau, 25–44. Boulder: Westview, 1984.

———. "Tanzimat'ın Küçük Evreni Olarak Osmanlı Masonluğu." *Tarih ve Toplum* 2, no. 73 (1990): 401–3.

Durakbaşa, Ayşe. "Kemalism as Identity Politics in Turkey." In *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Woman*, edited by Zehra F. Arat, 241–61. London: MacMillan Press, 1998.

Dursun, Turan. *Müslümanlık ve Nurculuk*. (1st ed. Altınok Matbaası, Ankara, 1971) İstanbul: Kaynak, 1997.

Dümer, Sâfi. *"İstanbul" mu? "Fâtih Mehmet" mi? "Ankara" mı? "Atatürk" mü?* İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1953.

Düzdağ, Mehmed Ertuğrul. *Mehmed Âkif Hakkında Araştırmalar*. İstanbul: Fatih, 1987.

Efe, Hatem. "Modernleşme ve Muhafazakârlık Kıskacında Türkiye'deki İslâmcılığın Gelişimi." *Tezkire* 5, no. 3 (2003): 42–63.

Eley, Geoff. "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the 19th Century." In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig Calhoun, 289–339. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996.

Emrence, Cem. "Politics of Discontent in the Midst of the Great Depression: The Free Republican Party of Turkey (1930)." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 23, no. Fall (2000): 31–52.

———. *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2006.

Engin, Arın. *Atatürkçülükte Dil ve Din*. İstanbul: Atatürkkent, 1955.

Erdican, Ali Galip. *Mehmet Fuat Köprülü: A Study of His Contribution to Cultural Reform in Modern Turkey*. Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1974.

Erdoğan, Fahrettin. *8 Milyonluk Alevi Türklerine Kızıl Komünist Damgasını Vuran Sebilürreşatçılara Cevap ve Bektaşilik*. Ankara: Emek Basım Yayımevi, 1950.

Erdoğan, Necmi. "Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations: Troubled Elite in Defence of a Sacred Heritage." In Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos et al., 251–82. Istanbul: Orient-Institut / Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000 (Turkish version of the article: "'Kalpaksız Kuvvacılar': Kemalist Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları." In *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos et al., 235–63. Istanbul: İletişim, 2001).

Ergin, Osman. *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*. 5 vols. İstanbul: Eser Matbaası, 1977.

Erk, Hasan Basri. *Tarih Boyunca Alevîlik*. İstanbul: Varol Matbaası, 1954.

Eroğlu, Hamza. *Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*. 1st ed. İstanbul: MEB, 1982.

Eroğul, Cem. *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*. 2nd ed. Ankara: İmge, 1990.

Ersanlı Behar, Büşra. *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmî Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929–1937)*. İstanbul: Afa, 1996.

Ertem, Bağış, and M. Görkem Doğan. "Cumhuriyet'in Cumhuriyet'i: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 501–12. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Esposito, John L. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse: New York University Press, 1984.

Farhi, David. "The *Şeriat* as a Political Slogan – or the 'Incident of the 31st March'." *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 no. 3 (1971): 275–99.

Filali-Ansary, Abdou. "The Debate on Secularism in Contemporary Societies of Muslims." *ISIM Newsletter*, no. 2 (1999): 6.

Fincancıoğlu, Yurdakul. *Demirel. Demokrasinin Duraklama Yılları*. İstanbul: Büke, 2000.

Fırat, M. Şerif. *Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi*. (1st ed. 1948, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası; 2nd ed. 1961, Ankara: M.E.B), 3rd ed. Ankara: Kardeş Matbaası, 1970.

