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Since climate change threatens human well-being across the globe and into the
future, we require a concept of well-being that encompasses an equivalent ambit.
This article argues that only a concept of human need can do the work required.
It compares need theory with three alternative approaches. Preference satisfaction
theory is criticised on the grounds of subjectivity, epistemic irrationality, endogenous
and adaptive preferences, the limitlessness of wants, the absence of moral
evaluation and the non-specificity of future preferences. The happiness approach
is found equally wanting. The main section shows how these deficiencies can be
addressed by a coherent theory of need. Human needs are necessary pre-conditions
to avoid serious harm and are universalisable, objective, empirically grounded, nonsubstitutable
and satiable. They are broader than ‘material’ needs since a need for
personal autonomy figures in all theoretical accounts. Whilst needs are universal,
need satisfiers are most often contextual and relative to institutions and cultures.
The satiability and non-substitutability of needs is critical for understanding sustainability.
Finally, it is argued that human needs provide an indispensable foundation
for many current ethical arguments for global and inter-generational justice in
the face of threats from climate change. An appendix compares this theory with the
capability approaches of Sen and Nussbaum and argues it to be more fundamental
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Kembali