Fortna, Benjamin. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Gazi M. Kemal Paşa Hazretleri İzmir Yolunda. Ankara: İstihbarat Matbaası, 1339/1923.
Gevgilili, Ali. "Türkiye'de Basın." *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* 1 (1983): 202–28.
Gezer, Hüseyin. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Heykeli*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1984.
Gilsenan, Michael. *Recognizing Islam: Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East*. London: I.B.Tauris, 1992.
Gologlu, Mahmut. *Devrimler ve Tepkileri (1924–1930)*. Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1972.
Gonca, Nihal. *Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası (1923–1933)*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Celal Bayar Üniversitesi, 2005.
Gökalp, Mehmet. *Haksızlıklar Karşısında Susmayan Âlim: Ord. Prof. Ali Fuad Başgil. Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Mücadeleleri*. İstanbul: Santral, 1963.
Gökalp, Ziya. *Türkçülüğün Esasları*. İstanbul: Varlık, 1963.
Göle, Nilüfer. *Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
———. "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites." *Middle East Journal* 1, no. 51 (1997): 46–58.
Gölpınarlı, Abdülbâki. *Alevi-Bektaşi Nefesleri*. İstanbul: Remzi, 1963.
Gözaydın, İştar B. "A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey." *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11, no. 1 (2006): 1–8.
Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
Gülalp, Haldun. "Using Islam as a Political Ideology: Turkey in Historical Perspective." *Cultural Dynamics* 14, no. 1 (2002): 21–39.
Güler, Sabır. "Aleviliğin Siyasal Örgütlenmesi: (Türkiye) Birlik Partisi ((T)BP) Deneyimi." *Kırkbudak (Journal of Anatolian Folk Beliefs)* 3, no. 10 (2007): 64–84.
Gün, Fahrettin. *Sebilürreşad Dergisi Ekseninde Çok Partili Hayata Geçerken İslamcılara Göre Din ve Laiklik (1948–1954)*. İstanbul: Beyan, 2001.
Gür, Faik. "Atatürk Heykelleri ve Türkiye'de Resmî Tarihin Görselleşmesi." *Toplum ve Bilim* 90 (2001): 147–66.
Güresin, Ecvet. *31 Mart İsyanı*. (1st ed. 1969) İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1998.
Güventürk, Faruk (Tümgeneral). *Din Işığı Altında Nurculuğun İçyüzü*. İstanbul: Okat, 1964.
Habermas, Jürgen. "The Emergence of the Public Sphere." In *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*. London: Blackwell, 1993.
Halbwachs, Maurice. *The Collective Memory*. New York: Harper-Colophon Books, 1980 (original ed. 1950).
———. "The Social Frameworks of Memory." In *Maurice Halbwachs on Collective Memory*, edited by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 (original ed. 1925).
Halide Edip. "Dictatorship and Reforms in Turkey." *Yale Review* 19, no. Fall (1929): 27–44.
Hanioğlu, Şükrü M. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
———. "Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic." *Studia Islamica* 86, no. 2 (1997): 133–58.
Harris, George S. "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 24, no. 4 (1970): 438–54.
Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley: Eothen, 1985.
———. *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Statesman*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998.
Heper, Metin, and Tanel Demirel. "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (1996): 109–23.
Heyd, Uriel. *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1954.

———. *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri*. Translated by Kadir Günay. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1979.

Hocaoğlu, Durmuş. *Laisizmden Millî Sekülarizme: Laiklik Sorununun Felsefi Çözümlemesi*. Ankara: Selçuk, 1995.

İğdemir, Uluğ. *Yılların İçinden: Makaleler, Anılar, İncelemeler*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976.

İnalcık, Halil. "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, 42–63. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

———. "Islam in the Ottoman Empire." *Cultura Turcica*, no. 5–7 (1968–70): 19–29.

———. "Kanunnâme." In *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 562–66, 1975.

———. "Türk Tarihinde Töre (Törü) ve Yasa Geleneği." *Doğu-Batı. Makaleler I* (2005): 64–84 (original publication in *Doğu-Batı* 13, 2000–1).

İnan, Abdülkadir. *Kur'ân-ı Kerim'in Türkçe Tercemeleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme*. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1961.

İnsel, Ahmet. "Atatürk Mucizesi ve Örümceklenmiş Kafalar." *Radikal* (30 July 2000).

İslamoğlu, Mustafa. *Devrimlere Tepkiler ve Menemen Provokasyonu*. 7th ed. İstanbul: Denge, 1998, (1st ed. 1991).

Jäschke, Gotthard. *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık*. Ankara: Bilgi, 1972.

Juynboll, Th. W. "Adhān." In *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 187–8. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987.

Kaçmazoğlu, H. Bayram. *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*. İstanbul: Birey, 1988.

Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları." *Türkiye Günlüğü* no. 33 (1995): 91–101.

Kadıoğlu, Fuat. *Gericilik ve Ötesi*. Zonguldak: Bingöl Basımevi, 1965.

Kaleli, Lütfi. *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri*. İstanbul: Can, 2000.

Kan Demir. *Şehit Kubilay*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1931.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Emancipated but Not Liberated?: Reflections on the Turkish Case." *Feminist Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 317–38.

———. "Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity." In *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 113–2. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997.

Kansu, Ceyhun Atuf. *Cumhuriyet Bayrağı Altında, Yaşam-Öykümde Devrim*. İstanbul: Varlık, 1973.

Kaplan, Mustafa. *Mahzun Mabed Ayasofya*. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 1987.

Kara, İsmail. *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler Kişiler*. (1st ed. 1987), 2nd ed. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Risâle, 1997.

———. *Biraz Yakın Tarih Biraz Uzak Hurafe*. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1998.

———. "Bir Tür Lâiklik ve Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı." In *75 Yılda Düşünceler Tartışmalar*, 197–206. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.

———. "Din ile Devlet Arasında Sıkışmış Bir Kurum: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı." *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 18 (2000a): 29–55.

———. ed. *Kutuz Hoca'nın Hatıraları: Cumhuriyet Döneminde Bir Köy Hocası*. İstanbul: Dergâh, 2000b.

Kara, Kemal. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük 2*. İstanbul: Önde, 1994.

Kara, Mustafa. *Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar Tarihi*. İstanbul: Dergah, 1990.*Metinlerle*

———. *Günümüz Tasavvuf Hareketleri*. İstanbul: Dergah, 2002.

Karahan, Abdullah Neyzar. *Şehit Edilişinin 50. Yılında Kubilay*. Ankara: Spor Toto, 1981.

Karaman, İbrahim Kamil, and Abdülvahap Dehmen. *Alevilikte Hacıbektaş Veli ve İlkeleri*. İstanbul: Tipo Neşriyat ve Basımevi, 1966.

Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Politikada 45 Yıl*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1999.

———. *Nur Baba*. (1st ed. Akşam Matbaası, 1922) İstanbul: İletişim, 2000.

Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959.

———. "The Turkish Left." *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 2 (1966): 169–86.
———. *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.
Kaya, Kamil. *Sosyolojik Açıdan Türkiye Din Devlet İlişkileri ve Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*. İstanbul: Emre, 1998.
Kaygusuz, İsmail. *"Görmediğim Tanrıya Tapmam": Alevilik, Kızılbaşlık ve Materyalizm*. İstanbul: Alev, 1996.
Kehl-Bodrogi, K., B. Kellner-Heinkele, and A. Otter-Beaujean, eds, *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997.
Keskioğlu, Osman. "Kur'ân-ı Kerîm ve Başka Dillere Çevrilmesi Konusunda Açıklamalar." In *Kur'ân-ı Kerîm ve Türkçe Anlamı (Meâl)*, xv-xxiii. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1990.
Keyder, Çağlar. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso, 1987.
Kırboğa, Ali Rıza. *Din Eğitimi ve İmam-Hatip Okulları Davası*. İstanbul: Milli Gazete, 1975.
Kırhan, Celâl. *Öğretmen Kubilay ve Uydurma Mehdi*. İstanbul: Sıralar Matbaası, 1963.
Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. *Benim Gözümde Adnan Menderes*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1970.
———. *O ve Ben*. İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1974.
———. *Müdafaalarım*. 6th ed. İstanbul: B.D., 1998.
———. *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*. 18th ed. (1st ed. İstanbul: Toker, 1969) İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1998.
Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner. *Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*. İstanbul: İmge, 1993.
Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet. *Müttefik: Köylü*. Stockholm: Arşiv, 1980.
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. *Les Kurdes Alévis face au Nationalisme Turc Kémaliste: l'Alévité du Dersim et son Rôle dans le Premier Soulevement Kurde contre Mustafa Kemal (Koçkiri, 1919–1921)*. Amsterdam: Stichting MERA, (MERA Occasional paper, no. 18), 1993.
Kili, Suna. *Türk Devrim Tarihi*. İstanbul: Tekin, 1982.
Kirişçi, Kemal. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (2000): 1–22.
Koçak, Cemil. "İslâmi Devlet Projesi: Başyücelik Devleti." *Tarih Toplum*, no. 72 (1989): 57–60.
———. *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938–1945)*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: İletişim, 1996.
———. *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2006.
Koloğlu, Orhan. "Marrano'dan Sabetaycı'ya Avdeti'den Dönme'ye… 350 Yıllık Serüven." *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 223 (2002): 50–61.
———. *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Masonlar*. İstanbul: Eylül, 2003.
———."1953'ten 2003'e 50 Yıl Boyunca Fatih ve Fetih." *Tarih ve Toplum* 39, no. 233 (2003): 10–19.
Köker, Levent. *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1993.
Köktener, Aysun. *Cumhuriyet: Bir Gazetenin Tarihi*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2004.
Kuru, Ahmet T. "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party." In *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party*, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz, 136–59. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.
Kurzman, Charles, and Lynn Owens. "The Sociology of Intellectuals." *Annual Review of Sociology*, no. 28 (2002): 63–90.
Kushner, David. "Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey." *Journal of Contemporary Turkey* 32, no. 2 (1997): 219–33.
Kutay, Cemal. *Türkçe İbadet Ana Dilimizle Kulluk Hakkı Atatürk'ün Beraberinde Götürdüğü Hasret*. İstanbul: Aksoy, 1998.
Küçük, Hülya. *The Role of Bektashis in Turkey's National Struggle*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002.
———. "Sufi Reactions against the Reforms after Turkey's National Struggle: How a Nightingale Turned into a Crow." In *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society*

and the State in Turkey and Iran, edited by Touraj Atabaki, 123–42. London: I.B.Tauris, 2007.

Küçük, Yalçın. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Aydınlar ve Dergileri." In *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 138–44. İstanbul: İletişim, 1983.

———. *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler I*. İstanbul: Tekin, 1989.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.

———. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Lindisfarne, Nancy. *Elhamdülillah Laikiz: Cinsiyet, İslam ve Türk Cumhuriyetçiliği*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.

Lipovsky, Igor P. *The Socialist Movement in Turkey (1960–1980)*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992.

Livni, Eran. "Alevi Identity in Turkish Historiography." Paper presented at the 17th Middle East History and Theory Conference (10–11 May), Chicago University 2002 (available from http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/meht/).

Madelung, W. "*Al-Mahdî*." *Encyclopaedia of Islam (Cd Edition)*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Mamdani, Mahmoud. *Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York: Pantheon, 2004.

Manaz, Abdullah. *Atatürk Reformları ve İslam*. İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995.

Mango, Andrew J.A. "Türkiye'de İslam." In *Türkiye'de İslam ve Lâiklik*, edited by Davut Dursun. İstanbul: İnsan, 1995, (also published in Douglas Grant, ed., *The Islamic Near East*, University of Toronto Press, 1960).

Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962.

———. *Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks*. İstanbul: Robert College, 1969.

———. "Religion in Modern Turkey." *International Social Science Journal* 29, no. 2 (1977): 579–99.

———. "A note on the Transformation of Religious Symbols in Turkey." TURCICA 16 (1984): 115–27

———. "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey." In *Islam in the Political Process*, edited by James Piscatori, 138–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

———. *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

———. *Din ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1992.

———. "Kolektif Hafıza ve Şuur." In *İslâm Düşüncesinin 20. Asırda Yeniden Yapılanması ve Bediüzzaman Said Nursî: Milletlerarası Sempozyum*, 12–16. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 1992.

———. "The Naqshibendi Order of Turkey." In *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 204–32. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

———. "Nurculuk." In *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, 255–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

———. "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today." *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 145–65.

Mark, Robert, and Ahmet Çakmak, eds., *Hagia Sophia from the Age of Justinian to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Markoff, Irene. "Introduction to Sufi Music and Ritual in Turkey." *MESA Bulletin* 29, no. 2 (1995): 157–60.

Massicard, Élise. "Alevism as a Productive Misunderstanding: The Hacıbektaş Festival." In *Turkey's Alevi Enigma*, edited by Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, 125–40. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Mazıcı, Nurşen. "Menemen Olayı'nın Sosyo-Kütürel ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Analizi." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 90 (2001): 131–46.

Mélikoff, Irène. "L'Islam Hétérodoxe en Anatolie." *Turcica* 14 (1982): 142–54.
Menderes, Adnan. *Bir Devre Damgasını Vuran Nutuklar, 1*. İstanbul: Mesafe, 1990.
"Menemen'de Kubilay Hadisesi." Hadise'den Sonra Mahalli Vak'aya Giden Dahiliye Vekili Şükrü Kaya Beyle Ordu Müfettişi Fahrettin Paşa Menemen'de Tahkikat Yaparlarken Şehit Edilen Mülazim Kubilay ve Hadiseyi Ika Edenler (Foto Etem). İstanbul: Eski Milliyet Fotografı, n.d.
Mert, Nuray. "Cumhuriyet, Lâiklik ve Din." In *75 Yılda Düşünceler Tartışmalar*, 207–14. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.
———. "Early Republican Secularism in Turkey: A Theoretical Approach." Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1992.
———. *Lâiklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış*. İstanbul: Bağlam, 1994.
———. "Gericilik." *Doğu Batı* 1, no. 3 (1998): 9–20.
———. *İslam ve Demokrasi: Bir Kurt Masalı*. İstanbul: İz, 1998.
———. "The Political History of Centre Right Parties: Discourses on Islam, the Nation and the People." In *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos et al., 49–97. Istanbul: Orient-Institut & Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000.
———. "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Lâiklik ve Karşı Lâikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 197–209. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
———. "Cami Gölgelerinden Gölge İnsanlara: Kültürel İslam Edebiyatı." In *Hep Muhalif Olmak*, 234–49. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
Müftüoğlu, Mustafa. *Yakın Tarihimizde bir Olay: Menemen Vak'ası*. (1st ed. 1969) İstanbul: Risale, 1991.
———. *Yalan Söyleyen Tarih Utansın*. (1st ed. 1975), 8th ed. İstanbul: Çile, 1988.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Necipoğlu, Gülru. "The Life of an Imperial Monument: Hagia Sophia after Byzantium." In *Hagia Sophia from the Age of Justinian to the Present*, edited by Robert Mark and Ahmet Çakmak, 195–225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Norton, John David. "The Development on the Annual Festival at Hacıbektaş, 1964–1985." In *Bektachhiyya: Etudes Sur l'Ordre Mystique des Bektachis et les Groupes Relevant de Hadji Bektach*, edited by Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein, 191–200. Istanbul: ISIS, 1995.
Noyan, Bedri. "İstiklal Savaşı'nda Bektaşiler." *Yeni Gazete*, 2 July 1966.
———. *Türk Milli Kültüründe ve Kurtuluş Savaşında Bektaşiler*. Ankara, 1990.
———. *Bütün Yönleriyle Bektâşîlik ve Alevîlik I-II*. İstanbul, 1999.
Nurculuk Hakkında. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığ. Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1964.
Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said. *Emirdağ Lâhikası*. İstanbul: Sözler, 2004.
———. *Tarihçe-i Hayat. Hayatı – Mesleği – Tercüme-i Hâli*. İstanbul: Söz, 2006.
Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar. "Alevilik ve Bektaşilik Hakkındaki Son Yayınlar Üzerinde Genel Bir Bakış ve Bazı Gerçekler 1–2." *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 91 and 92 (1991): 20–5, 51–6.
———. *Türk Folklorunda Kesik Baş: Tarih-Folklor İlişkisinden Bir Kesit*. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1989.
———. *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslâm: Yaklaşım, Yöntem ve Yorum Denemeleri*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1999.
Ocak Gez, Başak. "İbadet Dilinin Türkçeleştirilmesi Aşamalarından Biri Türkçe Ezan ve Uygulamaları." *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 6–7 (1996–7): 157–67.
Oğuz, Burhan. *Anadolu Aleviliğinin Kökenleri*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967.
Okan, Murat. *Türkiye'de Alevilik: Antropolojik Bir Yaklaşım*. Ankara: İmge, 2004.
Okur, Hafız Yaşar. *Atatürk'le On Beş Yıl: Dinî Hatıralar*. İstanbul: Sabah, 1963.
Okutan, Çağatay. *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a MTTB*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004.

Olick, Jeffrey K., and Daniel Levy. "Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics." *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 6 (1997): 921–36.

Olick, Jeffrey K., and Joyce Robbins. "Social Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 105–40.

Ongun, Hasan Hüseyin. "Başlangıcından Günümüze Said Nursî ve Nurculuk Hareketi." *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 45 (1997): 57–71.

Onur, Hüdavendigar. *Türk Sağı Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Burak, 2001.

Orga, İrfan. *Phoenix Ascendant. The Rise of the New Turkey*. London: Robert Hale, 1958.

Osma, Kıvanç. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Anıt Heykelleri (1923–1946)*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2003.

Otyam, Fikret. *Hû Dost*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Nefes, 1994, (originally published as serial in *Cumhuriyet* 1963).

Öktem, Alper. "Burdur'da Yerleşmiş Senirkent Alevileri." *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 196 (2000): 43–9.

Öktem, Emre. "Türkiye'deki Gayri Müslim Cemaatlerin Durumu." Paper presented at the Conference "Türkiye ve Avrupa'da Din, Devlet ve Toplum. Dinler Arası Barışçı bir Ortak Yaşam için Olanaklar ve Engeller." İstanbul, 23–4 October 2004.

Önder, Tuncay. "Ali Fuad Başgil." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Muhafazakârlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem, 291–301. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

Öz, Baki. *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Alevi-Bektaşiler*. İstanbul: Can, 1989.

———. *Çağdaşlaşma Açısından Tarikat ve Tekkelerin Kapatılma Olayı*. İstanbul: Can, 2004.

Öz, Eyüp. *Menemen Olayı ve Türkiye'de Mehdicilik*. Istanbul: 47 Numara Yayıncılık, 2007.

Özbek, Nadir. "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2004): 71–90.

Özcan, Esra. "Yaşar Nuri Öztürk." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 376–87. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Özdemir, Haydar. *Kimliklerimiz. Alevi Kime Denir? Mum Söndü İftirasının Tarihçesi*. İzmir: Höşgönül Matbaası, 1967.

Özdemir, Hikmet. *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı: Yön Hareketi*. Ankara: Bilgi, 1986.

Özdoğan, Günay Göksu. *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931–1946)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Özek, Çetin. *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968.

———. *Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İç Yüzü*. İstanbul: Varlık, 1964.

Özel, İsmet. *Erbain 40 Yılın Şiirleri*. İstanbul: Şule, 1998.

Özgen, H. Neşe. *Toplumsal Hafızanın Hatırlama ve Unutma Biçimleri: Van-Özalp ve 33 Kurşun Hadisesi*. İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2003.

Özipek, Bekir Berat. "İrtica Nedir?" In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 645–55. İstanbul: İletişim, 2004.

Öztoprak, Halil. *Kuranda Hikmet, Tarihte Hakikat: Alevilerde Namaz*. 1951.

Özturanlı, İskender. *Türkiye'de Lâikliğin Serüveni*. İzmir: İleri Kitabevi, 1995.

Öztürk, Halil Nimetullah. "Layikleşmek." In *Lâiklik*, edited by Türk Devrim Ocakları, 3–15. İstanbul: Milli Tesânüt Birliği Yayını 4, 1954.

Öztürk, Yaşar Nuri. *Ana Dilde İbadet Meselesi: Yeniden Yapılanmak*. İstanbul: Yeni Boyut, 1998.

Özyürek, Esra. *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

———. *The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007.

Pamuk, Şevket, and Roger Owen. *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*. London: I.B.Tauris, 1998.

Paret, R. "Ashâb Al-Kahf." In *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003 (Cd edition).

Parla, Taha. *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları*. Vol. 3, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u. İstanbul: İletişim, 1992.

Parla, Taha, and Andrew Davison. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

Reed, Howard A. "Turkey's New İmam-Hatip Schools." *Die Welt des Islams*, no. 4 (1956): 150–63.

Renan, Ernest. "What is a Nation?" In *Nation and Narration*, edited by Homi Bhabha, 8–22. London: Routledge, 1990.

Risale-i Nur Enstitüsü. "Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Ocak-Mart 1878 – 23 Mart 1960)." *Köprü* (Bediüzzaman Özel Sayısı), no. 70 (2000): 195–209.

Rıza Nur. *Hayat ve Hatıratım, Rıza Nur Atatürk Kavgası*. İstanbul: İşaret, 1992.

Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Development of Parties in Turkey." In *Political Parties and Political Development*, edited by J. La Palombara and Myron Weiner, 107–33. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

———. "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920–55." In *Islam and the West*, edited by Richard N. Frye, 67–107. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.

Safa, Peyami. *Doğu-Batı Sentezi*. İstanbul: Yağmur, 1976, (1st ed. 1963).

———. *Fatih-Harbiye*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1968.

Sağıroğlu, H., F. Kakioğlu, A.F. Yeşilyurt, and İ. Göktürk, eds., *Hürriyet Meşalesi: 27 Mayıs Millî Türk İhtilâli*. İstanbul: MMTB İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Talebe Derneği, 1961.

Sağman, Ali Riza. *Hz. Kur'an Radyoda Okunabilir mi?* İstanbul: Ahmet Said Matbaası, 1950.

Said, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage Books, 1994.

———. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books, 1978.

Saraçoğlu, Cemalettin A. "Menemen İrticaı Adı Altındaki Cinayetin Esrar Dolu İç Yüzü." *Tarih Konuşuyor* 5, no. 28 (1966): 2290–4.

Sarıtoprak, Zeki. "The Mahdi Tradition in Islam: A Social-Cognitive Approach." *Islamic Studies* 41, no. 4 (2002): 651–74.

Schüler, Harald. "Secularism and Ethnicity: Alevis and Social Democrats in Search of an Alliance." In *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey*, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, et al., 197–250. Istanbul: Orient-Institut & Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000.

Schwartz, Barry. "Commemorative Objects." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2002.

———. "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory." *Social Forces* 61, no. 2 (1982): 374–402.

Selâmi Münir. *Yeni Şurutüsselât ve Türkçe Ezan ve Kamet ve Namaz Sûreleri*. İstanbul: Güneş Matbaası, 1933.

Sencer, Muzaffer. *Dinin Türk Toplumuna Etkileri*. İstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1968.

———. *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri*. İstanbul: Geçiş, 1971.

Seufert, Günter, and Petra Weyland. "National Events and the Struggle for Fixing of Meaning: A Comparison of the Symbolic Dimensions of the Funeral Services for Atatürk and Özal." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 11 (1994): 71–98.

Sezgin, Abdülkadir. *Sosyolojik Açıdan Alevilik-Bektaşilik*. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002.

Sinclair-Webb, Emma. "Pilgrimage, Politics and Folklore: The Making of Alevi Community." *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, no. 6 (1999): 259–74.

Sitembölükbaşı, Şaban. *Türkiye'de İslâm'ın Yeniden İnkişafı (1950–1960)*. Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı, 1995.

Sivan, Emmanuel. *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990.

Sluka, Jeffrey A. "From Graves to Nations: Political Martyrdom and Irish Nationalism." In *Martyrdom and Political Resistance. Essays from Asia and Europe*, edited by Joyce Pettigrew, 35–60. Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1996.

Su, Kamil, and Kazım N. Duru. *Ortaokullar için Tarih, III*. İstanbul, 1943–49.

Sunar, İlkay, and Sabri Sayarı. "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Experiences in Southern Europe and Latin America*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, 165–86. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Şahhüseyinoğlu, Hasan Nedim. *Malatya Baliyan Aşireti*. Malatya: (private), 1991.

Şahiner, Necmeddin. *Son Yüzyılın İman ve Fikir Hareketi: Said Nursî ve Nurculuk Hakkında Aydınlar Konuşuyor*. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 1977.

———. *Son Şahitler: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatıyor*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 1980.

———. *Belgelerle Bediüzzaman'ın Kabir Olayı*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Timaş, 1998.

———. *Bilinmeyen Taraflariyle Bediüzzaman Said Nursî*. 13th ed. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 2001.

Şapolyo, Enver Behnan. *İnkılap Ötkünçleri*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934.

———. *Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1964.

———. *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü ile Basın*. Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1971.

Şener, Cemal. *Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal Bir Başkaldırının Kısa Tarihçesi*. (1st ed. İstanbul: Yön, 1989), 11th ed. İstanbul: Ant, 1991.

Şenol Cantek, L. Funda. *"Yaban"lar ve Yerliler: Başkent Olma Sürecinde Ankara*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

Şenşekerci, Erkan. *Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar (1918–1960)*. İstanbul: Alfa, 2000.

Şenünver, Güler, et al. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*. İstanbul: M.E.B., 2005.

Tabak, Serap. "Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını'nda Yankıları." *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, no. 10 (1995): 313–28.

Talay, Birsen. "27 Mayıs'a Adım Adım." *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 185 (1999): 26–9.

Taplamacıoğlu, Mehmet. "Lâyiklik İlkesi ve Türkiye'deki Durum." *A.Ü. İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 11 (1963): 35–3.

Tapper, Nancy and Richard Tapper. "'Thank God We Are Secular!' Aspects of Fundamentalism in a Turkish Town." In *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism*, edited by Lionel Caplan, 51–78. London: Macmillan Press, 1987.

Tarhanlı, İştar B. *Müslüman Toplum, "Lâik" Devlet: Türkiye'de Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*. İstanbul: Afa, 1993.

Taşkın, Yüksel. "Intellectuals and the State in Turkey: The Case of Nationalist Conservatism During and after the Cold War." Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001.

———."Anti-Komünizm ve Türk Milliyetçiliği: Endişe ve Pragmatizm." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, edited by Tanıl Bora, 618–34. İstanbul: İletişim, 2003.

Taşyürek, Muzaffer. *İslamın Sisli Yılları*. İstanbul: İhtar, 1995.

TBMM, "Menemen hadisesini ika ve teşkilâtı esasiye kanununu cebren tağyire teşebbüs edenlerden 37 şahsın ölüm cezasına çarptırılması hakkında 3/564 numaralı Başvekâlet tezkeresi ve Adliye Encümeni mazbatası." 31 January 1931, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* 25 (3), no. 4.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. *1929 Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları*. Ankara: ODTÜ, 1977.

Teziç, Erdoğan. *100 Soruda Siyasi Partiler*. İstanbul: Gerçek, 1976.

Thomas, Lewis V. "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam." *Middle East Journal*, no. 6 (1952): 22–40.

Tikveş, Özkan. "Cumhuriyetimizin Elli Yıllık Döneminde Laikliğe Aykırı Partilerin Kapatılması Sorunu." *İ.Ü. Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* 38, no. 1–4 (1973): 247–311.

Toker, Metin. *İsmet Paşa'yla On Yıl (1957–1960)*. Vol. 2. Ankara: Akis, 1966.

———. *Solda ve Sağda Vuruşanlar*. Ankara: Akis, 1971.

Topkaya, Erkin. *Program ve Tüzükleriyle Türkiye'de Başlıca Siyasi Partiler*. Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969.
Toprak, Binnaz. *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, 1981.
Toprak, Zafer, ed. *Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı (1923–1997)*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1998.
Topuz, Hıfzı. *100 Soruda Başlangıcından Bugüne Türk Basın Tarihi*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Gerçek, 1996.
Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye'de Siyasî Partiler, 1859–1952*. İstanbul, 1952.
———. *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*. İstanbul: Yenigün Matbaası, 1960.
———. *İslâmcılık Akımı*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003, (1st ed., *İslâmcılık Cereyanı*, İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962,).
Tunçay, Mete. "Zincire Vurulmuş Hürriyet." *Tarih ve Toplum* 91, no. 6 (1991): 6, 19.
———. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923–1931)*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999.
Türk Devrim Ocakları. *Lâiklik*. İstanbul: Milli Tesânüt Birliği Yayını 4, 1954.
Türkdoğan, Orhan. "Alevi Kimliği." *Türk Kültürü* 3, no. 382 (1995): 68–77.
Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar 1924–1938. Ankara: Genelkurmay Harb Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1972.
Türkmani, Kutbettin. *Alevilik: Doğuşu, Yayılışı ve Hususiyetleri*. Ankara, 1948.
Ulusoy, A.C. *Cemalettin Çelebi – Veliyettin Çelebi ve Kurtuluş Savaşı*. Hacıbektaş, 1986.
Usta, Emine Şeyma. *Atatürk'ün Cuma Hutbeleri*. İstanbul: İleri, 2005.
Uyar, Hakkı. *Vatan Cephesi: Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Cepheleşmelere Bir Örnek*. İstanbul: Büke, 2001.
Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*. 7th ed. İstanbul: Ülken, 1999.
Ünder, Hasan. "Atatürk İmgesinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 138–55. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
Ünlü, Barış. *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.
Üstün, Kemal. *Devrim Şehidi Öğretmen Kubilay: 60.Yıl (1930–1990)*. 4th ed. İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1990.
Üzmez, Hüseyin. *Malatya Suikastı*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Timaş, 1999.
Vahide, Şükran. "The Life and Times of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi." *Muslim World* 89, no. 3–4 (1999): 208–44.
Vakkasoğlu, Vehbi. "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Cumhuriyet Âlimleri." *Tercüman*, 23 May 1987.
van der Veer, Peter. "The Secularity of the State." 2000 (available from http://www.pcsw.uva.nl/gm/articles/pvdv2000.htm).
Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J. *Islam and the State*. London: Routledge, 1987.
Vorhoff, Karin. "Let's Reclaim Our History and Our Culture! Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey." *Die Welt des Islam* 38, no. 2 (1998): 220–52.
Weiker, Walter F. *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey, the Free Party and its Aftermath*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.
Wett, Carl. *Tekke Günlüğü*. Translated by Ercüment Asil and Haşim Koç. İstanbul: Elest, 2004.
Yakın Tarih Ansiklopedisi. İstanbul: Yeni Asya, 1989.
Yalman, Ahmet Emin. *Turkey in My Time*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
———. *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim, Vol. 4 (1945–1970)*. İstanbul: n.p., 1970.
Yaman, Ali. *Alevilik-Bektaşilik Bibliyografyası*. Mannheim: Alevi-Bektaşi Kültür Enstitüsü, 1998.
Yavuz, Hakan M. "The Assassination of Collective Memory: The Case of Turkey." *Muslim World* 89, no. 3–4 (1999): 193–207.
———. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Yazır, Elmalılı Muhammed Hamdi. *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili, Yeni Mealli Türkçe Tefsir*. İstanbul: Diyanet İşleri Reisliği, Ebüzziyan Matbaası, 1935–38.
Yazman, Aslan Tufan. "Devrimlere Karşı Bir Direniş. Menemen Olayının Yankıları." *Sigorta Dünyası* 14, no. 159 (1973).

Yeğen, Mesut. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1999.
———. "Kemalizm ve Hegemonya?" In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 56–74. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
Yeşilkağıt, Kutsal. "Policy Change under Military Rule: The Politics of Clergy-Training Colleges in Turkey." Ph.D. Thesis, Leiden University, 2001.
Yetiş, Kazım, ed. *Türk Edebiyatında İstanbul'un Fethi ve Fatih*. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005.
Yetkin, Çetin. *12 Eylül'de İrtica Niçin ve Nasıl Gelişti?* Ankara: Ümit, 1994.
———. *Atatürk'ün Başarısız Demokrasi Devrimi, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*. İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm, 1997.
Yıldırmaz, Sinan. "1950 Seçimleri ve Propaganda." *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları* 3, no. 6 (2004): 131–57.
Yıldız, Ahmet. *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene": Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.
Yücer, Rıza Ruşen. *Atatürk'e Ait Birkaç Fıkra ve Hâtıra*. İstanbul: Saka Basımevi, 1947.
Zerubavel, Eviatar. "Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past." *Qualitative Sociology* 19, no. 3 (1996): 283–99.
Zerubavel, Yael. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Zülfikar, Hamza. "İbadet Dili Olarak Türkçe ve Atatürk'ün Bu Konudaki Düşünceleri." *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi*, no. 555 (1998): 179–93.
Zürcher, Erik-Jan. *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984.
———. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London: I.B.Tauris, 1997.
———. "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism." *International Journal of the Sociology of Science*, no. 137 (1999): 81–92.
———. "The Core Terminology of Kemalism: Mefkûre, Millî, Muasır, Medenî." In *Les Mots de Politique de l'Empire Ottoman à la Turquie Kemaliste*, edited by François Georgeon, 55–64. Paris: EHESS/ESA, 2000.
———. "From Empire to Republic: Problems of Transition, Continuity and Change." In *Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive*, 2001a, (available from http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp).
———. "'Fundamentalism' as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism." In *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labor in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Erik-Jan Zürcher and Willem van Schendel, 209–22. London: I.B.Tauris, 2001b.
———. "Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought." In *Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive*, 2002, (available from http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp).
———. "Atatürk İmgeleri." In *Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma: Türkiye Tarihinde Geçiş Dönemi (1908–1928)*, 253–64. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005.
———. "The Rise and Fall of 'Modern' Turkey." In *Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive*, 1998 (available from http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp).
Zürcher, Erik-Jan, and Heleen van der Linden. "Searching for the Fault-Line: A Survey of the Role of Turkish Islam in the Acccession of Turkey to the European Union in the Light of the 'Clash of Civilisations'." In *The European Union, Turkey and Islam*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univesity Press, 2004.

Index